UNITED STATES


2. Information provided by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State.

3. Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999) (hereafter *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998*); *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999*. Of the 111 attacks against U.S. targets in 1998, 77 were nonlethal bombings of a multinational pipeline in Colombia that terrorists regarded as a U.S. target. The number of international terrorist attacks worldwide and the number of attacks against U.S. targets rose sharply in 1999 to 392 and 169, respectively. The significant increase in 1999 runs counter to the previous trend. It was due primarily to 91 nonlethal attacks on American-owned oil pipelines in Colombia; dozens of nonlethal attacks on property of various nations in Europe in protest against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing in Serbia; and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK).

4. *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, various editions, and information obtained from the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Statistics are one measure of the harm caused by terrorism, but trend lines are uneven. For example, a single catastrophic act of terrorism, like the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 in 1988, which killed 193 Americans, can significantly alter the averages.
9. Ibid.; see also 22 *U.S. Code*, secs. 2780, 2371.
13. *Islamist* is a term often used in the current literature. It means Muslims who promote the idea of an Islamic state.
16. *Attorney General: Guidelines* is quite strict and prohibits surveillance on grounds of suspicion based on radical views. These guidelines are policy, but they are also based on the right to privacy and freedom from search and seizure, rights that are protected by the Constitution and the laws thereunder.
18. Most U.S. antiterrorism statutes are found in Title 18, *U.S. Code*.
28. Ibid.
30. Travel advisories, as of March 18, 2002, could be obtained at <www.travel.state.gov/travel>.
ARGENTINA

1. A Washington Post op-ed piece provides recent examples of the last point: Noga Tarnopolsky, “Up against Argentina’s Stonewall,” Washington Post, August 28, 2000, A19. Tarnopolsky is a journalist currently at work on a book about family members who disappeared during the guerra sucia, the “dirty war.” The author argues for the declassification of U.S. and Argentine documents that would shed light on the thirty thousand who “disappeared” between 1976 and 1983, a quest, of course, that leaves out those who were illegally liquidated before the military coup in March 1976. Still, the point made in the piece remains valid. After more than twenty-five years, Argentine and possibly U.S. government documents regarding the fates of thousands of individuals remain hidden and unobtainable, with no adequate explanation as to why, a clear and present indication of the war’s political legacy, which has haunted at least the last three civilian governments and no doubt will trouble governments to come. Also see Tim Weiner and Ginger Thompson, “Wide Net in Argentine Torture Case,” New York Times, September 11, 2000, A6. The Times story recounts the arrest in Mexico of a reputed torturer who plied his trade during the 1970s at the Argentine Navy’s New Mechanics School (see the discussion in text at note 24), where as many as five thousand Argentines may have disappeared.

2. As we shall see, years after the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992 and the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA, or the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association) Jewish Cultural Center in July 1994, also in Buenos Aires, the perpetrators are still at large. Although clues and suspects abound, Argentina’s authorities have made no high-level arrests, and the country’s intelligence-collecting abilities regarding these terrorist acts remain scanty and ineffective despite extensive U.S. assistance.


The Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo (EGP) spent eight months preparing for its first and last battle—time enough for the local police to thoroughly infiltrate this small band of adventurers led by journalist Ricardo Masetti, none of whom had the slightest knowledge of operational security. In a grim pattern that would be repeated, however, neither the body of Masetti nor those of his followers was ever produced by the authorities.

5. For a keen sociological analysis of Uruguay in the 1970s during the era of the Tupamaro, see Ernst Halperin, Terrorism in Latin America (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1976), 37–45. It should be pointed out that while groups like the Montoneros did resemble the Tupamaros in social background and educational levels, the Trotskyite Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (People’s Revolutionary Army, or ERP)
leaders were older, were less university oriented, and had received training in Cuba. Overall, the ERP chiefs were more “professional” in conducting their war against the Argentine government.

6. Ibid., 40.

7. Geoffrey Jackson, *Surviving the Long Night* (New York: Vanguard, 1974). Like the contemporaneous Brazilian urban guerrillas and their leader, Carlos Marighela, the Tupamaros in reality often hit civilian targets that had little to do with the military or police, a taste for gunplay that rapidly lost them public support. For a sense of the Marighela style, see his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971).

8. Halperin, *Terrorism in Latin America*, 17. See also William E. Ratliff, *Castroism and Communism in Latin America, 1959–1976* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute–Hoover Policy Studies, 1976), 143–46. The ERP after 1974 would shift its focus from urban- to rural-based insurgency but with as little success as its 1963 EGP predecessors enjoyed. In addition to the two principals, the ERP and the Montoneros, Argentines of a Maoist bent formed the Fuerzas Argentinas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) while the ERP spawned a splinter group, the ERP–22 de Augusto. See O. Carlos Stoetzer, “The Political Situation in Argentina,” in *Argentina, OAS, and Hemispheric Security* (Washington, D.C.: American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979) 18. It should be added that all of these groups, with their penchant for violence, were self-consciously at cross-purposes with the Argentine Communist Party (PCA), which was thoroughly pro-Soviet in ideology and patronage and had long lost its taste for revolutionary adventurism. The armed Left’s final toll in human lives is still open to debate. At a minimum, however, it murdered 697 persons, including 400 policemen and 143 military, mostly officers. That figure is taken from Daniel Frontalini and Maria Cristina Calati, *El Mito de la Guerra Sucia* (Buenos Aires: Ed. CEL, 1984), quoted in Feitlowitz, *Lexicon of Terror*, 6. It is generally agreed that Montonero violence began in May 1970 with the kidnapping and subsequent murder of former president Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, the hardline anti-Peronist successor of Juan Perón. In a bit of grim Grand Guignol, the Montoneros would later steal Aramburu’s coffin from a Buenos Aires cemetery. See Fontaine, “Communist Revolutionaries in Argentina,” 52.


10. Guillén’s best-known work is his *Estratégica de la Guerrilla Urbana* (Montevideo: Liberación, 1969). For a brief time, he became popular, a Spanish version of Herbert Marcuse, that is, a Marxist who truly believed in revolution but was not tied directly to the Soviet Union.


