

Political Ideology and Other Drivers of State Budget Priorities

State government budgets consist of four major spending categories: education; public welfare, health, and hospitals; highways; and police protection and corrections.¹ Combined, these four broad categories account for more than 70 percent of all state government spending. At the end of the twentieth century, for every budgetary dollar spent in the typical (median) state, 33¢ went for education; 27¢ went for public welfare, health, and hospitals; 8¢ went for highways; and 4¢ went for police protection and corrections. Naturally, these expenditure allocations mirror the key responsibilities and functions of American state governments. For emphasis, figure 9.1 illustrates the budgetary pie sliced into these four components for the typical state government in 1998.

In the final three decades of the twentieth century the relative importance of these four components shifted, and for two components the budget reallocation was striking. Figure 9.2 illustrates the budget slices in the typical state in 1969. Most noteworthy, over this 30-year period the share of the budget allocated to highway programs dropped 11 percentage points. The drop in highway spending was almost exactly offset by a 10 percentage point rise in spending for public welfare, health, and hospitals. In 30 years, state highway expenditures dropped from the second largest budget item (19 percent in 1969) to a distant third, amounting to just 8 percent of the typical state budget in 1998. At the same time, spending for public welfare, health, and hospitals rose from third place (17 percent in 1969) to a strong second place, amounting to 27 percent of the typical state budget in 1998. The reallocation from highways to public welfare and health-related programs represents by far the most conspicuous transformation in state budgetary priorities in the late twentieth century.

Education spending remained the largest budget component throughout this three-decade period, but its share of the budget dropped 4 percentage points in the typical state, from 37 percent to




Fig. 9.1. Major components of state budgets in 1998 (values for the median state)




Fig. 9.2. Major components of state budgets in 1969 (values for the median state)

33 percent. Police protection and corrections spending increased 2 percentage points, from 2 percent to 4 percent. The “other” category increased 3 percentage points, to 28 percent from 25 percent.

This broad blueprint of the relative importance the major spending programs in the typical (median) state fails to capture the rich diversity among the states in budget priorities. For example, Utah devotes 43 percent of its state budget to funding education; in Massachusetts and New Hampshire only 20 percent of the state budget goes to education. New York devotes 39 percent of its budget to public welfare, health and hospitals; Alaska devotes 16 percent.

In addition, states differ widely in how their budget priorities changed over the 30 years examined. In Florida education spending as a share of the state budget fell 20 percentage points; in Idaho education spending rose by 5 percentage points. It is interesting to note that highway funding as a share of the budget fell in all 50 states between 1969 and 1998, with the greatest decline in Wyoming (20 percentage points) and the smallest decline in Massachusetts (2 percentage points).

Basic Trends in State Budget Priorities

Chapter 7 documented the changes that occurred over 30 years in aggregate state spending, and Chapter 8 identified the main elements that account for spending differences over time and across states. In per capita terms, total spending in the median state grew from \$1,696 per capita in 1969 to \$3,593 in 1998 (in constant 2000 dollars). This growth amounts to an average annual growth rate of 2.6 percent. By comparison, between 1969 and 1998 personal income per capita in the median state grew at an average annual rate of 1.7 percent. Figure 9.3 shows the comparable growth rates for the four main budget components between 1969 and 1998.

Real per capita spending for police protection and corrections grew at an annual rate of 5.2 percent, exactly twice the growth rate in aggregate state spending. Public welfare, health, and hospitals spending grew at an average annual clip of 4.2 percent, again well above the growth rate in aggregate state spending. Education spending per capita grew at a 2 percent annual rate, slower than the aggregate budget growth yet still faster than the 1.7 percent growth in state personal income. Perhaps the most surprising result pertains to state highway spending; it declined at an average annual rate of 0.4 percent. In 1998, highway spending in the median state equaled \$276 per capita, down from \$310 per capita in 1969 (both denominated in 2000 dollars).




Fig. 9.3. Comparative growth in major budget components, 1969-98 (values reflect the annual growth rate in real per capita spending)

Convergence in State Budget Components

The aggregate level of state spending exhibited little convergence after the mid-1970s, as chapter 7 explored in considerable detail. For example, the dispersion across states in aggregate spending as a share of income in 1998 equaled its value in 1977 (see fig. 7.8). Likewise, figure 7.7 shows that much of the convergence in spending per capita occurred in the early 1970s and that the dispersion in aggregate per capita spending remained almost flat for 20 years, from 1975 until 1994.

