

The Institutional Bases of Ideology

Are senators mostly creatures of their states? Don't they "go Washington"? Legislators can't be experts on everything; they rely upon their colleagues for voting cues (Matthews and Stimson 1975). Spend any time at the Capitol and you will realize that its culture is unlike any of the 50 states. The accoutrements of power shape one's worldview. Presidents and lobbyists cajole legislators in an attempt to pull them away from constituency pressures. Everett McKinley Dirksen (R-IL) became Senate minority leader in 1957. He came to believe, as other leaders did, "in the Senate with a reverence that approached religious intensity" and believed that "the Senate became an end in itself" (MacNeil 1970, 156).

Fenno (1991a, 108) speaks of a committee "chairman's vision" that "explains the need for party leadership — for someone to take a broader political view." Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), chair of the Budget Committee, admitted that his leadership position demanded that he not "always vote the way [New Mexicans] would want me to on everything, but I try my best and I am genuinely concerned about everyone in my state" (quoted in Fenno 1991a, 187). And former House minority leader Robert Michel (R-IL) argued, "There are some issues that I'd like to represent the people back home on, but that's not the will of my conference. If I do that [reflect constituency preferences] too many times, the conference will accuse me of being parochial."¹

If institutions matter, the Washington environment should help to shape personal ideology. I test three institutional models in this chapter. First, do leaders pay more attention to their institutional duties — and less to their constituents — than followers? Second, I consider a variant on the Kalt-Zupan (1990) institutional model. Its principal concern is monitoring costs: Do senators who face imminent reelection toe the

constituency line more than legislators whose next contest is further away? Do retiring members indulge themselves more than others? Do more desirable or more ideological committees lead senators to ignore their constituents more often? I add committee and party leadership positions to this model to capture a wider range of structural effects. There are scattered institutional effects across different cultures. But they are not consistent and sometimes are counterintuitive.

The final test looks at whether senators from the same state have similar personal ideologies. If senators' personal ideologies reflect their constituencies, the two senators from each state should vote similarly to each other. Same-state senators vote alike only if they are from the same party. This is an institutional challenge to the argument that public opinion shapes roll call voting. Once again, differences that seem to reflect structure reflect different constituency dynamics—and some strategic behavior by incumbents from minority parties.

Take Me to My Leader—and Away from My Voters?

Leaders have different responsibilities from rank-and-file members. Members of the House and Senate use the committee system to bring benefits back home. Leaders (and “control committees” such as Appropriations, Finance/Ways and Means, Budget, and House Rules) impose some order on this grabbing for goodies. They restrain constituency demands to preserve institutional authority. Leaders must also speak either for—or against—the president. The electorally secure are most likely to become leaders, largely because they are the only ones with sufficient electoral capital to spare in a job that *demand*s that they pay less attention to their constituents and more to their institutional needs (Mayhew 1974, 145–58).

Party leaders and committee leaders face different incentive systems.² Party leaders have responsibilities to the president or opposition party. This will tear them away from constituency demands. Rep. Joseph Martin (R-MA) noted that he toned down his “comparative” liberalism when he became House minority leader in 1939 to adopt an “at-least-near approach to the center of the Republican spectrum” (Martin 1960, 83). Michel cited the need to “take a leadership position to help the president” on foreign policy. Leaders are given free rein to loot the Treasury for their states (as exemplified by Howard Baker, R-TN, and especially Robert Byrd, D-WV). In return, they are expected to put

their own and their constituency's policy preferences aside in deference to the dominant views of their parties. Democratic leaders will generally be more liberal than their constituents, Republicans more conservative.

There are countervailing pressures. Because party leaders are symbols to the nation, parties are generally reluctant to select their most prominent ideologues, no matter how secure they are electorally. Party chieftains are expected to be faithful representatives, even servants, of their party in the Senate (Matthews 1960; Davidson 1985). Yet, they must also protect their own electoral flanks so that they can continue in their Washington roles. Byrd, never widely admired by fellow Democratic senators as a policy leader, believes that his first obligation is to *all* West Virginians (quoted in *Congressional Record*, Daily Edition, December 20, 1995, p. S18966):

[P]arty has a tendency to warp intelligence. I was chosen a Senator by a majority of the people of West Virginia seven times, but not for a majority only. I was chosen by a party, but not for a party. I try to represent all of the people of the state—Democrats and Republicans—who sent me here. I recognize no claim upon my action in the name and for the sake of party only.

Byrd practices what he preaches. His simple ideology scores are slightly to the left of his geographic constituency (.165) but considerably more conservative than his reelection constituency (−.687). His pure personal ideologies follow suit: slightly to the left of all West Virginians (.191) and more to the right of fellow Democrats (−.487). Byrd racked up huge electoral margins—his lowest vote share was his first Senate election in 1958 (59 percent), and he was not even challenged in 1976. This security gave him the leeway to seek out a leadership position. But, like Michel, he never forgot who sent him to Washington. His core partisan supporters are considerably to the right of other Northern Democrats (−.617 compared to a group mean of .038). So are his fellow party elites (−.627 compared to .511). Even for party leaders, constituency ties may come first.

Committee leaders are not tied tightly to—or against—the president. Only a handful of committee chairs have “institutional” responsibilities in running control committees. Ranking minority members have even fewer restraints. Since committees vary in their goals and strategic

premises, we cannot assume that there is an overarching design to committee leaders' behavior (Fenno 1973). Some committees want to pursue ideological agendas, others to ensure the reelection of all of their members (including the leaders). Committee leaders must satisfy their members, but their responsibility is to their panels, not to their parties. Republican party leaders gain public exposure by drifting to the right; there is no corresponding political currency for committee chairs, who must work with Democrats to gain projects for their states. Committee leaders have a shield of protection that party leaders don't: the seniority system. Especially in the Senate, where individualism is highly prized, senators are reluctant to overthrow committee leaders. In 1977–78, 35 percent of committee chairs were Southerners, compared to 27 percent of all Senate Democrats. Southern conservatism ensured that committee leaders were less liberal than the rest of the Democratic caucus (Matthews 1960, 164–65; Sinclair 1989, 107).

This was also the period that marked the end of moderate-to-liberal Eastern Republicans. Before their retirements or defeats (often in primaries), Javits, Case, Brooke, and Stafford secured successive reelections by appealing to Democratic and independent voters. They accumulated a lot of seniority and the ranking minority positions that went with them. Together with other moderates such as James Pearson (KS), Mark Hatfield (OR), and Charles Percy (IL), they held more than half of all ranking minority member positions in 1977–78.³ Republican committee leaders, in the aggregate, should well represent their geographic constituents but tilt to the left of their reelection constituents.

