ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2001, the day after the most brutal terrorist at-
tacks in history took place in New York, Washington, D.C., and Penn-
sylvania, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed Resolution 1368 (2001) in which it unequivocally condemned the operation as a threat to international peace and security and expressed its readiness to combat all forms of terrorism. Subsequently, the world organization took other action, such as the adoption on September 28 of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which required states to undertake a range of responses to the challenge of international terrorism. The following are some of the steps that were outlined.

1. [All UN member states] shall:
   (a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts; . . .

2. [All member states also] shall:
   (a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
   (b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information; . . .
   (d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens; . . .
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;

(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.

Similarly, other international bodies condemned the September 11 attacks and outlined various recommendations to cope with the growing threats of terrorism. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) implemented Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which asserts that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all. This was the first time that the collective self-defense article of NATO was implemented.

Also on September 21, 2001, the foreign ministers of Latin America adopted a resolution calling for Organization of American States (OAS) members to “take effective measures to deny terrorist groups the ability to operate within their territories.” They called on countries to work together to pursue those responsible for the attacks and bring them to justice, strengthening cooperation in such areas as extradition, mutual legal assistance, and information exchange. The ministers also directed the OAS Permanent Council to begin drafting a hemispheric antiterrorism treaty and convene a meeting of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE).

Finally, on December 4, 2001, the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreed on the Bucharest Plan of Action for Consulting Terrorism in that:

The OSCE stands ready to make its contribution to the fight against terrorism in close cooperation with other organizations and forums. This contribution will be consistent with the Platform for Cooperative Security and will benefit from interaction between global and regional anti-terrorism efforts under the aegis of the United Nations. The OSCE participating States commit their political will, resources, and practical means to the implementation of their obligations under existing international terrorism conventions and pledge them-
selves to intensify national, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to combat terrorism. (MC 9. Dec./1 Annex)

The aforementioned global and regional responses are only illustrative of the emerging trend of heightened concerns about terrorism in the post–September 11 era. This essay focuses on selected past counterterrorism strategies, summarizes the experiences of the ten countries examined in this volume, and provides some “best practices” lessons to be considered in developing future responses on the national and international levels.

PAST GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

The vulnerability of modern society and its infrastructure, coupled with the opportunities for the utilization of sophisticated high-level conventional and mass destruction weaponry, requires nations, both unilaterally and in concert, to develop credible response strategies and capabilities to minimize future threats. The stunning success of terrorist bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, facility attacks, and assassinations often results in a popular awareness of the important counterterrorist measures that states apply. After all, states possess enormous legal, economic, police, and military resources that terrorists cannot match. Governments have taken domestic and international measures to deal with conventional acts of terrorism, and they have taken special precautions to deal with mass destruction threats.

Since it is generally easier to take steps at home than it is to promote international action, states have taken a wide variety of domestic measures. Most notably, they have given great public attention to terrorism; improved intelligence-gathering resources against terrorists; enacted appropriate legislation; apprehended, prosecuted, and punished terrorists; and provided greater protection to government facilities and officials than they had furnished earlier. Moreover, certain counterterrorist measures have been taken in places where terrorists have been able to do great damage—most notably at airports.

Most governments have drawn attention to the barbarous nature of terrorism. It is not uncommon for political leaders to speak
out publicly in denouncing terrorist acts. In choosing civilians as targets, terrorists have often undermined their own case, as the random slaughter of men, women, and children in the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 indicates. Political leaders have been able to use such cases as examples of atrocities committed by terrorists. The most dramatic illustration of this approach relates to the September 11 events.

Intelligence agencies are alert to terrorism to an increasing extent. Timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of relevant information about the perpetrators, their ideologies, their modus operandi, and other aspects of their activities help to prevent incidents from occurring. In 1983, for example, a plot to firebomb a Seattle theater filled with hundreds of innocent people was foiled. In 1991 European intelligence agencies prevented Iraq-initiated terrorism in connection with the Gulf crisis. Finally, a number of suspects were arrested in the United States and abroad in December 1999 in an alleged plot to conduct terrorist activities on or around the New Year’s holiday.

