

4. Rwanda

Tragic Land of Dual Nationalisms

JOHN F. CLARK

[The Hutu and Tutsi] are two nations in a single state. . . . Two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy, who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were dwellers of different zones, or inhabitants of different planets.

—Grégoire Kayibanda, president of Rwanda

SINCE THE HOUR of its independence, Rwanda has proven to be a land of horror and fascination. The birth of the independent republic was accompanied by a terrible episode of communal violence, and the Rwandan people have known oppression, fear, and genocide during the postcolonial period. Indeed, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was an event of historical and global significance, representing as it does one of only three (true) genocides of the twentieth century.¹ Some one-tenth of the entire population of Rwanda died in the killings that took place over about three months in 1994.² Given the suffering and tragedy that Rwanda's people have endured—and inflicted upon one another—one feels a strong sense of necessity to understand what forces have given rise to such terrible outcomes. Yet the need for answers about Rwanda surpasses the mere academic: we want to understand the violence there not only as scholars but also as ordinary, moral human beings.

Not surprisingly, the scholarly community, both Africanist and otherwise, has devoted considerable effort to the analysis of Rwanda since the 1994 genocide. Among many other scholarly efforts, a number of journals have given over entire issues to the question of Rwanda and the crises of the "Great Lakes," or of "Central Africa."³ Similarly, a notable number of

books quickly appeared in print soon after the genocide, and many others have continued to appear in subsequent years.⁴ All these studies record a natural human revulsion toward the genocide in Rwanda, and many demonstrate a great sophistication about the ongoing dilemmas of reforming the Rwandan polity in such a way as to reduce the possibility of more tragedies in Rwanda's future.

The lessons that one may derive from Rwanda's sad experience are not ones that apply only in Africa, either, as the historical nature of the 1994 genocide suggests. In fact, Rwanda is hardly a "typical" African country, and the "ethnic" violence that has recently unfolded there is most typical of ethnically generated bloodshed elsewhere on the African continent. Only Nigeria, during its civil war, perhaps, has seen ethnically related killing on the scale of Rwanda, but both the context and nature of the killing there were different and perhaps more usual. Unlike most African countries, Rwanda does not have a plethora of ethnic, or "tribal," peoples but rather only three identity communities and only two of major significance.⁵ Of these two, the Hutu represented some 84 percent of the population and the Tutsi some 15 percent in the late 1950s; by the early 1990s, following several waves of migration, the Tutsi represented about 12 percent of the population.⁶

Unlike most other African countries, Rwanda is quite densely populated and intensively cultivated. In contrast to many, it has very few resources of international interest. Finally, in Rwanda, those who identify with one of the two dominant identity communities have long lived in near-total inter-spersion with one another; that it is to say, there are no Hutu or Tutsi "homelands" in Rwanda.⁷

Most studies to date have also treated the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy in Rwanda as an ethnic phenomenon, which it certainly is, in part. Most (contemporary) scholars have emphasized, however, the incredible fluidity of the fundamental Hutu and Tutsi identities, leaving one to marvel that so much blood could have been spilt on the basis of such apparently fragile social signifiers. Thus, the great paradox of Rwanda is that the bases for Hutu and Tutsi identity are most ephemeral, and yet the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy is far and away the most important social cleavage in the society, forming the main axis along which political forces in the country divide.

The innovation of this study is to test the limits of a new designation for Rwanda's two outstanding identities; *namely, this chapter proposes that Rwanda is a land of two nationalisms, that of Rwandan Hutu nationalism*

and *Rwandan Tutsi nationalism*. It further proposes that the rival nationalisms first appeared during the political crisis that led to Rwanda's independence and that both were consolidated during the regime of the country's first president, Grégoire Kayibanda. To date, the nature of the Hutu and Tutsi identities has been characterized in a number of different and compelling ways, but never before as *national* identities.⁸ Most notably, the Hutu and Tutsi identities have frequently been designated as *ethnic* identities, *caste* identities, or, more problematically, *class* identities.⁹ While each of these designations captures some aspects of the identities, providing very useful clues about their origins and evolutions, none acknowledges the ultimate manifestation of the identities as national ones, in the sense adopted in this volume. The designation of these identities as "national" ones will be controversial, and only partly indicative of their overall character, but this need not trouble us.¹⁰ This redesignation in fact captures the most important dimension of the identities and helps us to understand the contemporary nature of Rwandan politics. Most significantly, the specification of (Rwandan) Hutu and Tutsi as *national* identities helps us to understand the violent manifestations of social conflict in the country.

One should hasten to note that the two communities identified here are both *Rwandan* communities. This specification is important because there are indigenous groups of people identifying with the appellations *Hutu* and *Tutsi* both in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and there are also "ethnically related" peoples in southern Uganda.¹¹ Despite the possible objective bases for group identity that the two Rwandan groups might have with these extraterritorial peoples, however, no ties of transterritorial *nationalism* have yet emerged, though much communal fealty has been in evidence.¹²

It is also important to clarify that *nationalism* is used here in the sense specified in the introduction to this volume. The Rwandan Hutu and Rwandan Tutsi are nations in that they are each "communit[ies] of people organized around the idea of *self-determination*."¹³ The irreducibly tragic reality of Rwandan politics is that the representatives of the Hutu and Tutsi identities have sought *to control the Rwandan state* to protect the fundamental interests of their respective communities. Nationalism is defined at the outset of this volume as "the pursuit—through argument or other activity—of a set of rights and privileges for the self-defined members of the nation, including, at minimum, territorial autonomy or independence." Although I might put it slightly differently, the practical implica-

tions are the same: the leaders of the two outstanding identity communities in Rwanda have sought control over a specified territory to protect the “rights and privileges for the self-defined members of the nation.”

Despite its explanatory appeal, the idea of dual nationalisms may strike one as odd on a number of counts. First, the demographic, social, and geographic contexts for Rwanda’s dual nationalisms are utterly different from those typically imagined for other ethnic or civil communities claiming overlapping territorial spaces. In no other setting do the two national peoples live in such complete interspersed with one another, and in no other setting have two national peoples lived in such long economic symbiosis.¹⁴ In Rwanda, neither of the two identity communities has *typically* envisioned a total expulsion or removal of the other community; only in the extraordinary circumstances of the 1994 genocide did certain prominent Hutu figures in the ruling class undertake a project of eliminating or removing the opposing identity group. For the Tutsi identity community to physically remove the Hutu is virtually unimaginable, but for its leaders to rule the Rwandan state in pursuit of Tutsi interests is certainly not, as the policies of the present government attest. Despite the parallels with Palestine/Israel, and perhaps other multinational territories, the tight symbiosis of the identity communities over a period spanning centuries sets Rwanda apart.

Second, the notion of dual *nationalisms* in Rwanda is odd because there are such excellent objective bases for pan-Rwandan or, better, Banyarwanda nationalism. Rwanda has a “national” language, Kinyarwanda, common to both the Hutu and Tutsi communities, a language only used by the Banyarwanda in neighboring territories. In so many other mixed-identity settings, language has formed such an ineluctable force for creating social cohesion that one naturally expects the same for Rwanda. Both a few Rwandans and many outsiders, particularly scholars, have fervently and long hoped for the emergence of Banyarwanda nationalism, largely based upon language. In fact, a few Rwandans do have such an identity, but they have remained politically marginal, with tragic consequences, due to the social strength of the rival ethnonational identities.

Another source of Banyarwanda nationalism might have been the common colonial experience, but as I argue in this chapter, colonialism did not serve this end. Finally, partly as a result of colonialism, the “national” territory of the Banyarwanda has been well defined for decades and has been recognized among relevant actors including the Banyarwanda themselves,

the citizens of neighboring states, and the leaders of more distant global forces, including the great powers and the United Nations.¹⁵ Given these excellent objective bases, it is striking that Banyarwandan nationalism did not emerge in Rwanda.

If we accept that the label *national* can apply to the Hutu and Tutsi identity groups, at least as an ideal type, what implications does this have for explaining Rwanda's tragic postindependence history? Or, to conform with the framework of this volume, we might ask what *caused* the perpetuation of the dual nationalisms in Rwanda after independence. Theoretical approaches to ethnicity (and nationalism) suggest two competing hypotheses. The primordialist approach suggests that the binational conflict was a product of ancient and intrinsic differences between the two identity communities, each of which sought to control the historical Rwandan territory. The instrumentalist approach suggests, on the other hand, that the differences between the groups are largely artificial, created and sustained by the elites for narrow political ends. The instrumentalist approach implies that elite representatives of each identity group sought to create nationalist feelings (i.e., the desire to control the state) in their group in order to maintain themselves in power. This analysis, in turn, sheds light on the preeminent question about Rwanda as more conventionally posed: How can we possibly understand the inhuman hatreds that gave rise, first, to intercommunal mass killing and, finally, to genocide. Although we return explicitly to this causal question at the end of the chapter, the weight of the evidence suggests an answer well in advance.

The Development of Rwanda's Two Identity Communities

Since the Tutsi community, or rather a subset thereof, emerged more than five hundred years ago as the dominant social group in Rwanda, it seems fitting to begin with it in laying out the bases for Rwanda's identity communities. The bases for Rwandan Tutsi identity have included the group's distinctive ethnic origins, economic role, and political institutions, including the *mwamiship* and the chieftaincy. As important as the realities of such distinctive social attributes are the myths associated with each.

