JUST AS IT DID in the violence-ridden twentieth century, Turkey bears
the dubious distinction of having to fight perhaps the most varied
medley of outlaws bent on destroying its way of life in the new mil-
lennium. These terrorists target not only the Turkish state but ordi-
nary Turkish citizens. Even teachers, Muslim clergymen, techni-
cians, and local administrators (village headmen) have been
targeted, as they were perceived by the terrorists to be agents of the
government.1

In this environment, there are remnants of Cold War era terror-
ism as well as adherents of more contemporary political move-
ments at work. The latter groups pursue a variety of causes, each
claiming to be representative of various grievances, including the
repression of an ethnic minority, of a social class, of the entire na-
tion by the “oligarchy,” of the entire nation by the secular estab-
ishment, of an ethnic minority by another terrorist group, of Mus-
lims by the “global Zionist conspiracy,” and so on and so forth.
While fragmented in purpose, these terrorists have caused sub-
stantial damage to Turkey: thirty-five thousand Turkish citizens lost their lives between 1984 and 2000 as a result of terrorism.\(^2\)

**BACKGROUND**

The first wave of modern political terrorism hit Turkey in the late 1960s with Marxist students taking up arms to fight the regime. A spate of kidnappings, robberies, and murders went on for three years and subsided in 1971 after the military cracked down on the terrorists. Most of the terrorist leaders were either killed, arrested, or left the country for Europe or other parts of the Middle East.

The second wave of terrorism began in 1974, when most of the terrorist leaders convicted after the 1971 crackdown were released from prison due to a politically motivated amnesty granted by the government of the day. These terrorists soon went back to work and set up bigger and more resourceful groups, which unleashed urban terrorism the likes of which Turks had never seen. As Marxist terrorists targeted law enforcement personnel, conservative politicians, businessmen, and “uncooperative” citizens, ultranationalist groups also armed themselves and began attacking the Marxists as well as those suspected of aiding them. In the meantime, a terrorist group from Lebanon called the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was assassinating Turkish diplomats all over the world and attacking targets inside Turkey at random.\(^3\)

This spiral of terror led to a chaotic situation by 1980 when the daily body count was sometimes in the dozens, totaling around five thousand for the period between 1975 and 1980. Turkish armed forces seized power in a bloodless coup on September 12, 1980, and restored order with countrywide martial law. Thereafter things remained more or less calm for the next three years.

As a result of the December 1983 general elections, a civilian government came to power, shortly after which the third wave of terrorism began. On August 15, 1984, almost eight months after Turkey returned to democracy, a small group of Kurdish separatists began attacking military outposts in the southeastern part of the country, announcing the commencement of a new form of terrorism in Turkey, the ethnically nationalist, rural low-intensity
For the next fifteen years, Turkish authorities found themselves fighting this new form of terrorism as well as the more traditional urban Marxist type and the new Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. With the arrests of major Kurdish separatist terrorist leaders in 1999 and a series of successful operations against the Marxists and Islamic fundamentalists, the third wave of terror also seems to have reached its end. In the coming years, Turkey may find itself in the unavoidable position of having to fight a fourth wave of terrorism as a result of the circumstances this essay attempts to explore.

THE CULPRITS: ROGUES’ GALLERY

The following terrorist organizations share responsibility for most of the terrorism that takes place in Turkey today.

Ethnically Inspired: Fighting the “Colonialists”

Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK)

Led by Abdullah Ocalan (known as Apo—currently on death row in Turkey) between 1984 and 2000, the PKK posed the major terrorist threat in Turkey. This Maoist organization, which claims to pursue the rights of Turkey’s Kurds, is undergoing a process of transformation at present.4

Communists: Fighting the “Capitalist Oligarchs”

Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi-Devrimci Sol
(Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front-Revolutionary Left, or DHKP/C-DEVSOL)

A Marxist-Leninist nonethnic organization, it is better known for its urban activity and attacks against American nationals and interests in Turkey, but currently it is working hard to gain a foothold in the countryside as well. Dursun Karatas, who is currently at large in Western Europe, mostly in Belgium, leads DEVSOL. A direct descendant of one of Turkey’s deadliest Marxist terrorist organizations in the 1970s, the infamous Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi
(THKP-C), DEVSOL continues to target individual Turkish law enforcement and intelligence officers.

**Turkiye Komunist Partisi/Marksist Leninist-Turkiye**
**Isci Koylu Kurtulus Ordusu (Turkish Communist Party/ Marxist-Leninist-Turkish Workers and Peasants Liberation Army, or TKP/ML-TIKKO)**

This is a Maoist organization with a religious twist (most members belong to Turkey’s Alawite Muslim sect) active in both urban and rural areas. Advocating class (peasantry) warfare against the system, TIKKO also traces its roots to the 1970s and, although nonracial in philosophy, recruits heavily from among Turkey’s Kurds.

**Marksist Leninist Komunist Partisi/Kurulus (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party/Foundation) (MLKP/K)**

An emerging Marxist-Leninist organization that is nonethnic and homogeneous in its membership, this group is well armed and organized in its operations. So far it has been confined to Turkey’s metropolitan centers since it became operational in 1994.

**Islamic Fundamentalists: Fighting the “Secular Infidels”**

Fundamentalist subversive and terrorist activity in Turkey began in the 1960s. As early as 1967 and 1973, the leaders of Hizb-ul-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) were imprisoned for attempting to bring the Islamic State Constitution (Sharia) to Turkey. Islamic Jihad appeared as a real terrorist threat in the 1980s after a series of assassinations of Jordanian, Saudi, and Iraqi diplomats. In the 1990s, however, a new breed of terrorist appeared.

**Hizbullah (Party of God)**

Not to be confused with its Lebanese namesake, this Islamic fundamentalist organization comprises an exclusively Kurdish membership and aims at setting up an Islamic Kurdish state in Turkey. Hizbullah started out as a proestablishment reactionary movement against the PKK in the Kurdish-populated eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey. One of the most controversial terrorist activities of Hizbullah in southeastern Turkey has been the liquidation of dozens of pro-PKK activists, journalists, intellectuals, and politicians—a
development that began in the fall of 1991 and continued throughout 1992 and 1993. The Hizbullah regards the PKK as Islam’s enemy and has accused it of “trying to create an atheist community, supporting the communist system, trying to divide the people through chauvinist activities and directing pressure on the Muslim people.”

Some Turkish experts argue that Hizbullah’s goal is the establishment of an Islamic state in Turkey that will not necessarily be confined to the Kurdish areas of the country but will use these areas as springboards. Turkish authorities believe that Hizbullah came under Iranian control in 1993 and turned its efforts against the Turkish state. Hizbullah is now organized in western Turkey as well. Despite a recent crackdown, which resulted in the killing of its leader, Huseyin Velioglu, and arrests of hundreds of its members and supporters, it still enjoys a support base among Turkey’s ultrareligious Kurds. Even after the arrest of almost two hundred of its members, authorities estimate that around five hundred armed Hizbullah members are still at large. As of October 2000, Hizbullah’s remaining members were known to have opened negotiations with other Turkish Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups in order to consolidate their forces.

Islami Buyuk Dogu Akincilari-Cephesi (Islamic Great Orient Raiders Front, or IBDA-C)

This relatively new organization recruited approximately two hundred former Marxists and Islamic fundamentalists alike, creating a highly educated, dynamic, and determined cadre of militants bent on destroying the system in Turkey and replacing it with a socialist, Islamic fundamentalist one. Its members also profess very strong patriotic sentiments, a position that contradicts Islamic teaching, which underplays nationalism. Its leader, Salih Izzet Erdis (also known as Salih Mirzabeyoglu), is currently incarcerated in Istanbul. It is responsible for a number of assassinations and attacks against targets deemed un-Islamic by the organization.

Islami Hareket (Islamic Movement)

A fundamentalist organization, Islamic Movement is inspired by Iran and has been responsible for a spate of assassinations and other attacks against secular intellectuals and Jewish targets in Turkey since 1983. Some members once belonged to the Turkish Is-
Islamic Jihad of the 1980s. Irfan Cagrici is widely believed to have led this organization, which murdered a number of secular Turkish intellectuals and Iranian dissidents in Turkey. Some former Islamic Movement members went on to start Hizbullah.

