

## CHAPTER 5

### **Credibility and Geopolitics: Regional Interests at Stake**

A theoretical analysis of deterrence is primarily concerned with relative power and threat credibility as necessary conditions for deterrence stability, or, alternatively, their lack thereof, as sources of deterrence failure. The introductory theoretical framework clarified the importance of a state's interests, that is, "inherent credibility," for the stability of deterrence. As an extensive survey in the previous chapter clearly showed, the literature focused primarily on the issues of relative power. In the context of deterrence, this means that credible threats were largely analyzed in terms of a state having the capacity to carry out a threat effectively. The focus on relative capabilities overshadowed the basic issue of a genuinely credible reason to want to use power in the first place. The main argument in this book is that the *willingness* to carry out a threat is a function of the stakes that a major power might have in a crisis. In direct deterrence, when a major power's territory is directly threatened, the issues at stake are at their highest. In extended deterrence, its willingness to get involved in a conflict depends on the strength of its interest in the third party (Protégé) threatened by another power. Previous deterrence research (e.g., Huth 1988; Huth and Russett 1984, 1990) examined the stakes in extended deterrence in terms of the ties between a major power and its Protégé. The notion of inherent credibility of extended threats can be reinterpreted, however, to reflect the importance of the ties between a major power and the entire region where a Protégé is located. It can be argued, therefore, that a crisis is not likely to escalate unless it involves strong and conflicting interests of major powers in the region of conflict. In other words, unless there is a crisis of strong geostrategic salience for *both* competing powers, the situation between them of power disparity or transition would not lead to major fighting as respectively suggested by balance-of-power and power shift schools.

While geopolitical salience is an old idea, as it steadily evolved under different names, past treatments were mostly impressionistic,

and there was no attempt to develop a rigorous theoretical framework for examining it, though the “new geopolitics” should provide a disciplinary context. The idea of “spheres of interest” is also closely related to the argument tying regional stakes of major powers to the inherent credibility of their threats in extended deterrence. A few recent studies developed the related notion of “shatterbelts,” which should also be mentioned in this context. Although less rigorous in their treatment of these ideas, some prominent writings need to be briefly reviewed. After reviewing the evolution of those geopolitical writings that are related to the idea of major powers’ regional stakes in their conflicts, the chapter will empirically examine the argument developed here, which links geopolitics to the analysis of credibility of deterrent threats.

## Geopolitical Views

### Old Geopolitics

The German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, often regarded as the founder of modern political geography at the turn of the twentieth century, is best known for his thesis that the behavior of states is shaped by geographic attributes of location (*Lage*) and space (*Raum*). His deterministic view influenced the Geopolitik school in interwar Germany, casting a shadow on the legitimacy of his thought. But Ratzel also established the tradition, later followed by a number of geopolitical writers, of searching for a geographic area with critical strategic importance for the politics of world powers. Unlike other writers of his time, Ratzel did not see Europe as having a major role in world geostrategy and instead argued that “history would be dominated by larger states occupying continental areas, like North America, Asiatic Russia, Australia, and South America” (cited in Cohen 1973, 40).

Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, the next major figure in the development of the old geopolitics,<sup>1</sup> continued the search for a strategic regional “epicenter” of world politics. In his seminal book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (1890), he argued that the power controlling the sea was in the best position to control the world. To achieve full control over the seas, a power needed to have both preponderant naval capabilities *and* control over the landmass with the best strategic position for an effective use of naval capabilities. In Mahan’s view, this critical landmass was located within the Eurasian hinterland, which was the zone of conflict between British sea power and Russian

land power at the time. Mahan's writings, although in a somewhat simplified interpretation, have influenced the contemporary idea that sea-power leadership is the key to world power (e.g., Thompson 1988).

The idea that a preponderant sea power is the best candidate for the leading world power, so often attributed to Mahan, also had a tremendous impact on many statesmen at the turn of the twentieth century. As an illustration, Germany's fateful decision to shift away from Bismarckian policies and embark upon the rapid naval program in the 1890s was crowned by the Kaiser's famous proclamation "Our future lies on the water" (cited in Gooch 1923, 231).

But, as Cohen (1973) pointed out, what Mahan had in mind was in fact a *sea-transported* power, the key to which was control over the Eurasian land. In this sense, Mahan's ideas can be recognized in the geopolitical writings of Halford Mackinder, who also attributed the major role to Eurasia ("Heartland") as the critical geostrategic source for world domination. He summarized his thesis in this often-quoted statement: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the World" (Mackinder 1919, 150). Mackinder's thoughts ostensibly indicate a deterministic view of the relation between geography and world politics, which was quite common in early geopolitical thought.

The last major writer of the old geopolitics was Nicholas Spykman (1944), who argued that the so-called Rimland was the key to world control. The Rimland was specifically located in Eurasia's shorelands and corresponded to Mackinder's "Marginal Crescent" ("Maritime" Europe, Middle East, Southeast Asia, India, and China). Spykman was an American political geographer, and his intent was to find a U.S. geostrategic response to the rise of German hegemony. Hence, his Rimland doctrine advocated an alliance between Anglo-American sea power and Russian land power as an effective counterbalance to the German threat. Spykman's work was the last offspring of the old geopolitical thinking and did not find a home among contemporary writings. With the end of World War II, the era of old geopolitics was closed, and the role of geography was removed from the study of international relations for some time.

### New Geopolitics

Several factors contributed to the decline in the postwar interest in geopolitics. First, the advent of nuclear technology and technological

changes in transportation and communication made the constraints of geographic space and distance less relevant for the conduct of world politics. In this respect, the global reach of world powers could bypass the limitations of distance and could be achieved through the mere possession of technological advantages.

Second, traditional historical analysis of the regional interests of major powers was centered around the notion of “spheres of influence” or “spheres of interest.” These notions were even subject to international legal regulation at the turn of the century, but their obvious incompatibility with the principle of equal sovereignty led to their removal from international legal codes. Moreover, since the sphere-of-influence politics was often unjust toward smaller nations located within the spheres, major powers of the postwar period have not officially endorsed the pursuit of this policy. Hence, analysts of superpower behavior rarely concentrate on the effects of regions upon the superpower global competition or vice versa.

