

CHAPTER 4

Triple Play: Constituency, Elite, and Legislator Opinions

The dichotomy between constituency views and legislators' consciences is misplaced. Legislators are creatures of their districts, even when they stray from the position of the median voter. The message of chapter 3 is that legislators respond to their geographic constituencies, but also, and to a greater extent, to their reelection constituencies. There is considerably less misrepresentation than the principal-agent models would suggest. Is there, after all, such a thing as *pure* personal ideology?

The traditional linkage between legislator and constituency attitudes (Miller and Stokes 1963) is incomplete. The missing link is the part of legislator beliefs that reflects constituency and, particularly, elite attitudes. Legislators are responsive not only to their full geographic constituencies, but also to their partisan reelection constituencies and to the elites and activists of their parties. Deviations from public opinion reflect more than members' personal values. In addition to members' personal values and the ideologies of their constituents, there is a third factor: "Induced ideology" reflects both shared values and pressures from the electorate, especially fellow partisans, as well as activists and other elites. It is the systematic part of shirking. What mass and elite attitudes in a state cannot account for is a better measure of personal ideology. Stripped of its constituency component, personal ideology has far less power in accounting for roll call behavior. Induced ideology reflects a combination of a legislator's reelection, primary, and personal constituencies (Fenno 1978).

Pure and Induced Ideology

Senators with supportive state parties have a ready-made personal constituency. Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) serves as a leader of his party. He recruits candidates for lower offices, who become a key support base: “[A] lot of my friends, people who have been with me a long time, are running themselves, all over the state” (Fenno 1991a, 201). Domenici’s famed moderation stems from similar views among New Mexico GOP elites, who are to the left of the state party electorate (standardized induced-ideology score = .333). Domenici himself is more conservative than his partisan electorate (standardized pure partisanship = −.623).¹

Legislators without a large personal constituency may find themselves out of touch with both their state parties and voters. North Dakota Republican Mark Andrews was targeted for defeat in 1986 by the National Conservative Caucus; he lost to a populist Democrat. Andrews lamented: “My situation is made worse by the absence of any Republican party in this state. They are inept and incompetent and almost nonexistent” (Fenno 1992, 177, 252). Andrews seemed to engage in the typical Downsian strategy of moving toward the center and away from his personal constituency—and he lasted just one term.²

For most senators, supportive personal constituencies are the key to reelection because they can ensure themselves, with John Donne, that “no man is an Island, entire of itself.” Legislators share a common fate with fellow partisans. They talk politics, share ideas, and give each other comfort. They look to each other for political advice. Few confront a unified field in opposition to them, largely because only a handful could survive in a hostile environment. Most senators can’t build coalitions that are heavily dependent upon the other party. They need their own party base.

The closest we are likely to get to a measure of pure personal ideology is the residuals left over after we estimate induced values. These residuals don’t include internal factors such as party leadership persuasion, agenda effects, interest group pressures, and similar factors cited by Jackson and Kingdon (1992, 813). We rarely can get decent measures of these influences. Kingdon (1973) has shown that the internal and external pressures on members generally flow in the same direction. So we may not have much to worry about if we exclude factors specific to a particular vote in an overall index of ideology. It would be more problem-

atic if we left out larger influences such as party elite pressures on senators.

Fenno's multiple-constituencies model seems reasonably taut. It is unlikely that we are missing anything systematic across a wide range of votes. Critics used to refer to Senators Henry Jackson and Warren Magnuson (both D-WA) as "the Senators from Boeing" (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1973, 1057). Jackson and Magnuson were both hawks who looked out for the interests of their state's largest employer. But such fealty to specific interests is not likely to cause us difficulties in estimating personal ideology. If Washington voters accept the key role of Boeing in their economy, they are likely to support policies favored by the company, so representation will be reflected in (statewide) public opinion. If Washington voters are hostile to Boeing, but the company takes few stands on policy questions, then the impact on a member's overall ideology will range from negligible (if Jackson and Magnuson would have supported these policies anyway) to minor (if the two senators vote contrary to their basic ideology on scattered votes). Only when an interest has stands on many issues that are at variance with public opinion will there be a representational dilemma (Denzau and Munger 1986)—and the possibility that we have missed something systematic in the environment. It is probably safe to say that this is a rare occurrence (especially for *both* of a state's senators).

The multiple constituencies exhaust virtually all of the direct and systematic pressures on elected officials. With this assumption and the better-than-expected performance of residualization in chapter 2, it seems reasonable to apply the technique to derive better measures of pure ideology than we currently have. By the time I have purged legislators' ideology of the direct constituency preferences and induced ideology, there is not much of a story to tell. What remains is probably a good approximation of pure personal ideology.