Statutory loopholes in domestic law have been closed, as the experience of the United States suggests. A case in point is congressional action to pass the “long arm” statute, which makes it a federal crime for a terrorist to threaten, detain, seize, injure, or kill an American citizen abroad. Thus, in a sting operation in international waters off the coast of Cyprus, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Fawaz Younis, a Lebanese operative, in the 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian airliner that included American hostages. He was subsequently convicted and sentenced. In 1995, Ramzi Yousef, the conspirator behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was arrested in Pakistan and extradited to the United States. Also, Mohamedou Ould Slahi was arrested and later released in Nouakchott, Mauritania, upon the request of the United States. He was suspected of being the head of the Montreal terrorist cell that conspired to attack the United States around the 2000 New Year.

Governments have taken steps to protect their representatives abroad. Embassies are now constructed with security considerations heavily in mind, and diplomats are given training in thwarting terrorist acts such as kidnapping. Aviation throughout the world has become alert to the dangers posed by terrorists. Because of extensive hijackings of airplanes in the 1970s and 1980s, airlines today
require security check-ins, with X-ray machines scanning passengers and their baggage. Although not foolproof, as was demonstrated by the Lockerbie disaster, which destroyed a Pan Am flight over Scotland, killing 270 people, the surveillance system has had its share of successes.

Regarding weapons of mass destruction, government agents are responsible for preventing and responding to threats of their use. For example, these agents must employ the specific means and tools needed to manage the consequences of biological attacks. In general, government teams that must deter such threats will need greater capabilities in order to detect and identify the biological agents involved, disarm or destroy the device responsible if it has not yet completed dispersing the agent, protect victims and themselves from further contamination, track the agent cloud or otherwise delimit the contaminated area, decontaminate and treat victims, and decontaminate the affected site.

Special measures have been taken to deal with nuclear explosives and materials. Interagency cooperation in the United States is reflected in the fact that the FBI has contingency plans with every nuclear facility. Furthermore, states have engaged in a variety of measures to deal with the international aspects of terrorism. Among the most prominent are the use of diplomacy, implementation of economic sanctions, cooperation in law enforcement, ratification of international conventions, and employment of military force.

States can break diplomatic relations with countries sponsoring terrorist actions. They can, moreover, expel diplomats believed to be implicated in such matters. Western European countries and the United States have expelled Libyan diplomats suspected of engaging in terrorist activities. Economic sanctions are a lever against terrorism, although they are difficult to impose because they require widespread international cooperation. But the United States imposed an economic embargo against Iran and Libya in the 1980s and 1990s, as did the United Nations against Afghanistan in 1999 and 2000.

Many international conventions have been concluded to deal with terrorism. Some of the instruments include the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Violence against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, the 1991 Montreal Convention on the Market of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
Finally, military force has been used by countries experiencing terrorism. Thus, Israel retaliated against Hizbullah in Lebanon in 2000 and the United States bombed Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 in response to the attacks against American embassies in East Africa. As a consequence of the September 2001 attacks, the United States and its coalition destroyed the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime, which had supported Osama bin Laden’s group.

EXPERIENCES OF COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN TEN COUNTRIES

Each of the ten countries selected for analysis in this volume recorded different experiences of counterterrorism strategies. The following discussion summarizes research findings prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks by Al Qaeda’s terrorists.

United States

Since the 1970s, all U.S. administrations have viewed terrorism, especially international terrorism, as a serious threat to national security that requires a strong response. Although the average annual incidence of terrorist attacks reached a peak in 1986 and has since been declining, several massive terrorist bombings of U.S. targets in recent years suggest a trend toward more lethal attacks that cause larger numbers of casualties. Also, today’s terrorists are more likely to be associated with loose networks than established groups, and many are motivated by religious fanaticism and messianic goals rather than coherent political causes of the kind pursued by former terrorist organizations.

