Chapter 7

Party Discipline in the Chamber of Deputies

"Our party is so disorganized we can't even throw a party."
<div align="right">A leader of the PSDB</div>

"I am not a member of any organized party. I am a Democrat."
<div align="right">Will Rogers</div>

The previous chapter explored the strategies Brazilian presidents adopt as they strive to construct bases of legislative support. To understand the president's efforts at legislative coalition building, this chapter moves to the Congress itself, seeking to comprehend the role of legislative parties in the context of Brazil's institutional structure. Though political parties play key parts in all legislatures, their role varies enormously. In Great Britain and Argentina, for example, parties are the main actors, and the legislative game can be understood with few references to individual deputies. No one would argue that legislative parties in Brazil have the strength of Argentina's Peronists or Britain's Labour Party. Nonetheless, leaders of Brazil's congressional parties organize the legislative calendar, participate in legislative negotiations, and mediate between individual deputies and ministers.

The chapter takes the first steps toward adapting theories of legislative parties to the Brazilian case. The first section demonstrates that Brazilian presidents are hardly dominant actors. From the administration of José Sarney through the first government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, most executive proposals come out of the legislature highly modified or fail to come out at all. Why do presidential proposals so seldom emerge unscathed from the Congress? Do party leaders, especially leaders of parties that are nominally part of presidential coalitions, really oppose these proposals? If, instead, party leaders are simply unable to marshal their troops to support these bills, why are backbench deputies so reluctant?

The answers lie in the nature of Brazil's legislative parties. The second sec-

tion reviews the theoretical literature on legislative parties, a literature based mainly on the U.S. experience. This discussion demonstrates that Brazil ought to be a case of "conditional party government." Given Brazil's electoral rules and its federal structure, influence should flow from the bottom up, from party members to leaders, not from the top down. Arguments about the flow of influence in legislative parties depend, in the final analysis, on leaders' ability to compel backbenchers to follow their lead. The third section utilizes roll-call votes to test a multivariate model of the probability that individual deputies cooperate with their parties. A key indicator of party strength is the party leaders' ability to compel their members to follow the leadership's vote recommendations. A second, less direct indicator comes from the success of individual deputies in garnering pork. The higher the price leaders have to pay to buy support, the weaker the party. These indicators of party strength are embedded in a model that also includes measures of individual electoral security, ideology, seniority, constituency characteristics, and career background. The empirical analysis, presented in the fourth section, demonstrates that party recommendations (and the punishments and rewards that accompany them) rarely matter very much in determining cooperation or defection. The president's problem, in the end, is less party leaders' recalcitrance than their inability, even with lavish pork-barrel spending, to persuade deputies to support presidential proposals.

I.   Do Presidents Dominate?

Presidential success is commonly measured by assessing the approval rates of presidential initiatives on roll-call votes.[1] In any legislative setting, this technique is problematic. First, to the degree that roll calls reflect only those issues actually coming to a vote, they exemplify the classic problem of nondecisions. If congressional opposition is too strong, a presidential proposal may never face an up or down vote. A presidential trial balloon can generate such fierce opposition in the legislature that the president gives up, never sending a formal proposal to the Congress.[2]

Roll-call measures of party unity also fail to reflect the costs of gaining party backing. Presidents and party leaders pay these costs in combinations of

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1. For a recent analysis of roll calls as a measure of party discipline, see Amorim Neto, forthcoming.

2. Two well-known Brazilian examples include Collor's proposal for administrative reform and Sarney's attempt to impose tuition at federal universities. Both quietly disappeared, never to arrive at Congress's door.

pork and substantive policy concessions. Roll calls, in other words, really represent the end point of negotiations among presidents, party leaders, and rank-and-file deputies. What is needed, and what is usually lacking, are head counts—executive-branch leaders' estimates of the direction in which individual deputies are leaning, estimates made during the process of negotiation.[3]

A third limitation stems from the possibility of fundamental differences between the political processes generating roll calls and those generating other types of congressional decisions.[4] Without question, committees and voice votes on the floor make many key decisions in the Brazilian Congress.[5] Furthermore, roll calls are notoriously subject to "bandwagon" effects. In most congressional votes, 80 percent of the deputies support the winning side.[6] An eight-to-two ratio implies neither that four-fifths of the deputies supported the original proposal nor even that four-fifths support the final bill. In fact, overwhelming victories occur even when only bare majorities are really supportive. Such bandwagons develop when indifferent deputies trade support as part of cross-issue logrolls, or when they join the winning side in the hopes of gaining advantage on future votes. If a proposal has undergone, between its original form and final passage, significant concessions to congressional opposition, and if the proposal then passes with 80 percent approval, either enormous bandwagon effects are operating or the proposal's authors badly overestimated the concessions needed to obtain majority support.

In an important new research development, Brazilian scholars have begun using legislative roll calls to assess presidential success and party strength. In recent essays, Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi (Limongi and Figueiredo 1995, 1996; Figueiredo and Limongi 1997b) analyze roll calls taken from 1988 (the end of the Constituent Assembly) through 1994.[7] To approximate the concept of the party agenda, these authors concentrate on votes where party leaders made explicit recommendations (*encaminhamentos*) to their members.

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3. Sullivan 1987 has analyzed head-count data for some issues during the Eisenhower years.

4. In the U.S. Congress, it is clear that leaders exert influence in varying ways in these differing settings. Interest-group representatives, moreover, have varying degrees of access. After intensive research, VanDoren (1990, 311) concluded that "the processes that determine committee and voice-vote decisions are different from those that determine roll-call decisions."

5. Moreover, the Brazilian Congress has adopted rules deliberately hindering the use of roll calls.

6. In addition, few roll calls occur when ideological blocs oppose each other. When the PSDB and PMDB are grouped together in one bloc and the PFL-PTB-PDS are placed in another, majorities of these two blocs opposed each other on only 35 of 473 regular Chamber votes (1988–96) and on only 5 of 77 emergency-measure votes (1988–92).

7. Figueiredo and Limongi's findings have gained considerable attention in Brazil, even in the popular press (see Barros e Silva 1995).

Adopting the Rice index of party discipline, in which the minority percentage is subtracted from the majority percentage for each party on each vote, Figueiredo and Limongi find that even in the weakest parties an average of 85 percent of the members vote the same way. Most parties have even higher discipline scores.[8] The authors conclude that Brazilian parties are truly legislative actors and that parties consistently take predictable, coherent ideological positions. Figueiredo and Limongi admit that Brazil's electoral system fosters individualism on the part of legislators and hinders "accountability" between party and voter (Limongi and Figueiredo 1995, 498).[9] In spite of the electoral system, they argue, the legislature's internal rules allow "party leaders [to] control the work agenda and limit the area open to the individualistic strategies of deputies and senators" (500). Party leaders, as a result, dominate party followers. Arguments linking the electoral system to party weakness stop, in this view, at the Chamber door.

Figueiredo and Limongi's findings are controversial among students of Brazilian politics. As the only truly empirical research, their work must be taken as the conventional (if somewhat beleaguered) wisdom, but questions remain. What level of party unity, in comparative terms, makes a party disciplined? True, Brazil's parties have discipline scores (Rice indexes) in the 80s. Are these high numbers? Cross-country comparisons, as I will subsequently demonstrate, are risky, but even direct comparison leaves Brazil's parties well below those of some neighboring countries. Argentine party unity has traditionally been over 98 percent, and Argentine party leaders achieve these high levels of party voting with neither the pork-barrel wooing of deputies nor the substantive legislative concessions that occur in Brazil.[10] Venezuela, at least until recently, is another case of parties vastly more disciplined than those of Brazil.

Implicit in any judgment about the comparative discipline of Brazil's parties is an assumption of ceteris paribus. Scholars begin with certain questions of primary interest (typically hypotheses linking such concepts as presidentialism versus parliamentarism, single-member versus multimember electoral districts, or open-list versus closed-list proportional representation). Then, in order to make cross-national comparisons of party strength, they assume that institutional contexts are equivalent. Suppose we seek to test the hypothesis that closed-list proportional representation yields higher levels of party unity than open-list proportional representation. The rules of causal inference naturally require the

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8. Figueiredo and Limongi follow the common convention of calling this indicator "cohesion." Following Tsebelis (1995), I refer to deputies voting together as "discipline" or "unity." Parties are "cohesive" when deputies agree on substantive policy questions.

9. Similar arguments about party weakness have been made by Lamounier (1994), Lima Junior (1993), and Mainwaring (1993, 1999).

