

# Notes

## INTRODUCTION

1. See Bell (1993); Bell, Caplan, and Karim (1993); Caplan (1993); del Valle (1993).
2. See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, 104).
3. See Fabian (1983, 89); Crick (1976).
4. Cf. Dumont (1978).
5. See Ingold (1991); Morton (1995); Clifford (1986, 1988); Marcus and Cushman (1982); Marcus and Fischer (1986).
6. See also Haraway (1991, 185–201).
7. See Alcoff (1991).
8. Cf. Neumann (1992, 40–49).
9. In his reflection on the Western philosophical *Sources of the Self*, Charles Taylor writes, “In fact, our visions of the good are tied up with our understandings of the self. We have already seen one facet of this connection in the close link . . . between identity and moral orientation. We have a sense of who we are through our sense of where we stand to the good. But this will also mean . . . that radically different conceptions of what the good is go along with quite different conceptions of what a human agent is, different notions of the self. To trace the development of our modern visions of the good, which are in some respects unprecedented in human culture, is also to follow the evolution of unprecedented new understandings of agency and selfhood” (1989, 105).
10. See for example, Carrithers, Collins, and Lukes (1985).
11. See Kovel (1981, 1988); Benjamin (1988).
12. Mauss concludes, “Who knows even whether this ‘category,’ which all of us here believe to be well founded, will always be recognized as such? It is formulated only for us, among us. Even its oral strength—the sacred character of the human ‘person’ (*personne*)—is questioned, not only throughout the Orient, which has not yet attained the level of our sciences, but even in our countries where this principle was discovered” (1985, 22, emphasis in original).
13. See also Morton (1995).
14. See Bhabha (1993); M. Strathern (1988); Taylor (1989).
15. See Bordo (1990, 144–45); Benhabib (1990).
16. See, for example, Fox-Keller (1985); Flax (1990a, 1990b); Jaggar (1989); Lloyd (1984); Merchant (1980); Butler (1988); de Lauretis (1986a).
17. See Derrida (1978, 1982); Foucault (1978, 1980); Grosz (1989); Taylor (1986).
18. See Rorty (1979); Jay (1993).
19. See Bell and Nelson (1989); Ram (1993); Alcoff (1991).

20. When Descartes, “sitting by the fire, wearing a dressing gown,” began his quest to “establish something firm and constant in the sciences”—some irrefutable “knowledge of truth”—it was from the deceptive realms of the senses and the illusory world of his dreams that he fled. Beset by doubt and fear, he sought to eliminate all beliefs that were “not entirely certain.” Through “peaceful solitude” and rigorous self-examination and destruction of the “principles on which all [his] previous opinions were based,” he believed he might discover and articulate certainty and knowledge of truth. Not only did these musings reveal his conflation of truth with certainty but they also reflected Hegel’s (1974) observation that Descartes made an epistemological link between self-consciousness and the exposition of truth (Hodge 1988, 155). Although he claimed to suspend and examine his beliefs, he neither abandoned nor considered his most basic assumptions. Reason, certainty, knowledge of truth, and his rational, self-reflective methodology remained beyond question (Descartes 1968, 95–97).

21. With reason as its progenitor, it is a self that is potentially the same as other selves and for which the experiences of its embodiment (for example, its gender and its parentage, its historical, sociocultural context) are rendered prejudicial and therefore irrelevant to true and certain knowledge. It is a great irony that Descartes is credited with instigating Western philosophy’s preoccupation with the individual subject, and yet he attempted to subordinate individuality and morality to a transcendent, transhistorical rationality (Pelz 1974).

22. See Moore (1988); Haraway (1991, 127–81); di Leonardo (1991).

23. Where, for the sake of brevity, I conflate egalitarian and social constructionist feminism, feminist theorists such as Grosz (1994, 15–17) differentiate between the two.

24. See Haraway (1991, 127–48); Grosz (1994); Gatens (1983, 1991); Moore (1988, 1994c).

25. See, for example, Butler (1993); Wittig (1981).

26. See Moore (1994c); Mohanty (1991a, 1991b). Cf. Spivak (1984, 1988).

27. See Butler (1988, 1990); Irigaray (1985a, 1985b); Cixous (1981a, 1981b); de Lauretis (1986a, 1986b); I. Young (1990); Braidotti (1989); Flax (1990b).

28. See Taylor (1989); Pile and Thrift (1995, 24–25).

29. See Moore (1988, 187–98; 1994c, 26–27); de Lauretis (1986a).

30. I use the word *privilege* here with some irony. For, clearly, it is only because of privilege that the ethnographer can conduct fieldwork. What is more, to some extent, fieldwork inevitably reinforces this privilege and the relationship between privileged and underprivileged. However, I also use *privilege* to suggest that, without past experience of fieldwork, the intending fieldworker can romanticize the field and fieldwork relations. Fieldwork possibilities are not sullied by experience of the field.

31. See Dwyer (1977, 1979, 1982); Tedlock (1983); Hymes (1972); Scholte (1974).

32. See Bourdieu (1977); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992); James (1976); Turner (1986); Rosaldo (1989); Jackson (1989).