These modern terrorist elements present a particular challenge. The United States is especially concerned that terrorists may acquire biological, chemical, or radiological materials for attacks that would inflict catastrophic destruction. While this threat is sometimes sensationalized, it is nevertheless real. The United States combats state-sponsored terrorism, principally through sanctions, but it has had mixed success in co-opting allies for sanctions. Nevertheless, state terrorism has declined sharply.
The United States defines terrorism, in general, as “premeditated violence against noncombatants to influence an audience” and regards terrorist acts as crimes that should be prosecuted and punished. The United States has greatly expanded its antiterrorism laws and has supported a growing body of international antiterrorism treaties. It also seeks to enhance the physical security of U.S. installations and infrastructure. American policy opposes concessions to terrorists. The United States has occasionally retaliated against terrorists with military force, but this option is problematical and seldom available. Counterterrorism policy stresses close cooperation with foreign governments and has helped forge a growing international consensus against terrorism. To avoid the mistakes of former decades, the United States today pursues careful coordination of counterterrorism policy and operations among diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies and the Department of State. These policies have resulted in the apprehension of a growing number of international terrorists. In the U.S. public affairs policy on terrorism, officials strive for a balanced approach that avoids creating unnecessary fear to the advantage of terrorists. But politicians and the media do not always do likewise.

Argentina

Argentina’s war on terrorism was not a good war. No one should make excuses for the various terrorist groups that set Argentina ablaze in the 1970s. Their war was not a just one, but the response of the government went far beyond that needed to defeat such groups as the Montoneros and the People’s Guerrilla Army. The security forces did too much and too little and always erred on the side of excess. Quite rightly, the government response has been called “the dirty war” (la guerra sucia). The cost in human lives—especially innocent ones—was enormous, and the consequences of how that war was waged by the authorities continue to haunt Argentina today, twenty years after the conflict ended.

Why did things go so wrong? In part, Argentina was simply unprepared for what was a largely urban battle against terrorist groups, often of a Marxist bent, but with only marginal contacts with the Soviet camp. While nations like Peru and Venezuela faced both urban and rural violence in the early 1960s in the wake of the
Cuban revolution, Argentina was left largely untouched. Only when the focus of guerrilla strategy shifted to the cities, as it did in Brazil and Uruguay beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was Argentina drawn into what was intended to be a continentwide insurgency that the violent Left in Latin America believed was the only way to defeat “U.S. imperialism.”

Despite Che Guevara’s vision, that strategy fell short, as Guevara himself experienced in the lonely wilds of Bolivia in October 1967. The Argentine terrorist groups launched their struggle anyway. Their campaign of terror peaked during the brief presidency of Isabel Perón who succeeded her husband, Juan Perón, upon his death in July 1974. The second Perón proved to be utterly inept and confused in office, leaving decisions to shadowy figures like José López Rega, who was the government’s chief sponsor of counterterrorism. Unfortunately, López Rega had no scruples about waging war and used the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (Alianza Anticomunista Argentina) as his chief tool of repression. The Triple A, as it was called, followed no rules, kidnapping and killing anyone suspected of links with the terrorist groups. Many of the victims were innocent, and all would disappear without a trace.

Although the Triple A was disbanded shortly after the military ousted Mrs. Perón, the armed forces carried out its counterterror measures with the same disregard for human rights. In the traditional Argentine manner, each service was itself ridden with factions and acted independent of the high command. How much the junta leaders knew or ordered is still open to debate. But the results are apparent. Without good intelligence and a proper chain of command, the military and police were free to wage war as they saw fit. Some thirty thousand Argentines lost their lives, and most have never been accounted for. The questions of guilt, responsibility, and the ways in which the war’s victims met their end still haunt Argentine politics fifteen years after civilian rule was reestablished.

The terrorist groups of the 1970s may be broken permanently, but there is little sign that Argentina’s security services are any better equipped to deal with terrorism today. The fact that no one has yet solved the terrorist bombings of the Israeli embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires some years ago only confirms that belief.
Primarily, the conflict in Peru involved the Sendero Luminoso (SL, or Shining Path), the smaller Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), and the Peruvian state. Both insurgent and state forces made serious and decisive mistakes during the conflict. But in the end the former were defeated because they committed more mistakes and also because the latter, almost a decade after the beginning of the armed struggle on May 17, 1980, developed a different and more or less efficient counterinsurgency strategy than they previously had devised.