10. Mark Jones, personal communication. Chilean discipline seems equally high.

assumption that other institutional rules are constant across the different party systems. Is this assumption reasonable? When deputies easily switch parties, for example, what looks like party discipline may be illusory. If party leaders attempt to punish dissenters, deputies jump to another party. Discipline for the party losing members then rises. Given a sufficient number of alternative parties for the defectors to join, unity for the receiving parties need not fall (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1997). During the Sarney administration, the PMDB lost members to the PSDB on its left and to the PFL on its right. In the short run, overall discipline rose. In sum, where members easily switch, party itself is a moving target.

In Brazil these caveats represent real problems, not merely theoretical objections. Consider the problem of nondecisions. Any judgment of the strength of presidents presupposes knowledge, as a starting point, of the president's agenda. How is it possible to know what proposals presidents would send to the Congress if they thought passage was remotely possible? Though certain ideas may go unmentioned because they have no chance of passage, most reasonable proposals are at least aired in the media. Tables 15–17 attempt to define and trace the universe of presidential proposals in Brazil from 1990 to 1998. Sources include the *Latin America Weekly Report: Brazil,* the *Economist Country Report,* and the Brazilian financial newspaper *Gazeta Mercantil.* The tables, which include every presidential proposal mentioned in those publications, record what the president proposed, when it was proposed, what the legislature did with the proposal, and when that action occurred.[11]

Though these tables are not amenable to quantitative measures, they are quite revealing nonetheless. Many important proposals, though aired in the media, never arrive at Congress's door. Faced with powerful congressional opposition, President Fernando Collor de Mello gave up his attempts to eliminate

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11. This tracking makes the strong assumption that initial presidential proposals are sincere rather than strategic. In other words, presidential proposals are assumed to be what presidents really desire. Mark Peterson (1990a), in research on the United States, developed deductive models asking whether presidents get more of what they want by requesting either less or more than they really desire, and his models predict that presidents succeed by asking for less. However, Peterson found no empirical support for either strategy. Peterson's conclusions supported his earlier, interview-based study (1990b) and led him to conclude that U.S. presidents do in fact reveal their preferences sincerely—i.e., what they ask for is what they want. Patrick Fett (1992) came to the same conclusion for the first years of the Carter and Reagan presidencies. Both worked hard for the legislation they really wanted, neither ducking controversial issues nor backing easy winners.

Perhaps a president, knowing the legislature will reject a proposal, uses that rejection to appeal to voters for personal support in a reelection campaign or to campaign for the election of more supportive deputies. Until 1998 Brazilian presidents had no possibility of reelection, and legislative elections have so little programmatic content that it is hard to imagine voters responding to "line in the sand" strategies. There is no evidence that recent presidents have tried such tactics.

TABLE 15.   Congressional Response to Presidential Proposals (Collor administration)

Date of Initial Proposal	Substance of Presidential Proposal	Date of Action by Congress	Substance of Action by Congress
March 16, 1990	Collor submits 26 emergency measures. Key measures: [1] blocks access to savings [2] one-month freeze on prices [3] closure of several ministries, agencies, and public companies and privatization scheme [4] 50,000 employees lose jobs immediately, 300,000 on reduced pay [5] fiscal reform, including increased taxes on financial transactions and new taxes on capital gains, wealth, and agricultural incomes [6] elimination of subsidies and incentives and liberalization of imports	June 7, 1990	Four emergency measures are withdrawn, including two granting government police powers over certain kinds of economic behavior. The other two would raise taxes on financial operations and cut wages of public employees. Constitution prohibits increase in taxation and lowering of wages without prior approval of corresponding laws by Congress.
June 25, 1990	Emergency measure 193 (later 211 and 292), which established a new index for calculating "wage losses" and other adjustments	May 25, 1990 and later	None ratified. All end "sem eficácia," i.e., without legal force.
June 25, 1990	Reduction of import barriers. All barriers removed except tariffs, which would drop from a maximum of 105 percent to a maximum of 40 percent	??	Approved.
Late July 1990	Collor vetoes Congress bill linking wage adjustments to rate of inflation	??	Chamber overrides, but no quorum in Senate.

February 14, 1991	*Emendão* (officially "National Reconstruction Project"): [1] eliminates state monopoly on oil, other restrictions on foreign capital [2] eliminates mandated levels of pensions, autonomous pay regime of judiciary [3] eliminates 12 percent of ceiling on real interest rates [4] eliminates free university education [5] eliminates job security for government employees	All of *emendão* dies.
March 21, 1991	[1] Proposes minimum wage of $66 [2] minimum wage adjustments would occur in July and January [3] curbs on speculation and a short-term price freeze	March 1991 [1] Left in Congress wanted $149. Agreement at $77. [2] Timetable for adjustments varies. [3] Curb on speculation and price freeze accepted.
August 1991	Emergency measure granting pay increase to public servants and military	August 15, 1991 Rejected 239 to 11. PFL joined opposition.
September 19, 1991	Collor offers governors rollover of $57 billion owed by states to central government in exchange for their help in persuading party leaders to support *emendão*	Nothing passes.
October 24, 1991	Collor drops *emendão* provisions for job stability, central government control over state and municipal finances, and higher education reform	Congress had passed none of these.

TABLE 15.—*Continued*

Date of Initial Proposal	Substance of Presidential Proposal	Date of Action by Congress	Substance of Action by Congress
January 9, 1992	Tax increase proposal to raise income tax ceiling to 35 percent	January 1992	Congress rejects 35 percent ceiling at insistence of PMDB, and Collor is forced to agree to rollover $70 billion in state and municipal debt owed to the central government and foreign banks. Central government guarantees state debts. Deal favors badly managed states like São Paulo.
January 30, 1992	Government offers pensioners adjustment of 54 percent	January 30, 1992	Congress rejects government offer. Regular procedure gives pensioners 147 percent. Fifteen parties, representing 79 percent of Câmara, oppose government. Ministries are then reshuffled: Magri replaced by Stephanes, Procópio by Fiuza. Born-hausen into Casa Civil.
May 1992	Doubling of expected pay raises for military	May 1992	Passed quickly.
June–October 1992	Port legislation	??	Agrarian-reform law proposed by Left passed as part of logroll with Right on port legislation.
June–October 1992	Intellectual property law	??	Passed, terms unclear.

the state oil monopoly, control state and municipal finances, end free university education, and eliminate lifetime tenure for government employees. Itamar Franco never sent Congress his fiscal-reform program or his plan for a wealth tax. Fernando Henrique Cardoso abandoned his drive to install a mixed public-private pension system. Although his economic team regarded tax reform as crucial to its stabilization program, the president sent no tax-reform proposals to the Congress during his first term. He also made no effort to push through the political-institutional reforms he had long advocated. Among the proposals that do arrive at the Congress, many never reach a vote. Collor's proposals for new wage-adjustment indexes failed without ever coming to a vote. Franco's November 1993 package of emergency tax increases met a similar fate. Long delays are common. Pension- and administrative-reform proposals arrived in the Congress at the beginning of Cardoso's first term and received final approval only at the beginning of his second term, four years later. Little gets through the Congress without substantive concessions to individuals, to narrow economic interests, or to states.[12] Collor was forced to roll over $70 billion in debt owed by states to the central government before the Congress would approve an increase in the personal income tax ceiling. Franco had to agree to an accord pegging monthly wage rates to inflation before the governors of eleven states would resume repayments on billions of dollars they owed to the central government. Approval of Franco's plan to cut government expenditures, a key part of his stabilization program, necessitated government concessions on the rural caucus's debts. And during Cardoso's first administration, the government's critically needed social-security reform approached final passage only after a four-year struggle that required a substantial weakening of the original proposal as well as significant outlays in pork-barrel spending.[13]

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12. In early April 1997 the Chamber passed, by one vote, the president's proposal on administrative reform. The one-vote majority was achieved by doubling the ceiling on the maximum retirement benefit receivable, just for retired parliamentarians. On April 13 the president disavowed the agreement, putting the proposal itself in doubt. The proposal was finally approved in late 1998, but its effects were substantially delayed because Brazilian law prohibits the hiring or firing of government employees six months before or after an election. Since the next election occurred in October 1998, no one could be fired until after April 1999.

13. This pessimistic interpretation notwithstanding, some proposals do survive congressional scrutiny unscathed. Economy-opening measures, including tariff reduction and deregulation, have a high success rate, with especially strong support from the PFL's neoliberal wing and from northeastern deputies, who benefited less from state intervention in the economy. The drive to privatize state-owned enterprises has moved equally smoothly. Here state governors, needing the revenue generated by enterprise sales to cover their deficits or to reduce the fiscal pressure on the central government, joined neoliberals and northeasterners.

