6 x 9. 328 pgs. tables, figures. (1991) Paper 978-0-472-06460-1 $25.95S  Available Add to Cart Search this Book's Content About the Book Praise Series Michigan Studies in Political Analysis Subjects Political Science--American Politics

Information and Legislative Organization

Keith Krehbiel

Winner: Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association's 1992 Richard F. Fenno Prize

Presents an alternative informational theory of legislative politics to challenge the conventional view

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About the Book

In this controversial book, Keith Krehbiel investigates and casts doubt upon a view of Congress held by many academics, journalists, and members of the lay public: that Congress is organized primarily to facilitate logrolling or "gains from trade" between legislators. The author puts forward an alternative "informational" theory that, unlike previous formal theories, highlights institutional needs and individual incentives for acquiring policy expertise. Using games with incomplete information, Krehbiel derives a set of unique and testable predictions about the organization of legislatures -- including the composition of committees and the procedures under which legislation is considered.

Krehbiel's creative illustrations and nonmathematical presentation of formal theories make this book accessible to a diverse set of readers. The political relevance and testability of games with incomplete information will be appreciated by game theorists and economists, while the book's findings make it essential reading for political scientists who study American politics, political institutions, or democratic legislatures.