

7. Nationalism in Post-Soviet Lithuania

New Approaches for the Nation of “Innocent Sufferers”

TERRY D. CLARK

MOST SCHOLARS ARGUE that, in contrast to many of the states of the former Soviet Union, Lithuania has had few difficulties with its national minorities.¹ Much of this owes to Lithuanians constituting over 80 percent of the population, while the two largest national minorities comprise approximately 8 percent (Russians) and 7 percent (Poles) respectively. Given these demographics, the new Lithuanian state, unlike its Baltic neighbors, exercised the so-called zero option—granting citizenship to all individuals on its state territory at the time of restoration of independence irrespective of their national identity. This was a major factor in the relatively tranquil relations between national communities in the country.²

The argument for comparatively tranquil relations between national communities, however, is not the same as making the case that nationalism as a phenomenon does not exist in the political system. This chapter argues that nationalism has existed in one form or another since the late Soviet era. While it has not led to conflict of the sort seen in the other Baltic republics or parts of the former Soviet Union, it has nonetheless contributed to social difficulties and unrest, particularly in the period leading up to and immediately following the restoration of independence. But, since the immediate postindependence period, nationalism has also been both weakened and transformed. While the Lithuanian national myth remains, its effect on Lithuanian politics and daily life today is not what it had been at the end of the Soviet period when the country's independence was restored.

Early Nationalism

Lithuanian history is marked by an early period of expansionist glory, gradual decline, eventual cultural subjugation, and a prolonged struggle to develop and reassert a national identity. By the end of the fourteenth century, the grand duchy of Lithuania was one of the largest states in Europe. At its zenith it extended from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Following the union with Poland brought about by the marriage of the grand duke of Lithuania with the queen of Poland in 1386, however, the grand duchy entered a long period of decline. While relations between the two states in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were initially based on no more than the fact that they were under the same ruler, the Treaty of Lublin in 1569 merged what had been separate political and social institutions. As a consequence, the nobility of the two states rapidly fused, converging on the ideal of two peoples with an inseparable past and future.³ By 1698, Polish culture had become so dominant that Polish was declared the official state language for the entire commonwealth. Lithuanian had been largely relegated to the status of a language spoken by the illiterate peasant population of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's eastern regions.

The partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the eighteenth century brought the Lithuanian lands into the Russian Empire. This was resisted by the nobility and gentry, a resistance that culminated in the Insurrection of 1831. The insurrection, the aim of which was to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was confined to the largely Polonized upper class and residents of towns.⁴ Hence, the tsarist reprisals had little impact on the Lithuanian-speaking peasant population. Such reprisals included executions and deportations of the nobility, land seizures, and the closing of Vilnius University, which had served as a center for the maintenance and spread of Polish culture.

The relative passivity of the lower classes, however, changed radically with the abolition of serfdom in the Russian Empire. The attendant social and educational reforms had the unintended consequence of fueling a Lithuanian national reawakening, something seen in much of east central Europe during the nineteenth century. Taking advantage of the new freedoms and opportunities offered by the reforms, a significant proportion of the Lithuanian-speaking lower classes experienced rapid upward social mobility, entering the ranks of the professions and educated elite. Unlike

the Lithuanian nobility and gentry, they rejected both Polish and Russian culture. Many of them quickly formed the vanguard of an independence movement that resulted in yet another uprising in 1863. Unlike that of 1830, the Insurrection of 1863 sought an independent Lithuanian state. Indeed, these new intellectuals and professionals rejected the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its claim to represent the inseparable interests of the Polish and Lithuanian peoples.⁵ Hence, the Insurrection of 1863 can properly be viewed as the start of the Lithuanian national reawakening.

The tsarist response to the Insurrection of 1863 was harsh. In addition to executions and deportations, the use of the Latin alphabet was banned. In essence, no publication in the Lithuanian language was permitted. This policy remained in force from 1864 to 1904. The effect was twofold. First, it helped to identify the language as central to the national identity. Second, it consolidated support for an independent Lithuanian *nation-state* among virtually the entire population. During the period several illegal Lithuanian-language periodicals emerged urging national resistance to assimilation and rejecting reunification with Poland. The intensity of the resistance to the Russian Empire is most evidenced in the willingness of many to school their children in the Lithuanian language despite serious punishments for doing so.⁶

The lifting of the ban on publishing in the Lithuanian language was part of a package of concessions made by the tsar in the wake of the disastrous defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. In response, the independence movement formally organized and continued to press for an independent and national Lithuanian state in which Lithuanian would be the only official language. The vision was achieved on February 16, 1918, when a group of intellectuals declared the creation of the Republic of Lithuania following the collapse of the Russian Empire.

Deep divisions concerning relations with Poland continued to plague Lithuanian society in the interwar period. These divisions were most evident in two events: the Polish seizure of the region surrounding Vilnius in 1920 and the military coup of 1926. The Polish seizure of the heavily Polonized capital region had the support of many of the landowners and townspeople of the region, while the military coup of 1926 forcibly deposed a left-wing government elected with the support of many of the country's Poles and Jews. The Union of Nationalists installed a president in its place, and the president was given near-dictatorial powers. Further, leftist parties were

virtually denied the right to political participation for the remainder of the interwar period.⁷

The country's incorporation into the Soviet Union and the replacement of Lithuanian with Russian as the language of political and economic discourse in 1940 once again presented the Lithuanian nation with a challenge to the survival of its identity. However, the lessons learned in the period of the national reawakening and independence struggle helped it to survive. Of particular note were the strong attachment to the national language and the determination to protect it. Also apparent in the independence struggle (and postindependence period) were the efforts to protect the nation from Polish cultural domination and Russian political domination.

Toward Independence: The Struggle to Define National Membership & Gain Territorial Control

The Emergence of Sąjūdis

Responding to the opening provided by perestroika, an initiative group of intellectuals drawn from among discussion clubs, the Lithuanian Writer's Union, and a number of small groups concerned with protection of the environment and historical buildings declared the creation of the Lithuanian Reform Movement, Sąjūdis, in June 1988. The movement's initial goals were largely concerned with the protection of Lithuanian culture, particularly the language. This was reflected in the very first platform, which called for proclaiming the Lithuanian language as an official state language of the republic, strengthening the teaching of Lithuanian in schools, establishing language schools for national minorities, and correcting misrepresentations of Lithuanian history.⁸

These and other demands were adopted at Sąjūdis's Constituent Congress of October 1988, an event of enormous importance. Aired on television and radio, the congress stirred the Lithuanian nation and resulted in a dramatic change in the movement's membership. Almost overnight Sąjūdis was transformed from an intellectual movement to a mass movement. Within a short time, previously prohibited national myths and symbols were once again being displayed throughout the republic. By 1990, Sąjūdis's appeal to the Lithuanian national majority was so deep that the movement captured over 100 of the 140 seats in the republican legislature (the Supreme Council) in elections held that year.