TABLE 16. Congressional Response to Presidential Proposals (Franco administration)

Date of Initial Proposal	Substance of Presidential Proposal	Date of Action by Congress	Substance of Action by Congress
October 21, 1992	President calls for "Full and lasting fiscal reform," details unspecified.	October 22, 1992	PMDB leaders in Chamber and Senate tell Franco that only emergency measures can get approval. President agrees.
Late October 1992	Specific presidential proposals: [1] tightening of tax-collection procedures [2] one-year tax on financial transactions [3] selective tax on consumption (alcohol, cigarettes, fuels, etc.) [4] eliminate tax on industrial production from 400 products [5] eliminate a tax collected by state governments and one by municipal government, compensated for by increase in federal tax share [6] banks lift secrecy	January 20, 1993	By 375 to 87, Chamber approves [1] "provisional" .25 percent tax on financial transactions, but government agrees to spend more on specified social programs, [2] new corporate withholding tax on financial gains, [3] rejects new taxes on fuel and corporate assets, [4] tax on financial transactions not officially passed.
August 1992	Official budget of president.	April 1, 1993	In addition to amendments to budget, Congress denies government request for flexibility in administering budget. Congress also includes funds for vacant vice presidency and $320 million for Companhia Siderurgica Nacional. No funds for 147 percent court-ordered increase in pensions or 33 percent pay increase. No funds for Itamar's antihunger drive.
April 1993	Lift 40 percent ceiling on foreign ownership of privatized companies.	??	Approved.

Date		
June 1993	FHC's "Program of Immediate Action" [1] slash government spending by $6 billion [2] enforce revenue-raising measures [3] end transfers from federal government to states, municipalities, and agencies [4] force states to start repaying the $40 billion they owe the federal government [5] impose more control over state banks [6] accelerate privatization [7] crackdown on tax evaders	June 22, 1993	Congress approves tax on checks, generating $600 million a month in revenues. Approved after repeated rejections.
		August 1, 1993	Three zeros removed from currency; Congress agrees, bankers support this measure.
June 23, 1993	President vetoes congressional bill calling for monthly wage adjustments pegged to rate of inflation.	Late August 1993	After negotiations with presidents of Senate and Chamber and labor and business leaders, compromise calls for monthly wage adjustments at 10 percent below the monthly rate of inflation; PMDB, PFL, PSDB and PP support compromise. After accords, governments of 11 states, including São Paulo, Mato Grosso, Bahia, and Rio de Janeiro, resume repayments of up to $20 billion owed to federal government agencies.
No executive proposal		October 1–15, 1993	Congress approves a new electoral law, disciplining the financing of political campaigns, television rights, and so forth. No formal proposal yet. PMDB wants shock treatment, its ministers threaten to resign.
Late October 1993	Cardoso announces a package of anti-inflation measures that would reduce public spending at least $25 billion.		

TABLE 16.—*Continued*

Date of Initial Proposal	Substance of Presidential Proposal	Date of Action by Congress	Substance of Action by Congress
November 25, 1993	FHC says he wants to speed up privatization and cut government expenditure. He also wants new taxes designed to raise an additional $7 billion in 1994: [1] new tax would be on wealth, applying to those with assets over $2 million [2] higher income tax rates for those earning over $1,500 a month [3] In late October an emergency measure changes rules of privatization and gives Finance Ministry decisive say in program; it also removes ceiling on foreign investors in privatized companies		Congressional budget scandal breaks out, weakening Congress's ability to resist executive initiatives. But Congress cannot debate the constitutional changes FHC wants, so no progress made.
December 29, 1993	"Economic Stabilization Program" Emergency measures with [1] new top tax rate of 35 percent for those earning more than $10,000 a month [2] raise in social contribution from 23 percent to 30 percent [3] owners of farmland would be allowed to pay annual land taxes in six installments		[1] Governors oppose FSE, and in February the idea seems dead [2] PFL and PPR prevent quorum on tax bills on January 28 vote; taxes cannot take effect in 1994, since they cannot take effect in the year they are passed [3] Freeze of transfers at last year's levels, with an expected increase of 15 pecent in

Date	Events
December 29, 1993	[4] Emergency Social Fund (FSE) sets aside 15 percent of transfers from central government to state and municipal governments [5] creation of URV monetary unit. Set of proposals above.
February 8, 1994	revenues, never gets sent to Congress due to opposition [4] government agrees to retention of 3 percent, but this is dropped from budget committee's final report Congress approves [1] new rate of 35 percent for those earning more than $10,000 a month and increase from 25 percent to 25.6 percent for those earning $1,000 to $10,000 a month [2] tax on rural landowners smaller than proposal [3] shortening of time period to pay taxes like IPI and income tax, but no quorum on vote to institute these in 1994 [4] FSE will be 15 percent of total federal revenues, but excludes the constitutional transfers to states and municipalities, passed on February 8, 1994 [5] to get PFL support on FSE, government agrees to extend to May 31 the deadline for the debate on constitutional reforms, [6] FHC agrees to raise military pay Tax increase never sent to Congress, judged politically unfeasible.
January 1994	FHC says his cuts in public expenditure include the military. Joint chiefs want $700 million restored. FHC wants a linear increase of 5 percent in tax rates (to bring $3.7 billion new revenue) and retention of 15 percent of transfers to states and municipalities.

TABLE 17. Congressional Response to Presidential Proposals (Cardoso administration)

Date of Initial Proposal	Substance of Presidential Proposal	Date of Action by Congress	Substance of Action by Congress
February 18, 1995	[1] Social welfare minister advocates mixed system of public and private pensions. State retirement pensions could only be 5–10 times minimum wage, with an upper limit of $820 a month. Beyond that, arrangements would be individual. [2] Tax and fiscal reform. [3] Economic opening.	May 4, 1995	[1] Constitution and Justice Committee in Chamber voted to divide up the social-security reform proposals into several separate amendments. Government had wanted them treated as a single package. Eight progovernment deputies vote to separate (one from PFL, 3 from PP, 3 from PMDB, one from PL). Government then puts social-security reform on back burner until after economic reform. [2] Tax and fiscal reform delayed. [3] Economic opening proceeds.
July 13, 1995	Government proposes sale of Vale do Rio Doce company.	July 13, 1995	President promises that Petrobras will remain in public hands. Opposition agrees to sale.
August 1, 1995	Examination of constitutional reform issues resumes. [1] Tax reform proposals, details unknown [2] Social security: government wants to introduce private companies [3] Political reforms: include lengthening presidential term, shortening senatorial term, permitting presidential reelection, abolishing compulsory voting, establishing minimum requirements for minority parties. FHC says he is leaving initiative to Congress [4] Public administration reform: eliminates bureaucratic tenure	August 1, 1995	[1] Governors and mayors attack tax-reform proposals (which had never been formalized). President says he will consult with parties and state governments before submitting detailed proposals to Congress. [2] "Negative reaction" in Congress to introducing private companies in social security. [3] No action on political reform. [4] No action on public administration reform.

August 17, 1995	Bill assigns vetting of all ''sensitive'' exports (nuclear and missile) to the department of strategic affairs, facilitates space accord with United States.	??	Approved
September 21, 1995	Tax reform details: [1] Income-tax change delayed but will reduce top rate of corporate income tax from 48 percent to 30 percent [2] ICMS and IPI will be merged and rates will be fixed by Senate, not by state assemblies, as in current ICMS [3] Tax on energy will go from state to federal treasury [4] ICMS on exports abolished [5] Banking secrecy will be reduced. Inspectors from tax-collection agency will have access to all confidential information [6] Compulsory savings plans (currently allowed only in wartime, national emergency, or public-interest investment projects) will be allowed to be used to curb consumption or finance projects	September 21, 1995	[6] State governors and city mayors reject the change in compulsory savings plans.
September 21, 1995	Civil service reforms: [1] End tenure [2] Introduce some competitive bidding for services with the private sector	April 9, 1996	Passes Chamber, with concession benefiting parliamentarians. Does not pass Senate.
March 1996	Government tries to get social-security reform to clear the Chamber of Deputies.		Substitute bill approved over government objection.

