

Wheeling, Dealing, and Appealing: What Motivates Deputies?

“Balanced budgets are the rhetoric of incompetent politicians.”

Orestes Quéricia, former governor of São Paulo¹

“I think I can say, and say with pride, that we have some legislatures that bring higher prices than any in the world.”

Mark Twain (1875)

At the beginning of this book, I argued that the Brazilian Congress has trouble approving laws on issues of national concern. The legislative branch almost never initiates significant laws. While the Congress does acquiesce in many presidential proposals, final approval of these bills carries a high price in pork, patronage, and substantive concessions to privileged, often minute interests. Why are substantive issues so difficult for this legislature? Why is the Congress so obstructionist? A comparison of Brazil’s political institutions to those of other nations might lead to expectations of a very active legislature. David M. Olsen and Michael L. Mezey (1991, 201–14) identify characteristics widely associated with legislative activism, including presidentialism, especially with an open and decentralized executive; a candidate-centered, decentralized electoral system; functionally specialized interest groups; political parties that are numerous, weakly organized, internally fragmented, and autonomous; and legislative committees that parallel the structure of administrative agencies. All these characteristics are found in Brazil, and, indeed, Brazil’s Congress is active.² Its activism, however, is too often directed at stalling legislation until the executive meets the particularistic demands of small groups of deputies.

1. Ciro Gomes, former governor of Ceará, claims that Quéricia made this remark. The Portuguese is better: “Equilíbrio financeiro é conversa de político incompetente” (*Veja*, January 29, 1992, 9).

2. Mezey (Olsen and Mezey 1991, 207) notes, however, that in two important cases weak parties led to greater activity but not greater action—i.e., the legislatures ultimately could not resolve issues.

The obstructionist tendencies of Brazil's legislature have three possible causes. Perhaps—interpreting the veto-players argument narrowly—the multiplicity of parties is a sufficient cause. A second cause lies internally: the legislature's procedural rules might hinder policy-making, either deliberately or through consequences no one anticipated. Policy weakness could also result from the preferences, or ideologies, of deputies themselves. The deputies' avoidance of serious policy-making may be deliberate, either because their primary interests lie in pork barrel or because they prefer weak, nonprogrammatic parties that are unable to aggregate societal demands.³ Given that this legislature only dates from 1988, it is not possible to assign definitive weights to the three alternatives; rather, I simply examine the supporting evidence for each. Chapter 8 will discuss the first two causes. The question of motivation, the third cause, is the subject of this chapter.⁴

Congressional deputies are affected by ideology, constituency characteristics, election prospects, and pork-barrel inducements. No perfect methodology for weighing these motivations exists. Deputies could be interviewed, but their responses are likely to be unrealistically honest, above pork barrel, and progressive. Orations on the floor could be dissected, but many deputies rarely speak, and all target their remarks to particular audiences. Voting on regular legislation could be analyzed—such roll calls, in fact, will be the subject of chapter 7—but attempts at party discipline may mask other motivations. An intriguing exception, however, is the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) of 1987–88. During this period Congress, not the president, initiated most of the issues that came to a vote. Parties rarely tried to impose discipline, in part because the president's disinterest in most conflicts reduced the availability of side payments and in part because dissidents freely switched parties. Thus, the ANC's 1,021 votes will be the major set of votes from which to infer deputies' motivations. As a comparison, my models will also be evaluated with a set of votes taken on the emergency economic measures decreed by president Fernando Collor de Mello at the beginning of his term.⁵

3. Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that fragmented bases in the United States do not prevent legislators from delegating to parties. In Brazil, however, parties are more locally oriented, and the ease of party switching reduces deputies' incentives to preserve their parties' national reputations. Thanks to Scott Morgenstern for discussion of this point.

4. This analysis of motives is perfectly compatible with the "excess of veto players" argument. Either as individuals or in small groups, deputies—not just parties—become veto players, so their individual ideologies become relevant.

5. Although roll-call votes are available for the whole post-1987 period, this chapter uti-

The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first offers a general discussion of deputies' motivations. The second presents and evaluates a model of voting in the ANC and on the emergency presidential decrees in 1990. The third discusses the implications of the empirical findings.

I. What Do Deputies Want?

Most studies of the motivations of parliamentarians, especially studies in the rational choice tradition, assume reelection as legislators' primary goal. This assumption is justified in the U.S. House of Representatives, where reelection probabilities are very high, but rates of return in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies are much lower.⁶ These rates are so low, in fact, that it may well be irrational for deputies to focus their energies on reelection. In 1990 only about 40 percent of the incumbent deputies were reelected for the 1991–94 term. Of the 60 percent not returning, about half retired or stood for other offices and about half sought reelection to the Chamber but lost. The turnover rate in 1994 was a bit lower than in 1990, with only 40 percent of the deputies failing to return for the 1995–98 session, but in 1998 48 percent of the deputies were not reelected for the current term.⁷ Thus, in each legislative session, about half the deputies are serving their first term. Because turnover rates from both retirement and defeat are highest in the developed states of the South and Southeast, their delegations typically have even lower levels of seniority.

