

## Representation and Culture

The representational nexus is more complex than many have thought. Yet it is not complete. As chapter 5 makes clear, context matters in representation. Some states make it easier for senators to be more liberal than their fellow partisans. Others make it more difficult. What can we say about the dynamics of representation beyond the strategies of candidates (converging or diverging) and the closeness of a race? Are there societal forces that structure the relationship between legislators and constituents?

A logical place to look is a state's political culture. Culture is the doyen of contexts. It is more encompassing than electoral competition or ideology, though both depend on it. Culture is the set of common understandings of a polity or its sections. For that reason, it is also, many argue (see esp. Barry 1970, 50), so vague as to be either tautological or useless: We behave in certain ways because of our culture and our culture consists of how we behave. It's not worth fighting the big fight over tautologies. Instead, I hope to demonstrate the importance of culture empirically. It helps us to understand variations in legislator ideology and how these values affect elections.

Culture is an encompassing idea. It is a summary concept that incorporates political and social life in a polity. Dividing American states into distinct cultures implies that there are different patterns of values—and behavior. Distinct sets of values should lead to divergent patterns of representation. Elazar (1972, 85) divided the American states according to three dominant cultures, or “historical source[s] of . . . differences in habits, perspectives, and attitudes.” The *individualistic* culture portrays democratic governance as a marketplace. Political life in this culture depends upon strong parties, the only devices that prevent individualism from running rampant. Yet, individualism shuns ideological extremes

(Elazar 1972, 94–95). The *moralistic* culture glorifies politics as a great activity in the search for a good society. Parties may be useful, but they are not central to moralistic cultures. Party loyalty “can be abandoned with relative impunity” (96–98). The *traditionalistic* political culture emphasizes protection of the traditional social order, limiting power “to a small and self-perpetuating group drawn from an established elite.” Parties “encourage a degree of openness that goes against the fundamental grain of an elite-oriented political order” and thus play only a limited role in traditionalistic cultures (99).

The representational linkage in each culture follows the dominant worldview. In individualistic states each party has a well-defined set of core supporters, reflective of the ethnic and economic divisions that separate Democrats from Republicans. But these are the most competitive states. And parties often put a higher premium on the tangible rewards of holding office than on policies (Elazar 1972, 100–101, 135–39). A close balance between the parties in a marketplace culture suggests that the Downsian model would be most appropriate in this culture. More so than in other states, elected officials should pay heed not only to their own core supporters, but also to independents and opposition party identifiers. Strong party ties suggest that both mass and elite opinions within a legislator’s party should shape representation. Yet they should not pull legislators far away from the center of statewide opinion. The median voter reigns in the political marketplace. Deviations from the middle are costly.

Moralistic cultures are consumed with issues. Many are competitive, though several had dominant Republican parties when Elazar wrote (1972, 100–101, 135–39). By the late 1970s and early 1980s, GOP bastions such as Wisconsin, Iowa, Vermont, and the Dakotas had become more competitive electorally. Ideological politics in a competitive environment implies a polarized ecology. While issues often crossed party lines in the 1950s and 1960s, when Elazar first wrote, party coalitions became far more polarized in the 1970s and 1980s (W. Miller 1988). These divisions have long been — and still are — strongest in the moralistic culture. Moralistic states remain hotbeds of issue cleavages, but now with a much greater partisan undertow. So representation and elections should reflect the ideological-equilibrium model of representation rather than the Downsian. The values of independents and opposition party members don’t matter. In secure electoral environments, still mostly Republican in moralistic states, legislators can represent their

core supporters with little fear of electoral retribution. In more competitive arenas, mostly seats held by Northern Democrats in this culture, a polarized electorate might not provide legislators clear directions about where to go. So public officials might decide to stick with their base, even at the risk of offending voters at the other extreme—and in the middle of a state's distribution. This strategy is fraught with electoral hazards.

Traditionalistic cultures remain conservative. They should be less competitive than other states, but they are no longer the one-party bastions of the 1950s and 1960s. And the core constituents of Democratic parties in these states, even in the South, now tilt slightly leftward. Traditionalistic states have weak party organizations and give incumbents strong margins. The shape of representation remains one of elite domination (Elazar 1972, 100–101). Senators will pay close attention to the attitudes of fellow party elites in their states. Those who don't—who stake out their own agenda or become too close to their core supporters (for moderate-to-liberal Democrats) will pay an electoral price. Politics in traditionalistic cultures is a mixture of the party activist and Downsian models. Elites pay more attention to other elites. But if they stray too far from the conservative consensus in this culture, they are likely to pay an electoral price.

Traditionalistic states are not only dominated by elites. They are also conservative and (at least in the 1970s and early 1980s) still dominated by one party (mostly the Democrats). In a culture with a dominant worldview, legislators won't often be driven away from the values they share with their various constituencies. When deviations occur, they should be punished severely in elections. Individualistic cultures are marketplaces of ideas. They are more liberal than other cultures. Legislators don't stray far from public opinion; when they do they can often get away with it in elections. Voters are comfortable with their Northern Democratic liberals and give them leeway to be even more progressive than they are. The real clash of ideas comes in moralistic cultures, which are more polarized than other states. Conservative Republicans battle liberal Northern Democrats. Elites push each bloc to be more extreme than the public would like, and voters devote considerable effort to bringing legislators back in line.

Elazar's typology of political culture is dated. It was originally formulated in the early 1960s. I make no pretense that the world has stayed the same. Yet culture is presumed to be an enduring force. I shall note how

changes in the societies (especially in the traditionalistic states of the South) have affected representation since the 1960s. Yet, overall, Elazar's categories stand up well. The social and political environment about two decades later still differs across Elazar's categories of culture. And others find that this three-decade-old typology still helps predict key aspects of the social and political terrain today. Putnam (1995, 682 n. 17) finds that Elazar's typology is strongly correlated with state-level differences in social trust and membership in voluntary organizations.