33. See Rorty (1979); Merleau-Ponty (1962); James (1976, 1978); Heidegger (1975, 1993); Dewey (1929).

34. See Fabian (1983); Jay (1993).
35. See Jackson (1989, 136–55).
36. See Bell (1993); Caplan (1988a, 1988b); M. Strathern (1987a); Behar (1995).
37. When my father named some local people with whom he had particular friendships, he used the term *fuzzy wuzzies* as an affectionate collective term. The term *fuzzy wuzzy angels* was coined by Australian military personnel to describe the native people who assisted them in their wartime efforts.
38. See Damon (1989); Fortune ([1932] 1989); Battaglia (1990); Leach (1967); Leach and Leach (1983); Macintyre (1983, 1987); Malinowski (1922); Munn (1986, 1990); A. Weiner (1976, 1988); Thune (1980, 1990); Young (1989a, 1989b); Bromilow (1929).
39. See Macintyre (1995); Jolly (1992b); Thomas (1991); Biersack (1991).
40. See Carrier (1992); Thomas (1991); Gewertz and Errington (1991b).
41. M. Strathern notes that she replaced the word *deconstruction* with the terms *deconstitution* and *decomposition* in *The Gender of the Gift* to prevent readers from conflating Melanesian deconstructive practices with those promoted by Western postmodernist literary and philosophical theory. She notes that Melanesians “are not doing deconstruction in the Western sense because they do not hold constructionist premises” (1989a, 55–56).
42. Singer states that identifiable shortcomings in “conventional” medical anthropology include “microlevel circumscription” and “neglect of social relations,” medicalisation, and ecological reductionism (1989, 193). Singer suggests that “microlevel” analyses in small-scale communities have often emphasized the ritual and symbolic dimensions of health and sickness “as if rituals and symbols or perhaps values and beliefs constitute society independent of a political economic context” (1989; 1990, 179). “Meaning centered,” ecological, and comparativist forms of medical anthropology are targeted for criticism by these researchers. Meaning-centered anthropologists contend that “human illness is fundamentally . . . meaningful and that all clinical practice is inherently interpretive or ‘hermeneutic’” (Good and Good 1981, 175; see also Kleinman 1973, 1980). They stress that “multiple interpretative frames and discourses are brought to bear on any illness event.” Accordingly, “interpretations of the nature of an illness always bear the history of the discourse that shapes its interpretation, and are always contested in settings of local power relations” (Good 1994, 53). Critics of this approach argue that, in focusing on particular social relations (between, for example, doctor and patient), these studies often ignore the macrolevel forces that influence these interactions (Singer 1990).
- Ecological forms of medical anthropology analyze health and sickness in a given community in terms of the adaptive measures adopted by people to their physical environment. By taking the environment as given or natural, however, these studies overlook the human construction of it and the health and sickness of people living in it (Hahn 1995; Singer 1990). While both these forms of medical anthropology have been accused of medicalizing medical anthropology by employing the language, concepts, and values of Western biomedicine to frame their analyses, comparative cultural studies of health and illness, like those of Lewis (1975) and Frankel (1986) in Papua New Guinea, have been particularly

criticized by critical (interpretive) medical anthropologists. These studies fail to analyze Western biomedical epistemologies in the cultural constructivist terms reserved for so-called traditional medicine (Good 1994; Keck 1993; Lock and Scheper-Hughes 1990; A. Young 1982).

43. See also Morsy (1990); Good (1994); Scarry (1985).

44. See Clifford (1988); Geertz (1988); Stocking (1983); Said (1995); Abu-Lughod (1990); Trinh (1989).

45. See Scheper-Hughes (1995, 419–20); Clifford (1989, 562); M. Strathern (1989a, 565–66); Herzfeld (1989, 563); Rabinow (1996, 28–58).

46. Her dare, What if I talked like a woman? evokes Ursula Le Guin's comments to a college class in 1983. Le Guin asked, "Instead of talking power, what if I talked like a woman right here in public?" (1989, 115).

47. See Behar (1995); Behar and Gordon (1995); Marcus (1993); Gacs et al. (1989); Bell (1993).

48. See Caplan (1988a, 1988b); Moore (1988, 1994c); M. Strathern (1987c).

49. See D. Gordon (1988) and especially Gordon (1995) for a discussion of the implications of reading the history of feminist anthropology and ethnography through the conventional/experimental distinction.

50. Stacey (1990).

51. See, for example, Okely (1992); Okely and Callaway (1992); Callaway (1992); Cotterill and Letherby (1993).

52. See, for example, D. Gordon (1995); Josephides (1997); Trinh (1989); Moore (1994a, 1994b).

53. See, for example, D. Gordon (1993).

54. A feminist and an anthropologist but not a self-identified feminist anthropologist/ethnographer, Marilyn Strathern's contribution to debates about knowledge are unsurpassed in the discipline. See, for example, M. Strathern (1987c, 1988, 1989a, 1991).

55. See, for example, di Leonardo (1991); Cole and Phillips (1995); Behar (1995); Kirby (1993).

56. This point is also highlighted by Mascia-Lees, Sharpe, and Cohen (1989); Scheper-Hughes (1992).

57. See, for example, Caplan (1988b); Abu-Lughod (1991); Jennaway (1990); and compare with Rabinow (1996, 51–56).

#### CHAPTER 1

1. See Barker (1990, 7–10) and Forman (1990).

2. For a discussion of the role and impact of foreign missionaries in Melanesia (past and present) see Jolly and Macintyre (1989); Young (1989b, 1996); Burridge (1978); Boutilier, Hughes, and Tiffany (1978); Eves (1996a); Reed (1998); White (1992).

3. In 1993 there were at least ten Christian denominations represented in Alotau that had a permanent population of approximately 5,000 people. These included the Anglican, Catholic, Christian Revivalist, CLC (Christian Living

Center), Jehovah's Witness, Mormon, Seventh-Day Adventist, Tewala Bible College, and United Churches. The Baha'i were also represented.

4. Excluding its long point, Gadahoa, which is located on its southern margins, Nuakata is roughly 4.5 kilometers wide and 2.5 kilometers long.

5. Pidgin, Motu, and English are the lingua francas for much of Papua New Guinea; however, in Milne Bay Province, English and especially Dobu are the common languages.

6. This figure included the four sides of the island, the inhabitants of Daiwali, and people staying temporarily (several weeks or months) in places beyond Nuakata.

7. English equivalent not known.

8. Regional Methodist missions amalgamated with the Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands United Church in 1968 (M. Young 1996, 105).

9. The Reverend George Brown, general-secretary of the Australasian Methodist Missionary Society, briefly visited the island in 1890.

