

Chapter 4

History Matters: The Interaction of Social Structure and Political Events

“The corrupt politician of the Northeast manipulates little expenditures, but the corrupt politician of the South is more institutional, manipulating laws and privileges.”

Deputy Humberto Souto (*Folha de São Paulo*, November 15, 1993)

“There is only one law in American political science: sometimes it’s this way, sometimes it’s that way. Except in the South.”

Graduate student lore in the 1960s

In the introduction I suggested that in Latin America rational choice models will need broadening before they can explain real political outcomes.¹ One promising direction is Douglass North’s (1990, 94) conception of path dependence: “The consequence of small events and chance circumstances can determine solutions that, once they prevail, lead one to a particular path.” Actors benefiting from earlier institutional change are likely to resist efforts at reform, and, as institutions become established, actors make commitments that generate sunk costs. A second direction follows historical institutionalists’ emphasis on sub-national politics. Richard Locke and Kathleen Thelen (1993, 6), for example, see “national political economies not as coherent systems but as rather incoherent composites of diverse sub-national patterns which co-exist (often uneasily) within the same national territory.” Both extensions of rational choice methods resonate strongly in the Brazilian case. Contemporary politics exhibits an impressive continuity with the dictatorship’s politicians and political practices. States and localities have long played central roles on the national political stage.

This chapter explores the relation between political competition and two sets of causal factors. The first set includes socioeconomic and demographic

1. For a good example of a marriage between rational choice and historical narrative, see Ferejohn 1991.



Fig. 13. Brazil: Three northeastern states and two southern states

variables such as measures of wealth, migratory flows, and economic conditions. The second set focuses on certain chance historical events that turned out to have lasting political consequences. The discussion centers on two sets of comparisons.² The first comparison includes Paraná and Santa Catarina, two states that are quite similar in economic conditions, at least relative to the whole range of Brazilian states. Over a long period of time, however, their internal pol-

2. These cases were selected for multiple reasons. Their politics seemed to vary much more than their economic levels. Local social scientists had conducted extensive research, so background materials and knowledgeable informants were available. In addition, I had begun investigating these states during research for my earlier book (Ames 1987), which contains chapters on Brazilian politics between 1947 and 1964. An excellent example of intensive analysis of elites in a single state is found in Hagopian 1996.

itics, especially the nature of competition for legislative posts, has remained quite distinct. The key appears to be demography: population movements in Paraná created traditions of substate loyalties and extremely localist political orientations that Santa Catarina never experienced. The second comparison includes Maranhão, Ceará, and Bahia, three poor states in the Northeast. Here, too, although their divergence is more recent, political styles differ greatly. Demographic differences, however, seem slight. Instead, chance political events turn out to be fundamental in establishing initial conditions that have influenced political competition over long periods of time.³

Paraná and Santa Catarina

At first glance, Paraná and Santa Catarina might be expected to exhibit similar styles of politics. Neighbors in Brazil's prosperous South, the two states are reasonably close on such economic and social indicators as per capita income, education, and urbanization. Observers often classify both, in fact, as part of the "other Brazil," the Brazil that works. Closer inspection, however, reveals significant differences between Paraná and Santa Catarina. Most striking is the enduring strength, in Santa Catarina, of traditional right-wing parties.⁴ As figure 14 shows, ARENA and its successors, the PDS, PFL, and PTB, have been stronger in Santa Catarina in every election since 1978. Even discounting the huge gap in 1990 as an anomaly, the difference remains impressive, with PDS, PFL, and PTB deputies holding 45–50 percent of Santa Catarina's congressional delegation but only around 30 percent in Paraná. Partisan differences, however, tell only part of the story. With the exception of the 1986 election, Santa Catarina's deputies have individually been much more dominant. In their key municipalities they tend to get higher proportions of the total municipal vote. *Catarinense* deputies more often get their votes in geographically contiguous municipalities, and they rarely compete with each other for votes.

How can these radically different patterns of political competition be explained? Is Paraná's electorate simply more leftist? Apparently not, for in the

3. If the conception of scientific inquiry begins with a deductive model and proceeds to rigorous empirical testing, this chapter falls short. Though it begins with well-established and intuitively plausible concepts, no criteria exist for determining in advance which "chance" events will have long-term political impact. An inductive style is inescapable; with luck it will generate data and ideas for a more rigorous analyses.

4. I define the traditional Right as the sum of the PFL, PDS, and PTB. In 1994 the PDS became the PPR, then renamed itself the PPB.




Fig. 14. Strength of Right in congressional delegation

three presidential elections from 1989 through 1998 Santa Catarina gave much bigger shares of its votes to Lula than to his opponents, Fernando Collor de Mello and Fernando Henrique Cardoso.⁵ Clearly, then, what separates the two states is not a powerful grassroots cleavage. What does distinguish them, however, is the strength of traditional oligarchies. Santa Catarina’s oligarchy has maintained power; Paraná has hardly any oligarchy at all.

In Brazilian politics, Santa Catarina represents continuity. In the 1945–64 democratic period, two conservative parties, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the National Democratic Union (UDN), dominated Santa Catarina. Three great families monopolized power: the Ramos clan in the PSD, and the Konders and Bornhausens in the UDN.⁶ The Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) provided Left-populist opposition to the PSD and UDN but never really had much influence. The PTB failed to elect a single federal deputy until 1958, and it never had more than two (of fourteen) deputies. The *catarinense* oligarchy easily accepted the 1964 military coup, and the traditional families became the basis of

5. In 1998, for example, Lula received 36.6 percent in Santa Catarina but only 27.8 percent in Paraná.

6. This section relies on Viola 1986.

the promilitary ARENA party. The PTB turned into the opposition MDB, but even in this form it remained pitifully weak. In 1976, for example, ARENA won local elections in 154 municipalities; the MDB claimed just 32. By 1988—after the PMDB's Plano Cruzado success—the PMDB and parties to its left controlled 40 percent of Santa Catarina's municipalities; in Paraná the left held 56 percent of all municipalities (Grohmann 1997).

Paraná's political history contrasts strikingly with that of Santa Catarina. Before the military coup, the old PTB almost succeeded in dominating *paranaense* politics. But for the coup, in fact, the PTB would probably have controlled a majority of the state's congressional delegation after the 1964 elections.⁷

Until the ascendance in the 1990s of Jaime Lerner, Curitiba's internationally recognized mayor and two-term governor, Paraná's last important political leader was former Army officer Ney Braga. Descendant of a traditional political family, Braga had been nominated police secretary by the governor, his brother-in-law. In 1956 Braga was elected mayor of Curitiba, the state capital. An effective and popular mayor, he organized Paraná's Christian Democratic Party, and in the 1960 presidential election he supported the coalition that elected Jânio Quadros. In 1962 Braga got lucky, winning the governorship after the sudden death of his PTB opponent.