The "nuclear cell" of a Rwandan Tutsi kingdom was established by the fifteenth century, and a number of "formerly independent Hutu communities" were absorbed into the kingdom over the following century, beginning a long process of imperial expansion.¹⁶ Meanwhile, Rwanda remained

a territorial space occupied by a large but declining number of “microstates,” ruled by either Hutu or Tutsi chiefs. This process of expansion culminated only in the early twentieth century, when the rule of Tutsi chiefs was finally established throughout all of the contemporary territory of Rwanda. The process was only accomplished with the explicit, direct, and unflinching support of colonial authorities, first German and then Belgian. During all but the last fifty years of this five-hundred-year period, it must be stressed, only a small fraction of the entire Tutsi community was associated with either the Tutsi monarchy or the institution of Tutsi chieftaincy. The spread of “Tutsi consciousness” to the Tutsi masses only happened as independence neared.

The origin of the Tutsi people has been a matter of intensive debate among European and African scholars for more than one hundred years, and it remains unresolved. It is widely, but not universally, agreed that the Tutsi did originate from a different “ethnic stock” prior to their establishment of dominance in Rwanda.¹⁷ A number of early Belgian anthropologists and colonial administrators speculated about some far distant origins for the Tutsi, including such fantastic places as the lost continent of Atlantis and the Garden of Eden or, somewhat more reasonably, India.¹⁸ Such fantastic notions resonated with late-nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century European racial prejudices: these observers were able to persuade themselves that the Tutsi ruled in Rwanda because of some genetic superiority associated with race. Most serious scholars, however, seem to believe that the origins of the Tutsi do in fact lie outside of present-day Rwanda.¹⁹

In the past, the Tutsi apparently had some distinctive physiological features, based on their separate geographical origins. These included a lighter complexion, taller stature, and finer (thinner) noses compared with the “typical” Hutu. To a very limited extent, these physiological differences were occasionally still discernable in individuals at the time of European contact, and even into the twentieth century. Any original physiological distinction between Tutsi and Hutu, however, has largely been obliterated by intermarriage, “caste changing,” and other forms of ethnic mixing so that representatives of the two groups are not now reliably distinguishable.²⁰ Likewise, Tutsi and Hutu cultural practices and beliefs have also blended over the centuries. Thus, ethnicity per se is now a very slight basis indeed for identification with one of Rwanda’s two dominant communities.

Besides ethnicity, the traditional political function of the Tutsi in Rwandan society was another basis for the emergence of a Tutsi identity com-

munity. Specifically, the institutions of the Tutsi monarch, or *mwami*, and of the Tutsi chieftaincy were vitally important to the process. The Rwandan Tutsi monarchy represented a highly centralized, authoritarian, and unrivaled locus of power in both late precolonial and colonial Rwanda. For purposes of legitimation, the monarchy equipped itself with a ritual code (*ubwiru*) and a cadre of guardians of the code (*biru*). Among the duties of the *biru* was propagation of the official myths of the monarchy, one of which closely resembles Plato's "myth of the metals."²¹ Such myths were one tool that the Tutsi elites employed in their socialization of the Hutu and Twa in their inferior status.

While the Tutsi chiefs of Rwanda had far less autonomy than those of Burundi, where a much looser monarchy emerged, they did exercise a far-flung hegemony over Hutu populations, with the qualifications noted in the preceding. In areas under the control of the central monarchy, they reported to and served only at the will of the *mwami*, but they had substantial authority over both Hutu and Tutsi populations within their territories. The Rwandan Tutsi chieftaincy was a highly complex institution that involved a tripartite structure.²² The institution of the chieftaincy, with all of its hundreds of local representatives and myriad subordinates, served to spread the Tutsi identity, associated particularly with social superiority, from the apex down into a substantial part of the Tutsi population.

Yet another basis for Tutsi (and Hutu) identity in Rwanda was economic function, which served to divide the population into "classes," or "castes." The Tutsi who entered the Rwandan territory in the distant past apparently relied heavily for sustenance on cattle herding, rather than agriculture. Having established themselves in Rwanda, the Tutsi frequently put the care of some cattle in the hands of the Hutu, but this did not change the perception of differential economic roles. The *control* of cattle remained largely in Tutsi hands, while the Hutu cared for them and engaged in agriculture. Perhaps the most important socioeconomic institution of Rwanda until the mid-twentieth century was the quasi-feudal *buhake* contract, briefly described as a contract of "pastoral servitude."²³ Under the terms of such a contract, a local patron, usually a Tutsi, would make the usage of cattle and land available to a client, usually a Hutu. More generally, the patron would take on responsibilities for the welfare of the client. In return, the client would render specific goods, including some percentage of his agricultural produce to the patron.

This functional economic differentiation in society paralleled and

largely reinforced the cleavages represented by ethnic difference and political control. Whether the resultant cleavages are best viewed as class or caste cleavages depends largely on the degree of movement one perceives to exist between the two identity groups.²⁴ Early anthropological works documented the possibility of having one's identity change in correspondence with changing economic fortunes. Those Tutsi who lost their cattle and other means of support quite often came to be regarded as Hutu, while those Hutu males who prospered could sometimes marry into Tutsi families and have their offspring be considered as Tutsi.²⁵ As a result, the ethnic basis for the Tutsi-Hutu distinction eroded, even as identity group distinctions themselves became stronger.

Most of the early bases for Hutu identity can be deduced from the foregoing discussion. Unlike the Tutsi, the Hutu have typically perceived themselves as the "original" inhabitants of the Rwandan territory, as opposed to immigrants from a very distant past; in economic terms, their lives have been more associated with clientage and agricultural work, rather than patronage and cattle herding. Given their overall subordination in the society, the Hutu had little opportunity to develop any sense of collective consciousness, even as victims, until late in Rwandan colonial history.²⁶ One very important exception to this rule was in those peripheral parts of Rwanda where Hutu chiefs maintained their independence well into the colonial period.²⁷

Perhaps the dominant theme of contemporary writing on Rwandan history is the transformation of these sources of identity at the hands of the German, and then Belgian, colonizers. The major effect of colonialism was to reinforce, render static, and rigidify the Tutsi-Hutu identity difference in Rwanda. Both European colonizers found advantage in these practices since both relied on the Tutsi as their local adjuncts in the exercise of colonial hegemony. The Tutsi essentially became the instrument of indirect colonial rule, and for this system to function, it had to be undeniably clear who the Tutsi were and what the nature of their social role was. Among other methods of achieving this end, the Belgians issued identity cards to citizens stating their ethnic origin as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa.

The rigidification of identities in Rwanda by colonial authorities is observable in a number of areas. For instance, the *buhake* was altered in several ways to favor Tutsi domination. Whereas in precolonial Rwanda, poor Tutsi often played the client role in the contract, the colonizers turned the institution into one of complete Tutsi domination of Hutu. Moreover,

compared to the former terms, the terms of the contract were altered heavily in favor of the patrons. Finally, due to the monetization of the economy and the imposition of taxes, many Hutu were forced into (unequal) *buhake* contracts in order to meet their obligations.²⁸ Colonial anthropology, much of which identified the Tutsi as a “superior race” justified and rationalized these changes. Meanwhile, the colonial education system, as it functioned until after World War II, served to reify the abstract notion of Tutsi superiority. The mission schools run by Catholic authorities recruited almost exclusively the sons of Tutsi notables for education, which was the main vehicle for maintaining social superiority.²⁹ Thus, colonial efforts invested an elite segment of the Tutsi with tangible skills that prepared them for continued social domination and further reinforced their consciousness of superiority.

At a higher social level, the relationship between the monarchy and the chiefs also underwent a transformation under colonialism that reduced the autonomy of the chiefs and bolstered monarchical prerogatives. Colonial authorities also assisted the Tutsi mwami Yuhi Musinga (1896–1931) in putting down revolts in northern regions in 1912, in reasserting authority in Kinyaga in 1917, and in replacing Hutu chiefs with Tutsi chiefs in the second and third decades of the twentieth century.³⁰ Large areas of northern Rwanda remained under the rule of the Kiga (a Hutu clan) until it was suppressed and brought under Tutsi control through the instrument of a German military expedition in 1912.³¹ Similarly, in several areas of the Kinyaga region (of Cyangugu prefect), in the southwestern area of the country bordering on the DRC, Tutsi chiefs were only introduced after conquest by Belgian-led troops in 1925.³² These areas might well have remained independent of Tutsi rule without the intervention of Europeans in the process. Meanwhile, Tutsi chiefs throughout the country were invested with the formal titles of colonial bureaucrats and given a significant role in administration. Virtually all observers agree that the recrystallization of identities under colonialism set the stage for Tutsi-Hutu confrontation at the moment of independence and beyond.

The Emergence of Rwanda's Two National Communities

The “critical juncture” for the development of Rwanda's dual nationalisms coincided with the crisis of state control occasioned by the end of Belgian colonialism.³³ The revolution in Rwanda between 1959 and 1962 led to a

dramatic reordering of social relations in the country, and the Hutu-Tutsi schism was the main axis along which political forces divided. While Belgian colonial rule quietly withered away in the course of that revolution, this change was far from the most important of the transformations that the country witnessed, and it was not the result of Banyarwandan nationalism.³⁴ In the course of the revolution, a part of the ruling Tutsi establishment fled the country, while others accepted political marginalization.

Meanwhile, ordinary and impoverished Tutsi residents of the country saw themselves implicitly cast as oppressors of the majority of the population by the new Hutu elite that came to the fore. A small segment of this Hutu elite seized power for itself and set up rule over the country in the name of the Hutu masses. As for the Hutu masses themselves, they remained as disenfranchised and exploited as they had been under the “dual colonialism” of European-Tutsi rule. While this set of changes may or may not be termed an “ethnic revolution,” the changes did take place despite the absence of primordial, immutable sources of identity for the country’s two main groups.³⁵ Here, though, the main contention is that in the course of the Rwandan revolution the country’s two main identity communities took on aspirations of *national* self-determination. That is, large percentages of each community were seized with the desire to gain control over the Rwandan state for the primary reason of protecting the welfare of each group.