10. The Bromilows sought to overturn cultural practices that they considered incompatible with Christianity, including: cannibalism, witchcraft, sorcery, and the enforced lengthy seclusion of widows following their husbands' death. Affronted by the perceived neglect of children, instances of infanticide, and premarital sex, they also attempted to impose "the European-Wesleyan-Victorian family model" values and daily practices on the Dobuans (M. Young 1989b, 122). Young (1989b, 124) notes that they met with considerable resistance. Commenting on the impact of Polynesian evangelical missionaries on Tubetube and throughout the Louisiades, Macintyre states that because of their harsh methods they, rather than the Australian missionaries, are "remembered as the agents of change" (1989b, 162).

11. For a discussion of missionaries as "heroes responsible for instituting the moral order as it is known today" see White (1992, 136) and M. Young (1996) in particular.

12. As both White (1992, 159, 179) and M. Young (1977; 1996, 96–100) attest, commemorative enactments of missionary first encounters are widespread throughout the Pacific. In detailing the characteristic components of these reenactments they note that the missionary is depicted as the primary agent, while local people are portrayed as passive savages, awaiting pacification and conversion.

13. My observations and comments here coincide with Thune's (1990, 104) reflections on the role of village pastors in the Loboda village United Church on Normanby Island.

## CHAPTER 2

1. While the average life expectancy in PNG has been extended to fifty-four years and the national infant mortality rate has dropped from an estimated 500 deaths per 1,000 in 1949 (Gunther 1949, in Biddulph 1991) to 59 per 1,000 in 1990 (Grant 1990), the maternal mortality rate remains alarmingly high—approsi-

mately 930 per 100,000 live births (Kuble 1998). Decreases in the infant and maternal mortality rate have been achieved in urban areas of PNG, however these achievements have not been matched in rural or marginal areas (Biddulph 1991; Douglas 1991; Everett 1987; Gillett 1990; Mola 1985; 1989; Mola and Aitken 1984; see Mallett 2002).

2. Nancy Munn's first two field periods on Gawa stretched "from June 1973 to mid July 1974 and from late May 1975 through July 1975. A third period . . . extended from mid-October 1979 to early January 1981" (Munn 1986, xv). Moses was an infant during Munn's initial time on Gawa and was about nine when she returned for her third field trip.

3. Of course, Western researchers are not the only ones who express nostalgia (see Battaglia 1995).

4. In the Western world, over the past two centuries all stages or phases of reproduction, from conception to childbirth and breast-feeding, have become increasingly medicalized (Hahn 1995; Lewis 1990; Pierson, Arnup, and Levesque 1990, xiii). Responsibility and control over childbirth has been displaced from childbearing women themselves and their female midwives to medical practitioners, gynecologists, and obstetricians. As expertise and authority over birth has been subsumed by medical practitioners, the site of childbirth has gradually moved from home into doctors' working domains, i.e., the hospital. Similar changes have been observed in relation to pregnancy. In her detailed history of maternity care in Britain, Oakley (1984) documents the shifts from the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century view of pregnancy as a natural, biological state to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century view of it as pathology—as a medical phenomenon akin to illness, an "at risk" condition.

5. The development and use of NRT has generated vigorous and critical analysis by feminists. As Ginsburg and Rapp (1991) observe, some writers welcome these changes, claiming that the provision of safe and reliable forms of contraception, abortion, and obstetric care provides women with autonomy, control, and choice in relation to reproduction (see Gordon 1976; Petchesky 1984). However, many contest these assertions, suggesting that NRTs represent and perpetuate the extension of the medicalization of conception, pregnancy, and birth—a process inviting and effecting radical social transformation in whatever social contexts they are appropriated (see Rowland 1992). The monitoring of women's health necessitated by the use of these technologies institutes a new level of "social surveillance of reproductive practices" (Corea et al. 1987; Ginsburg and Rapp 1991, 315; Rowland 1987; 1992), presenting medical science with an ever-expanding platform for defining and prescribing healthy reproductive, maternal, and paternal behavior (Beck-Gernsheim 1989; Rapp 1993). It also makes possible ever more intrusive forms of birth and population control, particularly in third world contexts. Accordingly, women's choices and decisions to use reproductive technologies are constrained by issues such as class, ethnicity, location, religion (see Lazarus 1994; Nsiah-Jefferson and Hall 1989), and the complex interplays between local and global economic concerns—the vested interest of Western medical science, multinational pharmaceutical companies, and, in the Third World in particular, prescriptive social policies generated and, to varying degrees,

enforced by the World Bank and major aid organizations (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991; Yanoshik and Norsigan 1989).

6. Around the turn of the twentieth century, in the rapidly industrializing societies of Britain and Canada, the need for a healthy work force was perceived as crucial (Arnup, Levesque, and Pierson 1990; Lewis 1990; Oakley 1984). Major epidemics and wars in the first half of the twentieth century also focused political attention on the health of these populations. As a direct result, not only did public health become the concern of centralized policymakers, a concern that continues today, but greater attention was directed to infant care and nutrition, partially reflected in the collection and collation of more specific statistics about infant mortality (Oakley 1984, 36–37). This in turn led to an increasing preoccupation with maternal care. Mothers were held responsible for the health of their infants, and their behavior was subject to increased scrutiny, surveillance, and “education” by policymakers and health service providers who deemed themselves the arbiters of good “scientific” care (Hahn 1995; Oakley 1984; Pierson, Arnup, and Levesque 1990, xx). While improvements in infant mortality followed—largely, it seems, due to improved levels of hygiene, sanitation, and nutrition—similar improvements in maternal mortality were much slower to materialize.

7. Where in Britain policies on maternal practice and care were premised on a “class-based hierarchy of mothering,” in parts of the Pacific they were premised on race-based hierarchies (Jolly 1998a; 1998b). See Manderson (1992, 1998) for a discussion of colonial Malaya.

8. For example, Jolly contends that, unlike the condominium government in Vanuatu, the British colonial administrators of Fiji worked to preserve indigenous race and culture. Accordingly, “state-sponsored surveillance and education of indigenous mothers w[ere] thus attempted far more vigorously in Fiji than in Vanuatu where such concerns remained those of the missions until very late in the colonial period” (1998b).