There are a lot of concepts floating around, and I shall endeavor to minimize the gobbledegook, though I can't get rid of all of it. I reserve the terms *simple shirking* and *simple partisanship* for geographic and reelection constituency deviations, as presented in chapter 2. The predicted part of simple shirking is *induced* values. This reflects the combined impact of the multiple constituencies, measured using statewide (geographic) opinions. The predicted segment of state party shirking is *induced partisanship*. This is the idealized measure of elite influence: It

reflects the primary and personal constituencies, as well as (to a lesser extent) the reelection constituency's ideology.³ It is as close as we are going to get to a measure of partisan forces that pressure a public official. *Pure personal values* (or pure values) are the residuals from geographic (statewide) constituency; *pure personal partisanship* (or pure partisanship) reflects the residuals from the reelection followers. It is personal values stripped of all supporting constituencies, our best approximation of any beliefs that a legislator might have that are not shared by either masses or elites.

Is there much left once we take out the shared values with the legislator's personal constituency? The four senators with the largest scores (absolute values greater than 1.5) are moderate Republicans. Edward Brooke, John Chafee, Robert Stafford, and Lowell Weicker represent states with conservative party elites and partisan supporters, but moderate-to-liberal opposition parties. All but Brooke face a strongly conservative base, and all but Stafford confront an opposition that is not only liberal but also the dominant party in the state. Some senators don't have supportive personal constituencies.

Do these residualized measures predict roll call voting in the Senate? I estimate the effects of personal ideology on the 12 roll calls and two indices (anti-strip mining and the Panama Canal index). As before, the equations include the full range of state economic and political interests. I do not present them since they are not of immediate concern. Because this is the payoff question on whether personal ideology matters, I present a series of tests that will compare pure ideology with the more general measure developed in chapter 2.

The simplest test compares the significance levels of the alternative measures of personal ideology (since logit coefficients have no straightforward interpretation). Each logit equation has a test statistic for each variable equivalent to the *t*-test in regression (the maximum-likelihood estimate divided by its standard error), which can be compared directly (and with the *t*-tests for the two equations estimated by ordinary least squares). I present the results in table 8.

For geographic constituencies, the impact of personal ideology drops by more than half for the draft, abortion, pregnancy disability, loans to Communist countries, and the antistrip index. The impact of pure personal values matches "simple shirking" (the model of chapter 2) for the neutron bomb. The *t*-ratios for 5 of the 14 new equations are cut in half from the direct survey estimates in chapter 2. The average *t*-ratio

is cut almost in half—from 4.043 to 2.332. There is also less variation across impacts; the standard deviation of *t*-ratios is 1.631 across the 14 votes for simple ideology and .886 for the pure personal ideology.

All but 1 of the 14 coefficients for pure personal values are significant at $p < .10$ or better; 8 make the grade at $p < .01$. The coefficients

TABLE 8. Estimates of Residualized Ideology on Roll Calls

Vote	Geographic Constituency		Reelection Constituency	
	Pure Personal		Reelection Constituency	
	Ideology Coefficient	Induced Coefficient	Pure Personal Partisanship	Induced
Anti-strip mining	.447*** (2.427)	−5.202*** (−3.191)	.313** (2.092)	.513**** (−5.461)
Communist immigration	1.475*** (2.443)	−11.536*** (−2.452)	.383 (.728)	−1.744**** (−4.112)
Death penalty	2.275*** (2.447)	−36.411*** (−3.035)	1.845** (2.349)	−1.893**** (−3.754)
Draft	1.401** (2.260)	−13.884*** (−2.967)	1.039** (2.171)	−1.100**** (−3.356)
Sex education	1.397** (1.765)	−21.491*** (−2.937)	1.346** (1.765)	−3.227** (−2.937)
Neutron bomb	3.050**** (3.702)	−18.789*** (−3.149)	2.174**** (3.527)	−.912*** (−2.711)
Desegregation	2.098*** (2.843)	−12.988** (−2.268)	1.866*** (2.726)	−1.284*** (−2.268)*
Abortion	.683* (1.352)	−8.732** (−2.106)	.633* (1.567)	−.166 (−.657)
Pornography	1.448** (2.102)	−5.583 (−1.245)	.814* (1.452)	−.420* (−1.310)
Pregnancy disability	.520 (.584)	−11.078* (−1.616)	.211 (.269)	−1.756*** (−2.737)
Pregnancy discrimination	1.455* (1.518)	−16.148** (−2.087)	.239* (1.518)	−10.982** (−2.087)
Cuba	2.093*** (2.657)	−13.490** (−2.129)	1.765*** (2.537)	−1.458** (−3.075)
Communist loans	1.530*** (2.528)	−10.688** (−2.112)	1.518*** (2.698)	−1.030*** (−3.186)
Panama Canal index	2.196**** (4.016)	−15.340**** (−3.777)	1.404**** (3.539)	−1.537**** (−6.774)