If the discussion of the sources of Tutsi group identity should logically precede that of the Hutu’s sources, then the discussion of the emergence of Rwandan Hutu nationalism must precede that of Rwandan Tutsi nationalism. Given all of the social advantages that had accrued to Tutsi elites by the 1950s, they most probably took it for granted that they would inherit rulership of the country from the departing colonialists when the time came. Meanwhile, they enjoyed a myriad of advantages that largely reconciled them to colonial rule in the short term. The Hutu, on the other hand, correctly perceived that independence might well mean only continued marginalization for them in the society. Accordingly, they had a strong incentive to mobilize on behalf of a more egalitarian society before the final departure of Belgian authorities. Thus, Tutsi *nationalism* only emerged in reaction to the efforts of the Hutu elites to reorder social relations.

Ironically, given all of the colonial favoritism shown to the Tutsi through the 1940s, it was also colonial policies that allowed Rwandan Hutu nationalism to emerge. Before these changes took place, “the Hutu had lit-

the consciousness of themselves as a group.”³⁶ On the one hand, rather abrupt changes in Belgian colonial policy on Tutsi and Hutu status allowed for the emergence of a Hutu elite by the mid-1950s. This new elite quickly came to the fore of the Hutu movement for a reordering of social relations in Rwanda. On the other hand, Hutu peasants played a major role in the revolution at the local level throughout the country. Since Belgian colonial policies had left these peasants feeling overlooked and unjustly subjected to abuse by Tutsi chiefs, they were quite ready to follow their leaders in a campaign of social transformation—and in one of collective confrontation.

Without the creation of a Hutu *elite*, however, it is doubtful that Rwandan Hutu nationalism could ever have emerged. The policy changes that allowed the emergence of this elite took place first in the Catholic Church, particularly in the schools that it ran in the country, and second in the colonial administration itself. As for the local Catholic establishment, its practices toward the two local identity communities appear to have changed because of transformations within the church hierarchy and the arrival of a new class of missionaries after World War II. These new missionaries had “relatively humble social origins” and brought with them ideas of social change.³⁷ At the other end of the hierarchy, the appointment of a new Swiss apostolic vicar for Rwanda in 1955, Msgr. Perraudin, led to new policies that favored the Hutu. Most important, a greater percentage of Hutu were recruited into the mission schools, and into the clergy, as the 1950s progressed. As a result, by the end of the decade, a sizable cadre of educated Hutu potential leaders was on hand.

In the colonial administration, a slight drift toward more egalitarian social policies was accelerated by the appointment of Vice Governor-General Jean-Paul Harroy, also in 1955. Belgian colonial policies were no doubt affected on a broader scale by the experience of World War II, in which the excesses of “master race” doctrines became evident. The colonial administration began to advance a few Hutu into administrative service, even as it began to curtail the prerogatives of the Tutsi chiefs throughout the rural areas. The colonial administration also sought to thwart the efforts of the United Nation’s Trusteeship Council to speed up Rwanda’s independence in 1960 because the internal transfer of power was not yet complete. Finally, when the first round of Hutu peasant violence began against local Tutsi, the colonial administration firmly prevented any retaliation. Ultimately, the Hutu were allowed to “seize control of the central machinery of government.”³⁸

Long before that important event, though, the construction of Hutu national consciousness had to pass through a number of critical stages. A necessary first step was to raise consciousness of Hutu oppression among the literate class of new Hutu elites. Fortuitously for the Hutu cause, the Catholic Church decided to hand over the editorship of the leading Kinyarwanda language paper (*Kimanyateka*) to an important Hutu figure, Grégoire Kayibanda, in late 1956. In the hands of Kayibanda, later Rwanda's first president, this paper became the major voice for the cause of ethnic redress. At virtually the same moment that Kayibanda took over the editorship of *Kimanyateka*, Catholic authorities helped a group of Hutu elites found a coffee cooperative called TRAFIPRO (*Travail, Fidélité, Progrès*) in Kabgayi.³⁹ This organization provided an opportunity for Hutu elites to sharpen their leadership skills, and it gave rise to other such organizations around the country.

A second logical step was a statement of the philosophical aims of a potential Hutu government, which was aptly supplied by the Bahutu Manifesto,⁴⁰ issued in March 1957. The document essentially called for an end to "the political monopoly of one race, the Mututsi." The document frontally assaulted the "feudal" economic system and forthrightly demanded the promotion of Hutu interests. Importantly, the nine Hutu authors of the manifesto strongly opposed the removal of ethnic labels from the identity papers of the citizens.⁴¹ Had such labels been removed, and a strict meritocracy for government service instituted, Tutsi domination would have continued for some time, given that the Tutsi had previously enjoyed so many social advantages. The desire of the Hutu leadership to keep track of ethnic identities after the revolution demonstrates its aspiration for group redress and for rule in the interest of an ethnic majority.

Another critical stage in the development of Rwandan Hutu nationalism was the merger of the divergent northern strain, animated by the memory of a system of Hutu chiefs, who had only recently been disempowered, and the "modern" nationalism of Kayibanda and other educated Hutu elites in the country's central regions.⁴² The northern Kiga chiefs looked backward to the recent past when they exercised a feudal control of their own over fellow members of their identity community; meanwhile, the modern Hutu elites in the Gitarama region looked forward to an egalitarian future. Despite their somewhat retrograde political views, the northern Hutu leaders were better connected with peasant populations than those at the center. According to Lemarchand, "the earliest and strongest reaction" against

Tutsi supremacy was in the north. “The revolutionary contagion emanating from the north considerably strengthened Hutu solidarity throughout the country, . . . intensifying inter-caste antagonisms.”⁴³ Kayibanda and his colleagues, on the other hand, were much better connected internationally and drew on a more diverse set of political resources. Thus, according to Lemarchand, “By 1960 . . . these originally very different manifestations had coalesced into a more or less unified revolutionary movement aiming at the wholesale elimination of Tutsi elements from all positions of influence.”⁴⁴

The emergence of Rwandan Tutsi nationalism unfolded in two distinct stages leading up to independence. The first stage involved mostly Tutsi chiefs and “modern” elites and was generated by elections to “advisory councils” in 1953 and 1956. These “elections” were in fact a very limited exercise in popular governance since the masses played virtually no role in them.⁴⁵ Although a substantial minority of Hutu were elected into the sub-chieftdom council level, Tutsi representatives dominated at the higher levels. In fact, at the highest level (the Conseil Supérieur du Pays) the percentage of Tutsi actually increased from 90.6 percent in 1953 to 94 percent after the 1956 exercise. In this way, members of the Tutsi elites began to take on some functions—even if advisory ones—in the colonial administration. And as in every other case in colonial Africa, a small taste of power only whetted the appetites of those selected for a more significant role in their state governments. By the end of the decade, the Tutsi elites had developed, in classic anticolonial fashion, a sense of entitlement to power, and pressures for immediate independence began to build.

In the second stage, Rwandan Tutsi nationalism blossomed in reaction to the activities of the Hutu counterelites and, later, those of the Hutu peasantry.⁴⁶ Naturally, the Tutsi elites observed with growing anxiety the escalating demands of the Hutu counterelites, and they eventually realized that their only hope for maintaining their superior social standing was to take hold immediately of the reigns of power. Without mass support, however, they had little leverage against the Belgian colonizers. Meanwhile, throughout the country’s rural communities, Hutu resentment against Tutsi chiefs was growing, and new political activity among the Hutu evoked a counter-resentment. In this environment, the beating near the Kabgayi mission of a Hutu subchief by Tutsi political activists on November 1, 1959, set off a critical round of communal fighting between members of the two identity communities. In the following two weeks, as the fighting spread to other

regions, some three hundred people were killed, numerous homes were burned, and a mass exodus of Tutsi out of the country began.⁴⁷ The Belgian authorities sympathized far more with the Hutu during this unrest, allowing the Hutu to burn homes and forbidding the mwami to retaliate.⁴⁸ While it is important to note that the (Tutsi) monarchy was not a target of Hutu protests at this point, there is no denying the impact that these events had on the crystallization of the two *national* identities. From this point on, the Tutsi masses, who were as impoverished and oppressed as their Hutu comrades, began to identify strongly with their own elite leaders.

For both Rwandan nationalisms a key challenge was to articulate an ideology or program that protected the interests of the emergent nations without explicitly acknowledging the real purpose of the ideas. Particularly for Tutsi national leaders, who only represented a minority of the population by 1960, the appeal took pan-Rwandan (Banyarwandan) form. These Tutsi leaders called for immediate “national” independence for the Rwandan state, a call that attracted considerable international support.⁴⁹ Given the strong anticolonial zeitgeist of the era, the justness of the call could hardly be questioned, though its main intent was actually a perpetuation of Tutsi domination.

Meanwhile, those supporting the Rwandan Hutu ideal actually supported a short-term continuation of Belgian rule and decried what they called “Tutsi colonialism.” Rather, they called for immediate “democracy,” which in fact meant a transfer of power to the Hutu majority. A typical Hutu slogan observed at this hour was “Democracy First, [and] Independence Will Come; Down with Immediate Independence!”⁵⁰

The emergence of political parties and the results of the first elections follow directly from the development of Hutu and Tutsi nationalist feelings. In keeping with their disenfranchised position, Hutu elites were the first to create political parties. The first was the Hutu Social Movement of Kayibanda, founded in June 1957, which later became the Parti du Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU) in October 1959. Both names of this political entity are indicative of its identity-group orientation. The second Hutu party to be formed was the Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (APROSOMA), founded by Joseph Gitera in November 1957. This organization “claimed to be a class-based party but attracted almost no one but Hutu.”⁵¹ Aside from the fact that the two parties were vehicles for the two different personalities involved, hardly surprising in the African context, each also rallied different regional Hutu

forces. PARMEHUTU was deeply implanted in the regions of Gitarama and Ruhengeri, while APROSOMA had more support in the southern Butare region.