In addition to these major players, a number of smaller Kurdish, Marxist, and Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups exist and operate in Turkey. Although the smaller Kurdish and Marxist groups are not very significant in the terrorist threat they pose, it is worth noting that smaller Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as the Army of Quds (Jerusalem), are responsible for a spate of assassinations of secular Turkish intellectuals and for bomb attacks against Israeli and American targets. These groups are believed to be sponsored by Iranian sources, while an expatriate Turkish group of fundamentalists in Germany calling itself the Federated Islamic State of Anatolia also has ties to Iran.

**INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN TURKEY**

**Al Qaeda (the Base)**

Turkish terrorists not only travel abroad, but it appears that they also invite other terrorists into Turkey. In the past, Palestinian and Iranian elements have attacked Israeli and Turkish Jewish targets such as diplomats, community leaders, businessmen, and synagogues in Turkey. Turkish authorities have divulged information that Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda members have been using Turkey as a transit point. Throughout 1999, there were numerous reports of Al Qaeda members of Algerian, Iranian, Uzbek, Libyan, and Egyptian origin infiltrating Turkey to attack the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit held in Istanbul in November, which was attended by President Bill Clinton and many other heads of government. In December of the same year, Turks arrested an IBDAC member who admitted connections with Al Qaeda. In October 2000, American security agents began tracking three Al Qaeda operatives who had entered Turkey but subsequently lost them and were forced to alert Turkish authorities, fearing that they might attack the American consulate in Istanbul. These three individuals, two Yemenis and an Algerian associated with Osama bin Laden, were believed to have remained in Turkey.
until December 2000. In December 2000, Turkey also extradited to Italy a Tunisian national, Mahraz Hamdouni, whom the Italian authorities believed worked in Western Europe for Al Qaeda. Hamdouni had been arrested in Istanbul by the Turkish police acting on an international warrant.

Lebanese Hizbullah

Moral as well as limited financial support is rendered to Lebanese Hizbullah and Palestinian Hamas by sympathizers in Turkey. Some fundamentalist-controlled town councils held public fund-raisers for these organizations, especially during 1996 and 1997. In November 1997, Israeli Shin Beth security agents in Tel Aviv arrested a German man, Steven Smyrek, who had arrived there from Istanbul to conduct a reconnaissance for a suicide bombing by the Lebanese Hizbullah.

Front Islamique du Salut
(Islamic Salvation Front, or FIS)

In August 1998, Turkish police in Izmir detained and then deported Mr. Rabah al-Kabir, European coordinator of the radical Algerian terrorist organization FIS. Al Kabir, a resident of Germany, was reportedly trying to make contact with supporters in Turkey at the time.

In February 1998, following a determination by the Turkish military’s Milli Askeri Stratejik Konsept (National Military Strategic Concept, or MASK) study stating that the Islamic fundamentalist threat to Turkish national security was surpassing the separatist and Marxist ones, the powerful Milli Guvenlik Konseyi (National Security Council, or MGK) cracked down on fundamentalist organizations all over the country. The MASK had stipulated the need for suppression of fundamentalist subversive activity by military force if necessary. Unlike the United States, where the military is denied domestic law enforcement powers by the Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, “Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus,” United States Code, sec. 1385), by law the Turkish military is responsible for internal defense as well as protection of the country against foreign threats.
MEMBERSHIP IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

But who are the members of these organizations? What motivates a Turkish citizen to join one and partake in its illegal acts? Over the years, Turkish authorities and scientists have undertaken a number of studies to answer these questions. The common denominators they have discovered are as follows. The ordinary Turkish terrorist is of average intelligence, not very perceptive of his environment, an introvert, and easily manipulated. Contrary to some popular thinking, these people are not outgoing, psychotic types prone to violence. What is interesting about these results is that the convicted terrorists among whom the research was undertaken included adherents of all the different political ideologies mentioned previously.13 Dire economic conditions, religious sensitivities (including denominational differences, such as the one between Turkey’s majority Sunnis and minority Alawites that led to bloody incidents in the late 1970s), ethnic consciousness, and pressure from the feudal social structures all push young Turkish people into the arms of terrorist organizations. In a survey undertaken between 1994 and 1996 that studied 2,355 convicted PKK terrorists, it was revealed that most came from the countryside and were single, undereducated, and poor speakers of Turkish.14

TERRORISTS’ AIMS

According to the PKK’s party program, “Kurdistan” (the lands where the PKK hopes to set up an independent state in the future) is divided by four “colonizers,” namely, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, which are also “clients of imperialism” themselves. The largest part of Kurdistan is in Turkey, and the so-called Turkish Kurdistan is nominated to lead the “revolution.” The character of the revolution is “national” (decolonization and independence) and “democratic” (liquidation of the medieval feudal structures). The minimum aim is to destroy colonization and establish an independent, democratic, and united Kurdish state. The ultimate aim is to establish a state based on communism.15

In the face of its military defeat by Turkish security forces, the
PKK has somewhat changed its rhetoric from pursuit of independence to recognition of the Kurdish identity and limited autonomy. The Marxists and Islamic fundamentalists are less modest and advocate the destruction of the existing Turkish state, which they wish to replace with Marxist-Leninist and Islamic fundamentalist regimes, respectively.

Deterring terrorism and prosecuting terrorists, however, may be insufficient to end terrorism, especially when a large population supports the terrorist cause. In the absence of legal or other forms of discrimination against Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin who have enjoyed full political rights under the Turkish constitution, access to the system has never really been an issue. In this regard, Turkish Kurds have risen to high levels of government in both elected and appointed positions.

SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS

There are four types of external support rendered to terrorists. These are moral, political, resource, and sanctuary. Unfortunately Turkey’s terrorists enjoyed, and to an extent continue to enjoy, all four types of support from various sources.

Moral

The acknowledgment of the terrorists’ cause as just and admirable is rendered to most Turkish terrorist organizations from abroad. The governments of Greece and southern Cyprus have made public statements in the past blessing PKK’s struggle. That organization is known to enjoy close working relationships with terrorist organizations such as Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the German Red Army Faction (and its successors), Spanish Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Liberty, or ETA), and the Lebanese Hizbullah. Most Turkish terrorist organizations have political, logistical and moral relationships with foreign and domestic terrorists as well as with some state sponsors of terrorism. While much has been written about foreign relationships, of more tactical value is the nature of the relationships these terrorists have with one another inside the country. A good example is the deal PKK
worked out in the 1990s with DEVSOL and TIKKO in order to increase its urban activity. The former was somewhat successful in transforming its preexisting relationship into a practical working one inside Turkey by which DEVSOL and TIKKO cadres in the cities launched attacks as PKK’s subcontractors and also helped it expand into Turkey’s northern and southern coastal regions where it lacked a support base. All three groups shared training and supply facilities in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, in Greece, and in southern Cyprus.

Political

The second form of external support rendered to terrorists, which involves the active promotion of the terrorists’ strategic goals in international forums, is political. To that end, members of Parliament and diplomats from Greece, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, The Netherlands, Norway, and South Africa have directly or indirectly assisted Turkish terrorists in making their case in their respective capitals and in the international arena.

Resources

The third form of external support is resources, including money, weapons, food, advisers, and training. According to Turkish intelligence sources, Iran is a good example for this type of support, which it renders to the PKK and Islamic fundamentalist terrorists in Turkey. Ocalan’s younger brother, Osman, is reportedly seeking more Iranian funds, weapons, and logistics. He visited Iran in October 2000 for meetings with Iranian intelligence officials, and he asked them to intervene on behalf of PKK to persuade the Iranian-backed Iraqi Kurdish group Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to stop attacking PKK fighters in its territory in northern Iraq. Marxist and PKK terrorists have received similar support from Greece and Syria in the past.

Sanctuary

The fourth type of support is sanctuary for secure training and operational and logistical bases. This type of support was rendered to
the PKK in the 1980s and 1990s by Syria and continues to be rendered to it by Iran. Turkish authorities believe that Iran allows safe passage to PKK terrorists, who also receive medical attention in that country. They also claim that Syria and Armenia continue to allow PKK to recruit new members in those countries. According to Turkish intelligence sources, a PKK leader, Cemil Bayik, is in contact with Syrian president Bashar Assad, in violation of the 1998 Adana Accord that Syria signed with Turkey by which it pledged to cease and desist its aid to PKK.

