

8. Kravchuk to the Orange Revolution

The Victory of Civic Nationalism in Post-Soviet Ukraine

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UKRAINE'S 2004 PRESIDENTIAL election and Orange Revolution was facilitated by the role of civic nationalism. The inability to mobilize civic nationalism in sufficient quantity in 1991–92 permitted the election of sovereign Communist Leonid Kravchuk and later centrist Leonid Kuchma. The growth of a civic nationalist Ukrainian identity from 1992–2004 transformed the political landscape, permitting Viktor Yushchenko to be elected president.¹

Civic and ethnic nationalists in Ukraine can be differentiated fairly effectively based on their views on two issues, corresponding to the idea proposed by Lowell Barrington in this volume's introductory chapter that nationalism involves both membership boundaries and territorial boundaries. First, they have different definitions of the state, as either inclusive (civic) or exclusive (ethnic). Second, they either support Ukraine's inherited borders (civic nationalists) or harbor a desire to change them (ethnic Ukrainian, Russian nationalists, and Sovietophiles). This chapter is divided into two sections, which deal separately with ethnic and civic nationalism before and after independence.

Prior to independence, ethnic nationalists grouped within the Interparliamentary Assembly (IPA) demanded independence from the moment of its arrival on Ukraine's political scene in 1989. After Ukraine became an independent state, the IPA transformed itself into the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA). As an ethnic nationalist movement, it was joined by several new parties.² Civic nationalism only appeared as a phenomenon in 1990–91, although the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring

(Rukh) was created in 1988. Rukh was composed of two wings (national democratic political parties created by former political prisoners and the cultural intelligentsia) and adopted a platform of independence only in October 1990. Rukh was joined in 1989–90 by the Democratic Platform of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), which created the centrist Party of Democratic Revival and New Ukraine bloc. In 1990–91, the “Sovereign Communists” also peeled off from the CPU. These two wings of the CPU backed the transformation of the USSR into a confederation of sovereign states until August 1991, after which they supported Rukh’s program of independence. During 1988–91 civic nationalism in Ukraine therefore expanded from a narrower to a wider base by incorporating all CPU supporters except “Imperial Communists.”³

In the post-Soviet period, ethnic nationalists on the far right of the political spectrum could not convert the energy of the drive for independence into an effective use of the state for implementing ethnic nationalist policies. Instead, the far right nationalists were marginalized following independence, while civic nationalist parties in the center and center right borrowed from them when convenient on issues of language, culture, and history. Ethnic nationalists on the left were likewise unsuccessful in their pursuit of reunion with Russia and the development of an Eastern Slav identity based on Russian language and culture. Instead, a civic nation-building approach became paradigmatic, with broad consensus about the need to balance Ukrainian cultural revival with protection of minority cultural rights.

This does not mean that civic nationalists agreed on the details of the nation-building program. As in other former Communist states, the civic nationalist movement divided into its ideological wings once independence was achieved. But the central ideas of civic nationalism spread across the political spectrum. Rukh narrowed into a center-right political party and was joined by other national democratic offshoots (the Republican, Democratic, Reforms and Order, Christian Democratic, and other political parties). In the March 2002 elections both wings of the now-divided Rukh were members of a wider, patriotic (civic nationalist), reformist Our Ukraine bloc led by former National Bank governor and prime minister Viktor Yushchenko, which came first in the proportional half of the elections with 23.57 percent.

During the first half of the 1990s, the national idea extended to the center ground of Ukrainian politics within which the Sovereign Communists

congregated. Hence, Ukraine's "parties of power" (i.e., parties close to the authorities) are to be found among centrist (or "oligarchic") parties. During the second half of the 1990s, the civic national idea continued moving to the left and incorporated center-left and left-wing political parties committed to state independence, many of which were offshoots from the CPU during its period of illegality (the Socialist and Peasant parties). After more than a decade of independence only the radical left is in favor of Ukraine joining the Russian-Belarusian union. The center left now holds similar views to the center right on state independence for Ukraine and Russia. This could be clearly seen in the 1999 presidential election, when a majority (52.2 percent) of those who supported CPU leader Petro Symonenko also backed a union with Russia. Among supporters of Oleksandr Moroz's Socialists and President Leonid Kuchma, this figure was only 30.2 and 26.7 percent respectively.⁴

This brief overview of the various components of nationalism in Ukraine highlights its evolutionary nature, in both the late-Soviet and post-Soviet periods. It also points out the necessity of thinking carefully about one's categorization of political parties as nationalist, both in general and in terms of their civic and ethnic leanings. Scholars of Ukraine—and scholars generally—face potential pitfalls when attempting to employ the label *nationalist* either to a broad political movement or to a particular political party. Parties on the left can be nationalists, and parties on the right need not be ethnic nationalists. In this chapter, I outline a wider understanding of nationalism in Ukraine than is commonly discussed (see fig. 1 in the appendix to this chapter). I explore these various themes and conclude with lessons from the case of Ukraine about understanding nationalism after independence.

Nations & Nationalism prior to Independence

Nationalism is a multifaceted concept that incorporates many different definitions. A central claim of this chapter is that it should be differentiated before, and after, a state achieves independence. Although the tendency among scholars has been to define nationalism in Ukraine as one continuous process from the second half of the 1980s until the present, this approach has serious flaws. Nationalism prior to independence sought to establish a newly independent state (e.g., Ukraine from the former USSR). But nationalist movements for self-determination can be defined as either

civic and inclusive, ethnic and exclusive, or—as is usually the case—incorporating both elements.

Although scholars and journalists have defined as nationalists those who defend a state from disintegration and oppose self-determination (e.g., Serbia in the former Yugoslavia), this serves merely to confuse the issue. Those who seek to defend a multinational state or empire are best defined as imperialists—not nationalists—for they oppose both the self-determination of their own core state and that of the nonimperial nations.⁵ That which has been commonly defined as Russian nationalism is therefore, as Motyl points out, a myth.⁶

Ukraine's movement for self-determination evolved from two groups—former dissident political prisoners and the cultural intelligentsia—after Rukh was established in 1988. Rukh declared its support for self-determination, and thus became *de facto* a nationalist movement, but not until its October 1990 congress. Prior to that, Rukh had supported the transformation of the USSR into a confederation of sovereign republics (Boris Yeltsin's preference even in December 1991). Rukh defined itself as civic and inclusive, and the Ukrainian nation as encompassing all of Ukraine's ethnic groups. The civic nationalist approach adopted by Rukh was a product of three factors. First, the dissident-political prisoner wing of Rukh had a long tradition, dating back to the 1960s, of support for human rights. Ukraine was home to the largest Helsinki Group of any of the Soviet republics. In the Gulag, Ukrainian political prisoners, who were proportionately the largest of any Soviet ethnic group, developed close working relations with Jewish and other prisoners. Second, the conservative, anti-Gorbachev Ukrainian Communist leader Volodymyr Shcherbytsky ruled the republic from 1972 to 1989. Rukh and religious movements only developed into mass movements after his resignation in September 1989. Finally, the large number of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in Ukraine influenced Rukh's adoption of an evolutionary and non-radical program.

Not all political parties agreed with the evolutionary and civic approach of Rukh. Radical nationalist parties and movements emerged in western and central Ukraine by 1989 and immediately championed self-determination and maximum opposition to the Soviet regime and all Soviet institutions. These groups united in the IPA and opposed Rukh's participation in the 1989 Congress of Peoples Deputies and the 1990 Ukrainian parliamentary and local elections as “collaboration” with an occupying regime.⁷ The

IPA remained a minority movement and changed into a radical nationalist party (the Ukrainian National Assembly) after December 1991.

Alongside the evolution of Rukh, the CPU began to divide into three groups, particularly during 1990 and 1991. The first group was the Sovereign Communists. Led by Leonid Kravchuk, it championed Ukraine's sovereignty over all-union institutions. In the March 1991 referendum, Kravchuk added a question that obtained higher support for republican sovereignty than the Mikhail Gorbachev question regarding a "renewed federation." The former Sovereign Communists remained unaffiliated in the first half of the 1990s, earning the group the label of *party of power*. After 1994–96, this group naturally gravitated toward newly created centrist parties that had close ties with the establishment (Agrarians, Labor Ukraine, Party of Regions) or took over existing ones (United Social Democrats, Democratic Party, People's Democratic Party [the former PDRU]). As these were also the natural home of the Leonid Kuchma camp, there was a convergence of groups one and two (the Sovereign Communists and the CPU Democratic Platform) in the second half of the 1990s. In the October–November 1999 presidential election, Kravchuk backed Kuchma, and in 2000 Kuchma led the nonleft majority in parliament with his former parliamentary speaker, Ivan Pliushch, as the new speaker until it dissolved during the "Kuchmagate" scandal after November 2000.⁸

The Democratic Platform comprised the second group. The young, radical, democratic wing of the CPU—with the support of the Komsomol—broke off and formed the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine (PDRU). The PDRU backed the transformation of the USSR into a confederation of sovereign states, the same position as that of the Sovereign Communists until August 1991. The PDRU created the New Ukraine bloc to unite other smaller civic groups and political parties of a centrist orientation. New Ukraine stood in "constructive opposition" to President Kravchuk (December 1991–July 1994) and thereby became the ideological base, together with the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, that mounted the successful challenge on behalf of Kuchma in the summer 1994 presidential elections.

Members of the former Democratic Platform peeled away from supporting Kuchma in the late 1990s because of his support for a new oligarch class and the increasingly authoritarian nature of the regime, a process hastened by the revelations found in the "Kuchmagate" tapes made by a presidential guard in Kuchma's office from 1998 to 2000. By the 2002 elections

many of them were either members of the radical anti-Kuchma opposition (Yulia Tymoshenko's Forum for National Salvation) or Yushchenko's Our Ukraine.