Note: Entries are logit coefficients (regression coefficients for anti-strip mining and the Panama Canal index); maximum likelihood estimates/standard errors (or *t*-ratios) are in parentheses.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

for the draft, sex education, and pornography are significant only at $p < .05$; abortion and pregnancy discrimination only meet the .10 level, while the coefficient for pregnancy disability is less than its standard error.

Pure personal ideology is not strongly correlated with statewide public opinion. We can thus see the impact of public attitudes more clearly in models that replace the direct survey estimates with the induced values. Eight of the constituency coefficients are significant at $p < .01$ or better and all but two (pregnancy disability, which is significant at $p < .10$, and pornography) at $p < .05$. The mean t -ratio for statewide public opinion is 2.505, slightly higher than that for legislators' personal ideology. The impact is more consistent across votes: the standard deviation of t -ratios for statewide public opinion is .481, about half the value for induced values. *For geographic constituencies, public opinion plays a larger and more consistent role than pure personal values.*

The impact of legislators' personal ideology also drops for the reelection constituency models. The decline is not quite so sharp because deviations from the reelection constituency were not as great to begin with. Nine of the 14 direct survey estimates in Chapter 2 are significant at $p < .01$ or better; only five of the coefficients for pure personal partisanship meet this criterion. Only the death penalty vote has an impact as great for pure personal partisanship as it had in the reelection constituency model of Chapter 2.

On five votes the impacts for pure partisanship are cut more by half. These are all highly charged issues on which legislators might invite the wrath of their constituents if they strayed too far from public opinion: immigration from communist nations, abortion, pornography, pregnancy disability, and the Panama Canal votes. Only on the latter is there evidence of that personal ideology (deviations from reelection constituencies) matters; the others all have insignificant coefficients or t -ratios that meet only the weak test of $p < .10$. The revised effects are substantially weaker than the simple shirking models. The mean t -ratio falls to 2.067 from 2.969—and the standard deviation is cut from 1.219 to .940, drops of 30 and 23 percent, respectively. Reelection constituency ideology retains its powerful impacts. Only two issues—abortion and pornography—show weak or nonexistent effects for state party opinions. The mean t -ratio is 3.068, just about the same as the direct shirking estimate (3.067). It is half again as powerful as pure personal partisanship.

Once again there is less deviation from the reelection constituency than from the geographical constituency. Public opinion, especially that

of state partisans, matters more than legislators' personal ideology in shaping roll call voting in the Senate. Comparing *t*-ratios is a very rough guide to impacts. Significance tests are not measures of the strength of relationships. Instead, I focus on the *effects* of personal ideology, the difference in probabilities derived from setting personal ideology first at its minimum value and then at its maximum. The difference between the two is the effect (cf. chapter 2). The results are presented in table 9.

The direct estimates for geographic constituencies (from chapter 2) suggest powerful impacts for simple shirking. Four of the 12 votes have effects of more than .80. Moving one standard deviation in each direction almost completely determines roll call behavior on communist immigration, the neutron bomb, desegregation, and Cuba. A liberal would have a .90 probability of voting for desegregation (or against the neutron bomb), while a conservative would have just a .10 probability. Simple ideology also moves the draft, the death penalty, and loans to communist

TABLE 9. Logit Effects on Roll Calls

Vote	Geographic Constituency		Reelection Constituency	
	Simple	Pure	Simple	Pure
Communist immigration	.803	.295	.277	.070
Death penalty	.669	.289	.351	.236
Draft	.720	.279	.401	.232
Sex education	.698	.195	.119	.125
Neutron bomb	.856	.449	.625	.434
Desegregation	.895	.314	.689	.282
Abortion	.404	.152	.457	.183
Pornography	.393	.227	.397	.159
Pregnancy disability	.322	.052	.082	.019
Pregnancy discrimination	.474	.151	.092	.011
Cuba	.876	.383	.471	.322
Communist loans	.605	.305	.191	.320
Mean	.643	.258	.346	.199
Standard deviation	.202	.109	.201	.130

Note: Entries are *changes* in probability on roll call voting from a spatial location one standard deviation below the mean (zero) to one standard deviation above the mean, keeping all other predictors at their observed values.

countries—each with impacts of .60 or more. The mean effect for the original model for geographic constituencies is .643, with a standard deviation of .202. The estimates are cut almost in half when we shift to the reelection constituencies: The mean effect is now .346—with only two figures above .60 (desegregation and the neutron bomb) and four below .20 (the two pregnancy votes, sex education, and loans to communist countries). The standard deviation remains the same (.201). Once more, most of the controversial issues show the biggest drops in—and smallest amounts of—personal ideology.