9. For a discussion of the essentialist, ahistorical, ethnocentric, and elitist qualities of the French *l'écriture féminine* theorists, see Moi (1985) and Suleiman (1985). See also Simone de Beauvoir's response to this form of feminism in Simons and Benjamin (1979). While welcoming the celebration of women's bodily experiences, she dismisses the preoccupation with the body that these French feminists instituted. For a counterchallenge and discussion of these claims, see Dallery (1989); Jones (1981).

10. Following Jolly (1992a, 34), I use this term as a means to highlight and reflect on the colonizing discourses and practices arising from within Western feminism.

11. Used alone, or in a phrase incorporating the first person personal pronoun *ya*, the emphatic pronoun *yabom* means “I alone” or “myself.” In contradistinction to *yau*, this pronoun is used to draw attention to the “I” who is distinguished by particular act(s) performed alone, or unique features. Wycliffe revealed that it is also used to denote loneliness, considered a rare, highly undesirable, and, therefore, diminishing feeling or activity on Nuakata.

12. *Omiu* (you [pl.], yours); *ita* (we, us, ourselves [inclusive]); *ai* (we, us, ourselves [exclusive]); *hibom* (they, them, themselves).

13. Butler writes that “where there is an ‘I’ who utters or speaks and thereby produces an effect in discourse, there is first a discourse which precedes and enables that ‘I’ and forms in language the constraining trajectory of its will. Thus there is no ‘I’ who stands *behind* discourse and executes its volition *through* discourse. On the contrary, the ‘I’ only comes into being through being called, named . . . [I]t is the transitive invocation of the ‘I.’ Indeed, I can only say ‘I’ to the extent that I have first been addressed. . . . [P]aradoxically the discursive condition of social recognition *precedes* and *conditions* the formation of the subject; recognition is not conferred on a subject, but forms that subject” (1993, 225, emphasis in original).

14. Later, when people knew Roger better, they referred to him affectionately as *gagasa* (show-off).

15. The stated aim of the two-year CHW training program is to train frontline primary health-care workers whose role it is to “provide MCH [maternal and child health] care at every contact with mothers and children, basic obstetric care, nutritional surveillance and assist with immunizations. . . . [It is the broader] role of the CHW to improve the health of the rural population, especially that of mothers and children, through the promotion of self-reliance and improved health services in the village” (Health 1991, 223, 342).

16. Later, in my role as proxy health worker when Moses was absent from Nuakata, several reasons became apparent for people’s resistance to take or complete treatment/prophylactic doses of chloroquine. Quinine acts as the generic term for all tablets on Nuakata. Since quinine is known to relieve discomfort during sickness, people request and take it to relieve symptoms associated with sickness. As with their use of local “medicines,” they take “quinine” until the symptoms or discomfort has passed. While people acknowledge the need at times to use local protective “medicines” to prevent sickness caused by witchcraft, spirits, or sorcery, most publicly state that with the rise of Christianity these threats are fast becoming a thing of the past. Local medicines are more routinely used to heal existing conditions rather than prevent possible ones. Malaria is the only condition for which pregnant women, children, and infants are encouraged by Moses to take prophylactic doses of chloroquine to prevent sickness. However, the term *malaria* is rarely used on Nuakata. People generally say they have fever, hot or cold body, and headache, and they show little or no interest in the cause of these all-too-familiar forms of sickness.

17. This phenomenon is widely recognized by researchers and health service providers (Gillett 1990; Kolehmainen-Aitken 1990; Welsch 1991). It is the Health Department’s stated aim “to improve maternal and child health by increasing the number of women” available for frontline health work (1991, 340).

18. See Garner (1989) for a critique of such schemes.

19. Their interests and efforts were focused on a five-year UNICEF-funded village birth attendants project that was about to be implemented to the north of Nuakata in the Milne Bay provincial districts of Losuia, Esa’ala, and Bolubolu. In 1995 UNICEF, together with the Milne Bay provincial government, initiated and implemented a similar project in the Rabaraba district of Milne Bay

Province. The reported aim of the project is to provide village birth attendant training to select village women (Maolai 1995).

20. Attendance figures were not collected for the Nuakata MCH clinics, however Moses indicated that it is usual for between fifteen and twenty women to attend. High priority is given to the clinic by women with sick children or children requiring immunization.

21. Reid (1984) observed that of the MCH clinics she witnessed in PNG, 70 percent of the consultations between the nurses and mothers with children took less than two minutes. Hughes (1994, 231) stresses that MCH nurses often spend a considerable amount of their potential consultation time traveling to and from rural clinics.

22. In describing the ritualized nature of maternal and child health clinics Denoon (1989a), following Reid (1984) and Mola and Aitken (1984), concludes that the effect of this “ritualization of function” is to deny rural mothers in particular “their only prospect of maternity care” (1989a, 103–4).

23. See Jackson’s (1989) essays “Thinking through the body” and “Knowledge of the body” in particular.

24. As both Hughes (1994, 222–28) and Mull (1990) note, the PHC policy of the World Health Organization has been affected by controversy, conflict, economic constraints, and political will.

### CHAPTER 3

1. Sleeping in the *misinali* (pastor’s) house, we spent our days under a day shelter in the church grounds, learning the language with Wycliffe and myriad bystanders. We often felt like a living spectacle, objects of fascination and mirth, and, for young children, terror.

2. Several weeks later Mona distanced herself from me, commenting at the time that she must not be seen to be seeking special favor with me, otherwise people will talk or gossip about her.

3. I later discovered that many young women spoke basic English, but were too embarrassed to speak it with me.

4. Fabian writes that “confrontation is an epistemological prerequisite for ethnography. . . . [U]nder the conditions of shared time (or coevalness) field research is fundamentally confrontational and only superficially observational. To acknowledge that Self and Other are inextricably involved in a dialectical process will make anthropology not less but more realistic” (1991, 208).

