Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control

George W. Downs and David M. Rocke
Examines techniques and strategies of tacit bargaining in attempts to slow or halt arms races and maintain arms agreements


When most people, including social scientists, reflect on the ways that nations resolve their differences, they tend to think in terms of polar alternatives: war versus negotiation. This perspective ignores a third path: tacit bargaining, which is applicable, as this book shows, to a wide variety of international issues and is especially germane to the problem of treaty maintenance.

Praise / Awards

  • ". . . an important work to be studied by foreign policy and national security students. . . ."
  • ". . . impressive and thought-provoking. . . . It not only provides a useful introduction to those unfamiliar with the concept of collective security, but transcends this introductory stage by shedding light on the complexity of the problems that plague collective security and by discussing potential remedies. Moreover, the book sets a research agenda by pointing to the kind of studies that are likely to further our understanding of the effectiveness of collective security systems in the post-Cold war era. . . . [T]his book is essential reading for all those interested in learning more about the feasibility of different types of cooperative security structures in a changed international environment."
    --Journal of Politics

Product Details

  • 6 x 9.
  • 256pp.
  • tables, figures.
Available for sale worldwide

  • Paper
  • 1990
  • Available
  • 978-0-472-06450-2

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  • $35.95 U.S.