### **The Ecology of State Political Culture**

Individualistic cultures are concentrated in the large industrial states of the East and Midwest. Moralistic cultures dominate in the Midwest and Prairies, especially in rural states with a strong Progressive tradition. Traditionalistic states are prominent in the South and the West. I classified each state according to the dominant category Elazar assigned it (see his table, 1972, 118).

There is modest variation among the cultures in geographic constituency opinion.<sup>1</sup> If we look instead at the difference in percentages identifying as liberal and conservative, we see greater polarization. Traditionalistic cultures are the most conservative (with a mean score of  $-19.6$ , indicating a conservative electorate), followed by moralistic (mean =  $-15.4$ ) and individualistic ( $-9.6$ ). These overall scores hide variations within and across parties. Individualistic cultures are the most liberal for Democrats and the least conservative for Republicans. The moralistic cultures are slightly less liberal for Democrats. For Republicans, moralistic and traditionalistic cultures are equally far to the right. Traditionalistic cultures are the only conservative bastions for the Democrats.<sup>2</sup> Individualistic states are the most liberal, traditionalistic the most conservative. Reelection constituencies are strongly polarized in individualistic states but not in traditionalistic cultures, as Elazar would expect. However, the parties are every bit as polarized in moralistic states as they are in individualistic states.

Elite opinions follow a similar pattern (see table 20). For congressional candidates and party elites from the senator's party, for candidates and elites from the opposition, for senators' interest group ratings, and for three measures of personal ideology, traditionalistic cultures stand alone on the right. Moralistic and individualistic cultures fight for the honor of being centrist across these measures. On four measures

(simple partisanship, induced partisanship, and the two opposition party measures), moralistic cultures are more centrist than individualistic states. Senators' own elites are more liberal in moralistic cultures.

In polarized party systems Democratic identifiers tilt to the left and Republicans to the right. Fifty-two percent of these polarized reelection studies are found in moralistic cultures. Of the states with elections in 1982, candidates were slightly more likely to take distinct stands in moralistic states.<sup>3</sup> Only in moralistic states are party elites polarized. Contrary to Elazar's expectations, individualistic states *don't have polarized parties*. Instead, the minority party adopts the same ideological platform that the majority espouses. Both parties tilt toward the left of center. The only contest in traditionalistic states is how far right one can get.<sup>4</sup>

Beyond ideology, there are other differences across cultures. Individualistic states have strong party organizations, on both Mayhew's traditionalistic scale and for local party organizations for both the in-party and the out-party.<sup>5</sup> These states are also wealthy, with a lot of union members and few fundamentalists. Individualistic cultures dominate in industrial states, especially in the Northeast. Moralistic states have weak party organizations, but highly educated residents who hunt and fish. They are largely, though hardly exclusively, found in the Midwest. The traditionalistic culture, which is prominent in the South, has weak parties (cf. Key 1949, 399) and lower education and income. In

TABLE 20. Elite Ideology and Political Culture

	Traditionalist	Moralist	Individualist
Party congressional candidates	43.703	28.079	33.609
Other party congressional candidates	51.015	41.531	34.496
State party elite ideology	-.808	.643	.303
Other party elite ideology	-.755	.350	.251
Incumbent PRO-LCV score	-.891	.689	.475
Incumbent ADA score	.273	.614	.535
Simple personal ideology	-.662	.326	.274
Simple personal partisanship	-.481	.114	.330
Induced partisanship	-.379	.075	.276

*Note:* All comparisons across cultures are significant at least at  $p < .002$ . Positive values for congressional candidate ideology indicate greater conservatism. (The signs for candidate ideology are reflected in regression and probit analyses for ease of interpretation in this and preceding chapters). For party elites and personal ideology and partisanship, positive values indicate greater liberalism.

this conservative environment, there are many fundamentalists and few environmentalists.

### Culture Clashes

Traditionalistic states are conservative, individualistic more liberal, and moralistic cultures are battlegrounds between competing ideologies. Culture is more than ideology. It is a synopsis of how beliefs are *structured*. Traditionalistic states are not just conservative. They are dominated by elites. Individualistic states are more than just liberal. They are both economic and political marketplaces—in the classical sense of liberalism. Moralistic states are battlegrounds among highly educated masses and polarized elites.

If culture is about how ideas are structured, representation should reflect the traits of each culture. When senators deviate from public opinion in moralistic cultures, they should reflect the polarization between the parties among both the masses and the elites. Traditionalistic states should see greater conflicts among elites than among fellow partisans. Individualistic states, as marketplaces, should have the widest range of actors: fellow partisans, out-party members, independents, masses, and elites should all participate in the battle for senators' ideological souls. I present the results of regressions for simple personal ideology (as defined in chapter 2) in table 21. The models I estimate include variables beyond mass and elite actors. I focus on these masses and elites in the text.

Moralistic cultures are driven more by mass opinions than by elite attitudes. Senators with conservative primary/personal constituencies bolt more to the right than their geographic constituencies would prefer ( $p < .05$ ). Northern Democrats move to the left when their fellow congressional candidates are more liberal ( $p < .10$ ). And senators of both parties shift leftward when the *opposition party's* congressional candidates are liberal ( $p < .10$ ). The biggest impact comes from one's own partisans. A liberal reelection constituency leads to a more progressive personal ideology ( $p < .001$ ). In each case, we see support for the ideological-equilibrium model: Legislators go in the direction of—and beyond—the dominant ideology of their reelection and primary/personal constituencies. But there is also support for a Downsian perspective. A more heterogeneous electorate—states that voted Democratic for Congress but Republican for president in 1972—sends a message to senators