5. M. Strathern (1988) argues that the idea that women make babies derives from the commodity logic integral to Western capitalist production. She claims that Melanesian women do not think that “women make babies” (1988, 311–18).

6. A knowledgeable person is known as *tauhanapui* (the one who knows).

7. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (1989) states that the word *conception* is derived from the Latin *concipere* (to take) and implies “to take to oneself, take in and hold.” *Conception* is defined as, among other things, “the action of conceiving or fact of being conceived in the womb”; that which is conceived (the fetus),

the offspring); the action or faculty of conceiving in the mind, or of forming an idea or notion of anything; apprehension, imagination; that which is conceived in the mind, an idea, notion.” In contrast, *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* (1966) defines conception as the “act of becoming pregnant (formation of a viable zygote); state of being conceived; that which is conceived (embryo, fetus); the capacity, function or process of forming ideas or abstractions or of grasping the meaning of symbols representing such ideas or abstractions; an idea or general notion.” Subtle, yet significant, differences in the meaning of conception are conveyed by the two dictionaries. The former nominates where conception occurs (womb or mind), and the latter incorporates a scientific understanding of conception—the formation of a viable zygote—with its definition.

8. Bourdieu notes that Elias, following Benjamin Lee Whorf, points out that “Western languages tend to foreground substantives and objects at the expense of relations and to reduce processes to static conditions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 241 n. 36).

9. In discussing the significance of the dead body in Western biomedicine, Leder asserts that modern medicine is based “first and foremost, not upon the lived body, but upon the dead, inanimate body” (1992, 17). It is a point reinforced by Jordanova (1989), who explores the gender assumptions, sex roles, and body images conveyed by (especially) late-eighteenth-century wax anatomical models of female bodies.

10. See M. Strathern (1992) for a discussion of the biologization of natural kinship in twentieth-century Euro-American culture. Strathern notes that, as a result of new reproductive technologies, the distinction between “social” and “biological” parenthood has been “introduced into regular parlance” (1992, 18–19).

11. See Roth (1903), cited in Leach (1967, 39).

12. Malinowski (1948, 216–18) claimed that Trobriand islanders believe that impregnation occurs when a spirit of the dead (*baloma*) enters a woman’s vagina. The spirit belongs to the same subclan as the woman. It is the father’s role to open the woman’s vagina for the *baloma* to enter. Only the woman and her matrilineal kin contribute to the substantive constitution of the child.

13. While Malinowski recanted his initial assertion (1948, 220–37) that Trobriand island people’s ignorance of physiological paternity confirmed Frazer’s evolutionist argument that it was indicative of primitivism, he vigorously rejected the claim of Losuia district officer Alex Rentoul (1931) that knowledge of physiological paternity and magicoreligious beliefs coexisted on the island. Angered by this challenge to his ethnographic authority, he engaged the help of his friend Raphael Brudo, a regional pearl trader, to testify to the veracity of his claim. For further discussion of this conflict see “Footnotes to the History of Anthropology: Raphael Brudo on Malinowski’s fieldwork” (*History of Anthropology Newsletter* 1996).

14. Malinowski (1932) concludes that Trobriand conception beliefs reflect an ideology centered on bodily and spiritual identity.

15. Widely accused of ethnocentrism, Spiro later backed away from his initial argument.

16. See Clifford's (1986) article "Partial Truths" for a discussion of these issues.

17. Advice also given by Bourdieu (1977) and M. Strathern (1988).

18. In English the verb "to know" is derived from the Old English *gecnawan*, which is related to the Old Norse *kna* (I can) and the Latin *noscere* (to come to know). This etymology suggests an understanding of "knowing" as both potential and a process that is active and/or passive.

19. Of interest, too, is the grafting of God the Father onto a female cosmology.

20. For a discussion of the strategic responses of informants to the discussions and questions posed by the ethnographer, see Jackson (1989, 6) and J. Weiner (1998). Both authors insist that the (personal, social, political, and historical) context for ethnographic inquiry is crucial to understanding the responses given.

21. As Ram (1993) notes, postcolonial writers such as Spivak and Kirby deny that intersubjectivity between persons of different cultures can exist.

22. Because of this translation in the Dobuan Bible, the Auhelawa Bible translations and several local storybooks developed by the Summer Institute of Linguistics literacy program, the word *'ate* is now translated as "heart" by some local people.

23. Another word, *lautowoi*, derived from *lau* (to go) and *towoi* (to try), together with various adjectives, denotes embodied feeling(s). This noun/verb is generally used to describe embodied feelings arising from activity or sickness (e.g., weariness, vigor). A third word, *'amna* (sweet taste or feeling), is used to describe the embodied feeling when someone is tired.

24. For a discussion of syncretism and multiple cultural perspectives see Carrier (1992, 15) and Thomas (1992).

#### CHAPTER 4

1. Translation of the term *dalava* as hamlet is not without problems. Local people familiar with English translate this word as "village." I have chosen to translate it as "hamlet" in accordance with anthropological convention and the precedence already established by Massim ethnographers, such as Thune, Macintyre, and Battaglia. Unlike in the islands of the northern Massim, including the Trobriands, people in the southern Massim live in small family groups of no more than ten or fifteen people.

2. An unpublished dictionary of the Auhelawa language states that *natu mohimobilina* denotes those children to whom a woman has given birth. Although I did not hear this term used on Nuakata, I could not say with any certainty that it or an equivalent term is not used there.

3. By using the terms *belong* and *belonging* I am trying to subvert through avoidance the convolutions of identity politics. I am not here talking of a person's "sense of belonging," as this seems too abstract, too voluntary, but instead hope to capture the unquestionable foundational nature of a Nuakatan person's belonging to their *susu*.

4. The taboo on sexual intercourse while a woman is lactating is consistent

with this interpretation. It is feared that semen will contaminate the mother's breast-milk, causing the suckling infant to become sick or die (see also Macintyre 1988, 52).

5. For example, all those who descend from this common ancestress two or three generations back are obliged to contribute to all marriage and mortuary exchanges for any member of their group.