TABLE 17.—*Continued*

Date of Initial Proposal	Substance of Presidential Proposal	Date of Action by Congress	Substance of Action by Congress
March 1996	Financial Stabilization Fund takes place of Social Emergency Fund (retains scheduled transfers to states).		Approved.
April 1996	CPMF tax replaces IPMF tax, earmarked for health spending, government position unclear.		Approved.
November–December 1996	Government submits constitutional amendment allowing reelection for all executive officials, including president. Negotiations had actually begun much earlier.	February 26, 1997 March 21, 1997	Chamber and Senate approve. Evidence of extensive payoffs to individual deputies to secure favorable vote. Certain deputies receive $200,000 for favorable vote.
		June 1997	Congress defeats ceiling of $12,000 per month for salaries of state and municipal employees.
November 11, 1997	Emergency fiscal package of 51 measures, includes 10 percent rise in income tax, tax deductions for individuals limited to 20 percent of overall 1997 tax, price increases on fuels and gas, airport departure tax increase from $18 to $90, tax on car sales rises, federal budget cut, 33,000 civil service employees dismissed, elimination of regional incentives.	December 1997	Increase in income tax dropped because of PFL objection, departure tax increase dropped, regional incentives phased out slowly instead of immediately, cutting savings in half. Other elements approved.

December 2, 1997	Chamber approves end of tenure for civil servants. Government can dismiss employees whenever payrolls are > 60 percent of total tax revenues. Ceiling on salaries is $11,300. No one can be fired at state or federal levels until 1999 due to election in 1998. To get vote of PPB, Cardoso promised to release $450 million to city of São Paulo for a public transportation project.
February 1998	Social-security reform approved in Chamber. Main controversial points will be voted in April, and supplementary legislation voted in early 1999.
February 1998	Government released $545 million for local public works projects to get support on administrative reform and social security reforms, more than was spent in all 1997.
May 1998	Social-security reform passes Chamber, but government loses on two important provisions.

The inability of presidents to force their agendas through their legislatures is common in all democracies and, in particular, presidential systems. Still, Brazilian presidents seem particularly crippled. If the supposedly all-powerful president is really far from all powerful, attention should turn to the sources of presidential weakness. Is the problem simply that the multiplicity of parties creates an excess of veto players, thereby hindering any policy representing a movement away from the status quo, or does the problem lie in the propensity of deputies to defect from their party leaders' wishes?

II.   The Concept of the Legislative Party

Why do legislative parties exist?[14] Even where party identification is weak (surely the case in Brazil), enough voters have at least vague conceptions of parties and their records so that party labels affect reelection chances.[15] Legislators need the party label to take advantage of partisan electoral tides.[16] Legislative parties thus exist as solutions to collective action problems. Parties help prevent, in Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins's (1993) language, such "electoral inefficiencies" as the overproduction of particularistic legislation and the underproduction of legislation with collective benefits.

The strength of central authority in a party depends in part on the strength of individual motivations to defect. These motivations, in turn, depend on deputies' ties to their constituencies, the homogeneity of those constituencies, their ideological positions, and other factors. As a result, a finding that party membership predicts the voting of individual legislators does not establish the strength of the legislative party. Members may vote together because they share common beliefs about an issue, because their electoral constituencies are similar (Fiorina 1974, 2–3), or because they engage in logrolls or policy alliances.[17]

Cox and McCubbins (1993, 4–5) review three distinct ways in which

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14. For a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical bases of legislative parties, see Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999, esp. chap. 1.

15. In Brazil, however, where turnover between legislative sessions can surpass 50 percent, the goal of reelection is necessarily broader—including election to other offices and possible reelection to legislatures in the more distant future—and is not shared by all deputies.

16. Most observers would regard the PMDB's growth in 1986 and the PSDB-PFL alliance's surge in 1994 as partisan tides.

17. Cox and McCubbins (1993) describe the policy alliance between urban democrats supporting farm subsidies and rural democrats supporting food stamps. When this alliance, which party leaders merely facilitate, breaks down, the decline in average party loyalty is an indicator of the cohesion created by intraparty logrolls (see also Kingdon 1981).

scholars of the U.S. Congress conceptualize the legislative party. As floor voting coalitions, parties are thought to have little systematic influence on prefloor (committee) behavior. Partisans of this view utilize discipline on roll calls as a measure of party strength. As procedural coalitions, parties organize the House, make rules, and establish committees, but seldom do parties assume responsibility for policy. As conditional legislative parties, leaders' actions depend on party members' support on a case-by-case basis. Influence flows from the bottom up, and party leaders take responsibility only when there is widespread policy agreement among the party's members. By contrast, in such countries as Great Britain and Argentina, influence flows from the top down, and the rank and file grants automatic support—within some range of acceptability—to the leadership.

The empirical evidence marshaled by Cox and McCubbins for the U.S. case supports the model of conditional party government. What does this finding mean for the assessment of party strength? In their view, a measure of party strength should combine the size of the party's agenda with the party's discipline in support of its leadership on that agenda. The party agenda is all roll calls where (a) the leadership has a position and (b) where the other party either has no position or is opposed. When both parties have positions, and when these positions are opposed, the roll call is a party leadership vote. Discipline on such votes is the strongest test of party strength.

Scholarly understanding of the U.S. Congress helps provide knowledge about party strength in Brazil. Previous chapters argued that Brazil's electoral system produces a legislature with lots of weakly disciplined parties. Such a legislature is likely to be good at distributing pork but will have trouble making laws on issues of truly national scope. These difficulties matter less where presidents dominate their legislatures. But when key proposals in an executive's program require approval by a bicameral legislature, congressional obstructionism becomes a serious problem.

In retrospect, this argument remains incomplete. Brazil's legislature does, of course, shelter many parties. But while the nation's electoral rules clearly produce individualistic deputies motivated to resist discipline, until recently there has been no evidence from the legislature itself establishing the relative discipline of parties. Moreover, discipline (the propensity of party members to vote together) must be distinguished from coherence (the agreement of members' preferences on policy issues). Greater coherence means that, for any given number of parties, it will be harder to reach a legislative decision departing from the status quo (Tsebelis 1995).

Imagine an electoral structure in which deputies owe their seats and their

political futures totally to party leaders.[18] Such deputies have no choice: they must delegate power to party leaders in exchange for access to "party goods." But suppose that sitting deputies have automatic places on party slates, that voters cast votes for individual candidates rather than party labels, and that fundraising is completely centered on candidates. Now deputies can choose. They delegate to party leaders a portion of their freedom to make individual bargains and a portion of their freedom to vote with their constituency's interest. Legislators do so in exchange for a combination of individual and party goods surpassing what they can achieve individually. For some deputies, particularly those who do not dominate their constituencies, who share their electoral base with party colleagues, or who compete with deputies from other parties, the trade-off is an easy one. They need the party. For others, the party is marginal. Such deputies concede autonomy only after adequate compensation.

A finding, therefore, that a party's deputies vote together cannot prove that influence between party leaders and deputies necessarily flows from the top down. Instead, this phenomenon may denote the occurrence of a successful bargaining process in which nearly all deputies are satisfied with their individual payoffs. In a sense, the best predictor of the amount of bargaining likely to occur is the structure of electoral rules, because these rules determine party leaders' control over the ballot as well as deputies' propensities to negotiate with party leaders and with the executive. As should be obvious by this point, Brazil's structure produces a plethora of deputies motivated to drive hard bargains.

In this political context, roll-call analyses can measure legislative parties' strength only within a multivariate model. Figueiredo and Limongi's work, while truly pioneering, is essentially univariate; the only variable is the level of unity of each party in the Chamber of Deputies. To make inferences about the strength of party leaders, it is necessary to assess the importance of other determinants of party voting, including ideology, constituency characteristics, pork-barrel benefits, and seniority.

III.   A Model of Cooperation and Defection from Party Majorities

Motivation to Defect

Deputies desert their parties when they have the motivation and the autonomy. Motivations can be both ideological and electoral. *Ideological* motivation

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18. Coppedge's (1994) portrait of pre-1991 Venezuela fits this description.

means that on a given issue a deputy's preferences differ from those of the party majority. These preferences may be predictable on the basis of the deputy's political career or personal background, but they are analytically distinct from the interests of the deputy's constituency. In 1995 (before the 1995–98 legislative session), Maria das Graças Rua constructed a six-point left-right ideological scale. This measure, formulated from surveys of deputies and from background information, is reasonably free from contamination by actual votes, but it can be utilized only in the 1995–98 period. For earlier legislatures, deputies' links to ARENA (the right-wing political party created by the military dictatorship) serve as a crude indicator of conservatism.[19]

Electoral motivations, which come from demands made by the constituencies deputies represent, are more complex. Constituencies in Brazil, as chapter 1 showed, include the actual voters who put deputies into office, the interest groups and lobbies financing them, and their states' governors. Given Brazil's combination of open-list proportional representation and regionally specialized vote bases, defining a voting constituency is far from easy. It is possible to say, however, that deputies with more concentrated or clustered votes ought to have closer links to their voters; hence, they will have greater motivation to defect when their constituents' interests diverge from the party position. At the same time, these deputies will need to deliver pork-barrel programs to their constituents to ensure political survival. Local politicians, whose political careers include a stint as mayor or councilperson, are likely to emphasize their independence from party control.