TABLE 21. Determinants of Simple Personal Ideology in Different Cultures

Independent Variable	Moralist	Traditionalist	Individualist
Constant	5.113*** (1.554)	3.416*** (.700)	-.884 (.551)
Senator's party liberal-conservative difference	.044*** (.012)	.041** (.012)	.005 (.007)
Other party liberal-conservative difference			.014** (.005)
Electoral heterogeneity	-.114** (.045)		
Congressional candidate ideology: Northern Democrats	.023* (.015)	.040**** (.010)	.049**** (.006)
Congressional candidate ideology: opposition party	.020* (.012)		
State party elite ideology: Republicans	.671** (.266)	.423**** (.104)	.524**** (.131)
Last general election	-.030* (.017)	-.001 (.003)	
Union percentage	-.005** (.016)		
Growth rate	-.031** (.013)	-.023** (.008)	
Percentage independent			.034** (.018)
Other party state elite ideology			.480**** (.118)
State party centrist			1.090*** (.307)
Traditional party organization		-.303** (.089)	
Opposition state party strength		-2.455**** (.542)	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.381	.759	.673
SEE	.724	.397	.604
N	33	25	32

Note: Entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ . \*\* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ . \*\*\*\* $p < .0001$ .

that they must heed the call of the center of their geographic constituency. A heterogenous electorate tempers liberalism ( $p < .05$ ). So does a close race in the last election ( $p < .10$ ).

There aren't many ideological differences between masses and elites in traditionalistic states. Elite views largely trump the attitudes of reelection constituents. One's own party identifiers matter ( $p < .05$ ), but they are dwarfed by elite attitudes. For the handful of Northern Democrats in traditionalistic states, congressional candidate views exert a powerful pull. But in this more conservative environment, even elites push senators to the right ( $p < .0001$ ). Republican party elites also move GOP senators rightward ( $p < .0001$ ). While party organizations are weak in traditionalistic states, any signs of life push senators further to the right ( $p < .05$ ). So does opposition party identification ( $p < .0001$ ). The Democrats dominate in most traditionalistic states. When the Republicans show strength, the Democrats need to fight fire with fire. They need both stronger organizations and a more conservative ideology. Opposition party identification breeds stronger organization and both pushes senators to the right, much as Key (1949, chap. 18) argued over four decades ago. Opposition party strength and strong organization only temper elite dominance in traditionalistic cultures. They have no effects in more competitive environments.

Individualistic states are marketplaces for political ideas. Senators pay attention to their reelection constituencies, opposition party identifiers, independents, and the primary and personal constituencies of *both* parties. Moralistic states are political battlefields between competing ideologies. Individualistic states are more homogenous politically. Northern Democrats are liberal. Republicans may not be quite so liberal, but they are often moderate. And independents are more progressive in these states than elsewhere. So senators respond to the entire gamut of forces. They face a less contentious environment than legislators in moralistic states. GOP senators can veer leftward because their state party elites are more progressive ( $p < .0001$ ). Northern Democrats respond similarly to their party's congressional candidates ( $p < .0001$ ). Legislators from *both* parties respond to more progressive elites of the *other party* ( $p < .0001$ ).

Elites are hardly the whole story. If a senator's own reelection constituency is centrist (as opposed to conservative), (s)he will tilt leftward ( $p < .001$ ). *If the other party's identifiers are more liberal*, senators feel free to vote more progressively than the electorate would prefer ( $p <$

.05). Liberalism also thrives in states with a large bloc of independents — whose ranks take voters away from the GOP more than from Democrats in this culture ( $p < .05$ ). Individualistic cultures are a mixture of mass and elite influence, but they are not the battlegrounds that moralistic states are. Both voters and activists are relatively progressive. Liberal senators rely upon this (relative) consensus to build up support for their own agendas. Moderate senators find themselves pressured to tilt more to the left. By going beyond public opinion toward party elites, senators in individualistic states garner extra support in primaries that will help them — at least indirectly — in November, as I shall argue below. Senators from moralistic states can only please their fellow partisans. They are thus always fighting for their political lives. Legislators from individualistic states build broader coalitions that give them comfortable electoral cushions unavailable to other liberals.

The story of the effects of political culture largely supports Elazar's view, updated to reflect changes since he described the different environments. Both partisans and elites lead senators from moralistic states to go beyond their geographic constituents. Representation in traditionalistic cultures depends most strongly on primary and personal constituencies, much as Elazar and Key argued. Today's traditionalistic states are no longer one-party bastions dominated by insulated leaders.

In each case we see a mixture of Downsian and ideological-equilibrium motivations. Legislators must pay attention to electoral consequences, but how much they deviate from their reelection constituencies depends upon both mass and elite ideologies. Only in individualistic states do we see anything approaching a straightforward Downsian model: Legislators respond to the full range of attitudes. Yet, even here primary/personal constituencies matter a lot.

### **Elections as a Context Sport**

The payoff for representation is the electoral connection. The payoff for a contextual approach comes when different cultures produce distinct electoral connections. Simple partisanship differs across contexts. Do electoral patterns follow suit? I first consider general elections and then move on to primaries.

Party strength follows political culture. Traditionalistic states lack political competition. Over 80 percent of senators from this culture come from one-party dominant states. Almost 40 percent of voters identify with

their senator's party. Democratic senators in this culture are particularly advantaged: 43.8 percent of voters in traditionalistic states identify with their party, while just 24.8 percent say that they are Republicans. Individualistic states occupy a middle ground. Half of the senators come from one-party states; 29 percent identify with their senator's party. The Democrats have an advantage (32.7 percent to 24.8 percent), but it is far narrower than in the traditionalistic culture. The moralistic states are the most competitive. Only 20 percent are single-party. The parties are evenly balanced, each with about 30 percent of the electorate.<sup>6</sup>

These party distributions have electoral consequences. Incumbents average only 53 percent of the vote in their next election in moralistic states, compared to 62 percent in traditionalistic cultures and 60 percent in individualistic states. Incumbents face quality challengers 44 percent of the time in moralistic cultures, compared to 32 percent of the time in traditionalistic cultures. Most surprising is the dearth of good challengers in *individualistic* cultures, where only 22 percent of out-party candidates held prior office.<sup>7</sup>

Party affiliation helps explain these patterns. In moralistic states, Northern Democrats are most vulnerable (with an average vote share of 50 percent), but Republicans are safe (average vote share of 61 percent). Northern Democrats are most secure in individualistic cultures (average vote share of 63.1 percent), followed closely by traditionalistic cultures (60.4 percent average vote). Republicans are weakest in traditionalistic cultures (52 percent) and almost competitive with Northern Democrats in individualistic states (56 percent). Traditionalistic cultures have become more competitive than Elazar could have imagined. They are no longer one-party bastions that promise officeholders an easy ride.