Third, the neglect of regional aspects of major power rivalry is also a product of the strategic thinking of the Cold War era. Since the policy of containment was pursued as a globalist strategy, deterrence theorists did not discriminate among world regions when analyzing the relations between superpowers. The exceptions were rare: George Kennan, Walter Lippman, and Henry A. Wallace, to name a few notables, were early critics of the U.S. globalist position that did not differentiate among geopolitical regions in terms of their relevance to U.S. vital national interests.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the globalist approach strongly dominated both the containment policy and strategic scholarship of the Cold War era.

Despite the neglect of geopolitics, an emerging number of new scholars began to adopt a geopolitical approach to international relations, while completely abandoning the old deterministic views. As O’Loughlin and Anselin (1992, 14) point out, “The central distinguishing difference between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ geopolitics is that the ‘old geopolitics’ had geography as a determining variable while the central belief of the ‘new geopolitics’ . . . is that geography is only one of many possible conditioning factors in international relations.”

Most prominently, Sprout and Sprout (1957, 1965) played a key role in shaping a new geopolitical school of world politics. They introduced the concept of an ecological triad composed of an entity, its environment (“milieu”), and the entity-environment relationship. Depending on how the relationship between the three components was interpreted, the Sprouts distinguished among several “relationship the-

ories.” In *environmental determinism*, environmental attributes determine man’s behavior, as it was presented in the old geopolitical thought. In the doctrine of *environmental possibilism*, typical for the new geopolitics, “the milieu is conceived as a set of opportunities and limitations” and the initiative lies with man (Sprout and Sprout 1965, 83). The environment makes certain actions possible, but it is a person or the state as an entity that makes choices about them. Once the environment sets limits of what is possible, it also may have an impact on what choices would be more or less probable, which is the subject of *environmental probabilism*. Finally, there is *cognitive behaviorism*. While not a specific theory of man-milieu relationship, it postulates “the simple and familiar principle that a person reacts to his milieu as he apperceives it” (Sprout and Sprout 1957, 314).

Most, Starr, and Siverson (Most and Starr 1989; Siverson and Starr 1991) demonstrated that the majority of these models could be integrated into a single framework such as their model of “opportunity and willingness.” According to this model, “both opportunity (possibilism) and willingness (probabilism and cognitive behaviorism) are necessary for understanding behavior” (Starr 1991, 4). An increasing number of studies focusing on geography and international conflict subsequently flourished in the 1980s and 1990s. It is common for this new wave of studies to look primarily at the impact of geographic proximity and shared borders on the frequency of warfare or the spread of conflict (for reviews, see Most, Starr, and Siverson 1989; Diehl 1991). The analysis of geographic distance as a constraining factor for conflict was first initiated by Boulding and his notion of a “loss-of-strength gradient,” referring to “the degree to which military and political power diminishes as we move a unit distance away from its home base” (1962, 245). The effect of geographic distance was not, however, confirmed for major powers (Bueno de Mesquita 1981).

Another area of research examines territory as a source of conflict rather than as a facilitating or constraining condition for it.<sup>3</sup> Here, also, border disputes figure prominently, and the focus is on their origin, outcome, or recurring patterns in the form of “enduring rivalries.” There is one research strand, however, that goes beyond border disputes while still examining territory as a source of dispute. It is centered on the idea of “shatterbelts” or regions characterized by fragmentation and instability, thus representing arenas for major power competition. Although it is believed to be a relatively new concept (Diehl 1991, 21), it has a long history in the traditional writings (not to be confused with the old geopolitics) about gray areas or spheres of conflicting interests in major power rivalry.

### Geostrategic Salience and Regional Issues at Stake

To date, regional aspects of major power rivalry have not been subjected to a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis. Although there is almost no theoretical framework available for their examination, these issues are related to the idea of spheres of influence in earlier writings or to its modern version of shatterbelts.

#### Related Geopolitical Terms

*Spheres of Interest.* One of the earliest records of agreement on spheres of interest dates back to 509 B.C. when Rome and Carthage agreed not to interfere in each other's areas (Keal 1983, 38). The term *spheres of influence* was possibly not used before the 1880s, when major powers signed a series of treaties delineating the boundaries of their colonial empires. The reluctance to directly admit such a policy led to the adoption of the term *sphere of interest*, as Lord Balfour stressed in his speech to the House of Commons in 1898: "Spheres of influence we have never admitted, spheres of interest we have never denied." The distinction can indeed be viewed as "hair-splitting," as Hudson (1939, 105) observed.<sup>4</sup>

Naturally, the sphere-of-interest policy directly conflicts with the doctrine of sovereignty. Despite its questionable legitimacy, let alone legality, most historians argue that such a policy was traditionally pursued by major powers (see, e.g., Taylor 1954). However, the globalism of the Cold War containment strategy questioned its acceptability. Still, it should be noted that even in the early formative years of U.S. containment policy, a few intellectuals and policymakers were not persuaded that so-called indiscriminate globalism, i.e., a containment strategy that did not discriminate among the regions according to their national security relevance for U.S. interests, was a prudent policy.<sup>5</sup> In his essay on the origins of the Cold War, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. distinguished between "universalist" and "sphere-of-influence" views:

One theme indispensable to an understanding of the Cold War is the contrast between two clashing views of world order: the 'universalist' view, by which all nations shared a common interest in all the affairs of the world, and the 'sphere-of-influence' view, by which each great power would be assured by the other great powers of an acknowledged predominance in its own area of special interest. The universalist view assumed that national security would be guaranteed by an international organization. The

sphere-of-interest view assumed that national security would be guaranteed by the *balance of power*. While in practice these views have by no means been incompatible (indeed, our shaky peace has been based on a combination of the two), in the abstract they involved sharp contradictions. (1967, 26; emphasis added)

Although Schlesinger's remarks were confined to the Cold War period, they are clearly generalizable for other epochs as well. At least, the sphere-of-interest view can be generalized for the conduct of major powers in their long history of mutual rivalry. Schlesinger was one of the rare writers to use the term *spheres of influence* in the Cold War context. But the cited passage is also important in a larger theoretical sense: the term was tightly related to the concept of balance of power. As discussed in chapter 4, traditional writers tended to use the notion of balance of power with multiple meanings. Even Morgenthau (1948) argued that the delimitation of spheres of influence between major powers has been one of the mechanisms for balancing their power, which replaced an earlier direct exchange of territorial and colonial possessions. Indeed, he wrote that the "historically most important manifestation of the balance of power" was "to be found not in the equilibrium of two isolated nations but in the relations between one nation or alliance of nations and another alliance" (169). Precisely because he emphasized alliances as the most important mechanism in the balancing process, later scholars tended to disregard other balancing mechanisms such as "the delimitation of colonial and semicolonial spheres of influence [which] is organically connected with the balance-of-power system" (168).

