Look Inside

Contents

Introduction     1

Elections

Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections
John O. Ledyard     7

Voters, Investors, and the Consumption of Political Information
Brian E. Roberts     31

Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate Strategy: An Equilibrium Spatial Analysis
Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger     49

A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law
Thomas R. Palfrey     69

Service-Induced Campaign Contributions, Incumbent Shirking, and Reelection Opportunities
David P. Baron     93

Electoral Accountability and Incumbency
David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks     121

International Relations

The Dynamics of Longer Brinkmanship Crises
Robert Powell     151

Uncertainty, Rational Learning, and Bargaining in the Cuban Missile Crisis
R. Harrison Wagner     177

Bargaining in Repeated Crises: A Limited Information Model
James D. Morrow     207

Stability in International Systems and the Costs of War
Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook     229

The Road to War Is Strewn with Peaceful Intentions
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman     253

Legislative Processes

Reciprocity among Self-Interested Actors: Uncertainty, Asymmetry, and Distribution
Randall L. Calvert     269

Collective Choice without Procedural Commitment
Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel     295

Condorcet Consistent Binary Agendas under Incomplete Information
Joon Pyo Jung     315

The Power to Propose
David P. Baron and John Ferejohn     343

References     367

Description

Discusses the sophisticated application of game theory to the development of contemporary political theory