12. One of the Triple A’s favorite and indiscriminate targets was students, both university and secondary. In Latin America, students have a
well-earned reputation for their wholesale adoption of left-wing causes. That apparently was enough for the Triple A. At the School of Architecture and Urban Planning in La Plata (the capital of Buenos Aires Province and an hour’s drive from the city of Buenos Aires), reportedly one hundred students were murdered by the Triple A. The murders were supplemented by the bombing of the school’s cafeteria. See Feitlowitz, *Lexicon of Terror*, 179, 184. The Triple A’s branch organization in Córdoba, the Comando Liberator de América, was particularly violent and antisemitic to boot (214). It should be noted that López Rega was ousted from Isabel Perón’s cabinet at the insistence of the military. See also Hodges, *Argentina*, 110–12.


17. John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 102, 126, 129. In a sense, Argentina continues to face that problem. Violent crime is increasing, leading to what some analysts have described as a “soft civil war.” Armed robberies, kidnappings, and extortion—all the evils of the 1970s—are reappearing and often are the work of security force agents themselves. The only difference is that the current kind of crime is purely criminal in nature rather than political. But even the political terror was not pure since individuals did well in acquiring ill-gotten wealth during the *guerra sucia*.

18. To be sure, Argentina and Chile nearly came to blows on a number of occasions, especially over the Beagle Channel Islands—a dispute that was only resolved through the good offices of Pope John Paul II in 1984–85.


22. Harry Shlaudeman, who was U.S. ambassador before and during the Falklands War, observed that the dirty war “was to be a decentralized operation. The army was not about to take on the job alone and the opprobrium that would come with it. All three services and all their elements had to be involved in the responsibility for the repression. So the regime ended up as a strange mixture of repressive police-state style government with a weak hierarchy of authority and a general inability to control things from the center” (quoted in Hans Binnendijk, ed., *Authoritarian Regimes in Transition* [Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987], 235).

23. The ambiguity thickens. Massera, for example, was found to be responsible for the navy’s crimes but in his words was found “not guilty.” Precisely what this means remains unclear. The process took place under the
auspices of the National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP), appointed by President Alfonsín. For a year, the commission took evidence from witnesses, documenting nearly nine thousand victims. Its report was turned over by Alfonsín to the armed forces’ Supreme Tribunal for trial of the ex-commanders at the end of 1985. At trials’ end, Alfonsín sponsored two new laws that ended further prosecutions after February 23, 1987 (ibid., 13–14). The cessation of prosecution, of course, applies only to Argentina. Recently, the government of Mexico detained an Argentine citizen, Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, who has been accused of being a torturer at the navy’s New Mechanics School (ESMA). He is being held at the request of a Spanish magistrate, Baltasar Garzón, for possible trial in Spain for the crimes of torturing Spanish citizens in Argentina. Garzón is the same magistrate who sought Chile’s former dictator, Gen. Augusto Pinochet. Incidentally, Argentine president Fernando de la Rua (who resigned in December 2001) has already registered his objection to this process as an act of extraterritoriality, the precise view the Chilean government took of the attempted prosecution of Pinochet. See Weiner and Thompson, “Wide Net in Argentine Torture Case.” As for the former terrorists, they were given a blanket pardon by President Menem at the end of 1990. See Jorge G. Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War* (New York: Knopf, 1992), 15.

24. Feitlowitz, *Lexicon of Terror*, 46–47. The body count of five thousand can never be proved to be entirely accurate. But if some object that the figure is exaggerated, it is hardly the fault of those who came up with that number. Apparently, neither the Argentine Navy nor the country’s other security services bothered to keep an accurate count or follow even the minimum legal procedures. To this day, the argument goes on as to whether a list exists of the victims of the navy as well as of the other security forces. Various governments have claimed that such a list no longer exists—if it ever did. Even human rights organizations are divided on the question. Some believe, for example, that the list survives and remains hidden within the intelligence services; others claim such depositories as a Swiss vault (215–16).

25. As a good example of the authorities’ confusion as to who the real enemy was, consider the case of Jacobo Timmermann. A newspaper editor and gadfly, Timmermann initially welcomed the 1976 military coup, which, among other things, put him in the black book of the Far Left. Nevertheless, Timmermann would be arrested a year later and held without charge until he was released in 1979. See his *Preso sin Nombre, Celda sin Número* (Buenos Aires: El Cid Ediciones 1981). Since Timmermann’s release, he has succeeded in outraging the Israeli and Cuban governments with his trenchant criticism.


27. Robert Cox, former editor of the *Buenos Aires Herald*, makes precisely that point upon first supporting the military intervention after the chaos of the peronista interlude. See Binnendijk, *Authoritarian Regimes in Transition*, 244–46.

28. Domingo Cavallo, Roberto Domenech, and Yair Mundlak, *La Argentina que Pudo Ser: Los Costos de la Represión Económica* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Manatíal, 1989). A summary of this valuable work in English has been prepared by the International Center for Economic Growth, San Fran-

29. It should come as no surprise that an economist (and an Argentine to boot), Raúl Prebisch, provided the rationale for these policies beginning in the 1940s. His emphasis on abandoning liberal policies for statist ones came as a reaction to the world depression of the 1930s. His influence was eventually felt throughout Latin America, but Argentina probably remained under the Prebisch spell longer than any other country. See, for example, Raúl Prebisch, "El Desarrollo Económico de América Latina y Algunos de Sus Principales Problemas," *El Trimestre Económico* (July–September 1949): 359–61. For a recent appreciation and critique of Prebisch, see Leopoldo Solis, *Raúl Prebisch at ECLA: Years of Creative Intellectual Effort* (San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth, 1988).

**PERU**


3. Ibid., 22–23.


26. Gerónimo Inca, *El ABC de Sendero Luminoso y del MRTA* (Lima: Grupo Editorial Gerónimo Inca, 1994), 29. Here I have to say something about Gerónimo Inca. He does not exist. The name is a play on words. If one takes the first two letters of the first name and the first two letters of the last name, one has GEIN (for Grupo Especial de Inteligencia), the DINCOTE unit directly in charge of capturing Guzmán. The address of Grupo Editorial Gerónimo Inca does not exist either: Av. Los Libertadores no. 1509 (Liberator’s Avenue, no. 1509). This is Guzmán’s number in prison. *El ABC de Sendero* was a semiofficial book published by DINCOTE.