The movement's changing demographics radicalized Sąjūdis. In response, many of the movement's initial founders became some of its harshest critics.⁹ The centrality of the cultural concerns that had united the intellectuals of the initiative group gave way to the politicization of nationalism. Within a year, initial demands for economic sovereignty within the Soviet Union were replaced by insistence on the restoration of the country's prewar independence. The Supreme Council, elected in 1990 and dominated by Sąjūdis, declared as its first act the restoration of the independent prewar Republic of Lithuania. The effort to break with Moscow resulted in an economic blockade and several episodes of violence over an eighteen-month-long period. At the end of this period, however, Lithuania regained its independence in the aftermath of the failure by Soviet hardliners to reassert control in the abortive coup of August 1991.

The Crystallization of the Lithuanian National Idea

Much of the activity leading up to the restoration of Lithuanian independence revolved around the membership question "What is the Lithuanian nation?" The self-portrait that emerged was that of a people who had lived in a region traversed by many peoples; hence, Lithuanians had developed a high level of tolerance of others. However, not all of their neighbors had done likewise, imposing their culture and language on the Lithuanians. As a consequence, the Lithuanian nation was also depicted as a heroic people who had suffered for centuries from efforts, made by first the Poles and then the Russians, to dominate and forcibly assimilate them. Yet the Lithuanians had persevered and overcome these efforts.¹⁰ One scholar has called this self-image that of a nation of "innocent sufferers."¹¹

Such a self-depiction necessarily required Lithuanians to distinguish themselves from their oppressors. The most difficult task was to define an identity separate from that of the Poles, given the almost four hundred years of union between the two nations in which Polish language and culture had dominated. This mirrored the challenge during the interwar period, during which much of the country's intelligentsia, gentry, and townspeople demonstrated an attachment to Polish culture as well as the idea of union with Poland. Hence, the Lithuanian national revival in the late Soviet period was partially a struggle against Polish culture.¹²

Lithuanians had much less difficulty identifying themselves separately from the Russians. From the Lithuanian perspective, the primary task

appeared to be ridding the language of Russian or Soviet-imposed constructions. Indeed, the Soviet period was widely viewed as a time of occupation and forced Russification. Russian political and cultural dominance was supported by the economic dependence of the republic on Moscow, the deportation and liquidation of much of the Lithuanian intelligentsia in 1940 and the postwar period, and Russian immigration. This immigration, which some saw as an attempt at colonization, was most evident as a result of the construction of the nuclear power facility at Ignalina. The Ignalina facility primarily employed scientists and technicians from outside the republic, despite the availability of Lithuanian specialists.¹³

The Minorities Respond

Requiring as it did the rejection of Polish and Russian culture, the articulation of the Lithuanian national idea, combined with the insistence that the Lithuanian language become the primary vehicle for political and economic discourse, gave rise to anxieties among the republic's national minorities. The politicization of the national idea within Sąjūdis led to nationalist exclusivity that further exacerbated these anxieties.¹⁴ The movement's demands that an independent Lithuania be a national state, with priority given to the Lithuanian culture and language, appeared to be a clear threat of oppression or perhaps even forcible assimilation. This was reflected in the fact that Sąjūdis was almost totally a Lithuanian movement. At the Constituent Congress, 980 of the 1,021 deputies were Lithuanian; only 9 were Poles, and 8 were Russians.¹⁵

The response by many within the national minorities was predictable. Many Russians and smaller Russian-speaking minority groups—including Belarusians, Ukrainians, Jews, and Tatars—formed Edinstvo. This movement, formed with the encouragement of Moscow,¹⁶ stood in open opposition to Sąjūdis, and in particular to demands to make Lithuanian the official state language. But Edinstvo never succeeded in fully organizing the Russian-speaking community. While this was partially due to the organization's open support of the Soviet regime, it also reflected the highly fragmented nature of the Russian community itself. Hardly a community with a common interest, it was divided both socioeconomically and by varying degrees of integration into Lithuanian society. Large numbers of Russians, particularly those living in Vilnius, were descended from families that had lived in the region for centuries. Others were relatively new arrivals who had been brought to the

republic to provide a labor force in Soviet factories and projects, including the previously mentioned nuclear power station in the Ignalina region.

Poles, on the other hand, were a good deal more socioeconomically and historically united. Unlike the Russians, who were spread across many of the urban centers of the republic, Poles were largely concentrated in the regions in and around Vilnius that had been forcibly seized and occupied by Poland during the interwar era. The community's major weakness was the lack of an intelligentsia; most of its members were rural peasants with low levels of education. The Polish intelligentsia had fled during and after World War II. Those who had not were in many cases liquidated. Lacking an intelligentsia, and subjected to the Russification efforts of the Soviet era, the Lithuanian Poles spoke a language that was a dialect of Polish with strong Russian and Belarusian influence. In this context, Sąjūdis's demands that Lithuanian be the state language appeared to many as an effort to assimilate the Polish minority. As a consequence, they formed the Union of Poles in Lithuania to counter these efforts and came into direct conflict with Sąjūdis.¹⁷

The demands of the Union of Poles further contributed to concerns among Lithuanian nationalists within Sąjūdis of a reemergence of Polish cultural dominance or, worse, the loss once again of the Vilnius region. Among such demands were increasing the quality of Polish-language instruction in schools, creating a Polish university, and forming an autonomous Polish region in the area around Vilnius dominated by the Polish population.¹⁸ In pursuit of these goals, the political leadership of the Polish regions openly opposed Lithuanian independence and negotiated with Moscow for greater autonomy from Vilnius.

Given the opposition of both Edinstvo and the Union of Poles to the restoration of Lithuanian independence, both the Russians and Poles were viewed by many Lithuanians as being in clear opposition to the new state when independence was finally achieved. This perception was further fueled by the fact that both communities had elected deputies in the 1990 elections to the Supreme Council who were openly opposed to the restoration of the country's independence. Russians and Russian-speaking groups provided most of the electoral support for the Communist Party,¹⁹ and the Poles had elected eight deputies on the platform of the Union of Poles.