The hard-core, monarchist Tutsi elements did not counter with a party of their own until August 1959. The Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) “was strongly monarchist and hostile to the Belgians, and defended the idea of immediate independence.”⁵² The following month, a second largely Tutsi party, the Rwandese Democratic Union (RADER) party, was formed by (Tutsi) Chief Prosper Bwanakwari. The Belgians had encouraged the formation of this party with the idea that it might be able to attract moderate elements from both identity communities, but this was not to be. The party “was frowned upon by the monarchist diehards while the Hutu never quite managed to trust its liberalism.”⁵³ The late formation of these two parties demonstrates the reactive nature of Tutsi nationalism, which responded to the growing activism of the Hutu counterelites.

Despite some local anomalies and instances of cross-ethnic voting,⁵⁴ the successive elections in Rwanda demonstrate that the more radical Hutu and Tutsi nationalist parties attracted an increasing percentage of support from their respective identity communities. The first elections were for communal councils and burgomasters for Rwanda’s 229 communes in June and July 1960. With these elections, the country’s chiefs would become “mere figureheads,” and their powers would soon be completely suppressed.⁵⁵ PARMEHUTU was the big winner, gaining some 76 percent of the seats on the communal councils and 160 (70 percent) of the burgomaster positions. APROSOMA finished with the second-most votes, winning 7.5 percent of the seats on the communal councils and 51 (22 percent) burgomaster posts. Overall, the two Hutu-oriented parties had won 84 percent of the vote.⁵⁶ The legislative elections of September 25, 1961, only confirmed the domination of PARMEHUTU and the final polarization of the two identity communities. In these elections, PARMEHUTU won 78 percent of the vote and thirty-five seats (of forty-four) in the legislative assembly. By this time, the Tutsi vote had swung entirely to UNAR, which gained 17 percent of the vote and seven seats in the assembly. Thus, the two parties that tried in some way to transcend the polarization of the population along communal identity lines were both eclipsed by rivals with purely community-based appeals. In this fashion the ideologies of Rwandan Hutu and Rwandan Tutsi nationalism came to squash any hopes for transcommunity parties or ideologies. Eventually, the great majority of the popula-

tion chose sides—or was *forced* to choose sides—based on the country's primary identity communities.

For the most part, the national identities were manufactured by elites who sought bases of support in the population. The main hope of Tutsi elites was that Rwanda would quietly succeed to its independence, leaving them in charge. The more liberal among them, such as Chief Bwanakweri, doubtless hoped that the former discrimination against the Hutu would be alleviated and that Hutu representatives would slowly find their way into positions of authority. For the Hutu elites, though, the most apparent path to political power was to instigate a community-wide revolt of Hutu against all Tutsi, elites and disenfranchised alike. Once their campaign had begun, and gained the support of the colonial administration, the only resort of the Tutsi was to retrench around the traditional Tutsi institutions and demand immediate independence as a monarchy. Even the moderate and progressive Tutsi were eventually pushed into the UNAR camp in this way, as RADER disappeared from the political scene.

Rwanda's Nationalisms after Independence

After Rwanda's de facto independence in 1961, the country was in the hands of leaders who may properly be referred to as Rwandan Hutu nationalists through July 1994. Whatever objective good was or was not accomplished for the Hutu masses is scarcely relevant to their actual sources of legitimacy in the eyes of the Hutu public. The long period of Rwandan Hutu nationalism in control of the Rwandan state was punctuated by three major crises—in 1963, in 1972–73, and between 1990 and 1994. The last of these crises ended in a genocide of several hundred thousand Tutsi citizens and the political massacre of many tens of thousands of Hutu opponents between April and July 1994. Since 1994, the Rwandan state has been in the hands of a Tutsi nationalist regime, whose preeminent goal has been to protect the rights and interests of the remaining Tutsi parts of the population.

The Kayibanda Regime

The PARMEHUTU government of Grégoire Kayibanda that succeeded to power in 1961 came to embody the idea of Rwandan Hutu nationalism and staked its legitimacy firmly on the idea of defending and uplifting Rwanda's Hutu population. One can easily argue, and with good reason, that the real

purposes of the government were otherwise. Namely, the regime sought above all else to protect in power Kayibanda himself and the group of Hutu elites who formed the core of his supporters. In time, the regime also served to protect those Hutu from a certain region, Gitarama, against rivals from other regions, particularly Butare. One can further argue without real dissent that the PARMEHUTU regime did relatively little to promote or defend the real, material interests of the Hutu peasantry or even middle classes, other than to replace Tutsi members of the civil service with Hutu cadres. Impressive though they are, however, such arguments do not change the fact that the Kayibanda regime ruled with the support of a sizable majority of the country's Hutu population and with virtually no support from the Tutsi population. During its years in power, one main effect of the government was to further harden the two national identities that had emerged in the years leading up to Rwanda's independence, ensuring that any government ruling Rwanda would have to rely on one of the country's two national communities for support.

The real transfer of power in Rwanda did not occur following the legislative elections of 1961 but, rather, earlier that year, at the time of the "coup of Gitarama" on January 28, 1961. By this date, the colonial administration of Rwanda was locked in a quiet battle with the United Nations over the modalities of independence, generated by support for the UNAR position by important members of the United Nations General Assembly and Trusteeship Council. These supporters were now trying to organize a national reconciliation among Rwanda's increasingly fractious parties *before* the organization of elections in late 1961, thus delaying the independence process that they had previously tried to hasten.

In Rwanda, meanwhile, the special resident (Colonel Bem Logiest) and the resident general (Jean-Paul Harroy) both continued to favor the Hutu cause, as they had done since the mid-1950s. The Belgian government, which was initially torn between the two positions, eventually came around to the view of its own colonial administration, partly because of the Congo crisis and the resulting strained relations with the United Nations.⁵⁷ In these circumstances, the local administration allowed PARMEHUTU to organize secretly a meeting of all of the country's communal counselors and burgomasters on an assigned date. At this meeting, the representatives, dominated by PARMEHUTU, declared Rwanda a republic, abolished the monarchy, and went on to set up a provisional government with Kayibanda as prime minister. Thus, the subsequent elections of 1961 merely

confirmed a political reality that was already well established, and the formal independence that came on July 1, 1962, was a virtual afterthought.

Between early 1961 and 1964 the Kayibanda regime evolved into an exclusionist Rwandan Hutu nationalist dictatorship, but this process happened only slowly. From the beginning, the government did nothing to stop Hutu (PARMEHUTU) militants throughout the country from attacking Rwandan Tutsi citizens, thus encouraging their behavior. Such attacks were typically generated in response to the activities, including border attacks, of the exiled Tutsi communities in Uganda, Congo, Burundi, and Tanzania. The government referred to these exiled Tutsi as *Inyenzi*, or cockroaches, beginning the process of their dehumanization in the eyes of many Hutu. Nonetheless, the government did come to an agreement with UNAR representatives in New York in February 1962 that allowed for the entry of two UNAR ministers into the government. Meanwhile, seven seats in the assembly were in UNAR (Tutsi) hands, and UNAR was initially allowed to criticize the government through its own newspaper, *Unité*.⁵⁸

This limited Tutsi political activity was allowed to continue only until December 1963. In that month, Tutsi exiles based in Burundi and Congo attempted an invasion of Rwandan territory with the aim of overthrowing the Kayibanda/PARMEHUTU regime. In the midst of this fighting, the prominent local members of both the UNAR and the RADER parties, including the liberal Bwanakweri, were summarily executed in Ruhengeri.⁵⁹ Following these attacks, whose leaders nearly succeeded in occupying Kigali, national and local PARMEHUTU officials instigated assaults on Tutsi populations in several regions of the country, leading to the deaths of some ten thousand to fourteen thousand ordinary Tutsi. Tens of thousands more fled into exile, joining the thousands who had fled earlier. Following the “Bugesera Invasion,” all remaining Tutsi were purged from the assembly, prefect-level political posts, and higher levels of the administration. Only a few Tutsi were allowed to continue working in the lower levels of administration. As envisioned in the Bahutu Manifesto, identity cards listing “ethnic” affiliation were maintained under the PARMEHUTU regime, and the Tutsi were officially limited to no more than 9 percent of the positions in schools, civil service, or any other public sector.⁶⁰

Kayibanda used the threat of the “*Inyenzi*” to consolidate his power vis-à-vis his potential Hutu rivals and to establish a virtually totalitarian control over the country. This meant, among other measures, that Kayibanda and his government had to extinguish APROSOMA as a rival political

movement. A PARMEHUTU delegation in the assembly pointedly asked Gitera, APROSOMA's leader, to retire from politics and return to his business interests in October 1961, which he did. Subsequently, APROSOMA officials were systematically driven from office or "converted" to loyalty to PARMEHUTU by 1966.⁶¹ By this time, Kayibanda had become a kind of Hutu mwami, taking on the airs of a divinely implanted, infallible leader of the Hutu people. According to Prunier, his regime was characterized by "remoteness, authoritarianism and secretiveness." As far as its ideology was concerned, "the intrinsic worth of being Hutu [and] the total congruence between demographic majority and democracy" were emphasized.⁶² Indeed, the demographic facts of Rwanda created by the affiliation of most citizens with one of its two dominant identity communities allowed Kayibanda to cloak the practice of Rwandan Hutu nationalism in an enunciated ideology of "democratic" majoritarianism.