55. Paul F. Herman Jr., “Asymmetrical Warfare: Sizing the Threat,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement Journal 6, no. 1 (summer 1997): 176. Dunlap, in Preliminary Observations, says that in broad terms it simply means warfare that seeks to avoid an opponent’s strengths; it is an approach that tries to focus whatever may be one side’s comparative advantages against its enemy’s relative weaknesses. In a way, seeking asymmetries is fundamental to fighting all wars. But in the modern context asymmetrical warfare emphasizes what are popularly perceived as unconventional or nontraditional methodologies. Sendero was a nontraditional revolutionary organization.

56. Belaunde decided that the Sinchis, a supposed counterinsurgency unit of the Civil Guard created during his first administration (1963–68), which played an important role in combating the 1965 insurgency, would cope with Sendero in Ayacucho. The Sinchis, as was going to be the case with the armed forces, were trained to fight classical insurgents, something the members of Sendero were not. Frustration and impotence led to abuse of the population.


60. Barber, War of the Running Dogs, 193.


62. Quoted in Harry Summers, “A War Is a War Is a War Is a War,” in Thompson, Low-Intensity Conflict, 31. Peruvian intelligence did not perform badly prior to the ILA; actually, it correctly anticipated it but the consumers did not pay much attention. In spite of this relative success, it failed to assess what kind of insurgency the Sendero represented. See Gustavo Gorriti, Historia de la Guerra Milenaria en el Perú-I (Lima: Editorial Apoyo, 1990), 80–93.

63. McCuen, Art of Counter-revolutionary War, 29.

64. Shultz, “Political Strategies,” 129.


67. Degregori and Rivera, Fuerzas Armadas, 11.

68. McCuen, Art of Counter-revolutionary War, 143.

69. Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare, 129.

70. Barber, War of the Running Dogs, 96, 160.

71. Mackay, Malayan Emergency, 117.

72. McCuen, Art of Counter-revolutionary War, 57.

73. Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare, 149.

74. McCuen, Art of Counter-revolutionary War, 176, 204.

75. Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare, 10.

76. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 80–81. In Algeria, Ben Boulaïd, a National Liberation Front (FLN) leader, said that the French ratissages operations (razzias) were its best recruiting agent. One French officer, in the
face of excesses by the paras, said, “I am Captain Bottier; I fought myself; I
did thirty jumps with the resistance. . . . You band of little idiots—you are
doing exactly what the FLN terrorists count on you doing.” The journalist
Herb Greer, reporting on a particularly brutal French reprisal in which
women were killed, quotes a member of the FLN as declaring, “Voilà, we’ve
won another battle. They hate the French a little more now. The stupid bas-
tards are winning the war for us.” Both quotes are from Horne, *Savage War

77. Thompson, *Revolutionary War*, 96.
79. Edward Luttwak, “Notes on Low Intensity Warfare,” in *Defense Plan-
ning for the 1990s*, edited by William A. Buckingham Jr. (Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1984), 206–7, quoted in Thompson, *Low-
Intensity Conflict*, 3–4.
Creation of the Netherlands East Indies State,” in *Great Powers and Little
Wars: The Limits of Power*, edited by A. Hamish Ion and E. S. Errington
83. Ibid., 12.
87. Ibid., 290.
91. Timothy Lomperis, *From People’s War to People’s Rule: Insurgency,
Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North
92. Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam* (London and
94. Stern, *Shining and Other Paths*, 4. Guzmán also seemed not to have
read history: in 1949, the Greeks defeated the communist insurgency,
among other reasons because the population had been alienated by rebel
excesses. The population defended itself and supported the government
without special counterorganizational measures other than the formation
of a militia. So far, no one but the Greeks, says McCuen, and obviously after
them the Peruvians, has accomplished the feat—and they did it with assis-
tance from the rebels themselves (*Art of Counter-revolutionary War*, 309).
98. Instituto de Defensa Legal, *Perú: En La Espiral de Violencia* (Lima, In-
stituto de Defensa Legal, 1990), 10.
118. Quoted in McCuen, *Art of Counter-revolutionary War*, 62.

**COLOMBIA**

1. Gran Colombia was the name given to the newly independent republic that had been the Spanish Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada, which encompassed what is today Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador.

2. There are many good historical studies of Colombia, including David Bushnell’s many publications on the subject; Paul Oquist, *Violence, Conflict, and Politics in Colombia* (Bogotá: Instituto de Estudios Colombianos, 1978); and Alfredo Rangel Suárez, *Colombia: Guerra en el fin de siglo* (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1999). A brief sketch of Colombia’s history is available in U.S. Department of State, “Background Notes,” on the Internet at
3. This was one of the first uses of the term terrorism in the Colombian lexicon of violence and thus an acknowledgment that terrorism exists in the country, protestations presented in the introduction to this study notwithstanding. However, it was only used in relation to Escobar’s bombing campaign.


11. For a detailed account of this effort, see Rafael Pardo Rueda, De primera mano, Colombia, 1986–1994: Entre conflictos y esperanzas (Bogotá: CEREC, Grupo Editorial Norma, 1996).


15. The guerrillas set up mobile roadblocks, searching for detainees with sufficient money to merit kidnapping for ransom. These roadblocks are called “miraculous fishing expeditions,” or pescas milagrosas.


17. A good source on the structure and history of the Colombian forces in terms of counterterrorism and police forces (unfortunately available only in Spanish) is Malcolm Deas and Maria Victoria Llorente, eds., Reconocer la Guerra para Construir la Paz (Bogotá: CEREC, Ediciones Unianes, and Editorial Norma, 1999). A second source, primarily descriptive of the current force structure, is Policía Nacional Dirección de Inteligencia, Reflexiones de Inteligencia #4: Vision panoramica de los servicios de inteligencia (Santa Fe de Bogotá: Policía Nacional Dirección de Inteligencia, 1999).


19. Some of this material is based on an interview with a Colombian military official who requested anonymity, February 2000. The description
of the GAULA’s organization was obtained from an interview with Col. Jesus Bohorquez, director of the military (army) GAULAs, in Bogotá, March 1999. The number of hostages and rescue efforts were compiled from various government sources.

20. Eduardo Pizarro, “Toward an Institutional Collapse?” in Zackrison, Crisis?


SPAIN

1. Of course, this is not the only possible definition of terrorism but a working one adopted for the benefit of the whole project. The director of this project, Yonah Alexander, gave us the example of a much more general definition, which is the one used by the U.S. Department of Defense: “The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or try to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” Another example may simply be “coercive intimidation used for political ends,” proposed in Richard E. Friedman, “In Search of a Counterterrorism Strategy,” Terrorism 12, no. 6 (1989): 417–18.

