The Many Faces of Strategic Voting

Tactical Behavior in Electoral Systems Around the World
Laura B. Stephenson, John H. Aldrich, and André Blais, Editors

When voting against your candidate is in your best interest


Description

Voters do not always choose their preferred candidate on election day. Often they cast their ballots to prevent a particular outcome, as when their own preferred candidate has no hope of winning and they want to prevent another, undesirable candidate’s victory; or, they vote to promote a single-party majority in parliamentary systems, when their own candidate is from a party that has no hope of winning. In their thought-provoking book The Many Faces of Strategic Voting, Laura B. Stephenson, John H. Aldrich, and André Blais first provide a conceptual framework for understanding why people vote strategically, and what the differences are between sincere and strategic voting behaviors. Expert contributors then explore the many facets of strategic voting through case studies in Great Britain, Spain, Canada, Japan, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and the European Union.
 

“This is an excellent book that makes an important contribution to our understanding of voting behavior in a variety of contexts. The volume brings together a diverse set of contributors from around the world to address exciting and controversial questions about what motivates vote choice.”
—Jeffrey Karp, Brunel University London
 
The Many Faces of Strategic Voting will undoubtedly be of use for those studying voting behavior in a variety of different electoral contexts. It provides the basis for the development of new wave of comparative research on strategic voting.”
—Nick Vivyan, Durham University

Cover: Courtesy of Pexels
 


 

Laura B. Stephenson is Professor of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario.
John Aldrich is Pfizer-Pratt University Professor of Political Science at Duke University.
André Blais is Professor of Political Science at the Université de Montréal.

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Product Details

  • 6 x 9.
  • 252pp.
  • 17 charts, 68 tables.
Available for sale worldwide

  • Hardcover
  • 2018
  • Available
  • 978-0-472-13102-0

Add to Cart
  • $59.95 U.S.

  • Open Access
  • 2018
  • Available
  • 978-0-472-90112-8

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Keywords

  • Sincere vote; strategic vote; voting systems; electoral systems; proportional representation; mixed systems; two-vote elections; voters’ expectations; tactical voting; expressive voting; calculus of voting
     

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