Sąjūdis and the Lithuanian National Idea in the Early Independence Period

The constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, adopted in a national referendum in October 1992, makes it abundantly clear that the new state is a

national state. The preamble makes the unambiguous claim that the state is the creation of the Lithuanian nation and that the Lithuanian language is the state language. Further, the national idea of that people as it had emerged during the independence period is laid out. The Lithuanian people, having “established the State of Lithuania many centuries ago” and having “defended its freedom and independence and preserved its spirit, native language, writing, and customs,” are nevertheless a tolerant people desiring to foster “national accord” and a “harmonious civil society.”

The dilemma for the newly independent state was how to forge national accord and harmony within the context of a national state. Indeed, by focusing on the suffering inflicted at the hands of the Poles and Russians, the national idea contained elements of disintegration instead of integration, particularly since these two peoples constituted the two largest national minorities in the republic. The centrality of language to the Lithuanian self-identity also served to divide instead of unite the citizens of the new state. The paradox was further complicated by the fact that Sąjūdis, as the bearer of the national idea, dominated the national legislature.²⁰ Without the Soviet Union to struggle against, however, Sąjūdis had by now begun to fragment. As a result, several smaller political parties giving even greater priority to the nationalist idea emerged on the political right. These parties—including the Union of Lithuanian Nationalists, the Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees, the Independence Party, and the Christian Democrats—were largely concerned with the internal threat to the territorial integrity and independence of the new state posed by “disloyal” national minorities.

The nationalist parties and organizations (Sąjūdis had not organized itself as a political party) were particularly concerned at the time with the Polish “threat.” Governors of the Polish districts of Vilnius and Šalčininkai had aligned themselves with the Soviet authorities during the independence struggle, going so far as to support the effort by Communist Party hard-liners in August 1991 to reestablish Soviet rule in the republic. Many of these same governors were now making overtures toward Warsaw and demanding autonomy. The fear was that these regions would ultimately sue for independence or union with Poland. Concerns were openly expressed that the Poles might again raise the “Vilnius question.”

As a consequence, nationalism in the early independence period was largely of the “variant 2” outlined in Lowell Barrington’s introduction to this volume: nationalism in the service of protecting territorial integrity

from an internal threat. The constitution declared that the Lithuanian state was a unitary, indivisible state. This left no room for a federalist bargain, which might give vent to demands for autonomy or secession in the regions surrounding Vilnius. Hence, in response to the immediate threat, the government introduced direct rule in these regions in September 1991.

This action led to serious strains in relations with Poland, which—despite its renunciation of any territorial claims on Vilnius or the Polish regions—found itself unable to reduce Lithuanian fears to the contrary. The Lithuanian government further poisoned the atmosphere between the two countries by insisting on a Polish apology for and condemnation of the interwar seizure of Vilnius. While the demand was motivated by Lithuanian concerns that their own claim to the capital was questionable (given that they had regained the city as a “gift” from the Soviet authorities), nationalist yearnings “to correct” the historical record by establishing Polish guilt and Lithuanian innocence was just as apparent. In any event, the Poles would not accede to the demands, fearing that they might provide the pretext for further repression of the Polish minority in Lithuania. When Vilnius reneged on its promise to restore self-rule in the Polish regions, Poland was left with no other option than to engage in formal protest, an action that led to Lithuanian charges that Warsaw was interfering in Lithuania’s internal affairs.²¹

The introduction of direct rule in the Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions heightened tensions between the Lithuanian government and the country’s Polish population, leading to fears that the new state was bent on assimilating them. The latter was further increased by statements from nationalist leaders—among them the head of the Independence Party, a close personal confidant of Sąjūdis chair Vytautas Landsbergis—that the country’s Poles were in reality Polonized Lithuanians who had been deprived of their true identity and culture by centuries of Polish rule, particularly in the regions in which they lived.²²

Nationalist fears concerning the loyalties of the new state’s national minority populations, however, appear not to have been well founded. While sociological surveys of the time indicated a general lack of identity with the new state among Poles and Russians, there was also little indication of disloyalty among these same groups. While leaders in the Polish regions may have supported secession, few Poles did. Russians were largely passive and politically indifferent.²³ Survey results indicated that most Poles and Russians were content to live in an independent Lithuanian state

as long as their economic prospects were brighter than elsewhere. Indeed, most of them believed they were.²⁴ Hence, what was most critical to the social stability of the new state in relationship to its ethnic minorities was the rapid development of its economy.

While it was arguably too much to expect that any government could adequately deal with the challenges presented by the economic crisis in the wake of the Soviet collapse, the economy proved to be the Achilles' heel of the Sąjūdis government. The elections of 1992 were a stunning defeat for the nationalist parties. The former Communist Party, which had transformed itself into the Democratic Labor Party, won an absolute majority in the national legislature (now renamed the Seimas). This was followed by the election of the party's leader, Algirdas Brazauskas, as the first president of the republic (an office created by the constitution of 1992). The electoral victory of the Democratic Labor Party, which was owed in part to the support the party enjoyed with the overwhelming majority of the country's national minorities, helped to greatly reduce ethnic tensions in Lithuania. Entering office at the same time as direct rule was being lifted in the Polish regions, the leftist government placed economic matters as its first priority and greatly deemphasized national issues.

Divisions in, & the Changing Shape of, Lithuanian Nationalism since Independence

Despite the crushing defeat suffered by the nationalist parties in the 1992 elections, they were able to rebound and recapture the national legislature in 1996. By then, however, nationalism had been transformed. If nationalist parties and movements in the early independence movement were of the variant 2 type (being largely concerned with the internal threat to the territorial integrity of the republic), since 1994 they have taken on a more complex, multidimensional form. While many nationalists in Lithuania would claim that the movement has always been of the variant 3 type (nationalism as civic nation-building), the actions taken by the first Sąjūdis government in the Polish regions, as previously described, belie such a claim.