Among political scientists, like Morgenthau, Robert Gilpin also stressed the importance of regional influences of major powers, though he did not subscribe to the balance-of-power approach but instead to the power shift argument. It does not seem he intended to develop a coherent theoretical argument about spheres-of-influence politics, yet one can discern several ways in which this notion was treated in his work. First, he argues that there are three state objectives: territorial conquest, control over the world economy, and influence over the behavior of other states "through the use of threats and coercion, the formation of alliances, and the creation of exclusive spheres of influence." Gilpin argues further that control over the international system is a function of three factors: distribution of power, hierarchy of prestige, and a set of rights and rules governing interactions among states. The last factor includes "simple understandings regarding

spheres of influence.” Finally, in his discussion of the conditions that precipitate hegemonic wars, he attributes a critical role to a rising challenger: “As its relative power increases, a rising state attempts to change the rules governing the international system, the division of the spheres of influence, and, most important of all, the international distribution of territory” (1981, 24, 34, 187). Gilpin thus attributes several meanings and functions to the spheres of influence, that is, as an objective, an element of the rules, and an aspect of challenger’s dissatisfaction. Undoubtedly, Gilpin’s work is relevant in his acknowledgment that the politics of the spheres of influence plays an important part in major power behavior. An exact causal relationship between this kind of politics and international conflict was, however, left unspecified. Rigorous empirical research on spheres of interest is also virtually nonexistent.<sup>6</sup> The issue of causality was, to some extent, attempted in the literature on shatterbelts.

*Shatterbelts.* This is a new term for a relatively old notion concerning major power disagreements, tacit or open, over their influence in particular regions. Cohen coined the term *shatterbelt* and defined it as “a large, strategically located region that is occupied by a number of conflicting states and is caught between the conflicting interests of adjoining Great Powers” (1973, 85). The terms *spheres of influence* and *spheres of interest* are evidently substituted with the term *impact areas*. Cohen is also more inclined to use the term *nodes* instead of *major powers* or *superpowers*. These terminological substitutions may veil the essence of his study, which is centered on the geostrategic behavior of major powers and not far removed from the spheres-of-interest approach.

We may look at this world as one world, divided and polycentric—a world in which certain nodes (points or places) exercise or share primary power or influence over broader impact areas, shaping these areas, ultimately, into unique kinds of landscapes. . . . The major tensions of international relations occur when these nodes or places clash with one another as they interact in areas that are common ground. (1973, 25)

Cohen’s picture of the postwar “world landscape” rests on the division between two geostrategic realms: the “Trade-Dependent Maritime World” and the “Eurasian Continental” world. Each is dominated by one node (i.e., superpower): the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. Each geostrategic region is then subdivided into a

number of geopolitical regions. According to Cohen, the Middle East and Southeast Asia constitute shatterbelts, because their political and economic fate is of vital concern to both superpowers (1973, 87).

In his later works, Cohen made several revisions: he argued that the geostrategic realms became less cohesive, while geopolitical regions arose as more relevant; sub-Saharan Africa also became a shatterbelt region, but by the 1990s it lost this status, together with Southeast Asia, leaving only the Middle East as a region of fragmentation and contention. His definition of *shatterbelts* also underwent some changes, highlighting them as an area of major power contention. Although generally considered to be politically fragmented, the “distinguishing feature of the Shatterbelt, however, is that it presents an equal playing field to two or more competing powers operating from different geostrategic realms” (1991, 567).

The idea of shatterbelts apparently developed from Fairgrieve’s earlier notion of the “crush zone” of small states which “remain in the unsatisfactory position of buffer states, precariously dependent politically, and more surely dependent economically” (1915, 329). Fairgrieve argued that this zone, “crushed” between major powers, consisted of the small European states, the Balkans, Iran, Afghanistan, Siam, and Korea. Later, Hartshorne (1944) developed a similar idea of a European “shatter zone,” in which both world wars broke out. Hoffman (1952) also ascribed vital importance to the East European “Shatter-Belt” in the East-West competition. As Hensel and Diehl (1994, 35) correctly observe, these earlier writings “tended to describe a single region or belts of states, most often East-Central Europe, and did not attempt to draw any cross-regional comparisons or generalize beyond this one area.” It was Cohen who built upon these previous notions to develop his idea of “shatterbelts” and extend their empirical domain. On the other hand, he did not develop a theoretical framework for explanatory purposes; it was still a rather impressionistic and descriptive study of the role of shatterbelts in world politics.

A few recent studies attempted to refine the research in this area. Their improvement was limited primarily to conceptual matters that produced some revisions in the empirical delineation of shatterbelts (Kelly 1986; Van der Wusten and Nierop 1990; Hensel and Diehl 1994). In terms of the instability of shatterbelts, Van der Wusten and Nierop (1990) found that outside interventions were indeed more frequent in shatterbelts than in other regions. One of Hensel and Diehl’s (1994) findings was that the frequency of major power intervention was greater in shatterbelts than in other regions for interstate wars and dis-

putes. However, the reverse trend was found for extrasystemic wars and civil wars. Both studies focused only on areas of conflicts, thus excluding other, relatively peaceful, regions as a control variable. Once again, the causal model was not a part of the research agenda, which leaves the research on shatterbelts mostly void of a rigorous explanatory theory.

*Foreign Policy Portfolios Similarity.* Bueno de Mesquita (1981) pioneered the idea that foreign policy portfolios of states can significantly affect the degree of similarity or divergence of their security interests. Particularly, it was proposed that the similarity of states' alliance portfolios was a useful indicator of their security interests, using Kendall's  $\tau_b$  as the operational measure for the similarity of portfolios (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Bueno de Mesquita 1981). A number of studies subsequently used the  $\tau_b$  measure of alliance portfolio similarity between two or more states to estimate their willingness to get involved in conflict against each other (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1988, 1992; Kim 1991; Kim and Morrow 1992).