I noted previously the inapplicability to Brazil of the "primacy of reelection" assumption typically made by students of U.S. politics. While some deputies want long parliamentary careers, many others see the Chamber of Deputies as a mere stopover. Their immediate objective is a mayoral post, a run at the governorship, or even a return to private business. For these deputies, and for many who do seek Chamber careers, state governors are figures to reckon with. As chapter 4 illustrated, governors' ability to influence their delegations' voting behavior varies across the states as a function of social, historical, and demographic factors. In general, however, cooperation should be higher when a deputy represents the same party as the state governor.

Motivations are only part of the cooperation-defection story; equally important is the autonomy that allows defection. Deputies who are electorally less vulnerable, who are less subject to partisan tides, are clearly better able to go

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19. See the work of Tim Power (1997a, 1997b), who contributed the Graça Rua scale. I combined these two indicators by standardizing them.

their own way. One measure of electoral vulnerability is postelection rank in the party list. A deputy ranking first in the list has enormously more freedom of action than a deputy coming in at the bottom. Deputies with a greater share of the votes cast for candidates of their party, or with more seniority, are also more autonomous.[20] Finally, a central determinant of individual autonomy is the degree to which deputies dominate their constituencies. As noted in chapter 1, some deputies get high shares of the total vote cast in the municipalities that are important to them; these deputies dominate. Deputies who dominate their voters fear no competition from other parties or from members of their own party. If they change parties, their voters change with them. These party-transcending ties to voters come from an individual's charisma, family tradition, or reputation as an effective leader as well as from deals the deputy makes with local politicians. In either case, domination allows deputies to thumb their noses at party leaders.

Dominant deputies' behavior is complicated by their greater ability to claim credit for public works they deliver to their electoral bases. Greater dominance leads to more activity in such pork-seeking activities as the submission of budgetary amendments. Deputies who share their constituencies with other deputies have much less incentive to attract public projects to their bases, because such legislators cannot claim exclusive credit. This relationship, however, is curvilinear. At some level of dominance, deputies have such control that their seats are safe, and their incentives to fight for voters decline. In sum, the relationship between dominance and defection is linear in terms of autonomy from party control, but it is U-shaped in terms of the relationship between dominance and the deputy's need for pork barrel.

This formulation is implicitly interactive. Three autonomy measures—domination, seniority, and rank—work in concert with vote concentration, the electoral indicator of the potential desire to defect. More defections should be expected among deputies with concentrated votes when (1) they dominate their constituencies, (2) they rank high in postelection vote outcomes, and (3) they attain greater seniority.

No one who follows Brazilian politics doubts that pork-barrel programs and control over appointive jobs are the mother's milk of legislative majorities. Every crucial piece of legislation seems accompanied by the "liberation" of grants and a spate of appointments of party loyalists. Pork-barrel programs strongly affected voting in the 1987–88 Constituent Assembly. Between 1988

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20. However, seniority is also correlated with leadership positions, which may make defection much more difficult.

and 1993, the Chamber's internal rules allowed deputies to propose unlimited budget amendments, but a major scandal (involving millions of dollars in kickbacks from construction companies) led the Congress to reform the amendment process. Current rules allow each deputy amendments up to a fixed amount, roughly $1.2 million. These amendments are essentially under the deputy's control. The new rules might seem to weaken presidential autonomy, since the money cannot be increased or decreased, but in fact the system simply changed. The executive branch still has to transfer the funds, to sign the checks. In practice, the executive has proved willing to accelerate or hold back on disbursements for individual deputies. Whether the executive seeks the cooperation of deputies from parties supporting the government or the defection of deputies from parties in opposition, speedy disbursements are an appropriate tactic. Utilizing data from SIAFI, the national online accounting system, I calculated, for each year, the ratio of each deputy's actually disbursed funds to the average disbursed funds for all members of the Chamber. The resulting variable measures the pork-barrel favoritism enjoyed by each deputy.

It might be expected that if pork leads to party cooperation (limiting the discussion, for simplicity, to progovernment parties), a positive sign should be found on the pork variable—that is, more pork leads to more cooperation. In a dynamic sense this hypothesis is certainly correct, but cross-sectionally it might be wrong. Suppose the government concentrates its pork on deputies tending to vote no. Some gratefully change their votes to yes, while others remain obstinate. Compared to those who are so progovernment that they need no bribes, the opportunistic deputies are still less likely to cooperate, even though they are more cooperative than they would have been without the pork. Hence the sign on the coefficient of the pork variable could be negative even though it induces deputies to increase their party cooperation. In terms of the overall hypothesis regarding party strength, however, the size of the pork coefficient is crucial. The greater the importance of pork as a determinant of cooperation, the weaker the party's control over individual deputies.

Party Strength and Encaminhamentos

It is now possible to categorize the sources of party voting consensus. Party discipline can be a consequence, on the one hand, of pork inducements, constituency demands, and common policy preferences, or, on the other, of the influence of party leaders. The key to party strength as a determinant of cooperation and defection is the importance of the recommendation, or *encaminhamento,* of party leaders. On most votes, party leaders recommend a vote to

their members. Just before votes are cast, the Chamber president calls on each party leader for this recommendation. Leaders respond with "Yes," "No," or "The vote is left open."[21]

Parties frequently recommend votes in situations where the outcome, given the fact that normally opposed parties are on the same side, is a foregone conclusion.[22] In fact, a majority of all recommendations occurs on votes that are essentially uncontested. In such cases, dissent has few consequences for the leadership (or for party followers), since the vote cannot be lost. On contested recommendations, the chances of losing are much greater. A party's membership might live with a few dissenters, but as defections increase, tolerance for free riders drops. If defections are very numerous, of course, it becomes unclear whether the leadership recommendation has much impact on the members.

The central tests of party strength, then, are the coefficients of the variables measuring party leaders' recommendations on contested and uncontested votes. If neither is significant, party unity has nothing to do with leadership sanctions. If both variables are significant, deputies accept party leadership as long as it remains noncoercive—that is, party leaders avoid unpopular recommendations on contested votes, because they know members will reject such recommendations. If the coefficient on contested votes is significantly greater than the coefficient on uncontested votes, then we will conclude that party discipline matters: deputies respond to a leadership recommendation when it is crucial to the ultimate outcome of the vote.

Are All Votes Created Equal?

On many Chamber votes, individual cooperation and defection have little importance in terms of overall results, either because the vote is purely procedural or because the outcome is overwhelmingly one-sided. As a result, I weighted

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21. *Encaminhamentos* are not intended to force members to cast a particular vote; such compulsion is very rare and normally follows a party membership vote to close the question. Leaders sometimes respond to the Chamber president's questions with "the vote is left open, but the leader votes . . ." I code such recommendations as open.

22. The analysis excludes votes where more than 90 percent of the deputies cast the same vote—i.e., votes classed as uncontested have at least 10 percent dissent from the majority position. For the PMDB, PFL, and PSDB, I defined a recommendation as uncontested if each party made the same recommendation as the other two. For the PDT, a recommendation equal to that of the PFL was uncontested. For the PPB (formerly called the PDS or PPR), uncontested recommendations were identical to those of the PDT and PFL. Inclusion of variables for both contested and uncontested recommendations does not imply a full set of dummies, because the null case ("o") is the condition of no recommendation at all.

the votes by the number of deputies voting and by the closeness of the vote. For ordinary simple-majority votes, the weight was calculated as:

(Total Voting / Chamber Total) × (1 − ((2 × Yes − Total Voting) / Total Voting))

On constitutional issues, those requiring three-fifths of each chamber, the formula was:

(Total Voting / Chamber Total) × (1 − 2 × abs ((308 − Yes) / Chamber Total))

In other words, the closer the vote and the more deputies voting, the more weight given to that roll call in the overall regression.

Absentee Deputies

Most roll-call analyses simply delete deputies who fail to vote, counting them neither for nor against. In Brazil, at least, it is quite certain that party leaders hold a different view. On the basis of interviews with leaders of every major party, it is clear that party leaders know who failed to vote and why they failed to vote. Absentees without a good reason (medical leave, critical local political commitment, and so forth) are regarded as defectors, especially on constitutional issues, where 308 votes are needed for passage.