The third faction of the CPU was the "Imperial Communists." As the ideological heirs of Shcherbytsky, this group detested both groups one and two *and* Gorbachev. After the CPU was banned for supporting the putsch in August 1991, it reformed as a new CPU in October 1993. The CPU remains an orthodox, Sovietophile party that finds it difficult to come to terms with Ukrainian independence. During its period of illegality, the Socialist Party (SPU) and Peasant Party (SelPU) emerged as moderate offshoots that supported state independence. Their heyday was in 1994–99, when their leaders (Oleksandr Moroz for the SPU and Oleksandr Tkachenko for the SelPU) were parliamentary speakers. The CPU, SPU, and SelPU opposed Kravchuk and Kuchma. In 2000, a pro-statehood Communist Party of Ukraine Revived was established, probably with backing from the presidential administration.⁹

Thus, prior to independence, the Ukrainian nationalist movement that *supported* self-determination was composed of three groups: (1) the radical right (from 1989 on) adopted a platform of independence immediately in 1989 and espoused an *ethnic*, exclusive program of "Ukraine for Ukrainians!"; (2) Rukh (from 1990 on) adopted a platform of state independence in October 1990 based on a *civic*, inclusive program that linked national and human rights;¹⁰ and (3) the Sovereign Communists and Democratic Platform (from 1991 on) championed a confederation of sovereign republics until the August 1991 putsch (eleven months after Rukh dropped this program). On August 24, 1991, the Sovereign Communists, led by parliamentary speaker Kravchuk, moved into the Rukh camp and supported the parliamentary declaration of independence by an overwhelming constitutional majority vote.¹¹

Between October 1990 and August 1991 the Ukrainian nationalist movement for self-determination became a mass movement. The banning of the CPU in August 1991 removed the last obstacle to taking Ukraine out of the USSR and led to a united nationalist movement for self-determination from August to December 1991 that produced a 91 percent endorsement in the December 1 referendum.¹² If we define as nationalists those that sought to establish an independent state, then radical nationalists, Rukh, and the Sovereign Communists all joined the nationalist movement

at different times during the three years leading up to independence. Of these three groups, only the radical nationalists had an ethnic, exclusive program. The other two (Rukh and the Sovereign Communists and Democratic Platform) always backed a civic, inclusive definition of the nation. The Ukrainian example, therefore, shows how a broad-based nationalist movement for self-determination can simultaneously encompass both ethnic and civic nationalist ideologies (ethnic nationalism within the IPA and national [civic] democracy within Rukh).

Nationalist Ideas in Ukraine after Independence

Who Are the "Nationalists"?

After a country achieves independence, the nationalist movement has achieved its goal. In other words, as Ukrainian scholars and political party activists are fond of pointing out, "the national idea has been fulfilled."¹³ What next? How should the national idea in an independent state be defined? Who are the "we" and who are the "others"?¹⁴ Defining who are "nationalists" in the independent state is more complicated than defining nationalism for self-determination prior to independence. If we accept a definition that all of those who actively support the continued independence of the state are by definition nationalists, then this group of people includes, as it did in the preindependence era, both civic *and* ethnic nationalists.

Civic (also called *pragmatic* or *state*) nationalists are those who support an inclusive definition of the nation and range from the pro-statehood left (SPU, SelPU) to the center right (national democrats such as Rukh). In the West this has been described by Billig as "banal nationalism" because it has become ingrained within societal culture and public consciousness, as seen in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001.¹⁵ This spectrum is large and incorporates the former Sovereign Communists and "Democratic Platform Communists" who have congregated in the center (Kravchuk, Kuchma), as well as national democrats and offshoots from the CPU (SelPU, SPU).¹⁶

Wilson argues that it is impossible for a "nationalist" to win the presidency in Ukraine.¹⁷ Using our definition of civic (pragmatic) nationalists, we can see how such a definition is too narrow and flawed. Civic nationalists have, in fact, won *every* presidential election in Ukraine (December

1991, July 1994, November 1999, and 2004). In the first two cases civic nationalists were pitted against each other: V'acheslav Chornovil versus Kravchuk (December 1991) and Kravchuk versus Kuchma (June–July 1994).¹⁸ In the last, a civic nationalist, Kuchma, faced off against a Sovietophile, Petro Symonenko, the head of the CPU. In 2004, two civic nationalists faced each other—Yushenko and Yanukovych.

Civic nationalists have been divided over aspects of the national idea, but as discussed in more detail in the following, they remain united in defense of national interests such as territorial integrity. A study of Russian politics argued that “pragmatic nationalism represents the standard view one might expect the foreign policy elite to hold in any country.”¹⁹ Pragmatic nationalism has increasingly dominated Russian reformist circles since 1993, with a program of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) integration, promotion of Great Russia, and defense of national interests.²⁰

A similar development emerged in Ukraine. D'Anieri's study of Ukrainian security policy in the 1990s found that the ruling elites defended sovereignty over and above any benefits of economic integration in the CIS. Elites from all regions of Ukraine and different civic nationalist political parties were similarly concerned with “foreign economic penetration of Ukraine and the potential for neocolonialism.”²¹ D'Anieri continues, “The coalition of forces that sees sovereignty as a preeminent goal is strong in particular because it cuts across Ukraine's other major political schisms.”²² In the October–November 1999 presidential elections the “pragmatic nationalist” call to rely on one's own national forces dominated the programs of most of the contenders.²³

Unlike Malcolm, Pravda, Allison, and Light on Russia, D'Anieri does not define Ukraine's ruling elite's as pragmatic nationalists. Instead, D'Anieri falls into the traditional trap of only defining as nationalists western Ukrainian national democrats, which serves to confuse readers as to who the “nationalists” are in Ukraine.²⁴ He cannot argue that nationalism in parliament cuts across regions and parties and at the same time claim that nationalists only exist in western Ukraine among Ukrainophone national democrats.

Such a division of Ukrainian politics and parliamentary affairs into “nationalists” and “Russophiles” is common among Western scholars.²⁵ Ethnic nationalism, using this author's definition and that most commonly found in Ukraine, is weak throughout Ukraine, including in its western region.²⁶

The Ideas of the Ethnic Nationalists, Ukrainian and Russian

Ethnic nationalists are the same as those who were defined as such in the preindependence era (radical right parties such as the IPA [UNA]). But while scholars writing on nationalism in Ukraine usually adopt a similar framework to that used by D'Anieri,²⁷ I argue that the ethnic nationalists also include Russian and Soviet nationalists. Russia's policies of "external-territory-claiming" were matched by ethnic Russian nationalists and Sovietophiles within Ukraine arguing that Ukraine had no right to exist as an independent state but only in a vaguely defined Eastern Slavic union or a revived USSR. Sovietophiles saw an Eastern Slavic union as a stepping stone to a revived USSR. The homeland for Russian nationalists in Ukraine and Russian imperialists in Russia was clearly neither Ukraine nor the Russian Federation but an Eastern Slavic union, USSR, or tsarist empire.

Ethnic Russian nationalists include pan-Eastern Slavic and Russophile parties that usually align themselves with the CPU, Progressive Socialists, and internationalist fronts in regions such as the Donbas and Crimea.²⁸ The presidential program of Oleksandr Bazyliuk, head of the Slavic Party (successor to the Civic Congress and organizer of the Congress of Russian Organizations of Ukraine), defined Ukraine as part of the Slavic world and his party as patriotic.²⁹ Although Bazyliuk denies that Ukrainians are a separate ethnic group,³⁰ Wilson does not deem this sufficient to warrant defining him and his party as nationalist, only Russophile.³¹ Clearly double standards are at work here, as Ukrainians making similar comments about Russians would be undoubtedly defined as ethnic nationalists, or worse, by these same scholars.

Russian nationalists in Ukraine have difficulty in accepting Ukraine's right to exist as an independent state. They vacillate between a belief that the three Eastern Slavs are merely regional branches of one Russian nation or recognizing that a Soviet Ukrainian republican identity now exists that harmed the "natural" unification of the three Eastern Slavic "Russian" peoples prior to 1917.

In arguing for the unity of the three Eastern Slavs, they are as much pan-Russianists as German nationalists in the 1930s were pan-Germanists in seeking to unite all German speakers in one state. Russian nationalists in Ukraine see the three Eastern Slavs as all "Russians" (*Russkii*). The aim of the Slavic Party "is identical to what nationalists strive for in Russia."³²

In both the German and Eastern Slavic cases, nationalism is ethnic and primordial, not civic, although a civic path to power can be used (e.g., Adolf Hitler in Germany in 1933 and his admirer, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, in Belarus in 1994).³³ Lukashenka's ideology, Kolstø points out, is an "expression of skewed ethnic nationalism."³⁴ Other scholars have similarly defined the CPU in Ukraine as "Soviet national-socialism."³⁵

Russian ethnic nationalism in Ukraine is weak because many CPU supporters are Russified Ukrainians and ethnic Russian nationalism is weak throughout the former USSR.³⁶ In the 2002 elections, the two Russian nationalist blocs (the Russia Bloc and For a Union of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia) obtained a combined total of only 1.12 percent.³⁷

As tables 1 and 2 show, the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians increases as one moves across the political spectrum from left to right. Ethnic Ukrainian representation in the radical left is half that of ethnic Russians. The ethnic Ukrainian to ethnic Russian proportional mix is 2:1 (radical left), 3:1 (center left), 5:1 (center right), and 18:1 (radical right).³⁸

Russian nationalism in Ukraine has other defining attributes, many of which are jointly held with the radical left:³⁹

- denounces liberal values traditionally as "un-Russian";
- supports anti-Westernism;
- supports anti-Semitism;⁴⁰
- sees Russia as the natural leader of the Eastern Slavs;
- defends the inherited postcolonial status quo and denounces as "nationalist" any attempts at affirmative action for Ukrainian culture and language;
- fears a decline in the hegemony of Russian culture and language in Ukraine and accuses the authorities of discrimination in policies aimed at upgrading Ukrainian culture and language;
- saw, and still sees, no need to learn the titular language;
- describes the decline of the titular languages in republics such as Ukraine as "natural" and Russians are therefore not guilty for the Russification of other peoples;
- believes Russians suffered more than others in the former USSR and they never undertook any negative actions; and
- holds that the former USSR was never fully a Russian empire.

Ironically, Ukrainian ethnic nationalists share one idea with the ethnic Russian nationalists in Ukraine: the rejection of post-Soviet Ukraine as the

homeland for Ukrainians. They, like all their counterparts in other European states, want to expand the borders of the state to its “ethnographic borders.” As with Russian nationalists they seek to unite all those whom they define as belonging to one ethnic group within one state. Such a policy would bring confrontation with all of Ukraine’s neighbors. Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists seek to incorporate territory in Poland, Slovakia, Moldova, Belarus, and Russia into a “greater Ukraine.” Ethnic Russian nationalists and Sovietophiles would like to see Ukraine included within the Russian-Belarusian union or a revived USSR.

Ukrainian ethnic nationalists strongly oppose pan–Eastern Slavism. Nevertheless, one party, the UNA, turned the pan–Eastern Slavic framework on its head by arguing in favor of it as the basis for a Ukrainian empire centered upon Kyiv—not Moscow (a city six hundred years younger)—as a modern successor to the medieval state of Kyiv Rus’.