6. Macintyre (1983, 46) states in relation to Tubetube social organization that usufructuary rights may also be given to non-*susu* women in recognition of their labor on non-*susu* land.

7. I use the expression "ground of living/staying" here deliberately for, as mentioned earlier, there is no verb "to be" in Alina Nu'ata.

8. For a description of these roles on Tubetube see Macintyre (1983, 52).

9. The term *mulolo* means freely given gift of love. While it is used to denote the gifts given by children to a father's *susu* at the time of his death, it has more recently been used as the name of the annual gift-giving ceremony for the United Church. Occurring annually, this event sees each hamlet obligated to give money to support the work of the regional church. In the past the amount given was unspecified, but in 1993 the church insisted that each hamlet should contribute at least 20 kina. This term is also used to denote God's love for people. Macintyre (1983, 52) notes that this term is used similarly on Tubetube.

10. Commenting on the two names bestowed on the people of Duau on north-east Normanby Island, Thune notes of the *susu* name that it "should never be used and is rarely known by those beyond their *susu* for it contains within itself *susu* and hence individual identity and essentiality which should not pass beyond the boundaries of the bearer's *susu*" (1980, 95 n. 62).

11. Thune writes of Loboda village, Duau, that a second, unrestricted name is used by non-*susu* members, often to remember experiences or friendships.

12. Thune states that in "many respects there is a general identity uniting all bearers of the same name who may even structurally substitute for one another both within a *susu* and with respect to *susu* beyond itself" (1980, 95 n. 62).

13. Fortune writes that "certain rules and observances govern . . . [the] communication [between owners of a village and their in-laws]. The incomers are called Those-resulting-from-marriage, or strangers [by] . . . Owners of the Village . . . Those-resulting-from marriage cannot use the personal name of any one of the owners down to the smallest child, except in the case of a father to his own child. They must use a term of relationship" ([1932] 1989, 5).

14. A person addresses his/her birth father, father's brother, and mother's sister's husband as *tamagu* (my father). When, in conversation, it is necessary to distinguish between these fathers, a person can name his/her birth father *tamagu 'agu taulabalaba* and birth father's brothers and mother's sister's husband *madyagu*. The term *madyagu* is also used to address one's stepfather. In contrast, a person's mother's brother(s) is addressed as *yagubada*. A person's father's sister's husband and mother's brother's wife are named *yayagu*. On Tubetube, like Nuakata, "all men who are married to women ego class as *sina* [mother] are called *tama* [father]" (Macintyre 1983, 362). But, in contrast to Tubetube, where the term *madia-* is used to distinguish a mother's sister's husband from a man

who is a father's brother, on Nuakata the term *madiya-* is used interchangeably for both these men. It is also the term of address for a stepfather and a spouse's father. Macintyre notes that the exclusive use of the term *madia-* on Tubetube "for men of the ascendant generation who marry into ego's *susu*" is consistent with Lounsbury's assertion that the "spouses of consanguineals in the ascending generation are not affines, but a variety of step kin (and that they are never classed with affines in any kinship terminology except where affines are classed with consanguineals)" (1983, 362).

15. This brief description by no means exhausts the kinship terminology and its use on Nuakata. The kinship terminology on Nuakata is almost identical to those described by Macintyre (1983, 360–67) for Tubetube and Fortune ([1932] 1989, 37) for Dobu. It is consistent with an "Iroquois system in which cross and parallel kin in the middle three generations are distinguished according to the relative sex of the linking kin but in which only the last links in a chain of genealogical connection determine cross/parallel status" (see also Keesing 1975, 66–71; Macintyre 1983, 360). The same alterations to kinship status and terminology occur at death as they occur on Dobu and Tubetube. For example, Wycliffe revealed that when his mother's brother dies, he will assume the status and term of "father" to his mother's brother's children—people whom he addresses as "cousin" prior to his mother's brother's death.

16. As Battaglia has noted for Sabarl, where similar naming practices associated with marriage are observed, it seemed that "far from merely 'bridging' relations between groups (as they are often depicted in anthropological literature), marriages reinforce distinctions and may actually introduce conceptual space between persons" (1990, 113).

17. It became clear that this was the case when one fellow, widely regarded as the most greedy man on the island (*tauhamgogoi*, "the one who eats it all"), incensed the people working on the house by repeatedly asking us for tobacco without contributing to the building project. His nickname, which means "all the rice," was conferred upon him because "he will always eat a plate of rice, or the like, without considering others" (Wycliffe). We were strongly advised to refuse his requests out of respect for those working on the house.

18. Of Dobu, Fortune writes: "Normally the house interior is as rigidly restricted to man, wife, and their children, as the graveyard that the house fronts is rigidly restricted to the corpses of brothers, sisters, and sisters' children, it being understood that the house is restricted to the one unit, the biological family only, whereas the graveyard is common to all the *susu* of the village" ([1932] 1989, 4).

19. This was done more to protect them from the annoyance of biting than from any attempt to prevent malaria.

20. Many of Munn's (1986, 35–37) observations about the living places and habits of unmarried youths on Gawa (during the 1970s) seemed to hold true for young people on Nuakata during my time there. For example, she describes Gawan courting activities as transitional behaviors or rites de passage:

Instead of hierarchizing processes explicitly shaped by the authority of adults who impose regulation from the outside through direct control over initiates'

bodies, Gawan transition emphasises the relative autonomy of the youths while adults watch from behind the scenes, exerting covert influence on their children, but interfering directly only in cases of radical misbehaviour. (1986, 36–37)

21. Cf. Fortune, who specifies: “Those-resulting-from-marriage, while they are yet newly married, must approach an owner’s family sitting beneath the owner’s house by a roundabout way, circling in unobtrusively and bending apologetically while they do so, their own spouse being the only owner excepted. By the time one or two children are born this behavior is usually discarded towards the own mother-in-law’s *susu*” ([1932] 1989, 5–6).