2. See, for example, Fernando Reinares, Terrorismo y antiterrorismo (Barcelona: Paidós, 1998).

3. For example, ETA had close relations with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and other terrorist groups. See generally ibid., 175.

4. The GRAPO acknowledged its responsibility for a frustrated attempt to rob a money van in late June 2000 in Vigo (Galicia), which resulted in the death of two guards. Other terrorist groups, particularly Catalan groups demanding independence from Spain, such as Terra Lliure (Free Land), had some relevance during the transition to democracy.


6. For a recent and excellent book covering relevant aspects of ETA, see Antonio Elorza, José María Garmendia, Gurutz Jáuregui, Florencio Domínguez Iribarren, and Paxto Unzueta, La historia de ETA (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2000). See also the comprehensive article by Goldie Shabad and Francisco José Llera Ramo, “Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain,” in Terrorism in Context, edited by Martha Crenshaw (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 410–69.


8. This new foundation of Basque nationalism in the Basque language is largely due to the effort of Federico Krutwig. He had an ethnically mixed origin and was a militant of ETA from 1966 to 1968. Krutwig wrote a very in-
fluential book (published under the pseudonym Fernando Sarraílhi) called *Vasconia: Estudio dialéctico de una nacionalidad* (Buenos Aires: Norbait, [ca. 1963]). Some authors contend that this book was of material importance for ETA in its first years as a clandestine group (Reinares, *Terrorismo y antiterrorismo*, 44); others deny this direct influence (Juaristi, *El bucle melancólico*, 285). The important fact is not whether *Vasconia* directly influenced ETA. The key was the renewal of the whole approach that the book implied, that language, rather than race, is the defining feature of Basque nationalism. From an ethnic perspective, language is the soul of a people. See Elorza et al., *La historia de ETA*, 59.

If one considers the mixed demographic composition of the Basque Land in the time of Arana, but also when ETA was set up, the turn to Euskera becomes a necessary step toward the construction of a realistic nationalism. Of course, as the sociologist Gurutz Júaregui notes, Euskera itself is a language that was not spoken by most Basques ("ETA: Orígenes y evolución ideológica y política," in Elorza et al., *La historia de ETA*, 175).

9. The boundaries of the Basque region are a source of controversy even among radical Basque groups. Today, the Basque Autonomy includes three provinces: Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Alava. However, the Basque Movement of National Liberation pretends at least that the seven historical provinces of the Basque country (the three already mentioned plus Navarra in Spain and Laourd, Basse Navarre, and Soule in France [also known as the French Basque Land]) constitute the Basque nation. One should take into account that Basque nationalism is of low priority in the French Basque Land and that there are no expectations for growth of Basque nationalism in Navarra.


11. The Burgos trial occurred in December 1970. In that trial, three members of ETA were found guilty and sentenced to death but were finally pardoned by Franco. However, all the resistance to the trial and the coverage by the media helped ETA to acquire an international name and also to be recognized as a fighter for democracy against Franco. See, for example, Sagrario Morán, *ETA entre España y Francia* (Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1998), 76. Another famous trial with charges of terrorism took place in 1975 and ended with a death sentence for five terrorists, including two members of ETA and three members of the Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico (FRAP). On this occasion, the sentence was enforced. See J. L. Piñuel, *El terrorismo en la transición española, 1972–1982* (Madrid: Fundamentos, 1986). After the restoration of democracy in Spain following the death of Franco in 1975, the Spanish legal order abolished capital punishment.

12. An accurate portrayal of these quarrels may be found in the history of ETA’s assemblies. For an account of the ideological and political problems in the Fifth and Sixth Assemblies, see Gurutz Jáuregui, “ETA,” in Elorza et al., *La historia de ETA*, 233.

13. For instance, Jáuregui affirms that ETA has been ideologically dead from 1971 to the present (ibid., 260).

14. It has been reported that ETA has earned approximately 6.7 billion pesetas from its kidnappings. This calculation is made from the abduction
of Felipe Huarte, a businessman from Navarra, in 1973 to the abduction of Cosme Delclaux, a Basque businessman, in 1997. See Florencio Domínguez Iribarren, “El enfrentamiento de ETA con la democracia,” in Elorza et al., *La historia de ETA*, 360. Of the seventy-seven people kidnapped by ETA between 1972 and 1997, two were elected officials, one was a prison official, and the other seventy-four were civilians. As to the place where the kidnappings happened, sixty-three were in the Basque Land (Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, and Alava) and fourteen in the rest of Spain.

15. The MLNV consists of legal and illegal organizations, including a political party, Herri Batasuna (HB); a labor union, Langileen Abertzalen Batzordea (LAB); groups of young militants, for example, Jarrai and Taldes Y; and ETA.

16. A relevant member of the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, or PSOE) said that precisely that moment should have witnessed the beginning of the end of violence. See José María Benegas, *Euskadi: Sin la paz nada es posible* (Barcelona: Argos Vergara, 1984), 50 (quoted in Morán, *ETA entre España y Francia*, 105).


18. Actually, the French police were following the trail of two wired Russian missiles that Spanish intelligence had sold to the terrorist band.

19. We will discuss this collaboration further in the next section.


21. The Forum of Ermua, already mentioned, was an initiative born at that time.

22. The Ajuría Enea Pact was an agreement against violence signed on January 12, 1988, by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Alianza Popular (AP) [now Partido Popular], Centro Democrático y Social (CDS), Partido Liberal (PL), Convergencia i Unió (CIU), Partido Nacionalista Vasco, and Euskadiko Ezkerra. Two Basque parties—HB and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA)—did not sign. The Lizarra Pact of August 1998 brought the Ajuría Enea Pact to an end because the PNV agreed to be associated with Euskal Herritarrok (just a new name for HB) and therefore with ETA. ETA’s cease-fire, begun in September 1998, ended in December 1999 because the terrorist band believed that the PNV did not go far enough in its compromise with both the “national construction” of the Basque country and the interruption of any relationship with “the Spanish people.”