The new estimates from the residualization technique suggest that personal ideology is far less important than the principal-agent models would suggest. The mean effect for pure personal ideology (.258) is 60 percent lower than the methodology of chapter 2 suggests. Only the neutron bomb has an effect greater than .40; abortion, the two pregnancy votes, and sex education—the great moral issues once more—show effects less than .20. The standard deviation is cut in half—to .109. For reelection constituencies, the effect is even more dramatic. The effect for pure personal partisanship, the clearest measure of shirking from all partisan constituencies, is cut by 40 percent—to .199. The standard deviation falls to .130. Moral issues bring greater conformity to state partisans. Only three foreign policy votes—the neutron bomb, Cuba, and communist loans—have effects greater than .30 (cf. chapter 2). If we focus on the other nine votes—recognizing that immigration and the draft are a mixture of domestic and foreign concerns—the mean effect of shirking drops to .178 and the standard deviation to .112.

The Third Element of Representation

Something is missing. The models I have examined so far focus on constituency ideology and senators' pure personal ideology. The fundamental equation of the original shirking literature is that overall ideology equals the sum of constituency and personal values. My new perspective adds the third element to the mix: the part of a legislator's ideology that reflects mass and elite attitudes in a senator's state (and state party). If pure ideology is the residual from the equation predicting personal ideology from mass and elite traits, induced ideology is the systematic part of the same equation. Induced ideology reflects the linkage between a member's personal values and those of the supporting constituencies.

What happens when I add induced ideology to the mix? Pure per-

sonal ideology should not be affected much. These two components of legislator ideology must be uncorrelated with each other, as the systematic and residual components of regression analyses always are. Any impact on pure personal ideology will be indirect—in the pattern of intercorrelations among these two aspects of legislator ideology and other predictors (especially constituency attitudes).

For reelection constituencies, there is little change from table 8. Nine of the 14 coefficients for induced partisanship are significant at $p < .01$ or better; one more makes the grade at $p < .05$ (table 10). The two pregnancy votes together with sex education and loans to Communist countries are not affected by induced partisanship. All but pregnancy discrimination are driven largely by the opinions of the senator's reelection constituency rather than by the legislator's own values.⁴ The issues on which induced partisanship has the strongest impacts—abortion, environment, pornography, civil rights, and the neutron bomb—are arenas in which activists have polarized the parties. The pattern is largely the same for geographic constituencies, so I don't dwell on repetitious results.

Partitioning the Effects

Personal ideology appears to be an important determinant of roll call voting when I measure it as the simple difference between interest group ratings and constituency beliefs. Once we recognize that deviations from public opinion are rooted in mass and especially elite attitudes, personal ideology is less idiosyncratic—and less personal. Yet, an 18 to 20 percent shift in the likelihood of voting for a bill is impressive if not determinative. There still seems to be a role, however reduced, for personal ideology in explaining legislative votes.

Neither t -ratios nor changes in probabilities are the best measures for estimating the impact of personal ideology. Roll calls are discrete events. The yeas and nays are more visible to any constituents who may be paying attention than the underlying probability distributions. The nuances of how close a legislator is to a yea or nay may entrance political activists seeking to nudge members toward their preferred positions. Probabilities become important to constituents only when they push a legislator from the yea to the nay column (or vice versa).

We can derive probabilities of voting yea or nay on a roll call from logit analysis. These probabilities yield predictions of voting behavior: A probability of voting yea greater than .5 leads to a prediction of a yea

vote. These predictions, compared to senators' actual votes, give us a measure of how well we have predicted the roll call. If personal ideology matters, including it in a logit analysis should lead to greater predictive accuracy. More accurate than what? The simplest base model includes *no predictors*. A null model leads us to a straightforward prediction: The