The Ideas of the Civic Nationalists

After independence is achieved, the unity of the nationalist movement, even a civic nationalist movement, can come under stress. Different groups have alternative approaches to dealing with key questions for the state—how to define the nation and how to establish full control over its terri-

TABLE 1. Ethnic Self-Identification of the Electorate (in percentages)

	Radical Left	Center Left	Center Right	Radical Right
Ukrainian	62.9	70.2	80.1	91.4
Russian	33.9	23.6	14.9	5.0
Other	3.2	6.1	5.0	3.6

Source: O. Haran and O. Mayboroda, *Ukrains’ki Livi: Mizh Leninizmom I Sotsial-Demokratieiu* (Kyiv: KM Academia, 2000), 204.

TABLE 2. Language Group and Political Affiliation (in percentages)

Language Group	Radical Left	Center Left	Center Right	Radical Right
Ukrainian	31.7	39.5	52.7	76.3
Russophone	30.9	30.7	27.1	14.6
Ukrainian				
Russian	29.8	20.7	12.1	3.7
Other	7.6	9.0	8.2	5.5

Source: O. Haran and O. Mayboroda, *Ukrains’ki Livi: Mizh Leninizmom I Sotsial-Demokratieiu* (Kyiv: KM Academia, 2000), 204.

tory—which lead to clashes over policy, programs, and frames of reference. Civic nationalists in Ukraine differ on how to deal with foreign and domestic threats to territorial integrity, how much to participate in European integration, and whether to grant territorial autonomy to minorities in an otherwise unitary state. The biggest differences, however, concern how to define the “we” (nation), as based upon one or two titular nations or one or two state languages.

DEALING WITH EXTERNAL THREATS

Civic nationalists remain divided over how to deal with external threats. Although they remain committed to defending in the last resort Ukraine’s territorial integrity by any means (the president is, after all, the guarantor of the state’s integrity), they differ over how to deal with threats. National democrats adopt a tougher line against these threats than centrists and the center left, particularly if they emanate from Russia.

Nevertheless, Ukraine’s civic nationalist elites have consistently rejected Russian proposals for maintaining ill-defined “internal” CIS borders by treating them in the same manner as external borders; they have also opposed dual citizenship and demanded that the borders be defined as integral not only within the context of the CIS. Employing Barrington’s nationalism variants presented in the introduction, Ukraine, during 1991–97, therefore adopted a policy of “sovereignty-protecting” vis-à-vis Russian claims to its territory (Crimea) and Russia’s refusal to accept its inherited borders. Ukraine has consistently denounced Russian attempts at “co-national-protecting” in the former USSR and has rejected any attempts by Moscow to speak on behalf of its Russians or “compatriots” (Russo-phones).

DOES UKRAINE NEED EUROPE TO BE MODERN?

Ukrainian nationalism was originally a reaction against modernization that was tantamount to assimilation for Ukrainians. In the Soviet era, attacks on Ukrainian “bourgeois nationalism” included anybody or anything nationally conscious, or culturally, ideologically, and politically different from the Communist Party line. In independent Ukraine, civic nationalists are in the process of developing a nationalism that is an “ideology of national solidarity” but also a “doctrine of modernization.”⁴¹

Attempts have been made since the late 1990s to make civic nationalism into a doctrine of modernization that would lead to Ukraine’s reintegration

into Europe.⁴² Linking modernization to the diffusion of civic nationalism and integration from the center to the periphery would be consistent with the Karl Deutsch diffusionist model popular until the 1960s. Such a model has been elaborated by Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the United Social Democrats and former deputy speaker of parliament.⁴³ A modernization doctrine that links political and economic reform to a foreign policy of returning to Europe is obviously not to the liking of left-wing civic nationalists, such as the Socialists. This is because it rejects much of the Soviet legacy and supports the creation of a Western-style liberal democratic market economy.

TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY FOR MINORITIES?

In Ukraine, the center right, as in other liberal democratic states (except in the United States, Canada, and Germany), opposes federalism and territorial autonomy for minorities. Its support for a unitary state is premised upon a vision of the French Jacobin state that recognizes only individual, not collective, rights. Centrists and the left are more willing to countenance territorial autonomy as a *quid pro quo* to take the heat out of the separatist movement but remain divided over federalism. Federalism is largely opposed by Ukraine's elites, and plans to establish an upper parliamentary chamber (which was allegedly backed by a majority in the April 2000 referendum) are not popular across the entire political spectrum (as seen in discussions in 2003 and 2004 over presidential political reform proposals to introduce an unelected upper Council of Regions in parliament). Civic nationalists all remain united on the question of state- and institution-building, which is closely tied to expanding the center's control over its territory and ensuring that its policies are implemented at the local level.

WHO ARE "WE"? NATION-BUILDING AND THE DIFFICULT ISSUES OF RELIGION AND LANGUAGE

The civic definition of the nation has dominated state policy in Ukraine since independence, with Russian and Ukrainian ethnic nationalists and Sovietophiles marginalized from the policy process. Nevertheless, civic nationalists within the ruling elite in Ukraine only reached a consensus on nation-building during the course of the second half of the 1990s. Civic nationalists all desired some kind of nation-building and national integration, but they differed over how this should be undertaken.⁴⁴ Both the consensus on the need for nation-building and these differences over it in prac-

tice are a reflection of the country's regional disparities, the influence of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and the colonial legacy.

A divided titular nation inevitably led to evolutionary, moderate policies, and a certain level of agreement developed. Few civic nationalists, for example, supported the definition of Ukraine as a state with two titular nations (Russians and Ukrainians), as this would transform Ukraine into an Eastern Slavic state. Those that supported such a definition stressed the benefits of Ukrainian-Russian biculturalism.

Liberal Russophiles who defended such a definition united in the Social-Liberal SLON election bloc in the 1998 elections with the slogan "Let's Defend Russian Culture for the Peoples of Ukraine."⁴⁵ Such a rallying cry, however, attracted the support of only 0.91 percent of the voters.⁴⁶ The July 1996 constitution defined Ukraine as a country with only one titular nation, following the long tradition of the Soviet nationality policy of assigning a republican homeland to each major ethnic group with a foreign border.

The inculcation of common values, myths, and customs also proved to be unproblematical for civic nationalists in Ukraine. The only alternative to a Ukrainian national historiography that stressed Ukraine's distinctiveness from Russia and its Europeaness was that espoused by ethnic Russian nationalists and Sovietophiles from the nineteenth century to the 1980s, with a brief interlude in the 1920s when the Soviet regime pursued a policy of indigenization.

A Russian nationalist or Sovietophile historiography and myths rejected the very idea of a Ukrainian ethnic group or an independent existence from Russia and therefore could not be used by Ukrainian nation-builders. Western scholars, though, have been quick to negatively label this national historiography as *nationalist*, while defining Russophile historiography as merely the "traditional Russian interpretation" or "Soviet version."⁴⁷ Laitin calls Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, the doyen of Ukrainian national historiography, the author of a "nationalist bible."⁴⁸

One of the nation-building questions surrounds religion. Ukraine has sought to create an autocephalous, united Orthodox Church as an attribute of independence. Efforts to make the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Kyiv Patriarch the basis for such unity failed in 1992–94. The largest of the three Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, in terms of parishes, remains the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patri-

archate, though polls give the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Kyiv Patriarch far greater popular support.

After 2000, efforts were again underway to unite all three Orthodox Churches in Ukraine into an autocephalous church. Such a move was backed by the Constantinople patriarch, who does not recognize the canonicity of the transfer of the Kyiv Metropolis from Kyiv to Moscow in 1686 or the Russian Orthodox Church's jurisdiction over Ukraine. Not surprisingly, the main opponents of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church are ethnic Russian nationalists and Sovietophiles, who see this as further evidence of Ukraine cutting its ties to Russia.⁴⁹

But it is language that has proven to be the most divisive and complicated issue for civic nation-builders in Ukraine. A consensus was reached by Ukrainian civic nationalist elites that an independent state needed its own language. The loss of a national language is widely held to lead to the loss of national identity and independence, as seen most starkly in Belarus. The alternatives for Ukraine's nation-builders and civic nationalists are as follows:

1. Ukrainian as the sole state language: Russian would be squeezed out completely in favor of Ukrainian by removing the colonial legacy of Russification. Such a policy, similar to that adopted in the Baltic states, was never seriously contemplated and was only applied in western Ukraine.
2. Ukrainian as the sole state language applied differently by region: This policy was adopted in the 1989 Soviet Ukrainian law "On Languages" and reaffirmed in the 1996 constitution.⁵⁰ Such a policy foresaw the continued use of Russian but at the same time allowed for the continued expansion of Ukrainian. Although some of the postcolonial legacy would be tackled through affirmative action, the legacy would never be completely removed except in western Ukraine. The provision of Ukrainian in education has gradually expanded throughout the 1990s in all regions except the Donbas and the Crimea.⁵¹
3. Ukrainian and Russian as two state languages: Such a policy was only ever backed by ethnic Russian nationalists and Sovietophiles, particularly the CPU.⁵² Russian nationalists and Sovietophiles saw it as an attempt to "maintain the hegemonic status of the (Russian) minority

in the linguistic-cultural sphere.”⁵³ Precisely for this reason, Ukrainian civic nationalists opposed the introduction of two state languages because they understood that such a fictional equality, as in Belarus, would maintain the domination of Russian. The attitude of different political parties to the language question can be ascertained from tables 3 and 4.

Some in Ukraine, and many Western scholars, have defined a policy of only one state language—Ukrainian—in a country with a large number of Russophones as “ethnic” and tantamount to Ukraine pursuing “nationalizing” policies that deviate from its proclaimed aim of building a civic state.⁵⁴ But a civic state, if it has an inclusive citizenship and franchise, can be based on a Ukrainian *or* Ukrainian-Russian ethnocultural core. Either policy decision and framework could be defined as civic.

The definition of a civic state rests not on whether a state has one or two state languages or indeed if it has one or two titular nations. Most scholars define how civic a state is in terms of the inclusiveness of a state’s citizenship laws and the electoral franchise. All civic states are not purely civic but constructed on the basis of an ethnocultural core (in the case of some, two cores [Belgium]).⁵⁵

TABLE 3. Support for Languages within the Ukrainian Political Spectrum (in percentages)

	Radical Left	Center Left	Center Right	Radical Right
Russian as a second state language	37.4	26.4	15.7	1.9
Russian as an official language	36.4	31.0	25.6	10.2

Source: O. Haran and O. Mayboroda, *Ukrains’ki Livi: Mizh Leninizmom I Sotsial-Demokratieu* (Kyiv: KM Academia, 2000), 204.

