AS WE HAVE ENTERED the twenty-first century, terrorism remains a vital threat to national and global security interests. Thus, scores of countries have experienced sporadic and relentless subnational and government-sponsored terrorism. Epitomizing the state of anarchy in contemporary life and increasingly becoming a universal nightmare, terrorism includes kidnapping of businesspeople, assassination of political leaders, bombing of embassies, and hijacking of aircraft. In contrast to its older features, modern terrorism has introduced a new breed of warfare in terms of technology, victimization, threats, and responses.

The most devastating terrorist carnage ever recorded occurred on September 11, 2001. Nineteen terrorists hijacked four U.S. airliners, which they crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York; the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia; and a third location, not the intended target, a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The cost in terms of human lives, including the passengers and crew on the planes as well as the persons murdered in New York and the Pentagon, is about three thousand dead and thousands injured.

At 8:45 A.M., American Airlines Flight 11, en route from Boston to Los Angeles with eighty-one passengers and eleven crew members, crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. United Airlines Flight 175, also headed from Boston to Los Angeles and carrying fifty-six passengers and nine crew members, slammed into the
South Tower at 9:03 a.m. At 9:43 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77, scheduled to fly from Washington Dulles International Airport to Los Angeles with fifty-eight passengers and six crew members, crashed into the northwest side of the Pentagon. At 10:10 a.m., United Airlines Flight 93, headed from Newark to San Francisco and carrying thirty-eight passengers and seven crew members, crashed in Pennsylvania during a struggle between the hijackers and passengers.

This unprecedented attack and its grave implications raise a new set of security concerns affecting all civilized nations. Indeed, the coming years will undoubtedly see not only spectacular events such as those of September 11 but also various perpetrators (e.g., nations, organizations, and individuals) with the intent and capability to resort to “superterrorism”—biological, chemical, and nuclear. Exploiting new technologies, terrorists may also attempt cyberattacks against the critical infrastructure systems and economic bases.

These conventional and unconventional challenges to the world’s stability require effective national, regional, and global efforts to counter all forms of terrorism. It is not surprising, therefore, that the last four decades have seen a vast amount of literature from governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental perspectives on strategies for responding to terrorism. These conflicting publications and reports, whether official or scholarly, have resulted in confusion and chaos for students, the public, and policymakers, in particular.

The purpose of this policy-relevant research study is to examine the responses of ten selected nations that have encountered terrorist threats, to determine what worked and what did not, and to offer a comprehensive “best practices” counterterrorism strategy agenda for the twenty-first century.

The introduction consists of two sections: first, an overview of the terrorism challenges, focusing on the definitional issue, modus operandi, and future prospects; and, second, a discussion of the rationale as well as the content of the volume. A summary of the experiences of the ten countries’ case studies is detailed in the concluding chapter. It should be noted that the ten country-specific chapters were completed before the September 11 attacks. The contributors, however, have added commentaries in the form of “postscripts” based on the impact of these attacks.
A DEFINITIONAL FOCUS

Many governments have failed to appreciate the extent and implications of the terrorist threat to modern societies. As a result, a large number of countries, including Western democracies, have not developed strong commitments to deal effectively with the challenge. A major reason for this failure is the definitional and moral confusion over what constitutes terrorism. Every sovereign state reserves to itself the political and legal authority to define terrorism in the context of domestic and foreign affairs.

For example, in November 2001, Syria and the United States disagreed on the status of the Lebanese “guerrilla group” Hizbullah, with Syria arguing that it should not qualify as a terrorist organization. Thus, various countries have developed their own legal definitions of what constitutes terrorism. Canada’s description is based on its Security Offenses Act (1984) and its Security Intelligence Service Act (1984). These laws do not explicitly define terrorism but apply to “threats to the security of Canada.” Such threats include “activities within or relating to Canada directed toward, or in support of, the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political objective within Canada or a foreign state.”

In its Penal Code (chapters I and II of Title II), France, as another example, ties terrorist-related act, defined as “an act by an individual or group that uses intimidation or terror to disrupt public order,” to the code’s general criminal offenses. Although this definition does not mention political motivation, an act would not be labeled an act of terrorism unless it was linked to some political motive or cause.