TABLE 10. Three Components of Ideology as Determinants of Roll Call Voting

Vote	"Pure Personal" Partisanship	Induced Partisanship	State Party Ideology
Anti-strip mining	.344*** (2.555)	.514**** (4.535)	-.471**** (-5.539)
Communist immigration	.442 (.789)	1.610*** (2.761)	-2.455*** (-3.758)
Death penalty	2.475*** (2.579)	1.400** (2.034)	-1.951*** (-3.285)
Draft	1.296*** (2.472)	1.182*** (2.719)	-1.216*** (-3.387)
Sex education	1.441* (1.635)	.406 (.704)	-3.106*** (-3.163)
Neutron bomb	2.864**** (3.699)	2.117**** (3.619)	-1.145*** (-2.469)
Desegregation	4.988*** (3.074)	3.900*** (3.109)	-1.725*** (-2.683)
Abortion	.787** (1.739)	1.285*** (3.132)	-.141 (-.516)
Pornography	1.230** (1.992)	1.844*** (3.364)	-.513 (-1.281)
Pregnancy disability	.227 (.272)	.753 (1.099)	-1.491** (-2.272)
Pregnancy discrimination	-1.387 (-.563)	4.946 (.866)	-32.524 (-.911)
Cuba	1.823*** (2.398)	1.622*** (2.582)	-1.718*** (-2.959)
Communist loans	1.510*** (2.683)	-.081 (-.188)	-1.042*** (-3.160)
Panama Canal index	1.428*** (3.768)	.899*** (2.983)	-1.441**** (-6.579)

Note: Entries are probit coefficients (or regression coefficients for anti-strip mining and the Panama Canal index); maximum likelihood estimates divided by standard errors (or *t*-ratios) are in parentheses.

p* < .10. *p* < .05. ****p* < .01. *****p* < .0001.

percentage of members we expect to vote yea is simply the actual percentage that did vote yea. The mean majority vote on the 12 discrete roll calls is 67 percent. Now let us estimate a model with *only* legislators' values included. How much better does it do than a null model, with no predictors at all? The simple ideology estimates of chapter 2 improve on these predictions by 15.3 and 11 percent, respectively, for geographic and reelection constituencies. The pure personal (residualized) measures lead to gains over the null model by 3.4 percent and 2.3 percent for geographic and reelection constituencies. *When I shift to a measure of personal ideology that purges legislator ideology of elite as well as mass effects, the impact of values unique to legislators almost evaporates.*

This model incorporating only legislator ideology is too simplistic. A better way of assessing the impact of legislators' private values is through a "multivariate null model," which includes all predictors from the models in chapter 2 *except* personal ideology. I estimate a series of models that include different components of ideology: direct shirking only (from chapter 2), pure personal ideology plus induced ideology, pure personal ideology but not induced ideology, and induced but not pure personal values. For each of these models, I estimate the percent predicted correctly by the logit model. The model that includes both pure personal and induced values is the most comprehensive. So it should, and usually does, have the greatest predictive success. But how much better does it do than leaving one (or both) component(s) of personal ideology out?

Comparing the percentages predicted correctly is tricky statistically. It is analogous to partitioning the variance in regressions through increments in R^2 values. This is legitimate only if the variables added are uncorrelated with the predictors in the null model. The predictors in the various logit equations are routinely correlated with each other, either moderately or even strongly. However, I can legitimately assess the impacts of pure personal ideology and partisanship compared to other variables. They are purged of constituency effects, so they are by construction uncorrelated with other predictors in the logit analyses. (The adjusted R^2 's for the residualized measures with the other predictors are -.018 for the statewide estimates and .062 for the state party measures).

Induced ideology represents a greater problem. Since it is based upon the reelection, primary, and personal constituencies and legislators, there should be strong correlations between induced ideology and other predictors. The problem is severe for the geographic-constituency

estimates, where the adjusted R^2 between the other predictors and induced ideology is .447. It is less of a problem for the state party estimates, where the adjusted $R^2 = .169$. When I drop one predictor of the roll call indices, the adjusted R^2 drops to .114.⁵ Deleting this offending variable reduces the adjusted R^2 's with the other predictors of simple partisanship to .140 and induced state party ideology to .110. The assumption of independence does not hold among the predictors, but it comes tolerably close. I can estimate the increment in prediction success if we recognize that the figures will still slightly *underestimate* the impact of incremental changes.