Signorino and Ritter (1999) recently criticized the appropriateness of Kendall's  $\tau_b$  for measuring policy portfolio similarity, suggesting instead an alternative measure  $S$  that is more consistent with spatial models of international politics. Their further argument was to expand alliance portfolios with additional indicators of revealed policy preferences, specifically supplementing it with the UN voting patterns as an illustration. In fact, Bueno de Mesquita (1981) also originally suggested the use of multiple indicators to measure the similarity of states' policy positions. His eventual choice of a single measure was simply necessitated by the theoretical assumption that alliances were the most relevant aspect of security policy as opposed to, for example, involvement in international organizations.

Notwithstanding these differences on the issue of appropriate measures and indicators, both Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and Signorino and Ritter (1999) are concerned with the impact of foreign policy similarities on states' behavior in disputes. The notions of foreign policy portfolio similarity and regional salience ties, central to this study, may be *prima facie* interpreted as complementary, with two significant differences. First, tight linkages between a major power and most states in a region may, but do not necessarily have to, indicate the similarity of their foreign policy positions. The Cold War case of U.S. ties with the Western Europe and the Soviet presence in the Eastern Europe can easily be interpreted as an example of convergence between these two notions. Similar foreign policy positions between each super-

power and the respective regions (i.e., United States and West Europe; USSR and East Europe) were obviously correlated with the strength of their ties, which, in turn, shaped the variant level of salience of each region for the two superpowers. The same cannot be said for many other historical and contemporary cases. British and French strong presence and stakes in the Middle East until the late 1950s can hardly be assumed to reflect their similar foreign policies with such regional protégés as Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. To use another example, the Austro-Hungarian policy positions would be difficult to identify with those of most Balkan states, and yet its ties and stakes in the Balkans were quite strong.

The second difference is even more pronounced at the level of relations between major powers. In this respect, theoretical expectations about the similarity of their foreign policy interests could turn out to be opposite. Regardless of the measure of policy similarity ( $\tau_b$  or  $S$ ), a general expectation is that states are likely to have common security interests if they have similar partners for allies, foreign trade transactions, and so on (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Signorino and Ritter 1999). One can argue, however, that the logic might be somewhat reversed at the regional level. It is quite possible that conflicting, rather than common, security interests between two states can result if both achieve or aspire to have similar strong levels of alliance, trade, and other bonds with various states within the *same* region. As argued in this study, it is precisely the similarity of their foreign policy stakes in the same region, manifested through different forms of linkages with local states, that might trigger a severe clash between them over influence in the region.

*Other Related Terms.* The notion of regional salience, as advanced in this study, is further similar to what Goertz and Diehl (1992) call “relational importance” of the territory. It is different from its “intrinsic importance,” which reflects some permanent or semipermanent attribute of the territory, such as the physical size of the area, its natural resources, or its population. On the other hand, “the relational importance of a territory is made up of characteristics that have different degrees of significance for different states” (Goertz and Diehl 1992, 14). States may attach relational importance to the area on less tangible grounds (cultural, ethnic, historical ties), but they can also attach different degrees of importance to the area on a more tangible basis (economic and military ties, alliances, geographic proximity, etc.).

On the other hand, the “multiple hierarchy” model developed by Lemke (1996) is not entirely comparable to the idea of “regional

salience” as advanced here. In his model, Lemke examines the power standings of minor powers in their local “relevant neighborhoods,” testing if the power transition argument (see chap. 4) is generalizable from global to the regional domains. Therefore, the focus is mainly on the power distribution between local minor powers whereas “the question of great power interference [in local areas] has only been tangentially addressed and thus remains as an important area for continued research” (Kugler and Lemke 2000, 141). It is precisely this underexplored question of major power influence in various regional areas, either distant or close, that is the focus of my analysis.

### Regional Salience

Previous empirical research on deterrence looked exclusively at the Defender’s ties with a particular nation (Protégé) to measure the issues at stake in extended deterrence. However, the ties that the Defender and the Challenger have with an entire region where the third state is located might be a better choice to capture the idea of inherent credibility (or, alternatively, intrinsic interests). Namely, a particular state may be less significant for a major power, but it may be located in a region of greater national interest for that power. For this reason, regional stakes are viewed here in terms of a major power’s interests in an entire region rather than *vis-à-vis* a single state, which brings it closer to the idea of spheres of interest. Specifically, a major power’s stake in an entire region of conflict could be considered a main source of the inherent credibility of its extended threat. Regional stakes or, in other words, regional salience can, in turn, be interpreted as a reflection of the tightness of relations between a major power and most states in the region. These relations can take many forms, usually manifested through alliances, colonies of the past, or high volumes of mutual trade, arms transfers, and other military, diplomatic, and economic transactions.<sup>7</sup>

It is apparent that the notion of regional salience incorporates the idea of spheres of interest, and at best only indirectly those of shatterbelts and foreign policy portfolios similarity. As previously suggested, however, the causal linkage between spheres of interest and major power conflicts was never rigorously established. The purpose of this analysis is precisely to establish such a linkage and test it empirically. Furthermore, the regional salience variable refers to the less manipulable interests or stakes that forge a major power’s willingness to carry

out its threat. As such, it is close to the concept of inherent credibility advanced by the third-wave deterrence theorists (i.e., George and Smoke 1974; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Jervis 1979). In this sense, it also expands, both conceptually and theoretically, the notion of the “issues at stake,” empirically explored in quantitative research on deterrence (Huth 1988; Huth and Russett 1984). The general assumption is that the more salient the area is for a major power, the more likely it is to become involved in a crisis arising in the area. In the context of extended deterrence, it follows that the more salient the area is for a major power, the more likely it is that the power will be *willing* to defend a third party against another major power. The willingness of the state to carry out its threats when challenged, which is at the core of threat credibility issues, can thus be tied to the regional salience of a crisis for that state.

Moreover, the logic of the argument can be extended to claim that if an area is highly significant for more than one major power (i.e., an area of conflicting interests or a gray area), there would be a higher probability of a more serious conflict between major powers. Once again, this argument is not at odds with the intuitive claims advanced by a number of diplomatic historians and traditional scholars, who often refer to the spheres of influence *raison d'être* when interpreting the major powers' clashes over seemingly localized disputes. It is also consistent with the current literature that criticizes interventions based on reputational reasons and instead emphasizes the need for a grand strategy of “selective engagement” as a guiding principle for post-Cold War policy (for further details, see chap. 8). Note that regional stakes can also help us identify an *observable* aspect of inherent resolve in extended deterrence.

