8 Facilitating Shared Service

Formal Alignment and Active Partnerships

The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed not only the expansion of this nation’s global reach and international presence but also, in some ways correspondingly, the continued extension of the national state. Universities facilitated this growth by providing expertise in the form of manpower and knowledge. From relationships with long-established agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture, to relationships with newly developing bureaus, such as the Forestry Service, university-driven partnerships actively extended the reach of the federal state.

These partnerships between the university and the national state were stimulated by the formal alignment most clearly reflected in the AAU. The AAU worked with the federal government from its first meeting. However, it did not monopolize university relations with the national state. Some collaborations were initiated by individual universities acting autonomously, while others were developed as group ventures. As a whole, they reflected the influence that more formal alignment had on the university’s support of the new American state.

Evolving Alignment, Defining Partnerships, and Establishing Expertise

The rise of the AAU as well as other academic organizations meant that the nature and scope of active partnership would come to be defined collectively. For the nation’s leading universities, the formation of the AAU and the nature of institutional competition would lead to a more collective agenda, a greater uniformity of structure, and an increasing standardization of expectations. These forces would not only define
universities’ relationships to one another; they would shape their relationship to the national state as well. Responding to the demands of institutional entrepreneurs, the federal government began to devote greater resources to research and the pursuit of expertise. Yale president Arthur Twining Hadley’s *Facilities for Study and Research in the Offices at the United States Government in Washington*, issued in 1909 as a bulletin by the Bureau of Education, cataloged this development.

Of course, not every partnership would be of such a nature as to demand a collective solution; but whereas the later half of the nineteenth century had seen even the most ambitious partnerships developed on an individual or loosely coupled basis, the beginning of the twentieth century would see the national state undertake partnerships with academic associations as well as individual institutions. In tracing the variety of partnerships between the national state and universities in the first part of the twentieth century, we witness not only the development of specialized knowledge and expertise but the rise of formally structured, cooperative organizations that greatly assisted this development.

**Individual Entrepreneurship and Institutional Competition:**

**Forestry and the Evolution of Partnership**

Founded in 1900, Yale’s forestry school represented one of the clearest examples of partnership between universities and the national state. As the recently established federal Bureau of Forestry needed trained and expert foresters, Yale created a school to provide for such training and the development of expertise. In addition to shedding light on the provision of manpower and the creation of credentials, the school’s founding highlighted the importance of entrepreneurship, the institutionalization of skills and knowledge, and the extent to which even such modern efforts were dependent on simple familiarity and social connections.

An active and generous alum, as well as head of the federal Bureau of Forestry, Gifford Pinchot first broached the subject of a forestry school with Yale president Arthur Twining Hadley in December 1899: “It has occurred to me that certain of the course already being given at Yale, possibly with some modification, might be put together and described in the Catalogue as a group of studies or courses preparatory to professional training in forestry.” According to Pinchot, there were between twenty and twenty-five students at Yale who had decided to or were seriously considering adopting forestry as a profession. He had little doubt that this number would increase if existing courses were
arranged systematically so as not to conflict and if new courses were possibly added. Stressing the value of such a program to Yale, Pinchot offered to suggest the names of courses and instructors, in the hopes of assisting those already at the college as well as attracting others who were considering either “a technical forestry school or one abroad.”

Hadley was very receptive to the suggestion. Pinchot, assisted by his deputy and fellow Yale alum Henry Graves, quickly sent along proposals for two sets of courses to prepare students—one based in Yale College, the other based in Yale’s technical branch, the Sheffield Scientific School. Having convinced Hadley of the value to Yale, Pinchot then expressed the expectations of the Bureau of Forestry: “It would I think, be of great value to us here if men who have taken these studies, or any part of them, whether post-graduates or undergraduates, could receive certificates specifying the studies pursued and the marks received.” Pinchot’s preferred approach was to develop a school of national reach through partnership with his alma mater rather than advocate a federal forestry academy. Moving beyond the general scope and objectives of his plan, Pinchot suggested offering, at the beginning of every academic year, a talk to Yale students about the nature of the forestry profession. Pinchot outlined a few areas for improvement, stressing that such efforts would allow Yale to effectively serve the state and naturally gain a reputation as the preeminent institution for forestry study. For Pinchot, if Yale were to found a forestry school, it would not simply be a provider of manpower and issuer of credentials, it would also have to be the national standard-bearer for the profession.