GOVERNMENT POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

A Question of Law and Order

From the beginning of the PKK activities, Turkey considered the incidents a law and order question. The people’s war rhetoric of Ocalan did not impress Turkish authorities, for they were quite familiar with it from their decades-long struggle against the Turkish Marxists. During its fight against terrorism, Turkey made a point of not complying with terrorist demands, most of which have been irreconcilable with the democratic system under the Turkish constitution. One demand that both the PKK and the Marxist terrorists have in common is a general amnesty for all imprisoned terrorists. From death row, PKK leader Ocalan has offered a deal by which PKK members will lay down their arms if the Turkish government pardons all convicted terrorists. This so-called peace project has been ignored by the Turkish government so far.

Human Rights Problems

Civil Liberties

In countering the brutal terrorist campaign of the late 1970s, Turkey was forced to limit civil rights and liberties in order to restore law and order by declaring martial law in 1980. Martial law only lasted three years. With the transfer of power to civilian hands, other legal methods were put to use to better fight terrorism. While practices such as evacuation of villages, incommunicado detention of suspects, state security courts that featured military judges alongside civilian ones until 1999, and administrative
orders closing newspapers and banning public meetings in the area under emergency rule have been criticized, these were permissible under the Turkish constitution and legal recourse was available to the people affected by them.

Nonviolent Political Crime

The Turkish law on antiterrorism has an article that stipulates imprisonment for “every kind of propaganda” that contributes to terrorism. The lack of clarity in this article gave the prosecutors and judges too much discretion, a development that prompted criticism in Western human rights circles. However, according to the Turkish reasoning, so long as there is an armed group fighting a guerrilla war in the mountains, the views that are expressed orally or in writing to support the declared political objectives of this group inevitably help justify its terrorism, even without directly inciting violence.

Detention without Trial

In Turkey, the period of time during which a detainee can be held before being arraigned, while longer than in the United States, is in line with European standards. The European Court of Human Rights allows a maximum of four days of detention. The court did not qualify this decision according to circumstances. For instance, the existence of a public emergency does not warrant longer detention periods. For some time, Turkey applied fifteen days of detention for terrorist suspects and thirty days in the emergency area. Later these periods were reduced by half to the current seven days, during the first four days of which the detainee may not be contacted by his or her legal counsel if the authorities so order. This practice subjected Turkey to international criticism and to lawsuits at the European Court of Human Rights.20

Legal Reform

Turkish criminal procedure law was revised in the 1990s, making it more liberal and in line with internationally accepted human rights norms such as right to counsel during detention and shorter detention periods prior to arraignment. The lifting of the ban on communist and religiously oriented speech weakened the terrorists’ argument. Turkey has signed all the major international conventions
on the protection of human rights and abides by its obligations as a result of its accession to these conventions. Turkish citizens have access to the European Court of Human Rights should they feel that their grievances were not addressed after they exhausted the remedies provided by Turkish justice.

Cultural Rights

As far as cultural rights are concerned, the relaxation of restrictions on the public use of the Kurdish language is often erroneously interpreted as a concession on the part of the Turkish government. In fact, the restrictions had originally been imposed by the military while the country was under martial law in the early 1980s. As part of a democratization effort that included the abolition of legislation banning communism and religious fundamentalism in a nonviolent context, Kurdish language restrictions were lifted in 1991.  

TERRORIST GOALS COUNTERED

Terrorist goals may include recognition, coercion, provocation, intimidation, and insurgency support. Various terrorists in Turkey had all or some of these goals. The following are some of the tools that the Turkish government used to respond to terrorism. Many of these options were pursued simultaneously.

Deterrence

Governments can use their coercive capacity to make terrorism too costly for those who seek to use it. They can do this by means of military strikes against terrorist bases, assassinations of key leaders, collective punishment, or other methods. With the creation of a no-fly zone above the thirty-sixth parallel after the Gulf War, the PKK found a safe haven in northern Iraq, where a power vacuum existed in the absence of the Iraqi military. Turkey launched air strikes and cross-border operations against PKK targets in northern Iraq and Iran on numerous occasions, destroying bases and training camps and forcing PKK units to more remote mountainous areas far from major roads, making their supply lines long and arduous.
Negotiations

Turkish counterterrorism policy’s backbone is a no compromise/no negotiations approach. However, after Ocalan’s incarceration, Western pressure on the Turkish government to enter into negotiations with the PKK has increased. Martha Crenshaw, a political scientist at Wesleyan University, proposes negotiations as the only possible way to resolve some long-standing disputes and suggests that governments can elect to enter into negotiations with terrorist groups and make concessions in exchange for the groups’ renunciation of violence. The governments of Colombia and Spain entered into negotiations with their respective terrorist adversaries, the unfortunate results of which are still being revealed on television screens today. Fortunately, Turkey did not make this fateful decision, thanks in part to its military success and in part to the political determination of its successive governments.

Special Criminal Justice Tools

Governments can treat terrorism primarily as a crime and therefore pursue the extradition, prosecution, and incarceration of suspects. One drawback to this approach is that the prosecution of terrorists in a court of law can compromise government efforts to gather intelligence on terrorist organizations.

Repentance Law

The Turkish government made good use of the “repentance law,” passed in the 1980s, which allows terrorists to turn themselves in to the criminal justice system. Under this law, more than two thousand four hundred terrorists surrendered to security forces in order to qualify for reduced sentences. Many repentant terrorists were “turned” into informers and actively participated in counterterrorist operations, yielding positive results. Crenshaw suggests that such peace overtures must be well timed. Ideally, they should come at a time when the government is strong and the terrorist organization is undergoing a period of introspection. Immediately after Ocalan’s arrest in 1999, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit issued a call to all PKK members to take advantage of the repentance law.
Emergency Rule

Southeastern Turkey, the part of the country most affected by terrorism, has been under emergency rule since 1987. This status has allowed the administrative and security authorities in the area to cooperate more efficiently while expanding the powers of the security agencies. Emergency rule now covers four provinces in eastern and southeastern Turkey, down from thirteen provinces in 1990.

State Security Courts

Special criminal courts called “state security courts” were established that handle all criminal cases in which the offenses are deemed to threaten national security. These courts do not have caseloads as heavy as the regular criminal courts and are able to hear cases rapidly.

COUNTERTERRORISM TACTICS IMPLEMENTED

Military Tactics

Village Guard Militia

Crenshaw suggests that governments can make targets hard to attack. As targets are strengthened, however, some terrorist groups may shift their sights to softer targets. A law passed in 1985 made it possible for the security forces to train and arm volunteer Village Guards from among the very same Kurdish population that PKK recruited its cadres. The creation of this progovernment militia force contributed a great deal to the security forces’ tactical success in the field. The volunteer Village Guards, numbering close to ninety-five thousand, made it hard for the PKK to find “soft” targets, unprotected remote hamlets that can provide supplies and fresh recruits. In the high-unemployment environment of southeastern Turkey, Village Guard wages were often the only source of income for entire progovernment Kurdish families. But PKK leader Ocalan put into practice a new strategy intended to crush Village Guards. He declared them and their clans “traitors-collaborators” and ordered punitive strikes against villages protected by them. These strikes earned Ocalan the nickname “baby killer,” as PKK terrorists often wiped out entire Village Guard families in those raids. More
than twelve hundred Village Guards have been killed in action against the PKK since the inception of this program.

Proxy Forces

Turkey entered into agreements with Iraqi Kurdish groups, especially the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (IKDP) of Masood Barzani, and in the summer of 2000 with Jalal Talabani’s PUK, by which IKDP’s and PUK’s own fighters (*pashmarga*) participate in Turkish cross-border operations against PKK bases in northern Iraq and deny sanctuary to PKK terrorists in their zones of control. The PKK has used northern Iraq as a base for its attacks in Turkey’s southeast, and many of its forces retreated to the mountainous region after the 1999 capture of Ocalan. As of mid-2000, more than forty-five hundred PKK terrorists had sought sanctuary in PUK’s zone of control in northern Iraq. Turkey also armed and trained a small group of ethnically Turkish Turcoman residents of northern Iraq with a view to deploying them in a similar fashion. These efforts, akin to Israel’s creation of a buffer zone in southern Lebanon and Israel’s relationship with the South Lebanese Army, caused the PKK to lose some of its freedom of movement in northern Iraq.