Braga became the sponsor of a group of politicians who would go on to become powerful leaders in their own right. Many still wield influence in *paranaense* politics. When Braga became minister of agriculture in the first military government, he supported protégé Paulo Pimentel as governor. Pimentel later broke with Braga and developed an independent political base.⁸ Braga was also patron of Jayme Canet, the next governor, but Canet eventually followed Pimentel's route, breaking with Braga and becoming an independent politico. José Richa, a third Braga creation, split with his patron even before attaining real power. Richa left ARENA for the MDB, then helped form the PMDB and the PSDB.

Braga, then, was a powerful leader who could not construct a durable political machine. In part, his failure can be attributed to personal style. Observers report that he was very controlling, never allowing his disciples independent authority. In part, however, his leadership style seems based on an understanding of *paranaense* politics. Consider, for example, the origins of the Braga group. Ney himself came from a local family. José Richa, however, hailed from

7. The PTB was so strong that it almost elected a substitute candidate to the Senate in 1961 after its candidate died.

8. Between Pimentel and Canet another governor intervened, but the military cashiered him for corruption.

Rio de Janeiro. Leite Chaves, a key PTB leader, was from Paraíba. Canet, Álvaro Dias, and Pimentel were all born in São Paulo. In other words, none of the post-Braga generation of Paraná leaders were actually born there. In terms of occupational backgrounds, Braga and his group were mostly administrators, either in the public or private sector. The previous generation of conservative leaders—those from the PSD in the 1950s and 1960s—came from the landed elite of *mate* growers, a totally distinct social stratum.⁹ And finally, politics as a career, as a vocation, lacks prestige in Paraná. The state legislature is extremely localistic and quite weak organizationally. Turnover among deputies, at both federal and state levels, is very high.¹⁰ In a sense, the characteristics of Paraná's leaders, coupled with the low prestige of politics as a career, suggest something unique about Paraná society.

Relative to Santa Catarina, Paraná is somewhat more urban, a bit poorer, and less educated. The income distribution is slightly worse.¹¹ Paraná's population is more agricultural and substantially less industrial than that of Santa Catarina. But in relation to Brazil as a whole, these two states are really quite close—except for one demographic indicator, migration. Paraná has a much higher percentage of migrants from other states and other countries. Figures 15 and 16 reveal that in a high percentage of Paraná's municipalities more than 70 percent of the population was born in another state or country. In 1980 the total number of out-of-state migrants reached 527 per 1,000 inhabitants in Paraná. For Santa Catarina, the comparable figure was only 343 per 1,000.¹² Paraná's foreign migrants tend to be relatively recent European or Japanese stock. Migrants from Minas Gerais and from Japan are prevalent in parts of the state's northern tier, while *gaúchos* from Rio Grande do Sul dominate the Southwest.

Immigrant groups traditionally keep out of statewide politics. Though quite willing to support politicians with backgrounds in business or bureaucratic activities, immigrants demand that their representatives focus on local issues. And because they are recent arrivals, they rarely belong to traditional patronage net-

9. The old *mate* oligarchs faced few challenges after the military regime crushed the PTB, which before 1964 had dominated Paraná's north.

10. In a recent analysis of the "elite" of the national Congress, the lobbying firm Arko Advice (Aragão 1998) compiled a roster of congressional leaders—the movers and shakers—from each state. Paraná, in relation to the size of its delegation, has the fewest prominent members of Congress of any state.

11. The percentage of Paraná residents earning less than one-fourth the minimum salary is twice that of Santa Catarina.

12. These data are from the census of 1980. Underlining the importance of recent migratory flows is Paraná's second largest city, Londrina, which was only founded in 1929 and has more than 400,000 residents.




Fig. 15. Santa Catarina: Total migrants

works.¹³ As a result, Paraná lacks the kind of well-established economic and social oligarchy characterizing much of Brazil.

Extreme localism gives Paraná's politics an almost apolitical quality. Curitiba, the capital, has one of the weakest federal universities in Brazil. Its social science departments—centers of intellectual debate in most Brazilian universities—are especially poor. The capital's chief newspaper resembles a small-town weekly. On the whole, politics in Paraná is an unpopular business.¹⁴

Partly as a result of localized migratory flows, Paraná's deputies campaign in contiguous clusters of municipalities. Since party and individual loyalties are

13. Rebecca Menes (1997), in a study of U.S. cities, comes to similar conclusions about the difficulties machines face in recruiting migrants.

14. This explanation reflects the perspective of Paraná's active politicians. Every Paraná politician interviewed talked about the intensity of migration both in and out of the state, and all seemed to take for granted that in Paraná, politics really are local.




Fig. 16. Paraná: Total migrants

weak, and since deputies seek to expand their vote bases, they invade neighboring bailiwicks. The resulting competition reaches fratricidal levels. Nevertheless, deputies resist governors' efforts to control predatory campaign behavior, preferring instead to maintain independence. Once in office, Paraná's deputies make more budgetary amendments than representatives from any other state in the South or Southeast; in fact, they are among the amendment leaders in all Brazil.¹⁵

Indicators of other aspects of political competition support this interpretation. Because Paraná's turnover is so high, opportunities for elected office abound. In the four elections held between 1986 and 1998, an average of 8.0

15. Deputy Max Rosenmann, easily the champion in making amendments, targeted well over one hundred separate municipalities.

candidates ran for each seat in the Legislative Assembly of Paraná, while only 5.4 candidates competed for the same office in Santa Catarina.¹⁶ The Chamber of Deputies saw smaller but similar differences: 6.1 candidates per seat in Paraná, only 4.95 candidates per seat in Santa Catarina. An index of competitiveness taking into account both the number of candidates running for each seat and the size of the delegation shows that over the 1986–98 period, Paraná ranked, on average, just behind the thirteenth most competitive state in Brazil, while Santa Catarina ranked near the bottom, below the twenty-first most competitive state.¹⁷

Santa Catarina's oligarchic control reduces not only the number of new entrants into politics but also the number of parties competing for office. Between 1982 and 1994 (1998 results were unavailable), the number of effective parties in Santa Catarina's Chamber of Deputies delegation was 3.21; Paraná's delegation formed 4.0 effective parties (Leex 1999).¹⁸

In the end, even the political fortunes of a leader as well known as Jaime Lerner fail to transcend the essence of Paraná's politics. Lerner had been Curitiba's mayor while a member of the PDT. Though courted heavily by the national leadership of the PSDB, Lerner's entrance into that party was blocked by former governor Álvaro Dias, for whom Lerner would be formidable competition for the party nomination to any high office. Lerner entered the PFL instead, and in 1998 he won reelection over former governor Roberto Requião. Dias picked up a Senate seat for the PSDB. Though these three heavyweights dominate *paranaense* politics, all have strikingly short coattails. In the election for State Assembly, Lerner's PFL led with thirteen victories, but the three major parties together totaled only twenty-six of fifty-four seats. In the Chamber of Deputies, the PFL again led, with six victories, but the three parties jointly won only fifteen of thirty seats.

16. Summary tables for these and other common measures of competition can be obtained at the website of the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (www.iuperj.br) (hereafter cited as Leex 1999).