However, since 1994 this variant has indeed been largely pursued by the larger nationalist parties, including the most important of them, the Fatherland Union (Conservatives of Lithuania). The party emerged from the ashes of the electoral defeat suffered by Sąjūdis in 1992 and was the largest of the parties in the Seimas (the national legislature) at the end of

the 1990s, just a few votes shy of an absolute majority. However, its popular support waned substantially in the wake of the economic difficulties attending the Russian economic collapse of late 1998. As a consequence, the party suffered a serious electoral defeat in the 2000 national elections, winning only nine seats. Nonetheless, it remains a major contender in the political system, as attested to by its second-place showing in the 2002 local elections.²⁵ Indeed, the party remained the fourth-most-popular political party in the country by early 2003 (see table 1), and it won 25 seats in the 2004 legislative elections. Given the party's pensioner base, which continues to reflect concerns related to variant 2 nationalism, it has occasionally been compelled to undertake policies reflecting a concern with the territorial integrity of the republic.²⁶

TABLE 1. Population Indicating It Would Vote for the Respective Political Parties (in percentages)

Political Party	1999	2001	2003
Center Party	15.9	3.4	5.0
Democratic Labor Party	7.3	—	—
Liberal Democratic Party	—	—	14.0
Fatherland Union (Conservatives of Lithuania)	7.1	6.9	7.8
Christian Democratic Party	6.4	5.9	4.5
Social Democratic Party	6.1	33.1	18.4
National Party of Lithuanians and "Young Lithuania"	3.1	0.9	—
Union of Lithuanian Nationalists	0.4	—	—
"Young Lithuania" and the Union of Lithuanian Nationalists	—	—	0.7
New Union (Social Liberals)	2.9	5.3	5.1
New Democracy/Women's Party	2.1	0.4	—
Peasants' Party	1.9	2.1	—
Union of the Peasants' Party and New Democracy	—	—	3.1
Polish Electoral Action	1.5	0.6	0.5
Democratic Party	1.3	—	—
Christian Democratic Union	1.3	—	—
Liberal Union	1.1	9.7	8.1
Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees	0.7	—	—
Union of Russians of Lithuania	—	0.5	0.8
Moderate Conservatives	—	0.6	0.6
Lithuanian Freedom Union	—	0.7	0.5
Modern Christian Democratic Union	—	0.9	0.9
Other parties	1.0	0.4	0.6
Will not vote, unsure, or refuse to answer	39.9	28.6	29.4

Source: For 1999, a Vilmorus public opinion poll conducted in Lithuania in October 1999 and published in *Lietuvos Rytas*, October 9, 1999, 7. For 2001, a Vilmorus public opinion poll conducted in Lithuania in July 2001 and published in *Lietuvos Rytas*, July 14, 2001, 8. For 2003, a Vilmorus public opinion poll conducted in Lithuania in February 2003 and published in *Lietuvos Rytas*, February 15, 2003, 7.

The smaller nationalist parties, on the other hand, have focused almost exclusively on protecting the country from internal and external subversion and threats and have rejected civic nation-building approaches. This is particularly evident in their insistence that Polish and Russian not be given the status of state languages. Their support of Lithuanian nationals abroad is meant to further support these efforts. Thus, the smaller nationalist parties have pursued a mix of a peculiar version of variant 2 (nationalism as sovereignty-protecting) and variant 5 (nationalism as co-national-protecting).²⁷

Differences of Opinion among the Nationalist Parties

Concerns about the loyalties of the national minorities persisted among some Lithuanians in the years following independence.²⁸ These concerns were generally reflected in the positions of Lithuania's nationalist political parties, though not with equal intensity. One can use views on issues such as the perceived loyalty of Lithuania's minorities to distinguish among the nationalist parties. A survey conducted by the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University in 1995 of candidates to the national legislature demonstrates the differences between parties on questions involving the national minorities (see table 2). While the number of respondents is too small to permit detailed statistical analysis, the results confirm the intuitive view on the positioning of the major political parties on the national issue. The two largest parties on the political left, the Democratic Labor Party and the Social Democratic Party,²⁹ are included in table 2 for comparative purposes.

On questions related to whether national minorities enjoy too many rights or whether they are entitled to enjoy equal rights, the parties on the left took positions in support of the national minorities, while the two largest parties on the right, the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats, were less supportive. However, three small right parties—the Union of Lithuanian Nationalists, the Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees, and Jaunoji Lietuva (Young Lithuania)—were even more strident in their opposition to the rights of national minorities. Candidates from these three small right parties represented the most extreme views. This same pattern is apparent, with some modifications, concerning evaluations of the loyalty of the Russian and Polish national minorities. In the case of the Russians, the Christian Democrats were the most uncertain about the loyalty of this national minority. Concerning the Poles, Christian Democrats were once again the most uncertain; however, Jaunoji Lietuva (the most stridently

nationalist party in Lithuania) was the second-least-likely party to question their loyalty.

There is a relatively clear pattern here. While the political right was the bearer of nationalism in the political system, it was the smaller parties (joined by the Christian Democrats in some cases) that were the most stridently nationalistic. This was most certainly the case for Jaunoji Lietuva, which had adopted as one of its political slogans “Lithuania for Lithuanians!”

Interestingly, the other issue on which the nationalist parties have disagreed, at times forcefully, is the pursuit of membership in European organizations, specifically NATO and the European Union (EU).³⁰ Table 3 reports the ordinal ranking given to Lithuania’s membership in NATO and the EU by the candidates of the respective political parties in 1995. There was close agreement among the nationalist parties on NATO membership, though the three small nationalist parties most adamantly supported it. This reflects their fear of Russian subversive and aggressive acts against the

TABLE 2. Attitudes of Political Candidates of Respective Political Parties on Questions Concerning National Minorities

Political Party (number of respondents)	Average Response			
	National Minorities Have Too Many Rights	National Minorities Must Have Equal Rights	Poles are Disloyal	Russians are Disloyal
Average of all respondents	3.24	1.37	2.52	2.77
<i>Large Left Parties</i>				
Democratic Labor Party (57)	3.86	1.19	3.05	3.45
Social Democratic Party (40)	3.64	1.23	2.53	3.15
<i>Large Right Parties</i>				
Fatherland Union (Conservatives of Lithuania) (41)	3.05	1.46	2.33	2.49
Christian Democratic Party (26)	2.58	1.50	1.65	1.96
<i>Small Right Parties</i>				
Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees (19)	2.42	2.05	2.22	2.33
Union of Lithuanian Nationalists (21)	2.29	1.90	1.71	2.19
Jaunoji Lietuva (5)	2.00	2.50	3.00	2.00

Source: 1995 survey of candidates to the Seimas conducted by the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University.

Note: Scores closer to one indicate agreement with the statement; scores closer to five indicate disagreement.