Special Warfare Training

Realizing in the late 1980s that they were not prepared for LIC, Turkish security forces, both military and civilian, launched an effort to adapt their training and equipment to this new type of warfare. Turkish antiterrorism specialists conduct joint training exercises with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies such as the United States, Great Britain, and Germany as well as other friendly nations such as Israel. All branches of the Turkish security services created and/or enhanced their special operations departments, recruiting, training, and equipping operators capable of conducting unconventional counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The Turkish National Police, responsible for urban law enforcement, formed a new Special Operations Department numbering no less than sixty-two hundred officers. The Turkish military created a professional enlisted corps, which filled the gap between career noncommissioned officers and draftee enlisted men who are discharged after eighteen months of service.
In the mountainous Turkish southeast, helicopter gunships, mostly American Bell AH–1 Cobras, turned out to be deadly effective—so much so that when Turkey ordered additional units in 1995 the PKK went on a campaign via its sympathizers in Washington and successfully pressed the U.S. State Department to disallow the sale. The Turkish utility helicopter fleet was expanded with European and American utility helicopters, boosting the security forces’ airlift capacity tremendously. Especially in mountainous southeastern Turkey, heliborne operations proved to be very useful. But they were also risky. In the spring of 1997, the PKK shot down two Turkish Army helicopters using SA7 surface to air missiles (SAMs), which prompted the Turkish Army to invest in an extensive retrofit program to equip its helicopter fleet with passive SAM defense systems.

Both law enforcement agencies and military units acquired second- and third-generation night vision devices as well as thermal imaging equipment, enabling them to conduct surveillance and proactive operations under low light conditions. The military made use of light and heavy mortars, mobile and stationary, as well as medium- and heavy-caliber artillery pieces, some of which were airlifted to remote mountaintop firebases. This suppressive fire capability aided the small unit infantry operations against rural terrorists.

The PKK conducted mine warfare, which the Turkish security forces countered by utilizing mine-resistant wheeled and tracked armored personnel carriers and acquiring modern mine detection and clearance equipment. Yet PKK’s heavy use of antipersonnel land mines took a toll on Turkish security forces as well as the local civilian population. The unconventional methods practiced by the terrorists also motivated Turkish security forces to come up with innovative solutions, in pursuit of which they evaluated modern technology but also went back to their armories. Counterinsurgency units efficiently used 60 mm patrol mortars and 57 mm recoilless rifles that the Turkish military had previously mothballed. Modern small arms better suited for COIN missions, body armor, nonlethal weapons, and canine units were also acquired by Turkish security forces.
Defensive Tactics

Draining the Swamp

In the meantime, defensive tactics were also employed to preempt the terrorists’ own tactics. Remote villages and hamlets, often the target of terrorist attacks, were evacuated and their residents encouraged to relocate to safer zones, especially in the early 1990s. This tactic degraded the terrorists’ logistical resources and curbed their ability to conduct propaganda and recruitment activities. Human rights circles in the West condemned this tactic, alleging that 3 million people had been forcibly removed, thus changing the demographic composition of the region. In reality, the objective of evacuations was to save these vulnerable people living in remote areas from the constant PKK demands for supplies, recruits, and shelter. The entire population of the emergency region is approximately 6 million people, half of whom live in urban areas. Another 3 million occupy 18,500 villages and hamlets. Only about 300,000 people (i.e., 5 percent of the region’s total population), who occupied approximately 2,000 villages and hamlets, were evacuated. The Turkish government is investing millions of dollars in rebuilding villages destroyed by the PKK, the inhabitants of which were relocated to safer zones. So far, more than 32,000 inhabitants of more than 330 villages and hamlets have returned to their homes after security was restored.30

The Turkish military was especially effective in cordon and search operations at the battalion level during COIN. After these operations, cleared areas were saturated with security elements to deter the PKK from returning in the future, effectively “draining the swamp.”31 Turkey deployed a combined force of more than 300,000 in the emergency area. This number included 150,000 army troops, 10,000 from the air force, 50,000 Gendarmerie (the military rural police force), 40,000 police officers, and 95,000 Village Guards. Since 1993, the primary counterterrorism enforcement authority in the emergency area lies with the military, organized under three corps commands (two army and one Gendarmerie corps).

Intelligence

Turks also boosted their intelligence capability to better fight terrorism. This measure meant improving both their human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. Innovative
new methods, such as satellite imagery obtained from NATO allies and Israel as well as aerial imagery obtained by Turkish Air Force reconnaissance flights over the emergency area and northern Iraq, proved useful.\textsuperscript{32}

Turkish intelligence operators performed several successful snatch missions abroad, the most famous of which is the arrest of PKK leader Ocalan in Kenya.\textsuperscript{33} High-level PKK officials were captured in and extradited from Iraq, Libya, Moldova, and Rumania. As a result, many terrorists who felt safe abroad are now more careful and subdued in their actions than they used to be. A case in point is Fehriye Erdal, a DEVSOL member wanted for murder in Turkey who found sanctuary in Belgium recently. As much as the Belgian authorities hoped to ship Erdal to a third country, they had no luck finding a willing host from among the forty-four countries they contacted, most of them in Latin America and Africa.

Some Turkish special operations units conducted pseudo-operations.\textsuperscript{34} During these clandestine intelligence-gathering missions, conducted in the tradition of the Israeli Sayeret Duvedevan and Rhodesian Selous Scouts, Turkish intelligence operators, among whom were sometimes “turned” former terrorists,\textsuperscript{35} disguised themselves as guerrillas and approached suspected terrorist sympathizers, gathering valuable intelligence from them.

Psychological operations were also conducted on multiple fronts. While the military conducted its own “winning hearts and minds” campaign in eastern and southeastern Turkey, providing mobile health clinics and assisting schools in Kurdish-populated areas, the General Staff set up a civil cooperation bureau that liaised with the Turkish press and also utilized the Muslim clergy in spreading its antiterrorist messages. The Turkish military even set up and operated a local television station that broadcast in Kurdish. The arrest of PKK leaders was used by the authorities to showcase the government’s treatment of captured terrorists in an effort to encourage terrorists at large to turn themselves in to the authorities.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION}

Turkish security agencies cooperated closely with their counterparts abroad, especially in the United States, Germany, and Israel.
Turkish intelligence also conducted its own HUMINT collection missions in neighboring countries and Europe, where Turkish terrorist organizations are most active. These covert missions often helped detect early warning signals of planned terrorist attacks in Turkey such as suicide bombings. This cooperation is motivated by the fact that the threat posed by terrorists is often common to all countries involved. For example, DEVSOL targets both Turkish and American interests.37

Listings

On the diplomatic front, Turkey scored a legal success when the PKK and DEVSOL were listed as terrorist organizations by the U.S. Department of State and were prohibited from collecting material support in the United States. The American listing also gave Turkey’s counterterrorism effort the moral and political backing of the world’s only superpower. The PKK was also banned in Germany, making its operations there illegal, although in practice this ban was not as effective as the American one. In France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, Turkey has not been able to repeat the diplomatic success it achieved in persuading German authorities to ban the PKK. Turkish Marxists, especially DEVSOL, continue to have a very strong presence in these countries.

Resistance to International Intervention

Especially in the first half of the 1990s, there was international pressure on Turkey to apply the Geneva Conventions, which govern the laws of war. Had Turkey yielded to these pressures to conduct its security operations under the international laws of war, it would have had to accord prisoner of war status to captured PKK terrorists, opening the door for international organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross or the United Nations (UN) High Commission on Refugees, to interfere in its counterterrorism effort, which it considers a domestic issue. Turkish authorities were concerned that the application of the Geneva Conventions could pave the way to the international recognition of the PKK as a political party to the conflict. The international human rights community focused on the alleged human rights violations by Turkish security
forces while almost totally ignoring atrocious terrorist acts of the PKK on the assumption that human rights are violated only by states.