Pinchot could make such demands because Hadley shared his aspirations and his notions of service. Hadley was grateful to Pinchot for his and Graves’s efforts, expressing his sense of “great obligation.” Hadley hoped that the list “might amount to more formal organization.” Hadley allocated two hundred thousand dollars for an upgrade that Pinchot felt was necessary for the botanical garden, and Hadley asked if any additional funds would be needed to get the garden up to standard. He acknowledged that such a scheme as the one Pinchot had devised would require significant fund-raising as well as organization. However, he believed that with the help of Pinchot and others, Yale could be at the forefront of defining and providing expertise: “We should have every advantage in bringing our work into line with the actions of the Govt. and of private individuals who are practically promoting intelligent applications of the subject.”

After a series of letters and informal discussions, Pinchot and Hadley had laid out the parameters for the establishment of such a
school. Pinchot, who came from a wealthy family, would donate $150,000, as well as a tract of land in Pennsylvania (purchased by his family from the federal government), for research and instruction. As part of its responsibilities under the deed of gift, Yale would provide income for courses and “other necessary uses and purposes” incidental to the gift, as well as a suitable headquarters for the school. In accepting Pinchot’s gift and its terms, Hadley expressed, on behalf of the corporation, Yale’s gratitude for “the opportunity thus placed at their disposal of advancing the knowledge and practice of sound forestry in the United States.”

The school’s founding was integral to the development of the federal Bureau of Forestry. Just as important, however, was its impact on Yale and its sense of public mission. Pinchot certainly was a driving force behind the establishment of the school, and his generosity was essential. For example, in making plans for the opening of the school, Pinchot wished to hire William Ludworth of the Bureau of Forestry as an instructor. Discussing Ludworth’s salary with Hadley, Pinchot noted the amount required and mentioned that, “if necessary,” he would “be very glad to be of assistance” in meeting that salary. However, just as important to the school’s establishment was Hadley’s receptiveness and desire to serve the national state. In the same letter regarding faculty hiring, Pinchot discussed with Hadley the general development of the school. Pinchot outlined plans for the course bulletin and concluded that he was “very deeply glad to bring the school about.” He also praised Hadley: “you will remember that it was your suggestion that started me to consider the matter so that you have to thank yourself for it first of all.”

Yale’s partnership with the national state was indicative of the personal exchange between Hadley and Pinchot. With Hadley as Yale’s president and Pinchot as the school’s dean, their entrepreneurship meant they pursued every opportunity to further the reputation and reach of the forestry school and its expertise. Typical of such efforts was a letter by Hadley to Herbert Myrick, editor of the New England Homestead. Myrick had written Hadley and attached an article regarding efforts by the White Mountain Forestry Association to coordinate the use of materials and lands. Hadley expressed interest in the association’s work but was “surprised to see no reference to cooperation w/the Dept of Forestry at Washington.” He wrote, “The work done by this Dept in the direction in question is so intelligent that I have some doubt as to the wisdom of an independent organization—at any rate, until after careful consultation to avoid cross purposes.” Hadley
actively promoted the Bureau of Forestry, and Pinchot continually championed Yale’s program.

While Yale’s newly founded school had been a success, the nation’s first school of forestry, established at Cornell a few years earlier, had not found consistent support. The Cornell trustees had decided to close its New York State College of Forestry after Governor Benjamin Odell had vetoed their request for funding. Interestingly, rather than actively lobby to sustain the school as head of the Forestry Service, Pinchot, as dean, hoped to have Yale take advantage of Cornell’s closure. Stressing that Cornell’s decline was “purely the result of bad administration,” not the result of poor students, Pinchot suggested that Yale might “relax a little the severity of [its] entrance requirements,” in order to accept transfers from Cornell. Hadley was happy to make amendments. Pinchot responded by noting that there would also be a need for additional funds to take on transfers but that he expected “little difficulty” in obtaining the required amount by August.

