Models of Strategic Choice in Politics

Peter C. Ordeshook, Editor
Discusses the sophisticated application of game theory to the development of contemporary political theory

Description

This volume's sample of contemporary political theory draws on the rational choice paradigm in general and game theory in particular, and reveals several facts. First, applications of game theory extend beyond the adaptations of those games made familiar by introductory texts—Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and simple majority-rule voting games. Second, although the usual domain of research employing the mathematical tools has been elections and legislatures, international relations is now an especially fertile area of inquiry. Finally, because the contributions treat elections, legislative processes, and international relations, we see contemporary theory as an integrated subject. Specific models may employ different assumptions about the structure of strategic interaction, but the logic of game theory is a thread that unites them all.

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Contents

Introduction     1

Elections

Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections
John O. Ledyard     7

Voters, Investors, and the Consumption of Political Information
Brian E. Roberts     31

Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate Strategy: An Equilibrium Spatial Analysis
Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger     49

A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law
Thomas R. Palfrey     69

Service-Induced Campaign Contributions, Incumbent Shirking, and Reelection Opportunities
David P. Baron     93

Electoral Accountability and Incumbency
David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks     121

International Relations

The Dynamics of Longer Brinkmanship Crises
Robert Powell     151

Uncertainty, Rational Learning, and Bargaining in the Cuban Missile Crisis
R. Harrison Wagner     177

Bargaining in Repeated Crises: A Limited Information Model
James D. Morrow     207

Stability in International Systems and the Costs of War
Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook     229

The Road to War Is Strewn with Peaceful Intentions
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman     253

Legislative Processes

Reciprocity among Self-Interested Actors: Uncertainty, Asymmetry, and Distribution
Randall L. Calvert     269

Collective Choice without Procedural Commitment
Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel     295

Condorcet Consistent Binary Agendas under Incomplete Information
Joon Pyo Jung     315

The Power to Propose
David P. Baron and John Ferejohn     343

References     367

Product Details

  • 6 x 9.
  • 392pp.
  • tables, figures.
Available for sale worldwide

  • Hardcover
  • 1989
  • Available
  • 978-0-472-10122-1

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  • $90.00 U.S.

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