For both parties, about 40 percent of senators from this culture face challengers who have held previous office. Moralistic cultures give safer haven to GOP incumbents, who never in this sample face quality challengers. Over 60 percent of Northern Democrats from moralistic states face strong contenders. These Democrats get their revenge in individualistic states, where just 8 percent face top challengers, compared to 39 percent of Republican incumbents. *Northern Democratic incumbents are doubly advantaged in individualistic cultures: They have an edge in party identification and face weak challengers. They also face the least conservative geographic constituencies<sup>8</sup> and the most liberal reelection and primary/personal constituencies. The Republican advantage in moralistic states stems from weak Democratic challengers, not from their dominance of*

party strength. They also benefit from the relative conservatism of moralistic states.

Moralistic cultures are a tale of party polarization in moderately conservative electorates. This should provide fertile grounds for Republicans, but they hold just 29 percent of Senate seats in these states. Individualistic states have big advantages in Democratic-identification, moderate statewide electorates, liberal Democratic partisans, and weak GOP challengers. Yet Republicans and Democrats split these states equally. What drives electoral outcomes in different political cultures? I present regressions for general-election vote shares in each environment in table 22. As I have done in previous analyses, I use legislator ideology

TABLE 22. Determinants of General-Election Vote Shares in Different Cultures

Independent Variable	Moralist	Traditionalist	Individualist
Constant	28.194** (9.744)	87.405** (26.068)	42.619**** (9.092)
(Simple personal ideology)	-2.581* (1.481)	-7.809** (2.938)	2.926** (1.405)
Pure personal ideology	-1.880 (2.581)	-2.692 (3.664)	5.164** (1.763)
Induced ideology	-3.340* (.176)	-11.897** (3.484)	3.633** (1.088)
Opposition party moderate ideology percentage		-1.374** (.550)	
Opposition party mean ideology			10.184** (4.383)
Last general election	.362** (.194)		
Challenger quality	-8.887** (4.196)		-4.994** (1.922)
Challenger expenditures	-.003 (.003)		-.009*** (.001)
Senator's party identification		.668** (.212)	
Adjusted $R^2$	.534	.531	.718
SEE	7.157	10.484	4.153
$N$	22	22	23

Note: Entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ . \*\* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ . \*\*\*\* $p < .0001$ .

(deviations from the geographic constituency) rather than partisanship (deviations from the reelection constituency) in the equations for general-election results. To get a clearer handle on what shapes elections in the three cultures, I divide simple ideology into its two component parts, pure and induced ideologies. For each model, I also estimate the same regression using simple ideology instead of its two component parts. The coefficients for simple ideology are presented right after the constant, with the variable listed in parentheses. Finally, I focus on how legislator ideology affects vote shares, leaving the explanation of other variables in the models to notes.

Simple ideology matters in each culture, but with different consequences. Voting more liberally than one's constituents costs votes in moralistic and traditionalistic cultures but adds ballots in individualistic states. A standard-deviation shift to the left of the geographic constituency costs a senator 2.7 percent of the vote in moralistic states and 3.1 percent in traditionalistic cultures.<sup>9</sup> It produces a 2.6 percent bonus in individualistic states. The numbers are more dramatic when I break simple ideology into its component parts. A liberal pure personal ideology costs 1 percent in moralistic states and 1.5 percent in traditionalistic states. Neither of these effects is statistically significant. Only in individualistic states is there a significant effect ( $p < .05$ ) for pure ideology, and here it *helps incumbents*.

Induced ideology trumps pure personal partisanship. It is significant in all three cultures. Only in individualistic states do the values of a senator's core supporters matter less than personal ideology. An induced ideology that is a standard deviation further left costs senators from moralistic states 2.9 percent and legislators from traditionalistic cultures 7.3 percent ( $p < .10$  and  $p < .05$ , respectively). Elites and to a lesser extent party identifiers are polarized in moralistic cultures. Voters punish senators for associating with the wrong crowd.

Induced ideology is most costly in traditionalistic states, where masses and elites are conservative. If senators go against both, they pay dearly. A standard deviation shift leftward yields a vote loss of 7.3 percent. Individualistic states are more hospitable to liberals. A leftward pure personal ideology will gain 2.5 percent of the vote ( $p < .05$ ), while a similar shift in induced values will gain 2.9 percent.<sup>10</sup>

These results make some sense and raise some puzzles. Induced ideology matters more than personal values. The message most of the time is: Going further right is an ideological equilibrium. Going too far

left summons the wrath of a Downsian electorate. These results confirm the findings of chapters 3 through 5; they stem from the dominance of conservatives among statewide electorates. Where liberalism is more in fashion, in individualistic cultures, moving leftward helps. Yet, there are some nagging questions: Why are there weak electoral effects in the polarized moralistic states? And why should traditionalistic cultures, mostly one-party states with lopsided races, be so much more responsive to roll call deviations than the other cultures?