Here we investigate convergence in the four major budget components. A convergence pattern would suggest an underlying process in which states with below-average spending tend to catch up with neighboring states. For example, below-average education spending might become the subject of heated political discussion, with candidates for state offices pledging to increase funding to the “national average.” This process is sometimes labeled “benchmarking,” as candidates and voters use information about funding levels in other states to gauge their own state’s performance (see Besley and Case 1995a).

The basic method used in chapter 7 to measure convergence is re-employed here. Convergence is again measured by the coefficient of variation in spending for a specific component across the states in a given year.² These yearly values for each budget category are computed for the period 1969 through 1998. Spending for each budget component is denominated and displayed in three ways. Figure 9.4 plots the coefficient of variation using the natural log of spending per capita. Figure 9.5 plots the pattern using spending as a share of state income, and figure 9.6 uses spending as a share of the total state budget.

In figure 9.4 (which uses per capita spending) the police protection and corrections component shows a clear convergence trend, with the coefficient of variation dropping 42 percent over the three decades. Likewise, public welfare, health, and hospitals spending and education spending exhibit convergence, although the trend is much less pronounced than for police protection and corrections. The pattern for highway spending is less clear, and in fact the coefficient of variation in 1998 is 15 percent higher than it was in 1969.

The broad patterns in figure 9.5 (based on spending as a share of state income) are quite similar to those in figure 9.4. The police protection and corrections component exhibits the sharpest convergence; public welfare, health, and hospitals spending and education




Fig. 9.4. Convergence/divergence among states in budget priorities (spending per capita)




Fig. 9.5. Convergence/divergence among states in budget priorities (spending as a share of income)




Fig. 9.6. Convergence/divergence among states in budget priorities (spending as a share of total state budget)

spending exhibit modest convergence, and highway spending shows no secular tendency either way. The patterns in figure 9.6 (based on spending as a share of the total budget) differ somewhat from the two prior measures. The education component and the highway component show no signs of convergence, whereas the sharpest convergence trend appears for the public welfare, health, and hospitals component. Police protection and corrections spending as a share of the budget shows no convergence since the mid-1970s, the same pattern we observed for aggregate state spending.

With the possible exception of spending for welfare, health, and hospitals, the disparity among states in specific types of spending does not seem to be driven by a simple convergence process. This coincides with the central interpretation of the data for overall state spending. We next investigate a host of factors that potentially determine the composition of state budgets.

What Determines State Budget Priorities?

The investigation of spending for specific budget components follows the empirical procedure laid out in chapter 8. The first step estimates for each of the four spending categories a core regression model that controls for standard economic and demographic features in a state in a given year. The second step computes the metric for spending volatility for each budget category and reestimates the model by adding the volatility measure and the fiscal institutional variables. The key extension here is to bring political ideology explicitly into the analysis.

The introduction of political ideology variables seeks to capture the influence of “tastes,” or policy preferences, that stand apart from the influence of specific economic interests. For example, high unemployment rates, low per capita incomes, and a large elderly population should proxy the extent of potential beneficiaries from public health and welfare programs. These direct beneficiaries might reasonably favor such programs on self-interest grounds. However, other voters and policymakers might support health and welfare programs purely on ideological grounds. The importance of ideological support for particular programs would not necessarily be picked up in the economic and demographic control variables.

To examine the influence of ideologically determined policy preferences the models include two measures of political ideology, one for state citizens and one for state political leaders.³ These two ideology

indices are constructed to reflect political orientation along a liberal-conservative continuum, with 0 indicating the most conservative position and 100 the most liberal position.

Table 9.1 reports the two indices for the most recently available years. Based on the Citizen Ideology index, the ten most liberal states are Massachusetts, Hawaii, Maine, New York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, West Virginia, and Illinois. The ten most conservative states are Oklahoma, Idaho, Nebraska, Mississippi, Arizona, Utah, Montana, Alabama, Wyoming, and Louisiana. The indices further indicate that the political ideology within some states changed substantially between 1970 and 1997. Based on the percentage change in the Citizen Ideology index, the largest shifts toward liberalism occurred in South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, North Carolina, and Alabama. The largest shifts toward conservatism occurred in Idaho, Oklahoma, Alaska, Montana, and Utah. Between 1970 and 1997, 25 states became more conservative, 24 states became more liberal, and California remained unchanged. The analysis explores the responsiveness of budgetary priorities to these indicators of political ideology.