Lithuanian state supported by the Russian national minority within Lithuania (variant 2 nationalism). For them, NATO was the only solution to this security dilemma. The convergence on entry into NATO was also reflected in foreign policy efforts led by the Conservative government from 1996 to 2000 to have an international conference discuss the Russian enclave of the Kaliningrad region. A heavily militarized region adjoining Lithuania's western border, the region is of particular concern to the nationalists.³¹ The position of the Conservatives and Christian Democrats on NATO membership was based on more than just security calculations; it was also linked to their desire to "rejoin" Europe in general.

The sense of rejoining Europe was reflected in the similarly high ordinal score that the Conservatives and Christian Democrats gave to Lithuania's entry into the EU. (The two parties merged in 2004.) In contrast, all three of the smaller nationalist parties were adamantly opposed to EU member-

TABLE 3. Attitudes of Political Candidates of Respective Political Parties on Questions Concerning Membership in the European Union and NATO

Political Party (number of respondents)	Average Response	
	Membership in EU	Membership in NATO
Average of all respondents	2.70	3.07
<i>Large Left Parties</i>		
Democratic Labor Party (57)	2.20	3.50
Social Democratic Party (40)	2.29	3.42
<i>Large Right Parties</i>		
Fatherland Union (Conservatives of Lithuania) (41)	2.13	1.90
Christian Democratic Party (26)	2.08	2.22
<i>Small Right Parties</i>		
Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees (19)	2.81	1.88
Union of Lithuanian Nationalists (21)	3.79	1.24
Jaunoji Lietuva (5)	4.00	1.75

Source: 1995 survey of candidates to the Seimas conducted by the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University.

Note: Membership in the organization was placed on a list of ten organizations. Respondents were asked to rank order each in terms of their personal preferences. Scores closer to one indicate greater levels of support for Lithuania entering the organization.

ship, particularly the Union of Lithuanian Nationalists and Jaunoji Lietuva. This reflected a clear division between the moderate nationalism of the Conservatives and Christian Democrats and the more radical form represented by the small nationalist parties.

The small parties' general opposition to entering the EU denoted a novel variety of nationalism in its sovereignty-protecting form (variant 2 nationalism). The threat that these parties perceived from the EU has little to do with national minorities. Instead, it reflected a concern with what were considered to be the insidious effects on both the culture and socioeconomic structure resulting from integration with Europe and opening up to the global economy. Reflecting concerns voiced by left-wing parties as well, the smaller Lithuanian nationalist parties were worried by prospects that these processes might well relegate Lithuania to the status of a third-world economic colony of the West, with little to no control over investment decisions made within its borders. They were also troubled by the possible effects of those decisions on the socioeconomic order. But, unlike the political left, the small nationalist parties were also concerned about the impact that further Western investment would have on the cultural values of the country. This was particularly the case concerning language. Many on the far right voiced fears that English would be *de facto* imposed on the country by the logic of the global market. Having less than a decade before won their freedom from the Soviet Union, which controlled the country's economic development and placed both its language and culture in a secondary status, these parties represented the concerns of a growing number of Lithuanians that the long-sought sovereignty not be sacrificed.

The expression of such concerns was not new.³² What was new was the way that efforts of the Conservative government to privatize the economy (and lay the basis for Lithuania's accession to the EU) were increasingly uniting rather disparate forces—pensioners, students, intellectuals, leftists, and the more extreme nationalists.³³ Among the triggering events of the rising chorus of protests were the privatization of the national telephone company to a Scandinavian consortium and the sale of the country's oil industry to an American firm, Williams International. The latter raised particular concern that Lithuania's economic interests would not be well served and that American capital would overwhelm the country's economy, making it virtually impossible for an indigenous industrial and business class to emerge.

While small nationalist parties continued to oppose globalization of

Lithuania's economy in the 2000s, neither they nor the left were able to capitalize on the issue. Instead, populist elements gained the most traction on the issue and were able to mobilize those disillusioned and left behind by the economic reforms. Populism first became evident in the election of a poorly educated anti-Semite as mayor of Kaunas, the country's second largest city, in early 2000. While he left office to become a deputy in the parliament, populism continued to plague the country throughout the early 2000s. Rolandas Paksas was elected president on a populist platform in 2003. Despite his impeachment the following year, the Labor Party won a plurality in the legislative elections. The party had only recently been created by Victoras Uspaskichas, a notorious Russian-Lithuanian businessman who gained his fortune by questionable means and who as a member of the Seimas has demonstrated a willingness to use his political position for economic advantage.

The populism that these elements represent is not part of the nationalist phenomenon in Lithuania. Indeed, they have been opposed by the nationalist parties. They appeal to the disillusioned across ethnic and national lines. Most often they evoke nostalgia for the social guarantees of the Soviet era and often call for closer ties with Russia and a more cautious, if not overtly hostile, attitude toward the West.

The Moderate Nationalism of the Conservatives

As the preceding section indicates, compared to the small nationalist parties the Conservatives were both more pragmatic and more moderate. The greater temperance of the Conservatives on nationality issues gave them room to engage in an effort to build a civic consciousness among the national minorities, placing greater emphasis on a nation-building strategy (variant 3 nationalism). Upon returning to power in 1996, the party pursued such an effort. The main focus of the party was on economic development and integration into European security and economic structures, the latter efforts also largely informed by economic development concerns.

Yet the Conservatives were never able to eschew fully policies reflecting variant 2 nationalism. The pensioner population, an important component of the Conservatives' electoral base, continued to be concerned with the internal threat of secession from Poles in the Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions, as well as that posed by Russian subversive or aggressive behavior. As a consequence, the Conservatives occasionally contributed to a deterioration in the relations with the national minorities, particularly the Poles.

This was most evident in the decision taken by the Conservative-led government in 1998 to change the administrative boundaries of the city of Vilnius. In effect the changes placed large tracts of rural areas from the Polish regions under the city's jurisdiction. The government undertook these reforms without consultations with the Polish government, as required in agreements between the two states,³⁴ and despite having made promises to the contrary to the visiting Polish head of state the month before.³⁵

Causal Factors Shaping Lithuanian Nationalism since Independence

THE PURSUIT OF MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AND THE EU

Thus, by the middle to late 1990s the Conservatives were clearly still a nationalist party, but one that *usually* attempted to deemphasize forms of nationalism focusing on the internal threat to the national integrity. While the pensioners pulled them in the variant 2 direction on occasion, the party's more typically moderate stance owed largely to its aim to enter NATO and the EU. These were both goals that the Conservatives believed Poland could assist in achieving. Indeed, the effort to enter these European structures was behind the 1994 treaty with Poland that finally normalized relations between the two countries and significantly reduced the previous tensions between them. While the treaty was signed by the Democratic Labor Party government, it would not have been possible without the active support and concurrence of the Conservatives.³⁶ Following Poland's accession into NATO, Conservative leader Vytautas Landsbergis publicly proclaimed that Lithuania should be admitted in the next round given its historic ties with that country. This was indeed a remarkable turnabout for a man who had only several years before argued vehemently that Lithuania was part of an altogether different cultural and historical space from either Russia or Poland.