Party leaders are more conservative than the rank-and-file members.⁴ Table 24 presents the personal ideology scores for nonleaders and party leaders for simple ideology and partisanship and pure personal ideology and partisanship. The italicized entries in the third row are the *p* levels from an analysis of variance (one-tailed tests) when $p < .10$. Party leaders are more conservative (more negative scores) for all comparisons except for pure partisanship. The conservatism of all party leaders is *not* based upon their institutional positions, but rather upon the nature of their reelection constituents. Party leaders reflect the induced ideology of their state party constituencies.

Across all four comparisons, there are no significant differences between Democratic leaders and other Democratic senators. The simple ideology and pure partisanship scores indicate that Democratic party leaders are more *liberal* than the rank and file, but because there are

only two Democratic party leaders,⁵ these differences are not significant. Republican party leaders are more conservative than other GOP senators on three of the four comparisons. When I purge legislator positions of both the reelection and primary/personal constituencies, Republican leaders remain more conservative than other senators, but the difference is no longer significant. The pressures of core partisan supporters, not personal or institutional pressures, push Carl Curtis (NE), Clifford Hansen (WY), and John Tower (TX), to the right. Once I remove the impact of induced ideologies, both Democratic and Republican leaders follow Matthews's (1960, 131) "middle member" model. Such leaders are right in the center of their parties. They are as much servants of their partisans as leaders.

Southern representation may reflect the time period of my analysis. Southern Democratic unity has increased dramatically since the late 1970s (Rohde 1992), and Southern committee chairs have become more ideologically representative of all Democratic members (Sinclair 1989, 107). The South has become more competitive politically with the growth of Republican representation in both houses of Congress. In 1977–78 Southern senators averaged 13.9 years of seniority, com-

TABLE 24. Personal Ideologies of Nonleaders and Party Leaders in the Senate

	Simple Ideology	Simple Partisanship	Pure Personal Ideology	Pure Personal Partisanship
All senators	.050 -.744 (.030)	.051 -.766 (.025)	.019 -.277 (.093)	.011 -.167
Democrats	.376 .770	.009 .029	.027 .098	.018 .329
Republicans	-.514 -1.501 (.020)	.124 -1.164 (.015)	.005 -.464 (.035)	.000 -.415

Note: Entries in the first row are the (standardized) scores for simple ideology, simple partisanship, pure personal ideology, and pure personal partisanship for senators who are *not* party leaders. Entries in the second row are the scores for party leaders. Positive scores indicate that senators vote more liberally than their constituents would prefer; negative scores indicate that senators vote more conservatively than their constituents would prefer. Italicized entries in the third row represent one-tailed tests of significance in an analysis of variance. Where there is no entry, the results are not significant at $p < .10$ or better.

pared to 9.3 for others. Southern committee chairs averaged 30.2 years of service, compared to 6.0 for other Southerners. The figures for other senators were 17.6 and 6.5. Southern committee chairs averaged 76.2 percent of the vote in their previous elections, compared to 63.8 percent for other senators. The difference was less pronounced for non-Southerners: 62.5 percent versus 57.3 percent. The correlation between committee leadership and chamber seniority was .947 for Southern Democrats, .612 for Northern Democrats, and .708 for Republicans. As party competition increases, the duration of senators' careers will shrink. Only Southern Democrats show moderate-to-strong correlations between personal ideology and seniority. As total seniority falls and the strong linkage between tenure and leadership wanes, committee heads will be less prone to vote against their constituents.

Committee leaders are representative of both their states and nonleaders (see table 25). The only significant difference for all senators occurs on pure personal ideology. The gap in standardized scores is modest (.156) and is significant only at $p < .09$. Republican committee chairs, despite their Eastern bias, are no less attentive to their constituents than nonleaders. Democratic committee chairs tilt more to the right

TABLE 25. Personal Ideologies of Nonleaders and Committee Leaders in the Senate

	Simple Ideology	Simple Partisanship	Pure Personal Ideology	Pure Personal Partisanship
All senators	.078 -.182	.027 -.062	.049 -.107 (.090)	.043 -.100
Democrats	.504 .054 (.038)	.129 -.341 (.042)	.118 -.210 (.025)	.112 -.218 (.041)
Republicans	-.734 -.435	-.169 .238	-.075 .003	-.089 .027
Northern Democrats	.750 .584	.115 -.272	.148 -.134 (.092)	.049 -.207
Southern Democrats	-.235 -.741 (.021)	.171 -.445 (.035)	.035 -.324	.303 -.236 (.052)

Note: For an explanation of the table, see the note to table 24.

than their fellow partisans. The differences are greater for the two simple measures (.450 for geographic and .470 for reelection constituencies) than for pure ideology or partisanship (.328 and .330 respectively). The Democratic bias is largely attributable to Southern senators. While Northern Democratic chairs are slightly to the right of the rank and file, these differences are generally not significant. Southern Democratic chairs have more conservative personal ideologies than nonleaders.⁶

Leading a committee may require special devotion to the internal politics of the Senate. Tending to Washington doesn't mean that you have to ignore state interests. Domenici (R-NM) often sided with what he believed to be his constituents' — and his own — moderate views on economic policy to oppose Ronald Reagan's more austere budgets. New Mexicans viewed him favorably both as a national leader and as a faithful servant of the state (Fenno 1991a, 171–80). The senator worked hard to promote the image that he was a national leader but still very much a New Mexican (Fenno 1991a, 186). Leaders face the same set of constraints as other senators, perhaps magnified by the need to reassure voters that they have not lost touch. The case is not closed, however, and I shall include both committee and party leadership in the more complete institutional model that follows.

The Kalt-Zupan Institutional Model

The Kalt-Zupan (1990) institutional model mixes the internal world of Senate politics and the pressures to conform to state ideology from the pressures of upcoming elections. Their model makes two key assumptions. First, senators prefer to vote their personal ideology, while voters want legislators to adhere to public opinion (see chapter 1). Senators are most likely to indulge themselves when they have less to fear from the public. Constituents are most attentive to senators when they are running for reelection. Senators pay far more attention to the public in the fifth and sixth years of their terms than they do in the first four (Fenno 1982). The further away the next election is, the more leeway senators have. The electoral cycle is not part of the inner workings of Congress. But it is an institutional effect nonetheless. It is the calendar, rather than political pressures, that leads legislators to represent their constituents in distinctive ways. Change the calendar and legislators will vote differently, this argument implies. Second, legislators play a different game in Washington than at home. The most important work of Congress is done

in committees, so Kalt and Zupan base their Washington model on these “little legislatures.”