Note: Russian as a second state language would make it on a par with Ukrainian, which has been the sole state language since 1989. As an official language it would have recognition only in some restricted fields and in some regions of Ukraine.

TABLE 4. Languages Used within the Ukrainian Political Spectrum (in percentages)

	Radical Left	Center Left	Center Right	Radical Right
Ukrainian	36.8	44.0	58.1	79.4
Russian	63.2	56.0	41.9	20.9

Source: O. Haran and O. Mayboroda, *Ukrains’ki Livi: Mizh Leninizmom I Sotsial-Demokratieu* (Kyiv: KM Academia, 2000), 204.

In the Ukrainian case, scholars have been tempted to characterize the state as “ethnic” because it only has one constitutionally defined state language and titular nation. A Ukrainian state defined in such a manner that simultaneously adopts affirmative action for Ukrainian language and culture, has a Ukrainian ethnocultural core, and respects national minority rights and regional differences can still be defined as civic.⁵⁶

The Nation & Nationalism after Independence: Political Parties

National Democrats on the Right: Are They the Only “Real” Nationalists?

In Ukraine, the center-right parties are often disparaged by scholars as “nationalists.”⁵⁷ What such scholars mean by this is ethnic nationalists, with all the negative connotations this type of nationalism carries. Of particular relevance here is Rukh, which Kubicek claims is “the largest party with a nationalist orientation in Ukraine today.”⁵⁸ Are then only Ukrainophone political parties such as Rukh to be defined as nationalists?

Laitin thinks so and argues that only “nationalist deputies” opposed the definition of “peoples of Ukraine” (*narod Ukrainy*). These Ukrainophone “vigilantes” allegedly use “nationalist threats” and “provocations” against Russophones that “instills shame and guilt in many russophone Ukrainians.”⁵⁹ “Ukrainian nationalists,” Arel believes, see Russophones as victims of Soviet nationality policies (which they are) and thereby believes that they will only reacquire national consciousness through becoming Ukrainophones (which is not the case).⁶⁰ Arel believes that Kravchuk’s policies undermined his commitment to a civic state so that by 1994 “Kravchuk was widely seen as a partisan of the nationalizing state.” Therefore, Kravchuk lost the 1994 presidential elections to ascendant left-wing forces and a “fierce anti-nationalist campaign.”⁶¹

This use of the label *nationalist* to associate the center-right parties with (bad) ethnic nationalism is a loose use of the term. Labeling all center-right parties as *nationalist* (and only Ukrainophones as nationalists) places them in the same camp as the extreme right. Rukh and the other center-right parties have been labeled (*bad ethnic*) *nationalists* because of their support for righting some of the wrongs committed against the Ukrainian language and culture during tsarist and Soviet rule through affirmative action.

This is a common policy position in all postcolonial countries. It also need not be ethnic nationalism but rather can be one wing of civic nation-

alism. As Barrington's introduction makes clear, all national identities—whether civic or ethnic—need common cultural features to help unify groups. Pursuing policies designed to resurrect particular features need not be ethnic nationalism, especially when considered as part of a broader set of policies favorable to minority rights and pursued within an inclusive framework.

Downplaying the positions of Rukh and the center right on minority rights also means that such labeling is factually incorrect. Rukh and center-right parties have always been strong advocates of polyethnic rights for national minorities and group rights for those who live compactly in defined territories (e.g., Tatars in the Crimea, Hungarians in Transcarpathia, and Romanians in Chernivtsi oblast). The Ukrainian center-right parties do not advocate the disenfranchisement of ethnic Russians or the total removal of Russian language and culture from Ukraine.

Even many former political prisoners (who dominated the commanding heights of new national democratic parties) have always been strong advocates of minority rights. Rukh has supported a definition of the nation that defines everybody in Ukraine as a citizen regardless of their nationality.⁶² While supporting the introduction of Ukrainian into all walks of life (as stated in the June 1996 constitution) Rukh also “guarantee[d] the development of the Russian language, the languages and cultures of all nationalities.”⁶³ Indeed, Jaworsky believes that one of the two factors that prevented the outburst of interethnic conflict in Ukraine was its political parties, “which quickly reached a consensus on the need to provide guarantees for the rights of ethnic minorities in Ukraine.”⁶⁴

In addition, Ukraine's national democrats do not espouse the policies that are commonly promoted by Europe's new nationalist right. These include hostility to the European Union, xenophobia, anti-immigration policies, racism, distrust of parliamentary politics, neocorporatist economic policies, and state intervention. Ukraine's center right (i.e., Our Ukraine) would never support the “Third Way” of Europe's nationalist right. Third Way politics in Ukraine can be best summarized with the nationalist slogan of “Neither Moscow nor Washington!” Such views are the preserve of two groups in Ukraine: “pragmatic” oligarch centrists and the populist-right Yulia Tymoshenko bloc. The Tymoshenko Bloc includes the populist-right Fatherland Party, led by Tymoshenko. Her party split from the populist-left Hromada Party after it went into decline when former prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko fled abroad in 1999. Tymoshenko's

Fatherland Party gained adherents and a political niche in 1999–2002 from those who had backed Yevhen Marchuk's failed 1999 presidential campaign, such as veteran dissident Levko Lukianenko. The Fatherland Party merged with Stepan Khmara's populist-right Conservative Republican Party in 2002.

Ukraine's center-right parties are the staunchest advocates of Ukraine's full integration into transatlantic and European structures and espouse moderate free market economic policies.⁶⁵ These policies are to be found within Yushchenko's Our Ukraine 2002 election bloc that incorporates Rukh and other center-right parties and in Yushchenko's presidential program.⁶⁶

Centrists and the National Idea

Centrists only came on the scene after Ukraine achieved independence. They grew out of the "Democratic Platform" and "Sovereign Communists" wings of the CPU, regional interests, and industrialist groups. The earliest centrist groups were those linked to the PDRU and its New Ukraine bloc that backed Kuchma in the 1994 and 1999 presidential elections. Other political parties have adopted either regional titles (Crimean Party of Economic Revival and the Party of Regions) or social democratic and liberal labels.

After 2000, parliament was led by a speaker, first deputy speaker, and deputy speaker from centrist parties with close ties to the local or national establishment and therefore termed *parties of power*. These include the Party of Regions in the Donbas, Agrarians (renamed People's Party) in western and central Ukraine, and Social Democratic United Party (SDPU) in Kyiv and Transcarpathia. The Party of Regions is led by former Donetsk governor and prime minister Viktor Yanukovich.

Centrist political parties that backed Kuchma in the 1999 presidential elections see "centrism" as an ideology that backs Ukraine's independence (i.e., civic nationalism), the "consolidation of Ukraine as a modern European state," and accelerating political and economic reform.⁶⁷ In other words, centrist political parties defer to the national democrats on questions of symbols, myths, and ethnocultural attributes of the state, while seeking to build a new civic nationalism that both integrates nationally and modernizes economically and politically. This centrist "unification ideology" is pro-statehood and pro-economic reform, providing "the basis to achieve general national consensus."⁶⁸ While economically liberal, centrist

political parties may also be authoritarian politically, a feature common to “parties of power” in Russia.

In contrast to national democrats, centrist political parties give greater emphasis to individual over collective or state rights, including those of any ethnic group. They often deny that the state needs to possess any ethnocultural character, opening them to charges of cosmopolitanism. The equality of all ethnic groups is championed, and they therefore do not like the terms *titular nation* and *national minorities* because these divide Ukraine into ethnic Ukrainians and others. They also recognize the multinational character of the state, something Kuchma championed after 1994. Federalism was originally popular among them but has declined in favor of a decentralized unitary state that is the current policy of the state.⁶⁹ They support flexible language policies that take into account the inherited ethnocultural situation in the regions (whereas national democrats would like to change the postcolonial situation through affirmative action throughout Ukraine). Language problems, they believe, can be resolved locally, taking into account the views of the local inhabitants.⁷⁰

These policies are clearly recognizable as those that have been backed by Ukraine’s ruling elites during the 1990s. At the same time, centrists do support the gradual expansion of the Ukrainian language in education and would like Russophone Ukrainians to at least know Ukrainian. They do not oppose the national historiography, myths, and legends backed by national democrats. The national hymn, symbol, myths, and flag are also elements of nation-building that centrists have been happy to accept from the national democratic camp. Their quarrel with the national democratic camp is largely over language policies, although both camps recognize the value of language to national identity.

The Left and the National Idea

Discussions of nationalism in Ukraine tend to ignore the left. But a large section of the Ukrainian political spectrum on the left is supportive of Ukrainian state independence and can also therefore be defined as civic nationalist. This left-wing tradition has long historical roots in Ukraine going back to the late nineteenth century. Patriotism and civic nationalism can, after all, be defined in different ways. Kas’ianov points out that the first calls for Ukrainian independence came from the Ukrainian Marxist intelligentsia in Galicia and the socialist intelligentsia in eastern Ukraine.⁷¹

In Ukraine, the center left is now composed of four competing social

democratic parties, one of which had close ties to the “party of power” establishment (USDPU). In addition, the oligarchic, antipresidential Hromada and the propresidential Agrarian Party can also be included within this spectrum. To the immediate left of these parties, the Socialist and Peasant parties can be defined as pragmatic and are evolving away from the communists toward civic nationalist positions. Their evolution toward civic nationalist positions has occurred since the 1994 elections.

THE OPPOSITION OF THE LEFT TO NEOLIBERAL ECONOMICS AND NEOLIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Left-wing nationalism in Ukraine is similar to that espoused by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, Gamel Abdel Nasser in the Middle East, and traditional anti-American left-wing nationalism in Latin America. The left in Latin America, like in Ukraine, is critical of neoliberal policies not only for socioeconomic reasons but also because of the damage it inflicts on the “nation.” Criticism leveled at international financial institutions rests on the impact of their policies on society, sovereignty, and “the ability of the nation to determine its own fate.”⁷² Patriots should not only shout how much they love Ukraine (i.e., national democrats), former parliamentary chairman Oleksandr Tkachenko argues, but should learn how to do “everything that is the most advantageous for the state.”⁷³

The Ukrainian left parties, as in all postcolonial countries, remain critical of international financial institutions, a factor influenced by decades of anti-Western Soviet propaganda. The Progressive Socialists believe that international capital is leading Ukraine to “a total national catastrophe, the loss of statehood, enslavement and colonization.” After this, “the colonization of Ukraine will be completed by the hob nail boots of NATO troops.”⁷⁴ Protesting against the latest economic program sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Communists believe that it “threatens the existence of our state as an independent and sovereign state.” Condemning the Ukrainian government’s “capitulation to world capitalism,” it called upon the parliament “to protect our people and Ukraine from the encroachment of national and foreign enslavers!”⁷⁵ This is indeed rich coming from a party that seeks itself to subvert Ukrainian independence.