### **The Impact of Regional Salience on Deterrence**

To examine the validity of the argument that ties the geopolitical notion of regional salience to the credibility of extended threats, empirical measures need first to be developed. As the past research was limited in this respect, this chapter will introduce a number of new measures. The operationalization of regional salience (i.e., a major power's stakes in world regions) requires two operational specifications: the regions need to be delineated, and a measure of regional stakes must be developed.

## Geopolitical Regions

There are many difficulties in delineating regional boundaries if regions are understood in a geopolitical sense and not simply in geographic terms. Any attempt at such delineation needs to be consistent with the differentiation of the regions by both geographers and historians. The operational issues are related to their size, composition, variation over time, etc. If they are defined as geopolitical regions, then some of them inevitably change over time by merging with or separating from other geopolitical regions. This is especially true for the long time-span under observation.

The notions of Near East and Middle East are cases in point for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While the Maghreb states have been incorporated into a large cluster of the Middle East since World War II, the geopolitical dynamic of their international position was distinct from the Arabian Peninsula for the previous periods, largely because of the vested French, Italian, and Spanish presence there. In a similar way, some states in Southwest Asia (e.g., Iran or Iraq) were less related to, say, Egypt or Sudan as Middle Eastern states in the period before World War II. Rather, their geopolitical dynamics reflected their middle position between the Ottoman Empire and India. Hence, British and Russian interests occasionally clashed in this area, while the Arabian Peninsula was more in dispute between the British and the Ottomans. This is precisely the reason why many historical surveys distinguish between the Near East (Southwest Asia) and the Middle East (Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and Sudan). This distinction is less viable for the post-World War II period, as some Southwest Asian states began to resemble other Middle Eastern countries in their geopolitical position, outlook, and politics, thus merging with them in a larger regional cluster.

Even if a region itself does not change, some states are proximate to at least two subcontinental areas and may be subsumed within different regions in different time periods, which often depends on their political positioning. The case of Austria is illustrative. Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Austria covered large areas of Central and Eastern Europe; after its collapse in 1919, Austrian politics shifted westward, while Hungary remained, both geographically and politically, a part of Eastern Europe. Greece was also a traditional actor in the Balkan and East European politics, but after World War II it moved toward the Western European geopolitical cluster with its

strong military, political, and economic ties to West Europe, despite its marginal geographic distance.

Nevertheless, most other geopolitical regions remained constant throughout the twentieth century in terms of both size and composition. Table 5.1 classifies countries into distinct geopolitical groupings using their contemporary names.<sup>8</sup> It indicates 16 regions for the 1895–1914 period, 15 regions for 1920–39, and 14 for 1945–85. The difference in number results from the shifting nature of the area that is currently encompassed by the notion of Middle East. The size of the regions also matters. If they are identified with the size of entire continents, there is the danger of missing subcontinental aspects of major power rivalries. Asia, for instance, has always been an area of vested interests for many powers. However, their interest was not uniform throughout the Asian continent: as an illustration, the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry was often acute in South or East Asia, but almost completely absent in Southeast Asia. The distinction between Eastern and Western Europe is, after all, essential for testing the argument of those who believe that the spheres-of-interests view was a *modus operandi* of both superpowers during the Cold War despite their official policies of globalist commitments. Most studies of shatterbelts also delineate them as subcontinental areas (Cohen 1973, 1991; Kelly 1986).<sup>9</sup>

### Measuring Regional Saliency

The saliency of geopolitical regions remains to be operationalized for each major power to capture the notion of inherent credibility (i.e., intrinsic interests) in deterrence situations. It should be measured by looking into the tightness of political, military, and economic linkages between a major power and a region.<sup>10</sup> The measure is very similar to Huth and Russett's (1984) operationalization of individual ties between the Defender and its Protégé in extended-immediate deterrence. The ties may be forged through colonial possessions, alliances, diplomatic exchange, arms sales, foreign trade, investments, and so on.<sup>11</sup> Some principal modes of linkages among states change and ultimately erode over time, while others emerge and strengthen in importance. During the last hundred years, for instance, colonial ties reached both their peak and rapid collapse. Similarly, through the middle of this century, diplomatic exchanges of permanent missions stood as a symbol of the reputational status granted to different states, but their post-World War II explosion in numbers eroded their previous

**TABLE 5.1. Geopolitical Regions: Classification and Composition**

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**West Africa:** Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo

**Central Africa:** Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire

**East Africa:** Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania

**Southern Africa:** Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Uganda

**South Asia:** Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, (Tibet), USSR: Kazakhstan, USSR: Kirghizia, USSR: Tadzhikistan

**Southeast Asia:** Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam<sup>a</sup>

**East Asia:** China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, (Manchuria), Mongolia, Taiwan

**Oceania:** American Samoa, Australia, Fiji, Guam, Marianne, Caroline, and Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Western Samoa

**North Asia:** USSR: Northern Republics of Russia

**North America:** Canada, U.S.

**Central America and the Caribbean:** Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British West Indies, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad-Tobago, Virgin Islands

**South America:** Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela

**Western Europe:** Austria<sup>b</sup>, Belgium, Denmark, France, (West) Germany<sup>c</sup>, Greece (after 1945), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

**Eastern Europe:** Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, (Estonia), Finland, Greece (1895–1939), Hungary, (Latvia), (Lithuania), Poland, Rumania, USSR: Byelorussia, USSR: Moldova, USSR: Russia, USSR: Ukraine, Yugoslavia

**Maghreb (1895–1939):** Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia

**Middle East (since 1945):** Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, USSR: Armenia, USSR: Azerbaijan, USSR: Georgia, USSR: Uzbekistan, USSR: Turkmenistan, North Yemen, (south) Yemen

**Middle East (1895–1939):**<sup>d</sup> Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

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<sup>a</sup>As North Vietnam and South Vietnam during the period 1954–75.

<sup>b</sup>As Austria-Hungary during 1895–1914, it was classified in Eastern Europe.

<sup>c</sup>West Berlin is included.

<sup>d</sup>The Maghreb states are included in the Middle Eastern region since 1945.

significance. On the other hand, ties established through less formal channels (such as arms sales, foreign trade, and investment) have become more salient since the middle of this century, if not earlier. Typically, the forging of alliances was and continues to be a principal means for major powers to secure a foothold in various corners of the world.