23. For an analysis focused on this issue, see Benjamín Tejerina, “Civil Society, Political Violence, and Social Movements: The Case of the Basque Country,” in *State and Societal Reactions to Terrorism*, edited by Fernando Reinares (Oñati: International Institute for the Sociology of Law, 1997), 121-48. Tejerina’s article attempts to prove that “the success or failure of an organization using political violence does not depend so directly on its military efficiency, but on its capacity to create a social movement around itself, or to attract organizations from different social movements to its objectives” (122).


26. Santiago Sánchez, “Spain: Have We Learned Anything from Our Experience?” in Reinares, State and Societal Reactions to Terrorism, 43.


28. See table 2.

29. Article 52(2) is a provision that governs the exceptional derogation of fundamental rights. It says: “An organic law may determine the manner and the circumstances in which, on an individual basis and with the necessary participation of the courts and proper parliamentary control, the rights recognized in section 17, clause 2, and section 18, clauses 2 and 3, may be suspended as regards specific persons in connection with investigation of the activities of armed bands or terrorists groups.” For a commentary on this provision, see Francisco Fernández Segado, in Comentarios a la Constitución Española de 1978, edited by Oscar Alzaga Villamil, vol. 4 (Madrid: Cortes Generales, 1996), 627. A critique of the provision may be found in Sánchez, “Spain,” 43–45. The laws allowing special procedures have been challenged before the Constitutional Court, which declared them partially unconstitutional. See cases STC 25/1981, of July 14, 1981, Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) of August 13, 1981; STC 199/1987, of December 16, 1987, BOE of January 8, 1988; STC 89/1993, of March 12, 1993, BOE of April 15, 1993; and STC 71/1994, of March 3, 1994, BOE of March 24, 1994. See also, for example, José Carlos Remotti Carbonell, Constitución y medidas contra el terrorismo (Madrid: Colex, 1998), 247–327.

30. All of these reforms were undermined by the activities of the Grupos Antiterrorista de Liberación (GAL), which we will describe subsequently.


32. Sánchez, “Have We Learned Anything from Our Experience?” 50.


34. The present policy differs from the one defended by the PNV under the Lizarra Pact.

35. As a matter of fact, the government only requires a statement by a member of ETA that he or she renounces violence. Moreover, that person must have no record of having been accused of a crime of blood.

36. Art. 62(j) CE.

37. For a view from the courts, see, among others, Juan Carlos Campo Moreno, Represión penal del terrorismo: Una visión jurisprudencial (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 1997). On the matter of law enforcement, we are thinking mainly of the Spanish Criminal Code of 1995, which has a special provision, Title XXII, sec. 2, that sanctions terrorist activities (Arts. 571–80). There are many commentaries on these articles. See, for example, Gonzalo Rodríguez Mourullo, Comentarios al Código penal (Madrid: Civitas, 1997).

Other Basques have been ministers of the interior, such as the socialist José Luis Corcuera and the present minister, Jaime Mayor Oreja, who has served since 1996.

Alexander notes that it may be misleading to conclude that a decline in terrorist incidents shows that counterterrorist policies have worked. If the government makes political or economic concessions to terrorists, for example, the number of incidents may decline but the influence of terrorists may have been strengthened. Similarly, one incident may have a greater political, psychological, and strategic impact than hundreds of small attacks.

Ley 32/1999, October 8, Solidaridad con las víctimas del terrorismo, BOE, no. 242, October 9, 1999. In 2000, U.S. $1 was worth approximately 175 pesetas.


See Morán, *ETA entre España y Francia*, 186–87. Newspapers such as EGIN denounced the GAL as a group created by the Spanish government with the tacit acceptance of French authorities.


See Morán, *ETA entre España y Francia*.

See Reinares, *Terrorismo y antiterrorismo*, 140–43, which emphasizes this poor system of information dispersal.

Gaston Deferre declared at that time that “un terroriste n’est pas un refugié politique” (a terrorist is not a political refugee).

Philip Bidart, the leader of Iparretarrak, was arrested in France on February 20, 1988.

See Antonio Cassese, *Terrorism, Politics, and Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). See also Alfred P. Rubin, “Current Legal Approaches to International Terrorism,” *Terrorism* 13, nos. 4–5 (July–October 1990): 277–97 (Rubin defends an expansion of the humanitarian element that has become part of the law of war treaties to which nearly all states are parties; the application of the general rules of international law forbidding states to permit their territory to be used as a base for armed bands of whatever nature to operate in the territory of another state; and the refining of the law of self-defense and neutrality. These approaches are preferred to those that focus on the extension of national jurisdiction in disregard of the limits inherent in the international legal order because it is “the one most likely to lead to unmanageable political complications.” Writing in 1989, Rubin erroneously thought that an “international criminal court” was “inconsistent
with both law and reality.”) Richard Friedman also favors self-help as legitimate under international law (“In Search of a Counterterrorism Strategy”).

The treaties to which Spain is a party are available on the Internet from any major source (such as the United Nations treaties database). For a Spanish collection of treaties related to terrorism, see, for example, Jorge Pueyo Losa and M. Teresa Ponte Iglesias, Derecho internacional público: Recopilación de instrumentos jurídicos fundamentales (Santiago de Compostela: Tórculo, 1998), 191–231. See also Yonah Alexander, ed., International Terrorism: Political and Legal Documents (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992).


53. The European Convention on Extradition was concluded in Paris on December 13, 1957. It is available at <http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/24e.htm> (March 18, 2002). The new provisions of the French criminal code made it possible for the judiciary to extradite ETA members just for belonging to the terrorist organization. The first case occurred on June 8, 1994, when the Appellate Court of Paris authorized the extradition of Oroitz Salegi García on the grounds of being a member of ETA. See Morán, ETA entre España y Francia, 372, which emphasizes the symbolic meaning of this change.


55. The negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam became very difficult when the problem of asylum was discussed. Indeed, the Spanish government, spurred by the controversial decision of a Belgian authority not to extradite two Spanish citizens accused of complicity with ETA, presented a proposal to add a new paragraph on asylum to Article 8 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. That paragraph was intended to exclude the nationals of the members of the European Union from the right to asylum and the status of refugee. When the scope of Spain’s first proposal proved to be too wide, a second proposal intended to limit the right of asylum was presented. Finally, the member states decided to annex Protocol 29 to the European Community Treaty on asylum for nationals of member states of the European Union (1997), which is a compromise intended to accommodate the Spanish view with the international obligations and opinions of other European Union members.