17. The index of competitiveness equals $N/2W - 1$, where N is the number of candidates running for legislative office and W is the size of the corresponding delegation. See also W. Bonfim 1999, 42.

18. In the legislative assemblies the differences were smaller: 4.0 effective parties in Paraná and 3.5 in Santa Catarina. Effective parties were defined according to the Laakso-Taagapera index. In a study of party and electoral fragmentation in eight states (Bahia, Ceará, Goiás, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and São Paulo), Santa Catarina had the second lowest fragmentation (both party and electoral) and volatility, losing only to Ceará (see Lima Junior 1997, 308–10).

Bahia, Maranhão, and Ceará

In casual usage, the notion of a political boss carries a certain ambiguity. Paraná, as demonstrated earlier, no longer has any bosses. But suppose, in a given state, no one becomes a candidate for the Chamber of Deputies without the blessing of a certain leader. Perhaps all campaign financing flows through a single politician, so only approved candidates have any chance of receiving support. One politician may determine where candidates seek votes, directing some to vulnerable municipalities and preventing others from poaching on party colleagues' turf. Or suppose one leader has the strength to control the party delegation's postelection legislative voting. These criteria are not meant to posit an absolute standard for determining when a politician qualifies as a leader or boss. Maranhão and Bahia, however, are distinguished by the distinct power of individual leaders. In Ceará a troika of traditional political bosses ruled until 1986, when a "modernizing" reformist overthrew the machine.¹⁹

The Sarney family has dominated Maranhão's political life since 1966, when José Sarney became the state's governor.²⁰ Sarney has always had to contend with opposition from other elite factions, as conservative and promilitary as Sarney himself, when they contested his control of central government largesse. Sarney's predominance did not become truly decisive until he rose to become Tancredo Neves's vice presidential candidate in 1985 and then president after Tancredo's death. Between 1978 and 1994, nearly every federal deputy from Maranhão could be defined as pro- or anti-Sarney, with the "pros" easily outnumbering the "antis." Sarney picked candidates for the Chamber, candidates who might have few local followers. Though a few candidates had family-based or evangelical support, even they needed the machine's imprimatur. The machine could move candidates from one region to another between campaigns, and its representatives told mayors and council members how many votes each would supply.²¹ During the Sarney presidency, Maranhão's delegation to the Chamber often voted as a bloc, regardless of party, on key legisla-

19. For a comparative study of party and electoral fragmentation in Ceará, see Moraes Filho 1997.

20. This section is based on interviews with journalists, academics, and politicians in Maranhão, a few conducted in 1983 but most in 1990.

21. In the case of Deputy Carlos Magno, for example, the correlation (Pearson R) between the municipal shares of his personal vote total in the elections of 1978 and 1982 is .63. This finding is statistically significant, but it is much lower than the typical cross-election correlation for candidates in other states and is inflated by his substantial vote in the municipalities of Coelho Neto and Chapadinha, where his family is based. Without Coelho Neto and Chapadinha, the correlation is .57.

tion. In 1990 ex-president Sarney got himself elected senator from Amapá.²² His children, daughter Roseana and son Sarney Filho, both served as federal deputies, as did his former son-in-law. In 1994 Sarney secured Roseana's election to the governorship of Maranhão, and he won the presidency of the Senate. In 1998 Roseana was reelected, Sarney Filho became a minister in Fernando Henrique Cardoso's cabinet, and Sarney himself easily won reelection as senator from Amapá.

In terms of influence within his own state, Bahia's preeminent leader, Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM), enjoys a status second only to Sarney. Although Bahia's industrial development and greater urbanization enable leftist opposition, including communist parties, to maintain a significant presence in state politics, ACM has long dominated conservative and moderate elites. ACM is one of the few state leaders in recent Brazilian history who has leveraged regional influence into national predominance before holding a national office. Three times governor of Bahia, he was also Sarney's communications minister, a post with pork-distributing potential throughout the country. ACM's son, Luís Eduardo, a three-time federal deputy, rose to the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies during Cardoso's coalition (PSDB-PFL) administration. Until his sudden death in 1998, Luís Eduardo was probably the chief candidate to succeed Cardoso. ACM himself won a Senate seat in 1994 and held the presidency of the Senate through much of the two Cardoso administrations.

The last of this northeastern trio is Ceará. Until 1986, Ceará was a classic example of the politics of *coronelismo*. Particularly in the Northeast, but also in other parts of the nation, the "colonels" served as intermediaries between the populist state and ordinary citizens. Usually wealthy and prestigious landowners, these colonels delivered the votes of their employees and dependents to any party with the resources to buy them (Roett 1978, 63). In Ceará, three families of *coroneis* (in this case, actual military colonels), the Távoras, the Bezerras, and the Cals, dominated state politics from 1964 until the mid-1980s. Each family had a regional center: the Távoras in Jaguaribana, the Bezerras in Carirí, and the Cals in Ibiapaba. After the 1964 coup, the three colonels found a political home in the progovernment ARENA party, dominating state politics until 1986, when they were swept out of power by Tasso Jereissati, a young reformist business entrepreneur from the PMDB. Jereissati owed his election as governor—like PMDB candidates all over the country—to the enormously successful start of the Plano Cruzado, but both he and Ciro Gomes, the PMDB mayor of Fort-

22. Brazilian electoral laws are rather permissive, to say the least, when it comes to establishing a residence.

aleza (the capital) headed extremely popular administrations.²³ While governor, Jereissati founded Ceará's branch of the PSDB. In 1990 Gomes, now a PSDB member, became governor, with Jereissati reclaiming the post in 1994 and winning reelection in 1998 with more than 60 percent of the vote. Ceará's delegation to the Chamber of Deputies had been three-fourths ARENA-PDS between 1966 and 1982, but in 1986 the traditional Right elected only ten of twenty-two deputies. By 1990 the delegation included seven parties. The PSDB led with seven deputies; the PMDB followed with four. The traditional right-wing parties fell to less than one-third of the delegation.

With this sketch of the political scene, I will turn to the nature of political competition. In all three states, dominance follows the broad downward trend characteristic of Brazilian politics. Maranhão, as might be expected of a poor and agricultural state, began with the highest frequency of dominant politicians, but by 1994 the three states were virtually indistinguishable. In all four elections, deputies in Ceará competed more against each other; that is, Maranhão and Bahia had lower levels of interdeputy competition. But the biggest distinction is found in terms of spatial concentration. As figure 17 reveals, Bahian deputies are substantially less likely to get their votes in contiguous municipalities. Since such large states usually exhibit greater clustering, Bahia's position seems even more anomalous.²⁴

How does the partisan composition of the three delegations reflect ongoing political changes? As figure 18 shows, Ceará's traditional right-wing parties declined almost out of existence by 1994. In Maranhão, the Sarney machine managed to hold on to 40 percent of the delegation (50 percent if pro-Sarney deputies in other parties are included), while in Bahia these same parties controlled about one-third of the seats.