The strategic defeat of SL and the MRTA would not have been possible without the critical participation of the rural civil population, which forged an alliance with the security forces as part of that new approach in the late 1980s. This was, of course, the organization of self-defense committees (rondas campesinas), which in the end broke the Sendero’s strategic backbone.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Peru was on the brink of collapse. The existence of a state, the survival of a nation, and the stability of a region were at stake. A small, ruthless, but organized and dedicated revolutionary organization almost destroyed the country. How could this have happened? Why was the response so ineffectual until almost 1988–89? Carlos Tapia, a Peruvian counterinsurgency expert, says that in only a few instances in Latin American history has frivolity, inaction, or covert conciliation in the face of terrorist subversion taken a country to the edge of collapse. Also there have been only a few cases in which one can find so many mistakes committed by politicians and military leaders who had the responsibility for fighting the subversion and facilitated its expansion and development over several years.

From the beginning of the insurgency, both the civilian and military leaders failed to understand the real nature of the threat as a revolutionary war machine whose main objectives were political, although the primary symptoms felt were the military actions of the Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo (EGP, or Popular Guerrilla Army), the armed branch of the SL. The Sendero’s leader, Abimael Guzmán, structured the SL like an iceberg: the EGP acted on the surface, but the most important action took place under the surface. The Peruvian security establishment failed to understand
that this insurgency was different from the one that took place in 1965, which was easily infiltrated and destroyed. Consequently, it required a new counterinsurgency approach. As this study demonstrates, the Sendero also managed to wage a very efficient, asymmetrical war, which provoked and made the state’s initial response late, disproportionate, flawed, and counterproductive.

Colombia

Over the last forty years, terrorism in Colombia has gradually increased to the level at which many Colombians today are leaving the country, expressing the sentiment that “it is impossible to live here anymore.” This comment can be viewed as an indication of a level of fear that most terrorists only dream of achieving. Some analysts also assert that the migration from Colombia indicates an almost catastrophic failure of counterterrorism strategies by the government, private security forces, and society in general. But these are simplistic views of terrorism and counterterrorism strategies in Colombia. This intense fear is the result not of the impact of a single group of terrorists but of the cumulative effect of many manifestations of violence, crime, political unrest, and weak government efforts to take action against these negative elements.

The groups involved in imposing the violence include Marxist-inspired insurgent groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Army of National Liberation, and several other groups that over the years were formed and defeated or negotiated settlements with the government. At the other end of the political spectrum are the self-defense forces, such as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, which use terrorism in an effort to eradicate the Marxist groups. Further confusing the picture are criminal groups such as the drug mafias, the kidnapping mafias, and other common criminal groups, organized and unorganized. Such a mixture would be devastating for any nation.

The Colombian government and society have adopted many strategies over the past fifty years or so to deal with the various manifestations of violence and terrorism in their country. Most of these strategies have been abysmal failures. Some worked in the short run, and a few showed signs of minimal success. The princi-
pal failure of all is that there is a complete lack of consensus within the country on what a peaceful Colombia should look like.

The most significant fact is that Colombia has never developed a doctrine of national security, despite the almost forty years of open warfare with at least two Marxist insurgencies at any given time. In the absence of such a doctrine, the military and police are incapable of developing strategies to stop the rampant disregard for law and order. So various groups, such as the armed forces, paramilitary self-defense groups, churches, nongovernmental organizations, and the police, have developed tactics on their own, with various degrees of success. The military’s strategic reliance on the illegal paramilitary groups has worked temporarily as a force multiplier but reduces respect for the law. Churches work out strategies for accommodation, but these depend on the goodwill of the oppressors. Colombia’s presidents rely on foreign governments for strategies and funding, irrespective of national interests.

The worst effect of this cumulative volume of terror is that throughout Colombian society, almost to the individual level, there is a total lack of trust in government. The past five Colombian administrations have proved incapable of stemming the violence, and the current one shows almost no capacity to develop a successful, long-term counterterrorism strategy. As a case study in counterterrorism strategies for the twenty-first century, with few exceptions Colombia is primarily an example of what not to do.

Spain

Spanish counterterrorist policies include: (1) police and judicial action, (2) negotiation, (3) a program of integration for the members of the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) who renounce violence, (4) dispersion of prisoners, and (5) international cooperation. Although some specific policies, such as the dispersion of prisoners, have harmed the cohesion of ETA, counterterrorist policies have not been fully successful from a general perspective.