I obtained lists of deputies absent from the Chamber for "legitimate" reasons, including medical leaves or acceptance of executive-branch posts. After removing deputies from the analysis for each day they had official leave, the remaining absentees were coded "present." I then took the most conservative approach possible, reclassifying these "present but not voting" deputies only on the issues where their votes were most crucial. Thus, on constitutional issues, these deputies were switched from "present" to "defect."

IV.   Analysis

Why Do Deputies Cooperate or Defect?

For every recorded vote in the Chamber between 1988 and 1996, I created a dichotomous variable called "Cooperate." This variable measures the agreement or disagreement of each deputy with the majority of that deputy's party.[23] The

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23. A member can be in different parties on different votes. A few members have three or more party affiliations over the course of these votes. There are only a few cases in which a majority of a party voted against leaders' recommendations.

cooperation variable was then regressed, using a logistic specification, on the independent variables discussed earlier. The resulting regressions take the form:

Cooperation = Contested Recommendation + Uncontested Recommendation + Pork Share + Rank in Postelection List + Share of Party Vote + Municipal Dominance + Vote Concentration + Terms Served + (Concentration × Rank) + (Concentration × Term) + (Concentration × Dominance) + Ideology + Local Career + Governor of State from Deputy's Party + Incumbent Seeking Reelection

The model was implemented separately for each of six parties: on the Right, the Liberal Front Party (PFL), the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), and the Brazilian Progressive Party (PPB); in the center, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB); on the Left, the Democratic Labor Party (PDT).[24] The unit of observation, then, is each deputy's individual vote. Separate regressions were run for two periods: all post-1991 votes (utilizing a dummy variable for the 1995–98 period) and Cardoso's 1995–98 administration.[25] Regressions were also implemented, in each period and for each party, with absentees counted as missing or as defectors on constitutional supermajority votes.

No single table can include twenty-four separate regressions, and I have spared the reader the burden of examining twenty-four separate tables. Tables 18–23 present one regression—the whole period model with absentees included—for each party. Appendix D contains the results (for each party) with absentees always counted as missing.[26] All the regressions (including those not presented here) attain high levels of significance, and numerous variables reach high levels of statistical significance in each regression. In other words, the basic model tested here, while far from a complete explanation of party cooperation and defection, is persuasive.

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24. The model was not applied to the Workers' Party (PT) because party unity in the PT is so high that the logistic broke down. Alone in Brazil, the PT truly is a disciplined party.

25. SAS Proc Logistic was utilized for the regressions. SAS provides tests for collinearity and overdispersion as well as various checks on the residuals. Collinearity was occasionally a problem—though never in the case of the leadership vote recommendations—but little can be done about it except to interpret individual coefficients cautiously. Overdispersion, however, was present and was corrected with the deviance criterion, thus increasing the standard errors of the uncorrected regression. Various residual diagnostics, including the C criterion and the hat matrix diagonal, were examined for outliers and extremely influential observations. None had any visible effect on the coefficients.

26. Results from other periods are available from the author.

TABLE 18.   Cooperation and Defection among PFL Deputies, 1991–98

Dependent Variable: Cooperation with Party Majority (absentees included)

Variable	Unstandardized Parameter Estimate and Probability Level	Standard Error	Standardized Estimate	Odds Ratio
Cardoso administration (1995–98)	−0.3873	.2043	−0.0477	.679
Contested party recommendation	.1657	.1499	.0254	1.180
Uncontested party recommendation	−0.3476**	.1386	−0.0587	.706
Share of pork disbursements	−0.3960***	.1065	−0.0776	.673
Rank in postelection list	1.7097***	.3386	.1569	5.527
Share of total party vote	.0953	2.0308	.0011	1.100
Dominance of key municipalities	3.1012***	.7578	.1386	22.224
Concentration of vote	.1574***	.0313	.3825	1.170
Concentration × Rank in list	−0.1123**	.0385	−0.1444	.894
Concentration × Terms served	−0.0004	.0067	−0.0028	1.000
Concentration × Dominance	−0.4057***	.0925	−0.3067	.666
Ideology	.2775**	.1069	.0629	1.320
Terms served	.0528	.0605	.0281	1.054
Local political career	−0.2654*	.1381	−0.0437	.767
Governor from same party	.3204*	.1594	.0586	1.378
Incumbent seeking reelection	.3917**	.1544	.0568	1.479

−2 log likelihood = 2019.4
Model chi-squared = 455.3 $p < .000$ I
Correctly predicted = 63.9%
$N = 13{,}101$
$R^2 = .0342$ Max-rescaled $R^2 = .1984$

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$

Although tables 18–23 are limited to one regression for each party, the discussion that follows considers models with absentee deputies counted both as missing and as defectors in both periods. The emphasis is on overall, cross-party patterns, with some attention paid to results for each party. In each case, the crucial tests are the significance and direction (sign) of the unstandardized coefficients and the differences, within a given regression, in the sizes of the standardized coefficients.[27]

27. Standardizing causes variables to have the same mean and standard deviation. The coefficients are then comparable, because the coefficient represents a change in the propensity to cooperate that results from a change of one standard deviation in the independent variable.

TABLE 19.   Cooperation and Defection among PMDB Deputies, 1991–98

Dependent Variable: Cooperation with Party Majority (absentees included)

Variable	Unstandardized Parameter Estimate and Probability Level	Standard Error	Standardized Estimate	Odds Ratio
Cardoso administration (1995–98)	−.9400***	.2014	−0.1150	.391
Contested party recommendation	.1937	.1339	.0302	1.214
Uncontested party recommendation	−0.2853*	.1235	−0.0483	.752
Share of pork disbursements	−0.4223***	.0850	−0.9467	.656
Rank in postelection list	.1997	.3564	.0206	1.221
Share of total party vote	2.8314**	1.1202	.0621	16.969
Dominance of key municipalities	3.5046***	.8855	.1388	33.268
Concentration of vote	.1729***	.0297	.4228	1.189
Concentration × Rank in list	.0232	.0337	.0360	1.023
Concentration × Terms served	−1.0101	.0103	−0.0570	.990
Concentration × Dominance	−0.4962***	.0852	−0.3786	.609
Ideology	.3289***	.0986	.1394	1.481
Terms served	.3928***	.0986	.1394	1.481
Local political career	.007230	.1173	.0014	.765
Governor from same party	−0.2677**	.1284	−0.0484	.765
Incumbent seeking reelection	.3776***	.1145	.066391	1.459

-2 log likelihood = 2348.6
Model chi-squared = 337.7 $p < .0001$
Correctly predicted = 68.1%
$N = 14,224$
$R^2 = .0235$ Max-rescaled $R^2 = .1363$

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$

Do Leadership Recommendations Matter?

In only two cases (the PFL with absentees excluded and the PPB with absentees included) do leadership recommendations on both contested and uncontested votes positively affect party cooperation. In neither case, however, is cooperation stronger on votes that are contested rather than uncontested. Only in the case of the PDT is a positive recommendation on contested votes stronger than the recommendation on uncontested votes. Moreover, recommendations clearly play a minor role, even for these three parties, in the overall determination of deputies' propensities to cooperate or defect. In table 21, for example, the standardized coefficient of the PPB's contested recommendation variable is smaller than nine other variables, and it is one-ninth the size of the indicator of vote concentration. Overall, then, it appears that recommendations do not af-

TABLE 20.   Cooperation and Defection among PSDB Deputies, 1991–98

Dependent Variable: Cooperation with Party Majority (absentees included)

Variable	Unstandardized Parameter Estimate and Probability Level	Standard Error	Standardized Estimate	Odds Ratio
Cardoso administration (1995–98)	−0.7415**	.3008	−0.0633	.476
Contested party recommendation	−0.0308	.1721	−0.0044	.595
Uncontested party recommendation	−0.2999	.1614	−0.0488	.741
Share of pork disbursements	−0.5192***	.1280	−0.1101	.595
Rank in postelection list	2.5151***	.3528	.3066	12.368
Share of total party vote	14.2774***	2.4760	.1999	999.0
Dominance of key municipalities	2.4301*	1.0115	.1040	11.360
Concentration of vote	.1432***	.0317	.4075	1.154
Concentration × Rank in list	−0.2093***	.0342	−0.4889	.811
Concentration × Terms served	−0.0067	.0108	−0.0387	.993
Concentration × Dominance	−0.0381	.0869	−0.0267	.963
Ideology	−0.2411	.1362	−0.0533	.786
Terms served	.1406	.0880	.0523	1.151
Local political career	−0.0622	.1509	−0.0116	.940
Governor from same party	.9257***	.1580	.1800	2.524
Incumbent seeking reelection	−0.3957**	.1599	−0.0668	.673

−2 log likelihood = 1543.5
Model chi-squared = 429.9 $p < .0001$
Correctly predicted = 66.3%
$N = 10,723$
$R^2 = .0393$ Max-rescaled $R^2 = .2338$

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$

fect cooperation through threats of sanctions or promises of rewards. Party vote recommendations sometimes matter in the sense that they guide deputies who respond to calls for party solidarity and who simply need to know how the party is voting.[28] But even when recommendations do matter, other factors far outweigh them in determining deputies' cooperation or defection.