The developing competition between schools of forestry could also be seen in Ann Arbor. Unaware of the decision by Cornell’s trustees, the head of Michigan’s program, Filbert Roth, sought funds to retain a second instructor by comparing the university’s commitment to forestry with that of schools in the East. Arguing that removing funding for a second instructor “could not help doing mischief to school and scholars, by giving the matter a bad appearance and insufficient attention,” Roth even offered to contribute a portion of his own salary. Roth argued that since Yale had three instructors and Cornell had three also, “it would be too bad to let Ann Arbor be the ‘one horse’ forestry school of our country.” In keeping with the newly developing nature of the discipline and its partnerships, Roth, rather than look to the federal government for assistance, secured funds from the state forestry commission.

As the Bureau of Forestry and various schools of forestry were quickly developing, it would not be long before Michigan and other programs were competing for federal funds. At the end of 1908, Pinchot announced plans to place a forestry laboratory in the upper Midwest. Similar to agricultural experiment stations, such a laboratory would provide significant reputational and financial benefits to the university chosen. Michigan was one of three universities—Minnesota and Wisconsin were the other two—strongly pursuing this opportunity for active partnership. In its pursuit of the laboratory, the university was assisted by both its congressional delegation and its timber industry. James McLaughlin of the House Agriculture Committee and Sam Smith personally met with the Bureau of Forestry to present the
university’s case and also arranged for the university’s regents to make a presentation. Additionally, the state’s major lumber companies, responding to Filbert Roth’s intelligence that the laboratory choice would probably be between Wisconsin and Michigan and would depend largely on how much money each institution would be able to offer the Bureau of Forestry for installation, guaranteed four thousand dollars to supplement the university’s bid.

Despite such efforts, Michigan’s bid had its shortcomings. The Michigan state legislature offered general “support” but did not offer any financial assistance. Angell attempted to call on Pinchot during a visit to Washington, D.C., but the forester was traveling and thus unable to meet with him. A little over a month later, Pinchot wrote to Angell with the unfortunate news that Wisconsin had been selected. Saying that the decision was a “most difficult” one, Pinchot apologized to Angell that he could not have selected all three proposals. Assuring Angell there was nothing more that could have been done by the university, its regents, or the Michigan delegation in Congress, Pinchot said, “no one factor led to this decision.” Upon receiving Pinchot’s decision, Angell noted disappointment but also expressed understanding and a desire to continue working toward active partnership with the national state.

Pinchot did more than encourage competition between the leading universities and schools of forestry; he also sought to facilitate coordination. The AAU and the AAACES had discussed the value of advanced study in various fields and domains including forestry, but Pinchot wished to gather the foresters himself and thus issued a call for a conference of all universities and colleges where forestry was taught, to be held in December 1909 at Washington, D.C. Pinchot believed that such a conference would be “of great value to the progress of forestry as well as to the universities and to the forest service which employs so many of their graduates and which is vitally interested in the best training of foresters.” Beyond the mere agenda and practice of the conference, Pinchot’s effort reflected the evolution of active partnerships between the state and the university. Having begun as individual relations between universities and the bureau that were mediated by Pinchot’s personal connections, these partnerships evolved into competitive and coordinated efforts to serve the national state.

**Extending Entrepreneurship: Efforts in the Philippines**

Developing partnerships generally worked well for both the American state and the university. Universities could be assured that their stu-
dents were receiving relevant training, and the state could recruit interested talent. Additionally, government specialists could take advantage of university knowledge, advances, and equipment, while the university could offer more and varied courses. Such partnerships were also integral to universities’ broader effort to serve the “public,” an effort that grew more and more to mean linking with the federal state. At the same time, the federal state itself grew as America extended its reach to “colonial” possessions, such as the Philippines.

Various universities would actively support federal efforts in the Philippine territory. One of the first efforts in this regard was advocated to Hadley by Pinchot and involved bringing Filipino students to study at Yale. Newly appointed colonial governor William Howard Taft had been a classmate of Hadley’s at Yale. Pinchot’s friend Harris Proctor, civil service commissioner, called for Taft and the Philippine Commission to select a small number of students to pursue advanced studies at Yale and then return in order to assist the commission in its governance. Pinchot had already begun discussions with administrators in the Philippines about sending students to Yale’s forestry school. Proctor and he wished to see Yale provide scholarships for these students as well as those in other areas of professional expertise, such as law, medicine, and engineering.