Two negative lessons from the Spanish experience should be stressed. First, the rule of law should always be respected in combating terrorism. Second, one should not be ingenuous and suppose that a transition to democracy will change the radical demands of a
terrorist group. In fact, the Basque people have achieved a unique degree of self-government within Spain; participation, recognition, and access to the democratic system are already available to Basque citizens. Therefore, it is suitable to conclude that Basque national separatism, as defended by ETA, has nothing to do with the fight for individual rights and liberties or the democratic regulation of states.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom provides an informative case study on the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures in that the same measures were applied to both international and domestic terrorism with differing results. It shows that where there is no domestic support for the cause of the terrorists—as in the case of international terrorism in Britain—firm counterterrorism measures coupled with effective procedures can virtually eliminate terrorism. For domestic terrorism, absent a genuine political process in which there is a determined support, albeit from a minority composed of a small number of activists and a larger number of tacit supporters, the most that such policies can achieve is to contain the terrorist threat and damage within “acceptable” limits.

In the case of Northern Ireland, the situation is further complicated by intercommunal strife and is not a case of a terrorist group operating against a central government. Such terrorism cannot be eradicated by means of counterterrorism methods alone: political measures by the respective communities as well as the government are also needed. Even in this case of domestic terrorism, international mediation proved essential to a peace process. In spite of the setbacks, as far as Northern Ireland is concerned, the U.K. government’s security and political measures, with some exceptions, generally struck a balance between maintaining democratic and legal rights and avoiding continuous recourse to draconian military measures.

A key ingredient in which there has been success in counterterrorism measures is an obdurate stand on not making concessions to acts of violence and vigorous intelligence gathering. As the Northern Ireland case demonstrates, concessions may have to be made to complete a peace process but only in a context in which
the parties concerned have stopped using terrorism as the principal means of achieving their objectives.

Israel

In its war against terrorism, Israel has defined four strategic objectives. The first is a comprehensive strategy based on a multidimensional front for an ongoing battle rather than ad hoc tactical operations. The second is a combination of offensive and defensive operations and psychological and political elements. It is important to note Israel’s unequivocal concept, which claims that there is no strictly political solution to terrorism. Third, the most important weapons in this long war are patience, determination, and cunning and not necessarily firepower, military courage, and operational and tactical daring. Fourth, the cooperation of all “players” is imperative in this complex war. Cooperation is particularly important among the defense forces themselves (e.g., intelligence and the military), the political system, the general public, and the media.

The experience of Israel in its war against terrorism contains a singular character that prevents copying exactly its counterterrorism strategies and applying in other countries. At the same time, it is doubtful whether any other country has acquired such rich experience and myriad lessons—good and bad—in this cruel and difficult war.

The summary of Israel’s war against Arab terrorism since the Six Day War in 1967 is very important. Israel has learned that there is no military solution to terrorism, that sooner or later a political agreement will be reached, and that only such an agreement will bring an end to the terrorist war. At the same time, and in spite of this fundamental assumption, Israel maintains that it will not be possible to reach a political agreement unless the leadership of the Arab terrorist organizations comes to recognize that Israel cannot be defeated by force.

Turkey

Turkey has been a prime victim of terrorism over the last thirty years and will continue to suffer from it in the foreseeable future. With the changing global and regional political environment, the
Turkish regime has been attacked by virtually every kind of terrorism present in today's world—ideological, religious, and ethnic. Flourishing in the impoverished parts of the country and supported by foreign powers at odds with Turkey, Kurdish ethnic nationalist terrorism has inflicted much damage on the Turkish people in the last decade and a half. However, as this particular terrorist threat has been neutralized, at least for the time being, Marxist (always in fashion in Turkey) and Islamic fundamentalist terrorists are accelerating their assaults.

When terrorism turned into a low-intensity conflict in Turkey toward the end of the twentieth century, the government was forced to develop new military and legal methods to fight it, while still determined not to negotiate with or make concessions to the terrorists. This, in turn, led to legal and diplomatic problems that came close to making Turkey a pariah state on account of its human rights record. Fortunately, the victory over the separatists provided an environment of reconciliation and peace, which made it possible to improve human rights and democratic practices. In the future, Turkey's terrorism problem is expected to mutate into a transitional narcocriminal one, which will be harder to fight than its previous form due to its economic dimension. Nevertheless, the determination of the civilian and military authorities to overcome this new form of terrorism is promising better days for Turkey.