Why such high turnover? Some deputies decline to run because they are sure they will lose. Many deputies opt for executive offices simply because mayors are able to exercise more control over programs and can avoid living in Brasília. Some deputies switch to bureaucratic jobs as a way of fattening their clienteles before returning to elective office. Others tire of their restricted importance in policy-making.⁸ But even those running for reelection face a high rate of rejection, a rate that would be even higher but for the retirements of those facing certain defeat. Voters reject deputies for a variety of reasons: the weak-

lizes votes only from the Sarney and Collor administrations. In this shorter period, much better information about pork-barrel benefits to individual deputies is available.

6. A classic treatment of the institutionalization of the U.S. House appears in Polsby 1968.

7. The 1998 turnover rate is an estimate based on deputies serving as of August 1, 1999. Since a few reelected deputies might have already resigned by this date, the estimate may be off by a percentage point or two.

8. Based on her interviews with deputies, Celina Souza has made this argument (personal communication). She emphasizes the minimal visibility of congressional committees.

ness of both party and personal ties, corruption scandals, shifts in party alignments, and so on.⁹

These high turnover rates raise a caution against the facile assumption, coming mostly from the traditional stability of the U.S. House of Representatives, that reelection is elected politicians' primary goal. For many Brazilian deputies, especially those from poor regions, politics is a business.¹⁰ These politicians may choose to leave the Chamber, pursue other avenues of mobility, and return later. In the reality of Brazilian politics, it is more reasonable to assume that politicians seek to maximize income over their whole careers.

Faced with such daunting rates of congressional turnover, Brazilian legislators are likely to expect short careers. Does this expectation affect their motivations and behavior? Because deputies know they probably will not be around to profit from efforts to acquire legislative skills, they are less likely to invest in attaining such expertise. They find it better to concentrate on delivering pork to their districts, because pork advances local and state executive or bureaucratic ambitions. Since federal ministries control the distribution of most available pork, deputies cultivate relationships with the executive branch.

Concentration on pork does not automatically preclude broader legislative activity. According to Carlos Alberto Marques Novaes (1994, 109), between 1989 and 1991 deputies introduced 6,601 bills. Only 43 were approved, and the vast majority never got out of committee. Novaes concludes that deputies introduce legislation with no intention of shepherding their bills through to final passage. Deputies submit bills, the Chamber prints them, and these printed versions (*avulsos*) are sent to constituents as proof of "service."

How do deputies view parties? Brazil's electoral rules produce parties with individualistic deputies. Consider deputies with geographically scattered electoral bases. With fragmented bases hindering even minimal accountability to constituents, these deputies should prefer weak parties—that is, parties unable to impose discipline or a common program (Novaes 1994). Even deputies with concentrated vote distributions—with constituencies demanding high levels of local benefits—have little reason to support parties whose leaders will compel the deputies to vote jointly. Only the small minority of deputies focusing pri-

9. Chapter 2 demonstrated that deputies with dominant vote bases (electoral bases where they received most of their key municipalities' votes) more easily survived changes in overall party vote shares.

10. In some regions, as demonstrated earlier, politics is a family business. In Bahia 40 percent of the deputies have a relative (of the same generation or older) holding political office. In São Paulo only 5 percent come from political families.

marily on national-level legislation will seek parties with authority to discipline the members and prevent free riders on the party's reputation.¹¹

II. Voting in the Constituent Assembly and on President Collor's Emergency Decrees

In 1987 and 1988, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate met each morning in joint session as the Constituent Assembly; each afternoon they separated to conduct regular legislative business. Constitution writing is naturally quite different from normal legislative politics. Parties less often define clear-cut positions and seldom attempt to discipline members. Ideological positions are more important in constitutional assemblies than in regular legislation. It would appear, then, that a constitutional assembly more clearly reveals deputies' underlying motivations, but this assumption can be tested by applying the model both to the constitutional assembly and to voting on subsequent legislation in the same legislature.

This analysis of the ANC builds on the pioneering research of Maria D'Alva Gil Kinzo, who fashioned a series of issue scales from key constitutional votes. I selected four scales as indicators of basic dimensions of voting.¹² The

11. The broad preference for weak parties does not mean that most deputies prefer no party discipline at all. Along with state delegations and interest-specific caucuses (such as the *bancada rural*, or rural delegation), parties are one way deputies organize themselves to bargain. Deputies join bargaining units because they gain from conceding a certain amount of autonomy. Their acceptance of reduced autonomy contributes to predictability in the group's negotiations with the executive. Predictability is an obvious prerequisite for success in bargaining—i.e., a group leader promising a certain number of votes must be able to deliver. How much unity makes a party credible is difficult to quantify, and most parties allow certain members occasional defections for reasons of constituency pressure or conscience. Chapter 7 elaborates this point. See also Aldrich 1995.