This ruining of Ukraine by Kuchma on behalf of the IMF (or “international capital”) is a common theme within left-wing civic nationalism and Soviet and Russian ethnic nationalism.⁷⁶ Socioeconomic reforms in Ukraine, conducted with the assistance of the IMF and “Western advisers”

led to a “satanic blitzkrieg” that has resulted in a decline in Ukraine’s population from fifty-two to forty-eight million. “We are now being presented with genocide against our own people,” Communist leader Symonenko claimed.⁷⁷ Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz’s aide, Ivan Boky, believes that it is Kuchma’s socioeconomic policies “which are destroying independence, sowing social tensions.”⁷⁸ Moroz’s 1999 presidential election program denounced the “immoral ruination of one’s motherland and the physical extermination of millions of citizens.” Ukraine’s revival would be undertaken by “liquidating the banditocratic regime” and placing “trust in one’s people, its talents and traditions, and in the potential of the Fatherland.”⁷⁹ The Progressive Socialists also issued a statement, “On Political Genocide in Ukraine,” with a call to commemorate the “memory of the victims of genocide in Ukraine.”⁸⁰ They are here, of course, not referring to the artificial famine of 1933, which led to the deaths of seven million people under Joseph Stalin, but to the decline in Ukraine’s population during the 1990s.

Such policies, aided and abetted domestically, are “transforming Ukraine into a colonial state”⁸¹ and into a “protectorate of international financial oligarchs and NATO’s puppet.”⁸² The IMF, the left believes, is undertaking a “veiled form of colonisation and economic plunder.”⁸³ Symonenko believes that Ukraine has already lost its economic independence and is forced to do the bidding of international financial organizations, NATO, and “overseas lords.” Government programs and presidential decrees “are only translations into the Ukrainian language of demands by the IMF in return for successive financial-narcotic injections.” The main outcome of this is that “the colonization of Ukraine continues.”⁸⁴ Symonenko argues that “our elite acts like a colonial administration” that robs from a colony to provide for a future luxurious lifestyle in the West.⁸⁵ These denunciations turn Kuchma’s arguments on their head by accusing him (not the left) of endangering Ukraine’s sovereignty and thereby promoting the left as defenders of Ukraine’s state independence (civic nationalism). For the radical left, Ukraine would be better served with republican sovereignty within a revived USSR.

In the ideological arsenal of the left, *international capital* can refer to Western, domestic, and Russian capital. The left claims that the West is attempting to “eliminate Ukraine as a potential competitor,” yet it has also been distrustful of Russian oligarchs, particularly of those close to former Russian president Boris Yeltsin.⁸⁶ Obeying the dictate of the IMF and the

West threatens Ukraine's sovereignty because "positions in the Cabinet of Ministers are not decided by the President of Ukraine but some Washington uncle."⁸⁷ The left is also a strong supporter of the protectionism of domestic industry. Such policies are not only found in Ukraine. Protectionism is a "quintessentially nationalist discourse," a study found of the era in France of the Socialist president François Mitterand.⁸⁸

THE LEFT AND TIES TO RUSSIA

Contrary to what is usually perceived, the left parties are not in favor of a militarily weak Ukraine. The pro-statehood, civic nationalist wing (SPU, SelPU) supports Ukraine's nonbloc status and does not want Ukraine to join *either* the CIS or NATO military bloc. Soviet nationalists (CPU, Progressive Socialists) seek to join with Russia and Belarus in a "common (nuclear) shield" against NATO.⁸⁹ Tkachenko is critical of the destruction of sections of Ukraine's military industrial complex because "now, powerful neighbors do not want to reckon with our country as a weak state."⁹⁰

Tkachenko has strongly denied any comparison between himself and Lukashenka.⁹¹ Lukashenka minimizes differences between Belarusians and Russians and thereby sees no need for a border between both states (or with Ukraine; Belarus refuses to ratify the Ukrainian-Belarusian border treaty). Tkachenko, on the other hand, insisted that the Russian Duma ratify the May 1997 Ukrainian-Russian treaty—which it did in December 1998, followed by the Federation Council two months later. This legally codified the inherited borders from Soviet Ukraine. Tkachenko therefore argues that he "dotted the i's on the question of Ukrainian independence."⁹² The ratification of the treaty led to the arrival of an "independent country (Ukraine) with its own borders and territory."⁹³ This meant, Tkachenko argues, that Russian-Ukrainian cooperation could advance between both independent countries.

Tkachenko believes, with some justification, that Russia's acceptance of Ukraine as an independent state began only after both houses of its parliament ratified the treaty and thereby accepted the inherited territorial status quo from the former USSR. Tkachenko rebuts accusations that he favors a revived USSR, which, he believes, is contradicted by his insistence that Russia ratify the treaty with Ukraine, thereby recognizing the border as a prerequisite before cooperation could progress between them.⁹⁴ Tkachenko is therefore convinced that "the Ukrainian people will never turn away from this glorious achievement [of an independent Ukraine] and have a chance

to impart with it.”⁹⁵ The left parties turn the argument around and argue that it is Kuchma, and his ruling elites, who are likely to lose Ukraine its independence.

Moroz’s party, established in October 1991 when the Communists were still banned (August 1991–October 1993), has grown into what it defines as “a pro-state party.”⁹⁶ The gulf between the pro-statehood SPU and the Soviet nationalist, antistatehood CPU grew during the “Kuchmagate” crisis. The SPU played a central role in exposing the misdemeanors found on the tapes and remained in radical opposition to Kuchma. The CPU, on the other hand, saw a greater threat in Yushchenko than from Kuchma and the oligarchs. Only after the 2002 elections, which saw the CPU presence in parliament halved, did the CPU join the radical antipresidential SPU and Yulia Tymoshenko bloc.

Moroz has emphasized a belief that the policies pursued by Kravchuk and Kuchma have led to disunion in society. Support for independence was strongly linked to the degree to which citizens have faith and trust in their state. Independence was therefore being undermined by Kuchma’s policies, even though it was “historically justified,” and if these policies were continued, it would lead to the loss of Ukrainian independence. The October 1999 presidential elections were “a chance to choose independence.” “Independence,” as defined by the left, would be “real,” no longer dependent upon “foreign advisers” (i.e., the IMF and other international institutions) who have conducted “economic and social experiments by political maniacs.” Moroz’s 1999 election program called upon Ukrainians to resist “turning Ukraine into a colony, an appendage to NATO.” Although it welcomed “good neighborly fraternal economic and political relations” with Russia, Belarus, and other Slavic states, it fell far short of sacrificing Ukraine’s sovereignty in a union.⁹⁷ According to Moroz, Ukraine should not be assigned to any kind of “special zone” (i.e., a Russian “sphere of influence”).⁹⁸

To save Ukraine, the left proposed that a “coalition of national patriotic forces” be established “who can take upon themselves the responsibilities for the fate of both the state and the people.”⁹⁹ The skills of “patriotic” Ukrainians should be pooled to produce a national program for Ukraine’s revival in order to reject foreign advisers.¹⁰⁰ In such a program, “national interests must dominate in the work of all branches of government.”¹⁰¹ Achieving a “genuine independent state” required “a steadfast majority of true patriots and true people placed in the highest legislative

body of the state.”¹⁰² A national program should be advanced that would unite Ukrainians on the basis of patriotism in order for Ukraine to be truly “a sovereign and economically independent country.”¹⁰³ The continued decline in the economy “was a threat to our state sovereignty” and would be rescued by “true experts and patriots” whose duty would be to “rescue the state.” “The president must become an example of honor, diligence, and patriotism for the people,” Tkachenko told Mykolaiv oblast leaders.¹⁰⁴

The evolution of the left toward civic nationalism was evident in the joint appeal by four presidential candidates (Moroz, Tkachenko, Yevhen Marchuk, and Volodymyr Oliynyk) on the August 24, 1999, anniversary of Ukraine’s independence. The joint appeal was made symbolically in Kaniv, the birthplace of Ukraine’s national bard, Taras Shevchenko. The appeal is noticeable in that it never once mentions socialism, yet it is permeated by civic nationalism. They felt that a new executive needed to be elected as a “rescuer of the state”: “It is visible that, if the current president remains, our state will be finally ruined and Ukraine will lose its sovereignty.” They therefore called upon Ukrainians to unite because “the Fatherland is in danger!”: “We will rise together and make Ukraine a rich, strong, and respected country in the world.”¹⁰⁵

THE LEFT AND CULTURE IN UKRAINE

A common misconception among scholars is that the Ukrainian left is opposed to nation-building, Ukrainian language, and culture. To what degree is this the case? The left and the “Kaniv-4” bemoan the lack of national consolidation and unity under Kuchma. They therefore place great emphasis upon building greater unity not only between different branches of the ruling elite but also between different regions of Ukraine. Thus, they propose that different regions should be harmonized within an overall common national identity and national idea. The language problem would be “solved,” Moroz promised if he was elected president, and Ukrainians would become “united and consolidated.”¹⁰⁶

A national idea that unites social, economic, political, and national factors could therefore be developed as a means of uniting and mobilizing Ukrainians to rally around a program developed as a left-wing Third Way. It would have to “enrich nation wide values” and “incorporate our Ukrainian mentality.”¹⁰⁷ The revival of Ukrainian culture and language is a central plank of Ukraine’s national and economic revival in order that “our people

will never become the fertilizer of the future, or anonymous Ivans who do not remember their ancestry.”¹⁰⁸

A “union of popular and patriotic forces” with the Socialists as its core could develop a national idea, Moroz believes.¹⁰⁹ A national idea that promoted ethnic hatred or forcefully inculcated Western ideas would not work, Socialists argue. Instead, a national idea incorporated within state-building, which maintains “national traditions” and maintains one’s “originality” (i.e., language and culture), “will never lose its actuality, its value.”¹¹⁰ All decisions by Ukraine’s leaders should therefore be based upon the “Ukrainian people’s will,” which includes national interests, historical experience, and traditions.¹¹¹

Conclusion: Civic Nationalism in Ukraine and Lessons from Its Victory

In this chapter, I have divided the discussion of nationalist ideas and parties between a nationalist movement *prior* to independence (seeking self-determination) and the civic nationalists who have attempted to engage in nation-building and integration *after* independence. The two periods of Ukrainian nationalist development are clearly different and should not be confused.