In terms of the variants of nationalism described in Lowell Barrington's opening chapter of this volume, Kayibanda's main efforts with regard to territory were of the "sovereignty-protecting" variety. Given the well-established territorial dimensions of the Rwandan state inherited in 1962, the Kayibanda regime did not mount a significant irridentist campaign challenging the territorial integrity of any neighboring state. On the other hand, there were very real internal and external threats to "territorial control," which Kayibanda met with sufficient force to quash. With regard to defining the relevant national identity, Kayibanda took no significant steps to build a civic (i.e., Banyarwandan) nation in Rwanda; rather, he clearly focused his efforts on protecting and defending the interests of the emergent Hutu nation (hence, "nation-protecting"). While Kayibanda and other members of his regime certainly grieved over the fate of Burundi's Hutu, especially during the genocidal massacres of 1972, they took little action in the name of "co-national-protecting," except to welcome the Hutu refugees who flooded into Rwanda in 1972. Kayibanda's main ambition for the Hutu of Burundi would have been for them to seize control of the Burundian state, not for them to live in a common (state) homeland with the Rwandan Hutu. This fact justifies the point made earlier in the chapter that the dual nationalisms of Rwanda pertain solely to the *Rwandan* Hutu and Tutsi identity communities.

The Habyarimana Regime and the Genocide of 1994

The second of the three crises that struck Rwanda under Hutu nationalist rule ended with Kayibanda being driven from power and General Juvénal

Habyarimana seizing power. After the Tutsi nationalism challenge was effectively repressed in 1963, the real politics in Rwanda began to revolve around a different axis, namely the regional rivalries of different Hutu politicians. Kayibanda's core constituency in Gitarama had rivalries both with senior figures from Butare, in the south, and, to a lesser extent, with leaders from Ruhengeri, in the north. The deeper source of the crisis of legitimacy was Kayibanda's failure to stimulate rapid economic development or to articulate any positive ideology to capture the imagination of the citizens of his country. In short, his repression was not justified in the name of any larger discernable project, which became problematic once the Tutsi nationalist "threat" receded.

The actual stimulus for Habyarimana's coup d'état in July 1973 was a failed effort on Kayibanda's part to reactivate the Hutu-Tutsi rivalry beginning the previous year. In May and June 1972, the Tutsi-dominated state in Burundi carried out a massive campaign of Hutu massacres in response to a challenge to its power. Kayibanda, realizing that his regime was failing, sought to capitalize on these events by raising the specter of resurgent Tutsi nationalism. He soon organized vigilante committees of Hutu radicals to ensure a rigid enforcement of his ethnic quota policy in all arenas of Rwandan life. This effort backfired, however, when many of the locally organized committees began to persecute not their putative Tutsi antagonists but rather rival Hutu from other regions.⁶³ The atmosphere of growing chaos provoked by these events provided the pretext for Habyarimana's coup and ensured its success.

From the time of his coup until the late 1980s, Habyarimana ruled without significant challenge and recorded only one failed coup attempt in 1980. Unlike Kayibanda, Habyarimana developed a successful ideology that did engender a certain amount of economic progress, as well as political stability. Habyarimana created his own political party (the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement—MRND) in 1973 and enshrined it in the constitution as the sole legal party. Political opponents to the regime, including former president Kayibanda (who died in prison), were dealt with ruthlessly. The regime exercised a quasi-totalitarian control over the movement and political activities of its citizens and even required peasants to provide two days of free labor per month.⁶⁴ The regime also enjoyed the support of the Catholic Church and encouraged Christian piety and humility in the citizenry.⁶⁵ As a result of the order and progress that one could witness in Rwanda between 1973 and 1990, the international

aid community lavished the Habyarimana regime with generous support. And despite the restrictions on freedoms, the regime enjoyed the support of the great majority of Hutu and the tolerance of most Tutsi for most of its pre-1990 history.

As in the years of the Kayibanda regime during which the Tutsi nationalist threat was suppressed, the little “politics” that occurred under Habyarimana involved rivalries among various Hutu “political clans” in the country. The activity of Habyarimana’s opponents-in-waiting increased during the periodic downturns in the Rwandan economy caused by falling coffee prices in the late 1970s and again in the late 1980s.⁶⁶ The nature of Habyarimana’s policies with regard to identity community politics was somewhat ambiguous and thus open to interpretation. In that the regime had a kind of “ideology” that transcended the Hutu-Tutsi divide, one may be inclined to agree with Catharine Newbury that the Habyarimana regime made efforts “to dampen ethnic tensions over the period from 1973 to the mid-1980s.”⁶⁷ Yet one should also bear in mind that the regime continued to equate rule in the name of the majority (i.e., the Hutu) with democracy. Moreover, one must recall, as does Prunier, that “throughout the Habyarimana years there would not be a single Tutsi bourgmestre or préfet, there was only one Tutsi officer in the whole army, there were two Tutsi members of parliament out of seventy and there was only one Tutsi minister out of a cabinet of between twenty-five and thirty members.”⁶⁸ Most importantly of all, Habyarimana retained the policy of issuing identity cards that listed each citizen’s “ethnicity” and the quota policy that restricted Tutsi to no more than 9 percent of the positions in any school, government agency, or business. Such policies may have served to “dampen ethnic tensions,” but if they did so, it was by reminding the Tutsi community that they could have no substantive role in the governing of the country and encouraging the Hutu to believe that the government favored them at the expense of the Tutsi.

Due to these ambiguities, the question arises of whether Habyarimana (prior to 1990) was acting as a Rwandan nationalist or as a Rwandan Hutu nationalist. On the question of controlling the “homeland,” Habyarimana, like his predecessor, responded to internal and external threats to territorial control but did not claim external territory. On the question of defining the nation, however, there would be disagreement. Newbury, given her emphasis, might well maintain that Habyarimana was engaged in “civic nation-building” (of a Rwandan nation), while Prunier would certainly

emphasize that the thrust of his policies served to protect the (Hutu) ethnic nation.

The key to understanding Habyarimana's behavior, however, is to recognize that his most important goal was simply staying in power. To that end, protecting the Hutu identity group and promoting its feeling of enfranchisement was far more important than building a cross-community Rwandan national identity, so one is forced to accept Prunier's emphasis. Like his predecessor, Habyarimana paid lip service to the welfare of non-Rwandan Hutu living abroad, but he did not take substantive steps to annex foreign territory or otherwise protect their interests.

If Habyarimana's policies on identity community politics were somewhat open to interpretation between 1973 and 1989, after the onset of the civil war in 1990, they were clearly and undeniably aimed at protecting the Hutu nation and asserting its right to rule. The late 1980s saw both the onset of a severe economic crisis, occasioned particularly by a drop in coffee prices, and the opening of a new political space in response to global and regional pressures for political reform. Following the outbreak of protests in a number of other African countries, and a decline in support from many foreign donors who now wanted political reform, the pressures for change inside Rwanda mounted dramatically during 1990.⁶⁹ The government was forced to free the press and to abandon the single-party state concept. Encouraged by the opening of political space in Rwanda, Tutsi exiles in Uganda had organized an opposition political party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which also gained the support of some Hutu exiles from Rwanda. On October 1, 1990, the RPF launched an attack on the Habyarimana regime from its base in Uganda, but the attack was initially rebuffed, and the RPF military commander, Fred Rwigyema, was killed. Although the RPF was publicly seeking the "right to return" for Ugandan political refugees abroad,⁷⁰ it certainly had the larger goal of contesting power in Kigali.

Following the attack of the RPF, Habyarimana's government adopted a dual strategy of continuing to open up political space on the one hand and of trying to convince the Hutu population of a grave threat from Tutsi invasion on the other. In the first category, the government began to allow the formation of opposition parties and to negotiate possible power-sharing agreements. It even conceded to the RPF demand that ethnic labels be removed from identity cards.⁷¹ In April 1992, in response to still more popular demands for reform, a new, multiparty transitional government,

whose prime minister came from the opposition Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), was installed.

Nonetheless, Habyarimana remained president. Even as his regime allowed reforms, “it worked simultaneously to diminish the impact of the reforms and to ensure that configurations of power did not change.”⁷² With the assistance of France, Habyarimana began a massive buildup of the Rwandan army, which increased from five thousand to thirty-five thousand in less than a year after the October 1990 invasion. Meanwhile, the government-controlled radio began disseminating false reports of atrocities at the hands of the RPF, which had again invaded the country in 1992, stimulating fear in the Hutu population. Moreover, the government began to organize massacres of Tutsi by local officials, resulting in hundreds of deaths through 1993. According to Longman, “By raising ethnic tensions, the MRND was able both to appeal to Hutu ethnic loyalty to build support and to frighten most Tutsi from taking an active role in political opposition.”⁷³

While Habyarimana pursued his dual strategy for defusing the opposition, his grasp on power was slowly slipping away, and the crisis of his regime was growing more severe. Meanwhile, a cadre of extremist Hutu nationalists were drawing up a “final solution” to the threat of Tutsi invasion and Tutsi rule: they were preparing a mass killing of all political opposition to be followed shortly by a genocide of all Rwandan Tutsi within reach. A great many details of the modalities of the genocide, especially the training of Interahamwe militiamen specifically for this purpose, were carefully organized in advance.⁷⁴ The plan was then implemented immediately after the downing of Habyarimana’s plane on April 6, 1994, an event that itself may have been perpetrated by the *génocidaires*.⁷⁵ Some 800,000 Rwandan citizens, including some 750,000 Tutsi, were massacred by a variety of horrifying means over the next three months.⁷⁶

As every serious observer of Rwanda has recognized, the genocide resulted from the active planning of high state officials and not from the “failure” of the Rwandan state.⁷⁷ It was a source of tremendous frustration to Rwanda scholars that many press accounts of the genocide accepted the propaganda of the perpetrators that the killings were the result of spontaneous, “tribal” fighting between Hutu and Tutsi elements. In fact, the tragedy represents an extreme form of Rwandan Hutu nationalism in the hands of fanatical state leaders. Essentially, both Habyarimana and his immediate successors pursued the same varieties of nationalism as Kayibanda, but the latter were the first to employ genocide as a means to that end.