The transfer of subjects is usually called “communitarization.” A noteworthy example here would be the Schengen Agreements of June 19, 1990, which provides for police transboundary vigilance and pursuit and judicial cooperation in cases of terrorism. See, generally, Council Decision of May 1, 1999, which laid down the detailed arrangements for the integration of the Schengen Secretariat into the General Secretariat of the Council, OJ L 119, 7.5.1999, p. 49.

60. OJ C 313, 23.10.1996, p. 11.
63. See Peter Chalk, “EU Counter-terrorism, the Maastricht Third Pillar, and Liberal Democratic Acceptability,” Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 2 (1994): 103–45.

64. On the second pillar after the Treaty of Amsterdam, see Antonio Remiro-Brotóns, “¿Qué ha significado el Tratado de Amsterdam para la PESC?” Gaceta Jurídica de la CE, series D, no. 29 (1999): 71–104. The overlapping problem is mentioned by Reinares (Terrorismo y antiterrorismo, 209), who cites a paper by Monica den Boer presented at the conference European Democracies against Terrorism, International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Oñati, 1996.

65. See Reinares, Terrorismo y antiterrorismo, 145–46.


67. See the Joint Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, September 14, 2001.

UNITED KINGDOM

1. Emergency Powers Act 1920, Sec. 2(1).
2. PTA, Sec. 20.
3. William Best was in the Royal Irish Rangers but was originally from Derry. He was visiting friends at the time of his kidnapping. Four hundred women attacked the offices of the official IRA the next day, expressing the outrage of the local community over the murder.
4. For example, the IRA set off a bomb outside the Chelsea Barracks in London on October 10, 1981, which killed two civilians and injured twenty-
three soldiers. On October 12, 1984, it set off a bomb at the hotel being used for the Conservative Party’s annual conference—the Grand Hotel in Brighton. This bomb was intended to kill the entire British cabinet in one go. It killed five people and injured many more but missed its principal target, Margaret Thatcher, then prime minister, and members of her cabinet. In the spring of 1993, IRA bombs at Warrington and Bishopsgate, respectively, killed two and one persons and injured fifty-one and forty-five others. After the collapse of the IRA cease-fire in February 1996, large bombs at Canary Wharf in London (two dead and more than one hundred injured) and in Manchester (more than two hundred injured) rocked the business communities there.

5. The security services are popularly known, respectively, as MI5 and MI6.

6. On Tuesday, June 8, 1971, Harry Tuzo, then general officer commanding the British Army, said that a permanent military solution to the conflict could not be achieved.


8. The UDR was a locally recruited branch of the British Army.

9. One example is the demonstrations and riots in Seattle during the G-8 meeting in early 2000.

10. This was in the Downing Street Declaration of August 1969.


12. Physical abuse and harsh intimidation were allegedly used by the police in the early 1970s as a means of obtaining confessions.

13. This operation had an important legal background in that the denial of continuous control over parts of Ulster by the paramilitaries was a major factor in effectively preventing them from succeeding in claiming combatant status under the international laws of armed conflict.

ISRAEL

1. The government of Israel adopted a resolution making it the legal heir of the Jordanian government with regard to all of Judaea and Samaria (the West Bank) and the legal heir of the Egyptian military administration with regard to the Gaza Strip. The government regarded all of the lands as
belonging to the state, with all public lands designated for the establishment of Israeli settlements in those areas. It also saw no obligation to preserve any tracts for the needs of the indigenous Palestinian populace.

2. The acronym SHABAK stands for Hebrew shin-beth-kaff, the initials of Sherut Bitachon Kelali, which translates as General Security Service.

3. Black September was the name given by the Palestinians to the grim military confrontation that erupted in September 1970 between the Jordanian army and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) militias in Jordan (with even Syrian forces penetrating Jordan at a given point with the assistance of PLO fighters).

4. Israel enjoys an extremely high level of alertness among the Israeli public to possible terrorist bombs and any other suspicious phenomena. Every citizen has the ability to immediately call in a police patrol or bomb squad, and this has frequently resulted in the early detection and neutralization of bombs before they could cause harm. Such successful outcomes would not be achievable if it were not for the willingness of the public to tolerate hundreds of false alarms and the unhesitating readiness of the various bomb squads to speed to the site of suspicious objects. The Israeli public and the security services have proven that “crying wolf” does not always diminish vigilance.

5. In February 1999, in the wake of severe military clashes in southern Lebanon, Israel anticipated that Hizbullah would launch Katyusha rockets against Israeli civilian targets, towns, and villages along the Lebanese border. As a precaution, the military authorities of the Israeli Northern Command ordered the local populace to take to the shelters (prompting many civilians to take their families to different locales). The rocket attacks never came, and it was several days before the “all clear” signal was given. Thus, Hizbullah was able to achieve its goal of terrorizing Israelis without launching a single rocket.

6. To this day, Israel has not been able to resolve this difficult dilemma. From the legal, moral, and operational standpoints, Israel must choose between exerting physical pressure during the interrogation of a terrorist for the sake of extracting vital and urgent intelligence and the desire to adhere to the conventional norms of a democratic state that is founded on laws and recognizes the rights of the individual.

7. It is noteworthy that the decision to suspend security measures of one sort or another, a decision that clearly establishes who is to be held responsible if anything goes awry, is a sensitive political-psychological issue.

8. In the interest of preventing, as much as possible, a disruption of the employment of Palestinian workers in Israel, and a similar interest in disturbing the local populace as little as possible, the Israeli government adopted a new policy in 1998. This permitted the entry of workers into Israeli territory, in spite of any closure that might be in effect, as long as such workers had had special permits issued to them on the responsibility of their employers. The functional effectiveness of this decision has not yet been tested in application.

9. The relatively new phenomenon of Palestinian suicide-bombers in 2001–2 has significantly changed this criticism. On one hand, these terror-
ists are clearly choosing closed civilian targets, like restaurants, hotels, shops, malls, or passenger buses. On the other hand, the presence of a security-warden at the entrance of such places did, in numerous cases, deter the terrorist from trying to enter the closed target and brought them to commit suicide at the entrance, thus bringing down significantly the number of Israeli casualties.