I test a variant of the Kalt-Zupan model (see chaps. 3 and 4).⁷ Just as drivers will go too fast when there are too few police around, legislators should vote contrary to their constituents’ wishes when there is little chance that they will be caught. High monitoring costs gives senators leeway (Kalt and Zupan 1990, 120–21). Members just reelected have time on their side. Voters won’t pay attention to their voting records until later in their terms. Retiring senators have an infinite time horizon. They don’t have to worry about the voters’ wrath and should be most likely to indulge their own ideologies (cf. Schmidt et al., 1996).⁸

The two-year House term inhibits voting against constituency views. The six-year Senate cycle provides greater leeway (Fenno 1982, 37). As one new senator said, “The six year-term gives you insurance. Well, not exactly—it gives you a cushion. It gives you some squirming room” (quoted in Fenno 1982, 37). A large number of studies have shown that senators moderate their voting behavior as they approach reelection (Ahuja 1994; Amacher and Boyes 1978; Elling 1982; Thomas 1985; Wright and Berkman 1986). Senators who were at the beginning of their terms in 1977–78 had less leeway, but still should be more likely to vote contrary to their constituents than legislators close to their next election.

Kalt and Zupan adopt a variant on the reputation argument: Senators build up political capital with constituents based upon their longevity. Senators with “brand names” are more likely to be reelected. As they gain tenure, legislators will also gather more leeway (Kalt and Zupan 1990, 119–20). Brand name is measured by a senator’s tenure, multiplied by the lowest margin of victory in the last primary or general election. Senators with “brand names” should be more likely to vote according to their personal ideology. They have more electoral security, with less to fear from an aggrieved electorate.

The two internal variables are “committee power” and “taste.” The former is the sum of the average length of time it takes senators to become members of each of their committees. Senators use committee positions to bring benefits to their constituents. It takes more time to get on the most powerful committees. Senators with a lot of committee power can bring home the bacon and keep constituents’ eyes off the prize of ideological voting. If you do enough good things for the voters, they won’t care how you vote (Kalt and Zupan 1990, 122). “Taste” reflects a member’s *preference* for ideological voting. Even if each member were to

have equal opportunities to vote against their states, not all would want to “indulge” themselves. Kalt and Zupan argue that legislators are known by the company they keep. Liberal legislators will seek out positions on progressive committees. Conservative senators will prefer assignments on right-leaning committees. Senators who surround themselves with like-minded colleagues are sending signals that they would prefer to vote more ideologically than their states would like. Taste is the average Americans for Democratic Action score for all members of each committee on which a senator serves. My more complete model adds committee and party leadership.⁹

Kalt and Zupan test their model using the absolute values of residuals from ADA ratings, not the PROLCV scores they employ in their earlier work. I shall continue to examine directional ideology. It pays to be cautious of results for all senators, so I shall estimate separate regressions for Northern Democrats and Republicans. Northern Democrats may have a “taste” for liberal committees and GOP senators a preference for conservatism. These contradictory effects may cancel each other out, so it is safer to estimate separate models.

Results in previous chapters are not very sensitive to whether I use ADA or LCV ratings. This time they are. There is no apparent reason why the two group measures yield different results, so I report both. We can impart too much power to structural effects if we stick to just the LCV-based measures. There is a lot of data to summarize, since I use two interest group measures and then compare results for Northern Democrats and Republicans and among the three cultures. So I restrict the discussion to pure personal partisanship. If there is a conflict between “going Washington” and representing one’s state, it should show up in pure personal values rather than in induced ideology. It doesn’t matter much whether we use personal ideology or partisanship. The models are largely the same.¹⁰ For the regression I employ to obtain the “residualized” measures for the ADA scores, see appendix D. Table 26 presents the results for the institutional model for all senators, Northern Democrats, and Republicans.

The LCV results suggest important structural effects. Four of the seven predictors for all senators are significant at $p < .05$ or better. Senators who serve on powerful committees believe that they can deflect unpopular issue positions. They are more liberal than their constituents ($p < .01$). Senators with brand names, long tenure, and high margins of victory also vote against their constituents’—and core supporters’—

TABLE 26. Institutional-Ideology Models

Independent Variable	All Senators	Northern Democrats	Republicans
PRO-LCV Models			
Taste	.379 (1.029)	1.332*** (2.814)	-.827** (-2.007)
Committee power	.008*** (2.602)	.084** (2.117)	.047** (2.163)
Brand name	-.0003** (-1.946)	-.0004*** (-2.567)	.00009 (.235)
Election proximity	-.068** (-1.887)	-.090** (-1.812)	-.014 (-.232)
Retire	-.338** (-2.185)	-.404** (-2.257)	-.252** (-1.973)
Committee leader	.006 (.038)	-.176 (-1.218)	.137 (.688)
Party leader	-.234 (-.876)	.151 (.909)	-.371** (-2.163)
Constant	-.716 (-.747)	-3.445** (-2.914)	1.755 (1.452)
Adjusted R^2	.077	.307	.201
SEE	.631	.574	.517
N	96	42	37
ADA Models			
Taste	.092 (.273)	.597 (1.249)	-.136 (-.299)
Committee power	.001 (.705)	.024 (.609)	-.009 (-.313)
Brand name	-.0001 (-1.067)	-.0004** (-1.666)	.0008 (1.289)
Election proximity	-.091** (-1.970)	-.054 (-.753)	-.010 (-.136)
Retire	-.151** (-.809)	.251 (1.116)	-.293 (-1.123)
Committee leader	.069 (.432)	-.456** (-2.334)	.418 (1.423)
Party leader	-.045 (-.241)	.262 (1.025)	-.106 (-.396)
Constant	-.071 (-.080)	-1.444 (-1.093)	.268 (.204)
Adjusted R^2	-.012	.058	.005
SEE	.692	.699	.693
N	96	42	37

** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

preferences. These electorally secure and senior members vote more conservatively than voters wish.¹¹ Monitoring matters, as principal-agent models suggest (see chapter 1). Senators are more likely to vote *more conservatively* than their core partisans would wish if they intend to retire or have a long time until their next election.

But not so fast. The model does not perform that well. The adjusted R^2 is just .077, and the standard error of the estimate is .631, about the same as the standard deviation for the ideology measure (.657). It is unclear why senators with longer time horizons—a longer electoral cycle, retirement looming ahead, or electoral safety through a brand name—would tilt to the right. The puzzle is hardly resolved when we see (column 2 in table 26) that Northern Democrats prefer to vote more *conservatively* than their core backers and reelection constituencies wish. If legislators secretly want to be ideologues but are constrained by voters (and elites), Northern Democrats should pine to go left. Going right is like a chocoholic at Hershey Park insisting on vanilla. Yes, Republicans who retire (column 3) indulge their conservatism. Like Northern Democrats, they use their committee power to bolt *leftward*. Two institutional findings make sense for the GOP. Republicans on liberal committees fight fire with fire: They veer to the right. So do Republican party leaders, as Michel indicated he faced pressure to do.