Rwandan Tutsi Nationalism: From Exile to Power

As for Rwandan Tutsi nationalism, the flame was kept alive between 1963 and 1994, largely outside the Rwandan state in the various exile communities around the world. Given the near-totalitarian nature of the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes, it could also use “democracy” as its official justification. Between 1961 and 1963 Rwandan Tutsi political forces were essentially split between those in exile in neighboring countries and those still trying to operate in the country. As long as UNAR operated within Rwanda, Tutsi nationalism had a voice there, but this was ultimately intolerable to Kayibanda. Insofar as RADER retained some support among better-educated Hutu in certain corners of the country,⁷⁸ a glimmer of Banyarwandan nationalism stayed alive, but such an ideology was scarcely more acceptable to Kayibanda. The massacres of innocent Tutsi civilians within Rwanda succeeded in changing the ideologies of many remaining Tutsi inside the country from one of Banyarwandan national to Rwandan Tutsi nationalism, though giving voice to their feelings of pain and disenfranchisement would have been lethal.

After December 1963, Rwandan Tutsi nationalism existed only in the exile community in neighboring countries, where it percolated—or festered—for more than three decades. Prunier estimates that about four hundred thousand Tutsi refugees had fled abroad to neighboring countries by late 1964 and that this number had grown to between six hundred thousand and seven hundred thousand by the early 1990s.⁷⁹ The refugee communities kept alive their sense of identity through an array of cultural associations around the world, as Tutsi populations spread far beyond the camps. Many became successful professionals in the Western world, and some contributed money to Tutsi political organizations.

The Rwandan Tutsi might well have languished in exile until they were finally absorbed into the local populations were it not for the onset of the political reform movement in the early 1990s and the fluctuating fortunes of the Tutsi refugee population in neighboring Uganda. Under the second regime (1981–85) of Ugandan president Milton Obote, the Rwandan Tutsi refugee community in Uganda became the target of attacks by certain Bairu militants in Obote’s government.⁸⁰ As a result, several hundred young Tutsi refugees in Uganda soon joined Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM), a guerrilla movement seeking to overthrow Obote’s government. When Museveni eventually seized power in Kampala

in January 1986, some three thousand members of his fourteen-thousand-strong guerrilla army were of Rwanda Tutsi origin; by 1990, the Rwandan Tutsi numbered about eight thousand in Museveni's reinforced, one-hundred-thousand-strong army.⁸¹ As a result of their experience in Museveni's army, these Tutsi exiles gained invaluable military experience, access to arms, and, most important, the good will of President Museveni. At a meeting in Kampala in December 1987 the old Rwandan exile political organ adopted a new name (the Rwandan Patriotic Front—RPF) and a new mission—the return to Rwanda by force.⁸²

The vague plans of the RPF leaders were given new life after the onset of the political reform movement in 1989. A number of Hutu political opponents of Habyarimana began to flee Rwanda, and a number came to Uganda and joined forces with the RPF. In the first half of 1990, sensing the growing disarray in Habyarimana's regime, the RPF leaders, including Major General Fred Rwigyema and Major Paul Kagame,⁸³ planned an invasion of their homeland. When the hour of the invasion came, on October 1, 1990, Kagame was actually in the United States, receiving military training. After Rwigyema was killed on the second day of the attack, Kagame was notified, and he returned home to take command of the RPF force in Rwanda. By the time of his arrival toward the end of October, however, this thrust of the RPF had been repulsed by the Rwandan regular army (the Forces Armées Rwandaises—FAR). The French government soon rushed to Habyarimana's aid, helping him to bolster his army against any new attacks and shielding the regime against "Anglo-Saxon plots."

Over the next three and one-half years, the RPF reorganized itself under Kagame's leadership, while its soldiers hid out in the isolated mountain regions of northern Rwanda and, surreptitiously, in southern Uganda. The army commanders recruited more Rwandan exiles, increasing the size of their military force (the Rwandan Patriotic Army—RPA) from about 2,500 in 1990 to more than 25,000 in April 1994.⁸⁴ Tutsi exiles, as well as a few Hutu political opponents of Habyarimana from all around the world, sent financial contributions to the RPF to fund its political and military activities. The RPA leaders acquired arms both from their old comrades in the Ugandan army and from the international arms market.

Throughout this period, the RPA conducted small-scale military operations in the north of the country, including a daring raid on Ruhengeri in January 1991. In February 1993, the RPA launched a major military campaign in response to local massacres and the Habyarimana government's

pullout from a political settlement negotiated in Arusha, Tanzania.⁸⁵ Local massacres of Tutsi and Hutu political opponents of Habyarimana were rampant in the ensuing months, stiffening the RPA's determination to fight. Meanwhile, the assassination of Burundi's Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993 further hardened the hearts of the Hutu hard-liners in Kigali.

The RPA did not launch operations again in earnest until after the death of Habyarimana on April 6, 1994. It soon became apparent to it that an extremist Hutu nationalist faction set on genocide was in control of the government. In late April 1994, the RPA moved into various quarters of Kigali, but the interim government set up by the Hutu hard-liners quickly moved to the city of Gitarama. As the fighting continued, the genocide continued to unfold in areas of the country controlled by the FAR and the militias set up by the genocidal militias, the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi. On June 13, the RPA took the town of Gitirama, and the rump Hutu hard-liner government again had to flee. On June 23, the French launched a "humanitarian mission" to Rwanda (Opération Turquoise), which failed to save the lives of very many Rwandans but did allow many units of the FAR to escape into exile in Zaire intact. On July 4, the RPA finally captured the remainder of Kigali, after which the resistance of the FAR soon collapsed. On July 19, a new, RPF government was installed in Kigali. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Hutu were fleeing into refugee camps in Zaire, while tens of thousands of Tutsi exiles from Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda began moving into Rwanda to claim land and vacated homes.

Following its seizure of power in Kigali, the government in Kigali had two major preoccupations: to render justice to the victims of the 1994 genocide and to quash any threat to the regime from the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. In the course of these two activities, the regime, effectively headed by Vice President and Minister of Defense Paul Kagame, committed its own atrocities and grievous human rights abuses. As the RPF occupied outlying areas of the country, there were soon stories of horrifying reprisals against the civilian Hutu population. At least five thousand Hutu refugees were killed at the Kibeho camp in April 1995. In the course of the war that installed Laurent Kabila in power in Kinshasa (DRC) in May 1997, tens of thousands more Hutu civilians fleeing their refugee camps were tracked down and killed, along with some number of Interahamwe militiamen.⁸⁶ Meanwhile, some one hundred thousand suspects of the genocide have

been packed in the “filthy, human warehouses, the prisons,” where thousands have died.⁸⁷ The scale of the killings is such that some scholars have even referred to them, albeit controversially, as yet another “genocide.”⁸⁸ While one may demur from the idea that the regime is bent on the extermination of Rwanda’s Hutu, one may infer that it is a Rwandan Tutsi nationalist regime. That is, it controls Rwanda for the primary purposes of protecting the rights and welfare of Rwanda’s Tutsi. This is no less true for the fact that a sizable number of prominent Hutu have held important positions in the regime, including the presidency itself, in the person of Pasteur Bizimungu.⁸⁹

Rather contradictorily, the RPF regime has pursued all five variants of postindependence nationalism on behalf of Rwanda’s Tutsi at once. Unlike its predecessors, the new regime in Kigali has actually advanced claims over certain parts of territory of the DRC occupied by the (indigenous) Banyarwandan population.⁹⁰ This would seem to qualify as “external-territory-claiming,” as defined in Barrington’s introductory chapter. The real goal of such claims, however, is to justify Rwanda’s military presence in Congo, where it has been involved in “co-national-protecting” of the Banyamulenge (indigenous Congolese Tutsi) since 1996. It seems doubtful that Rwanda’s leaders will seriously pursue a strategy of incorporating any parts of Congolese territory into that of Rwanda, given the weakness of their claims. The contraction of the current regime’s ideology lies in the fact that its practice is transparently one of (Tutsi) nation-protecting, while its rhetoric is that of “civic nation-building.” Since the Rwandan Tutsi continue to represent a very small portion of the population, the public appeal to a civic ideal of nationalism, rather than an “ethnic” one, is inevitable. In order to try to resolve this contradiction, the RPF’s largely Tutsi leadership has chosen an unusual central value as the centerpiece of “Rwandan” civic nationalism: the ideal of rendering justice to the victims of genocide. The RPF has thus made devotion to the pursuit of the *génocidaires* the highest expression of (putatively civic) nationalism, which happens to serve perfectly the end of protecting the (Tutsi) nation.

The Lessons of the Rwandan Binational Experience

The lessons of the Rwandan binational experience are sobering ones for those who hope that nationalism can be harnessed to liberal goals such as self-determination, democracy, and development. In this case, national

identities defined against a communal “other” have been deployed by unscrupulous politicians to propel themselves into office and maintain themselves there. Their power has come at the expense equally of the nation that they represent and of the “other,” cast in the role of adversary and threat. In their worst manifestations, these political patterns have set the stage for genocidal campaigns against both national peoples of Rwanda. Moreover, Rwanda’s dual national identities have been manufactured despite the exceedingly weak objective bases for Hutu-Tutsi differentiation and the relatively strong objective bases for Banyarwandan nationalism.

The genesis and staying power of national identities in Rwanda are surprising and disturbing to anyone with liberal sensibilities. Liberal Rwandans and outside observers have long hoped for the emergence of a benign Banyarwandan nationalism, which could cultivate a sense of national dignity and serve as a basis for productive economic development. Since the Rwandan territory was well defined, and there were excellent objective bases for the development of such nationalism, such a nationalism might have emerged but for the ambitions of venal politicians. Two opposing national identities were instead created from the two identity communities. Conflict between them has been in the interest of those whose political fortunes have depended upon the support of angry populations, animated by a sense of victimhood and a desire for vengeance.