Hence, any measure of the stakes that major powers have in world regions needs to be adapted to the variable nature of the linkages they form with other states. For these reasons, one needs to use partially different indicators of regional salience for a long period such as that extending from 1895 to 1985. Moreover, as no single type of linkage predominates, this measure must be composite. While alliances are included throughout the entire time span (1895–1985), colonial possessions and diplomatic exchanges are added to the alliance bonds only for the period from 1895 to 1939. They are replaced by the level of foreign trade for the period from 1945 to 1985. Foreign trade is also included for the 1920–41 period. In short, the measure of regional salience is composed of alliances, colonial possessions, and diplomatic exchange for the period 1895–1939. Then foreign trade is added for the interwar period (1920–41), whereas the regional salience variable for the period 1945–85 is composed of alliances and foreign trade. Since the composite score of regional salience is an additive index, it is constructed as a sum of the components and then averaged out by dividing the sum by the number of included components.

As for the individual components specifically, *alliance bonds* were measured in terms of the regional distribution of alliances in a major power's alliance portfolio. The data on the number and types of alliances between major powers and other states were collected from the original data set by Small and Singer (1969), updated by Oren (1990). The measurement proceeded in several stages. First, if there was an alliance between the major power and other states, the variable was coded one; all other dyadic relations between that major power and other states without alliance ties were coded zero. Then, the number of alliances between the major power and every state in the region were added into the regional sum (e.g., call this figure  $X_i$  for a region  $i$ ,  $X_o$  for a region  $o$ , etc., to calculate the alliance portfolio of a major power  $X$ ). Finally, the obtained regional sums were calculated as a percentage share of all the alliances concluded between that major power and all other states in the world. The sum of the percentage shares of all regions in a major power's alliance portfolio should then yield 100 percent (i.e.,  $X_i + X_o + \dots = 100$  percent). *Diplomatic exchanges* were

measured in a similar way. The number of diplomatic missions received by a major power from all independent states in a particular region was first computed into the regional sum, which was then converted into the percentage share of all diplomatic missions received by that major power. The data on the number and ranks of permanent diplomatic missions are provided by the University of Michigan data set of the Correlates of War (COW) project conducted by Singer and Small. As was done for alliances, the diplomatic mission variable was first coded as a binary variable, with the value of one if there was a diplomatic exchange between a major power and another state; otherwise, it was coded zero.

Since there is no comprehensive data set available for colonial possessions and foreign trade, an original data set had to be created. Detailed information on the sources consulted for creating the new data set for major powers' colonies and their individual trade with all independent states is presented in appendix C. The appendix also presents the tables of regional distributions of colonies and foreign trade for all major powers for sample years, as this information is not available elsewhere.

For *colonial possessions*, the square miles of colonial territory controlled by a major power were accrued for each region, then converted into a percentage share of the total colonial holdings of that major power. *The New Encyclopædia Britannica* (1998) and Townsend (1941) were the primary sources of information for the square mileage of colonial areas, supplemented by a number of additional sources as described in appendix C. The regional score of a major power's *foreign trade* was constructed in the same way as the other three components of the regional salience variable. That is, the amount of trade between a major power and a particular region was expressed in terms of its percentage of the total trade between that major power and the rest of the world. The calculation of regional shares of a major power's foreign trade and diplomatic exchange followed an additive logic similar to that used for alliances and diplomatic exchanges. The main sources for the amount of foreign trade between major powers and each independent state were the annual statistical reports on world trade issued by the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund. More details are provided in appendix C.

Since the composite score for regional salience is an additive index, it is constructed as a sum of the components, then averaged out by dividing the sum by the number of included components. For example, the salience of a region  $i$  for a major power  $X$  during the 1945–85

period consists of the region  $i$ 's percentage share in power  $X$ 's alliances with the world (let us label this figure as  $X_i^{\text{alliance}}$ ) and its percentage share in  $X$ 's foreign trade with the world ( $X_i^{\text{trade}}$ ). The composite score for  $i$ 's regional salience for a state  $X$  during the 1945–85 period is then calculated as the sum of the components divided by their number:

$$X_i^{\text{salience}} = (X_i^{\text{alliance}} + X_i^{\text{trade}}) / 2$$

Note that this is only an illustration for calculating the regional salience for the post–World War II period. As discussed, other components, such as diplomatic exchanges and colonies, were added for the earlier periods, when their impact on world politics was more prominent. To summarize, the composite score of regional salience is a multidimensional observable category consisting of military, diplomatic, and economic ties between major powers and world regions. It, therefore, provides valid grounds for assessing the presence and intensity of stakes that major powers have in different parts of the world.

#### Regional Stakes in Extended Deterrence: An Empirical Test

There are two separate questions that need to be addressed when assessing the impact of regional stakes on the dynamics of extended deterrence between major powers. General deterrence failures do not necessarily mark the beginning of immediate deterrence (see fig. 3.1 and chap. 3). In fact, only 31.37 percent of all cases of general deterrence failures escalated into crises of immediate deterrence—either extended or direct ones. The issue of whether any power would be willing to protect a third party against another power, therefore, addresses the question of what causes extended-immediate deterrence (EID) to occur in the first place. Huth's (1994) examination of this question is a rare exception and provides the starting point for future research. The results of his analysis indicated that a Defender was likely to attempt extended deterrence if the Protégé was an ally, geographically proximate, and, surprisingly, dissimilar from the Defender in its domestic regime type. Neither the amount of foreign trade between the Defender and the Protégé nor the Protégé's strategic natural resources had any significant effect on the probability of attempted deterrence. Apart from Huth's study (1994), empirical research rarely addressed this issue at all, concentrating instead on explaining the outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence. The logic of the inherent credibility of

threats, as suggested in the introductory chapter, may have the potential to illuminate some answers to both issues—at least in part.

To summarize the argument briefly, the question of the inherent credibility of extended deterrent threats has been undeservedly overlooked in the deterrence literature. The neglect of this issue is remarkable since it should be prior to all other concerns such as what types of actions can create a more believable threat to an adversary. If the stakes are low, there might not be a deterrent threat in the first place, because states “select themselves” into conflicts based on the intensity of their vital interests involved. Vital interests, in turn, are directly related to the strength of the ties between a major power and the region of conflict, which the conventional wisdom of traditional scholarship has customarily labeled as the “spheres of interest” issue. The measure of regional salience, developed in the previous section, is one of the first attempts to quantify this old notion. It remains to be seen whether states do indeed select themselves into foreign crises (i.e., extended-immediate deterrence encounters) based on how much their stakes or interests are involved in a region of an ongoing conflict between another power and a third state (i.e., general deterrence failure between major powers).