In short, an analysis of various governmental as well as academic views on the subject indicates that there is no consensus of what terrorism is. Nevertheless, there seems to be an agreement related to several components, such as the nature of the act (e.g., unlawful), perpetrators (e.g., individuals, groups, or states), objectives (e.g., political), intended outcomes and motivations (e.g., fear and frustration), targets (e.g., victims), and methods (e.g., hostage taking).

On the basis of these elements, the following working definition was suggested to the contributors of this volume: terrorism is defined as the calculated employment or the threat of violence by
individuals, subnational groups, and state actors to attain political, social, and economic objectives in the violation of law. These acts are intended to create an overwhelming fear in a target area larger than the victims attacked or threatened.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW

Terrorism, as a cost-effective tool of low-intensity conflict that projects psychological intimidation and physical force in violation of law, has ancient roots. Examples are the attacks mounted by the Jewish religious extremists known as the Zealot Sicarii against the Romans in occupied Judea as well as the martyrdom missions of the Hashashin (assassins) targeting the Crusaders in the Middle East. The former were active for seventy years in the first century, and the latter lasted some two hundred years—from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. Their experience has proven that terrorism can be attractive, effective, and durable, even if the tools are rather primitive.

In subsequent periods, several European maritime states between the sixteenth and late eighteenth centuries employed pirates, or privateers, to terrorize the seas for the purpose of advancing foreign policy objectives. By the time of the Reign of Terror (1793–94) during the French Revolution, terrorism from “above” and “below” was commonplace. A variety of European groups, nourished by extremist political theories (e.g., left- and right-wing ideologies) and militant nationalism, have attained some tactical successes. Resorting to regicide and other terrorist activities, such as bombing, terrorists assassinated a considerable number of European rulers and officials, including Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Although not intended by the perpetrator, the murder of the Austrian archduke in Sarajevo drew the powers into World War I. The period between the two world wars also witnessed waves of attacks in such regions of the world as Asia and the Middle East, where nationalist groups fought for liberation from colonial rule.

It was not until the late 1960s that terrorism became a constant fixture of international life. Rapid developments in modern technology, improvements in communications facilities, and inexpensive
and rapid travel contributed to the proliferation of indigenous international terrorist groups and to the intensification of ideological and political violence (e.g., the rise of Palestinian terrorism following the Arab defeat in the Six Day War of 1967).

More specifically, present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of violence, in terms of both threats and responses, that makes it clear that we have entered an “Age of Terrorism” with serious implications for national, regional, and global security. Perhaps the most significant dangers that result from modern-day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.

Thus, despite the end of the Cold War and the evolving New World Order, terrorism remains as threatening as ever. Undoubtedly, conflicts emerging from ideological, religious, and national animosities will continue to make terrorism a global problem well into the twenty-first century. The vulnerability of modern society and its infrastructure, coupled with the opportunities for the utilization of sophisticated high-leverage conventional and unconventional weaponry, requires states, both unilaterally and in concert, to develop credible responses and capabilities in order to minimize future threats. Ensuring the safety and interests of its citizens at home and abroad will, therefore, continue to be every government’s paramount responsibility in the coming months and years. Understanding the methods of operation employed by terrorists, identifying the threats and specific targets both present and future, and knowing the damage and consequences that may result from acts of terror violence will assist governments in responding to the reality of terrorism.

**TERRORISTS’ MODUS OPERANDI**

Contemporary terrorist groups have utilized a wide range of tactics in order to achieve their political, social, or economic objectives. These methods of operation have included arson, bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, facility attacks, destruction of property, the slaughter of innocent people, and assassinations. The terrorist
arsenal comprises not only explosives and arms, such as guns, but includes more sophisticated weapons, such as antitank rockets and ground-to-air missiles.

While a general pattern of criminal behavior may be attributed to all terrorists, the modus operandi of terrorist groups will vary considerably depending on each group’s motivation and capabilities. Groups that are small and unsophisticated can be expected to rely mostly on bombings. Those with state support and whose members possess great skills will probably attempt to carry out more complex operations such as kidnappings, assassinations, facility attacks, and hijacking.