12. Kinzo (1989) leaves unclear whether the groups of votes are true scales or merely indexes. I applied standard scale tests (with the help of David Nixon), retaining only those votes meeting scaling criteria. Logit analyses of individual votes were generally consistent with regressions based on the multivote scales, but these scales are preferable because they minimize the effects of absentee voting and other peculiarities specific to particular votes. I call Kinzo's "Economic Conservatism" scale "Statism-Welfarism," because the items really measure willingness to support government intervention in the economy and defense of issues championed by unions. I renamed her "Support for Democratic Values" scale "Support for Popular Democracy," because a number of its items concern class-action lawsuits and direct democracy, while other items concern military intervention. The Congressional Power scale includes nine items, with a typical item requiring congressional approval for the federal budget. The Support for Executive scale includes five items; a typical item gave future presidents a five-year mandate. The State Economic Intervention-Welfarism scale included six items; a typical item dealt with indemnities paid to workers fired unfairly

four scales include “support for expanded congressional prerogatives,” “support for expanded executive authority,” “statism-welfarism,” and “support for popular democracy.”

The second set of votes comes from the same legislature—that is, the deputies voting on constitutional provisions then proceeded to vote on a series of emergency decrees.¹³ Brazil’s economy teetered at the edge of hyperinflation when Collor assumed power in early 1990. In short order Collor promulgated a series of draconian measures. The most significant and controversial decrees reformed the structure of central government ministries, fixed prices and salaries, established a privatization program, regulated civil servants’ conduct, altered business taxes, eliminated fiscal subsidies, and—most dramatically—sequestered private financial assets. Collor’s decrees arrived at the legislature as *medidas provisórias* (emergency measures). Though the decrees became law immediately, they would become null if the legislature failed to approve them within a set time period. Given that the president’s party had few congressional seats, passage depended on the persuasive power of Collor and legislative allies.

Explanatory Variables

Dominance and Clustering

How should the spatial distribution of electoral support—that is, dominance and clustering—influence deputies’ voting? Again, dominance refers to the ability of a deputy to collect high percentages of all votes cast (for any candidate) in those municipalities contributing the bulk of the deputy’s individual vote. Dominant deputies are mostly found in less developed, more rural areas. If the wealth of constituencies is held constant, deputies dominating their core municipalities should oppose state economic intervention and short-term welfare measures. Dominance is impossible without the backing of a community’s economic elite, and local elites rarely support agrarian reform or expanded workers’ rights. Dominant deputies should also uphold executive power. As dominance increases, deputies are better able to claim credit for the pork they deliver, so they work harder at bringing pork home (Shepsle and Weingast

by employers. The Support for Popular Democracy Scale included six items; a typical item permitted class-action suits. The index of President Collor’s emergency decrees included eight items; the most important allowed the government to confiscate a substantial part of private savings for as long as eighteen months. See appendix C for discussion of the Constituent Assembly. In each case the variable summed across the individual items. Further information about the scales is available on request.

13. For an extensive treatment of emergency measures, see Figueiredo and Limongi 1997a.

1987). Because the executive in Brazil controls most pork-barrel programs, good relations with the president are a must. Moreover, dominant deputies tend to be more senior, so they have time in which to develop good relations. Dominant deputies should also be reluctant to expand congressional authority, because increases would weaken the old guard's monopoly on access.

Clustering means that the municipalities contributing the bulk of the deputy's individual votes are physically close to each other. Clustered votes make deputies more accountable to voters and less responsive to local or regional bosses. Face-to-face contact in clustered constituencies is greater, community organizations participate more in campaigns, and a deputy's career is more likely to be rooted in this core region. Accountability makes deputies more likely to promote a legislative agenda, so they seek expanded congressional power. Greater accountability, however, also encourages deputies to maximize pork, and since the executive plays a central role in pork distribution, clustered deputies might be expected to support expanded executive power. In the South, by contrast, public attitudes were so hostile to President Sarney that deputies were likely to seek reduced executive authority, even though they might individually try to maintain links to the president. Clustered vote bases should produce deputies with a populist bent—deputies who will tend toward economic interventionism and favor organized labor's demands. Last, support for popular democracy is likely to be higher among clustered-vote deputies, because they rarely depend on deals with local elites that enable them to deliver private goods rather than local public goods.

*Constituency Attributes*¹⁴

In the political context of the late 1980s, deputies relying on voters in industrial areas should be pro-Congress, antiexecutive, and statist-welfarist on economic issues. At the same time, the control constituencies exert over deputies should depend not merely on the wealth and industrial level of a deputy's voters but also on the constituency's homogeneity. Imagine two constituencies with the same average level of income or industrialization. In one, most municipalities are near the mean on these characteristics; in the other, the communities are more diverse. In the more homogeneous constituency, voters' interests are clearer to their deputy because the municipalities are similar; in a heterogeneous constituency, interests are diverse and conflicting.¹⁵

14. Wealth and industrial development are highly correlated, so only the overall relationship between these indicators and voting is of interest.

15. Per capita income is a reasonable indicator of the economic development of an areal unit, but the concept is more difficult to operationalize when actual voters, rather than a legally fixed dis-

To test the relationship between constituency wealth, the intramunicipal variation of wealth, and the scales measuring voting behavior, I created dummy variables to identify deputies with constituencies of high, medium, and low heterogeneity. I then multiplied these dummies by the measure of wealth. Ultimately, the regression results show the effects of wealth for each range of heterogeneity.