The puzzles are explained by partisan differences. The inferences about parties in distinct cultures are tentative, since they are often based on small number of cases.<sup>11</sup> When I break the results down by party, pure ideology matters more in moralistic cultures than induced values. Northern Democrats lose 16.3 percent of the vote for each standard-deviation move to the left in pure ideology and (an insignificant) 1.2 percent for induced ideology. Republicans drop 15.5 percent for each standard-deviation move *to the right* and an additional 5.4 percent for induced ideology. Democrats lose votes when they are too liberal, and Republicans lose votes when they are too conservative. Voters in moralistic cultures, which have produced some of the most famous profiles in courage (Norris, the La Follette family in Wisconsin, William Proxmire, Hubert Humphrey), punish senators more for their own transgressions than for the behavior of their core supporters. *It would not make much sense to be a profile in courage if you didn't face any risks.*

In traditionalistic states ideology matters only for Democrats. A one unit shift leftward in pure personal ideology costs 5.4 percent of the vote, while a similar shift in induced values penalizes the incumbent by 9.2 percent. The South has had more than its share of courageous legislators, including Senator Frank Graham (NC) and Representatives Frank Smith (MS) and Carl Elliott (GA).<sup>12</sup> All complained that their stands on civil rights ultimately cost them their seats. Miller and Stokes (1963) tell of Rep. Brooks Hays (AK), who lost his seat to a write-in candidate in 1958 on the same issue. Lyndon B. Johnson, who won many elections on his path from local office to the White House and lost a few as well, learned a lesson from the 1938 defeat of his friend Maury Maverick in a Democratic primary. Maverick was an aptly named liberal member of the House. Johnson wrote of his loss in a memo to himself that he reread often: "Maury got too far ahead of his people, and I'm not going to do that. Don't get too far away from those Texans" (quoted in M. Miller 1980, 68).

Each member was penalized for his personal ideology but was also a creature of his district (or state). They all represented constituencies that were more progressive than the South as a whole or even their states (for representatives). So when voters cast ballots against these legislators, they were reacting even more strongly against their supporting coalitions than legislators' personal values. Politicians can balance their own ideology with their core supporters' values or play to the dominant ideology in their states. Senator John Tower (R-TX), one of the biggest "shirkers" in chapter 2, was less out of touch when I break his personal partisanship into pure and induced components. Both measures put him considerably to the right of center. He was going too far in the right (and correct) direction, so he was safe. His Democratic colleague Lloyd Bentsen was somewhat more liberal than his geographic constituency, but he was to the right of his reelection and primary/personal constituencies (as his induced partisanship score indicates). He struck just the right balance and was electorally safe. On the other hand, Graham's fellow North Carolinian Robert Morgan was slightly to the left of his reelection constituents. His pure personal partisanship and induced partisanship were also somewhat liberal, especially for a Southern Democrat from a traditionalistic state. Morgan lost to conservative Republican John East in 1980.<sup>13</sup>

The big surprise is that pure ideology is more costly for Republicans than Democrats in moralistic states. GOP incumbents win a larger vote share than Northern Democrats, are at parity in terms of party identification, and are no more extreme in their ADA ratings or either measure of statewide personal ideology. They should benefit from the relative conservatism of moralistic states. Yet, they pay a somewhat greater electoral price. GOP candidates may be the victims of favorable circumstances. Their advantages are so great that they scare off quality challengers. No Republican in a moralistic culture faced a quality challenger, while over 60 percent of Northern Democrats from these states had to run against a candidate who held some elective office. So Republican races are likely to be low key, with candidates taking distinct stands—where ideology counts most (see chapter 5). Democratic contests may also involve diverging candidates, but they are usually hard fought—and ideology is not quite so powerful.

There is a similar dynamic with the roles reversed in individualistic states. Northern Democrats largely get a free ride: Only 1 in 13 faced a quality challenger (7.7 percent). Republicans have a rougher time: Al-

most 40 percent (5 of 13) faced opponents who previously held elective office. Moralistic Democrats and individualistic Republicans each lost almost 10 percent of the vote if they faced a quality challenger.<sup>14</sup> Northern Democrats from individualistic cultures also run in low-key races where candidates take distinct stands, so they have big advantages over their Republican counterparts, who may face strong challengers with similar issue positions. Senators who get out of step with their geographic constituencies are likely to face stronger challengers. When Republicans in individualistic states go too far to the right, they are more likely to invite a strong challenge.

Each culture has a distinct pattern of representation. In moralistic states, Democrats are drawn to the left and Republicans to the right by reelection, primary, and personal constituencies. Both pay a price in the general election if they stray too far from their geographic constituencies. Legislators in traditionalistic states are pushed to the right by elites and lose votes if they don't go far enough. Senators in individualistic cultures respond to a marketplace of ideas, but in this more progressive environment they prosper most when they go further leftward than the full electorate would wish. Democrats fare better than Republicans when they flaunt their liberalism, but even Republicans have little to fear from moderation in these states.

Each culture's ideology shapes its pattern of representation. Traditionalistic cultures are elite driven and punish excess liberalism. Individualistic states are more progressive and responsive to a wide range of ideas; here liberals flourish. Moralistic states are the ideological battlegrounds of American politics, with partisan identifiers and elites pushing senators to take distinct stands and a moderately conservative statewide electorate jostling toward moderation.

Most of the country penalizes senators for being too liberal. In a country where most voters identify as conservative, legislators should emphasize either concordance with prevailing winds or at least some semblance of moderation. Follow the center, Downs argued, and for most of the country this is good advice. One bloc of states stands out twice: Northern Democrats from individualistic cultures have more liberal constituents than any other senators (first), and they are rewarded for going further left than their constituents would wish (second). Their personal ideology doesn't affect their vote shares. But, for each standard-deviation shift leftward in their induced values, they gain 3.7 percent. Northern Democrats gain extra votes when the opposition is

conservative ( $p < .05$ ). For each standard-deviation increase in the state mean ideology scale (where positive scores indicate greater conservatism), the incumbent gains 2 percent of the vote. The impact holds only for Northern Democrats. Republicans neither gain nor lose from ideology in individualistic states. Their electoral fate depends upon the quality of the challengers they face.<sup>15</sup>

The cultural story provides a message for liberals. Go with the majority and moderate in conservative areas. Go with your core supporters in your heartland. Conservatives have less to fear from issue voting. Either they gain from it (Democrats in traditionalistic cultures) or largely escape its effects (Republicans in both traditionalistic and individualistic states). Democratic and Republican voters are polarized in individualistic states, but *both sets of primary/personal constituencies are relatively liberal*. In traditionalistic cultures, both masses and elites are on the right in each party. *Only when masses and elites are both polarized, as in moralistic states, will both liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, pay a price for being out of step with the public*. Democrats lose votes when they are too liberal, Republicans when they are too conservative.