The occupational backgrounds of deputies from the three states exhibit sharp differences. Since 1978 traditional politicians have dominated Maranhão's delegations: two-thirds of the deputies have prior experience as mayors, council members, or state deputies. Ceará's deputies are somewhat less likely to build on local political careers, and in Bahia state and local politicians are scarce: in 1990 less than half had any local or state experience. The big difference is displayed in figure 19, which plots the bureaucratic backgrounds of the three delegations. The number of deputies with backgrounds in state or (less of-

23. The most sophisticated political analysis of Ceará is Washington Bonfim 1999. For an analysis of Jereissati's programs, see Tendler 1997.

24. The degree of clustering is quite stable. In Maranhão spatial clustering rises in 1978, when the PMDB does well, and falls thereafter. Ceará's voting pattern, perhaps as a result of the party fragmentation of the 1990 election, becomes more clustered only in that year.




Fig. 17. Average clustering in congressional delegation

ten) federal bureaucratic jobs rose in Bahia to 66 percent by 1990 before falling to 52 percent in 1994. In Ceará less than 30 percent of the deputies had similar histories, and in Maranhão the number fell after 1982, dropping to 34 percent by 1994. Overall, then, Maranhão's deputies are more likely to be state and local politicians, while Bahian deputies are more likely to come from bureaucratic backgrounds.²⁵

In sum, then, Bahia has a powerful, nationally significant political figure coordinating the campaigning of the Chamber candidates of center and right-wing parties, and most of these candidates began their careers in the executive branch of state government. Maranhão also hosts a dominant, nationally prominent political figure, but here politicians serve their apprenticeships in state and local politics, and until recently the promilitary, right-wing parties housed both pro- and anti-Sarney factions. In Ceará, traditional families once dominated, but the PMDB onslaught of 1986 decimated them. Because the reformers—now in the PSDB—managed a successful state administration, their victory endured.

25. The decline in 1994 of Bahia's cohort of ex-bureaucrats may be a function of the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. As resource declines cut the number of projects available, fewer politicians are able to launch careers based on pork barrel.




Fig. 18. Strength of Right in congressional delegation




Fig. 19. Politicians with bureaucratic experience in congressional delegation

Ceará now has a strong cadre of PSDB members in the Congress, the state assembly, and the bureaucracy. In Ceará an oligarchy of the probusiness center has replaced the right-wing oligarchs that long dominated the state's politics.

What is revealed by the indicators of political competition utilized earlier in Paraná and Santa Catarina? In competition for Chamber of Deputies seats, Maranhão and Ceará had about the same number of candidates per seat (4.2 and 4.45, respectively), with Bahia a bit behind at 3.9. In races for the state assemblies, Maranhão led with 9.15 candidates per seat, followed by Ceará at 6.4 and Bahia at 5.25 (Leex 1999). In other words, Bahia's oligarchy has the strongest gatekeeping effect on competition, but competition under Ceará's supposedly "modern" administrations of Jereissati and Gomes is essentially the same. The reconciliational style of the Sarney machine, however, seems linked to the openness of competition in Maranhão. The countrywide order of competition echoes these results: Maranhão, on average, is the eighth most competitive state in legislative assembly races, with Bahia fourteenth and Ceará seventeenth. For Chamber seats, the three states are very close, all between nineteenth and twenty-first. Ceará has the lowest number of effective parties in its state legislature, 3.45, followed by Bahia at 3.9 and Maranhão at 4.5. For the Chamber, Ceará again has the fewest effective parties, 3.05, with Maranhão at 3.32 and Bahia at 3.8.²⁶

The first attempt to explain this puzzle relies, as it did in the comparison of Paraná and Santa Catarina, on the differences between the states' economic and demographic conditions. Bahia has the most diversified economy. With modern petrochemical plants as well as nonferrous metals and paper, Bahia's substantial industrial sector is responsible for more than 40 percent of the state's gross product. Agriculture, based on exports of cacao, coffee, dairy products, and soybeans, accounts for another 16 percent. Maranhão is substantially poorer and more agricultural. The industrial sector accounts for only 30 percent of the state's production, with agriculture supplying another 22 percent. Ceará has the least industry (just 27 percent of gross product), and agriculture contributes only 15 percent. Ceará relies on services, mainly tourism and government employment. Services contribute 58 percent of state income (far more than in the other two states), and government employment contributes another 10.4 percent (Brazil 1992, 1044).²⁷

26. Bahia's high number of effective parties in the Chamber of Deputies probably results from the Left's strength in Salvador and other industrial cities.

27. These data are from 1985. Maranhão is second in government's contribution to state product, at 6.7 percent.

Can economic and demographic differences explain the differences in political competition? Bahia is naturally the wealthiest, with per capita income in Ceará and Maranhão standing at 58 percent and 48 percent, respectively, of the Bahian level.²⁸ In terms of urbanization, Bahia and Ceará are very similar, with Maranhão substantially more rural. Municipalities in Bahia and Ceará have roughly similar levels of migrants; Maranhão has about 30 percent more. Overall, the three states are strikingly different in economic and demographic terms, but the distinctions do not seem closely correlated with their political differences. It is now time to pursue the route of path dependence.²⁹

Maranhão

Sarney is actually the second post–World War II politician to dominate Maranhão. In the 1930s, Getúlio Vargas sent Vitorino Freire as part of a team of “interventors.” Freire gradually built a powerful machine based on patronage, populism, pork, and violence. Governor in the 1950s and senator until his death in 1977, Freire faced no serious challengers until Sarney himself.

Sarney had been a federal deputy from 1958 to 1965 for the old UDN party. Elected governor in 1965, he presented himself as a conservative modernizer. This position sharply differentiated Sarney from all his predecessors, who made little effort to attract infrastructure programs from the federal government. Maranhão before the 1964 military coup could even be characterized as a state whose elites sought to avoid federal programs—in stark contrast to Ceará’s pork-hungry leaders—because such programs implied intervention and change. Only with Sarney’s ascendance was a conscious effort made to attract federal largesse.³⁰ For Sarney, modernization essentially meant development based on modern capitalist agriculture, for the state had virtually no industry even as late as the 1960s (Cleary 1987). The state’s chief crops (rice, cotton, and palm nuts) yielded little. The backwardness of infrastructure hindered agricultural development. Paved roads, for example, existed only in São Luís. A dirt road connected the city with the capitals of neighboring states, but no road at all ran to Imperatriz, the state’s second largest city. Governor Sarney started an active program of road and bridge building. In addition, his decrees allowed land speculators and large corporations to take over vacant tracts of land and squeeze small landholders off land they had been farming without clear title.

28. Santa Catarina and Paraná, by contrast, have approximately three times the per capita incomes of these northeastern states.