In addition to the previously discussed idea of NATO and EU membership as part of a larger desire "to rejoin Europe," the Conservatives had rational reasons to pursue membership in both, especially NATO. In addition to the pensioners, the party's political base included some members of the business community. Both the pensioners and the business leaders supported Lithuania's entry into European security structures, but for different reasons. The business community prized the economic stability that NATO membership offered, while pensioners were convinced that the

alliance was the only means to ensure against the loss of the country's independence to a reemerging greater Russia.

CHANGES IN MASS ATTITUDES AMONG, AND ABOUT, THE MINORITIES

Both contributing to and resulting from the Conservatives' less strident nationalist attitudes, tensions between the country's national minorities had reduced significantly since the start of the post-Soviet independence period.³⁷ As early as 1993, public opinion surveys found only a small minority of respondents across the three main national groupings indicated dissatisfaction with living in Lithuania: Lithuanians (13 percent dissatisfaction), Russians (16 percent), and Poles (18 percent).³⁸ By 1995,³⁹ surveys indicated even less cause for concern about the loyalties of Lithuania's Russian-speaking community. While ethnic Lithuanians expressed greater support for the legitimacy of the state and its functions, the Russian-speaking population was only marginally less supportive. Responses to the questions listed in table 4 demonstrate that Russian speakers were slightly less likely than Lithuanians to feel that everyone living in the country should perform military service, pay taxes, and respect the national flag. There was no significant difference of opinion on whether residents should respect the law. These general patterns remained relatively unchanged in 2000, as the data in table 4 indicate.⁴⁰ The only differences of note in the 1995 and 2000 responses were increases in the numbers of citizens from both groups indicating support for the legitimacy of the state and its functions, with Russian speakers significantly more likely to support military service in 2000 than in 1995 and both Lithuanians and Russian speakers more likely to believe that paying taxes was a civic duty.

These data suggest that there was very little difference in levels of satisfaction with Lithuanian citizenship from 1993 to 2000 among the country's ethnic groups. They also indicate that the kind of reactive nationalism among the ethnic majority seen in other Eurasian countries (Azerbaijan, for example) was much less likely in Lithuania. There was no violent ethnic conflict of the kind seen in the Caucasus, there was much less perception of cultural threat than in the other Baltic states, and the perception of territorial threat was declining among all but the most extreme nationalists. These factors, combined with the push for membership in NATO and the EU, gave nationalist elites little reason to push an occlusive (variant 2) nationalist agenda.

The only source of any significant degree of disagreement among

Lithuania’s major ethnic communities revolved around the language issue. Not surprisingly, given that Lithuanian national identity is primarily defined along this dimension, an overwhelming majority of ethnic Lithuanians (95 percent) in 2000 continued to insist that all citizens had a civic responsibility to learn the national language. In contrast, only three-fourths of Russians and Poles held to this view.⁴¹ This served as a primary means for right-wing nationalists in the smaller parties to mobilize support. However, the amount of support was relatively small.

Conclusions: Lessons about Lithuania, Lessons from Lithuania

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn *about* Lithuania is that the core of the Lithuanian identity is neither the national myth nor symbols

TABLE 4. Comparison of Attitudes toward Civic Duties (in percentages)

Duty	1995 Survey		2000 Survey	
	Lithuanians	Russians	Lithuanians	Russians
Military service				
Always	57	46	57	51
Usually	22	30	21	26
Unimportant	10	12	13	14
Not at all	9	8	9	7
Don’t know	1	4	0	2
Pay taxes				
Always	59	48	71	58
Usually	26	29	20	25
Unimportant	10	11	7	12
Not at all	3	7	2	5
Don’t know	1	4	0	0
Respect flag				
Always	88	79	94	80
Usually	10	18	5	17
Unimportant	1	1	1	3
Not at all	0	2	0	0
Don’t know	0	2	0	0
Obey laws				
Always	76	75	78	76
Usually	19	21	18	21
Unimportant	3	2	4	3
Not at all	0	1	0	0
Don’t know	0	2	0	0

Source: “New Baltics Barometer II” (Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1995), questions 89–93; and “New Baltic Barometer IV: A Survey Study” (Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 2000), questions D.1.A., D.1.C, D.1.D, and D.1.E.

related to the myth. More so than most nations, language is central to determining inclusion. This is not surprising given the forty-year-long effort by the Russian Empire to abolish the language in its written form. Indeed, the Lithuanian language serves more than as a means for transmitting culture. It is itself virtually the only way of identifying that one is or is not culturally Lithuanian. Different regions of the country demonstrate wide variation in traditions and even symbols. Even religion does not unite the nation. While a plurality are professed Catholics, a large part of the nation is Protestant or even pagan, holding to the earliest traditions of the grand duchy of Lithuania as the last pagan state in Europe.

Nonetheless, the national myth is not unimportant. While it does not serve as a means for determining inclusion, it helps to define Lithuanian culture and attitudes to the outside world. What is interesting about the myth is that while Lithuanian nationalism has evolved sometimes over short periods of time, and even taken more than one form at any given time, the national myth has remained relatively stable. Indeed, despite the evolution of the strategies pursued by Lithuanian nationalists since 1988, the idea that Lithuanians are a nation of “innocent sufferers” has continued to persist, at times in the face of contradictory evidence. The charge of national complicity in the Holocaust, for example, has posed a challenge to the very heart of the national myth. It calls into question both the image of a nation of innocent sufferers as well as that of a tolerant nation. It is therefore not at all surprising that many Lithuanians have had difficulty in addressing the issue.⁴² Indeed, the response by some has been outright denial or countercharges that the Jews were implicated in the genocide of the Lithuanian nation during the Soviet occupation. Nonetheless, despite substantial popular resistance, formal apologies have been rendered, and the country’s schoolbooks have for the first time addressed Lithuania’s involvement in the Holocaust.⁴³

Although it is less important than at the time of the restoration of independence, the image of a nation of “innocent sufferers” continues to manifest itself in the form of a distinct distrust of outsiders. While not resulting in overt hostility—indeed Lithuanians are outwardly quite tolerant—the distinctive form of xenophobia that is reflected here is more than mere national pride. It is informed by a sense that all foreigners, not just representatives of historically repressive nations such as the Poles or Russians, have little to contribute to Lithuania.⁴⁴ Indeed, there is a pervasive belief that the Lithuanian nation is so unique that it defies understanding by out-

siders. Hence, there is a decided resistance to advice or assistance proffered by foreigners.