Can Pork Buy Deputies' Cooperation?

Chapter 6 demonstrated that pork-barrel expenditures buy or at least rent congressional loyalty. In four of the six parties represented in tables 18–23, the

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28. In the U.S. context, a more elaborate version of this argument appears in Kingdon 1981.

TABLE 21.   Cooperation and Defection among PPB Deputies, 1991–98

Dependent Variable: Cooperation with Party Majority (absentees included)

Variable	Unstandardized Parameter Estimate and Probability Level	Standard Error	Standardized Estimate	Odds Ratio
Cardoso administration (1995–98)	−0.4469*	.2175	−0.0441	.640
Contested party recommendation	.2696*	.1255	.049700	1.309
Uncontested party recommendation	.5673*	.2490	.0576	1.764
Share of pork disbursements	−0.1170	.0991	−0.0272	.890
Rank in postelection list	1.8857***	.3094	.2032	6.591
Share of total party vote	−1.0858	2.3506	−0.0141	.338
Dominance of key municipalities	−2.7803**	1.0167	−0.1226	.062
Concentration of vote	.0973***	.0242	.2379	1.102
Concentration × Rank in list	−0.2721***	.0443	−0.4320	.762
Concentration × Terms served	−0.0281**	.0095	−0.1701	.972
Concentration × Dominance	.3848**	.1206	.1832	1.469
Ideology	.1489	.0898	.0541	1.161
Terms served	.3246***	.0901	.1448	1.383
Local political career	−0.2148	.1325	−0.0405	.807
Governor from same party	.9368	.7068	.0395	2.552
Incumbent seeking reelection	.2626	.1408	.0438	1.300

-2 log likelihood $= 1698.6$
Model chi-squared $= 261.2$ $p < .0001$
Correctly predicted $= 66.6\%$
$N = 9,024$
$R^2 = .0285$ Max-rescaled $R^2 = .1462$

  *$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$

coefficient on the pork variable is negative and significant; for the other two parties the coefficient is weak, but the sign is correct. The same effect appears when votes are restricted to the Cardoso administration (1995–98). The tables in appendix D, however, demonstrate that the exclusion of absentee deputies (counting them as missing) produces a coefficient that is positive in all cases and significantly positive in three. To interpret this difference (absentees included vs. absentees excluded), note that absentee deputies have a propensity to defect. The threat of defection establishes a claim on pork-barrel spending. Government and party leaders reward defectors, expecting greater cooperation on future votes. Overall, the government concentrates pork-barrel spending on those likely to defect. Though their rate of cooperation increases, they remain

TABLE 22.   Cooperation and Defection among PDT Deputies, 1991–98

Dependent Variable: Cooperation with Party Majority (absentees included)

Variable	Unstandardized Parameter Estimate and Probability Level	Standard Error	Standardized Estimate	Odds Ratio
Cardoso administration (1995–98)	.1889	.5957	.0194	1.208
Contested party recommendation	.4611*	.2155	.0888	1.586
Uncontested party recommendation	−0.1112	.2672	−0.0169	.895
Share of pork disbursements	−0.6556**	.2181	−0.1408	.519
Rank in postelection list	.4559	.7348	.0563	1.578
Share of total party vote	12.5580	9.2882	.1078	999.0
Dominance of key municipalities	3.6081	3.1463	.1557	36.898
Concentration of vote	.1649	.1102	.2907	1.179
Concentration × Rank in list	.0225	.0982	.0302	1.023
Concentration × Terms served	−0.0332	.0420	−0.1076	.967
Concentration × Dominance	−0.2491	.3356	−0.1463	.779
Ideology	.167437	.2682	.0443	1.182
Terms served	.2276	.2066	.1033	1.256
Local political career	−1.0725**	.3457	−0.2067	.342
Governor from same party	1.3073	.8239	.1292	3.696
Incumbent seeking reelection	−0.1962	.3160	−0.0334	.822

−2 log likelihood = 540.7

Model chi-squared = 131.7 $p < .0001$

Correctly predicted = 68.9%

$N = 3764$

$R^2 = .0344$ Max-rescaled $R^2 = .2102$

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$

more likely to defect (producing a negative coefficient) than are deputies who receive less.[29]

Parties in which influence flows from top to bottom, as in Venezuela's Acción Democratica, maintain discipline without individualized bargaining. Not so in Brazil, where pork-barrel spending is necessary to cement coalitions on practically any serious issue. In part, then, pork compensates for the party weakness that the leadership recommendation variables revealed.

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29. This interpretation is obviously extremely tentative. A time-series model would offer a better test, but a game-theoretic approach, as Bill Keech has suggested in a personal communication, is really optimal.

TABLE 23.   Cooperation and Defection among PTB Deputies, 1991–98

Dependent Variable: Cooperation with Party Majority (absentees included)

Variable	Unstandardized Parameter Estimate and Probability Level	Standard Error	Standardized Estimate	Odds Ratio
Cardoso administration (1995–98)	−0.6395	.4771	−0.0659	.528
Contested party recommendation	−0.7079***	.2075	−0.1368	.493
Uncontested party recommendation	−0.4101	.2563	−0.0570	.664
Share of pork disbursements	−0.0620	.1838	−0.0152	.940
Rank in postelection list	−2.2549*	1.0933	−0.2059	.105
Share of total party vote	24.6165***	5.7649	.2985	999.0
Dominance of key municipalities	5.9312*	2.6933	.2417	376.6
Concentration of vote	.0224	.0568	.0452	1.023
Concentration × Rank in list	.3548**	.1139	.5247	1.426
Concentration × Terms served	.0462	.0365	.2525	1.047
Concentration × Dominance	−0.7916**	.3117	−0.4671	.453
Ideology	.9967***	.2758	.2805	2.709
Terms served	−0.1850	.2590	−0.0930	.831
Local political career	−0.5821	.3378	−0.0783	.559
Governor from same party	−1.5557**	.5726	−0.1511	.211
Incumbent seeking reelection	.3299	.3415	.059522	1.391

-2 log likelihood $= 671.2$

Model chi-squared $= 186.1$ $p < .0001$

Correctly predicted $= 69.0\%$

$N = 3474$

$R^2 = .0522$ Max-rescaled $R^2 = .2385$

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$

Electoral Strength, Constituency, Ideology, Career Background

In nearly every case, low ranks in parties' postelection lists are associated with higher degrees of cooperation with party majorities.[30] These weak deputies cooperate because doing so facilitates access to jobs and pork. Cooperation gives deputies a platform on which to stand when running for reelection in districts where they think the electorate cares about the party label. For the PSDB and the PFL, rank's effects on cooperation are strikingly larger between 1991 and 1994 than between 1995 and 1998. The PSDB opposed the government during

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30. The coefficient on the indicator of deputies' shares of aggregate party vote was much less consistent. Due to the weakness of these coefficients and also to the high collinearity of the two variables, it seems reasonable to emphasize rank's effects on cooperation.

most of the 1991–94 period, but after 1994 the party became a key member of the governing coalition. The decline in the importance of rank for PSDB deputies suggests that the party label, not access to pork, motivates cooperation, because access to pork is much greater for the party in the current period. The PFL had an off-again, on-again relationship with the government before 1995 but, like the PSDB, participated in the governing coalition in the Cardoso administration.[31] In the case of parties like the PDT, no common objectives exist between party leaders and the executive. In the Cardoso period, with absentees included, weak PDT deputies are no more likely to cooperate than are strong deputies. On the basis of interviews with legislators, I believe that the executive targets pork to weak PDT deputies to persuade them to avoid voting against the government; that is, in this situation not voting was preferable to the government than a vote with the antigovernment party majority.

What happens when deputies dominate their constituencies? For the PFL, PMDB, PSDB, and PTB, dominance is associated with greater party cooperation. Dominant deputies, as observed in chapter 1, tend to be a traditional type whose political careers are based either on their family's regional predominance or on their own deal making with scattered local (often rural) bosses able to deliver blocs of votes. For these deputies, continued electoral success requires delivering pork-barrel projects to their local intermediaries.