What is of particular concern is the fact that “superweapons” are slowly emerging upon the terrorist scene. That is, as technological developments offer new capabilities for terrorist groups, their modus operandi may change. According to various intelligence reports, at least a dozen terrorist groups have shown an interest in acquiring biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. When the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo terrorist doomsday cult mounted the sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway in 1995, which killed twelve people and injured more than five thousand, it was seeking more lethal weapons than sarin when its leaders were arrested.

And yet, having attained considerable tactical success during the past four decades, terrorists sometimes find it politically expedient to restrain the level of political violence. It is important to understand that these self-imposed restraints will not persist indefinitely and that future incidents may continue to be costly in terms of human lives and property. Certain conditions, such as religious extremism or perceptions that their “cause” is lost, could provide terrorists with an incentive to escalate their attacks dramatically.

Indeed, future terrorist incidents could be much more costly in terms of human lives and property than in the past. The use of weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, or nuclear) as instruments of terrorism could inflict large-scale damage on persons and property. For instance, while the probability of nuclear terrorism remains low in comparison with biological and chemical terrorism, the consequences for mass destruction could be enormous. Thus, if a bomb is stolen (or built by a terrorist group with reasonable resources and talent), an explosion in a major city one kiloton in magnitude (one-twentieth the power of the Hiroshima at-
tack) would cause more than one hundred thousand fatalities and damage totaling billions of dollars. The human, physical, and psychological consequences of such an incident would be far more catastrophic than those of the Three Mile Island or Chernobyl accidents caused by operators who innocently overrode key safety systems of nuclear reactors.

**FUTURE PROSPECTS: TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY TRENDS**

The bloody record of terror violence underscores, once again, the fact that terrorism is a permanent fixture of international life, epitomizing the state of anarchy in modern societies that is becoming a universal nightmare. It is safe to assume, therefore, that terrorism will continue into the twenty-first century. This prognosis is born from the reality that many of the causes that motivate terrorists, such as ideological, political, and national animosities, will remain unresolved, thereby encouraging terrorists to instigate violence to achieve political, economic, and social change.

There are several specific reasons why terrorism will grow in the future. First, it has proved to be very successful in attracting publicity, disrupting the activities of governments and businesses, and causing significant amounts of death and destruction. Second, arms, explosives, supplies, financing, and secret communications are readily available. Third, an international support network of groups and states exist that greatly facilitates the undertaking of terrorist activities.

Advances in science and technology are slowly turning all of modern society into a potential victim of terrorism. As such, there is no immunity for the noncombatant segment or nations with any direct connection to political violence motivated by particular conflicts. Superterrorism, then, is likely to have an unprecedented and serious impact on the future quality of life and on orderly, civilized existence.

More specifically, it is conceivable that a highly motivated and desperate terrorist group with technological and financial assets will attempt to improve its bargaining leverage by resorting to mass destructive violence. Such a determined group would be willing to take numerous risks in acquiring and using such weapons.
Because the confrontation is seen by many groups as an “all or nothing” struggle, in case of failure the terrorists are prepared to bring the government to submission, to actually use these weapons and in the process to bring devastation and destruction to many lives, including their own. For these terrorists, the fear of deterrence or retaliation does not exist as it does in the case of states.

It is obvious that the prospects of success for such a group would be enhanced if it had previously demonstrated high technological capabilities and a strong willingness to incur the high risks involved in similar ventures. Even if there were some skepticism about the credibility of the threat, no rational government would lightly risk an unconventional incident. The danger here is that if one subnational body succeeds in achieving its goals then the temptation for other terrorist groups to use, or threaten to use, similar weapons may become irresistible.

In view of these considerations, the arsenal of tomorrow’s terrorist might include biological, chemical, and nuclear instruments of massive potential. These weapons are capable of producing from several thousand to several million casualties in a single incident and of causing governmental disruption of major proportions and widespread public panic.

Notwithstanding the assumption that in the short term future biological and chemical terrorism is feasible technologically, the specter of nuclear terrorism, such as the explosion of a nuclear bomb, the use of fissionable material as a radioactive poison, and the seizure and sabotage of nuclear facilities, is seen by many experts as plausible and by others as inevitable. At this time, however, a credible threat or hoax involving a nuclear device, holding for political or economic ransom a reactor or other nuclear facility or shipment of reactor fuel or waste, or the truck bombing of a reactor may be the most likely forms of nuclear terrorism.