In the Ukrainian case, the preindependence nationalist movement expanded from radical right ethnic nationalists in 1989 to the civic nationalist Rukh and the Sovereign Communists and Democratic Platform of the CPU in 1990–91. Civic nationalism was confined to the center-right movement Rukh until 1991, spread to the center in 1992–95, and then to the left beginning in the middle to late 1990s (see fig. 2 in the appendix to this chapter).

I therefore have defined civic nationalists in the post-Soviet period to include those political parties from the left to the center right committed both to independence and to a civic definition of citizenship and the franchise. As in all civic states, civic nationalists define the “we” differently depending upon their place within the political spectrum—not depending on the language they speak or the region they hail from, as is commonly the view among scholars.

The ethnic nationalist option never received widespread popular support in Ukraine, either before or after independence was achieved. Prior to independence, both wings of the nationalist movement (civic and ethnic) were able to mobilize only one-third of Ukrainians. Independence was only

made possible by defections from the Sovereign Communists and the Democratic Platform of the CPU joining this nationalist movement. The addition of these two elements pushed support for independence to a majority of the population and forced this nationalism to be moderate to appease different linguistic and regional constituencies.

If Ukraine's titular population was not divided by language, as in the Baltic states, the ethnic-civic nationalist movement would have achieved a majority without assistance from these two defecting wings of the CPU. Such a scenario would have led to the victory of Rukh leader V'iacheslav Chornovil in the December 1991 presidential elections, not Kravchuk.

Events in the post-Soviet space show that postindependence nationalism may have then led to either of two scenarios, the Baltic or Transcaucasian. In the former, the nationalist movement evolved from ethnic to civic in Estonia and Latvia after international pressure and the reestablishment of the hegemony of the titular nation where German-style ethnic exclusive policies were initially applied. In Lithuania, the nationalist movement evolved into a civic variant quicker. In the Transcaucasus, on the other hand, the victory of ethnic nationalism led to civil and interstate wars and the eventual removal of nationalists in all but Armenia.

In Ukraine the only region where ethnic nationalism had—and still has—a presence is in its western region, the only area of Ukraine where ethnic Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language dominate urban centers. The ethnic, regional, and linguistic diversity of the remainder of Ukraine influenced the evolution of nationalism in post-Soviet Ukraine into a civic variant that gradually spread during the course of the 1990s from the center right through the center to the center left. After a decade of independence only the radical left still remains hostile to Ukrainian statehood.

These steps in the evolution of Ukrainian nationalism are not peculiar to Ukraine, although their study within a comparative perspective is still to be undertaken.¹¹² The Baltic and Transcaucasian scenarios show how defining nationalism only in a negative manner fails to provide us with the full picture. Ukraine's post-Soviet nationalism has been forced to balance an uneasy alliance between the national democrats and centrist oligarchs that disintegrated during "Kuchmagate." This alliance had a positive and negative side to it. Ukraine escaped ethnic conflict and did not go down the Transcaucasian path. At the same time, Ukraine "muddled" along indecisively throughout its first decade as an independent state because (again, unlike in the Baltic states) the former Sovereign Communists turned cen-

trist oligarchs are ideologically amorphous and unable to chart a clear domestic or foreign policy course.¹¹³

In the independent Ukrainian state, the wide-embracing political spectrum of civic nationalism incorporated a wide variety of policy proposals as to how the national idea (i.e., the nation) should be defined. The most complicated question relates to language, whereas others (symbols, historiography, myths, etc.) were accepted by both centrists and national democrats.

There was simply never an alternative to a civic, inclusive definition of the Ukrainian state. A concession to the Crimea, the only region in Ukraine with an ethnic Russian majority, of territorial autonomy has been the exception rather than the rule, as Ukraine's civic nationalists have consistently opposed federalism.

Ukraine's control over Ukraine's borders and defense of territorial integrity has always been a central plank of its nation-builders, and consensus in support of territorial integrity has remained high. Ethnic Russian nationalists and Sovietophiles have disagreed with the boundaries of the state and nation, looking to either a pan-Eastern Slavic or Soviet homeland for Ukraine. Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists, on the other hand, seek, as do extreme nationalists elsewhere, to incorporate all Ukrainians in one state through the annexation of Ukrainian ethnographic territory in neighboring states.

One of the main lessons from the case of Ukraine is not to equate ethnic nationalism with nationalism. This leads scholars to produce an overly wide list of "nationalist" parties and leaders, and it feeds into the perception of nationalism as something negative—leading to chauvinism and ethnic tensions. Nationalism can be either good or bad and has existed in all nation-states since the late eighteenth century. This is especially important in the period following the establishment of independence. Groups supporting the pursuit of independence are easy to label *nationalist*. Once nationalism is achieved, it becomes more important for scholars to think carefully about those they consider—and, especially, do not consider—nationalists.

Another, related, lesson for scholars is to be careful about how they portray the nationalism of parties on the right and the left of the political spectrum. In Ukraine, Rukh has been criticized for supporting ethnic nationalist policies and therefore labeled (again, in the bad ethnic sense) *nationalist*. But as described in detail in this chapter, Rukh's policies are much more accurately labeled as *civic nationalism*, particularly given the group's strong

support for polyethnic rights for national minorities, its rejection of any anti-Semitism, and its backing for automatic citizenship.¹¹⁴

This makes Rukh an unusual bedfellow to its center-right allies in the West, such as Britain's Conservatives or Republicans in the United States, who are opponents of multiculturalism, polyethnic rights, and regional devolution.¹¹⁵ Yet, ironically, it is the center-right parties in Ukraine that are labeled as *nationalists*, while similar parties in Western liberal democracies who are *opposed* to regional devolution and polyethnic rights rarely receive this label. They are, simply, *conservatives*.

On the other hand, scholars have been too quick to label parties of Ukraine's left as *antistate*, seeking reunion of Ukraine and Russia. This has been particularly misleading since the late 1990s. The 1998, 1999, 2002, and 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections witnessed the evolution of Ukraine's political spectrum toward a left committed to state independence. Although President Kuchma attempted to portray himself as the only defender of independence (as, ironically, Kravchuk had in 1994 against Kuchma), the reality was that only three of the thirteen presidential candidates in the 1999 election supported Ukraine's integration into another union.

Scholars should not look to political leaders for guidance on how to label a country's political parties. Like it or not, left-wing civic nationalists have arrived on the Ukrainian political scene, and they can build upon a wealthy tradition of Ukrainian socialist thought, going back over one hundred years, that links social, economic, political, and national issues.

There is much that could have been covered in this chapter but was not. I have discussed in greater detail elsewhere the far right nationalist groups in Ukraine in the post-Soviet period.¹¹⁶ While important in framing the question of an independent state in the late Soviet period, their unwillingness to abandon ethnic nationalist ideas has left them marginalized and politically irrelevant since independence. I leave to further study the question of the acceptance of the civic nationalist project at the mass level, especially in a setting of continued political and economic difficulty.¹¹⁷ The creation of an integrated civic nation is slowly progressing in Ukraine, and consensus is growing among the ruling elites as to its outlines and policies.¹¹⁸ By 2002, two years after the Ukrainian economy began to grow for the first time since the late 1980s, support for Ukrainian independence had returned to the high levels recorded in the December 1991 referendum.¹¹⁹ During Ukraine's independence the political landscape changed

sufficiently to facilitate mobilization in the 2004 Orange Revolution and Yushchenko's election: civic nationalism had emerged victorious in Ukraine.

NOTES

1. See Taras Kuzio, "Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine's 2004 Elections and 'Orange Revolution,'" *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, no. 1 (March–April 2005): 29–44.

2. Including the Federation for the State Independence of Ukraine (known by its abbreviation DSU), the Social National Party, and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (ideological heirs to the Stepan Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists).

3. With 3.5 million members the CPU was the largest republican party in the USSR until the Russian SFSR created its own republican communist party in 1990. Imperial Communists had no political representation during the illegality of the CPU (August 1991–October 1993).

4. O. Haran and O. Mayboroda, *Ukraiins'ki Livi: Mizh Leninizmom I Sotsial-Demokratieu* (Kyiv: KM Academia, 2000), 212.

5. For an elaboration of this argument see David G. Rowley, "Imperial versus National Discourse: The Case of Russia," *Nations and Nationalism* 6, pt. 1 (January 2000): 23–42; and Oleksandr Mayboroda, *Roys'kyi Natsionalizm v Ukraini (1991–1998rr)* (Kyiv: Kyiv Mohyla Academy, 1999), 4.

6. See Alexander J. Motyl, "The Myth of Russian Nationalism," *Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 161–73. In the former USSR, no Russian dissident group agitated for self-determination. Hence, the dissident groups' demands for the Soviet state to uphold human rights were less threatening than those of Ukrainian, Estonian, and other national democrats who sought to defend human and national rights (including self-determination), an ideology that was closer to nineteenth-century liberal nationalism than to universalist liberalism (see Bear F. Braumoeller, *Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic Peace in the Soviet Successor States* [Washington, DC: National Council on Eurasian and East European Research, 1996], as well as Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* [London: Routledge, 1993], 98). The Russian SFSR was the only Soviet republic *not* to declare independence from the USSR, and it celebrates its "independence day" on the day it declared republican sovereignty in May 1990. The Russian SFSR was led by a democrat—Boris Yeltsin—and therefore it accepted the replacement of the USSR with the CIS (unlike Serbia, which was led from 1988 by a former Communist turned ethnic nationalist, Slobodan Milosevic). Nevertheless, Russia disagreed with Ukraine over the definition of the CIS as either a new confederation dominated by Russia or a "civilized divorce" as advocated by Ukraine (see chap. 1 in Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, and T. Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine* [Boulder: Westview, 1999], 10–44).

7. See T. Kuzio, "Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine before and after Independence: The Right and Its Politics, 1989–1994," *Nationalities Papers* 52, no. 2 (summer 1997): 211–42.