Rwandan Hutu and Rwandan Tutsi nationalist politicians have sought to control the Rwandan state in the interest of their respective identity communities. Although they typically speak in the name of universal values such as “democracy” (for instance, for a demographic majority) or of “justice” (for the surviving victims of genocide against the Tutsi), their real goals are clear enough in the context: to gain and maintain power by *appearing* to protect or promote the interests of one identity community or the other. The fact that the real interests of neither community are served by such politicians does not change the reality that such appeals have resonated well enough in the identity communities to keep them in power. The fact that the national identities are “artificial” and “created” does not lessen the human devastation wrought in their name.

Between 1959 and 1994, Rwanda’s Hutu nationalist politicians sought to polarize people along the lines of the dominant identity communities. The fact that most liberal, Banyarwandan nationalist politicians have disappeared from the scene is a testament to the success of their project. Rwandan Tutsi nationalist politicians have been less interested in polarizing peo-

ple in the same way, since their community represents a minority of the population. Nonetheless, it is telling that Tutsi exiles were not able to combine forces effectively with opposition Hutu elements during the long years of Hutu domination inside Rwanda. While the current RPF regime in Rwanda had a (token) Hutu as its president, the real power of the country always lay in the hands of Kagame and a few other leading Tutsi. No one can seriously doubt the utter Tutsi dominance of the current regime in Kigali, nor of the army that keeps it in power.

To put matters in terms of the causal hypotheses laid out in the introduction, it is clear that both nationalisms survived in Rwanda due to the actions of elite representatives of each community. In general, this confirms the instrumentalist perspective on the outbreak of intercommunal violence. Interestingly, while this conclusion serves to reinforce one of the main findings of recent scholarship on Rwanda, it challenges another directly. Most recent scholarship goes to great pains to debunk the primordialist mythmaking of both Rwandan Tutsi and Rwandan Hutu nationalist politicians and of ill-informed media sources about the precolonial roots of difference between the identity communities. In their enthusiasm for placing the blame for Rwanda's recent tragedy squarely on colonialism, however, the same scholarship suggests that the recent leaders of Rwanda's identity communities are virtual prisoners of the (colonial) past. Inadvertently, this stance absolves them of blame for episodes of postindependent intercommunal violence and genocide. The present analysis strongly confirms the view that objective, primordial differences between Hutu and Tutsi have little to do with intercommunal violence. On the other hand, it does suggest that the choices made by power-seeking politicians to create nationalisms out of unformed identity communities were not inevitable or determined by colonial manipulation either. As the constructivist perspective proposes, the structures and the agents in these situations have mutually created ("constituted") one another, but the structures instituted by colonial authorities cannot be said to exercise a determining power over the influence of all Rwandan politicians.

To explain the outbreak of intercommunal violence, as opposed to merely the continuation of dual nationalisms in Rwanda, one has to add one further variable to the causal picture: uncertainty over the control of the state. As long as the Rwandan state was firmly under the control of colonial authorities, aided by their Tutsi adjuncts, Rwandan Hutu nationalism could not even emerge. With the loosening of colonial control, how-

ever, and the addition of the idea of the Hutu as a distinctive and oppressed group, Rwandan Hutu nationalism blossomed quite suddenly. While control over the state was uncertain, from 1959 well into the 1960s, intercommunal violence was manifest. During the long years of quasi-totalitarian Rwandan Hutu control, however, such violence was suppressed. It made its reappearance with the return of uncertainty in the era of political reform, the early 1990s. Sensing that they risked losing control over the Rwandan state in 1993–94, extreme Rwandan Hutu nationalists devised a “final solution,” hoping to ensure their control in perpetuity. Now that Rwandan Tutsi nationalism has succeeded in dominating the state, and its control is relatively ensured, intercommunal violence has diminished again. Hence, uncertainty of control is a “necessary condition” that can be mated with the “efficient cause” of identity communal nationalism to explain the timing of the outbreaks of intercommunal violence.

As noted in the preceding, most contemporary scholars, and particularly historians, prefer to emphasize the colonial roots of the current national polarization of Rwanda. These years were indeed critical in altering the perceptions of Rwanda’s two main identity communities and building the basis upon which nationalisms would later be built. The appearance of these nationalisms themselves sprang onto the political scene in Rwanda with breathtaking suddenness in the final months of colonial rule. At that point, even when colonial authorities sought to address injustices that they themselves had perpetuated in the past, their actions had the effect of further polarizing the political scene. This was the first crisis of state control that wracked Rwanda and began to crystallize the country’s two national identity communities. The subsequent crises of control that occurred in 1963, 1972, and 1990–94 all led to abrupt and startling escalations in intercommunity tensions; the last regime crisis led the Hutu nationalists to seek a “final solution” to the challenge of the Tutsi nationalists. The country continues in the grip of these dual nationalisms, with any hope of overcoming the intercommunity confrontation depending on their containment in a larger, pan-Rwanda nationalist framework.

NOTES

The opening epigraph is cited in René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (London: Pall Mall and Praeger, 1970), 169.

1. Alain Destexhe, “The Third Genocide,” *Foreign Policy* 97 (winter 1994–95): 3–17.

2. The actual number of those killed in the genocide remains one matter (of many) of intensive controversy surrounding the 1994 genocide. For one discussion of the numbers killed, and their ethnic-national identities, see Gérard Prunier, *The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 261–65.

3. These have included *Issue*, the “opinion” journal of the (U.S.) African Studies Association, *Africa Today*, the *African Studies Review*, and the prestigious French journal *Politique Africaine*. The special issue of *Issue* entitled simply “Rwanda” was vol. 23, no. 2 (1995) and was devoted entirely to Rwanda and to the policies of foreign powers toward Rwanda; the special issue of *Africa Today*, vol. 45, no.1 (January–March 1998), was entitled “Crisis in Central Africa” and contained an introduction and four main articles, three of which were on Rwanda. The special issue of the *African Studies Review* 45, no. 1 (April 1998), contained an introduction and six articles, of which four were on Rwanda or genocide. The special issue of *Politique Africaine* 68 (December 1997), contained two introductory pieces and seven major articles, mostly on the involvement of foreign actors or transnational themes. In 1998 another issue of *Issue* was devoted to the problems of “Central Africa.”

4. Among these are Alain Destexhe, *Rwanda and the Genocide*, trans. Alison Marschner (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Prunier, *The Rwandan Crisis*; Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., *The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999); and Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998).

5. The “third people” referred to here are the Twa, who only represent about 1 percent of the population and whose political presence has been marginal in modern Rwandan history. Of course, the anthropological fascination with the Twa, and other “pygmy” (hunter-gatherer) people, is justified. On the BaMbuti people of Congo, see Colin Turnbull, *The Forest People* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962). The role of Rwanda’s Twa is not considered further in this chapter.

6. The later figure may be found in Prunier, *The Rwandan Crisis*, 264.

7. As René Lemarchand notes in *Rwanda and Burundi* (London: Pall Mall and Praeger, 1970), 25, “In Rwanda [as opposed to Burundi], Tutsi elements were spread almost evenly throughout the country. The only notable exception was the northern region (Ndorwa, Mutara, Mulra), where the Tutsi never accounted for more than a tiny fraction of the total population.”

8. The formulation of former President Kayibanda in the epigraph for this chapter has not been pursued by scholars.

9. The problem with referring to the Tutsi, for instance, as a class, is that the mass of Tutsi was equally as impoverished as the Hutu in 1955. See Phillipe Leurquin, *Le niveau de vie des populations du Ruanda-Urundi* (Louvain, 1961), 203. We might add that the Tutsi were even referred to as a “race” by the authors of the Bahutu Manifesto of 1957, as they were by some colonial administrators and anthropologists of an earlier period. Since this designation is least accurate in characterizing the true nature of the identity community, and reflects an illusory view of social reality, it is not used here.

10. It need not trouble us in the same way that other sociopolitical entities might appropriately go under a variety of labels at the same time. Consider the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (1965–97); this regime might be characterized at once as, for example, *personalistic*, *military*, *quasi-totalitarian*, *statist*, *one party*, and *kleptocratic*. The relevance of these various labels varied over the course of the regime, but they were not

fundamentally contradictory. Rather, each captured different key aspects of the regime in question.

11. The Banyarwandan populations in eastern Congo (DRC) include one group that had immigrated into the area in precolonial times and other groups that had immigrated more recently. On this topic, see Jean-Claude Willame, *Banyarwanda et Banyamulenge: Violences ethniques et gestion de l'identitaire au Kivu* (Paris: Harmattan, 1997). On the relatedness of the Banyankole of southern Uganda, see Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 68 n. 51.

12. Although this is not to say that there have not been intense moments of transnational (transstate, or cross-border) empathy and concern among the Hutu and Tutsi identity communities in the Great Lakes region. For instance, at the moment of Hutu massacres in Burundi in 1972, the Rwandan Hutu leadership viewed events in Burundi with utmost concern. Likewise, the subsequent Rwandan Hutu regime in Kigali expressed similar concerns about developments in Burundi in 1993 when the regime of Mechior Ndadaye was overthrown by Tutsi army officers. For Rwanda-Burundi relations throughout the independence period, see Helen M. Hintjens, "Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 2 (1999): 276–80; and René Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnogenocide as Discourse and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

13. Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy," in *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 11, quoted in the introductory chapter to this volume; for a similar view, also see Lowell Barrington, "'Nation' and 'Nationalism': The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30, no. 4 (December 1997): 713.

14. There are some other near parallels, however, such as Palestine/Israel, where two different national peoples are occupying the very same territory. Perhaps the extreme intractability of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute arises for the same reason as the Tutsi-Hutu dispute does in Rwanda: two national peoples vying for control of the same territory makes for the most intensive and dangerous kind of national conflict. Without the line drawn by the United Nations in 1947, in fact, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute might have at some point taken on the genocidal quality of the Hutu-Tutsi clash. In Israel, the Jewish leadership has not generally envisioned a total expulsion of the national "other" from "its" national space (though some elements in both the population and leadership may have happily contemplated such an eventuality).