The ADA personal-partisanship scores resolve some of these contradictions by eviscerating most of the significant relationships. In the model for all senators electoral proximity is the only significant variable. It retains its negative sign, but it is not significant in the equations for *either party bloc*. The perplexing negative sign (and significant result) reappears in the Northern Democratic equation, together with a more understandable tilt to the right for Democratic party committee leaders. Nothing is significant in the GOP equation. And none of the models performs particularly well.¹²

We have a dismal choice. If we prefer the measures based on LCV group scores, we have more potent findings. Yet, these results defy the predictions of principal-agent models of representation. We can choose pure personal partisanship based on ADA ratings, but we come up almost empty-handed in our search for structural effects. Things don't improve if we shift from the reelection to the geographic constituency. The models are even less impressive, with fewer significant coefficients and patterns just as puzzling.

Maybe there is structural order somewhere else. Institutional factors

vary across cultures: Committee power and brand names are strongest in traditionalistic states. Senators from moralistic states are most likely to be retiring and least likely to be committee leaders. And legislators from individualistic states in 1978 had the longest average time horizon to their next election. Dummy variables for culture have inconsistent effects when added to the model. Yet we know that *patterns of representation*, not just mean scores, vary across cultures. What happens when I estimate the same structural model for each culture?

Not much. Electoral proximity is now significant in four more equations: for all three cultures with the LCV scores, and for the ADA measure for moralistic culture. Committee power in traditionalistic and individualistic cultures leads senators toward greater liberalism (for the LCV indices only). The ADA scores provide some support for monitoring: Senators with brand names bolt rightward in traditionalistic cultures and leftward in individualistic states.

What happened to the corporate culture of Capitol Hill? To a considerable extent, it is a myth. Sure Congress feels like no other place on earth. But largely that's because Capitol Hill is the only place where the entire country comes together. Congress is a very representative institution, sometimes too much so. Senators and representatives talk the Washington talk but walk the constituency walk. There is something beneath it all that reflects an interaction between constituency dynamics and legislative structure. We just haven't found it yet.

The place to look is the interaction between party and culture. But is hazardous because of small *N*s: There are but five Northern Democrats from traditionalistic cultures, 10 GOP moralists, 10 Republican traditionalists, and about 15 from either party who hail from individualistic states. Keeping those caveats in mind, the patterns that I find make a lot of sense.

Northern Democrats from moralistic cultures who join liberal committees vote more progressively than their constituents would wish. Republicans on similar committees from moralistic and individualistic cultures shift rightward. GOP committee and party leaders do have responsibilities.¹³ They seek to *moderate* their parties. Retirement makes Northern Democrats more liberal. Retiring Republicans from individualistic states bolt rightward. And GOP senators from moralistic states vote more conservatively when there is more lead time to the next election. Monitoring matters in moralistic cultures, where the culture is already polarized and voters have shown that they are ready to punish legislators

who get too far afield. It also counts for the minority party in individualistic states.¹⁴ In moralistic states, senators' preferences for ideology (the taste variable) lead Northern Democrats to vote more liberally and Republicans more conservatively than their constituents would prefer. Taste also pushes Northern Democrats to the left in individualistic states and GOP solons to the right in traditionalistic states.

Where parties are polarized, legislators move toward their primary and personal constituencies. Their close ties to like-minded members in the chambers push them even further to the left or right. Legislators are most likely to go beyond their core supporters when they feel most electorally secure. Constituents don't need to expend much effort on monitoring representatives who agree with them on most issues. Policy accord builds trust, which in turn translates into votes (Bianco 1994). This padding gives members the leeway they need to go beyond their constituents' preferences. Such a strategy is not costless. It is difficult for members to get away with going too far beyond their reelection constituencies. In polarized party systems and when one's party is in the minority, it is electorally risky to go too far. When legislators can boldly go beyond their core supporters, structural factors play a lesser role.

Monitoring costs, retirement, and election proximity are significant in several contexts. If legislators maintain consistent voting records and may be able to profit from their ideological stands, why should monitoring matter? First, senators' ideological stands are not frozen solid. The correlation between the 1977–78 LCV scores and later values for members whose terms expired in 1980 or 1982 is .800. The correlations between simple ideology measures is .721; for simple partisanship, it is .535 (cf. chapter 5). Do changes in roll call behavior lead to smaller deviations, especially as the next election approaches? Are senators who face imminent reelection more faithful servants of their geographic constituents? No. For simple ideology, the correlation between stratified personal ideology and election proximity is .196, barely higher than the .160 for the original ideology measure among Republicans. Among Northern Democrats, the correlation drops to $-.014$ from $-.203$. The measures for simple partisanship are similar.

Yet, there are some variations. There is a drop-off in the correlation between simple ideology and stratified values *in the middle of a senator's term*. Senators who have just been elected stay with their ideologies. The correlation between simple ideology and stratified values is .803 for this group, compared to .694 for senators who have three years to go

until they face the voters. The drop in correlations in the middle of a senator's term is particularly noticeable in traditionalistic cultures, as legislators move to the left in the middle of their terms. Democrats, both Northern and Southern, are most likely to shift their positions in the middle of their terms.

Most of the time retiring senators don't indulge themselves in values that run counter to their constituents' preferences. *They are at least as consistent in their values as legislators who plan to run again.* Lott and Reed (1989, 87) argue that such consistency is a hallmark of a politics where ideology is a more powerful motivator than reelection. The correlation between simple and stratified ideology is .846 for retiring senators and .799 for legislators who seek another term. When I divide senators by party and political culture, a slightly different picture emerges. In almost all cases—senators from individualistic cultures are the sole exception—the correlation between simple and stratified personal ideology is *stronger* for members seeking another term than among those who are retiring. For each of these groups (again with individualistic cultures being the exception) the correlation between simple partisanship and stratified partisanship is *higher* for retiring senators than for solons seeking reelection. Retiring members seem to side more with their core supporters, paying less attention to the larger electorate. When we look at the difference in simple ideology and partisanship scores, we see less dramatic differences. No bloc of senators moves sharply to the right or left of the geographic constituency as the election approaches. Legislators from traditionalistic cultures, especially Democrats, move marginally ($p < .07$) to the left to shore up their primary bases.