The Downsian message still rings true: Candidates should not stray too far afield. They should resist the temptation to follow their reelection, primary, and personal constituencies. If they listen too closely to the people to whom they are closest, they will pay at the polls. Only when they are in a supportive environment can they “indulge” themselves. You can binge with other bingers. And you know you are not alone. When voters punish you, these results indicate, they take out their frustrations on how far afield your *personal* ideology is. When they reward you, they salute your supporters as well.

Yet, Downs is wrong in a fundamental sense. Most legislators are not moderates. In traditionalistic and individualistic cultures, they espouse the *dominant* ideology in their state. Downs would have no problem with this, since his legislators converge to the median. But many, if not most, senators go *beyond* mass attitudes to reflect party activists. While deviations from public opinion have electoral costs, legislators don't hew the center line to keep themselves safe. Either they are secure already (as in traditionalistic and individualistic states), or they feel such a strong pull from party activists that they willingly risk vote loss. In one culture, we have sufficient cases to make comparisons between incumbents and challengers in 1982. We might expect out-party candidates to

converge to the incumbent's ideology in individualistic cultures. They don't. Only 43 percent of the 13 races in 1982 have candidates taking similar positions. One-third of Northern Democratic incumbents find their GOP opponents taking liberal stands, while just over 40 percent of Republican incumbents have Democratic challengers adopting their stands.

If party elites lead legislators away from the geographic constituency and deviations from public opinion cost votes in November, why do rational legislators stand apart from public attitudes? One key linkage emphasized so far is that ideology helps legislators gain votes in primaries, and the extra votes in the spring bring more ballots in the fall. Does this logic hold across cultures? I turn now to an examination of how legislators' partisan values affect their primary vote shares.

### Primaries and Culture

As with general elections, primary outcomes are driven by different forces in each culture. The differences are not quite so stark, largely because senators overwhelmingly win their primary contests regardless of context. Senators fare best in moralistic cultures, with an average vote share of 87.3 percent. But the other two ecologies are not far behind, with an average vote share of 84 percent. The differences among cultures are not significant. Democrats and Republicans fare equally well in primaries across all cultures.

I present the regressions for primary election vote shares in table 23. The first cut at ideology finds no effect for simple partisanship in any culture. When I break ideology into its components, the story changes. In moralistic culture a liberal induced ideology costs votes in the primary ( $p < .001$ ), just as it does in the general election. Each standardized move to the left costs incumbents 7.2 percent of the vote. The only other impact for any type of personal ideology is in individualistic cultures: A liberal pure personal ideology *costs incumbents about 5 percent of the vote for each standardized change*. This is most puzzling. In the most progressive culture, it is better to be too liberal (relative to all voters) in the general election than to be too liberal (relative to one's partisan bloc) in the primary.

The enigma disappears when we look at partisan as well as cultural divisions.<sup>16</sup> Liberal pure partisanship *helps* Northern Democrats in individualistic cultures ( $p < .05$ ). Each standard-deviation shift leftward

gives them an additional 5.3 percent of the vote. Induced values, which help in the general election, have no impact in the primary. Republicans in individualistic states get neither a boost nor a punishment from ideology in the general elections But *both pure personal ideology and induced partisanship matter in primaries*. A standard-deviation shift *rightward* in personal partisanship brings Republican incumbents 8.6 percent more of the vote ( $p < .0001$ ). A conservative induced ideology gives individualistic Republicans an additional 6.4 percent of the vote ( $p < .01$ ).

TABLE 23. Determinants of Primary-Election Vote Shares in Different Cultures

Independent Variable	Moralist	Traditionalist	Individualist
Constant	131.600**** (11.999)	123.100**** (9.020)	113.000**** (25.337)
(Simple personal partisanship)	-3.530 (2.991)	.081 (2.878)	-3.484 (3.565)
Pure personal partisanship	3.365 (4.048)	-.707 (5.058)	-8.953* (5.582)
Induced partisanship	-12.439*** (3.400)	.451 (4.346)	-.416 (3.362)
Senator's party identification	-1.761**** (.400)	-.628** (.183)	
Polarized ideology among state partisans	-20.734**** (5.748)		
Percentage rural	.359** (.135)	-.202** (.114)	
Primary challenger quality		-50.585**** (10.539)	-44.994**** (9.897)
Percent independent liberals			-1.999** (1.026)
Percent environmental activists			2.963** (1.587)
Other party opinion distribution			-9.690** (4.164)
Adjusted $R^2$	.318	.636	.362
SEE	12.101	11.078	14.960
$N$	26	22	26

Note: Entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ . \*\* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ . \*\*\*\* $p < .0001$ .

As in the general election, Northern Democrats gain by voting more liberally than their partisans wish. Republicans gain votes in primaries by appealing to their conservative core. They pay no price for their ideology in the general election, though they get no boost either. While some GOP senators in this culture prevail in primaries, others do pay a price. In two instances the conservative core of the party dumped incumbents deemed to be too liberal, Clifford Case (NJ) and Jacob Javits (NY). They wounded Edward Brooke (MA) and almost upset Charles McC. Mathias (MD). Brooke lost in November, but Mathias won a substantial victory in the fall. Conservatives in individualistic cultures can take out their frustrations on moderate-liberal GOP legislators in primaries. Once legislators get past the first hurdle, they are in less danger from ideology.

Republicans lose votes in November by moving to the right of their geographic constituents in moralistic cultures. Yet they *gain* support in primaries by being more conservative than their reelection and primary/personal constituencies. Each standard-deviation shift rightward in induced partisanship brings a GOP incumbent an extra 16 percent of the vote! A similar movement in personal partisanship gains an additional 5.2 percent of the primary vote ( $p < .0001$  and  $p < .01$ , respectively). Ideology is important for both parties in November in moralistic cultures. Yet neither type of partisanship affects primary votes for Northern Democrats. Democrats in moralistic cultures largely get a free ride. None face quality challengers, and 40 percent have no primary opposition at all. Even Northern Democratic incumbents who have opposition do better than any other cultural/partisan bloc but one (Northern Democrats from traditionalistic cultures).