Career Path

Though many career paths lead to the Chamber, most fall into one of three modal trajectories: local, business, and bureaucratic.¹⁶ “Local” deputies are those who served as mayors or on municipal councils as one of their last two jobs prior to joining the Chamber of Deputies. A “business” career implies that the deputy acted primarily in the private sector. “Bureaucratic” deputies held high-level jobs in state or federal agencies. Extensive conversations with Brazilian informants, including journalists, academics, and deputies, persuaded me that business types differed fundamentally from other kinds of deputies. Business types tended to see their activities in the Chamber as an extension of their personal economic interests. When deputies lobby for private hospitals, the construction industry, or poultry processors, they do not merely represent important constituents; in fact, the economic interest may hardly function in their districts. Instead, such “corporatist” deputies represent their own personal interests.¹⁷ Some deputies run lobbying operations out of their offices as a kind of small business, charging fees for representational services.¹⁸ Obviously, not all business deputies embody a corporatist representational style, but they

district, define a constituency. I define the per capita income of a given deputy’s voters as the average per capita income of the municipalities in which the deputy received votes, weighted by the percentage of the deputy’s total vote received in each municipality. The homogeneity of the constituency is defined as the coefficient of variation across municipalities of these same weighted per capita incomes.

16. This formulation has a weakness: it misclassifies deputies whose expected career path is a combination of two or more discrete careers. In other words, one can be a career politician but leave elective office for a stint in the bureaucracy or business. Knowing that such shifts are probable, the behavior of deputies whose most recent jobs were elected should be closer to the behavior of pure bureaucrats or business types. With the passage of time and the greater institutionalization of Brazil’s legislature, a more nuanced career analysis will be possible (see also Samuels 1998, 2001).

17. Henry Jackson was often called the “senator from Boeing,” but the label referred to the importance of Boeing to his home state, not to personal business interests.

18. A staff member for one northeastern deputy estimated that she and the deputy divided about \$100,000 per year paid by firms for lobbying the executive branch. The staff member did most of the real lobbying; the deputy distributed his share of the money in small payoffs within his constituency.

adopt it more often than do deputies with local or bureaucratic backgrounds. Given the strong regulatory power of the executive and bureaucracy, business deputies should be antilegislature and proexecutive. Their economic attitudes, given their position as private-sector employers, should be antistatist and anti-welfarist. Their support for popular democracy is likely to be low, because many of the scale's items involve antibusiness mobilization.

Another path marks one of the legislature's most notorious factions, the roughly forty Protestant ministers called *evangélicos*. They are widely seen as quite pork oriented, willing to grant the executive practically anything in exchange for public works benefiting their religious ministries.

Seniority and Electoral Insecurity

In a legislature with high turnover, few deputies accrue much seniority. The legislature's internal rules, in addition, barely reward seniority. Committee chairs retain their positions for only two years, senior deputies have no additional staff allowance, and the dominance of party proportionality as a criterion for committee appointment (coupled with the large number of parties) gives senior members little advantage. But senior deputies have time and motivation to establish close ties with ministries supplying constituency-specific goods. In the early legislatures of the new republic, many senior deputies had served during the military period. They were likely to maintain strong ties with executive branch agencies. They are also frequent candidates for ministerial positions, so they are likely to be proexecutive. Because a more powerful legislature would benefit newer deputies, senior members are unlikely to support expanded congressional prerogatives.

In an open-list proportional system, each deputy's electoral fortunes depend partly on the aggregate vote of all candidates from the party. But deputies' chances depend even more on their individual vote totals, and all deputies know how close they were to defeat in the last election. The further from the top of the party's postelection list, the weaker the deputy. Low-ranking deputies—especially deputies whose electoral dominance allows them to claim exclusive credit for the pork they deliver—are particularly vulnerable to executive pressure, because the president controls the pork that a deputy could use to draw a few more votes at the next election.

State Unity and State Interests

A state's deputies will vote as a bloc when they have a common interest or when a state leader demands unity. On economic and social issues some delegations may be predominantly populist or neoliberal, but such positions represent voter

preferences, not geographic interests. States in the North and Northeast, however, hold more congressional seats and receive more pork than their populations merit, so their deputies ought to support expanded congressional prerogatives. Conversely, because these same deputies tend to be quite senior, they profit from close ties to a strong executive. Overall, then, constituency issues are too diffuse to incline state delegations in any particular direction. Still, state politics matters in Brazil, and some state governors lead powerful machines.¹⁹ These caciques may have little to gain or lose on constitutional issues, but they increase their influence by delivering blocs of deputies, including, in some cases, allied deputies from other parties.²⁰ On the president's emergency measures, delegations' votes depend on state economic interests and, once again, on governors' political interests. Given these multiple constraints, unequivocal predictions as to the strength or effects of state unity are impossible, but the issue can be explored by including dummy variables for the dominant parties of two states, Bahia and Maranhão, both known for their strong state machines.

Party and Ideology

When political parties are stable and disciplined, voting behavior can be confidently predicted on the basis of party affiliations. Brazilian parties are far from stable and disciplined, however, and deputies jump ship with impunity, even in the middle of legislative sessions. Between 1987 and 1990, for example, 40 percent of all deputies changed parties, mostly during the Constituent Assembly. Whether deputies switched for electoral or ideological reasons, the implications are the same: party in the long term is endogenous. Rather than a determinant of issue positions and electoral tactics—at least in the Constituent Assembly—party is a consequence.