In only two instances is there any evidence of an electoral effect from shifting positions. Republicans from traditionalistic cultures appear to lose primary votes when they move too far to the left ($r = .817$). But this result is suspect, since five of the seven senators had uncontested primaries and the only close race occurred in Vermont, represented by Robert Stafford, one of the most moderate Republicans in the Senate (who moved leftward as the election neared). A clearer picture of electoral effects occurs in moralistic states, where conservative Republican senators who move to the center of their geographic constituencies gain votes in the general election ($r = -.761$). But most GOP senators from moralistic states move to the *right* of their geographic constituencies. And it is not simply a matter of shoring up their electoral base. Retiring Republican

senators in moralistic states move just as far toward their reelection constituents as legislators who seek another term. Senators who retire and solons who run again, legislators just elected and members whose terms are expiring, behave alike. Most are simply consistent over time. There's no big payoff for big shifts in personal ideology or partisanship. Moving toward your geographic constituents and away from your reelection constituents doesn't create an electoral safety net. The six-year term for senators creates different monitoring problem for some senators. Voters pay more attention to senators who are up for reelection and know less about incumbents who don't face the electorate (Born 1991, 770–71). But this does not mean that senators have a free ride until the campaign has begun. They regularly hear from their primary/personal constituencies — which may drive them to extremes in the early-to-middle years of the campaign. If they go too far left or right, they could set themselves up for danger in the future. They might find it tough to get close to their geographic constituencies. Or they could jump all over the place and let their opponents charge them with inconsistency.

Yet, legislators don't establish reputations for consistency just to win elections. They have their own values. If reputations were largely foils, legislators should cast them off when they announce their retirement. But they don't. Sometimes politicians are even willing to tell voters that their *next term* will be their last.¹⁵ Nor is there consistent evidence that an approaching election will temper the ideological commitment of most legislators. As Lott (1987) argues, the crucial selection occurs at the beginning: People vote for candidates who value the same things they do. This “solves” most of the problem of misrepresentation, since there is no incentive for legislators to vote differently from what their constituents wish. The major dilemma they face is how to balance the demands of their multiple constituencies. But most of the time they get similar messages from each. When problems arise, they come from conflicts among the constituencies. And these difficulties can arise just as easily for members just starting their careers as they can for retiring members.

Legislators' strategy is not the only reason monitoring costs matter. Some senators make it easier for voters to follow their records than others, both by taking highly ideological positions and by maintaining consistency over time. Most voting records are similar over time, and senators are most likely to take extreme positions if they come from supportive environments.

Institutional factors such as committee or party leadership are rarely significant. Committee and party leaders face the same mass and elite constraints as other members. Republican committee leaders have personal partisanship more to the left than other GOP senators. Their reelection constituents are no different from those of other GOP senators, but their primary and personal constituents are more liberal. GOP party leaders have more conservative personal-partisanship scores than other Republican senators. Again, their reelection constituents are typical of other Republican senators, but their primary/personal constituencies tilt more to the right.¹⁶ Northern Democratic senators are in sync with their personal and primary constituents.

Leaders deviate more than followers from public opinion because they are more committed to their primary and personal constituencies. Michel said that his voting pattern was mostly similar before and after he assumed a leadership role. He was grateful to come “from a district that was basically conservative.” Most important, he said, was the need to court his constituents every two years.

I had an opponent every time, and some of my races were close. It made me more understanding of some of my colleagues. I had to work to get reelected if I wanted to continue to be a moderate conservative. So other members couldn't come up to me and say, “Bob, you don't understand my problem. You have a safe seat.”

Successful leaders recognize that they must be middle members in more than one way. They must represent the core of their districts or states as well as of their legislative parties.

The only exception is for Northern Democratic committee chairs, who have more conservative pure partisan values than other Northern Democrats, but whose constituents and party elites are more liberal.¹⁷ Committee leadership is significant in the Northern Democratic equation employing ADA scores. The nine leaders are more conservative than their geographic, reelection, or primary/personal constituents. And they get away with it. They have substantially more seniority (19.8 years compared to 7.5 for other Northern Democrats) and win both their primaries (94.1 percent compared to 78.0 percent) and general elections (70 percent compared to 58.3 percent) with few worries. Personal ideology matters some of the time, but hardly in the way principal-agent models suggest. These Northern Democrats are *too conservative* for

their constituents; despite their personal values, their constituents elect them again and again by overwhelming margins.

Committee leaders are different from other Northern Democrats. But their relative conservatism (ADA scores of 64.5 compared to 74.1 for others, $p < .08$) reflects strategic choices as much as it does personal values. Northern Democrats who become committee chairs come mostly from individualistic cultures, but they don't pursue the same ideological electoral strategy that most of their colleagues do. They are Downsians. They are closer to their geographic constituents' opinion than to their reelection followers'.¹⁸ Their personal partisan values tilt rightward, as independents and especially Republicans become more conservative in their states. Other Northern Democratic senators are immune to independent ideology; they become marginally more *liberal* when GOP identifiers lurch rightward.¹⁹

There is no clear way to tell whether this effect is generational (more senior Democrats are more conservative), strategic (reflecting a Downsian rather than ideological-equilibrium electoral plan), or structural (only moderates or conservatives can gain committee leadership positions).²⁰ No doubt it is some of each, but there is some evidence that personal partisanship reflects constituency dynamics. Committee chairs are far more likely than other Northern Democrats to shift their ideology rightward as the next election approaches. Their colleagues place their ideologies out in front for all to see and judge; chairs risk being charged with inconsistency to gain the votes of opposition party identifiers and independents.²¹

Most of the time structural factors reinforce the ideological proclivities of legislators, their reelection, primary, and personal constituencies. When they don't, they seem to reflect a legislator's reelection strategy. The search for structural effects is not over. I turn now to the puzzle of divided-party Senate delegations.

Birds of a Feather?

Constituency-based theories of legislative behavior have foundered on one of the enduring problems of recent American politics: the waning of partisan attachments and the frequency of split-party delegations. In 1977–78 24 of the 50 Senate delegations had one Republican and one Democrat. Senators in divided delegations vote like Democrats and Republicans, not as representatives of their states. Constituency traits

are of little help in accounting for how split delegations vote (Grofman, Griffin, and Glazer 1990; Poole and Rosenthal 1984). If senators' voting behavior cannot be explained by constituency factors, institutional factors such as party leadership influence may account for differences between Democrats and Republicans (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

Senators from single-party delegations vote alike far more than those from split delegations. The correlations between the PROLCV scores of the two groups are .772 and .284 (see table 27).²² The correlations are similar for simple ideology but drop sharply for simple partisanship and virtually vanish for pure personal ideology and partisanship. So do the differences between same-party senators and members of split delegations. Some of the correlations among same-state senators are depressed by the Arkansas travelers, John McClellan and Dale Bumpers. McClellan was the last of a breed of segregationist conservatives in the Democratic party, Bumpers the harbinger of a new era. I report correlations without Arkansas in the bottom half of table 27; now the correlations for unified delegations uniformly exceed those for split delegations, and often by quite a lot.