29. In addition to North 1990, a useful discussion of path dependence appears in Putnam 1993, 179–81.

30. I discuss this case and that of Ceará in Ames 1987.

As Cleary points out (1987, 18–19), Sarney was hostile to the traditional forms of landholding represented by the agrarian elite. Rather than implementing agrarian reform, the governor bypassed the traditional elite by opening up new lands to agrarian capitalists, especially cattle interests, and directing the state to facilitate these capitalists' endeavors. Those benefiting from cheap land or nearby roads were connected, of course, with the Revolution of 1964, and they rewarded the Sarney machine. The process did not displace traditional elites from their local power bases, because the new capitalists, many from other states, remained out of politics, concentrating instead on their new enterprises.

Sarney's program transformed Maranhão. Rice production soared, beef production expanded, and São Luís became the site of a major aluminum factory. Between 1960 and 1991, São Luís' population grew from 158,000 to 695,000, and the percentage of the state's population living in urban areas more than doubled (Brazil 1992, 208). Not surprisingly, the dislocations that came with these changes, coupled with the total inadequacy of social programs, had disastrous consequences for the poor, but in the heady growth days of the Brazilian "miracle" such effects seemed merely transitory.

In the 1970 election Sarney easily won his own seat in the Senate, and he successfully managed the campaign of his chosen successor as governor. Observers saw this victory as a consecration of Sarney's power, but Freire remained on the scene. The old *caudilho* had been a firm defender of the 1964 coup, and as a federal senator he was well connected in Brasília. From 1970 until his death in 1977, Freire bitterly opposed the Sarney machine.³¹ Freire choked off federal funds for Maranhão and in this way contributed to the unpopularity of Sarney's chosen successor.³² In 1974 Freire maneuvered to ensure the nomination of a distant relative, Osvaldo Nunes Freire, and Sarney had to accept the nomination. When Vitorino died in 1977, Sarney expected to reclaim the governorship and become the sole arbiter of Maranhão politics, but Nunes Freire blocked Sarney's nomination and forced him to accept a supposed ally, Federal Deputy João Castelo (Rolim 1979, 87). In the Chamber of Deputies, Maranhão's ARENA delegation split into a Sarney wing (with six *sarneyistas* and two pro-Sarney independents) and a two-deputy wing led by Governor Nunes Freire.

Castelo began as Sarney's ally but immediately broke with the ex-governor and began to build a separate political machine. In part, the Castelo regime was based on precisely the economic development that Sarney had initiated. Its

31. This section relies on Cleary 1987.

32. The Santana administration, it must be noted, was incompetent in its own right.

geographic center was Imperatriz, a city strategically located in the southern part of the state, in the heart of the new agricultural development. Castelo allied with the new entrepreneurs of Imperatriz: landowners, builders, mine and timber operators, and so on. His major public project was the construction of a costly and grandiose soccer stadium. Though corruption was rampant, Castelo left office in 1982 with his popularity intact. His election to the Senate provided him with a springboard for the development of his own machine, one capable of posing a constant threat to Sarney. Led by Castelo, the anti-Sarney forces in the PDS delegation peaked in the 1982 election, with eight *sarneistas* and four anti-*sarneistas*.

Sarney then got lucky. The 1985 presidential election was scheduled to be disputed in an electoral college, and Sarney was president of the proregime party, the PDS. The military leaders assumed they had sufficiently rigged the college to ensure their candidate's victory. The leading PDS candidate was Paulo Maluf, ex-governor of São Paulo. Sarney opposed Maluf's nomination on the grounds that Maluf was too unpopular to win. Castelo, however, bet on Maluf. Sarney eventually resigned the PDS presidency and accepted the vice presidential slot on the ticket of the opposition Liberal Alliance. In the end, Tancredo Neves's Liberal Alliance won in the electoral college, Tancredo died, and Sarney became president.

With his archenemy in the presidential palace, Castelo's political death might have been a foregone conclusion. But in late 1985, Castelo engineered his wife's election as mayor of São Luís—over Sarney's candidate—and announced his intention to seek the governorship in 1986. Still, as Cleary (1987, 324) notes, Castelo proceeded to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. His wife threatened to fire 5,000 city employees hired by the previous administration. A huge demonstration erupted, the city hall went up in flames, and Castelo lost all credibility. A Sarney ally, PMDB member Eptácio Cafeteira, was elected governor over Castelo by more than 1 million votes. The euphoria of the Plano Cruzado helped, of course, and Cafeteira united his urban base with Sarney's rural strength. Cafeteira eventually quarreled with Sarney, but in 1990 the president allied with popular journalist Edison Lobão. With Lobão winning the governorship in 1990 and Sarney's daughter victorious in 1994, the Sarney machine had finally consolidated its domination of Maranhão.

Ceará

Most of Ceará is located in the Northeast's drought region, the dry *sertão*. Because of the economy's extreme fragility, the state has long depended on the

federal government. Elite groups rose and fell as their economic fortunes waxed and waned, with each faction struggling to secure a stable share of the available federal relief money. Beginning in the nineteenth century, periodic droughts gave rise to the *indústria da seca*, a phrase referring to profiteering on pork-barrel projects tied to drought relief. Opposition to the dominant political forces always existed, of course, but the opposition joined with dominant groups in efforts to free more central government funds for the state.³³

Until the overthrow of civilian government in 1964, conservative forces in Ceará seemed to be losing out to leftist elements. In 1958 the Labor Party (PTB) allied with the PSD to elect a PTB governor. Four years later, groups led by businessman Carlos Jereissati (father of the reformist governor elected in 1986) tried to force the election of a nationalist-populist slate. The UDN responded by joining conservative elements in the PSD and PTB to form the “Union for Ceará,” electing Virgílio Távora governor. In 1964, after a brief hesitation due to Távora’s friendship with ousted President João Goulart, the UDN accepted the military overthrow. In the end, the coup bequeathed lasting power to the UDN.

As mentioned earlier, three families dominated Ceará’s ARENA: the Bezerras, the Távoras, and the Cals. The Bezerras, through their control of a network of banks, had the strongest economic base. In addition, control of state government had enabled them to extend their influence from the Carirí region to the rest of the state. The Távoras (or *virgilistas*, after Virgílio Távora) represented the old UDN. They had benefited from their control of the state government between 1966 and 1970. The Cals group had formed when César Cals de Oliveira, an army colonel who had occupied various federal administrative posts, held the governorship from 1971 and 1974 and then chose to remain in politics. Lacking an independent financial base, the Cals group was the weakest. The rivalry between the Bezerras and the Cals was greater than any other pair, partly because Adauto Bezerra and Virgílio Távora had joint business ventures and partly because a Távora (Vargas’s interventor in the state in the 1930s) had persecuted a member of the Cals group.