Diplomatic Relations

Turkey maintained diplomatic relations with countries that supported or tolerated terrorist groups on their territory while pursuing various methods in dealing with the problem. In the case of Syria, the prime backer of the PKK, an outright military threat that Turkey issued in 1998 was an appropriate response to Syrian hostility. In the case of Italy and the Republic of South Africa, economic boycotts were utilized.

Turkey’s anticipated European Union (EU) membership is also having an impact on its fight with terrorism. Membership means a high standard of government conduct and tough scrutiny of civil liberties and human rights. Turkey’s application for full membership in the EU did not please everybody. Some in Europe considered Turkey to be a country with a culture and religion that differs from the European norm and as such not appropriate for European integration. They thought that excessive human rights criticism would deter Turkey from insisting on full membership. These circles also pointed to the European Parliament resolutions condemning Turkey and condoning PKK terrorism.38

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE TURKISH COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORT

Some of the tactics the Turkish government applied in its counterterrorism efforts did not yield the desired results and exposed severe shortcomings in certain areas. These shortcomings included the lack of coordination among the various Turkish intelligence services, the failure of the correctional system, the inability to apply capital punishment, corruption among security personnel, and an inadequate government response to new forms of violence.

Lack of Coordination among Intelligence Services

Coordination and information sharing among the various intelligence and security services in Turkey, especially in the 1980s and
early 1990s, were far from satisfactory, resulting in a duplication of effort and setbacks for the common cause. In the 1980s, Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT, the National Intelligence Organization, a civilian agency that reports directly to the prime minister) lacked HUMINT assets in the rural southeast, where the PKK operated. This void led to the creation of Jandarma Istihbarat ve Terorle Mucadele (JITEM, the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism, the Turkish military rural police intelligence department’s own counterterrorism wing). However, MIT gathered valuable intelligence across the border in Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Greece and other European countries. Currently, MIT shares the intelligence-gathering responsibility with the Turkish General Staff’s intelligence branch, JITEM, and the Turkish National Police intelligence branch.

Failure of the Correctional System

Captured and incarcerated terrorists, far from being rehabilitated, could not even be properly supervised while in jail. Turkish prisons are notoriously “run by their inmates.” Incarcerated terrorists live in wards that they turn into terrorist training academies and give instruction not only in ideology but in practical matters such as close combat, bomb making, and other terrorist tactics. Armed groups such as DEVSOL and IBDA-C hold sway in many of Turkey’s large, overcrowded prison dormitories. A current project to transfer hard core terrorists from these wards to maximum security cells in newly built prisons has been met with great resistance from terrorist supporters and so-called human rights advocates on the outside. The transfers are aimed at breaking the inmate grip on the jails. In December 2000, Turkish authorities stormed twenty prisons around the country and forcibly removed the majority of DEVSOL and TIKKO inmates, who resisted with firearms and makeshift incendiary devices, resulting in the deaths of thirty inmates and two Turkish Gendarmerie troopers. While no less humane than similar maximum security facilities in the West and certainly less restrictive than American SuperMax prisons, the transfers are being portrayed by terrorist supporters as human rights violations. One cannot help but draw a comparison between conditions in Turkish and Peruvian jails, where once terrorists also ruled. Experts agree that regaining control of the jails helped Peruvian authorities’ overall efforts
against the Shining Path (once Peru’s major terrorist organization), ultimately contributing to that organization’s demise.

Capital Punishment

While the death sentence remains on Turkey’s statute books, no executions have been carried out since 1984. In the fight against terrorism, the deterrence factor of capital punishment is a serious card Turkey has not been able to play. Furthermore, there is public debate about abolishing capital punishment altogether so that Turkey will be in line with the European human rights norms.

Corruption

Turkey has not been very successful in curbing the underground economy and money laundering by criminals. On account of their involvement in trafficking narcotics, terrorist groups such as the PKK and DEVSOL have been able to launder their profits and transfer funds in and out of Turkey. A degree of corruption occurred among the security forces engaged in the fight against terrorism mainly because of the narcotics involved. In hindsight, it can be said that some security force members assumed that they possessed extralegal powers and exercised those for personal gain, committing acts of extortion, murder, robbery, and assistance to drug runners. The Turkish judiciary has cracked down on such corruption and racketeering since 1998.

Response to New Forms of Terrorist Violence

During the 1980s and the 1990s, Turkey encountered forms of violence that it had not experienced before. The phenomenon of suicide bombings emerged in the late 1990s in a desperate attempt by the PKK to make up for the ground it had lost in the rural areas and to export terrorism to urban centers. Both Marxists and Islamic fundamentalists successfully utilized bombs (including car bombs) to assassinate bureaucrats, security officials, and intellectuals. Security forces often fell victim to terrorist ambushes, especially in rural areas but also in the cities, as Marxist terrorists acquired heavy firepower, for example, antitank rockets, military
grade explosives such as C4, and command-detonated bomb-making capability.

Hizbullah introduced kidnapping to Turkey as a terrorist tool. This organization kidnapped hundreds of civilians, almost all of them of Kurdish origin, to obtain money and intelligence. Most of Hizbullah’s victims were eventually tortured to death. Turkish security officials recovered the bodies of perhaps less than half the people Hizbullah kidnapped in the late 1990s. As of late 2000, thirteen alleged leaders of Hizbullah faced the death penalty on charges of murdering more than 150 people and attempting the violent overthrow of Turkey’s secular order. The PKK also massively resorted to kidnapping children as young as fifteen years old from the villages and hamlets in the southeast and deploying them as “child soldiers,” especially in the first half of the 1990s.

Both the PKK and Hizbullah established a network of sympathizers—civilians who provided sanctuary, supplies, and funds to terrorists. The PKK often acknowledged that its operations would not have been so successful without the participation of this militia, which is called Koma Gel in Kurdish. It is thought to number around fifty thousand with another three hundred thousand sympathizers. The PKK and TIKKO recruited foreigners to serve in their armed formations. Citizens of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Armenia, Lebanon, Greece, and Germany are known to have participated in PKK attacks against Turkey, while TIKKO fielded Swiss nationals in the early 1990s.

ACCOUNTING FOR THE COUNTERTERRORIST STRUGGLE

As the terrorist threat continues in Turkey, the struggle against it has yielded both pluses and minuses. On the plus side, Turkey has gained the relative safety of its citizens, especially in the southeastern and eastern parts of the country. It also gained the respect of its allies and friends in the world when it came out on the winning side of the counterterrorist fight. Even during the early 1990s, at the height of the terrorist campaign in Turkey, free and fair elections continued to be held and the percentage of voters going to the polls remained above North American and European percentages. On the minus side, many young lives were lost, not only among the
security forces and civilians but also on the terrorist side. When taking stock, Turks are aware that the terrorists who met their fate fighting the state were also Turkish citizens who might have led peaceful and productive lives had they not been subverted by the terrorist organizations. Moreover, the country’s image abroad has been tarnished by allegations of human rights abuses by the security forces.

Despite more than thirty-five years of brutal urban and rural terrorism, which became an LIC, Turkey has managed to preserve its Western-style parliamentary democracy and the rule of law under its constitution without making significant compromises from its way of life. But it has done so at a hefty price.

Number of Incidents

In 1984, the year PKK began its open armed struggle against the Turkish government, the total number of terrorist incidents attributable to it was 160. Thereafter, the numbers changed as shown in table 1.