The multivariate null model averages 77 percent correct predictions, a 10 percent improvement over the naive null forecast (table 11). The biggest improvements over the multivariate null for the direct estimate of personal ideology occur on the neutron bomb, desegregation, abor-

TABLE 11. Comparison of Predictions from Truncated and Full State Party Models

Vote	Null	Multi-variate Null	With Direct Shirking	Pure Personal Plus Induced	Pure Personal No Induced	Induced No Pure Personal
Communist immigration	57.0	77.9	83.7	80.2	79.1	81.4
Death penalty	72.2	84.3	85.5	84.3	81.9	85.5
Draft	50.6	70.8	73.0	71.9	68.5	68.5
Sex education	71.4	86.0	90.5	90.5	88.1	88.1
Neutron bomb	62.0	67.4	84.8	85.9	76.1	75.0
Desegregation	69.8	80.2	88.4	88.4	80.2	81.4
Abortion	57.6	62.0	68.5	69.6	65.2	68.5
Pornography	75.9	78.3	80.7	81.9	77.1	79.5
Pregnancy disability	86.8	90.4	90.4	90.4	89.2	90.4
Pregnancy discrimination	84.0	92.6	93.8	93.8	92.6	93.8
Cuba	52.1	73.2	83.1	81.7	78.9	83.1
Communist loans	62.5	69.3	69.3	73.9	73.9	69.3
Mean % predicted correctly	66.8	77.0	82.6	82.7	79.2	80.4
Mean % correct: domestic	69.4	79.3	83.8	83.4	80.2	81.9

tion, and the Cuba votes. Including the direct measure of personal ideology—or its two components combined (pure personal ideology and induced values)—improves predictions by a further 5.6 percent to almost 83 percent.

When I split simple partisanship into its two components, induced partisanship outperforms pure personal values. Augmenting the multivariate null model to include induced partisanship leads to an average of 80.4 percent correct predictions, for a gain of 3.4 percent. Adding only pure personal ideology gets us 2.2 percent more correct predictions (79.2 percent). The induced-only model performs worse than the multivariate null only for the draft. It does about as well on the Communist immigration, death penalty, sex education, desegregation, pornography, the two pregnancy votes, and Communist loans. Most of these are moral issues on which legislators pay close attention to constituency attitudes. Only on the neutron bomb, abortion, and Cuba—two foreign-policy votes and an issue on which partisan elites are far more polarized than the rank and file—does pure partisanship have powerful effects.

Pure personal partisanship, the presumed best measure of legislators' own values purged of influences from fellow partisans, performs worse than the multivariate null on three votes—the draft, pornography, and pregnancy disability. Only on the neutron bomb and Cuba does it lead to substantially improved predictions. Induced values have a considerably greater impact than senators' own values on abortion—just as we would expect on a highly volatile issue that is highly charged electorally and divisive among elites. Pure personal partisanship outperforms the constituency component of the reelection constituency (induced partisanship) on two votes—the neutron bomb and loans to Communist countries, both low-visibility foreign-policy roll calls that might tap legislators' own ideals.⁶ The Cuba vote, which is more electorally salient (especially to elites within the Republican party), is better predicted by induced than by personal partisanship.

On average, when I add both personal and induced partisanship to the multivariate null model, there is a 5.7 percent gain in predictive success compared to the multivariate null model (which includes all predictors except the two components of personal ideology). Since induced and personal partisanship are (by construction) independent of each other, I can partition the gains in predictive success. Induced beliefs account for 3.4 percent more votes, personal partisanship 2.2 percent more. Sixty percent of the gain in predictive success comes from the

shared views of elites and constituency demographics; less than 40 percent is due to personal partisanship.⁷

The Policy Indulgent and the Electorally Indigent

Which legislators are most likely to “indulge” themselves in pure personal ideology? We saw (in chapter 2) that Northern Democrats are less likely to shirk than Republicans and Southern Democrats. What happens when I change focus to all three components of legislator ideology?

The results are the same—but more so—in the estimations for pure personal partisanship. Of the 14 roll calls, Northern Democratic pure personal partisanship is significant at $p < .10$ on only 3: the neutron bomb ($p < .005$), ANTISTRIPE, and pornography (both $p < .05$). (See table 12.) For Republicans and Southern Democrats, 11 of the 14 coefficients are significant at $p < .10$. Ten meet at least the $p < .05$ level, and

TABLE 12. Summary of Partisan and Regional Effects of Three Components of Legislator on Roll Call Voting

Vote	Northern Democrats			Republicans and Southern Democrats		
	Personal	Induced	Constituency	Personal	Induced	Constituency
Communist immigration	—	.05	.005	—	.05	.05
Death penalty	—	—	—	.05	.10	.10
Draft	—	.05	.01	.05	.05	—
Sex education	—	.10	.05	.05	.05	.05
Neutron bomb	.005	.01	.001	.005	.005	—
Desegregation	—	.10	—	.05	.05	.10
Abortion	—	.05	—	.10	.05	—
Pornography	.05	.05	.05	—	.005	.10
Pregnancy disability	—	—	—	—	—	.05
Pregnancy discrimination	—	—	—	.05	.005	—
Cuba	—	.05	.05	.05	.05	—
Anti-strip mining	.05	.10	—	.005	.0001	.05
Panama Canal	—	.01	.0001	.0001	.005	.0001

Note: Entries are p -levels (one-tailed tests) for logits or regressions predicting roll call behavior with models as laid out in chapter 2.