By training Filipinos and providing them with various practical skills and social knowledge, Pinchot and Proctor not only hoped to educate young men but also sought to facilitate the United States’ rule over the territory. In this way, they reflected a belief that university partnerships with the national state could help extend the reach of the federal government beyond its own borders. Expertise and specialized knowledge could be applied to all areas of government concern. As Pinchot summarized in concluding the plan, “I lay it before you with the most confidence because it seems to me to be in line with the policy of cooperation with the Government which I have heard you express.”16 Hadley agreed with the sentiments of Proctor and Pinchot and secured funding for the program.

These scholarships were not the only example of universities assisting the national state’s governance of its territories. Individual appointments often substituted for institutional programs. In one telling instance, in response to Taft’s request for a “good man” to oversee the Philippine judicial system, Hadley recommended Charles Vander Graff, from Yale’s graduating class of 1881. Hadley wrote that Vander Graff was a “first rate” lawyer and a “leading man in every way,” who possessed the expertise Taft felt necessary for the position—a
good knowledge of Spanish and an extensive familiarity with Roman law, which he had developed through his practice in New Orleans. Alleviating any concerns Taft might have had about a previous lack of public service, Hadley stressed that Vander Graff’s lack of “political advancement” could be attributed to the fact that he was “uncompromising in his position as a good Democrat.”

Vander Graff was soon offered and accepted a position in the colonial administration. Clearly, Vander Graff’s familiarity with Hadley and Hadley’s connections to Taft were of great help in securing him the position. However, this familiarity was coupled with the formal training and specialized knowledge that Hadley and Taft believed the position required. Additionally, partisan political connections were certainly not necessary, since Vander Graff’s standing as a “good Democrat” did not keep Hadley from recommending him or Taft from appointing him. This is not a minor point, for in the new American state, institutional loyalties could outweigh partisan ones.

Keeping with the developing relationship between higher education and the federal state, the partnership between the nation’s colleges and universities and its Philippine territory included more than occasional requests to fill individual positions. More systematic and formal relationships were also developing. In addition to supporting colonial governance and administration, institutions of higher learning were also called on to provide teachers for the colony. In June 1901, Lt. Col. C. R. Edwards, the chief of the War Department’s Division of Insular Affairs, asked Hadley to recommend ten men “of strong scholarship” for teaching positions in the Philippines. Hadley soon thereafter sent along the names of recent graduates. Yale’s peers, such as Columbia and Harvard, also recommended individuals for such teaching posts. At the end of the summer, Edwards found his need to be greater than anticipated and asked Hadley if he might be able to recommend any additional individuals. Hadley replied that he desired to assist Governor Taft and the Philippine Commission in any way possible but could not be of immediate assistance: “I regret very much that the prosperous times have caused so large a number of our graduates to find good places elsewhere that we have exhausted the list of those whom we are at present able to recommended.”

A lack of sufficient personnel was not the only challenge universities encountered when seeking to develop partnerships with the foreign extensions of the national state. University experts were sometimes torn between their desire to be of service and their own personal interests and satisfaction. Hadley’s Yale was at the forefront of university
partnerships with the Philippines, but it was not the only institution to undertake such efforts. Angell’s Michigan also worked with Taft’s government, and from this partnership came a strong example of the conflict between personal desire and national service.

Michigan professor Paul Freer had been serving the Department of the Interior in the Philippines as head of government laboratories since early in Taft’s administration. His initial appointment was scheduled to last through May 1903. Soon after Freer’s arrival, Taft requested and Angell granted an extension of Freer’s service through September 1903. In May 1903, Angell formally recalled Freer to ensure his return by September. This recall triggered Secretary of War George Edmunds to write Angell at the request of Taft. Acknowledging Angell’s previous “kindness” in extending Freer’s leave, Edmunds mentioned that Taft wondered if Freer might be released to the federal government for another two years and asked that Angell “recognize the urgent necessity” of his request and grant Freer further leave.