Weak competition makes for an issueless politics in primaries, if not general elections. Low-key races where candidates take distinct positions are not walkaways. Incumbents in these contests average 60 percent of the votes, a far cry from the almost 90 percent garnered by Northern Democrats from moralistic cultures in their primaries.<sup>17</sup> Incumbents who face either no opposition or weak challengers are less likely to benefit from — or lose votes because of — issues.<sup>18</sup>

Where do we stand? In chapters 3 and 5, I reported that Northern Democrats lose votes in general elections if their pure ideology is too liberal. We now see that this holds only for moralistic states. In individualistic states, they gain votes in the primary if their personal partisanship is liberal and in the general election if their induced partisanship tilts

leftward. Initially, I reported (chapter 3) that Northern Democrats win extra votes in primaries by bolting leftward. Now we see that this reasonable expectation is more compelling than the contrary finding in chapter 5, but only for moralistic states. Legislators represent constituents in different cultures. Northern Democrats have more liberal pure and induced ideologies in moralistic cultures than in other cultures with one exception.<sup>19</sup>

Northern Democrats go leftward in the primary because that is where their reelection constituents are. A leftward tilt helps them in November only in individualistic cultures, where the sum of Northern Democrats and independents who identify as liberal is greater than the share who call themselves conservatives. The progressive position may not be the ideal point of the median voter, but it is of the support coalition needed to win: one's own party identifiers and independents, who constitute 70 percent of the electorate for each of the Northern Democratic groups. Individualistic Democrats don't need to converge to the center of all voters. They have a secure base. Moralistic Northern Democrats face a more conservative statewide electorate. Independents in moralistic states are relatively conservative, so Northern Democrats from these states are forced to adopt a more explicitly Downsian strategy in November. These legislators have more liberal personal partisanship than their colleagues from individualistic states. More pronounced positions in less friendly environments lead to more competitive elections, just as Downs foretold.

In chapters 3 and 5 I showed that Republicans fare better in primaries as they vote more conservatively than their reelection constituents would prefer. Republican senators' ideology, either simple or pure, plays no role in the general election. But the results in this chapter tell a somewhat different story. Some of the differences reflect who was up for reelection in 1982: GOP senators facing the electorate in that year had more liberal induced ideologies (both statewide and state party).<sup>20</sup> So the "liberalizing" impact of induced values may reflect the more liberal class of Republicans that I examined in chapter 5. Almost 80 percent of Republican senators up for reelection in 1982 came from individualistic cultures, where the negative impact of induced liberalism in primaries is smallest.<sup>21</sup> In the two other cultures, largely unrepresented in chapter 5, conservative core supporters bring extra votes. And voters in these states sympathize more with the right than the left. The reelection, primary, and personal constituencies of Republican senators are most conservative in

moralistic states, followed by traditionalistic, and then individualistic.<sup>22</sup> So it is not surprising that conservatism helps in primaries.

Why does conservatism hurt GOP incumbents *only* in moralistic states? Neither pure nor induced ideology affects Republican vote shares in traditionalistic cultures. Statewide ideology is only marginally (and not significantly) more progressive for GOP-held moralistic Senate seats compared to traditionalistic ones. And the same holds for the various measures of personal ideology, as well as straightforward measures such as ADA or LCV ratings. What differs is the spread of ideology in moralistic states. The standard deviations for both the ideology of the geographic constituency and the share of liberals minus conservatives are about twice as large for moralistic states as in traditionalistic ones.<sup>23</sup> Being a strong conservative is more risky in moralistic cultures than in traditionalistic states for Republicans, just as taking too progressive a stand can be hazardous to Northern Democrats.

### Culture Clash

People may see ideology similarly across regions. But the dynamic of representation varies across cultures. The traditionalistic culture is still dominated by elite views. The individualistic culture is more of a marketplace, where even opposition partisans' views matter. And moralistic states are ideological battlegrounds among both masses and elites. Representation reflects the dominant worldview in each culture. The most conservative culture relies most heavily on elite views, the most liberal on public attitudes. Electoral battles are most hard fought in moralistic cultures (at least those states with Democratic incumbents). And there senators gain votes in the primary from going with the dominant ideology in their party and lose votes in November if they stray too far away from the center and toward their parties. In individualistic states Northern Democrats gain votes in both the primary and general elections by veering leftward. Southern Democrats gain by progressivism in the spring but need to shift rightward in the fall. Republicans from traditionalistic cultures are the mirror images of Northern Democrats from individualistic states: They gain votes in both the primary and general elections by deviating rightward.

We come to a hybrid of the ideological-equilibrium and Downsian models: Go to the left (or right) in the primary and to the center in the general election. The model is plausible and has the great virtue of

putting together two plausible accounts. There are three problems that give us pause. First, if most senators don't face quality challengers in the primary and average 85 percent of the vote, why do they need to worry about satisfying their core partisans? Couldn't they moderate their behavior in the spring to prepare themselves for the fall?

No. Changing positions is electorally risky. And a strong ideological identification brings out the faithful. For Republicans in traditionalistic and individualistic cultures, there is an astonishingly high correlation between primary vote share and induced partisanship (in both cases the correlation is greater than  $-.9$ ). Southern Democrats gain from a liberal induced partisanship ( $r = .65$ ). *Primaries give primary and personal constituencies the chance to energize the reelection constituencies for the race in November.* Induced rather than personal partisanship shapes primary vote shares. Senators' personal partisanship is largely independent of past electoral history. The correlation with *previous* primary vote share is just  $-.058$ .<sup>24</sup>

Many senators face little opposition in primaries, so there is little need to adjust their voting records after an election. The strong effects of candidate partisanship (especially induced partisanship) on the *next* primary election together with the generally weak effects of the *last* primary on current ideology suggest that legislators stand pat, but voters do not. Senators mostly don't change their positions in response to a poor primary showing last time out. Their ideology is largely shaped by pressures from their reelection, primary, and personal constituencies. But the reelection constituencies sometimes respond to legislator behavior. Even those who lose votes because they are not sufficiently politically correct don't (at least in this sample) actually lose their primaries.