To test this argument, the cases of general deterrence failures that never escalated into extended-immediate deterrence against another power should be compared to those cases where this escalation indeed occurred. While the identity of the Defender is certain for the latter situation, it can be a methodological challenge to identify a potential Defender for the former situation, since it does not involve an actual Defender. Nevertheless, the issue is not problematic here as this study is only concerned with major powers as Defenders or Challengers. All major powers provide the universe of potential Defenders in situations of general deterrence failure, whether these cases escalate into immediate deterrence or not. Consequently, the regional stakes of all other major powers were compared to those of the actual Challenger in all cases of general deterrence failure, that is, when the Challenger was involved in a conflict against a smaller nation. Each case was disaggregated into the same number of dyadic cases as there were major powers in the international system, minus the Challenger. This is not the most optimal solution as it creates a large number of “zeros” (i.e., non-events), but it is nevertheless used here as one of the optional methods for testing purposes.

There are three other methods that were also used for selecting, as randomly as possible, a potential Defender. One is straightforward,

consisting of a simple random selection of one power from the pool of all major powers except for the Challenger.<sup>12</sup> Another option is to calculate the average value of stakes that all other powers have in a region of general deterrence failure. To mitigate the problem of skewness if there is a power with vastly preponderant stakes (i.e., to control for the variance), one standard deviation (SD) needs to be added to the mean value of regional salience for all other major powers as potential Defenders. Finally, there is one measure that makes it more difficult to confirm the argument that only the states with high regional stakes are more likely to “select themselves” into immediate deterrence. Major powers with the highest stakes, but who did not act as the Defender (the Challenger naturally again being exempted), can be compared to the actual Defenders in the EID cases. Note that this criterion for selecting a potential Defender for the cases of general deterrence failures that did not escalate into immediate deterrence is biased *against* the argument developed in this book. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present the test results concerning the potential of regional salience for explaining the onset of extended-immediate deterrence using the entire range of measures.

The descriptive comparisons in table 5.2 reveal that a random selection of a potential Defender is a solid methodological choice since the mean value of a randomly selected Defender is almost equal to the mean value of all potential Defenders. That is, it is analogous to a lottery rather than being a biased selection. Even when a standard deviation is added to the mean value of all potential Defenders, the values of regional salience are still lower for a potential Defender than for the Challenger in general deterrence failures that did not escalate into immediate deterrence. These values are also lower than the average value of regional interests of actual Defenders when extended-immediate deterrence did occur. In short, this brief descriptive survey indicates that general deterrence failures that do not escalate into a major power crisis over the third party are situations in which the Challenger has stronger regional interests than most other powers. Only when there is another power with strong interests in the region of conflict will this power likely become a Defender.

Table 5.3 subjects this conclusion to a more rigorous test. The dependent variable is dichotomous, with a value of zero indicating the absence of EID in a major power dyad and a value of one marking the onset of EID in the dyad. Binomial logit was accordingly used for estimation. Each binomial logit analysis uses alternative measures for selecting a potential Defender when there was no actual Defender (i.e., the cases when there was no EID), whereas the actual Defender is

always included for all cases of general deterrence failures that escalated into EID crises. The results are statistically significant and strong across all alternative measures, indicating a positive correlation between the Defender's interests and the probability of extended-immediate deterrence. These findings thus provide strong support for the argument on "self-selection" into immediate deterrence based on regional stakes. Note that the same results are found in the test using a measure that is biased *against* this argument. That is, it selects a major power with the strongest regional interests, apart from the Challenger, for a potential Defender in those cases that did not escalate into immediate deterrence, whereas the cases with escalation into EID include only actual Defenders. These consistently strong findings across different measures provide a robust validation for the importance of regional salience in predicting the onset of extended-immediate deterrence.

**TABLE 5.2. Descriptive Statistics for Regional Salience in General Deterrence Failures**

Explanatory Variables	Mean Value	Standard Deviation	<i>N</i>
<b>No Immediate Deterrence</b>			
Challenger's Regional Interests	14.665	12.716	112
Regional Interests of a Potential Defender:			
A Randomly Selected Major Power	6.484	9.300	112
Regional Interests of All Potential Defenders: Mean Value	6.865	6.861	112
Regional Interests of All Potential Defenders: Adjusted Mean Value (mean + SD)	12.548	12.304	112
Regional Interests of a Potential Defender: A Major Power with the Highest Regional Stakes	15.424	15.320	112
<b>Immediate Deterrence Cases</b>			
Challenger's Regional Interests	16.578	15.613	70
Actual Defender's Regional Interests	15.558	13.230	70
Regional Interests of All Potential Defenders: Mean Value	11.522	8.342	70
Regional Interests of All Potential Defenders: Adjusted Mean Value (mean + SD)	21.689	14.103	70

*Note:* As already explained in chapter 3, the number of test cases (*N*) refers to deterrence dyads. The number of cases for general deterrence failures that did not escalate into immediate deterrence is 105, but some cases involved more than one Challenger, which results in a higher number of cases and subcases (*N* = 112). The immediate deterrence cases could involve more than one Challenger, Defender, or Protégé, which results in *N* of 70.

**TABLE 5.3. The Impact of Regional Interests on the Onset of Extended-Immediate Deterrence (EID), Binomial Logit Coefficients**

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
Constant	-1.167***	.270
Challenger's Regional Interests	-.002	.012
Defender's Regional Interests:		
A Random/Actual Defender	.072***	.016
Model Chi-Square (df) = 26.184*** (2)		
Log Likelihood Function = -108.171		
N (dyads) = 182		
Constant	-1.152***	.278
Challenger's Regional Interests	-.002	.012
Defender's Regional Interests:		
A Mean Value of All Potential Defenders	.080***	.022
Model Chi-Square (df) = 15.523*** (2)		
Log Likelihood Function = -113.501		
N = 182		
Constant	-1.275***	.289
Challenger's Regional Interests	-.005	.012
Defender's Regional Interests:		
An Adjusted Mean of All Potential Defenders	.053***	.013
Model Chi-Square (df) = 19.558*** (2)		
Log Likelihood Function = -111.484		
N = 182		
Constant	-1.272***	.290
Challenger's Regional Interests	-.007	.012
Defender's Regional Interests:		
A Major Power with the Strongest Interests	.044***	.011
Model Chi-Square (df) = 19.689*** (2)		
Log Likelihood Function = -111.418		
N = 182		
Dyads		
Constant	-2.793***	.210
Challenger's Regional Interests	-.012	.010
Defender's Regional Interests:		
A Random/Actual Defender	.049***	.009
Model Chi-Square (df) = 27.426*** (2)		
Log Likelihood Function = -231.777		
N (dyads) = 894		

\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$  (one-tailed  $t$ -tests).