Yet there is nothing about the Lithuanian national myth that demands retribution or aggressive behavior toward others. While the idea of innocent suffering calls for vigilance in defense of the nation, the choice for aggressive behavior is just that, a choice. There is nothing in the context of the development of the Lithuanian state and society from 1988 to the present that suggests that such a choice has been made or is likely to be made. To the contrary, perhaps the healthiest aspect of the Lithuanian social and political system has been the steady breakup of the nationalist movement itself. Sąjūdis in its early stages represented a nearly monolithic nationalist movement. However, it quickly began to fragment. It has since given birth to a number of splinter parties directly or indirectly related to the initial movement. Indeed, until very recently the core of virtually every party in the country with the exception of the Social Democratic Party (the new Social Democratic Party having formed as the result of the merger of the Democratic Labor Party and old Social Democratic Party in 2000) is drawn from the movement.

While most such parties continue to hold onto the national idea, they disagree on what the national interests are and the strategies best employed for achieving them. The resultant political competition has not only placed a healthy check on the emergence of more destructive expressions of nationalism but has contributed immeasurably to the development of a sense of loyalty to the young state among all national groups.⁴⁵ As a result, the transformation of postindependence nationalism has assisted the formation of a stable, consolidated, and democratic Lithuanian state. This, in turn, argues that nationalism need not be a destructive force. Indeed, it can and does play an important role not only in state-building but in the transition to democracy, a point made in much of the earlier literature on development and democratization as well as the more recent literature on nationalism.

Lithuanian nationalism offers some lessons about the general phenomenon as well. First, as Lowell Barrington points out in his introductory chapter, nationalism has a resilient quality to it. This owes largely to the fact that political elites find it a useful tool for mobilizing segments of the public in support of their political aspirations. In the Lithuanian case nationalism has successfully been transformed from one concerned with territorial defense against internal threats to one largely focused on a strategy of

building civic consciousness among all of the country's citizens. At the same time, however, political elites are not unconstrained in their efforts to mold nationalism to their purposes. This is evidenced by the relative inability of Lithuania's small nationalist parties to convince the larger part of the Lithuanian population of the continued need for vigilance against an internal threat posed by the country's ethnic minorities. In contrast, the larger parties were successful in responding to *both* the opportunities and limitations of the moment.

A second set of lessons concerns the degree to which territorial integrity and the inclusivity of the national ideal serve as causes for the continued survival of nationalism. Both remain at the core of the smaller parties' political programs. These parties stress the threat posed by the Polish and Russian minorities and demand that the state increase disincentives for engaging in discourse in any language other than Lithuanian. This lies at the heart of their concerns about membership in the EU. The larger nationalist parties on the other hand are content with the status quo, which *de facto* (although not *de jure*) establishes a working knowledge of Lithuanian as a prerequisite to enjoying fully the economic and social benefits of citizenship.

The third and final lesson is that external forces, particularly those related to globalization, can have a profound effect on nationalism. For some, such as Lithuania's smaller parties (not including populist parties), globalization can present a threat to the nation. That threat can encompass assaults on territorial integrity, as global economic changes may increase the number of foreigners owning property or voting in local elections. For others, however, globalization may well introduce incentives to make the national community more inclusive by eroding the dominance of the national language in economic discourse and establishing a mutually beneficial dialogue with a wider community.

NOTES

1. An exception is Vesna Popovski, *National Minorities and Citizenship Rights in Lithuania, 1988–1993* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).

2. See, for example, Vesna Popovski, "Citizenship and Ethno-politics in Lithuania," *International Politics* 33 (March 1996): 45–55; and Tamara J. Resler, "Dilemmas of Democratization: Safeguarding Minorities in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no. 1 (1997): 89–116.

3. Jack J. Stukas, *Awakening Lithuania: A Study on the Rise of Modern Lithuanian Nationalism* (Madison, NJ: Florham Park Press, 1966).

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Alfonsas Eidintas, "The Nation Creates Its State," in *Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918–1940*, ed. Edvardas Tuskenis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

8. Arvydas Juozaitis, "The Lithuanian Independence Movement and National Minorities" (Peace Research Reports, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, Germany, December 1992), 7–8.

9. Ibid.

10. See, for example, Thomas Venclova, "The Heirs of Gediminas," in *Personal Freedom and National Resurgence: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies I*, ed. Alexandr Dobrynin and Broniua Kuzmickas (Washington, DC: Paideia Press and the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994), 7–16; and Vytautas Kavolis, "The Second Lithuanian Revival: Culture as Performance," in *Personal Freedom and National Resurgence: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies I*, ed. Alexandr Dobrynin and Broniua Kuzmickas (Washington, DC: Paideia Press and the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994), 149–60.

11. Tim Snyder, "National Myths and International Relations: Poland and Lithuania, 1989–1994," *East European Politics and Societies* 9, no. 2 (1995): 317–43.

12. Ibid.

13. A. Matulionis, "Tautinės mažumos ir tautinės problemos Lietuvoje," in *Tautinės Mažumos: Etnosocialinių problemų seminaro 1991–1992 m. medžiaga*, ed. Natalija Kasatkina, Vida Kasparavičienė, and Arvydas Matulionis (Vilnius: Filosofijos, sociologijos ir teisės institutas, 1992), 11–15. It should be noted, however, that this influx of Russians was significantly less in Lithuania than in its Baltic neighbors to the north, Latvia and Estonia. The larger numbers of such Russian speakers in the other Baltic countries created a perception of threat to the cultural survival of the nations there that was much greater than in Lithuania.

14. Popovski, "Citizenship and Ethno-politics in Lithuania."

15. Juozaitis, "The Lithuanian Independence Movement and National Minorities."

16. It is almost a certainty that the movement was formed at the instigation of the KGB to help undermine political stability in the breakaway republic.