If party affiliations are useless as explanatory variables during a time of intense party switching, is it possible to measure ideological position? One possibility is the deputy's party during the military regime. Until 1982 the right-wing military regime allowed only two parties. The National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) supported the government; the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) opposed it. After 1982, ARENA became the Democratic Social Party (PDS), but former ARENA members constitute the most conservative elements in almost every party (Power 1993, 86–93). I expect former ARENA

19. On the importance of state politics, see Samuels 1998.

20. Weak governors seek to increase their influence. In the legislative struggle over Cardoso's efforts to promote a constitutional amendment permitting his own reelection, certain small state governors organized their deputies to trade support for the amendment for financial rewards. The governors, it appeared, became brokers to increase their clout in Brasília (see *Folha de São Paulo*, June 25–27, 1997).

members to be proexecutive and anti-Congress, opposed to state intervention and the demands of organized labor, and (given their role in the military regime) less supportive of popular democracy.

By the time the Chamber voted on Collor's emergency decrees, party membership had stabilized. Party can now be more confidently tested as an explanatory variable. The Workers' Party (PT) and the Democratic Workers' Party (PDT) opposed Collor; the PDS and the Liberal Front Party (PFL) supported him; the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the patronage and pork-oriented Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) split. In the large majority of votes in the ANC, parties made no recommendations (*encaminhamentos*) to their members, while on the emergency measures such instruction was common, though neither legally nor practically binding.

The Pork Barrel

In single-member systems, all deputies should be equally interested in pork-barrel projects, because they are equally able to claim credit for the projects built in their districts.²¹ In multimember constituencies, the ability to claim credit decreases as the number of vote-receiving deputies increases. Brazil's Left-leaning deputies often share working-class constituencies where credit claiming is impossible and where national economic issues take precedence over public works. Thus, in the long run, pork-oriented deputies tend to be anti-labor and proexecutive.²² In the short run, the executive may offer specific inducements to attract deputies. President Sarney, for example, utilized pork to recruit deputies on key constitutional votes, including both the issue of a five-year term for himself and for future presidents as well as the issue of presidentialism over parliamentarism. Collor claimed to be above such "politics," but the revelations surrounding his impeachment indicate that the Collor administration reached new depths of corruption.

Fortunately, success in attracting pork is measurable. The variable "Pork Payoff to Municipality" is the probability that a deputy could claim credit for an intergovernmental transfer made in 1988 to municipalities where that deputy received votes.²³ "Pork Payoff to Deputy" refers to a 1988 social assistance pro-

21. Pork-barrel projects are not necessarily or even largely corrupt. On this distinction see Geddes and Ribeiro Neto 1999.

22. Supporting executive power does not mean weakening congressional prerogatives. Two of the items on the scale involve municipal elections—many deputies may envision a future run for municipal office. It was also unlikely that the vote on lengthening presidential terms was decided on principle; rather, it was decided on pro- or anti-Sarney lines.

23. Municipalities, not deputies, receive intergovernmental transfers. If a deputy wins all the votes in a municipality, then that deputy clearly gets all the credit. Suppose, however, a group of deputies shares a municipality's votes. Do all deputies claim credit equally? Do they divide the

gram of the Ministry of Planning (SEPLAN). Specific deputies sponsored this program in each municipality. “Radio and TV License” calculates the probability that the Ministry of Communications granted a concession during the ANC to a municipality in which the deputy had an electoral base.²⁴ “Ministerial Request” indicates that in 1990 the deputy met personally with the ministers of infrastructure, agriculture, education, or social action. These meetings were not about the weather.²⁵

Results

Table 10 presents the model’s results for four basic dimensions of voting in the ANC.²⁶ Consider first the results for dominance, clustering, and constituency income. Deputies dominating their vote bases were more likely to back the executive and less likely to support congressional prerogatives. Dominance was unrelated, however, to statism-welfarism or support for popular democracy. Dominance does not, therefore, simply predict deputies’ Left-Right positions. Rather, it leads to a purely “political” tactic: stay close to the executive and minimize support for a Congress whose structure already affords privileged access to dominant deputies (Novaes 1994).

Clustering of electoral bases produced effects that support and amplify our expectations. Both inside and outside the South, deputies with clustered vote bases supported congressional power and statist-welfarist issues. But clustering led to antiexecutive positions only in the South and to more support for pop-

credit in proportion to their vote shares? Does the leading vote getter get all the credit? Does the credit go to deputies from the president’s party, or is it divided in terms of party vote shares? Most informants believed that either the leading vote getter of any party or of the president’s party would get the pork. I tried various formulations, achieving the best results by assuming that only the leading candidate in a given municipality could claim credit but that leader could be of any party. If a deputy received credit for pork in a municipality contributing only a minute fraction of the deputy’s total statewide vote, the credit would do little electorally. In aggregating the individual municipal probabilities, I therefore weighted each municipality’s probability by the fraction of the deputy’s total vote the municipality contributed. In effect, the indicator measures the probability that someone voting for deputy X benefited from an intergovernmental transfer. The precise period of pork delivery in May–June 1988 corresponds exactly to President Sarney’s campaign for a five-year term and for presidentialism. Longer periods produced weaker but similar results.