Moreover, the evolving threat of cyberterrorism should also be considered. It is the prevailing assessment of intelligence agencies, strategic thinkers, and scientists that not only “hackers” and “crackers” (criminal hackers) but also terrorists (individuals, groups, or state sponsors) are likely to intensify the exploitation of the new “equalizer” weapon as a form of electronic warfare. It is estimated, for instance, that hostile low-risk perpetrators launching a well-
coordinated attack with about thirty computer experts strategically placed around the globe and a budget of approximately ten million dollars could bring even the United States, the only superpower, to its knees.

There are numerous other devastating scenarios, including altering formulas for medications at pharmaceutical plants, “crashing” telephone systems, misrouting passenger trains, changing the pressure in gas pipelines to cause valve failure, disrupting the operations of air traffic control, triggering oil refinery explosions and fires, scrambling the software used by emergency services, “turning off” power grids, and simultaneously detonating hundreds of computerized bombs around the world.

In sum, this new medium of communication, and command and control, supplemented by unlimited paralyzing and destructive keyboard attacks on civilian and military critical infrastructure nerve centers, forces us to think about the “unthinkable” with great concern.

When suicidal terrorists hijacked four regularly scheduled passenger aircraft in flight and succeeded in crashing them into the World Trade Center in Manhattan and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned to learn that terrorists had struck such a devastating blow at symbols of the nation’s commercial and military power. Although one of the hijacked aircraft crashed in an open field in Pennsylvania, missing its unknown intended target, the terrorists still succeeded in killing everyone aboard the four aircraft, including themselves.

With the crashes, the toll on lives in buildings and on the ground was horrific. In all, about three thousand people were killed and thousands of others were injured. The twin buildings of the World Trade Center were destroyed, and neighboring property was subjected to much damage as well.

The world in general and Americans in particular asked many questions, not least of which were:

Who was responsible for such an atrocity?

What did the people who committed these deeds expect to accomplish?

How did the terrorists succeed in taking control of the aircraft despite airport security procedures?
Why did the intelligence and law enforcement authorities, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), fail to learn of the operation in advance and prevent it from happening?

Some answers to these questions have been offered. Investigation has revealed that nineteen men participated in the four hijackings and that many supporters—numbering perhaps one hundred or more—helped with the preparations. Almost immediately, the September 11 hijackings were linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda (the Base organization). This global network, also known as the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders as well as the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Shrines, opposes all nations and institutions that are not governed in a manner consistent with its extremist interpretation of Islam. Since the United States supports some of these “corrupt” governments, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, bin Laden has declared war on America as early as the attacks perpetrated against U.S. troops in Somalia and the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993.

Since these operations, Al Qaeda has been blamed for other operations directed against the United States, including the 1995 car bombing of the American-operated Saudi National Guard Training Center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; the 1996 attack at Khobar Towers, a U.S. Air Force housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; the 1998 truck bombings outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and the suicide bombings of the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, in 2000. These attacks resulted in the deaths of thousands, including many Americans.

It is against this background that President George W. Bush, speaking before Congress on September 20, 2001, declared a global war against Al Qaeda and terrorism in general. Subsequently, the United States and its international coalition went to war against bin Laden’s bases in Afghanistan and against the Taliban regime.

While this military battle has been won, many other issues remain concerning the most devastating terrorist attack in world history. Although they were by no means definitive, government officials and terrorism specialists offered answers to the various questions about the September 11 attack. The terrorists may have believed that they would go to Heaven because they had acted in
support of Islam against the American enemy. The terrorists used knives as weapons to take over the aircraft. Finally, intelligence and law enforcement officials had learned that some of the individuals later named as directly responsible for hijacking the aircraft were in the United States. But these officials had no prior knowledge that such a murderous act was planned. Only after the event did investigators put some pieces of the puzzle together and learn that the terrorists had planned and trained for this event for perhaps two years. Some analysts pointed out that it is extremely difficult to penetrate Middle Eastern terrorist groups, just as it is to penetrate Mafia organizations, because of strong personal, family, and traditional ties in the region.

Although time was needed to gather the necessary information about responsibility for the disaster, the nation began to focus its attention on counterterrorism in order to prevent terrorist incidents from occurring in the future or, if they did, to minimize the damage.