By 1978 ARENA’s domination of state politics was nearly complete. Of the state’s 141 municipalities, ARENA controlled all but seven. The administration of outgoing Governor Adauto Bezerra had developed new mechanisms

33. I treat the pork ethos of the *cearense* delegation to the 1946–64 legislature in Ames 1987. Another example of the reconciliatory nature of party competition comes from the election of 1974, in which Virgílio Távora refused to accept César Cals’s nomination of a Távora enemy for the Senate. Távora left the country during the campaign, effectively conceding the seat to the MDB, the party both he and Cals opposed.

to fortify ARENA's control. A Secretariat for Municipal Affairs, headed by Aداuto's brother, Humberto, coordinated state activities in each municipality. The Secretariat of Planning, under the control of ally Paulo Lustosa da Costa from the Bank of the Northeast, channeled funds to worthy allies—and later provided the springboard for Lustosa da Costa's own political career (Rolim 1979, 101).

With its domination assured, ARENA's leaders parceled out the available jobs to satisfy its three chiefs. Virgílio Távora would be appointed governor by the military regime in Brasília; Humberto Bezerra (twin brother of Aداuto) would be Ceará's appointed "bionic" senator; César Cals would be the elected senator; and Aداuto Bezerra would run for federal deputy. Cals, however, feared he would lose a direct election, so he opted for the *biônico* post. Humberto, also fearing a direct election, chose to wait out the election. In the end, a Bezerra ally, José Lins de Albuquerque, accepted the nomination and won easily.

In the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, ARENA won fifteen of Ceará's twenty seats. Fortaleza, with 25 percent of the state's voters, contributed 40 percent of the votes garnered by opposition MDB candidates. In spite of ARENA's decisive victory, it was evident that ARENA's grip was becoming more fragile. Such regional towns as Crato and Juazeiro do Norte, once bastions of the Bezerras, had begun electing opposition deputies.

In 1982 the machine triumphed once again. Now called the Social Democratic Party (PDS), it had the very real help of the military regime. In April, seven months before the election, President Figueiredo came to Ceará to bless the "colonels agreement," a pact splitting up the appointed jobs in Ceará that would be available after the elections. The agreement granted equal shares to the Távoras, the Bezerras, and the Cals. The president's intervention was necessary because both César Cals and Aداuto Bezerra wanted the governorship. Virgílio Távora offered his own ally, Aécio de Borba. Figueiredo's compromise made the Távora administration's secretary of planning, Luís Gonzaga Motta, the gubernatorial candidate. Virgílio Távora would return to the Senate. Fearing that the Bezerras would sit on their hands in the election, Virgílio insisted that blood-related Bezerras be on the tickets as vice governor and senatorial substitute.³⁴ César Cals, though he lost the fight to become governor, was nominated mayor of Fortaleza and received a third of the appointable positions. The PDS candidates for governor and senator won easily, and the party took seven-

34. In elections for the Senate, voters can choose any of the candidates a party puts up. The party with the largest total vote gets the Senate seat, and the candidate with the largest individual total becomes the senator, with the others becoming substitutes. On the colonels' agreement, see Barros and da Costa 1985.

teen of the twenty-two Chamber seats. In municipal elections the PDS won 136 mayoral contests against 4 for the PMDB.

The three oligarchic families had created a governing machine based on two fundamental points: unity of the top leaders and division at the bottom, at the level of the bases.³⁵ As long as the oligarchs got along, the opposition MDB was electorally doomed. But Gonzaga Motta, a governor imposed by the final military president, could not manage the inevitable conflicts between leaders fighting for space in the coming postmilitary era. Though he greatly expanded the number of state secretaries (the state-level equivalent of ministries) to try to accommodate the colonels' demands, the result was unmanageable budget deficits, widespread administrative irregularities, and rapid turnover as cabinet secretaries positioned themselves for electoral office. Motta himself, seeing that he had no future in his own party, switched to the PMDB.

The 1982 election turned out to be the swan song of the old caciques. Three years later, Fortaleza elected its first mayor since the start of the military regime. The Liberal Front Party (PFL), a splinter of the old PDS, nominated Lúcio Alcântara, a federal deputy with a modern image. The PMDB put up a veteran deputy, and the PT nominated a radical sociologist, Maria Luiza Fontenele. With the help of Virgílio Távora (who happened to be a relative of Fontenele) the PT candidate won. Though Maria Luiza's administration was not notably successful, it was clear that the Right, even in a multicandidate election, could no longer pull a significant vote in the state's biggest city.

By 1986 Ceará's political forces had completely realigned. During the Motta administration, the three oligarchic families essentially functioned as veto players under a unanimity rule. Not surprisingly, consistent economic policy could not be implemented in such a political environment. The resulting fiscal chaos was particularly damaging to the state's younger industrialists, and this group took over the state PMDB and gave its support to entrepreneur Tasso Jereissati. With the backing of Motta and the help of the Plano Cruzado, Jereissati defeated the PFL candidate. The PMDB elected both senators and twelve of twenty-two deputies, while the PFL could manage only six deputies.

Though Jereissati could not have won in 1986 without the help of Motta and his PMDB allies, the new governor immediately distanced himself from the Motta group, which constituted the majority of the PMDB in the state assembly. Instead, Jereissati centralized the multiple, patronage-based secretariats into a single government secretary and placed the crucial economic secretariats in the hands of his entrepreneurial allies. With political power centralized,

35. In this section I follow the analysis of W. Bonfim 1999.

pork could be distributed much more efficiently—that is, cheaply. The economic secretaries and their policies could be insulated from pork distribution altogether (W. Bonfim 1999, 21). Jereissati successfully substituted a direct, almost populist style of communicating with voters, especially voters on Fortaleza's periphery, as a substitute for the more traditional, mediated style of his predecessors.

Though the PSDB has done poorly in Fortaleza—which contributes almost 30 percent of the total statewide vote—the party's strength in the interior guarantees victories. In 1990 Ciro Gomes succeeded Jereissati as governor, defeating Lustosa, the old Bezerra ally. The PSDB's successes also rearranged party financial coffers. By 1990 the Cals' machine was so short of money that César Cals's son failed in a try for the Chamber of Deputies, and the old bosses could secure seats for just two of their followers, Virgílio's son, Carlos, and Adauto Bezerra's brother, Orlando. With Jereissati's easy reelection in 1998, the PSDB became the state's dominant party, claiming twenty-one of forty-six state assembly seats and twelve of twenty-two seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

While the Jereissati-Gomes administrations have profoundly modernized Ceará's economic management and rationalized (through centralization) the distribution of pork, the oligarchic character of the state's politics has not changed. Before the Jereissati revolution, Ceará, like other northeastern states, ranked low on all the common indexes of party competitiveness, including the number of effective parties, the number of candidates per seat, the fragmentation of the parties, and so on. During and after the revolution, however, Ceará's low degree of competitiveness did not change. In a sense, a more progressive oligarchy replaced the three colonels.

Bahia

For many years, Bahia has been the strongest bailiwick of the Brazilian Right. The National Democratic Union (UDN), Vargas's fiercest opponent, won every gubernatorial contest prior to 1964 except the election of 1950. After the 1964 coup, Bahia's UDN became the heart of the promilitary ARENA, conquering all the state's executive positions until the 1986 gubernatorial election (when Waldir Pires captured the state house).