15. One minor exception to this overall observation is a certain slice of territory in southern Uganda (Bufumbiro), bordering on northern Rwanda. The boundary here was clarified by the International Boundary Commission in 1912 and has not been a matter of serious international contention since then. See Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 99. There has also been a revival of certain irridentist claims since 1994, on which, see the following.

16. *Ibid.*, 20.

17. See, for instance, Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 5–16, for a concise discussion.

18. See *ibid.*, 8; as late as 1970, a former French ambassador to Rwanda was able to publish a book identifying the primordial Tutsi as a group of "magi" from Tibet. See Paul del Perugia, *Les derniers Rois-Mages*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Phébus, 1978) (1st ed., 1970), 37. Cited in Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*.

19. For example, this is the final word of Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 16. Also see

Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 18. One prominent theory is that the primordial Tutsi came from Ethiopia, where such people as the Oromo seem to have similar economic-cultural patterns and some physical similarities with the stereotypical Tutsi.

20. Given the current climate on race in the Western world, most scholars take great pains to make this point, which is now widely accepted. It is made most emphatically and effectively by Catharine Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860–1960* (New York: Columbia, 1988). Also see Claudine Vidal, *Sociologies des passions: Rwanda, Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1991), especially 35; Pierre Tabara, *Afrique: La face cachée* (Paris: La pensée universelle); and Hintjens, "Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda," 247.

21. According to this foundational myth, the original king of the Tutsi sired three sons, Gatwa, Gahutu, and Gatutsi, but only the last proved himself worthy to be the king's successor—hence the mythical justification for Tutsi rulership. See Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 32–33.

22. According to Lemarchand, "Each province was entrusted to an army chief, and each district to a land chief and a cattle chief who were responsible for the collection of tithes in produce and cattle. Beneath this triumvirate spread a vast network of subchiefs from whom tribute was exacted for the higher chiefs and the kings." See Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 27.

23. Tabara, *Afrique: La face cachée*, 80.

24. Lemarchand, who uses the term *castes* to describe the Hutu and Tutsi throughout his work *Rwanda and Burundi*, represents one school of thought, while Newbury, who explicitly rejects the use of the term *caste* on the grounds that (1) there was no religious grounds for "sanctioning separate between ethnic groups," (2) economic specialization was not so clear-cut as has been suggested, and (3) the categories of Hutu and Tutsi were "flexible" in precolonial times (Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 11–12).

25. See Louis de Lacger, *Le Ruanda* (Kabgayi, Rwanda: publisher unknown, 1961) (1st ed., 1939), cited in Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 12–13; even Lemarchand, who portrays the Rwandan "caste" system as rigidly inflexible, does acknowledge that wealthy and politically powerful Hutu could be "absorbed into the upper caste." See Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 39.

26. Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 43.

27. In these locations, particularly in the northern regions of the Kiga clan, local Hutu chiefs fought fiercely to resist incorporation into the Tutsi-dominated realm and certainly retained a very different identity as a result. There is no indication, however, that the independent Hutu-Kiga chiefs had any sense of ethnic solidarity with those Hutu who lived under the suzerainty of the mwami.

28. Whereas many Hutu in precolonial times had not submitted themselves to a patron. See Tabara, *Afrique: La face cachée*, 79–83.

29. On the Belgian colonial favoritism shown to the Tutsi in education, see Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 134–36; and Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 115–16.

30. See Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 59–60 and 73; and Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 130. It is worth noting that Belgian colonial policy initially favored the Hutu before switching definitely to indirect rule through the mwami. See Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 129.

31. Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 60.

32. Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 183.

33. On the concept of “critical junctures,” see Leonardo Villalón, “The African State at the End of the Twentieth Century: Parameters of the Critical Juncture,” in *The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration*, ed. Leonardo Villalón and Philip Huxtable (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 3–25.

34. According to Lemarchand (*Rwanda and Burundi*, 81), Banyarwandan nationalism was “never more than an epiphenomenon.”

35. Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 181.

36. Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 96.

37. *Ibid.*, 107.

38. *Ibid.*, 109.

39. *Ibid.*, 148; and Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 44.

40. The official name of the document was “Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in Rwanda.” The entire text can be found, in French, in F. Nkundabagenzi, *Le Rwanda politique (1958–1960)* (Brussels: CRISP, 1961), 20–29.

41. See the discussion of this problem in Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 46.

42. This is an important theme of Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, chapter 3.

43. *Ibid.*, 101–2.

44. *Ibid.*, 112.

45. The highly complicated process began with the nomination of “electoral colleges” by regional “subchiefs.” These colleges then elected members of subchiefdom councils from among their own members. Subsequently, the members of the councils elected chiefdom councils, which then in turn elected the councils for the territories (region) and the state level. See Jacques J. Maquet and Marcel d’Hertefeldt, *Elections en société féodale: Une étude sur l’introduction du vote populaire au Ruanda-Urundi* (Brussels, ARSC, 1959), 22–25.

46. See Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 136.

47. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 49–50.

48. Tabara, *Afrique: La face cachée*, 180–85.

49. Especially from left-wing forces, including several Communist countries on the United Nations Trusteeship Council. These countries (ironically) supported the monarchist UNAR party in 1959–60. See Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 47, and the discussion in this chapter.

50. See the cover photo on Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*.

51. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 47.

52. *Ibid.*, 47.

53. *Ibid.*, 48.

54. For instance, Newbury makes much of the fact that an independent party, Intérêts Communaux du Kinyaga (INTERCOKI), and RADER together gained some 32 percent of the vote in Abiiru province (of Cyanguu Territory) in the 1960 communal elections (see Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 203–6). After a further analysis of the local vote, she concludes that the vote in the province was “based more on persons and programs than on ethnic orientation and Hutu-Tuutsi polarization” (206). Be that as it may, the increasing polarization of the vote along ethnic lines and in favor of essentially (Hutu and Tutsi) nationalist parties was clear in the 1961 elections.

55. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 52; and Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 184.

56. See Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 178; Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 198; and Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 51–52. It is particularly interesting to note

that PARMEHUTU, a forthrightly (Hutu) nationalist party, far outpaced APROSOMA, which initially had some limited support from poorer Tutsi constituents. It is true, on the other hand, that RADER, the more liberal Tutsi-oriented party, outscored the radical Tutsi UNAR party in these elections, though both together only garnered 8 percent of the communal council positions.

57. Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 188–94

58. *Ibid.*, 197.

59. These events are known as the “Bugesera Invasion.” *Ibid.*, 216–27; the description of the executions is found on p. 223.

60. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 60 n. 35.

61. Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 234.

62. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 56, 58.

63. *Ibid.*, 61.

64. *Ibid.*, 79.

65. See Timothy Longman, “Christianity and Democratisation in Rwanda: Assessing Church Responses to Political Crisis in the 1990s,” in *The Christian Churches and Democratisation of Africa*, ed. Paul Gifford (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1995).

66. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 84.

67. Catharine Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda,” *Africa Today* 45, no. 1 (January–March 1998), 18; also see Timothy Longman, “Rwanda: Democratization and Disorder: Political Transformation and Social Deterioration,” in *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*, ed. John F. Clark and David E. Gardinier (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 298.

68. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 75.

69. See Longman, “Rwanda,” 290–92.

70. As emphasized in *ibid.*, 293.

71. *Ibid.*, 294.

72. *Ibid.*, 296.

73. *Ibid.*, 298.

74. See Michele D. Wagner, “All the Bourgmestre’s Men: Making Sense of Genocide in Rwanda,” *Africa Today* 45, no. 1 (1998): 29–34; Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 237–42; and Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” 267–73.

75. See René Lemarchand, “Rwanda: The Rationality of Genocide,” *Issue* 23, no. 2 (1995): 10; cf. Longman, “Rwanda,” 300.

76. The figures are from Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 265; for one popular account of the modalities of the killings, see Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*.

77. See especially Alison Des Forges, “The Ideology of Genocide,” *Issue* 23, no. 2 (1995): 44–47; this point is a major theme in the writings of, among others, Catharine Newbury, David Newbury, Longman, and Hintjens.

78. As it did; see Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 223.

79. Prunier deducts a percentage for those who had assimilated into their local environments; see *The Rwanda Crisis*, 63.

80. The Bairu are the “low-caste” section of the Banyankole people of southern Uganda, the “high-caste” portion being the Bahima. The Banyankole are historically and ethnically linked with the Banyarwanda, and the “caste” division of the Banyankole parallels the Hutu-Tutsi divide in Rwanda.

81. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 70–71.

82. Ibid., 72–73.

83. Rwigyema was a former commander in chief of the NRM's army, and Kagame was then acting head of military security for Museveni.

84. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 93, 117.

85. The RPA reached to within thirty kilometers of Kigali before the RPF leadership decided that an assault on the capital would be unwise because of France's determined military support of Habyarimana and because the Hutu population in the capital had rallied to the defense of Habyarimana's regime.

86. René Lemarchand, "The Fire in the Great Lakes," *Current History* 98, no. 628 (May 1999): 196.

87. Wagner, "All the Bourgmestre's Men," 26.

88. René Lemarchand, "Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?" *African Studies Review* 41, no. 1 (April 1998).

89. Bizimungu's presence at the head of the Rwandan government raises the question of whether a nonmember of a nation could play the role of a leading nationalist for that nation. The answer seems to be affirmative, given not only Bizimungu's example but also that of other state rulers, like Stalin, who served the interests of one nation (the Russians) while having origins in another national group (Georgian/Ossetian).

90. David Newbury, "Irredentist Rwanda: Ethnic and Territorial Frontiers in Central Africa," *Africa Today* 44, no. 2 (1997): especially 214–15.