22. Battaglia claims that on Sabarl, where residence is virilocal following marriage, “a new bride has a fragile claim to control of the husband’s house” (1990, 31). It is only through her services to her husband’s kin that she establishes power and influence in this realm.

23. Wycliffe’s initial tentative declaration that *maybe* Susan and Nowel were married reflected more widespread uncertainty about when and by what means a couple are considered married. Some people with whom I spoke about marriage thought it occurred when the couple began living with one another. Others considered this living-together a form of betrothal that was finally realized as marriage when gifts had been exchanged between the couple’s respective *susu*, and family parties arranged in the couple’s natal hamlets. Perhaps these differing opinions expressed by people within and across different *susu* reflect a process of transformation and contraction of marriage practices more uniformly upheld in the past. For example, Fortune ([1932] 1989, 21–30) indicated that for the people of Dobu during the late 1920s a young couple were considered betrothed once they were discovered sleeping together in the girl’s natal hamlet. From that point onward the young couple would “avoid the personal names” of their potential in-laws. The young man would immediately commence work in his in-laws’ garden, working alongside them. While he would sleep with his potential spouse at night, he would not eat or associate with his in-laws in their hamlet. After a year or so, when he had accumulated the necessary gifts to exchange between the *susu*, the respective exchanges would occur (see Fortune [1932] 1989, 25–26) and the marriage would be pronounced. In describing and elaborating upon Dobuan social organization, Fortune (5–30) highlights the fundamental differences between *susu* and non-*susu* encapsulated and, indeed, consummated in the marriage relationship. He stresses the alienation, born of difference, experienced by either a man or woman when they are living in their spouse’s hamlet/village.

24. As Munn (1986) notes for Gawa, this freedom to wander around alone or with groups of young men or women is a feature of young people’s behavior that changes upon marriage.

25. In Alina Nu’ata the word ‘*amwaha* (more broadly meaning “stairs or entrance to a dwelling”) can be used both as a concrete noun, e.g., ‘*amwa’amwahanane* (place or path), and in a more abstract sense when referring to a person’s actions, attitudes, and ways of doing things, e.g., ‘*amwa’amwaha* (the moving along that path, or someone’s ways and the actual expression of those ways).

This etymological link between personal actions and path provides a local metaphor that gives expression to Nuakatan sociality, a link that also exists in other languages of the Massim.

26. As with Thune's observations of Dobu, the people living in any given hamlet are usually "either members of the owning *susu* or their spouses, or children" (Thune 1980, 14). But this is not always the case. At times individuals and, indeed, whole family groups live on non-*susu*/nonclan land.

27. Divorce was common in this community, and it was usual for the couple, whatever their ages, to separate and return to their own *susu*, where they remained until remarrying. Children of divorced couples remained with their mothers, but some visited at their fathers' place.

#### CHAPTER 5

1. See M. Strathern (1988) and Wagner (1977, 1981) for a discussion of analogous ways of thinking and knowing in Papua New Guinea.

2. Also the word for twins, *patubwau*, in Alina Nu'ata means two seeds.

3. Syntocinon is given to expedite the birthing of the placenta and prevent hemorrhage associated with retained placenta. Ergometrine is given to prevent hemorrhaging following birth of the placenta.

4. Eunice claimed that "it is good for women to have four or five children. It makes them strong, their blood strong. Ten or eleven [children] is not good for the blood. It is too many to look after properly."

5. In her unpublished dictionary of Auhelawa, Daphne Lithgow suggests that the stem word *laba* means line. Martha Macintyre indicated that in the Tubetube language *laba* refers to the sight line or watermark on a boat. It also means edge or boundary (personal communication). This accords with Thune's (1980, 89 n. 57) claim that on northeast Normanby *laba* means boundary, border, edge, limit, finish. Thune states, however, that *labalaba* does not carry these meanings. It refers to the individual referred to by Fortune ([1932] 1989, 14–15) as "boundary man" (see also Chowning 1989). Whereas on Dobu the son of a deceased man is addressed by members of the man's *susu* as "boundary man" (*labalaba*), on northeast Normanby a man's sons and daughters are addressed as *labalaba* by members of his *susu*, whether he is dead or alive. Although *laba* and *labalaba* in Alina Nu'ata are clearly cognates with the Dobuan terms, I did not hear them used in this way. Used as a verb, *labalaba* referred to process and time of birth. Used as a noun, this term denotes one who directly effects or makes birth possible. The fact that this term is used to describe birth mothers as well as birth fathers suggests local recognition of paternity in pregnancy and birth.

#### CHAPTER 6

1. In this text I trace my experiential account of a burial ceremony that I attended early in my fieldwork on Nuakata. I juxtapose this with a more abstracted reflection on the contemporary practices, social implications, and meaning of death, and part of the ensuing mortuary sequence on Nuakata. I do

not posit either of these forms of textual representation of death as more authentic, more factual, more or less interpretative or subjective than the other. Rather, these accounts are intended to resonate with one another at points, to sound discordant notes at others. I do this to strategically point to some of the epistemological and political consequences of the way death is represented in anthropological texts (see Mallett 1998).

2. Macintyre (1989b, 139) describes the same practices on Tubetube.

3. As on Nuakata, singing (*wali*) is the first stage of the Tubetube mortuary sequence (Macintyre 1989b, 135–37).

4. Dewey writes: “Through habits formed in intercourse with the world, we inhabit the world. It becomes a home and the home is part of our every experience” (1958, 104). See Scarry (1985, 27–180) for an inspired discussion of the spatial and material territories of people’s lives.

5. Although theoretically contentious, the term *personality* has been popularly and pragmatically appropriated by many people, even those who are opposed to this concept. It often seems to imply a fixed internal state or localized epicenter within the brain, which in concert with social forces and/or biological drives and imperatives directs a person’s behavior. Accordingly, thinking and behavior are considered an expression of personality rather than personality itself. These expressions are subservient to hidden internal forces of (self-)consciousness or will, which are integral to the personality.