Unchallenged dominance promotes fragmentation, and by 1978 ARENA had split into three factions: one headed by Antônio Carlos Magalhães (the *carlistas*), another headed by Luis Vianna Filho,³⁶ and a third headed by

36. This group also included Jutahy Magalhães and Lomanto Júnior.

Roberto Santos. ACM's group was usually able to strike a bargain with Vianna, but Santos was unalterably hostile.

Why was Bahia such a stronghold of the Right? The state's only big city, Salvador, has roughly 16 percent of the electorate. Outside Salvador, population density is very low. Centrist and leftist forces are usually successful only in Salvador; elsewhere, traditional oligarchical groups dominate. Before 1978 the MDB had no party organization at all in more than 100 of Bahia's 336 municipalities, and in almost 200 municipalities the MDB won no council seats. In a milieu of such weakness, the more conservative elements of the MDB opted to become *adesistas*, that is, politicians willing to cooperate with ARENA in exchange for a share of state patronage. The MDB's more ideological *auténtico* wing simply lacked the numbers to mount a real opposition.

By 1975, the MDB began to take on a more ideological cast. After the national legislative elections of 1974, in which the MDB enjoyed great success in the states of the South and Southeast, students and workers joined the Bahian MDB in large numbers. When the MDB captured a majority of Salvador's council seats in the 1975 municipal elections, *adesistas* statewide began to leave the party for ARENA. In the 1978 elections, MDB candidates competed fiercely against each other, especially in Salvador and its environs, for the support of ideologically motivated voters. The competition mobilized voters in the capital, but elsewhere the MDB remained almost nonexistent, and the party lost support when it expelled rural mayors who had supported local ARENA candidates. The result was continued ARENA dominance statewide: ARENA's candidate for the Senate received two-thirds of the vote, and ARENA elected twenty-four deputies against just eight for the MDB.

Antônio Carlos Magalhães did not come from a old political family, and the lack of *coronelismo* baggage may have facilitated his reputation for a style of policy-making that was technocratic and modernizing rather than one based on pork and patronage. In the late 1950s, as a state and federal deputy, the young ACM had deviated from the UDN line to defend the developmentalist policies of President Kubitschek. During the early years of the military regime, Governor Luis Vianna Filho nominated ACM as mayor of Salvador, and in 1970 the military made him Bahia's governor. He occupied the statehouse again from 1978 until 1982.

ACM intended to use the 1978–82 gubernatorial term as a springboard to the presidency after the generals completed their withdrawal. Profiting from his strong links to incoming military President João Figueiredo and to ex-president Geisel, ACM was able to attract crucial industrial projects, including a petrochemical complex, and federal transfers to Bahia surpassed those to other

states. At their peak, in 1982, such grants amounted to almost 25 percent of the state's total receipts (C. Souza 1997, 47).

Magalhães's political power was never more evident than in the 1982 gubernatorial election. When ACM's candidate, Cleriston Andrade, died unexpectedly just before the election, he was able to marshal sufficient support to elect last-minute candidate João Durval. As governor, Durval followed a course often seen in examining Brazilian state politics: he immediately distanced himself from ACM and began his own political organization. Durval's key appointments, compared to those of ACM, were marked by a much higher level of narrowly political criteria, and his administration became quite unpopular. The smell of corruption, in conjunction with the initial success of the Plano Cruzado, ultimately led to the defeat of conservative forces by the PMDB's Waldir Pires in 1986. Not until 1990 could ACM himself recapture the statehouse, this time by direct election.

ACM's extraordinary influence, both in Bahia and nationally, owes much to his construction of a developmentalist, technocratic image. One crucial component of this technocratic style was administrative. During the military period, Bahia implemented an administrative reorganization paralleling reforms undertaken by the military regime and, much earlier, by Juscelino Kubitschek. ACM's reorganization insulated the bureaucratic agencies dealing with planning, budgeting, and economic programs from patronage but left the social services as reservoirs of partisan criteria and personal favors. Another crucial component of ACM's technocratic style was his appointment policy: he demanded loyalty but also expected competence. Even leftists could be part of his coterie; leftist technocrats, in fact, were so numerous they came to be called the *esquerda carlista*, the Carlist Left. ACM's appointees knew that loyalty had its rewards: in 1993 five deputies in ACM's congressional group were former technocrats.³⁷

ACM's influence also owes much to his ability to co-opt or conciliate potential foes and to manipulate the levers of traditional patronage cum pork. At least until 1986, the PMDB still had a substantial complement of *adesistas*, deputies who supported ACM while remaining in the opposition. ACM encouraged them by keeping potential PFL competitors out of their bailiwicks.³⁸

37. The ACM group totaled eighteen. Five of eighteen may appear a small percentage, but political families are so important in Bahia that this cohort really represents a major innovation. This explanation of the ACM phenomenon owes a considerable debt to C. Souza 1997. See also C. Souza 1999, 256.

38. This protectiveness can be measured by examining the competitive situation of *adesistas* in relation to other PMDB deputies. First it is necessary to count the number of PMDB deputies

They responded, as chapter 7 will demonstrate, by supporting ACM in the legislature.

Social programs, especially education, have also been central tools in the machine's survival strategy. Official studies report that of all teachers in schools financed by the state of Bahia, 40 percent have been appointed by politicians, 21 percent by educational staff, and only 39 percent by competitive exams. Politicians appoint almost three-fourths of all headmasters, and these headmasters are themselves crucial in teacher appointments.³⁹ Until the 1980s, every state secretary of education in Bahia ran for the legislature after leaving the state bureaucracy.

Under both the generals and their civilian successors, ACM also relied on his powerful ties to the central government. Politicians in disfavor suffered. As chapter 5 will show, Bahian municipalities received few intergovernmental grants (*convênios*) while Pires served as governor (between 1987 and 1989), even though Pires and Sarney were both PMDB members. ACM's support, as a member of the cabinet and commander of a large legislative delegation, was far more important to President Sarney than was the president's partisan ties to Pires. Pires, of course, may have withheld state grants from ACM's local municipalities.

The financing of Bahia's debt provides another example of the importance of ACM's central government connections. In budgetary terms, interest on the state debt falls into the category of "Expenditure on Administration and Planning." In 1990 that expenditure took a big jump, climbing in one year from 23.4 percent to 30.8 percent of all spending. ACM was running for governor and was also serving as a Sarney minister. The administration of incumbent Governor Nilo Coelho was ACM's archenemy: ACM persuaded Sarney to punish Coelho by refusing to negotiate with Bahia over interest payments on the state's debt. Since the governor had to allot more state funds to the debt, he had less cash to spend on the 1990 elections (C. Souza 1997, 140).

whose vote bases are significantly related to the vote bases of other PMDB deputies. These deputies, in other words, receive substantial shares of their votes in the strongholds of other deputies. *Adesista* deputies, of course, are a subset of all PMDB deputies. In 1986, the *adesista* faction of the PMDB (identified through interviews with academics and journalists) included Luiz Vianna Neto, Fernando Gomes Oliveira, França Teixeira, Carlos Santana, Jorge Viana Dias da Silva, Genebaldo Correia, and Uldurico Pinto. ACM's friends, the seven *adesistas*, had significant competition with 51 percent of all other deputies. The non-*adesista* PMDB deputies had significant competition with 77 percent of all other deputies. Thus ACM, by keeping PFL candidates out of the bailiwicks of his friends in the opposition party, improved their electoral chances.