Factors that Influence State Budget Allocations

Table 9.2 presents the results for the core model containing the economic and demographic variables for each budget component.⁴ The core models for education; public welfare, health, and hospitals; and highways are estimated with a high degree of precision, while the “within-state” *R*-squared of 0.37 for the highways model is more modest. The two economic factors in the models, per capita income and the unemployment rate, exert prominent effects on each budget component except education spending. In that model neither income nor unemployment is statistically significant. An increase in the unemployment rate tends to increase spending on public welfare and police protection and to detract from spending on highways. Spending in all three of these categories is boosted by increases in state income.

Consistent with the findings for total spending described in chapter 8, we find evidence of economies of scale in per capita spending on education, public welfare, and highways. That is, per capita spending falls as state population increases. In contrast, per capita spending for police protection and corrections rises with population, evidence of diseconomies of scale. We find a mixed bag of results with respect to the percentage of the population in urban areas; in urban areas per capita

TABLE 9.1. Political Ideology Ratings

	Citizen Index, 1997	Citizen % Change	Government Index, 1996	Government % Change
Alabama	36	12	31	35
Alaska	28	-61	41	-36
Arizona	25	-38	2	-88
Arkansas	45	89	69	206
California	54	0	30	-3
Colorado	46	20	56	343
Connecticut	68	15	43	-42
Delaware	43	-9	64	163
Florida	44	78	62	187
Georgia	42	250	77	386
Hawaii	74	-10	94	1
Idaho	14	-73	2	-90
Illinois	60	23	17	-30
Indiana	40	-15	44	446
Iowa	41	-22	24	19
Kansas	44	24	10	-73
Kentucky	34	-11	69	82
Louisiana	30	52	39	61
Maine	72	17	63	-17
Maryland	62	10	90	77
Massachusetts	83	14	70	-2
Michigan	57	-5	16	-70
Minnesota	56	-3	43	11
Mississippi	24	109	26	117
Missouri	44	1	69	6
Montana	27	-45	3	-96
Nebraska	21	-25	74	1200
Nevada	33	13	51	168
New Hampshire	40	-9	1	-94
New Jersey	67	1	34	-14
New Mexico	43	1	52	23
New York	69	1	44	-10
North Carolina	42	154	60	128
North Dakota	48	-1	7	-86
Ohio	48	-6	15	-38
Oklahoma	8	-73	11	-61
Oregon	54	3	59	9
Pennsylvania	58	-2	25	-43
Rhode Island	69	-13	62	-30
South Carolina	41	272	25	44
South Dakota	42	-15	7	9
Tennessee	35	25	24	-38
Texas	40	48	31	-20
Utah	27	-44	5	-65
Vermont	59	-2	84	75
Virginia	42	248	26	111
Washington	51	-12	61	83
West Virginia	60	14	81	61
Wisconsin	52	-9	28	17
Wyoming	30	-21	7	74

Note: Data from William D. Berry et al. 1998. A value of 0 indicates the most conservative position and 100 the most liberal position. The Citizen % Change for the Citizen index is for 1970 to 1997, and the Government % Change for the Government index is for 1970 to 1996.

spending rises for education and highways and falls for public welfare and police protection and corrections. As the percentage of the population between 18 and 64 rises we observe a rise in education spending and a decline in spending for highways and police protection and corrections. In the public welfare equation the coefficient controlling for population age is positive but statistically insignificant.

