DOI: 10.3998/mpub.12284
- 6 x 9.
- 392pp.
- tables, figures.
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- 1989
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- 978-0-472-10122-1
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Models of Strategic Choice in Politics
Discusses the sophisticated application of game theory to the development of contemporary political theory
Description
This volume's sample of contemporary political theory draws on the rational choice paradigm in general and game theory in particular, and reveals several facts. First, applications of game theory extend beyond the adaptations of those games made familiar by introductory texts—Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and simple majority-rule voting games. Second, although the usual domain of research employing the mathematical tools has been elections and legislatures, international relations is now an especially fertile area of inquiry. Finally, because the contributions treat elections, legislative processes, and international relations, we see contemporary theory as an integrated subject. Specific models may employ different assumptions about the structure of strategic interaction, but the logic of game theory is a thread that unites them all.
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Contents
Introduction 1
Elections
Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections
John O. Ledyard 7
Voters, Investors, and the Consumption of Political Information
Brian E. Roberts 31
Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate Strategy: An Equilibrium Spatial Analysis
Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger 49
A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law
Thomas R. Palfrey 69
Service-Induced Campaign Contributions, Incumbent Shirking, and Reelection Opportunities
David P. Baron 93
Electoral Accountability and Incumbency
David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks 121
International Relations
The Dynamics of Longer Brinkmanship Crises
Robert Powell 151
Uncertainty, Rational Learning, and Bargaining in the Cuban Missile Crisis
R. Harrison Wagner 177
Bargaining in Repeated Crises: A Limited Information Model
James D. Morrow 207
Stability in International Systems and the Costs of War
Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook 229
The Road to War Is Strewn with Peaceful Intentions
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman 253
Legislative Processes
Reciprocity among Self-Interested Actors: Uncertainty, Asymmetry, and Distribution
Randall L. Calvert 269
Collective Choice without Procedural Commitment
Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel 295
Condorcet Consistent Binary Agendas under Incomplete Information
Joon Pyo Jung 315
The Power to Propose
David P. Baron and John Ferejohn 343
References 367
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