These correlations indicate that senators from divided delegations respond to similar forces. They don't mean that split-bloc legislators vote the same way. The biggest differences remain *between the parties, not within them*. The average Republican from a unified delegation is marginally more conservative than one whose colleague is a Democrat:

TABLE 27. Correlations among Ideology Measures for Same-State Senators

	All Senators	Same-Party Delegations	Split Delegations
<i>With Arkansas</i>			
PRO-LCV scores	.507	.761	.263
Simple ideology	.528	.772	.284
Simple partisanship	.449	.483	.416
Pure personal ideology	.176	.220	.101
Pure personal partisanship	-.031	-.041	-.034
<i>Without Arkansas</i>			
PRO-LCV scores	.546	.859	.263
Simple ideology	.568	.868	.284
Simple partisanship	.524	.677	.416
Pure personal ideology	.260	.394	.101
Pure personal partisanship	.088	.146	-.034

Their average ADA scores are 23.7 and 30.5, respectively ($p < .22$). A Northern Democrat with a colleague from the same party is slightly more liberal than a colleague from a divided contingent: Their average ADA scores are 74.2 and 69.5 ($p < .21$). Even these modest differences fade when we look at pure personal partisanship, where the difference between split and unified delegations is .064 for Republicans ($p < .376$) and .001 for Northern Democrats ($p < .500$).

Poole and Rosenthal (1984, 1071) argue that “the support coalition interests within each state” drive similarities among same-party senators (cf. Markus 1974; Jung, Kenny, and Lott 1994). What drives personal ideology in unified and divided delegations? I rearranged the database by state, subtracting one senator’s personal ideology scores from the other’s. I focus on the estimates for personal partisanship since the differences between pure personal ideology and partisanship are minute. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the difference in pure partisanship scores for a state’s senators. I use the absolute value because there is no natural way of ordering a state’s senators. The bigger the absolute difference, the more polarized the two senators are.

The portrait of the two types of delegations suggests that we need two different types of models. If senators are divided more by party than by constituency traits (Poole and Rosenthal 1984; Grofman, Griffin, and Glazer 1990), same-party senators should agree with each other far more than divided-party contingents. This is captured well in the concept of induced partisanship, which is necessarily the same for both solons for a single-party delegation and is far less consistent for senators from divided delegations ($r = .616$). Party differences are mostly encapsulated in induced partisan values. The gap between divided and unified delegations is far smaller for pure partisanship. The absolute difference in personal partisanship is greater in states with divided delegations, but not by much. The mean scores are .761 for split contingents and .666 for unified delegations.

For divided contingents, the key determinants of differences in personal ideology ought to be different support coalitions for the two parties. I could make the same argument for unified delegations if I had data on each senator’s electoral base. But I do not. I have assumed that senators’ reelection constituencies are primarily partisan. Senators from the same state party have, by assumption, identical supporting coalitions (so there is no need to estimate models for induced ideology or partisanship). There are also differences among senators that may reflect their

institutional positions, their own styles or strategies, or unmeasured aspects of their support coalitions. I report the regressions in table 28.

Split delegations do reflect senators' different supporting coalitions. Senators are more likely to have different personal partisan values when they represent states with a diverse populations and when party elites are strongly polarized (both $p < .0001$). *The greater the share of conservatives among independents, the larger the differences in partisan values among solons of different parties. There is an unexpected source of*

TABLE 28. Models of Absolute Ideology for Divided and Unified Senate Delegations

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-Ratio
A. Divided Delegations			
Constant	-8.040	1.935	-4.155***
Absolute difference in elite attitudes	.474	.082	5.760****
Population diversity	10.788	2.057	5.245****
Absolute difference in partisans' ideology	-.020	.011	-1.901**
% conservatives: independents	.136	.034	4.017****
$R^2 = .709$ Adjusted $R^2 = .645$ SEE = .301 $N = 23$			
B. Unified Delegations			
Constant	2.557	.708	3.611**
Absolute differences in seniority	.028	.009	3.109***
Elite ideology	.497	.086	5.751****
Dominant party	.530	.174	3.048***
Population diversity	-5.721	1.637	-3.494***
$R^2 = .601$ Adjusted $R^2 = .521$ SEE = .432 $N = 25$			

** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

moderation: fellow partisans. The greater the absolute difference in reelection constituents' ideology (as measured by the absolute difference in party identifiers' liberalism-conservatism), the less polarized senators are ($p < .05$). Senators from divided party delegations are pushed to extremes by their reelection and primary/personal constituencies and by strongly conservative independents. *Constituency dynamics lead senators from split delegations to take different ideological stands.* The divisive effects of constituency seem to do the entire job. No institutional variables are significant for split delegations.

Unified delegations are only marginally (and not significantly) more similar in their personal ideologies than divided contingents. The typical pattern in single-party contingents is for one senator to pursue a Downsian strategy and the other to be a stronger ideologue. Same-state senators may vote similarly, but much of the linkage reflects their common base of core supporters. Not all politics reflect strong party ties. Senators from single-party delegations have their own rivalries and distinct support coalitions. And the differences in personal partisanship reflect these distinctions.

Primary and personal constituencies are the major driving force for unified delegations, as they are for split contingents. The more liberal state party elites are, the greater the ideological difference between the two solons ($p < .0001$). One legislator typically follows the middle course, tilting just left or right of center. The other is a faithful ideologue. A strongly liberal Democratic party elite will push the ideologue further leftward, creating a larger gap between the two senators. Elite pressures matter mightily in unified delegations, since Democratic core supporters are more liberal and Republican elites more conservative in single-party states (though neither is significant). States with a dominant party are also more likely to have senators who differ from each other ($p < .01$). In a competitive environment, both senators need to seek the middle ground. It is safer for at least one to be an ideologue in a one-party state.

Population diversity in single-party states *minimizes the differences* between a state's senators ($p < .01$), while it separates senators in divided delegations. In a highly diverse and competitive state, each party will claim part of the population as its base. The two parties will divide the electorate and will make strong ideological appeals to its own segment. Where there is less competition — in one-party states — the two senators will find that diversity creates uncertainty. They can't, or won't, divide up the electorate by ethnic group. Instead, each will make similar

appeals to keep each bloc within the party. A diverse base will thus bring the two senators together, not split them apart.

Finally, there is an institutional effect for same-state senators that is lacking in divided delegations. Senators whose careers largely coincide with each other will have similar partisan values ($p < .01$). A state with one very senior and one junior member will have greater divisions among its senators. More often than not (although not significantly so), the senior solon is conservative, the junior member more progressive. The senior senator is more likely to be the Downsian, the junior colleague the ideologue. Senior members may see themselves as power brokers in their state parties. This might lead to greater moderation. Too strong an ideological stance might alienate some party officials, especially if there is even a modest degree of factionalism within the party.