39. Waldir Pires told C. Souza (1997, 134) that children could register in state schools only if they had a letter from a local politician or state deputy. The data come from the Department of Education of Bahia (Secretaria da Educação e Cultura 1992, 59, cited by C. Souza 1997).

Even in Cardoso's supposedly postclientelist administration, manipulation of social programs served the short-term political goals of the Bahian machine. The president's wife, anthropologist Ruth Cardoso, directed a new entity (Community Solidarity) located in the president's office. The new agency sought to coordinate federal social programs so that municipal needs and absorptive capacities, not simply political ties, would drive the allocation of funds. Although the program was just getting under way, it seemed to be making some progress in rationalizing the distribution of social funds—except in Bahia. According to informants, the word quickly went out that nothing was to go to Bahian municipalities headed by ACM's opponents.⁴⁰

Media power has also been central to the machine. According to his foes, ACM controls, through either family or protégés, a network of ninety radio and TV channels (C. Souza 1997, 131–32). Although this figure may be exaggerated, the family's properties do include the biggest network in Bahia.⁴¹ In addition, ACM is a main player in the state's highly politicized print media.⁴² With such media power, the Bahian electorate is fed a rosy picture of ACM's achievements, while opponents suffer constant, vitriolic attacks.

Conclusion

In this chapter the unit of observation remained the individual state, but the mode of investigation switched from quantitative models to analytic narratives exploring the interactions among economic and demographic factors, extraordinary political events, and political competition. Fortunately, the cases selected exhibit much more variance in their modes of political competition than in economic or social conditions.

Paraná and Santa Catarina are relatively wealthy, but their politics are quite distinct. Paraná seems essentially leaderless, with highly localized competition for elected office, a weak legislature, very high turnover of elected politicians at both state and federal levels, and strong voice for parties on the left. Santa Catarina has maintained a stable political oligarchy since World War II. Though

40. Confidential communication from a high-ranking agency staff member.

41. TV Bahia, ACM's network, is linked to Globo, the network of Roberto Marinho. Ex-governor Coelho owns TV Aratú, and Pedro Irujo (erstwhile ally, current opponent of ACM) owned TV Itapoã, which he later sold to TV Record.

42. Major political groups own three of four daily newspapers. ACM's family owns one, ex-federal deputy Joaci Goes owned a second (later sold to its employees), and ex-Salvador mayor Mário Kertész controlled the third (*Jornal da Bahia*) until it closed.

the state is more industrial than is Paraná, Santa Catarina's Left has traditionally been weaker.

Why are Santa Catarina and Paraná so different? The real cause seems to be demography. In Paraná, powerful migratory flows from other states and from other countries created subregions with their own political orientations. Paraná's center—the area around Curitiba—is relatively unimportant both demographically and politically. The economy provides enough opportunities that politics is no longer a highly desirable alternative. As a result, Paraná's leaders lack strong roots in their own state. The delegation to the Chamber of Deputies has too little collective seniority to gain national influence. Moreover, Paraná's population elects deputies with quite local orientations, so pork delivery becomes the litmus test of electability.

Maranhão, Ceará, and Bahia offer quite different styles. No other Brazilian state-level leaders have the clout of Maranhão's José Sarney or Bahia's Antônio Carlos Magalhães. Both have become the elder statesmen of political families: Sarney got his daughter into Maranhão's statehouse and two other family members into the Congress. ACM's son was president of the Chamber of Deputies and a possible candidate for Brazil's presidency, and his brother has been a deputy. The two men's styles, however, are quite different: Sarney is much more given to compromise and tolerance; ACM rules with an iron hand. Ceará was once the classic example of domination by colonels. Now the World Bank and other international lending agencies portray the state as a shining beacon of progressive government. And in truth, although its politicians lack the power and flair of Sarney or ACM, Ceará has gained dramatically in political and administrative management over the past fourteen years. In a sense, though, Ceará simply changed oligarchies. Although the current regime is undoubtedly more efficient and progressive, political competition remains as closed as it was under the colonels. Why have these states developed so differently?

Sarney dominated Maranhão essentially because he was the first state politician to take advantage of Brasília's largesse. At the same time, Sarney never was able—perhaps never cared—to eliminate opposition. He may have been the single most powerful politician, but his protégés usually broke away, and politicians made successful careers in the opposition. In truth, Sarney's margin of preeminence was slight until he became Tancredo Neves's vice presidential running mate and then, after Tancredo's death, president. In the aftermath, Maranhão's share of central government pork became enormous. Sarney took care of his family and even captured a Senate seat from nearby Amapá.

Ceará's cliques of colonels had things too easy. They carved up the state, building political machines through traditional rural control. When the military

took over in 1964, the colonels adjusted easily, and the generals happily left such cooperative leaders in place. But the colonels forgot the slogan of a famous populist *paulista* leader: “He steals, but he gets things done.”⁴³ The *cearense* bosses stole (or at least they had a reputation for stealing), but mostly they failed to get anything done. Eventually, urban growth made Fortaleza the dominant factor in Ceará’s electorate, and when open politics loomed, the cost of maintaining three families of bosses acting like veto players became unbearable. Reaching agreement on policy, given the unanimity rule the bosses had tacitly adopted, became impossible even with lavish patronage, so the bosses were history. Tasso Jereissati was certainly more progressive than was Sarney, but Jereissati’s role—more than twenty years later—was similar. Tasso implemented programs benefiting ordinary people. But when his political management—especially his centralization of patronage—proved as skillful as his policy management, the old bosses suddenly found that they could no longer buy enough votes to stay in power.

Within Bahia, Magalhães commanded a political machine far more powerful than any Ceará *coronel*. ACM, however, was never a traditional political boss. He dispensed favors, made and broke political careers, and grew quite wealthy, but he also modernized Bahia’s infrastructure and fostered industrial growth. What made all these developments possible? The military regime gave ACM very strong support, lavishing government spending and favorable industrial policies on Bahia. Salvador, traditionally the Left’s stronghold, never was a big part of the Bahian electorate. But these factors cannot explain why ACM thrived even after the generals’ withdrawal. What happened, however, illustrates again the importance in politics of timing. ACM used central government resources to create a political machine based on bureaucratic power. When Sarney inaugurated the New Republic in 1986, the Bahian delegation in the Chamber of Deputies was the most united of any large state delegation, and ACM had allies in other northeastern states as well. His support was indispensable to Sarney’s political survival. So ACM’s regional influence turned into national influence, and he became the most powerful single politician in the Brazilian Congress.

43. The Portuguese is better: “Rouba, mas faz.”