The notion that an act of military terrorism could occur was not new to the United States. Indeed, the largest act of domestic terrorism in American history was the bomb blast on April 19, 1995, that destroyed the nine-story Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. This devastating attack perpetrated by two American terrorists claimed 168 lives, including those of 19 children, and wounded 674 people. The explosion, which resulted from the detonation of a 4,800 pound ammonium nitrate fuel oil bomb carried in a truck, not only destroyed the federal building but severely damaged or destroyed twenty-five other structures. In addition, another three hundred buildings were damaged and window glass shattered in a ten-block radius.

Aside from such indigenous domestic terrorist activity, the reality of international Islamic groups operating in the United States in the last decade has become evident. Seeking to achieve common political, social, or economic objectives that transcend national differences, these terrorists, operating under the banner of radical Islam, struck at the United States massively on February 26, 1993. A devastating car bomb explosion occurred in the parking garage at the World Trade Center in New York City, killing 6 people and injuring 1,042 others. The bomb, consisting of approximately twelve hundred pounds of explosives, resulted in a crater of 150 feet in
diameter and five stories high. The attack caused considerable damage to the garage, hundreds of vehicles were demolished, and the Vista Hotel, located directly above the detonation site, was badly damaged.

The perpetrators of this attack, considered at that time to have been the single largest international terrorist incident that had ever occurred in the United States, were arrested, convicted, and are currently serving their sentences. They include people from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestinian Authority areas, and the United States.

Following the World Trade Center attack, members of the international radical Islamic network once again posed a significant threat to American security interests. In June 1993, a group of terrorists consisting of Egyptians, Sudanese, a Jordanian, and a Puerto Rican were apprehended by the FBI in an aborted plot directed at a number of New York City landmarks and various political figures. The terrorists had targeted the United Nations, a New York federal building, the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during his 1993 visit to New York, and at least two U.S. political figures. The conspirators were subsequently convicted and sentenced for their criminal activities.

This plot and the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, as well as numerous attacks abroad, underscored most dramatically the vulnerability of the United States to threats originating from both domestic and international terrorism, with resulting dire human, political, economic, and strategic consequences.

In light of this reality, it is not surprising, therefore, that the United States has adopted an elaborate counterterrorism strategy. The record indicates that while thousands of terrorist incidents were recorded in the past four decades a number of international plots were aborted due to effective intelligence and law enforcement efforts. One of the best-known aborted operations was the plan of groups affiliated with Al Qaeda to destroy a dozen U.S. jumbo jets flying Asia-Pacific routes in 1995. The three terrorists involved in the plot were arrested overseas, brought to the United States, and convicted in federal court.

This successful example is, however, an exception to the victimization of the United States both at home and abroad. As always, new terrorist acts occurred and the nation hoped that it had the personnel and weapons needed to deal successfully with the problem.
It took many measures, such as increasing security in government buildings and at airports, enacting antiterrorism laws, expanding antiterrorism law enforcement authority and operations, promoting antiterrorism treaties, and even taking military action against a state sponsor of terrorism, to prevent attacks on U.S. interests.

In both the executive and legislative branches of the federal government and in state and local governments as well, it was generally believed that acts of terrorism in one form or another would be a continuing threat. And so it was generally agreed that both the American government and the American people ought to be prepared.

In experiencing problems of terrorism, the United States, of course, was not alone. Every country on our planet has a terrorism problem, although some are more serious than others. Names of the organizations remind us of the global reach of terrorism. The Red Brigades in Italy, the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, the Baader-Meinhof gang in West Germany, Hamas in the Middle East, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey, and the Shining Path in Peru are but a few of the terrorist groups that engaged in violent acts, some of which were so extensive that they threatened governmental authority and in doing so caused governments to appear powerless.

Governments so challenged responded to acts of terrorism in different ways. Politically, one response was to seek political means of conciliation to resolve underlying issues in an effort to undermine popular support for terrorist acts. Another response was the widespread repression not only of terrorists but of innocent civilians as well. Other responses included military attacks and police raids on supposed terrorist sites, freezing the financial assets of individuals believed to be connected to the terrorists, arranging for training in counterterrorism practices, and rallying international support, to name but a few.