17. Juozaitis, "The Lithuanian Independence Movement and National Minorities."

18. Ibid.

19. In late 1989, the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL) formally declared its independence from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As a result, two communist parties nominated candidates in the legislative elections of 1990: the newly independent CPL, which later that year became the Democratic Labor Party, and the CPL that remained a part of the CPSU (CPL[CPSU]). The former won twenty seats and the latter four seats in the Supreme Council.

20. The republican legislature elected during the Soviet era, which had declared the restoration of Lithuania's independence, became the first legislature of the Republic of Lithuania and remained so during the first year of independence.

21. Snyder, "National Myths and International Relations."

22. Popovski, "Citizenship and Ethno-politics in Lithuania."

23. Irena Maryniak, "The Uncomfortable Commonwealth," *Index on Censorship* 21, no. 10 (October 1992): 26–27.

24. A. Eigirdas, "Pilietybės priėmimo procesas pietryčių Lietuvoje: Socialinė politinė gyventojų tipologija," in *Tautinės Mažumos: Etnosocialinių problemų seminaro 1991–1992 m. medžiaga*, ed. Natalija Kasatkina, Vida Kasparavičienė, and Arvydas Matulionis (Vilnius: Filosofijos, sociologijos ir teisės institutas, 1992), 19–24.

25. The party won the second-largest number of deputies in the December 2002 elections to local councils.

26. See the following discussion.

27. A peculiar version of variant 2 because it included a desire to protect Lithuania from EU dominance (see the following).

28. In response to the question on the 1995 "New Baltics Barometer II" whether there is any potential for minority conflict between Lithuanians and Russian residents, Lithuanians were statistically less sanguine on the issue (chi-square significance = 0.0001, Cramer's V = 0.16495). Forty-two percent of Russian speakers answered "definitely not," compared to only 28 percent of Lithuanians. Further, 29 percent of Lithuanians responded "definitely" or "possibly" in comparison to 18 percent of Russian speakers. See "New Baltics Barometer II" (Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1995), question 72.

29. These two parties have since merged into a new Social Democratic Party.

30. Lithuania became a member of both NATO and the EU in 2004.

31. Among other efforts was the signing of agreements with Kaliningrad to provide general economic aid as well as cultural and educational support for Lithuanians in the region. The latter reflects variant 5 nationalism, nationalism as co-national-protecting. It was further apparent in similar agreements for the cultural support of Lithuanian national minorities in Poland and Belarus.

32. See, for example, Leonidas Donskis, "Lithuania at the End of the Twentieth Century: The Creation of an Open Society and Culture," in *Personal Freedom and National Resurgence: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies I*, ed. Alexandr Dobrynin and Broniua Kuzmickas (Washington, DC: Paideia Press and the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994), 75–82.

33. See, for example, Kęstutis Gečas, "Mitinge-raginimai Lietuvai prisikelti iš naujo," *Lietuvos Rytas*, October 23, 1999, 7; and Rūta Grinevičiūtė, "Pono 'Williams' naftos jausmas," *Veidas*, October 14–20, 1999, 30–32.

34. Related to the treaty, the two countries signed a number of agreements promising to respect the rights of national minorities in their respective countries and to consult one another on policies affecting these minorities. In this regard, it should be noted that Poland has a substantial Lithuanian minority.

35. While many saw in this an effort to reduce the number of regions dominated by the Polish minority, others viewed the move in more economic terms. Placing these rural districts under the jurisdiction of the Vilnius government required the Poles to submit their claims for the restoration of prewar properties to a largely non-Polish jurisdiction.

36. Snyder, "National Myths and International Relations."

37. Public opinion surveys indicated that the percentage of Lithuanians perceiving a degradation in relations between the republic's minorities decreased from 8 percent in 1989 to 5 percent in 1993. The corresponding figures for Poles were 18 percent in 1989 and 13 percent in 1993. The smallest decrease was reported among Russians, from 9 percent in 1989 to 8 percent in 1993. During the same period, those reporting they had participated in altercations between different nationalities decreased from 21 percent in

1989 to 12 percent in 1993, with corresponding decreases reported among Lithuanians (23 percent to 12 percent), Poles (16 percent to 9 percent), and Russians (21 percent to 11 percent). See Vida Kasparavičienė, Eugenija Krukauskienė, and Arvydas Matulionis, eds., *Vilniečio portretas: Sociologiniai metmenys* (Vilnius: Filosofijos, sociologijos ir teisės institutas, 1995).

38. Ibid.

39. The “New Baltics Barometer II” was conducted in Lithuania in April 1995 by Vilmorus. It overrepresents the Russian-speaking population to permit comparisons between ethnic Lithuanians and the Russian-speaking community, many of whom are Poles. Of the 870 respondents to the survey, 239 were self-identified Russian speakers.

40. The “New Baltics Barometer IV: A Survey Study” was conducted in Lithuania in April 2000 by Vilmorus. It overrepresents the Russian-speaking population to permit comparisons between ethnic Lithuanians and the Russian-speaking community, many of whom are Poles. Of the 1,112 respondents to the survey, 212 were self-identified Russian speakers.

41. “New Baltics Barometer IV,” question D.1.B.

42. Before the war, Vilnius was home to one of the most thriving Jewish communities in the world. Ninety-six percent of that community was liquidated in the Holocaust, in which many Lithuanians participated. On May 8, 1990, the Supreme Council passed a declaration of regret for the nation’s involvement in the extermination of Jews, and President Algirdas Brazauskas apologized in a speech before the Israeli Knesset in February 1995. Nevertheless, many in the international community doubt whether these apologies reflect the attitudes of most Lithuanians. See Vytautas Paulauskas, “Erscheinungen des Rechtsextremismus und Nationalismus in Litauen,” *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* 21 (1996); and Laisvė Radzevičienė, “Išniekinta tautiška giesmė—tik autentiškas folkloras?” *TV antena* 39 (October 2–8, 1999): 10–12. These doubts were heightened when a radical politician who had made several statements with overtly antisemitic overtones was elected mayor of Kaunas, the country’s second-largest city, in early 2000.

43. Paulauskas, “Erscheinungen des Rechtsextremismus und Nationalismus in Litauen.”

44. The previously noted opposition to privatization is partly motivated by the notion that the sale of state assets to foreigners suggests that Lithuanians are not capable of managing them.

45. The more radical nationalist parties on the political right are small. They do not have enough public support to meet the requirement for gaining seats in the national legislature that are allocated on a proportional basis. And while there is a fascist party, the central government refuses to register it, as it violates laws against sowing social discord and national enmity. The party itself comprises no more than two hundred individuals.