The coefficients for the Challenger's interests, however, are statistically insignificant, though their sign is negative, suggesting that other major powers are less likely to interfere in conflicts between a major power (Challenger) and a third state located in the region of the Challenger's vital interests. Nevertheless, this finding is not statistically significant, leading to the conclusion that the Challenger's regional stakes are not as relevant as the Defender's in accounting for the onset of extended-immediate deterrence. Simply put, whether there is another major power that is willing to act as the Defender of a third party depends on the strength of its stakes in the region of conflict. The probability of extended-immediate deterrence occurring is much less likely to depend on the Challenger's stakes.

The results regarding the relevance of the Challenger's or Defender's stakes for the outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence are presented in table 5.4. Since there are four types of outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence, a multinomial logit analysis is used.<sup>13</sup> The coefficients for both the Defender's and Challenger's regional interests are now statistically significant, though not for the same pairs of deterrence outcomes. Also note that the results are more significant than those obtained for the predictive power of relative capabilities as an explanatory variable (chap. 4). A careful inspection reveals that the results strongly indicate that a Challenger with strong interests in the region of conflict is more likely to fight or even agree to compromise rather than yield to the Defender's demands. Moreover, the higher the Challenger's stakes, the stronger the Challenger's preference for war over compromise. The Defender's willingness to acquiesce is also partly a function of the regional salience of the crisis for the Challenger. Similar patterns emerge for the Defender's regional interests as well. Most importantly, the positive and statistically significant parameter estimates for the Defender's stakes regarding the choice between war or compromise (note that compromise is the base category here) also indicate that the Defender with strong regional interests is more likely to fight than compromise—exactly the same finding as that for the Challenger.

These results further confirm the strong explanatory power of regional stakes in accounting for the onset and outcome of extended-immediate deterrence. In the context of the selection bias issue, tables 5.3 and 5.4 strongly indicate that regional ties are positively related to both general and immediate deterrence success despite the potential selection bias.<sup>14</sup> That is, the model does not include the Challenger's *ex ante* resolve, but the coefficients for immediate deterrence are still not

reversed from those obtained in general deterrence models. Despite some expected attenuation in the estimated coefficients due to selection bias, the findings suggest that favorable regional interests have strong deterring effects in *both* general and immediate deterrence.

A more refined insight into the impact of regional interests is provided by table 5.5, which reports predicted probabilities and their marginal change for different values of regional stakes on both sides. Table 5.5 reveals that, for war to occur, the regional interests of both sides must not only be equal, but must also be strong. If the stakes are low for both major powers (e.g., set at their minimum in the example), they are unlikely to fight. Fighting is also unlikely if only one side has high stakes. The probability of war increases substantially only if both sides have equal and strong stakes in the Protégé's region. This pattern clearly confirms one of the key arguments in this book, that it is the geopolitics of commitments that often explain why certain deterrence failures lead to war.

Overall, the results confirm the validity of the argument that a state's decision to join a crisis, in the role of Defender, is largely a function of its intrinsic interests. There is convincing evidence as well that these interests are manifested through the Defender's ties with its Protégé's entire region. The variable of regional interests is also a valid predictor of deterrence outcomes, and these findings are consistent with the logic of deterrence theory emphasizing the role of inherent credibility. In addition, it is an observable category, and if these inter-

**TABLE 5.4. The Impact of Regional Interests on Deterrence Outcomes, Multinomial Logit Coefficients**

Variable	Compromise	AcqCh	War	Compromise	War	War
	vs. AcqDef	vs. AcqDef	vs. AcqDef	vs. AcqCh	vs. AcqCh	vs. Compromise
Challenger's Regional Interests	-.102*** (.039)	-.057*** (.024)	.026 (.029)	-.045* (.036)	.083*** (.029)	.128*** (.043)
Defender's Regional Interests	-.025 (.034)	-.032 (.028)	.046* (.033)	.007 (.028)	.075** (.031)	.071** (.037)
Constant	1.882** (.871)	2.610*** (.769)	-1.819* (1.265)	-.728* (.560)	-4.429*** (1.181)	-3.701*** (1.255)
Model Chi-Square (df) = 28.010*** (6)						
Log Likelihood Function = -72.938						
N = 70						

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$  (one-tailed  $t$ -tests).

**TABLE 5.5. Predicted Probabilities of Deterrence Outcomes**

Regional Interests		AcqDef		AcqCh		Compromise		War	
Challenger	Defender	<i>p</i>	$\Delta$	<i>p</i>	$\Delta$	<i>p</i>	$\Delta$	<i>p</i>	$\Delta$
<b>Symmetric Low Stakes</b>									
minimum	minimum	4.72		63.69		30.82		0.78	
<b>Symmetric High Stakes</b>									
maximum	maximum	9.60	+4.9	0.92	-62.8	0.05	-30.8	88.43	+88.7
			+34.0		+24.7		+1.0		-59.7
<b>Asymmetric Stakes</b>									
maximum	minimum	43.58		25.62		1.03		29.77	
minimum	maximum	14.31	-29.3	31.37	+5.7	22.28	+21.2	32.05	+2.3

*Note:* The calculation of predicted probabilities and marginal change is described in appendix D and chapter 4 (table 4.4).

ests are indicative of the inherent credibility of threats in extended deterrence, as argued in this analysis, then the findings confirm the importance of inherent resolve, as identified with regional stakes, for predicting both the onset and outcomes of EID crises.

The next chapter turns to the problem of potential domestic influences on foreign policy credibility as a factor alternative to, but not necessarily incompatible with, a state's regional stakes as a source of its external resolve.