3 votes (the neutron bomb, Communist loans, and the Panama Canal index) qualify at $p < .005$ or less. Conservatives go beyond their core partisan constituents on all votes except Communist immigration, pornography, and pregnancy disability. In contrast, we see that induced partisanship matters, especially for Northern Democrats. Ten of the 14 coefficients for the combined effects of the reelection and the personal/primary constituencies are significant at least at $p < .10$. For conservatives (Southern Democrats and Republicans), 12 of the 14 coefficients are significant, four at $p < .005$ or better.

Induced Ideology and Elections

Do senators who vote their own consciences suffer electorally? I estimated a simultaneous-equation model for primary- and general-election vote shares based upon the results in chapter 3 to examine the distinctive effects of pure personal and induced ideologies. There is no need to estimate anything as complex as the models in that chapter, since pure personal ideology is presumed to be independent of electoral forces.⁸ The results for all senators are presented in table 13. When we split legislator ideology into its two components, the dynamics of chapter 3 become clearer. Pure ideology, either from the geographic or the reelection constituency, is unrelated to electoral success in *either the primary or the general election*. *A more liberal induced ideology costs a few votes in the primary, but it takes a much greater toll in November*. Senators who move one standard deviation in a liberal direction away from induced partisanship party lose 4 percent of the vote in the primary.⁹ Moving a similar amount to the left of statewide induced ideology costs 4.7 percent in the general election. The pattern resembles that of chapter 3, but points to the *shared* component of ideology with other elites, rather than legislators' purely personal values, as the reason senators lose votes in November.

These models are tentative because they focus only on incumbents. When we examine both incumbents and challengers in chapter 5, we shall see greater effects for personal ideology for both primary and general elections. The big impacts in November still reflect induced values, but challenger partisan constituencies carry the load. We shall also see greater impacts across partisan blocs. We can get a glimpse of the impacts for challengers from these data. The more liberal a Democrat's pure personal

ideology—either from the geographic or the reelection constituency—the more money the challenger raises and spends ($r = .385$ and $.459$, respectively). The impact of personal ideology is indirect: Liberal Democrats who bolt too far left are likely to draw stronger challengers, who will

TABLE 13. Simultaneous Equation Model of Primary and General Election Effects of Induced and Pure Personal Ideology

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-Statistic
Primary Election Model			
Constant	80.573	8.743	9.216
Pure personal partisanship	-2.938	2.341	-1.255
Induced partisanship	-2.940	1.830	-1.607*
Senator's party ID	-.438	.179	-2.447***
Seniority	-.470	.222	-2.116**
Primary challenger quality	-41.700	7.102	-5.872****
Last general election	.433	.169	2.564***
$R^2 = .406$ Adjusted $R^2 = .348$ SEE = 12.823 $N = 68$			
General Election Model			
Constant	-10.701	18.462	-.580
Pure personal ideology	-.378	2.172	-.174
Induced ideology	-3.920	1.504	-2.607***
Challenger expenditures	-.006	.001	-4.318****
Senator's party ID	.803	.134	5.995****
Population diversity	60.558	24.266	2.496***
Primary vote	.239	.108	2.206**
$R^2 = .417$ Adjusted $R^2 = .360$ SEE = 9.378 $N = 68$			
System $R^2 = .410$			

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

be more likely to unseat them in November. The effects of deviating from both state partisans and induced values are indirect.

The splitting of the two types of member values obliterates the straightforward relationship of chapter 3. It may well be that voters in November are not as issue oriented as primary electorates. They may simply see shirking and punish it without caring what drives senators away from the center. We should not make too much of this debate about ideology, because the models in chapter 3 and in table 13 show that the key determinant of (Northern) Democratic success in general elections is the party's edge in party identification. Most of the Democratic senators who lost in 1980 came from minority parties in their states. In a Republican year, their times were up.