24. The calculation was analogous to the “Pork Payoff to Municipality” variable. I adjusted the probability where I knew a particular deputy owned the radio or TV station.

25. The parliamentary liaisons of these ministries maintain lists of deputies meeting with ministers. While requesting that individual names remain confidential, they permitted the copying of the lists.

26. To simplify tables 10 and 11, I eliminated the variables measuring the effects of wealth in contexts of high and low variance. Their coefficients were always insignificant.

TABLE 10. OLS Estimates for Voting in the Constituent Assembly

Independent Variables	Congressional Power	Support for Executive	Statism-Welfarism	Support for Popular Democracy
Constant	-.176**	.136*	.113	.076
Municipal dominance	-.110**	.131**	-.037	.002
Clustering in South	.019**	-.024**	.015*	.008
Clustering outside South	.029**	-.009	.025*	.024*
Wealth × Medium variance	.061	-.115**	.091	.104*
Local career	.033	-.001	.052	-.002
Business career	-.112**	-.146**	-.143**	-.158**
Bureaucratic career	-.059	.044	-.046	-.034
Evangelical	-.204**	.194**	-.095**	-.126
Terms in office	-.037	.045	.007	-.029
Rank in party list	-.005	.113**	.004	.003
Bahia × PFL	-.108**	.087**	-.130**	-.162**
Bahia × PMDB	.103**	-.149**	.116**	.071
Maranhão × PFL	-.028	.076**	-.043	-.032
Maranhão × PMDB	-.011	.036	.027	-.003
ARENA	-.304**	.190**	-.342**	-.266**
<i>Pork-barrel indicators</i>				
Pork to municipality	-.104**	.059	-.070	-.119**
Ministerial audience	-.156**	.145**	-.193**	-.182**
Radio-TV license	-.065*	.079**	-.097**	-.141**
Pork to deputy	-.142**	.215**	-.122**	-.095*
<i>R</i> ²	.34	.38	.33	.27
<i>R</i> ² (without pork variables)	.17	.28	.24	.18
F	9.25	10.89	8.87	6.63
<i>N</i>	403	403	403	403

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients.

** *p* < .05, two-tailed test * *p* < .10, two-tailed test

ular democracy only outside the South. These regional differences come from context: outside the South support for a strong executive is widespread, and even clustered deputies succumb to executive pressure. At the same time, oligarchical rule is still prevalent outside the South, so only when deputies cluster do we find the responsiveness to voters that leads to support for mass, democratic politics.

Wealth and industry had the expected effects—antiexecutive, economically statist-welfarist, supportive of popular democracy—but only in constituencies of moderate heterogeneity. In other words, increasing wealth failed to affect voting precisely where I expected the strongest effects—that is, in the most uniform constituencies. Why? Uniform constituencies, it seems, tend to

fall into two groups. One includes deputies picking up nearly all their votes in big cities and industrial suburbs. Such deputies have concentrated-shared constituencies and mostly vote Left: antiexecutive, welfarist, and so on. The other cluster includes deputies constructing constituencies by making deals with local bosses, typically in a scattered-dominant pattern. Such deputies usually vote on the Right, the opposite of their big-city colleagues. These groups tend to cancel each other out: wealthy big cities, especially São Paulo, are more industrial and hence more supportive of PT candidates; wealthy scattered municipalities are likely to be agricultural and more conservative.

The results for the career variables confirmed deputies' and journalists' observations: politicians with business backgrounds supported executive power, opposed congressional influence, and opposed labor's economic demands. Such deputies also opposed—perhaps in defense of their economic interests—popular democracy. Bureaucrats and local politicians manifested no tendencies at all.²⁷ Evangelicals, as expected, were proexecutive, anti-Congress, antilabor, and antidemocratic.

How important were seniority and electoral insecurity? Many of the most senior deputies had served in the Congress before 1985, during military rule. Their votes were indistinguishable from junior deputies on economic and popular democracy issues and were weakly but positively supportive of executive power. It is striking that the Chamber's most senior deputies opposed increasing congressional influence over policy.

Electoral insecurity influenced only one of the issue scales: weak deputies were proexecutive. That linkage is crucial, however, because the executive controls electoral resources vital to weak deputies. It should be emphasized, however, that the relationship between electoral weakness and support for executive power does not mean a disinterested vote on an issue of principle. Instead, it suggests that even in a constitutional assembly—where long-term perspectives ought to prevail—weak deputies must look to their own political survival. They supported an expansion of executive power because at that moment their short-term future dictated such support.

Strong state leaders matter politically. Some governors polarized their delegations. The single most dominant state-level organization, the Liberal Front Party of Bahia's Antônio Carlos Magalhães, exercised considerable power over its deputies: PFL deputies in Bahia stand out as a coherent bloc. But Bahia's PMDB deputies emerge as a vigorously opposing bloc. Thus, the extra-right-

27. The absence of differences for bureaucratic deputies contradicts Power (1993), who found a strong executive orientation.

wing Bahian PFL is matched by an extra-left-wing PMDB. In Maranhão, the Sarney organization, even with its chief in the presidency, unified only on the key issue of executive power. On that issue the PMDB was almost as pro-executive as Sarney's PFL. Thus, Brazil's folk wisdom is on target: ACM polarized politicians; Sarney reconciled them.