Single-party states are not happy bands of liberals or conservatives hewing to the party line. They are marked by personal rivalries, often based on seniority, that are reflected in different partisan values. For every pair as close as John Culver and Dick Clark (both D-IA), there is a couplet (or two) such as Pete Domenici and Harrison Schmitt (R-NM). Domenici and Schmitt did not get along well personally, and their personal ideologies differed: Schmitt was an unreconstructed Reaganite, while Domenici often fought his president even from a position of leadership (Fenno 1991a, 32–33, 176).

John Glenn and Howard Metzenbaum, Ohio Democrats who battled each other in a 1970 primary and had little nice to say about each other until 1984, pursued different electoral strategies. Glenn initially ignored party leaders and activists, while Metzenbaum courted them and won their 1970 endorsement. Glenn's constituency was all of Ohio, while his colleague courted blacks, labor, and the party faithful (Fenno 1990, 15, 108, 225). Their pure ideologies reflect these differences. Glenn is faithful to his geographic constituency (with a standardized score of $-.009$ for induced values), but to the right of his reelection constituency ($-.187$ for induced partisanship). Metzenbaum is to the left of the Ohio electorate ($.193$), but on target with his Democratic party constituents ($-.045$).

Same-party senators are often rivals for control of their party organization, even when they are ideologically close. Arlen Specter and John Heinz, moderate Pennsylvania Republicans, had a testy relationship (Fenno 1991b, 149). Both strove to please activists, as the effects of elites and induced ideology demonstrate. They also endeavored to differentiate

themselves from each other.²³ And California's Barbara Boxer (D) admits that she has never been close to her colleague Dianne Feinstein, even though they are both from the same part of the state and are both Jewish women: "Dianne and I have never been close. We had always moved within different coalitions within the Democratic party in California. . . . We had taken different positions over the stands on issues several times over the years, and certainly had always presented our stands differently" (Boxer with Boxer 1994, 81, 157).²⁴

Senators in both types of delegations are divided by elite ideologies. Yet, this is not what we would expect in a world dominated by political parties. We would envision a world of cohesive single-party states and polarized divided delegations. To a large extent this is true, but not when we move to personal partisanship, with the values of core partisan supporters removed. The key difference between split delegations and single-party states is in *how rivalries among senators are played out*. In two-party states, both masses and elites matter. In states with unified delegations, only elite attitudes (as well as conflicts within the parties) determine how different senators will be. Senators respond to variations on the same song in single-party states — and these conflicts reflect elite attitudes and competing goals of senators more than the values of the larger electorate. Geographic and reelection constituencies play larger roles in shaping battles among divided delegations because the overall ideological divide is much greater and the fight cannot be contained among elites.

Multiple Constituencies Matter

I have found some structural effects, but far fewer than Kalt and Zupan (1990). Even the evidence on monitoring, so prominent in the principal-agent models and the empirical studies of shirking (but cf. Lott and Reed 1989; Lott and Bronars 1993), gets inconsistent support. What accounts for the differences? Multiple constituencies. Leaders, like other senators, may not always reflect the views of their geographic constituencies. But they are just as faithful representatives of their reelection and primary/personal constituencies as other legislators. Taking multiple constituencies into account means that I don't have to make ad hoc assumptions about party and committee leaders. Mayhew (1974, 145–56) proposes a model of legislative organization based on the reelection motivation. Yet he treats leaders as different. Since they are more

electorally secure, they can make sacrifices for the collective good of the chamber. They forsake their constituents' preferences to tend to institutional and partisan goals. Once we take multiple constituencies into account in a multivariate model, leaders don't have distinctive personal ideologies.

If leaders are constrained by party constituents and activists, they will remain creatures of their states rather than of the Senate. This will limit their opportunities for "rent-seeking," or employing their institutional positions to secure a profit (usually policy benefits) for themselves (cf. Bates 1988). Leaders who must respond to voters are in a poor position to plunder others (but cf. Levi 1988). Whatever benefits they obtain will be of little assistance back home. They might even lead to the charge that the member has "gone Washington." So it is rational for members to hew to the district (party) line and not become creatures of the Washington establishment.

Divided delegations also pose a theoretical challenge to the multiple-constituencies perspective. Why are some delegations divided? Both the Downsian and ideological-equilibrium theses agree that divided delegations reflect more heterogeneous electorates than single-party delegations (Bender 1994, 157–60; cf. Bender and Lott 1996, 86–87). Legislators from single-party contingents have a more secure partisan base: 36 percent of their constituents identify with their party, compared to 29 percent for legislators from divided delegations ($p < .0001$). Independents are more critical in divided blocs, where they comprise 37.1 percent of a senator's electorate compared to 32.2 percent for legislators from one-party delegations ($p < .001$). The best predictor of unified versus split delegations is the share of independents among a senator's geographic constituency.

Downsians argue that independent voters are more likely to be centrists. Together with other moderates, they want to balance the ideological tendencies of the two parties. These middle-of-the-road voters split their ballots in an attempt to bring both Republicans and Democrats closer to the center (Fiorina 1992, chap. 5). The ideological-equilibrium model holds that a more even balance between the parties (with many independents) stems from a spirited contest over ideas. One-party dominance symbolizes the triumph of one vision over its competitors (Fiorina 1974, 54; Huntington 1950, 675; W. Miller 1964; Miller and Stokes n.d., chap. 7).

The CBS sample (see chapter 5) supports the ideological-equilibrium

view: 63.6 percent of candidates from one-party states converge, compared to 37.5 percent of those from divided delegations ($p < .09$, $\phi = -.257$, $Q = -.489$). Voters may rationally divide their delegations because they want different, though perhaps contradictory, things from each party (Jacobson 1990, chap. 6).

Unified delegations reflect truncated competition, the domination of one ideology over the other. Divided blocs suggest a greater competition among both parties and, especially, ideas. Yet, the fight over ideas *between the parties* occurs within a *less conflictual party system*. Split delegations are found mostly in individualistic states, where 72 percent of the delegations are divided. The ideological conflict is between Democrats and Republicans who are to the left of their national parties: 39 percent of Northern Democratic senators from divided delegations have liberal reelection constituencies, compared to 25 percent from unified blocs. All Republicans represent conservative reelection constituencies, but the share of conservatives falls from 50.6 for unified delegations to 46.9 percent in divided contingents. Republican induced partisanship is more liberal in divided delegations ($p < .07$).

One cannot, at least for the late 1970s and early 1980s, simply compare unified and divided delegations. There are different paths to each, with predictable consequences. Candidates may win either because their party has an overwhelming advantage in a state or because they are strong campaigners. Dominant parties are more likely to produce unified delegations, but the relationship is modest: 65 percent of one-party systems lead to one-party Senate delegations, while 54 percent of competitive party systems produce divided delegations ($\phi = .172$, $Q = .359$, $p < .05$). There are only three states dominated by Republicans, one with a unified bloc and two with split delegations, so we cannot make firm statements about them. The overall patterns between dominant and competitive party systems are clear and comport well with what I have argued in preceding chapters.