10. In keeping with the Oslo Declaration of Principles, Israel and the Palestinians are currently (April 2000) implementing an interim agreement whereby Israel is gradually handing over sections of Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip to Palestinian control. The occupied territories have been segmented into three categories: Area C, which continues to be under full Israeli military control; Area A, which already has been handed over in its entirety to the Palestinians; and Area B, which has been handed over to the Palestinians in terms of total civil administration but with Israel continuing to be exclusively responsible for collective security.

11. In the past, during the period preceding the peace process, Israel possessed a clear and diametric policy. The strategy in the battle against Palestinian terrorism was expressed in efforts to persuade neighboring countries not to cooperate with Palestinian terrorist organizations and to take initiatives for inhibiting and dampening cross-border attacks; otherwise, their own civil and military facilities might be vulnerable to Israeli attack. During that period, Israel was not deterred by the threat of escalation, even at the risk of war. During the 1950s, such Israeli military actions led to the Sinai Campaign against Egypt. In the 1960s, Israel’s actions were directed against Jordan and Syria, which served as no small factor in the backdrop of the Six Day War. The battles of Black September in Jordan of the 1970s had a similar backdrop. Finally, the situation in southern Lebanon led to Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982.

12. Among the prominent examples are the following:

**July 1956.** Mustafa Hafez, head of Egyptian intelligence in the Gaza Strip, was killed by a letter bomb; two days later, Salah Mustafa, who was responsible for initiating and organizing Fidayun attacks against Israel, was killed in a similar manner.

**April 1988.** A commando force in Tunis killed Abu Jihad, head of the PLO military arm.

**January 1996.** Yehya Ayash, the “Engineer,” who was behind a string of painful terrorist attacks in Israel, was killed in Gaza (which was under full PA control).

**September 1997.** There was an unsuccessful attempt to kill Khaled Mashal, one of the key figures of the Hamas movement, in Jordan.

13. An unusual occurrence was the mistaken killing of Ahmad Busheiki, an Arab of Palestinian origin, in Lillehammer, Norway. He was mistakenly identified as a member of the terrorist cell that had carried out the grim massacre of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. The resulting political storm over the mistaken identity and the subsequent arrest of some of the Israelis involved in the action led to the revelation that Israel had been behind it.
14. On this point, it is important to bear in mind that until recently Is-
rael did not have a National Security Council. Therefore, such recommen-
dations for action are not examined or analyzed by a neutral and objective
body, exploring and weighing the full spectrum of political, legal, moral,
and operational considerations for the benefit of the government leader-
ship that has to approve implementation.

15. This assertion does not discount the option of eliminating figures
with regard to whom the direct operational effect is negligible. The main
contribution in such a case is in reinforcing the concept that Israel has
“long arms that can reach anywhere.” The goal is to reflect positively on Is-
rael’s intelligence services, sending a message that traitors among the se-
nior figures of the terrorist organizations had supplied the information and
data to Israeli intelligence and, of course, acknowledging the operational
daring and imagination that enabled such a successful attack.

16. On a number of occasions, I was personally involved in situations
wherein Israeli intelligence received data that would have justified planning
an operation for the elimination of the head of the PLO, Yasser Arafat. Fur-
thermore, in each case it was clear that an operation of this sort would
have to be an open one, wherein it would be impossible to hide Israel’s di-
rect responsibility. I was of the opinion that the elimination of Arafat would
have yielded no real operational benefits; moreover, it would have caused
severe damage in the form of the harshest possible reactions both on the
political plane and in the form of retaliatory terrorist attacks. In such cases,
it was my practice to appear before the IDF chief of staff and the minister
of defense, presenting them with the information and functional options for
planning a military action along with clear arguments for my ultimate rec-
ommendation against initiating such an action. These recommendations
were accepted without objection.

17. Israel did not forget the important lessons of its own experience
during the British Mandate period. When the mandatory authority began
issuing and carrying out death sentences, the Jewish Etzel underground
(Irgun Tzva’i Le’umi) instituted a policy of taking British hostages and
clearly threatening that, if the British authorities were to carry out further
death penalties, the Etzel would hang them. Following the hanging of two
such hostages, the Mandate authorities put an end to implementation of
the death sentence. In view of this experience, the consideration that de-
terred Israel more from levying the death penalty than any other was con-
cern over causing harm to potential Israeli hostages or even innocent Jews
in other countries.

18. At the end of 1992, following a string of terrorist attacks carried out
by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organizations, the government
of Israel decided upon a mass expulsion of some four hundred Palestinians
to Lebanese territory. Because of judicial delays, and in spite of the fact
that Israel’s High Court of Justice had approved the expulsion orders, the
Lebanese government was able to prevent the deportees from entering its
territory, leaving them in a sort of no-man’s land adjacent to the border.
This area for months saw numerous politicians and media people making
pilgrimages to it. Ultimately, in a “thin, small voice,” Israel canceled the ex-
pulsion orders.

20. The only exception to this is tourism, which has suffered in the wake of every act of terrorism, causing a critical drop in the number of international tourists.

21. From September 29, 2000, to April 22, 2002, there were 102 terrorist acts initiated by Palestinian suicide-bombers. In these acts, a total of 430 Israelis were killed and some 1,600 were wounded.

TURKEY

1. Terrorists in Turkey murdered more than three hundred such officials and professionals between 1990 and 2000.

2. Approximately six thousand security force members, five thousand civilians (five hundred of them children), and twenty-four thousand terrorists were killed in Turkey during this time period.

3. This group was a Cold War aberration that aimed to create an independent Armenian homeland in eastern Turkey.

4. Kurds are estimated to represent approximately 20 percent of Turkey’s 65 million people.


6. Ibid.


10. Emin Demirel, Teror, 4th ed. (İstanbul: Alfa, 1999), 616.


12. Demirel, Teror, 661.

13. “Türk Teroristin Sasırtan Profili” (Surprising Profile of the Turkish Terrorist), Hurriyet, July 30, 2000, electronic ed.


17. James L. Gallagher, Low Intensity Conflict (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1992), 36.


19. In December 2000, the Turkish Parliament enacted a law granting
early release to approximately twenty thousand inmates convicted of non-political or nonviolent political offenses. In January 2001, the chairman of the Turkish General Staff, Gen. Huseyin Kivrikoglu, claimed that approximately sixteen hundred of those released under the amnesty were PKK members who should have been left behind bars.