Casualties

Along with the variations in the number of incidents, the number of casualties as a result of terrorist attacks also changed. From about

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6,400⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4,000⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>500⁹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁷At the height of PKK’s campaign.
⁸Thereafter the number of incidents began to decline rapidly, although the PKK was still attacking Turkish military outposts along the Iraqi border with 122 mm Katyusha rockets.
⁹Back to the level of terrorist activity in 1985 when the PKK was in its armed propaganda stage.
130 in 1984 (including military, law enforcement, and civilians killed and wounded by terrorists), it rose to a high of 5,500 in 1994, after which the numbers declined drastically.\textsuperscript{42}

During the first ten months of 2000, 570 PKK members were taken out of action (350 killed and 220 captured). Nearly 600 supporters were arrested for aiding and abetting the terrorists. Also during the first ten months of 2000, 66 people were killed by PKK terrorists (27 security force members and 39 civilians), mostly as a result of land mines and other unexploded ordnance incidents.\textsuperscript{43} In other words, 350 terrorists were killed for the loss of 27 security force members. The 1:13 kill ratio in favor of the security forces during the first ten months of 2000 may be compared with the 1:3 ratio in 1994 and the dismal 1:2 in 1992 when the PKK enjoyed a balance of power with the security forces in certain zones in the emergency area. The kill ratio for the period between 1984 and 2000 was close to 1:6. As far as LICs are concerned, experts agree that the 1:10 ratio is a healthy indicator of a professional and seasoned COIN force getting the job done. Since 1984, the Turkish military bore the brunt of the casualties, with nearly 4,000 officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men killed in counterterrorism operations. The National Police lost almost 200 officers.

Economic Damage Inflicted by Terrorists

The national economy has been seriously impacted by the cost of fighting terrorism. Since 1984, Turkey has spent almost $100 billion on fighting terrorism and injecting capital to kick start the local economy in the southeastern part of the country, where only 10 percent of the population lives. The low per capita income in the southeast (10 percent of the per capita income in western Turkey) is attributed to the lack of natural resources except for limited oil reserves (100 percent of Turkey’s domestic oil production comes from the emergency area; the PKK has specifically targeted oil wells, pipelines, and pump stations) and rich water sources, the remoteness of the region from commercial centers, and the mountainous, nonarable nature of the land. In its heyday (the late 1980s and early 1990s), the PKK deliberately destroyed the economy of southeastern Turkey by attacking economic assets and infrastructure. Construction sites were abandoned. Mines were closed. Unemployment
skyrocketed. The entire southeastern region was turned into a desolate land where fear reigned.\textsuperscript{44}

The Turkish government invests many times more than what it collects in taxes in southeastern Turkey, the region most affected by terrorism.\textsuperscript{45} It invests more money in infrastructure and quality of life projects in southeastern Turkey than in other parts of the country. The Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi (Southeastern Anatolia Project, or GAP), a massive irrigation and hydroelectric generation project nearing completion, is estimated to cost the Turkish government $32 billion and is expected to create 3.3 million new jobs.\textsuperscript{46} It is interesting to note that captured terrorists in 1998 revealed Syrian plans in which PKK cadres would be sent to sabotage components of this project.

\textbf{LESSONS LEARNED}

From these experiences, Turks were able to draw some lessons that might be applicable to similar situations elsewhere.

\textbf{Determination Is the Key}

Even when the PKK was at the height of its campaign during the mid-1990s, the Turkish government did not consider entering into negotiations with it. This determination paid off later, as the terrorists’ strength was diminished.

\textbf{Complacency Is a Cardinal Sin}

When the PKK first struck in 1984, the authorities in Ankara dismissed its adherents as common bandits without developing so much as a curiosity about their leadership, bases, and supporters. Some experts claim that Turkey made its first major mistake in its counterterrorism strategy when in 1987 most of eastern and southeastern Turkey was transferred from martial law to emergency rule, effectively handing administrative power from the military to civilians. The civilian authorities were clearly unprepared to handle such a responsibility in an LIC environment before securing the efficient cooperation of the Turkish military.\textsuperscript{47} Even the military,
Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, and Troops and Resources Available, Time and Political Considerations (METT-TP): Analysis Is a Useful Tool

The METT-T model is an analytical tool routinely used by military commanders for planning and mission analysis. However, in an LIC environment political objectives drive military decisions at every level, from strategic to tactical, and the traditional METT-T factors are expanded to include \( P \), for political factors.\(^\text{48}\) In 1991, the Turkish General Staff under the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Dogan Gures, conducted a METT-TP analysis (Vazife-Dusman-Arazi-Kuvvet Analizi, or VDAK, in Turkish military jargon.)\(^\text{49}\) In that analysis, the Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy model, per U.S. Army’s Field Manual FM 100–20, 2–8, was probably followed. The result of the METT-TP analysis marked a turning point in the Turkish struggle against terrorism both rural and urban. Turkey adopted a preemptive COIN strategy. Presumably, that the Turkish General Staff’s METT-TP findings alone did not result in the change of tactics in 1991, but they were probably supported by a decision of the Turkish government to deal with the terrorism problem before it destroyed the regime.\(^\text{50}\)

CONCLUSIONS

PKK’s Disintegration?

Leadership

Terrorists disillusioned with Ocalan’s leadership and the PKK’s failure are increasingly leaving the organization. These terrorists are likely to start their own spin-off organizations, which may launch attacks in Turkey independent of PKK command and control. Crenshaw suggests splitting pragmatists from radical rejectionists. Such efforts can diminish public support for the terrorists and deny them a strong base from which to operate.\(^\text{51}\) Until he was arrested and brought to Turkey in 1999, PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan ruled the organization with an iron fist. Despite convening
its general assembly and electing a leadership team, Ocalan made all the decisions no matter how trivial the issues. The membership still regards him as the leader, although he is now in prison, while most day-to-day decisions are made by a temporary leadership council composed of his lieutenants—Osman Ocalan, Cemil Bayik, Nizamettin Tas, Murat Karayilan, Duran Kalkan, and Mustafa Karasu—who do not enjoy popular support among the cadres. This arrangement has contributed to divisions within the PKK. Nevertheless, should the PKK’s political expectations not be fulfilled, it can be expected to revert to armed attacks supported by Palestinian intifada-type uprisings (called serhildan in Kurdish), which it attempted once before in the 1992–93 period in Kurdish-populated areas.

Internal Dynamics

The organization’s internal dynamics are very volatile, its members torn between Kurdish nationalism, tribal loyalties, religious conviction, Marxist idealism, the concern of individuals for their well-being, and a desire to join the greater Turkish society into which most of their fellow Kurds have been integrated. In the light of these dynamics, it might be easier to appreciate the fact that more and more PKK members are leaving the organization. These internal divisions are not new. Disappointed with Ocalan’s dictatorial rule, a group of PKK members split off in 1998. As these new members were attempting to form a new organization, which they called PKK Vejin (Resurrection), they were promptly assassinated in Damascus, Syria, by Ocalan’s hardliners. Ocalan’s arrest and his conciliatory rhetoric on death row sparked a new wave of departures from the organization. As of January 2001, PKK was keeping nearly two hundred of its dissident cadres at a special prison camp in northern Iraq.

Recent Clashes

While the authorities attribute the reduced number of terrorist incidents to COIN operations, skeptics interpret the data differently. They claim that PKK’s tactical withdrawal from Turkey into northern Iraq and Iran, under Ocalan’s orders, is the reason for fewer armed clashes between terrorists and security forces. Experts point out that the clashes during 2000 were mostly instances in which in-
dividual PKK units in the field were ambushed by security forces, as opposed to the more common type of clashes that occurred a few years ago when the PKK would ambush security forces on patrol or attack military camps. Yet, as of October 2000, PKK units continued to engage Turkish security forces near the border areas close to Iran and Iraq. Nevertheless, Turkish military commanders announced in October 2000 that for the first time since 1993, when the military was given the lead in fighting the PKK in the emergency area, they were ready to hand the lead back to the law enforcement authorities—a sign that the PKK threat is perceived as diminished.52 There are also those who suggest that the PKK will use this respite to regroup and reorganize its armed militants while reserving the option to launch a new campaign of terror should Ocalan’s so-called peace initiative fail and if the PKK does not succeed in transforming itself into a legitimate political movement. Turkish intelligence commented that approximately 500 to 1,000 dissident terrorists were no longer obeying Ocalan’s lieutenants and were operating independently inside Turkey and northern Iraq, where they were preparing to establish themselves in their own bases for the winter. This group, in addition to the 4,500 to 5,000 PKK terrorists across the border in northern Iraq, continues to pose a threat to Turkey.53 This is probably why the Turkish Army sent approximately 10,000 troops along with tanks and artillery into northern Iraq in January 2001.

