Contents

Acknowledgments vii
Preface ix

I OVERVIEW 1
The Public Choice Revolution  Gwartney & Wagner  3

II INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 19
I RENT SEEKING 20
Is the Theory of Rent-Seeking Here to Stay?  Tollison  24
Rent Seeking and Tax Reform  Tullock  40
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation  McChesney  53

II COLLECTIVE ACTION 73
The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO  Oneal  77
The South Will Fall Again: The South as Leader and Laggard in Economic Growth  Olson  100

III BUREAUCRACY 123
Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers? The Niskanen Model and Its Critics  Blais & Dion  126
vi CONTENTS

The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen’s Theory of Bureaucracy Breton & Wintrobe 146

IV ELECTIONS AND THE ECONOMY 162
National Elections and Policy Induced Business Cycles: A Historical Perspective on the Literature Soh 165
Econometrics and Presidential Elections Fair 186
Taxes and the Electoral Cycle: How Sensitive Are Governors to Coming Elections? Case 201

III SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 215
I CHOOSING DECISION RULES 216
Individual Choice in Voting and the Market Buchanan 219
Constitutional Design for a Rent-Seeking Society: Voting Rule Choice Spindler 232
Social Choice and Arrow’s Paradox MacKay 242

II MAJORITY RULE 252
Collective Decision Rules and Local Debt Choice: A Test of the Median-Voter Hypothesis McEachern 255
The Strategy of Voting Dixit & Nalebuff 267
Probabilistic Majority Rule Mueller 288

III ALTERNATIVE VOTING PROCEDURES 305
An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes Levin & Nalebuff 308
An Application of Social Choice Theory to U.S.D.A. Forest Service Decision Making Martin, Shields, Tolwinski, & Kent 335

IV THE CALCULUS OF VOTING 354
Rational Choice and Turnout Aldrich 357
The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates Heckelman 389

IV FINAL THOUGHTS 411
Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the “Nobel” Lie Brennan & Buchanan 413