India

Terrorism in India can be broadly classified under three categories: (1) cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir; (2) terrorism with internal roots, but supported by external forces in the northeastern states and Punjab; and (3) domestic terrorism, with no external links, in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh. In Jammu and Kashmir, the situation is complicated because the terrorist movement is spearheaded by Islamic fundamentalists from Pakistan. This type of international terrorism can be effectively dealt with through closer international cooperation. Terrorism in the second and third categories can be eradicated only if more attention is paid to tackling its internal root causes.

The counterterrorism strategy has to be multidimensional. Economic and political measures are as important as, if not more im-
important than, military measures. Military measures, although an essential component, cannot deal with this complex problem alone, as is clearly demonstrated by the Indian experience in Punjab and Mizoram. But making concessions under duress does not lead to an improvement in the situation either. Terrorist groups are unlikely to come to the negotiating table unless they are put under pressure. At the same time, excessive use of military force can be counterproductive. Public support is crucial. Only a balanced approach that does not unnecessarily alienate the people is likely to succeed. Special forces, such as the National Security Guard, and antiterrorism law, such as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act, can play vital roles in curbing terrorism.

Japan

Before the Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 sarin gas attack, Japan’s gravest terrorist threat emerged from the leftist Japanese Red Army. Because of the Japanese Constitution’s stringent civil liberties guarantees as well as its famous Article IX, in which the nation gives up the right to war as well as participation in most forms of armed conflict, Japanese police and security forces faced a tough environment in which to crack down on the group. Because of some badly handled crises in the 1970s, Japan acquired a reputation for being a “bargainer” with terrorist groups and has had to work with the international community in order to compensate for its relatively underequipped counterrorist capabilities. Even so, because of Japan’s restrained international presence, this approach has worked reasonably well.

The Aum attack changed all that. Suffering from the only major use of chemical weapons by a terrorist group against a civilian population, the Japanese government was quickly criticized by citizens who were angry about its failure to have done more to prevent the attack. Because the attack was quickly followed by the Tupac Amaru siege of the Japanese ambassador’s compound in Peru, a palpable sense of crisis emerged among policymakers who deal with terrorism.

Their response has been muted but has signaled important institutional innovations. Because of constitutional proscriptions against the use of force as well as a public expectation that the government should take a conciliatory approach with terrorists in order to save
lives, the Japanese government must work within tight constraints. Even so, the National Police Agency, the Self-Defense Forces, and other elements of the Japanese government have begun to coordinate their efforts more closely in order to enhance their counterterrorism capabilities. The radical reorganization of the Japanese bureaucracy in early 2001 makes it too early to determine how effectively the government will handle the next terrorist crisis.

**SELECTED “BEST PRACTICES” LESSONS**

This volume, in focusing on the experiences of ten countries, provides ample evidence of counterterrorism strategy failures and successes. The record is unmistakable. The main question is: what are the lessons to be learned in terms of developing more effective responses in the future so that the threat of primitive, spectacular, super-, and cyberterrorism can be reduced and brought under manageable levels?

Analysis of this perspective requires an examination of two major areas. The first focuses on policies of governments vis-à-vis terrorism. Included in this framework are issues such as the political environment in the country concerned; the perception of the nature of the terrorist threat, domestically and internationally; low-, medium-, and high-priority counterterrorism policies developed by governments; and the legal environment. The second area deals with the structure, resources, and implementation of counterterrorism policies. This cluster covers counterterrorist organizational structures, intelligence, law enforcement and diplomatic methods, economic measures, and military responses.

Among the successes relevant to some of these themes, it is noteworthy to mention that a positive political environment is critical. For instance, the government of Peru won against the Sendero Luminoso terrorists in part because the military did not interfere in the daily lives of the people in the countryside. In fact, the armed forces followed a constructive policy: while the Sendero became more distant toward peasant society, the military forged closer ties with all sectors of Peruvian society. As the Sendero grew more external to peasant society, the armed forces became more tied to the population.
Similarly, Turkey has revised its criminal procedure laws, which are now mostly in accord with human rights norms. Among these are shorter detention periods prior to detainment and the right to counsel during detention. Turkish citizens have access to the European Court of Human Rights if citizens feel that their rights have been violated.