6. This understanding was inflected in the command *tau tau tau*, which means “go, go, go.” In this context *tau* acts as a homonym of *lau* (to go).

7. In some ways this is similar to English expressions like “a body of people,” or “the body corporate.”

8. I use the term *selfish* cautiously here, as the term used to describe such people on Nuakata is *tau’aiduma*, which may be roughly translated as “the one who eats or claims all the food for him/herself.”

9. On Tubetube the term *galiauna* or *yanasa* is used to denote both male and female members of the paired matrilineage who orchestrate the activities associated with burial (Macintyre 1989b, 139–40; also see Seligman [1910] 1976, 609–10). According to Chowning (1989, 100) the term *geyawuna* (the workers and eaters) is used in Molima, Fergusson Island, to denote those responsible for burial and handling the dead body. Usually this task falls to the deceased’s sister’s children or mother’s brother. On northeast Normanby Island, as on Nuakata, the principal grave digger is usually a “favoured, more distant matrilineal mate or member of an associated matrilineage” (Thune 1989, 159–60).

10. The practice of referring to the deceased as ill has been noted by Leenhardt (1979), who asserts that for Melanesians in general and Canaques in particular the “nothingness” of death does not exist. “Death appears to him as a negative state of life and a different form of existence” (Leenhardt 1979, 35).

11. As previously discussed, embodiment on Nuakata is considered contingent upon the combined labors of matrilineal and affinal kin. Embodiment constitutes a confluence of mutually dependent relationships. See Munn (1986, 164).

12. In discussing Fortune’s ([1932] 1989) descriptions of the significance of seed yams on Dobu, Bloch and Parry state: “[Yams] are *tomota*—‘human beings.’

. . . But further than this, they are the lineage kin descended from the founding ancestress of the *susu*. Their flesh . . . is planted in the garden as the corpses of the ancestors are planted in the village mound. . . . What reproduces the lineage in a material sense, then is . . . the flesh of its own kind. The consumption of yams . . . grown from one's own lineage's seed strain, thus amounts to an act of symbolic endo-cannibalism" (1982, 28).

13. The term for widow, *hiwape*, is derived from *hiwa* (to pour out) and *'wapelu* (to wither). As on Tubetube and Duau, the widow/widower on Nuakata are considered the alienable possession of the grieving *susu*. By employing the alienable possessive pronoun *yama* (our), the *susu* of the deceased indicate the widow/widower's loss of status and integral connection with their matrilineage (see Macintyre 1989b, 135).

14. While an emotionally charged moment, I remained aware that I might be projecting emotions onto Waligeha.

15. Macintyre (1989b, 136) notes that on Tubetube it was colonial government officers, rather than missionaries, who forced people to abandon their practice of burying corpses in shallow graves and disinterring skeletons. Missionaries focused their efforts on transforming the treatment of the widow by her affines.

16. See Macintyre (1989b, 145–49) for a discussion of the gifts exchanged between *susu* and affines of the deceased following death on Tubetube.

17. See Foster (1995) for an analysis of the social processes that have led to local understanding of mortuary rites as *kastom* on Tanga Island, New Ireland.

18. A review of ethnographic articles dealing with notions of ethical practice reveals that while such issues have been addressed in specific contexts, they have yet to be considered in all (disciplinary and geographical) fields of anthropological inquiry. The specific contexts where these issues have been considered include medical settings/research (e.g., Schoepf 1991; Schuster 1996); applied anthropological research (e.g., Barrett 1997; Dominy 1990; Everhart 1984; Williams 1995); and ethnic conflict (Khazanov 1996).

19. For example, affected by the mortuary ceremony and people's visible demonstrations of distress, I risked misinterpreting their emotions. My impulse to project emotions onto people is evident in my discussion of Waligeha's grief associated with the loss of his daughter. While aware at the time that this was highly problematic, I nevertheless entertained these ideas and assumptions about the nature of his grief.

20. As Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990) attest, it has only been in the past decade that the anthropology of emotion has emerged as a legitimate field of study in the discipline.

21. M. Young (1989a, 193–94) states that in Bwaidoka on southeast Goode-nough Island *bwabwale* was a feast conducted by the owners of the deceased for the buriers. It was formerly held a year after the initial feast to remove food taboos from the principal mourners. This contrasts with the *bwabwali* sequence of feasts described by Thune (1989, 163–67), which were held in Loboda village on northeast Normanby Island. These feasts were variously conducted by the deceased's matrilineal mates and his/her affines, in order to sever the ties and erase the debts between the respective *susu*. Chowning (1989, 101) notes that for

the people of Molima, Fergusson Island, *bwabwale* is the feast that frees the bereaved spouse from mourning.

22. Originally from the Sigasiga region of Duau on Normanby Island, the grandfather mentioned in this account was considered a custodian of customary knowledge within Wycliffe's clan. With his passing in 1989 detailed knowledge and understanding of past ways practiced on Nuakata were all but lost, save for the fragments remembered by his living kin. Wycliffe had spent many hours with his grandfather learning about customary matters.

23. Many people living on Nuakata are descendants of people from Duau. On Nuakata many people consider Duau the place from which custom originates.

24. Daphne Lithgow defines *muli* in Auhelawa as a marriage payment (cf. Fortune [1932] 1989, 197–200; Lepowsky 1989, 228 n. 8).

#### CONCLUSION

1. I quote this letter while knowing that some may interpret it as an attempt to authenticate my research experience. In one sense, of course, it does perform this function (or one like it), but, more important, it demonstrates the centrality of the relationships between ethnographers and their subjects that underpin the participant observation method. I am also aware that some will see the content of this letter as romantic, but even if this is so (and I am not sure it is), given that my research and research relationships are only newly founded, is it unreasonable that romance should be a part of them? Is it not at least possible to have thinking romanticism? Could it also be true that romanticism is a significant aspect or phase of our thinking, feeling, relating—one that brings with it a unique and important form of knowing and understanding? (see de Zengotita 1989, 692; Hasstrup 1995, 690).