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 3.
26. Ibid., 2.
27. Ibid., 4.
28. Ibid., 2.
33. After leaving Syria in the fall of 1998, Ocalan traveled to Russia, Italy, and Greece before he was secretly taken to Kenya by his Greek hosts in February 1999. Soon Turkish intelligence agents found him in Nairobi, Kenya, and took him back to Turkey.
34. The use of “pseudo” insurgents (i.e., members of the counterinsurgency forces posing as insurgents) is a well-established, if lesser-known, method of gathering intelligence and one often used by police units involved in crime detection.
35. These turned terrorists (or “repentant informers” as they were often called) were deployed in a fashion similar to the South African security police deployment of the *askari*, that is, former terrorists from the Umkhonto we Sizwe and Azanian People’s Liberation Army.
36. Approximately ten thousand armed terrorists were captured alive between 1984 and 2000.
37. For example, DEVSOL shot antitank rockets at American diplomatic missions as well as Turkish police buildings, tried to bomb a large American air base in Turkey, and attacked and/or assassinated American diplomats, military officers, and civilians in Turkey as well as Turkish military, law enforcement, and intelligence personnel.
42. Ibid.
44. Necip Toruntau, Degisen Stratejilerin Odaginda Turkiye (Turkey at the Center of Changing Strategies) (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1996), 233.
48. Gallagher, Low Intensity Conflict, 10.
50. Kislali, Guneydogu, 223.
51. USIP, Special Report, 1.
52. Mahmut Bulut, “Kislaya Donus” (Back to the Barracks), Sabah, October 15, 2000, electronic ed.
54. “Bati’da PKK Usulu Irtica” (PKK-Style Fundamentalism in the West), Hurrîyet, October 2, 2000, electronic ed.
55. “Vali: Terör Azaldi.”
56. “Solcu Partilerden Filistinlilere Destek” (Support from the Leftist Parties to the Palestinians), Zaman, October 15, 2000, electronic ed.
59. In the mid-1990s, PKK’s revenue was estimated to be anywhere from $80 to $200 million.
63. Dugencioglu, Buuyuen Bir Tehdit, 131.
64. Cumhuriyet, October 9, 2000, electronic ed.
66. The General Staff created a new unit called Ekonomik ve Mali Izleme Merkezi (Economic and Financial Monitoring Center, or EMIM) for this purpose.
68. Approximately forty thousand Turks have died as a result of terrorism since the 1970s, which cost the Turkish economy more than 250 billion dollars.
INDIA

2. Ibid., 319–20.
4. See Human Rights Watch, India: Arms and Abuses in Indian Punjab and Kashmir, 6, no. 10 (September 1994).
5. In 1947, Pakistan consisted of two parts—West Pakistan and East Pakistan—which were divided by fifteen hundred kilometers of Indian territory. East Pakistan seceded in 1971, after a civil war with West Pakistan, and was renamed Bangladesh.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 194.
9. Ibid., 390.
10. Ibid., 65.
11. Ibid., 120.
13. See North East Sun (Guwahati), May 15–31, 2000, 8.

JAPAN

1. This essay is not primarily about the Aum affair, although we use it to examine shifts in Japan’s counterterrorism policy. For English-language examinations of the attack, see such works as Ian Reader, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000); David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (New York: Crown, 1996); and, in comparative perspective, Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
3. The Plan for International Bases was aimed at establishing international bases in socialist countries such as North Korea and Cuba, using them to train JRA members, and then sending them back to Japan to achieve communist revolution through armed struggle. See Japan National Police Agency, “White Paper on Police,” 1997, 11.
4. On March 31, 1970, Japan Airlines jetliner Flight 351 (Yodo-go), bound for Fukuoka from Tokyo, was flying over Mount Fuji when it was hijacked by nine armed members of Kyosando Sekigun-ha. The terrorists took 129 passengers and crew members hostage and demanded that the plane be flown to North Korea. They surrendered to North Korean author-
ities, although the North Korean government had not been in on the plan. This was the first hijacking case in Japan.

Among the hijackers, two died in North Korea (Kintaro Yoshida in 1985 and the leader, Takamaro Tamiya, in 1995). Yoshimi Tanaka was detained by the Cambodian authorities in March 1996, transported to Thailand, and arrested there. In June 2000, he was extradited to Japan, where he is now detained. Five other members are believed to still be in North Korea, although unconfirmed reports suggest that one is dead. The last member was arrested in Japan in 1988 after returning and hiding in the country. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. He was discharged from prison after serving his term.


6. The opinion poll was entitled “The Japan Air Lines’ Hijacking Case” by the Office of Public Relations of the Prime Minister’s Office. The survey had more than 3,500 respondents, based on a stratified two-stage random sample, taken from 4,400 requests made between October 19 and October 23, 1977.

7. The following statement, the first major one from the Japanese government on the topic, was released by a special task force on August 25, 1978.

   *Counter-Measure Policies against Hijacking and Others*

   1. In order to confront with international terrorism such as hijacking, it is particularly important to enhance international cooperation. For this reason, “a statement on hijacking” was made in the G7 Summit Meeting held in Bonn in West Germany. In this statement, 7 industrial nations, including Japan, expressed their resolution to jointly take specific countermeasures against a country which would refuse to extradite criminals in dealing with international hijacking case. The Japanese government, in cooperation with other countries, is to make necessary arrangements to promptly put all procedures in the statement into practice, and to earnestly request other nations to participate in enforcing these measures.

   2. To deal with terrorism such as hijacking, it is important to take complete preventive measures and to allow terrorists no opportunities of which they may take advantage, and the Japanese government will continue its efforts in this regard. Should an incident unfortunately take place, however, the government is to make all possible efforts to rescue hostages safely. Furthermore in such a case, based upon the aforementioned international cooperation and enhanced cooperative relations, the Japanese government is ready to take a stern stance against any unlawful demands from terrorists, to maintain the order of law.

   3. We request that the public support this stance.


11. For details, see the Enforcement Regulations of Police Law, Article 1, clause 24.


16. The Self-Defense Forces were established as the National Police Reserve in 1950. After the promulgation of the Self-Defense Forces Law, they were reorganized as the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces in 1954. On their range of action, see Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 3.