8. See T. Kuzio, "Ukraine One Year after 'Kuchmagate,'" *RFE/RL Newline* 5, no. 224, pt. 2 (November 28, 2001).
9. See I. V. Diyak, *Khto Zakhystyt; Nash Narod I Derzhavu: Komunistychna Partiya Ukrayiny chy Ukrainiiska Komunistychna Partiya? Shtrykhy do Istorii ta S'ohodennia Kompartii Ukraini* (Kyiv: Naukova Knyha and Nova Literatura, 2000). On presidential clone parties see T. Kuzio, "The 2002 Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine: Democratization or Authoritarianism," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 19, no. 2 (June 2003): 24–54.
10. Prior to December 1991, Rukh was supported by the PDRU in parliament in the Democratic Bloc.
11. The "Imperial Communists" also jumped ship and backed the parliamentary vote, but in this group's case it was out of fear of the anti-Communist Yeltsin leadership in Moscow.
12. The Gorbachev era is covered in T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 2000).
13. Z. V. Kas'ianov, "Ukrayins'kyi natsionalizm: Problema naukovoho pereosmyslennia," *Ukrainiiska Istorychnyi Zhurnal* 2 (1998): 39–54.
14. See T. Kuzio, "Identity and Nation Building in Ukraine: Defining the 'Other,'" *Ethnicities* 1, no. 3 (December 2001): 343–65.
15. Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).
16. Such a wide definition of civic nationalism is consistent with Kas'ianov's study of Ukrainian nationalism that defines it from the center-left through centrist parties to the center-right. I agree with Kas'ianov's framework, which defines Ukrainian nationalism in a broader manner to that of integral nationalism. See Kas'ianov, "Ukrainiiska Istorychnyi natsionalizm."
17. Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine: Two Presidents and Their Powers," in *Postcommunist Presidents*, ed. Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 83.
18. As Paul D'Anieri points out, "Compared to most other states in the world and in the region, Ukraine's politics is still a very nationalist one." See Paul D'Anieri, *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations* (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1999), 201. It is consequently unclear why "nationalists" are only to be found among Ukrainophones in western Ukraine.
19. Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margo Light, *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 87.
20. Malcolm, Pravda, Allison, and Light, *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, 131.
21. D'Anieri, *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations*, 176.
22. *Ibid.*, 203.
23. Oleh Derhachov, "Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy of Ukraine" (Center for Peace, Conflict and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv, October 1999).
24. For an early discussion see T. Kuzio, "Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New Framework," *Politics* 20, no. 2 (May 2000): 77–86.
25. The only exception is Stephen Shulman, "Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 3 (September 2000): 365–90. The more common viewpoint of defining nationalism in a very narrow sense is to be found in Paul Kubicek, "Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 2 (March 2000): 273–74; Sarah Birch, *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine* (London: Macmillan, 2000), 29;

and Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 163, 182, 184, 203.

26. As Molchanov points out, Ukraine has experienced “selective nationalism” while “popular nationalism,” which might have led to ethnic nationalism, has been mooted. Mikhail A. Molchanov, “Post-communist Nationalism as a Power Resource: A Russian-Ukrainian Comparison,” *Nationalities Papers* 28, no. 2 (June 2000): 283. But who better to quote than the leader of the CPU, Petro Symonenko, who argues that ethnic nationalism is weak throughout Ukraine, including in western Ukraine (*Tserkalo Tyzhnia*, September 16, 2000). The image of a nationalist western Ukraine does not square with the ethnic Ukrainian nationalist election bloc National Front obtaining only slightly more votes than the left and pro-Russian organizations in L’viv oblast in the 1998 parliamentary elections. See Volodymyr Kulyk, *Ukrains’kyi Nationalizm u Nezalezhnyi Ukraini* (Kyiv: Kyiv Mohyla Academy, 1998), 58.

27. See Kubicek, “Regional Polarisation in Ukraine”; and Anatol Lieven, “Russkoyazychnye Regiony Ukrayiny: Troyanski Kon’?” in *Ukraina I Rossiya: Obshchestva I Gosudarstva*, ed. D. E. Furman (Moscow: Prava Cheloveka, 1997), 224, 226, 233, 246, 253.

28. Oleksandr Mayboroda points out that the main political force in support of the “Russian great power idea” in Ukraine is the CPU. See Mayboroda, *Rosiy’s’kyi Natsionalizm v Ukraini (1991–1998rr)*, 27.

29. Ukrainian Television-1, October 4, 1999.

30. “Russian and Ukrainian culture, despite language and local differences, represent a single whole,” Bazyliuk told the convention of his Civic Congress. Quoted from Shulman, “Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration,” 386.

31. Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians*, 309. On Russian perceptions of Ukrainians see Tor Bukkvoll, “Off the Cuff Politics—Explaining Russia’s Lack of a Ukraine Strategy,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 8 (December 2001): 1141–57; and Vera Tolz, *Russia: Inventing the Nation* (London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 209–34.

32. Mayboroda, *Rosiy’s’kyi Natsionalizm v Ukraini (1991–1998rr)*, 19.

33. On the Lukashenka phenomenon see Steven M. Eke and Taras Kuzio, “Sul-tanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 3 (May 2000): 523–47.

34. Kolstø, Pål, *Political Construction Sites: Nation-Building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States* (Boulder: Westview, 2000): 162.

35. *Den’*, May 22, 1997; Andrew Wilson, “The Long March of the Ukrainian Left: Backwards towards Communism, Sideways to Social-Democracy or Forwards to Socialism?” *Masaryk Journal* 3, no. 1 (January 2000): 130.

36. Interview with the sociologist Yevhen Holovakha in *Den’*, October 24, 2000. Birch disagrees: “Russian ethnicity can thus be expected to be a more distinct determinant of voting behaviour than Ukrainian ethnicity.” Birch, *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine*, 28.

37. On the weakness of Russian nationalism see T. Kuzio, “Russians and Russo-phones in the Former USSR and Serbs in Yugoslavia: A Comparative Study of Passivity and Mobilisation,” *RFERL East European Perspectives* 5, nos. 13, 14, 15 (June 25, 2003; July 9, 2003; July 23, 2003).

38. Haran and Mayboroda, *Ukrains’ki Livi*, 206.

39. President Lukashenka has promoted these policies since 1994 in Belarus.

40. In December 2001 the Prosecutor's Office in the Crimea launched criminal proceedings against the *Russkii Krym* newspaper, organ of the ethnic nationalist Russian Movement of the Crimea, because of anti-Semitic articles it had published. The charges could have led to the newspaper being banned.

41. Kas'ianov, "Ukraiins'kyi natsionalizm," 49.

42. Mikhail A. Molchanov believes that Ukraine's and Russia's elites use nationalism less for modernization than in a struggle over resources. See Molchanov, "Post-communist Nationalism as a Power Resource," 284.

43. *Holos Ukrainy*, December 25, 1998.

44. See T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building* (London: Routledge, 1998).

45. SLON was created by the Constitutional Democrats and Interregional Bloc of Reforms (IRBR). The latter had been an ally of Kuchma's in 1994. Its leader, Vladimir Grynev, was a former leading member of New Ukraine. The IRBR merged with the oligarch People's Democratic Party in 2001.

46. See Anatol Lieven, "The Weakness of Russian Nationalism," *Survival* 41, no. 2 (summer 1999): 53–70.

47. D'Anieri, *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations*, 22. See also T. Kuzio, "Historiography and National Identity among the Eastern Slavs: Towards a New Framework," *National Identities* 3, no. 2 (July 2001):109–32.

48. David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Population in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 291.

49. See the interview with Patriarch Filaret, head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Kyiv Patriarch in *Tserkalo Tyzhnia*, August 5–11, 2000.

50. See Dominique Arel, "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?" *Nationalities Papers* 23, no. 3 (September 1995): 597–622.

51. See Jan Janmaat, *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population* (Amsterdam: Netherlands Geographical Studies, 2000). See my review article in *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 25, nos. 1–2 (summer–winter 2000): 200–213.

52. The language question has never even been straightforward for the CPU. At its second congress in 1995, 159 (or 40 percent) out of 390 delegates opposed supporting Russian as a second state language. Many of those who opposed this policy were from western Ukraine.

53. Mayboroda, *Rosiy's'kyi Natsionalizm v Ukraini (1991–1998rr)*, 25. "The final goals of the communists and Russian nationalists are the same," Ukrainian authors believe. See Yu. M. Alekseyev, S. V. Kul'chytskyi, and A. H. Sliusarenko, *Ukraina na zlami istorychnykh epokh (Derzhavotvorchyi protses 1985–1999rr)*. (Kyiv: Eksor, 2000), 145.

54. Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, 100, 101, 141, 142; and Dominique Arel, "Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State" in *Political Culture and Civil Society in the Former Soviet Union*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 294. For an alternative view see T. Kuzio, "Nation Building or Nationalizing State? A Survey of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence," *Nations and Nationalism* 7, pt. 2 (April 2001): 135–54.

55. See T. Kuzio, "The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn's Framework for Understanding Nationalism," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25, no. 1 (January 2002): 20–39.

56. Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 25, 199, 250, 257, 258–59; and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Nationalism and Communist Multi-Ethnic Polities: The Legacies of Ethnicization,” in *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, ed. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, and Roman Solchanyk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 504–5.

57. The exception is scholars and political leaders in Ukraine. Rukh, Democratic, Reforms and Order, and Christian Democratic parties are usually labeled as *center-right*, not *nationalist*, ones. See O. M. Volkov, *Politychna Ideolohiya* (Kyiv: Stylos, 1999), 81–83, 127. Jack Snyder agrees with this commonly used definition in Ukraine. See Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*, 25, 199, 250, 257, 258–59. Andrew Wilson disagrees and argues that they are better defined as ethnic nationalists. See his *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 137, and *The Ukrainians*, 79.

58. Paul Kubicek, “Dynamics of Contemporary Ukrainian Nationalism: Empire-Breaking to State Building,” *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 23, nos. 1–2 (1996): 39–50; and Paul Kubicek, “What Happened to the Nationalists in Ukraine?” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 5, no. 1 (spring 1999): 29–45.

59. Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, 100–101, 141–42.

60. Arel, “Ukraine,” 294.

61. Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s*, 112, 114.

62. *Kievskiy Vedomosti*, September 2, 1997.

63. Quoted from the election program of Hennadiy Udoenko, head of one wing of Rukh, in *Uriadovyi Kurier*, September 23, 1999.

64. John Jaworsky, “Nationality Policy and Potential for Inter-ethnic Conflict in Ukraine,” in *Managing Diversity in Plural Societies: Minorities, Migration and Nation-Building in Post-Communist Europe*, ed. Magda Opalski (Ottawa: Forum Eastern Europe, 1998), 117–18.

65. The new nationalist right in Western Europe includes the Freedom Party (Austria), Northern League (Italy), Flemish Bloc (Belgium), People’s Party (Switzerland), Republican Party (Germany), and National Front (France). This definition of nationalist parties does not include conservative or Christian Democratic parties but parties whose policies toward citizenship, the franchise, and minorities are not civic or inclusive. See Ian Hall and Magali Perrault, “The Re-Austrianisation of Central Europe?” *Central European Review* 2, no. 13 (April 3, 2000).