In responding to the terrorist challenge, the enemies of terrorism would be helped if they had an understanding of the experiences of many countries. What worked successfully in one country could possibly work in another. To be sure, nations differ in their problems, leadership, resources, and popular support so that a policy that worked in one country might not be successful applied to another. Nevertheless, lessons learned in counterterrorism policies and practices in different countries can offer valuable insights to
those officials responsible for setting policy. It is this principle that sparked the interest of the contributors to this volume.

This book presents analyses of counterterrorism policies in ten countries in different areas of the world, including North and South America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Specifically, the countries examined are the United States, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Spain, the United Kingdom, Israel, Turkey, India, and Japan. The authors include former government officials as well as journalists, academics, and terrorism experts from these countries.

In undertaking this project, guidelines were established. It was recognized, however, that it would be impossible to impose strict rules. In this regard, the participants understood at the outset that they might not even agree on the meaning of certain terms. After all, the term terrorism has hundreds of definitions. Even the agencies of the U.S. government do not agree among themselves on the definition of the term. Some observers say, perhaps cynically, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” Moreover, the expertise of the authors varies. Still, we thought that we would make a contribution to the study of terrorism by focusing on what does and does not work in counterterrorism. The effort was seen not as a definitive study but as a survey that would be of value to anyone interested in understanding counterterrorism options.

The contributors were asked to consider a number of factors that have an influence on the success of counterterrorism: the political environment, terrorist threats and counterterrorism policies, the legal environment, the public affairs environment, the counterterrorism organizational structure, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic methods, economic measures, and military responses.

In addition, the contributors were asked to focus on four questions. First, in a particular country what is the governmental and public perception of the terrorist threat on the conventional and unconventional levels? Second, how successful were the government’s policies and actions in combating both domestic and international terrorism? Success was to be evaluated in terms of the following criteria.

- Reduction in the number of terrorist incidents
- Reduction in the number of casualties in terrorist incidents
- Reduction in the monetary cost inflicted by terrorist incidents
Reduction in the size of terrorist groups operating in a country
Number of terrorists killed, captured, and/or convicted
Protection of national infrastructures (e.g., transportation, communications, economic and political institutions, and security installations and units)
Preservation of basic national structures and policies (e.g., the rule of law, democracy, and civil rights and liberties)

Third, what factors influence the government’s willingness and ability to cooperate with other nations in combating terrorism? And, fourth, what does the counterterrorism balance sheet of the specific country look like?

In the ten countries under examination, the numbers of terrorist organizations are many and their tactics vary. A brief and select description of some of these organizations and the tactics they have used sets the stage for understanding the problems that government agencies entrusted with counterterrorism responsibilities have to face.

Since the essays in this volume were written, in 1999–2001, terrorist activities in the different countries have continued and at times even escalated. Several updated examples will suffice to illustrate the kind of such attacks in November and December 2001:

Peru: Shining Path terrorists bombed an electric tower near Lima.
Colombia: Members of the AUC murdered fifteen bus passengers.
Spain: An ETA gunman shot and killed two regional Basque police officers.
Israel: A Hamas suicide bomber attacked a civilian bus in Haifa, killing sixteen people and injuring sixty others.

More extensive, updated versions of the essays are provided by the contributors as postscripts to their country chapters.

For its part, the United States has been a frequent target of terrorism both at home and abroad. While the most damaging operation occurred on September 11, 2001, with the hijacking and crashes of four aircraft, there have been many other international attacks. Among the attacks on the United States were the following: the 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Teheran, during which American
diplomats were held hostage for 444 days; the bombing of the U.S. embassy and the Marine headquarters in Beirut in 1983; the 17 day hijacking of Trans-World Airlines (TWA) Flight 847 in 1985; and the 1988 destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland. The United States has also had to deal with domestic terrorists, including leftist and rightist groups with ideological and political agendas that reject U.S. policy on both the domestic and foreign fronts. Retired ambassador Philip C. Wilcox Jr., who has served as U.S. ambassador at large and coordinator for counterterrorism, considers the U.S. government’s role in handling such matters.