Former members of the promilitary ARENA party behaved as predicted: proexecutive, anti-Congress, opposed to labor's economic demands, and low on popular democracy. Fundamentally, the ARENA variable measures long-term ideological predispositions. While many former ARENA members have moved into centrist or even mildly leftist parties—maximizing their electability, one presumes—their positions remain obdurately conservative.

Consider finally the effects of pork. Overall, deputies receiving pork benefits voted to weaken the legislature and strengthen the executive and tended to oppose statism-welfarism and popular democracy. Though a few coefficients are insignificant, the directions are always correct, and the insignificant cases occur on the fuzziest indicator—that is, where the deputy benefiting from a public works project could not easily be identified. Without the pork variables, moreover, the model's percentage of variance explained (R^2) declines by an average of 28 percent. In sum, pork buys—or at least rents—deputies.

In table 11 the model is applied to deputies' support for President Collor's eight emergency measures.²⁸ Each vote supporting Collor is assigned a 1; each vote opposed receives a 0. The dependent variable is simply the sum of the pro-Collor votes. Though broadly similar to the ANC model, the regression includes a number of important modifications. First, issue positions—the object of explanation in the first model—become explanatory variables. Second, the model categorizes deputies both by their actual parties and by their previous affiliation, if any, with ARENA. By 1990 the party switching of the ANC period had settled down; party now could really mean something. Adding parties also allows the separate measurement of dominance for deputies from the right-wing PFL and PDS and from the centrist PMDB. These two dummies enable examination of the hypothesis that dominance gives deputies autonomy from party leaders.²⁹

Both vote distribution and constituency wealth continue to influence voting. Dominant PFL and PDS deputies opposed the president. (The PFL as a

28. Two of the emergency decrees dealt with questions of executive-branch organization, four decrees affected economic stabilization and privatization, one established new rules for civil servants, and one concerned the right to strike. See appendix C for details on the emergency decrees.

29. Chapter 7, which focuses on party discipline from 1988 to 1996, revisits this question of autonomy from party leaders.

TABLE 11. OLS Estimates of Determinants of Support for Collor's Emergency Decrees

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate
Constant	-.080
Dominance × PFL-PDS	-.073**
Dominance × PMDB	.080**
Clustering in South	-.003
Clustering outside South	.078
Wealth × Medium variance	-.117**
Business career	.048
Bureaucratic career	.014
Evangelical	.080**
Terms in office	-.027
Rank in party list	-.014
Bahia × PFL	.011
Bahia × PMDB	.008
Maranhão × PFL	.008
Maranhão × PMDB	.015
ARENA	.207**
PDT	-.166**
PT	-.235**
PFL	.046
PDS	.120*
PMDB	-.301**
Congressional power	.009
Support for executive	.117**
Statism-welfarism	.127**
Popular democracy	-.023
<i>Pork-barrel indicators</i>	
Pork to municipality	-.021
Ministerial audience	.125**
Radio-TV license	.055
Pork to deputy	.008
$R^2 = .52$ $F = 14.62$ $N = 379$	

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients.

** $p < .05$, two-tailed test * $p < .10$, two-tailed test

whole neither backed nor opposed President Collor, and the PDS supported him only weakly.) Dominant PMDB deputies also dissented from their party—they backed the president while the party as a whole opposed him. Thus, in both cases, dominance facilitated autonomy. In an open-list system, it is easy to see why dominance frees deputies, but why should autonomous deputies want to oppose their party leaders? The answer, I believe, is that PDS-PFL defectors tend to be located in states where most deputies opposed the president, and

PMDB defectors are mostly in supportive states, so these deputies were moving toward the center of their respective state political contexts.

Constituency wealth affects voting behavior only for deputies whose vote bases are moderately heterogeneous. The mutually canceling effects of the two kinds of low-variance constituencies—scattered rural municipalities and concentrated big city bases—again seem the most likely explanation.

Do powerful governors influence their deputies? Once again paralleling the model of voting in the constitutional assembly, dummy variables for Bahia and Maranhão estimate the influence of ACM and Sarney. In neither case did the deputies from these states stand out in their voting behavior. This result differs from the ANC model, where the Bahian governor polarized his delegation. The difference probably stems from nature of the two kinds of votes. In the Assembly, deputies were more likely to struggle with questions of long-term ideological significance. On the emergency measures, they decided immediate pocketbook issues. Economic interests dominated ideological disputes. ACM remained a mighty force in national-level politics, but the emergency measures did not have a particular effect on Bahia, so the governor's delegation voted along other criteria.