66. The only exception is the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, which, after much initial hesitation, was finally allowed to join the Our Ukraine bloc. On centrist parties see T. Kuzio, “Reformers Face Limited Choices,” *Kyiv Post*, July 2, 2002.

67. Quoted from the speech by Prime Minister Valery Pustovoitenko to the congress of the All-Ukrainian Democratic Forces Association (*Uriadovyi Kurier*, September 7, 1999).

68. *Ibid.*

69. See T. Kuzio, “Centre-Periphery Relations in Ukraine: Regionalism, Federalism and National Integration,” in *Federalism and Decentralization in Eastern and Central Europe*, ed. Jurgen Rose and Johannes Raut (Frankfurt: Carl Lang Verlag, 2002), 329–48.

70. Via’acheslav Shved, “The Conceptual Approaches of Ukrainian Political Par-

ties to Ethno-Political Problems in Independent Ukraine,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 19, no. 2 (winter 1994): 69–84.

71. H. Kas’ianov, *Teorii Natsii ta Natsionalizm* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1999), 326. In 1917–21, Ukraine’s various independent governments were socialist (except for the conservative monarchist government of 1918), supporting initially federal ties with Russia and then independence. Such a civic nationalist tradition within socialism was a result of the strong interconnection in Ukraine between the socioeconomic and national questions. The Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP[B]U) had only 4,300 members in the whole of Ukraine in mid-1918. As Magosci points out, “The party itself was foreign to Ukraine.” See Paul R. Magosci, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 531. The establishment of the Ukrainian SSR by invading Bolshevik forces created a territorial entity devoid of national content. This forced the Bolsheviks to agree to a policy of indigenization that was promoted by the Borotbists (Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries), who had merged with the CP(B)U. In the 1920s the Soviet regime’s policy of indigenization allowed for Ukrainianization, which was supported by Ukrainian national Communists seeking to link socialism with the national idea. On national communism in Ukraine, see Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (London: Hurst, 1998), 11, 31–32, 263, 281, 316, 339, 341. Nahaylo points out that in the 1920s Ukraine’s national Communists supported a confederal USSR (as they did between March 1990 and August 23, 1991), the “unfinished business of nation-state building,” the de-Russification of cities, and the Ukrainianization of education (p.11). By 1933–34 the policy had been halted with an artificial famine, great terror, and reimposition of traditional Russian historiography. Ukrainian national communism was never totally extinguished but reappeared during times of liberalization in the 1960s and the late Gorbachev era in the form of “sovereign communism.”

72. “The Latin American Pressure Cooker,” *STATFORCOM, Global Intelligence Update*, December 30, 1999, <http://www.stratfor.com>.

73. O. Tkachenko, interviewed in *Holos Ukrayiny*, March 31, 1999.

74. *Holos Ukrayiny*, September 18, 1998.

75. *Holos Ukrayiny*, December 26, 1998.

76. See the comments by speakers at the left speakers’ rally on May 1 (*Interfax*, May 1, 1999).

77. Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 495.

78. Interviewed in *Sil’ski Visti*, September 10, 1999.

79. *Holos Ukrayiny*, September 8, 1999.

80. *Holos Ukrayiny*, December 26, 1998.

81. Appeal of the left-center parliamentary faction (*Kievskiy vedomosti*, May 21, 1999).

82. Heorhiy Kruchkov, Communist and former head of the parliamentary commission on defense and security (*Holos Ukrayiny*, June 8, 1999).

83. *Ukrainian Weekly*, July 11, 1999.

84. Petro Symonenko, “Kolonizatsiya Ukrayiny: Rik S’iomyi,” *Holos Ukrayiny*, November 21, 1997; *Holos Ukrayiny*, May 23, 1998; and *Intelnews*, November 16, 1999

85. Petro Symonenko, “Novitne Istoriya Ukrayiny: Pochatok Vidrozhennia chy Prodovzhennia Natsional’noii Trahediia?” *Tserkalo Tyzhnia*, September 16, 2000.

86. Natalia Vitrenko, leader of the Progressive Socialists, quoted on Ukrainian Television-1, September 23, 1999.

87. V. Semeniuk, "Samovbyvcha polityka menshovartosti," *Holos Ukrayiny*, June 30, 1999. Tkachenko said on Ukrainian Television-1 (September 20, 1999) that Ukrainians "are now deprived from ruling the country and are playing someone else's tune."

88. Julius W. Friend, "Nationalism: The Guiding Thread in French Policy, 1981–1996" (paper prepared for the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 28–31, 1997).

89. Comments by Natalia Vitrenko, leader of the Progressive Socialists, in *Kyiv Post*, September 9, 1999.

90. ITAR-TASS, October 9, 1999.

91. He rose to his position from that of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, whereas Lukashenka became president from his post as director of a collective farm. See *ibid.*

92. *Ibid.*

93. O. Tkachenko on Ukrainian Television-1, September 20, 1999.

94. *Zerkalo Nedeli*, August 28–September 3, 1999.

95. *Holos Ukrayiny*, August 21, 1999.

96. *Holos Ukrayiny*, January 16, 1998.

97. *Holos Ukrayiny*, September 8, 1999.

98. Oleksandr Moroz, "Nam ne potribna ani 'spetsial'na' ani prosto 'zona,'" *Holos Ukrayiny*, August 26, 1999.

99. Left-center parliamentary faction statement in *Holos Ukrayiny*, September 9, 1998.

100. O. Tkachenko in *Holos Ukrayiny*, September 24, 1998.

101. O. Tkachenko in *Ukraina moloda*, October 15, 1998.

102. Left-center parliamentary faction statement in *Sil'ski Visti*, January 15, 1998. Symonenko, leader of the Communists, also denounced the fact that Ukraine "has virtually lost its economic and political independence" (*Holos Ukrayiny*, September 1, 1999). After the victory of Kuchma in the October–November 1999 presidential elections, defeated Communist leader Symonenko warned that Ukraine "will begin to quickly lose its economic independence" (*Intelnews*, November 16, 1999).

103. O. Tkachenko on his "National Program for Ukraine's Revival" (*Holos Ukrayiny*, May 27, 1999).

104. *Holos Ukrayiny*, August 19, 1999. Tkachenko blamed the "destructive experiment" and "senseless reforms" conducted in the former USSR and Ukraine over the last fifteen years for the "economic collapse" that led to a "threat to its existence" and Ukrainian statehood (*Holos Ukrayiny*, September 8, 1999). Ukraine therefore needed to elect a "savior of the Motherland" (ITAR-TASS, August 21, 1999).

105. *Holos Ukrayiny*, August 26, 1999.

106. *Ibid.*

107. O. Tkachenko, addressing Odesa deputies (*Holos Ukrayiny*, December 9, 1998).

108. Interview with O. Tkachenko in *Nezavisimost*, September 16, 1998.

109. O. Moroz, to the sixth congress of the Socialist Party (*Ukrayina moloda*, June 16, 1998).

110. *Holos Ukrayiny*, April 30, 1996.

111. O. Moroz, "Livyi Marsh," *Viche* 9 (1999): 22.

112. See Philip G. Roeder, "Peoples and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete Revolutions," *Slavic Review* 58, no. 4 (winter 1999): 854–81; T. Kuzio, "Stateness and Institutions in Ukraine: A Theoretical and Comparative Introduction" in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. T. Kuzio, R. S. Kravchuk, and P. D. D'Anieri (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 1–24; and T. Kuzio, "Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?" *Politics*, September 2001, 169–78.

113. See T. Kuzio, "Muddling Along: The First Decade of Ukrainian Independence," *Harriman Review* 14, no. 3 (fall 2001). On Ukraine's multiparty system see T. Kuzio, "Ukraine's Approaching Elections and Fractured Multiparty System," *RFE/RL Newline* 5, no. 220, pt. 2 (November 20, 2001).

114. See Lowell Barrington, "The Domestic and International Consequences of Citizenship in the Soviet Successor States," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 5 (July 1995): 731–63; and Yuri I. Shevchuk, "Citizenship in Ukraine: A Western Perspective," in *State and Nation Building in East Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. S. J. Micgiel (New York: Institute on East Central Europe, Columbia University, 1996), 351–69.

115. In addition, while Rukh is commonly defined as nationalist, the Polish Solidarity movement is not. At the same time, Rukh supports many nationality policies more commonly associated with social democratic and liberal parties in Western democracies.

116. T. Kuzio, "Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine before and after Independence"; and T. Kuzio, "Radical Right Parties and Civic Groups in Belarus and Ukraine," in *The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties*, ed. Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Winberg (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 203–30.

117. Lowell Barrington found that the most popular identity in Ukraine at the mass level was citizenship (i.e., state or civic), followed by ethnic and linguistic. See his "Russian-Speakers in Ukraine and Kazakhstan: 'Nationality,' 'Population,' or Neither?" *Post-Soviet Affairs* 17, no. 2 (April–June 2001): 129–58.

118. See W. Zimmerman, "Is Ukraine a Political Community?" *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 31, no. 1 (1998): 43–55.

119. See T. Kuzio, "Support for Independence Returns to 1991 Levels," *RFERL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report* 5, no. 2 (January 21, 2003).

APPENDIX: VIEWS OF ETHNIC AND CIVIC NATIONALISM IN UKRAINE AND THE GROWTH OF UKRAINIAN CIVIC NATIONALISM

In this appendix, I use two figures to summarize the arguments presented in the chapter about civic and ethnic nationalism in Ukraine. Figure 1 is a model of the way scholars have traditionally thought about political parties in Ukraine and where they fall on a political spectrum from ethnic Russian and Soviet to ethnic Ukrainian. As the text of the chapter points out, while some scholars have had an even more narrow version of nationalism in Ukraine—only considering Ukrainian ethnic nationalist parties to be "nationalist"—many have also recognized the "nationalist" features of the ethnic Russian parties.

But even this understanding of ethnic Russian parties as nationalist has missed the extent to which the major political parties in Ukraine came to accept the basic ideas of the civic nationalist approach during the 1990s. Figure 2 charts what I describe in the

chapter as the development of attachment to the principles of civic nationalism by the major parties in Ukraine from the late Soviet period through the first half-decade of independence. It is, therefore, a graphic representation of the victory of civic nationalism in Ukraine.




Fig. 1. A spatial model of the traditional view of civic and ethnic nationalism of the major political parties in Ukraine




Fig. 2. The acceptance of civic nationalism in Ukraine by the major political parties in Ukraine