

# Party Competition and Responsible Party Government



# **Party Competition and Responsible Party Government**

A Theory of Spatial Competition  
Based upon Insights from  
Behavioral Voting Research

*James Adams*

*Ann Arbor*

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*To Dorothy Adams*



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