The only exceptions to the dominance-cooperation linkage were the PPB, which was significantly negative, and the PDT, which was positive but insignificant. I have no definitive explanation for these deviant party members. Since their parties took opposing positions on most government-sponsored proposals, the ideological positions of dominant deputies are not the motivating factor. Instead, the explanation might lie in these two parties' supracongressional leadership. In both cases, a powerful presidential hopeful dominated the party, but neither the PPB's Paulo Maluf nor the PDT's Leonel Brizola controlled any pork. For deputies in these two parties, defecting from the party majority could be a tactic of political survival that only dominant deputies had the autonomy to pursue.

A much stronger constituency effect comes from the geographic concentration of the votes of individual deputies. Vote clustering has strong and positive effects on cooperation in nearly every party, time period, and absentee condition.[32] Given the assumption that concentration of votes increases deputies'

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31. This explanation does not work for the PPB. I have not determined why.

32. The only negative relationship is found in one PDT case, but given the opposition status of the party, this finding is really confirmatory.

accountability to their voters, it might be argued that this observation simply reflects popular support for executive initiatives. To some degree this finding is plausible, but issue-based links must be rare in Brazil, because the ties between voters and deputies are so weak and because deputies have little idea what constituents think. Instead, vote concentration means that deputies are simultaneously more likely to be able to claim credit for public spending directed to their constituencies and under more pressure to deliver.

Seniority produces small and inconsistent effects. The original hypothesis suggested that senior deputies, other things equal, have the autonomy to defect if they so desire. Conversely, senior deputies tend to get along by going along, and they may be thoroughly tied to the leadership. Many senior deputies hold some sort of minor leadership position.

Deputies with local political backgrounds did not cooperate or defect at different rates than did other politicians, and governors did not consistently influence the deputies from their states. But deputies in states with PSDB governors were exceptionally cooperative, probably because three PSDB governors represented industrial states with similar economic problems and with close ties to the origins of the PSDB and to President Cardoso.[33] PFL governors, led by the powerful PFL machine in Bahia, also influenced their deputies in the direction of cooperation. PTB and PMDB deputies in states with governors from these parties seemed more likely to defect, but this finding may simply be a result of particularly fractious intrastate politics.

Incumbents seeking reelection consistently cooperated with their parties. Among the larger parties, only PSDB members cooperated significantly less often if they planned reelection campaigns. If the causal story behind this relationship is the currying of favor by deputies expecting to seek reelection, what explains the PSDB defections? Here, perhaps, are the consequences—on its more left-of-center deputies—of the PSDB's increasing neoliberalism. For those deputies whose constituencies are vulnerable to invasions from the Left, usually from the PT, or who are ideologically uncomfortable with their party's rightward drift, defection may be a rational survival strategy. This argument once again suggests that the decision to seek reelection is causally prior to, and therefore affects, voting decisions.

Ideology is a moderately strong and fairly consistent force, but its effects at first glance seem counterintuitive. With the exception of the PDT, more con-

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33. The three PSDB governors include Eduardo Azeredo in Minas Gerais, Marcello Alencar in Rio de Janeiro, and Mário Covas in São Paulo.

servative members within each party are more likely to follow party recommendations. If most legislation is aimed at the median legislator, then the conservative members of right-wing parties ought to be most disaffected and hence most prone to defect. Likewise, left-wing members of left-of-center parties ought to be most disaffected and prone to defection. Why do conservative right-wingers cooperate? In part, pork-barrel inducements must overwhelm ideological disagreement. At the same time, ideological conformity with party programs fails to affect deputies' behavior because most Brazilian parties simply lack any sort of coherent programs.

Last, consider the three variables representing the interaction of clustering with electoral rank, seniority, and dominance. Contrary to my earlier prediction (that strong deputies with concentrated votes would defect), weak but concentrated deputies are the defectors. An examination of residuals shows that such deputies tend to share their electoral bases with other deputies.[34] Sharing limits their ability to claim credit for pork, so currying favor with party leaders is pointless. However, their constituencies have higher levels of voter awareness and include cohorts of voters negatively affected by neoliberal economic policies. For weak deputies facing such voters, defection from the party yields a positive electoral payoff.

Clustered PFL and PMDB deputies who dominate their key municipalities defect more from their leaderships, but their counterparts in the PSDB cooperate more with the party. This finding is not surprising: concentrated-dominant PFL and PMDB types are mostly in the Northeast and reflect the strength of traditional political families and deal making.[35] For these deputies, the party label has little importance for their electoral futures. By contrast, concentrated-dominant PSDB deputies usually have strong local backgrounds, often as mayors or state deputies from medium-sized communities. These deputies cooperate because party labels and access to pork matter.[36]

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34. A typical example of this kind of concentrated and shared electoral base is the municipality of São Paulo. While the whole state constitutes the legal electoral district, this single municipality effectively elects twenty to thirty deputies, or nearly half the state total. No candidate gets more than 10 percent of the municipality's votes, but all get 60–70 percent of their personal vote there.

35. As demonstrated earlier in this book, the party label is quite important in Bahia. Magalhães built his PFL machine on access to central government funds, and former state secretaries of programs such as health and education dominate his congressional delegation. I am indebted to Simone Rodrigues da Silva for help on this question.

36. The combination of senior deputies with concentrated vote bases does not seem to affect cooperation.

Conclusion

Though Brazil's democratic presidents have an impressive range of formal and informal powers, they face constant, crippling difficulties in moving their agendas through the legislature. Many proposals fail to come to a vote. Others cannot get out of committee. Still others never arrive at the Congress at all. Proposals that survive the legislative process emerge disfigured by substantive concessions and saddled by high costs in pork-barrel side payments. This chapter took the first steps in exploring Brazilian executive-legislative relations by searching for the microfoundations of congressional intransigence. I sought to resolve an apparent contradiction raised by two strands of research. One strand points to the electoral system as the culprit: Brazil combines open-list proportional representation, high-magnitude electoral districts, unlimited reelection, and candidate selection at the level of states. This institutional structure should produce a legislature full of individualistic, pork-oriented deputies and weakly disciplined parties. But a second strand of research suggests that the sanctions and rewards wielded by party leaders are strong enough to counteract the fragmenting tendencies of the electoral system and produce legislative parties with very high levels of voting unity.

As in many political systems, votes on the floor of Brazil's legislature represent the culmination of a process of intensive bargaining among presidents, party leaders, interest-based caucuses, and individual deputies. Given the nation's institutional structure, Brazil should be a prime example of conditional legislative parties, where leaders' actions depend on the support of party members on a case-by-case basis and where influence flows from the bottom up.

In this setting, analysis of roll-call votes requires a theory of legislative behavior that is necessarily multivariate. As a first step, this chapter developed a model predicting cooperation or defection from party majorities. If the conditional party influence model is incorrect, if influence flows from the top down, party leaders ought to be able to persuade their members to follow leadership vote recommendations. Leaders too weak to compel cooperation can try to buy support with pork-barrel programs and job appointments directed at individual deputies. But many deputies have the autonomy and motivation to resist party leaders or to extract a high price for support. The freedom to resist depends on electoral security, which in turn is determined by deputies' postelection rank, share of their party's vote, legislative seniority, and municipal-level dominance. The motivation to resist depends on ideology, constituency characteristics, and political background.

Applied to Brazil's six major parties in the 1991–98 period, this model of

cooperation and defection fares well. Overall, it provides persuasive evidence that party leaders lack the power to compel cooperation. Leaders make voting recommendations to their members, and these recommendations sometimes positively affect cooperation. But vote recommendations have no more effect on crucial, highly contested votes than on uncontested votes and have much less influence than constituency characteristics and pork-barrel spending.

Deputies cooperate at higher rates when they are weak electorally and when their constituencies are geographically concentrated. Electoral weakness makes deputies reluctant to surrender the benefits of the party label. Legislators may bargain hard for substantive compromises on legislation and may extract high prices in pork or appointments for support, but in the end the party label helps defend deputies against interparty and intraparty competitors. When a deputy's constituents are geographically concentrated, they are more likely to know who their deputy is and more likely to demand results from their deputies. Given the absence of programmatic content in Brazil's parties, results implies pork.

The model's most notable misprediction resulted from the indicator of ideology. Brazil's parties do have broadly distinct ideological centers, even if the distinctions are very broad indeed. In general, however, conservative deputies cooperate more, regardless of the relationship between their party and the median legislator. I expected more defections from conservative members of right-wing parties and leftist members of left-wing parties. Perhaps the error lies in the use of a unidimensional indicator of ideology in a multidimensional voting space. It is also possible that legislators rarely care much about ideological questions, so their ideological predilections are overwhelmed by their need for pork.