The first objection wouldn't matter if you could please your base, who would then mobilize on your behalf and boost your vote share in November. The relationship between ideology and electoral success would be indirect. You wouldn't need the extra votes in the spring because you feared losing the primary. These additional ballots would be an insurance policy for November. Except that they're usually not, and this is the second problem. In only two contexts—Northern Democrats from individualistic states and Republicans from moralistic cultures—is there a spillover from the spring to the fall.<sup>25</sup> And these are the cultures where incumbents need help *the least*. They are the essential liberal and conservative constituencies, where legislators *don't need to*

*moderate their positions to get extra votes in the fall.* Where senators face a real dilemma of representation, they find it difficult to play the ideologue in the spring and the centrist in the fall. Traditionalistic Southern Democratic states, moralistic Northern Democratic cultures, and individualistic Republican states are the key electoral battlegrounds. The latter two have close races. All three have different optimal strategies in the primary and general elections.

Third, legislators who shift their positions from the primary to the general election, or at any time during their terms, risk being accused of waffling. It may be riskier to change your position than to take an unpopular one (Downs 1957, 103–10). Stratifying roll call behavior by election years has little effect on either general ideological stands or the relationships between personal ideology and election outcomes (chaps. 3 and 4).

If we view legislators as creatures of their constituencies, we see that their values reflect their environments. This is not a question of determinism versus free will or of any similar philosophical debate. Instead, it is an argument about the type of person who *can win* first a primary and then a general election, who *can energize a base* to get nominated and elected. If you are out of step with your core supporters, you won't be taken seriously by the activists who can get you your first nomination and mobilize resources for your first election. In an era when parties don't matter as much as in the past for nominating and electing politicians, it is easy to dismiss the role of party activists in representation. Some candidates have such a wide personal following that they can afford to keep their distance from party activists. John Glenn (D-OH), a former astronaut who long battled his state's party organizations, is a prominent example (see chapter 7). Most don't have such a base and must court fellow partisans who will do the legwork required to put them and keep them in office. Even those who have the name recognition and resources usually come to the Senate from a different route than Glenn did. They come up through the ranks, holding lower-level elective office before they get to the Senate (or the House). They have neither the opportunity nor the desire to stake out an ideology distinct from their fellow partisans. They share values with others like them.

These "others" are hardly the same everywhere. This is the message of both Fenno's *Home Style* and Elazar's *American Federalism*. Different constituencies make distinct representational demands on their

members. Some are service providers, others ideologists. Some districts (or states) expect their senators to be liberals, others conservatives, and still others moderates. This is the message of *Home Style*.

Ideological appeals can be a viable strategy when there is greater ideological consensus among a state's voters, as in individualistic and traditionalistic cultures. When party identifiers are polarized, as in moralistic cultures, there are greater pressures for each party's candidate to respond to elites — and to take stands that could hurt them in the general election. Two-thirds of races in traditionalistic cultures find candidates converging, compared to 46.7 percent of races in individualistic and 33.3 percent of contests in moralistic states.<sup>26</sup> Candidates are most likely to take similar stands when party identifiers take similar positions: 28.6 percent of races find converging candidates when Democratic and Republican identifiers are divided ideologically, compared to 52.6 percent when they are not.<sup>27</sup> In traditionalistic cultures, it is safe to be a conservative — and both candidates are. In individualistic states, liberalism is acceptable, especially for Northern Democrats. There is no safe strategy in moralistic states. It is better to be a conservative than a liberal. Yet, Republicans who lurch too far to the right face electoral difficulties, as do Northern Democrats who tilt too much to the left.

Moralistic states have weak party organizations on Mayhew's (1986) scale.<sup>28</sup> So do traditionalistic cultures. Weak organizations in a competitive environment make ideology a trap. Parties are collections of like-minded citizens who place a greater emphasis on ideology than on winning elections. Party elites push candidates to extremes. There are few organizational loyalists to bring candidates back to the center. Democrats move to the left, Republicans to the right, and both pay an electoral price. Parties in traditionalistic states are also weak, but there is an ideological consensus with less electoral competition. Elites still play a larger role in traditionalistic cultures than elsewhere. They reinforce the conservative ideology of the electorate. So it is safe for legislators to hue to a conservative line. In the more liberal individualistic culture, strong party organizations are compatible with ideological politics. Senator Paul Douglas (D-IL) believed that political machines could even foster liberal sentiments among candidates (see chapter 1). And going to the left, at least for Northern Democrats, is a profitable strategy in a progressive environment.

Culture shows us that neither the ideological equilibrium/party activist model nor the Downsian framework tells the whole story. The

ideological-equilibrium account is fundamental to understanding the dynamics of primary elections everywhere. It also explains voting behavior where there is a dominant ideology — and where there is less electoral competition (as in the low-key diverging races of chapter 5). The Downsian account still has power, but in nonobvious ways. Candidates are most likely to converge where there is an ideological consensus. Yet incumbents who are in sync with their electorates and are lucky enough to draw an opponent who takes the minority position are sitting pretty. They can use ideology to their advantage, satisfying both their party faithful and the broader electorate. Ideology hurts candidates in the traditional Downsian sense where parties are most polarized.

Representational styles, and the consequences of not following public opinion, vary by culture. These patterns conform to most of Elazar's expectations. When we "update" his expectations to account for both political and demographic changes, the cultural trichotomy is even more helpful in explaining both how and why legislators vote with or against their constituents. Is it all in the constituencies? What about the Washington environment? Before the journey is over, we need to look at the institutional context of Congress. Legislators face many temptations to desert their constituents in the nation's capital. The next chapter examines the institutional connection.