The money game plays both ways. The more liberal Republican senators are relative to their geographic and reelection constituencies, the *less* money their challengers raise ($r = -.364$ for statewide pure ideology and $-.409$ for state party pure ideology). Moderate Republicans who survive primary challenges will face Democratic challengers with smaller war chests. Once they make it past the first race, moderate Republicans are relatively home free—just as conservative Democrats are. They need this protection in their moderate-to-liberal states because they are most likely to face quality challengers (who will be well funded) in states where their party has a smaller share of identifiers ($r = -.486$). The one tool that incumbents use to drive away good challengers—huge war chests—are less likely to be available to liberal Republican shirkers (Jacobson and Kernell 1983). Republican senators with more *conservative* induced ideologies raise more money than those with liberal activists ($r = .338$ for statewide and $.323$ for state party models). Liberal Republicans don't scare challengers away with their money. They do it with their roll call votes.

Campaign contributors seem to have different interests than voters, activists, or legislators (cf. Denzau and Munger 1986). They may be driven toward special interests, but they are not ideological. The Republican incumbents who raise the most money are the ones who are closest to their constituents—both statewide and state party. Democratic incumbents of *all stripes* appear to raise money with equal ease (or difficulty). The money tree shakes best for challengers taking on incumbents out of step with both constituents and activists. If campaign contributors seek influence with incumbents, getting too close to out-of-step legislators or activists is risky.

Masses, Elites, and Legislators

Personal ideology may not shape legislators' votes, but it may send signals to activists. The significance and the modest shifts in probabilities of voting yea on roll calls may be subtle cues to the activists in a senator's primary constituency, the very people who push the member to the left or the right. Elites pay more attention to nuances, to legislators' policy statements, and to committee and subcommittee activities. They may be more interested in position taking (Mayhew 1974) or behind-the-scenes activities (Hall and Wayman 1990) than in roll call behavior.

Senators, like entrepreneurs in any other enterprise, need to establish reputations (Kreps 1990). Reputations signal to voters and elites where legislators stand; they show constituents that leaders are consistent and credible (Dougan and Munger 1989; Glazer and Grofman 1989). They also help deter potential challengers within the party and boost the shirker's vote share in the primary. Yet, too strong an ideological stance will cost votes in November. Legislators want to show voters that they have principles. They don't want to stand too far away from their constituents, who might ultimately turn on them.

The dyadic legislator-constituency linkage suggests a simple representational dilemma: Do you vote your conscience or your constituency? A third dimension complicates the problem: You need to protect your base, ranging from your loyal supporters to your political allies and confidants to your campaign contributors. Legislators' success in November depends upon how close they are to their constituents. Elections make legislators the most responsive of all elites. They can use ideology to develop reputations that will give them name recognition, but since party identifiers, elites, and legislators share similar values, voters may use rational shortcuts by placing more emphasis on induced rather than personal ideology. We continue to see support for the ideological-equilibrium model, but it is not quite as straightforward. It pays to be ideological—even more so than your reelection constituency—in the primaries. Yet, the benefits legislators reap come from the ideological positioning of their core partisan supporters, not from their own personal ideology. It *hurts* legislators to be too ideological come November. The tendency to move toward your core partisan supporters can be costly in the general election. Once again, the problem doesn't appear to be legislators' own values. Instead, they pay a price for sticking too closely to their reelection, primary, and personal followers.

The principal-agent models err when they posit legislators with interests that are opposed to those of their constituents. Legislators rarely stray far from their base, their reelection, primary, and personal constituencies. And most of the time there is little conflict with the geographic constituency. For 55 of 96 senators (57.3 percent), the dominant ideology is the same for geographic and reelection constituencies. In principle, legislators can be both ideologues *and* Downsians. They get into trouble only when they follow their elites too far. And it is liberals who face a more hostile environment. All 13 senators with progressive reelection constituencies come from moderate geographic electorates.¹⁰ No senator faces a reelection constituency with an ideology that directly conflicts with the full electorate. Legislators can get into trouble for going too far. But it would take considerable effort to go against *both* geographic and reelection constituents. Only one Republican senator of the 20 with conservative geographic and reelection constituents had an ADA score of more than 50; only one Democrat of the 13 with a liberal reelection following had an ADA score below 50.¹¹

When voters punish legislators, they take out their frustrations on senators' fellow partisans, not on the "personal" ideology of the legislators. For legislators don't exercise their own judgment as much as they reflect the multiple constituencies they represent. Not one senator has a pure personal partisanship that qualifies as a "shirker" (with a score of 1.96 or greater in absolute value). Moreover, the next chapter shows why legislators don't need to worry so much about going past their reelection constituents: Challengers and their parties are often more out of step with public opinion than incumbents. Sitting legislators can often afford the luxury of getting out of step a little because their opponents stand so far outside the mainstream.