Jihad Alumni

Many Turkish Islamic fundamentalists have volunteered in jihad (Islamic holy war) type struggles in places such as Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia, Kosovo, Tajikistan, and Chechnya. Some of these veterans have returned to Turkey but maintain their contacts with their fellow mujaheddeen (Islamic holy warriors) abroad. The IBDA-C sports some of these veterans among its members.54 In essence, fundamentalist terrorist organizations, such as Hizbullah and IBDA-C, have sported charismatic leaders who were reluctant to share authority with their cohorts. With IBDA-C’s leader incarcerated and Hizbullah’s dead, these organizations will be working to reorganize in the near future. As they do so, Turkish authorities, who received valuable support from the Israeli intelligence agency,
Mossad, in the first few months of 2000, will continue to pursue Hizbullah terrorists, having conducted more than 720 operations against this organization in 2000 alone, arresting 2,700 suspected terrorists, 1,700 of whom were later indicted. Nevertheless, in January 2001 terrorists widely suspected to be members of Hizbullah assassinated the police chief of Diyarbakir Province in southeastern Turkey along with his five bodyguards in a military-style ambush, sending a clear message to the authorities that the organization is still alive and kicking.

In the wake of new violence and acts of terrorism in Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East, American and Israeli assets in Turkey are under increased risk of attack from Islamic fundamentalist and Marxist terrorists. Marginal Turkish leftist parties known for their sympathies for organizations such as the PKK and DEVSOL, as well as fundamentalists, including IBDA-C sympathizers, have demonstrated against not only Israel but also the United States, which they blame for the violence in Palestine.

Marxist Uproar

In 2000, Marxist terrorist organizations maintained their lowest level of operations, but this will no longer be the case in 2001. Ambushing cruisers and sniping at security buildings and vehicles, DEVSOL and TIKKO are attacking the Turkish police to avenge the deaths of thirty of their members during the prison takeovers in December 2000. In a gruesome turn of events, DEVSOL borrowed a tactic from the PKK, sending a suicide bomber to a police station in Istanbul in an attempt to kill the local police chief.

Narcoterrorism as an Emerging Threat

Collusion between Terrorism and Organized Crime

The PKK, DEVSOL, and to an extent Hizbullah have engaged in narcotics and arms trafficking as well as smuggling illegal aliens into Western Europe. These activities have grown to be a very profitable business and an important source of income by means of which the terrorist groups finance their organizations. The PKK works hard to increase the number of its supporters in Europe by using the loopholes in asylum laws. The rise in the level of profits,
especially from narcotics, means that trafficking is likely to con-
tinue regardless of the political developments that affect these or-
ganizations’ causes. Apart from voluntary contributions from the
Kurdish diaspora, whose inhabitants support the PKK, the main
source of financing is drug trafficking. In this huge enterprise, the
PKK cooperates in concert with criminal Kurdish clans in a manner
similar to that of the Sicilian Mafia families. Between 1984 and 1993,
fourteen of the forty-two tons of heroin, or 33 percent of the total,
that reached Europe were seized from Turkish citizens, 95 percent
of whom were affiliated with the PKK.

A Creeping “Colombian Syndrome”

Throughout the 1970s, Turkey’s major terrorist problem was with
the Marxists. In the 1980s, it was the Kurdish separatists. In the
1990s, Islamic fundamentalists gained prominence among other ter-
rorist groups. In the twenty-first century, the greater danger may be
from gangsters in league with terrorists, with a likely effect of nar-
coterrorism in the worst Colombian fashion. In 1993, Turkey’s top
investigative journalist, Ugur Mumcu, was assassinated in a car
bombing. Mumcu had written hundreds of articles and dozens of
books detailing the intricate relationships between Turkey’s terror-
ist organizations, drug runners, and arms traffickers. Although sus-
picion first fell on Islami Hareket terrorists, who murdered other
secular Turkish intellectuals before and after the Mumcu assassi-
nation, some experts speculated that Islami Hareket was acting as a
subcontractor for one of Turkey’s top drug barons, Behcet Canturk,
an ethnic Kurd tied to the PKK’s main man in Western Europe, Yasar
Kaya. Canturk was rumored to have paid Islami Hareket $25,000 to
assassinate Mumcu, who had published a book detailing Canturk’s
illegal activities in Turkey and Europe. Before he himself was
killed in 1994, Canturk was a key figure in the PKK’s relationship
with drug runners, a relationship similar to the Colombian Cali car-
tel’s relationship with Colombia’s major terrorist group, the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

Government Response

In October 2000, the Turkish minister of the interior, Sadettin Tantan,
a former police chief himself, underscored the emergence of cor-
ruption and racketeering as the primary threat to Turkish national
security, surpassing Kurdish separatist, Marxist, and Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.64 Concerned commentators are already calling for the Turkish National Security Council to undertake a threat analysis similar to the 1991 study, this time targeting the drug runners, money launderers, and racketeers.65 The Turkish military has expressed interest in the subject, and an effort is reportedly under way to include corruption and racketeering in the National Military Strategic Concept document.66 This is thought to be a major threat to Turkish national security that needs to be countered.67

In the past three decades, the Republic of Turkey has endured much hardship because of terrorism.68 However, the Turkish government’s determination not to give in to the demands of the terrorists, who wish to change the Turkish regime, has prevailed. Owing to its location at the crossroads of the East and the West, Turkey will continue to be targeted by terrorists in an attempt to bring it under the influence of one global political power or another. But the Turkish nation’s firm commitment to a democratic and secular way of life, as proven by the many sons and daughters it has sacrificed in the struggle against terrorism, will prevent these efforts in the twenty-first century as well.

POSTSCRIPT

WHILE THE WORLD WAS watching the news in the aftermath of the terror attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, domestic terror incidents continued to take place in Turkey. During the two months following the September 11 attacks, fifteen terrorists who belonged to the PKK, the Turkish Hizbullah, TIKKO, and DEVSOL were killed in various incidents in which eight Turkish security force members and a civilian also lost their lives.

The Turkish security forces engaged the PKK terrorists in southeastern Turkey in sporadic clashes and conducted two major cross-border operations against PKK bases in northern Iraq in the fall of 2001. Meanwhile, the PKK went forward with its efforts to “politicize” its “struggle” by creating new front organizations to engage in open political activity and to recruit new members in Belgium.

Turkey’s foremost Marxist terrorist organization, DEVSOL, also
worked harder on its own kind of public relations campaign, ordering dozens of its members in prison and outside to starve themselves to death and set themselves on fire in order to protest the transfer of their imprisoned leaders and hardcore cadres to new, maximum security prisons. As hunger strikers died in scores, with their sympathizers turning the dreadful events into macabre shows of defiance on television, other DEVSOL members became suicide bombers and attacked the Turkish police, killing officers and civilians alike in deadly attacks in Istanbul.

The Turkish Hizbullah, with most of its leaders killed, arrested, or on the run, continued to launch retaliatory attacks against the Turkish security forces and expanded from its power base in southeastern Turkey into western Turkish cities in search of new members. Hizbullah, with a long tradition of being shrouded in silence and mystery, also launched a public relations campaign, claiming responsibility for its attacks, and tried to demonstrate that it had not yet been broken while not forgetting to voice its approval of the September 11 attacks.

A fundamentalist Islamic organization, the so-called Federated Islamic State of Anatolia (FISA, also known as the Caliphate State), operating under the legal title of the Union of Islamic Societies and Communities from its base in Cologne, Germany, enjoyed support among the Turkish immigrant workers in that country. Although it is believed to have only about one thousand active members and with its leader, Metin Kaplan, serving the first year of a four-year prison term for being an accessory to murder, the FISA poses a legitimate terrorist threat to Turkey.

A Turkish Connection with September 11?

The somewhat cultish FISA provided traces of the connections between Turkish Islamic fundamentalists and the Al Qaeda network. In October 1998, several FISA members were arrested in Turkey while they prepared to launch a suicide attack against the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the modern secular Turkish state, using a single engine Cessna aircraft loaded with a large amount of explosives. The mausoleum, a national shrine to modern Turkey’s Western secular tradition, would have been the perfect target for the Islamic fundamentalists, who hate what it symbolizes as much as the
September 11 attackers hated the Twin Towers and the Pentagon for what they symbolized. German intelligence also believes that Kaplan’s followers met with Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan on several occasions after 1996 and negotiated an alliance. Shortly after September 11, one of Kaplan’s top lieutenants was arrested while trying to board a flight from Germany to Iran with terrorist training manuals and a chemical-protective suit in his luggage. American attorney general John Ashcroft declared that the man, who had also been charged for the botched 1998 suicide attack in Ankara, was a sleeper agent for Osama bin Laden. The fact that the leader of the September 11 suicide team, Mohammad Atta, while studying in Hamburg, Germany, had befriended a Turkish woman and traveled to Turkey on several occasions also raised some questions.