Argentina has a tradition of alternating military juntas and democratic governments, a situation that has set the stage for significant state- and nonstate-initiated acts of terrorism. During the peak of the right-wing juntas in the 1960s and 1970s, thousands of civilians disappeared while others were arrested or tortured. This infliction of state violence against certain segments of the populace led to strong reactions among revolutionary factions. During the 1970s, the Montoneros, a left-wing, Peronist, urban guerrilla group, conducted kidnappings of prominent Argentine and foreign businessmen as well as attacks against armed forces’ equipment and personnel. Another active left-wing group, which attacked similar targets, was the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP). The key right-wing organization was the Argentine Anti-communist Alliance.

International terrorism struck Jewish and Israeli targets in Argentina during the 1990s. In 1992, the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed, killing twenty-nine people. The Islamic Jihad, an arm of the Iran-backed Hizbullah, claimed responsibility. More devastating was the 1994 attack staged by a suicide bomber who detonated a vehicle loaded with explosives in front of Argentina’s main Jewish center, resulting in the deaths of eighty-six people and the wounding of more than three thousand. The Followers of God, a previously unknown Middle Eastern group, claimed responsibility for the attack. Dr. Roger W. Fontaine, a journalist for Tiempos del Mundos in Washington, D.C., analyzes the Argentine counterterrorism experience.

In the case of Peru, two principal insurgency groups, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), inflicted bombings, kidnappings, murder, and mayhem on domestic and foreign civilians and military and political targets. Shin-
ing Path, formed in the late 1960s by Abimael Guzmán, sought to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a revolutionary peasant regime. Guzmán and other leaders, who were captured in the early 1990s, staged such dramatic terrorist attacks as bombing a location near the Congress building in Lima in 1987, which left forty dead; assassinating provincial mayors in 1986; blowing up electrical towers; and bombing the U.S. embassy in Lima in 1983.

The Marxist MRTA, established in 1984, received support from Nicaragua and Cuba. It carried out various attacks against Peruvian, U.S., and other foreign targets. For instance, it bombed two U.S. Information Service Centers in Lima in 1988 and the Bolivian embassy in 1987. It also attacked the Lima offices of the Texaco Corporation in 1985. It was responsible for the takeover of the Japanese ambassador’s residence in Lima in 1996, which involved the capture of hundreds of hostages. In 1997, Peruvian antiterrorist and military forces liberated the remaining hostages and killed the MRTA members. Prof. Alberto Bolivar of the Peruvian Institute for Geopolitical and Strategic Studies in Lima, Peru, reviews counterterrorism strategies in Lima.

Terrorist organizations in Colombia historically consisted of Marxist-inspired insurgent groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and several others that over the years were formed and defeated or negotiated settlements with the government. The activities of FARC include bombings, murder, kidnapping, extortion, and hijacking as well as guerrilla and conventional military action against Colombian political, military, and economic targets. Foreign citizens are often kidnapped and held for ransom, which is used to fund these activities. Entities with assets more than a million dollars are “taxed” by FARC. It has well-documented ties to narcotics traffickers, principally through the provision of armed protection. In March 1999, FARC executed three U.S. Indian rights activists on Venezuelan territory after it kidnapped them in Colombia.

The ELN annually conducts hundreds of kidnappings for ransom, often targeting foreign employees of large corporations, especially in the petroleum industry. It also frequently assaults energy infrastructure and has inflicted major damage on pipelines and the electric distribution network.

In recent years, several non-Marxist terrorist groups have
emerged in Colombia. Right-wing self-defense forces such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) use terrorist tactics to fight the FARC and ELN. The AUC has been accused of numerous acts of terrorism, including the massacre of hundreds of civilians, the forced displacement of entire villages, and the kidnapping of political figures to force recognition of group demands. In 2000, it committed at least seventy-five massacres, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, which were designed to terrorize and intimidate local populations into accepting AUC control. It has also committed hundreds of kidnappings, including the abduction of seven Colombian members of Congress in November 2000. Criminal groups like the drug cartels are also known to use terrorist techniques in Colombia. James Zackrison of Oxford University examines Colombia’s counterterrorism efforts.

Terrorism has plagued Spain since the late 1950s with the formation of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), which aims to create an independent state in the Basque country. This group has been responsible for numerous bombings, assassinations of government officials, and campaigns of terror directed against tourist sites. In all, ETA has killed more than eight hundred people during its existence. Professors Antonio Remiro Brotóns and Carlos Espósito of the Universidad Autonoma de Madrid evaluate Spain’s counterterrorism campaign and its successes and failures.