Another useful lesson relates to successful counterterrorism policies. The Israeli experience is instructive. Essentially, in its long war against terrorism, Israel has defined four strategic objectives: a comprehensive strategic concept presenting a multidimensional front for the ongoing battle rather than an ad hoc operation comprising only tactical and fragmented actions; a combination of various elements such as offensive and defensive actions, patience, determination, and cunning (and not necessarily firepower); and the cooperation of all the “players”—both civilian and military.

Effective legal policies, such as national legislation, are also notable. For instance, in the United Kingdom, terrorism laws were initially temporary because legislation evolved in response to Irish violence and later to international terrorism. Out of a concern for civil rights protection, Britain’s counterterrorist laws had to be reviewed on an annual basis.

“Best practices” lessons related to implementation of counterterrorism strategies are also evident. Within the organizational structure, the role of intelligence is particularly significant. In the Israeli experience, for example, intelligence is critical for operational purposes and therefore it has to be almost exclusively of a tactical nature.

Military forces must be specially trained for counterterrorism operations. In India in 1987, the National Security Guard, a professional force of commandos, succeeded in flushing the terrorists from the Golden Temple without undue loss of life. It was a highly successful operation.

Negotiations between governments and insurgent organizations have mixed results. Sometimes, as in the case of Northern Ireland, they may lead to movement toward a consensus and a willingness to work peacefully within the political system. At other times, however, they are unsuccessful. Although the Basque people are assured political representation and respect for human rights in Spain, negotiations have not succeeded in ending separatist violence in that
country. Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority have broken down, leading to escalating terrorist activities by groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad and expanding military responses by the Israel Defense Forces.

Developing good “best practices” policy in counterterrorism requires coming to terms with the mistakes made by governments. The most fundamental reason why Argentina’s experience with counterterrorism was less than satisfactory was Argentina’s lack of preparation among the security forces and their inability to learn from past mistakes. A lesson learned from the U.S. failure in Iran-Contra is that close teamwork among many agencies must be integrated in a coordinated process. The failure of the Indian central government to strengthen the Punjab police in 1983 resulted in forces that were neither organized nor trained to effectively counter terrorist attacks. Similarly, coordination and information sharing among the various intelligence and security services in Turkey, especially in the 1980s and early 1990s, were far from satisfactory, resulting in a duplication of effort and setbacks for the common cause.

Because Spain had a poor system of information on terrorism toward foreign countries in its transition to democracy, it had much trouble in its war against ETA. The inability of Colombia to devise a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy has contributed to the breakdown of law and order in that country and a reliance on paramilitary forces to perform the functions of the government.

In sum, many governments and people have failed to appreciate the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threat. Some countries have tended to regard terrorism as a minor nuisance or irritant. As a result, a large number of states have not yet developed a strong commitment to deal effectively with the problem of terrorism.

The policy implications are therefore threefold. First, there are no simplistic or complete solutions to the problem of terrorism. As the tactics utilized to challenge the authority of the state are, and continue to be, novel, so, too, must be the response by the instruments of the state. We must also be cautious to avoid the kinds of overreaction that could lead to repression and the ultimate weakening of the democratic institutions we seek to protect.

Second, having achieved considerable tactical success during the past three decades, terrorists sometimes find it politically expedient to restrain the level of political violence. These self-imposed
restraints will not persist indefinitely, and future incidents may continue to be costly in terms of human lives and property. Certain conditions, such as religious extremism or perceptions that the “cause” is lost, could provide terrorists with an incentive to escalate their attacks dramatically.

Third, the vulnerability of modern society and its infrastructure, coupled with opportunities for the utilization of sophisticated, high-leverage, conventional and unconventional weaponry, requires states both unilaterally and in concert to develop credible responses and capabilities to minimize future threats.

These policy implications are more relevant in the post–September 11 era than ever before. The United States and the international coalition have recognized that the future terrorist challenge demands from them no less resolve than was required to combat Nazism and Fascism during the last century. The message communicated by Sir Winston Churchill at the House of Commons on May 13, 1940, will therefore continue to be instructive well into the twenty-first century: “Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival.”