When I break down the data by both party system and delegation unity, there is support for *both* the Downsian and ideological-equilibrium models — though not precisely as either might expect. I present correlations between general-election vote shares and pure personal and induced ideologies in table 29, with the usual caution about very small *Ns*. Yet, the patterns are clear: Ideology plays a lesser role in Senate elections in competitive party systems. Of the eight correlations for competitive systems, five are less than .4 in absolute value. *All of the correlations greater*

(in absolute value) than .4 support a Downsian interpretation. Northern Democrats lose votes in either split or unified delegations when their pure personal ideology veers leftward. Republicans lose votes in unified delegations when their core supporters are conservative.

For one-party states, there is a mixture of Downsian and ideological-equilibrium dynamics. Northern Democratic senators from one-party states and *unified* delegations pay an electoral price for their liberalism. The correlation between induced ideology and general election vote share is $-.829$ (significant at $p < .04$). Almost 90 percent of these Democratic members come from moralistic states. In this culture, even a strong Democratic advantage in party identification does not shelter senators from the electoral effects of an unpopular ideology. In one-party states with divided delegations (all of which are individualistic cultures), Northern Democratic incumbents gain votes when their pure personal ideology or induced values are liberal ($r = .699$ and $.658$, respectively). There is indirect evidence that GOP senators from divided delegations and dominant parties win more votes as their core supporters veer rightward. The correlation between induced ideology and general-election vote shares for divided delegations among all Republicans is $-.419$, higher than the r for GOP senators from competitive districts ($r = -.244$).

There are two major paths to divided delegations. Competitive party systems make it possible for both parties to claim Senate seats. But even in a one-party world, strong candidates can sometimes prevail through their own strengths. In competitive systems, ideology has sporadic and modest effects on elections across both unified and divided

TABLE 29. Correlations Between Ideology Measures and General Election Vote Shares

	Unified Delegations	Split Delegations	Ns
Northern Democrats Dominant			
Pure personal ideology	-.109	.699	5,5
Induced ideology	-.829	.658	
Northern Democrats Competitive			
Pure personal ideology	-.472	-.459	15,7
Induced ideology	.149	-.155	
Republicans Competitive			
Pure personal ideology	.056	.272	7,16
Induced ideology	.473	-.244	

delegations in competitive party systems. And these impacts benefit candidates who tilt against their party's dominant ideology. Incumbents and challengers are likely to converge in competitive arenas. The battle in November is for the center of the geographic constituency. The minority party has less ground to make up; mimicking the majority party can change a unified delegation into a split one. Competitive states seem classic examples of the Downsian model: Strong competition breeds moderation. And centrism makes it difficult for voters to cast ideological ballots. When voters can overcome this information problem, they punish legislators who go too far toward their reelection, primary, and personal constituencies.

In one-party dominant systems senators out of step with their geographic constituency pay a steep price for staying too close to their core supporters. All incumbents and challengers from one-party systems take divergent ideological stands. Northern Democrats from one-party states face a more liberal geographic constituency ($p < .05$). Issues do play a more critical role in one-party states, but not as we might expect. Senators from one-party states with unified delegations might seem to prosper more from ideology than their colleagues from split blocs. They don't. Northern Democrats from unified delegations lose votes for having liberal reelection and primary/personal constituencies. Their brethren from divided blocs *gain votes* when their personal and induced ideologies are liberal. While these states might appear to be havens for ideological politicians such as a Kennedy in Massachusetts or a Hatch in Utah, this logic doesn't always hold. Even in one-party states, the majority party does not constitute a majority coalition: It averages 42.6 percent of identifiers.²⁵ Going too far toward your base might alienate the majority of voters you need to attract.

These results reflect both the time period under study and the dynamics of distinct cultures. Consider Republican senator Jones from a strongly Democratic state. Her Democratic colleague Smith gains votes by being liberal. Smith has the further advantage of anticipating a race against a conservative Republican. This is the prototypical Democratic LKD race. Any Republican who succeeds in getting elected here must go against the grain of her party. Jones must fight to make the race competitive — and this means adopting a more Downsian strategy. And so these GOP incumbents do. The correlation between their ADA ratings and those of their Democratic colleagues is .972. By being *relatively moderate*, though still conservative enough to remain Republicans, they

can establish a personal vote that will allow them to split what should be a united Democratic delegation. Their primary and personal constituents (state party elites) are relatively moderate, and a liberal induced ideology brings them extra votes (see table 29).

Now consider a Northern Democrat from a strongly Democratic state with a colleague from the same party. Institutional and political rivalries will lead one member to become more moderate than the other. The states that elected two Democrats in the late 1970s and early 1980s were largely moralistic cultures in the Midwest. Despite the dominance of Democrats, these states are largely conservative. So going against the geographic constituency can be costly. Senators are tempted to stick with their base in one-party states. But their base is not big enough to win an election. While their personal and primary constituencies are as liberal as those of their colleagues with divided delegations, their reelection constituency is decidedly less progressive. Only 25.4 percent of Democratic identifiers in one-party unified states call themselves liberals, compared to 31.1 percent in one-party divided delegations ($p < .015$). When these senators cater to their core supporters, they lose votes.

As Lott (1987) argues, voters won't tolerate this behavior long. So the 1980s brought about a sorting in both types of single-party delegations. Moderate Republicans such as Javits, Case, and Brooke fell prey to intraparty battles. They were mostly replaced by Democrats, who had a stronger claim to the liberal mantle. By the mid-1980s, the ideological politics of the individualistic culture led to a decline in split delegations in the one region of the country where liberalism still rules. The Democratic edge in moralistic culture has since given way to a more even balance between the parties—in some cases even united Republican delegations. Moralistic states still have polarized parties, but the balance better reflects the ideological division within them.

Structural effects are greatest, though hardly overwhelming, where the political system is most homogenous: in one-party states. Senators from unified delegations are often rivals for power in their state parties. They don't face the same pressures at the ballot box that solons from divided contingents do. So they can turn their attention inward. The core of the difference for these types of delegations is different environments. Institutional rivalries emerge in one-party environments, much as Key (1949, chap. 14) argued about the South many years ago. Factionalism may not be endemic in one-party states, but it flourishes there. Competitive environments lead senators to pay more attention to their fellow

partisans and less to power games for control of state parties and for influence in Washington. In the bigger picture, senators from different parties are separated by their electoral coalitions.

What you get out of an institution such as the Senate depends a lot on what you put into it. And we put a lot more into our structures of governance than simple constituency demands. Representation — and its structures — varies with partisan and elite demands and a state's environment and culture.