For the United Kingdom, the major terrorism challenge has been the activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), also known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The IRA was formed in Ulster, Northern Ireland, for the purpose of unifying Ireland. Its activities included bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and robberies. Before the 1994 cease-fire, the IRA attacked British targets and Northern Ireland loyalists. Despite the ongoing peace process, Catholic splinter groups as well as Protestant opponents to a political solution continue their violent activities.

The British experience with terrorism is not only related to the Irish problem but is connected to the activities of a variety of foreign nationals, such as Middle Eastern operatives, active in the United Kingdom. For instance, one Palestinian terrorist group attempted to assassinate Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom and tried to attack an Israeli aircraft. Great Britain has been the target of many acts of terrorism abroad, and tourists traveling outside
the country have been victims. Col. Terence Taylor, retired, assistant director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, assesses the British counterterrorism experience.

Israel has been the target of terrorism initiated by various extremist Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic groups at home and abroad. Even after the signing of the Oslo Peace Accord with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993, the Jewish state continues to be plagued by terrorism.

Hamas pursues the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. Its military arm, 'Izz al-Din al-Kassam, has conducted many attacks against civilian and military targets. Israeli facilities and citizens have been targets of many attacks outside of Israel, such as the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, which was perpetrated by Iranian agents. Other state sponsors of terrorism, including Libya, Iraq, and Syria, have also targeted Israel.

Israel has also faced Jewish terrorism. In 1994, for example, an Israeli religious extremist massacred forty-three Muslims at a historic Hebron mosque. During the following year, a Jewish terrorist and opponent of the peace process assassinated Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. Gen. Shlomo Gazit, retired, senior fellow at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, analyzes the Israeli counterintelligence effort.

Turkey has experienced terrorism from ideological, religious, and ethnic sources. The Kurds, Marxists, and Islamic fundamentalists have posed the main threats. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which is dedicated to an independent Armenian state within a portion of present-day Turkey, has murdered officials, and bombed Turkish targets in Europe and the United States.

The greatest threat posed by terrorists in Turkey, however, is from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Marxist-Leninist insurgent movement seeking to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. The PKK has conducted a terrorist campaign not only in Turkey but throughout Europe. Its operatives have received financial and training support from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Turkish ambassador Gunduz S. Aktan, retired, and investigative journalist Ali M. Koknar analyze the Turkish counterterrorism effort.

Three kinds of terrorism in India are analyzed: (1) cross-border
terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir; (2) terrorism with internal roots, but supported by external forces, in the northeastern states and Punjab; and (3) domestic terrorism with no external links in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh.

Numerous Sikh terrorist organizations advocating a separate Sikh state of Khalistan have engaged in various violent activities in India and elsewhere. In 1984, Sikh terrorists assassinated Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi. Kashmir is the site of the most intense terrorist activities. The Harakat ul-Ansar organization seeks Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. More specifically, the group is dedicated to continuing an armed struggle against “nonbelievers” and anti-Islamic forces. Although the group has mounted operations against Indian security forces and civilian targets in Kashmir, its members have also participated in attacks in Burma, Tajikistan, and Bosnia. Ved Marwah, research professor at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, describes India’s counterterrorism efforts.

The best-known incident of terrorism in Japan was the attack by Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult, in the Tokyo subway in which terrorists used poisonous sarin gas to kill twelve people and injure five thousand. Before Aum Shinrikyo, Japan’s major threat came from the leftist Japanese Red Army (JRA). A Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1971, JRA conducted many activities, including the 1972 Lod Airport attack in Israel in which twenty-six people were killed; the 1975 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; the 1987 rocket attack against the British embassy in Rome; the 1988 rocket attack against the U.S. embassy in Spain; and cooperation with Hizbullah in Lebanon in 1977. Isao Itabashi and Masamichi Ogawara of the Council for Public Policy in Tokyo, and David Leheny, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, analyze Japanese counterterrorism strategies.

It is hoped that this scholarly effort will stimulate further study and research, with a view to devise “best practices” responses to the global scourge of terrorism.