Ideology and party had independent and significant influence. Proexecutive, antilegisature, antilabor deputies supported President Collor. Previous affiliation with ARENA also contributed independently—that is, ARENA's heirs were strongly pro-Collor. Members of the PT and Brizola's PDT opposed the president, while PDS and PFL members supported him. The centrist PMDB and the highly clientelistic PTB fell in the middle. Although this finding might suggest that parties, in spite of their fragmentation and incoherence, play a role in legislative voting, such a conclusion would be premature. Party members vote together because they have common electoral interests, because they have organized themselves into bargaining units to increase individual members' leverage over the executive, or because party leaders impose sanctions. These explanations, which I will attempt to test in chapter 7, affect the view of parties as organizations where leaders dominate followers or where followers choose to delegate certain prerogatives to leaders (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

The only personal characteristic affecting support for the emergency decrees was "Evangelical Background." Former Protestant ministers supported the president more than did deputies with other backgrounds. Seniority and electoral weakness had no effect.

Of the variables measuring affinity for pork-barrel programs, one strongly influenced presidential support. Deputies meeting with ministers voted with the president. Of the four indicators of pork barrel, this variable was the sharpest,

since the identity of the deputy receiving the pork was unambiguous. Once again, the evidence supports the idea of a strong linkage between pork-barrel benefits and support for presidentialism.

III. Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter began with a puzzle. Brazil's legislature is quite active, but the Congress accomplishes little on its own initiative, and its activism often results in obstructing presidential proposals even though a majority of deputies have few objections to the policy innovations themselves. Instead, presidential proposals are subject to intense bargaining over extremely parochial substantive interests and over pork and patronage.

Legislative obstructionism can have three causes: a large number of parties that are far apart ideologically, procedural roadblocks, or an excess of members with little interest in broad legislation. This chapter focused on the third cause—that is, on motivations. What mix of constituency pressures, ideology, electoral needs, and local interests determines voting patterns?

To explore deputies' motivations, the chapter modeled two sets of votes. The first set was linked to a series of broad issue areas in the 1987–88 Constituent Assembly, while the second determined the fate of a group of emergency decrees issued by President Collor in 1990. On the constitutional issues of congressional prerogatives, executive power, statism-welfarism, and popular democracy, the individual consequences of the electoral system made a difference. Deputies with more clustered votes tended to be pro-Congress, antiexecutive, supportive of state intervention and welfare, and supportive of popular democracy. These positions resulted, I suggest, from the greater accountability that vote clustering produces. Dominant deputies, by contrast, backed the executive and opposed a stronger Congress, and dominance gave deputies the autonomy to dissent from their parties' mainstreams.

The social characteristics of constituencies did influence congressional voting, though modestly, in the sense that industrial areas elected more liberal deputies. Overall, however, socioeconomic conditions forged only weak ties between voters and deputies. Brazilian citizens exert pressure for pork-barrel programs but on broader issues have little control over representatives. This finding should not come as a surprise, because no observer of a Brazilian election could feel confident that many voters know anything at all about the positions of their deputies. Ironically, Protestant voters may have the tightest control over their representatives, both in terms of ideological positions and in terms of pork.

Ideology played a large role in legislative voting. Former members of the ARENA party were consistently anti-Congress, proexecutive, antilabor, and lower on support for popular democracy. Deputies with these values clustered in parties that supported President Collor on his emergency economic decrees and constituted his strongest supporters even within the progovernment parties.

Powerful state governors influenced their delegations in identifiable ways. The governor of Bahia cared about constitutional issues, and he polarized his delegation between partisans and opponents. Sarney, a weaker leader, mobilized his home-state supporters only on the issue of executive strength, but his more conciliatory approach brought him support from opponents inside the state as well.

Perhaps the most striking finding was the importance of the deputies' orientations to particularistic benefits and programs as determinants of broader positions. The coefficients of the pork-barrel measures are quite large, and the model's explained variance improves substantially with their inclusion. In the Constituent Assembly, deputies could be bought or at least rented: deputies receiving public works for their bailiwicks were proexecutive, anti-Congress, antilabor, and low on support for popular democracy. At the beginning of the Collor government, pork effects were smaller, partly because the administration was somewhat disorganized and partly because Collor seemed to believe his charisma could mobilize support. Still, pork-oriented deputies consistently backed the executive. The importance of direct benefits to deputies speaks volumes about the absence of links, on issues of national scope, between voters and their representatives and goes far toward explaining the absence of legislative initiative on the part of the Congress.³⁰

Nonetheless, a reduction in the availability of particularistic benefits is unlikely to transform the legislature into a paragon of national problem solving. Indeed, if the electoral structure were left unchanged, a shrinkage in pork might prove counterproductive. In the current system, the executive builds coalitions by coupling deputies' disinterest in broad policy with their desire for pork. A reduction in pork would lead to greater turnover and to the gradual replacement of pork-oriented deputies in the legislature. In the absence of programmatic parties, more deputies would rely, by necessity, on ties to "corporativist" organizations—that is, on ties to groups representing narrow economic interests.³¹ The resulting legislature might well be more active in the sense that "segmentalist" demands would receive a hearing, but it would also be more conflictual and less responsive to executive guidance.

30. See C. Souza 1997 and Martínez-Lara 1996.

31. For a recent work on the importance of "segmental" interests in Brazilian policy-making, see Weyland 1996a.