In light of this, it is not surprising that the American authorities have detained no less than fifty Turkish citizens along with thousands of other Muslims from the Middle Eastern countries and elsewhere. Turkish Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as IBDA-C and FISA have been working to cross-pollinate the small Turkish American community in the United States for the past few years, and the U.S. authorities were aware of the fact that several Turks participated in the activities of certain above-board Islamic organizations, mostly charities, active in the United States. Some of these charities were closed, and the U.S. government, which found them to be associated with Al Qaeda after September 11, froze their accounts. While none of the detained Turks was implicated in the attacks or held for immigration irregularities, just three weeks after the attacks the German authorities arrested a Turk along with two Yemenis for planning terrorist attacks in Germany.

As the U.S. authorities began releasing lists of individuals and companies believed to be part of the complex web of finances that supported the Al Qaeda network, some Turkish businessmen and companies appeared on the lists as well. Furthermore, as the American-assisted anti-Taliban forces advanced in Afghanistan in November 2001, some Turkish volunteers who had been fighting alongside the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces crawled out of the woodwork, and some even found themselves arrested while trying to sneak out of Afghanistan. Though very small in number, the Turkish volunteers point to the direct links between Al Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalist terrorists in Turkey.
Turkey’s Contribution to the War on Terror

The government of Turkey, on the other hand, has readily joined the U.S. war on terrorism. Taking advantage of its excellent relations with Pakistan, the Turkish president and ministers visited Gen. Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan, encouraging him to render his support to the antiterrorist coalition alongside the United States.

Turkey has had a long history of training Afghan officials in both Afghanistan and Turkey since the 1920s. Thousands of Afghan students have attended Turkish schools. On the strength of its historic and ethnic ties to Afghanistan, Turkey maintained a presence in the country even during the civil war of the 1990s. The Turkish government gave military aid to the ethnic Uzbek general Abdurrashid Dostum of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, which made it possible to develop intelligence resources in the country. For humanitarian reasons, Turkey also built and operated hospitals and schools in the Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan. These resources were useful to the coalition when the U.S. operation in Afghanistan began in October 2001.

Turkey also relied on its working experience and amicable relations in Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan, where it has been assisting the government for the last two years in its own antiterrorism campaign against Islamic fundamentalists of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an Al Qaeda affiliate. The Turkish Air Force helped revamp Soviet era airbases in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for use by coalition aircraft. Turkey readied a company of its elite Special Forces, with extensive experience in counterinsurgency operations in the mountainous Turkish southeast and northern Iraq, for duty with the Northern Alliance when the U.S. antiterrorism campaign began in October 2001. But only one squad from this company was deployed with General Dostum’s forces by the end of the year. Turkey also earmarked a navy frigate for patrol duty in the Indian Ocean and two thousand troops to participate in an international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. Inside Turkey, two thousand other Turkish soldiers, airmen, and sailors worked exclusively on coalition operations, using eight different facilities, including the joint U.S.-Turkish Incirlik airbase in southern Turkey and the joint Turkish-NATO Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Eskisehir in northwestern Turkey. Wary of the Al Qaeda assassination of
Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massood days before the September 11 attacks, Turkish police trained the bodyguards of the head of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, Burhanuddin Rabbani. Turkish police also shared their experience in fighting Islamic fundamentalist terrorists such as the Turkish Hizbullah with the American Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Impact of September 11 on Turkey’s Terrorism Problem

For years, the U.S. government has best understood and appreciated the Turkish counterterrorism effort. Unfortunately, this sentiment was not fully shared by Turkey’s European allies. Save for a symbolic ban in Germany, Turkish terrorist organizations such as the PKK and DEVSOL continue to operate unimpeded in Western Europe. Turkey has requested that its European allies blacklist these organizations, as well as Islamic fundamentalist groups such as the Turkish Hizbullah, FISA, and others, just as the United States has been doing, and freeze their funds. After September 11, the U.S. State Department added the Turkish Hizbullah to its terrorist exclusion list, which already included PKK and DEVSOL. Several European Union states with large Kurdish immigrant communities are reluctant to see the PKK on such a list, to the dismay of NATO ally Turkey. While the EU listed the PKK as a terrorist organization, it omitted the PKK’s political wing, the Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan (ERNK, or National Liberation Front of Kurdistan), DEVSOL, Turkish Hizbullah, and FISA. Turkey wanted the following organizations to be banned in Europe: PKK-ERNK, IBDA-C, FISA, Hizbullah, DEVSOL, TIKKO, MLKP, and another Islamic fundamentalist organization known as Islamic Society–National View, which Turks believed FISA had sprouted from in the early 1980s. The PKK-ERNK continues to operate as a legal party in the Netherlands and has a television station based in Great Britain. Some European governments remain paralyzed by a fear that their large Kurdish and Muslim fundamentalist populations may become restive and violent unless they go some way toward accommodating their demands. In Germany alone, there are an estimated eight hundred members of Hizbullah and many more PKK activists and sympathizers. The most visible impact of September 11 on Turkey’s terrorism problem
occurred when Germany, under pressure from the United States, finally banned FISA and froze its assets in December 2001, citing FISA’s violation of German laws. German authorities also indicated to Turkey that they might extradite FISA’s incarcerated leader, Metin Kaplan, to Turkey after the completion of his sentence in Germany, provided that Turkey promises not to execute him.

What the Future May Bring

The PKK makes about $10 million from donations, extortion, and drug running in Europe every year. The Islamic fundamentalist organizations also collect millions of dollars from Turkish immigrant worker communities in Western Europe under the guise of Islamic investment schemes, from which they divert funds to terrorist activities. Turkey has advised its NATO allies that the PKK uses bank accounts in Switzerland, Jersey Island, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, and southern Cyprus to launder its money, while the Islamic fundamentalists rely on couriers who carry cash by hand. This flow of money also feeds underground economic activities in Turkey, compounding the spiral of corruption and lawlessness. In order to better combat this problem, Turkey has passed new legislation, in accordance with the UN Treaty for the Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism, allowing it to compensate the victims of terrorism out of the frozen funds of the terrorists. The Turkish Treasury also cooperated closely with the United States to go after the funds and front companies affiliated with the Al Qaeda organization that operated in Turkey.

With its German activities curbed, FISA was expected to shift its operations to the Netherlands, where it has invested around $13 million of the funds collected from its thirty thousand supporters. In Austria, Turkish Hizbullah and FISA members were already using the same locations for their meetings. The combination of FISA’s finances and Hizbullah’s military capabilities presented the perfect combination to attack Western, especially American, targets inside Turkey, such as the Incirlik airbase, which bin Laden had reportedly ordered his followers to prepare to attack. Allied aircraft have used Incirlik since the end of the Gulf War in 1991 to enforce the northern no-fly zone in Iraq. It would probably be one of the nerve centers in the event of an expansion of the American war on terrorism to Iraq.
Such a possible development worries Turkish officials due to the fact that it would further burden the already struggling Turkish economy, which has suffered a great deal due to the loss of trade with Iraq under UN sanctions and the loss of oil pipeline revenues from that country. Any operations against Iraq would also damage the tourism industry in Turkey, one of the few lifesavers in the ongoing economic crisis. Thus, by the end of 2001 Turkey and EU states were opposing military action against Iraq unless it is proved Baghdad had a hand in the suicide airliner or anthrax attacks on the United States.

As the Turkish Hizbullah, with its new leader, Isa Altsoy, who is believed to be hiding in Germany under an assumed name with an Iranian passport, worked to recruit new members and replenish its arsenal, and as the worsening clashes between Israel and the Palestinians further antagonized Muslim sentiment toward the West, by the end of 2001 it became clear that the fight against terrorism, and particularly against Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, will be a long-term process.