Importance of Expenditure Volatility and Fiscal Institutions on the Major Budget Components

Table 9.3 shows the findings for expenditure volatility and fiscal institutions for the four budget components.⁵ The Expenditure Volatility variable exhibits a positive and significant correlation with education and public welfare spending (the two largest budget components) but not with highway or police protection and correction spending. Com-

TABLE 9.2. Major Budget Components: Regression Results for Core Models with Demographic and Economic Factors

Independent Variables	Real per Capita Spending on ^a			
	Education	Public Welfare, Health, & Hospitals	Highways	Police Protection & Corrections
Income per Capita ^a	-0.003 (-1.35)	0.019 (7.90)**	0.014 (10.12)**	0.006 (14.40)**
Unemployment Rate	-3.84 (-1.95)	6.90 (3.37)**	-2.28 (-1.98)*	0.95 (2.48)*
ln (Population)	-139 (-4.96)**	-260 (-8.90)**	-81 (-4.95)**	17 (3.04)**
Urban Population (% of population)	5.08 (3.07)**	-6.02 (-3.50)**	2.36 (2.44)**	-1.94 (-6.01)**
Population Age 18 to 64 (% of population)	7.44 (2.24)*	5.88 (1.71)	-8.06 (-4.16)**	-2.91 (-4.84)**
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummy variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared, within states	0.74	0.87	0.37	0.81
R-squared, between states	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.20
R-squared, overall	0.24	0.06	0.05	0.15
F-statistic	111**	268**	23**	168**
Total panel observations ^b	1,363	1,363	1,363	1,363

Note: Parameters are estimated using cross-sectional time-series FGLS regressions. z-statistics are shown in parentheses.

^aDenominated in real (2000) dollars.

^bSample includes 47 states for the years 1970–98. Alaska, Hawaii, and Wyoming are omitted.

* Indicates significance at the 5 percent level for a two-tailed test. ** Indicates significance at the 1 percent level for a two-tailed test.

puting the respective elasticities allows us to compare the magnitudes of these volatility effects. Table 9.4 reports these elasticities for the budget components, as well as for the elasticity of total spending with respect to volatility, which equals 0.35 (as computed in chapter 8). As shown in table 9.4, a 1 percent increase in volatility amounts to a 0.4 percent increase in public welfare spending and a 0.33 percent increase in education spending. In other words, this suggests that the efficiency of public welfare programs is more sensitive to planning uncertainty than the typical program in the state budget. The efficiency of education spending appears to be slightly less sensitive to uncertainty than the typical budget program.

TABLE 9.3. Major Budget Components: Regression Results for Expenditure Volatility and Fiscal Institutions

Independent Variables	Real per Capita Spending on ^a			
	Education	Public Welfare, Health, & Hospitals	Highways	Police Protection & Corrections
Expenditure Volatility of Budget Component	4.61 (11.40)**	2.51 (4.71)**	0.51 (1.91)	-0.36 (-0.90)
Strict Balanced Budget Requirement (= 1 if yes)	87 (7.09)**	-87 (-5.69)**	15 (3.99)**	-5 (-2.67)**
Item Reduction Veto Power (= 1 if yes)	-170 (-19.99)**	72 (4.27)**	20 (5.65)**	-15 (-9.70)**
Supermaj. Required for Tax Increase (= 1 if yes)	-74 (-6.74)**	36 (2.23)*	-2 (-0.41)	5 (3.72)**
Tax or Expenditure Limitation (TEL) (= 1 if yes)	-213 (-3.62)**	-455 (-9.25)**	7 (0.36)	-32 (-4.37)**
Interaction Term: TEL × Income per Capita	0.008 (3.08)**	0.018 (8.43)**	-0.0004 (-0.52)	0.002 (6.13)**
Biennial Budget Cycle (= 1 if yes)	6 (0.87)	20 (2.10)*	17 (5.88)**	-8 (-7.69)**
Year dummy variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other variables included, see tables 9.1 and 9.6	Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4
Wald chi-squared	2651**	6898**	3168**	5609**
Total panel observations ^b	1,316	1,316	1,316	1,316

Note: Parameters are estimated using cross-sectional time-series FGLS regressions. *z*-statistics are shown in parentheses.

^aDenominated in real (2000) dollars.

^bSample includes 47 states: Alaska, Hawaii, and Wyoming are omitted. The sample period is 1970–97, the last year for which the Citizen Ideology index data are available.

^cThe models reported control for the Citizen Ideology index. The results for this variable are reported in table 9.6.

* Indicates significance at the 5 percent level for a two-tailed test. ** Indicates significance at the 1 percent level for a two-tailed test.

Table 9.5 further illustrates and compares the impact of budget volatility on outlays for the major spending categories. There the elasticity estimates from table 9.4 are used to assess the consequences of a 1 percent increase in budget volatility on per capita spending for each budget category. These estimated effects on outlays are evaluated at the respective sample means. For example, consider the results for education spending. As shown in table 9.4, a 1 percent increase in education expenditure volatility yields a 0.33 percent increase in education spending per capita. As table 9.5 reports, this increase would equal \$30 per capita based on the sample mean for education spending. For public welfare spending, a 1 percent increase in budget volatility results in a 0.40 percent spending increase, or \$26 per capita, as shown in table 9.5. The estimated coefficient for expenditure volatility is not significant in either the highways or the police protection and

TABLE 9.4. Relative Importance of Ideology versus Expenditure Volatility: Elasticity Estimates

	Education	Public Welfare, Health, & Hospitals	Highways	Police Protection & Corrections	Total Spending
Expenditure Volatility of					
Budget Component	0.33	0.40	0.06	-0.03	0.35
Citizen Ideology index	-0.04	0.20	-0.08	-0.14	0.17
Government Ideology index	0.001	0.10	-0.04	-0.01	-0.07

Note: The values in the table reflect point elasticity estimates computed at the sample means for the respective budget components. Values in bold type indicate that the relationship is statistically significant at the 5 percent or the 1 percent level of confidence.

TABLE 9.5. Relative Importance of Ideology versus Expenditure Volatility: Impact on per Capita Spending of a 1 Percent Increase (in \$)

	Education	Public Welfare, Health, & Hospitals	Highways	Police Protection & Corrections	Total Spending
Expenditure Volatility of					
Budget Component	30	26	2	-0.30	95
Citizen Ideology index	-3	13	-2	-1	47
Government Ideology index	0.10	6	-1	-0.05	19

Note: These dollar estimates use the elasticities shown in table 9.4 and evaluate the impact at the sample means for each budget component. Values in bold type indicate that the relationship is statistically significant at the 5 percent or the 1 percent level of confidence.

corrections models, and the estimated size of the volatility effect is likewise miniscule for these two budget components.

In summary, uncertainty about future funding levels has considerable impact on the two largest programs in state budgets: education and public welfare. This finding suggests that reductions in uncertainty that facilitate efficient operating techniques in these critical functions of state government would yield potentially large savings for taxpayers.

The models shown in table 9.3 reveal stark differences with respect to how fiscal institutions affect specific spending categories. The item reduction veto power appears to have a major impact on curtailing education spending and only minor consequences for police protection and corrections spending. Tax and expenditure limitations have a large effect on welfare-related spending and no effect at all on highway spending. A supermajority requirement for a tax increase restrains spending for education-related programs but not spending for welfare-related programs. In essence, these findings suggest that fiscal institutions have consequences that go well beyond the overall size of state budgets. Not all budget categories are affected equally, and thus institutions appear to influence the allocation of spending among major programs.

Political Ideology Matters

The models assess the impact of political ideology on state spending decisions while taking into account economic, demographic, and institutional factors. The relevant regression coefficients and test statistics are reported in table 9.6, the elasticities are reported in table 9.4, and the projected impact of a 1 percent change in political ideology is reported in table 9.5.⁶ The index for Citizen Ideology has a statistically significant coefficient in all four models, and the index for Government Ideology has a statistically significant coefficient in the models for public welfare and highways (see table 9.6).

Political ideology plays the greatest role in determining public welfare, health, and hospitals spending. A 1 percent increase in Citizen Ideology (the degree of liberalism increases by 1 percent) results in a 0.20 percent spending increase in welfare-related programs. Evaluated at the sample mean, this ideology shift would expand welfare funding by \$13 per capita. Government ideology also significantly affects welfare funding, and the estimated elasticity is 0.10. At the state mean, this implies that a 1 percent rise in Government

Ideology (a shift toward liberalism) is associated with a \$6 per capita rise in welfare funding.

Political ideology has the second largest impact on spending for police protection and corrections. For that component, a 1 percent shift in citizen liberalism amounts to a 0.14 percent decline in spending. The comparable effect of a more liberal citizenry is a 0.08 percent drop in highway funding and a 0.04 percent drop in education funding. The Government Ideology coefficient is negative and statistically significant for highway spending, but the estimated impact on spending is quite small. A 1 percent shift in government liberalism amounts to only about \$1 per capita. Finally, the results for total state spending indicate that a 1 percent rise in citizen liberalism increases the mean state budget by \$47 per capita. A 1 percent rise in government ideology increases the mean state budget by \$19 per capita.

The impact of ideology on total state spending is shown graphically in figure 9.7, and the impact of ideology on the four budget components is graphed in figure 9.8. Both figures plot the relationships holding the other control variables constant at their sample mean values. Taken together, these results indicate that political ideology affects both the size of state budgets and how funds are allocated within the budget.

Consider states such as Arizona, Indiana, or Wisconsin, which have become relatively more conservative since 1970. The budgetary

TABLE 9.6. Major Budget Components: Regression Results for Citizen and Government Political Ideology Indices

	Real Per Capita Spending on ^a			
	Education	Public Welfare, Health, & Hospitals	Highways	Police Protection & Corrections
Citizen Ideology index ^b	-0.70 (-2.64)**	2.81 (10.18)**	-0.51 (-4.26)**	-0.25 (-6.57)**
Government Ideology index ^b	-0.12 (-0.70)	1.31 (9.45)**	-0.21 (-3.14)**	-0.01 (-0.42)
Other variables included, see tables 9.2 and 9.3	Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4

Note: Parameters are estimated using cross-sectional time-series FGLS regressions. *z*-statistics are shown in parentheses.

^aDenominated in real (2000) dollars.

^bData for the Citizen Ideology index are available through 1997, and data for the Government Ideology index are available through 1996.

* Indicates significance at the 5 percent level for a two-tailed test. ** Indicates significance at the 1 percent level for a two-tailed test.




Fig. 9.7. Effect of citizen and government ideology on total spending (most liberal ideology = 100)




Fig. 9.8. Effect of citizen ideology on budget priorities (most liberal ideology = 100)

implication of this ideological trend is to constrain overall state spending, with welfare, health, and hospitals spending taking a disproportionately large hit. This happens because, as the total budget shrinks, funding tends to increase slightly for education, highways, and police protection programs. Alternatively, consider a trend toward a more liberal citizenry, such as in Florida, North Carolina, or

Texas. The budgetary implication is an overall spending increase, with disproportionately large increases in welfare, health, and hospitals funding, at the expense of police protection and corrections, highway, and education funding.

Commentary

The late Aaron Wildavsky eloquently articulated the notion that government budgets reflect the underlying values and preferences of society: “Ask how budgets should be made and you will be asking how social life ought to be lived” (Webber and Wildavsky 1980, 22). This genre of a citizen or voter-oriented model of fiscal policy-making has a long tradition in political science. The analysis of state budgets in this chapter supports a voter-oriented framework to a substantial degree. Even after controlling for a barrage of economic, demographic, and institutional factors, political ideology significantly and independently affects the size and composition of state spending.

It is important to note that the analysis adds perspective regarding the relative influence of various forces. How much does political ideology influence budgetary outcomes? Political ideology appears to matter less than other factors such as fiscal stability and specific institutional arrangements. In short, models that treat state institutions as relatively transparent and neutral communicators of voter preferences have severely limited explanatory power.

Appendix

TABLE 9.A1. Summary Statistics and Data Sources

Variable	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation
Education (Expenditure per Capita) ^a	\$910	\$885	\$227
Public Welfare, Health, & Hospitals (Expenditure per Capita) ^a	\$644	\$576	\$285
Highways (Expenditure per Capita) ^a	\$287	\$273	\$94
Police Protection & Corrections (Expenditure per Capita) ^a	\$85	\$73	\$43
Education Expenditure Volatility	\$73	\$67	\$28
Public Welfare, Health, & Hospitals Expenditure Volatility	\$75	\$71	\$30
Highways Expenditure Volatility	\$40	\$34	\$21
Police Protection & Corrections Expenditure Volatility	\$14	\$12	\$7
Citizen Ideology ^b	46	46	16
Government Ideology ^b	49	48	22

^aDenominated in real (2000) dollars. Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census Web Site.

^bData from Berry et al. 1998.