It required the shuffling of some teaching responsibilities for the coming year, but Angell was quick to pass the request of Taft and Edmunds along to the regents, with his full endorsement and understanding of Freer’s significance to the Philippine efforts. They soon granted approval, so that Freer might continue his “very special and important work.” Not everyone was pleased with this arrangement, most particularly Freer himself. Writing to Angell, he expressed his displeasure, tempered by a sense of obligation: “the Government seems to be impressed with the importance of my remaining for that length of time and owing to the great pressure brought to bear on me I did not see how I could refuse if the Board of Regents were willing.” While understanding the demand for his services, Freer was eager to return to Ann Arbor, as he felt he had gained all that he could from his experience: “It has been a very interesting experience out here and very valuable to me, but I think I am coming to the point where I have all the experience I need and all of value that is possible.” Freer went on to say he was ready for his return and was hoping he might combine his work in Ann Arbor with service to a government laboratory.

Unfortunately for Freer, Taft insisted he remain. The government had bought a large number of sick animals, and the task of immunizing them had fallen to Freer’s labs. Reiterating the fact that he was very disappointed with having to stay, Freer continued:

The Governor [Taft] seems to be afraid that everything would go wrong if I were to leave. I never realized that I was quite so important an individual
before, and personally I do not suppose I ought to give my thanks to Congress for passing the $3 million [in emergency funding], because it is this matter that has held up my proposed trip home.

Freer recognized the obligation his expertise carried and tried to be accepting of the fact that he was remaining in the Philippines. He ended his letter to Angell, however, on a very melancholy note, stating, “the lack of change in temperature grows monotonous in time, and the beauties of the tropics fade very much when you are face to face with a disappointment such as I had today.”

In addition to representing the human element of such efforts, Freer’s tale also underscored the limited formalization that defined many of these partnerships. Freer’s appointment was not part of a prescribed program that had a specific length of time or included a readily available replacement. While not fully established, such efforts did represent the extended reach of expertise as it was sought by American interests across the Pacific as well as closer to home.

Despite occasional difficulties, these formalized, but still not fully systematic, partnerships remained an important link between the national state’s colonial and diplomatic interests and universities’ available expertise. The partnerships were not unidirectional. Freer might have complained about the service, but initially he coveted his appointment in the Philippines, believing it would be of great benefit to his research and career. Additionally, universities often greatly benefited from such assignments, using the federal government to gather research materials for its museums and laboratories and experience for its faculty and students. Freer, for example, might have remained in the Philippines at the request of colonial governor Taft, but his work benefited the University of Michigan as well the colonial government. Previously, when Michigan and other institutions wished to obtain specimens for their collections, they would either have to fund a research expedition themselves or buy collections from dealers. With the expanded reach of the American state, the federal government could obtain materials from around the world on a university’s behalf, saving the university from expending a great deal of time, money, or manpower.

Worldly Expertise: Institutionalizing Government Service

University efforts to support the American state abroad would not be limited to individual postings. Institutional entrepreneurs would seek to extend their schools’ service and societal relevance through a variety
of means. One of the most ambitious undertakings in this regard involved Hadley’s attempt to build a curriculum to train staff for the nation’s “colonial efforts.” Hadley’s attempts were rooted in the most basic forms of partnership and simple personal relations, but they extended to a systematic program.

Writing Taft to congratulate him on his appointment as governor of the Philippines, Hadley also took the opportunity to propose a new course of study. After praising Taft and wishing him the best in his new position, Hadley began by stating Yale’s priority of service and synopsizing the partnership already undertaken with Pinchot.

In this connection I have an ax of my own—or rather of Yale’s—to grind. Ever since Pinchot has been in the forestry dept he has been keeping his eyes open with regard to possible teaching in forestry which should meet American administrative needs and the upshot of it is that we shall next month be able to publish the prospectus of a school of forestry, with excellent equipment, ample endowment and, best of all, living connection with the needs of the government and the country.25

Hadley was pleased with the forestry effort and wished to extend Yale’s partnership with the federal state further. He continued, “now I have at heart, and have had at heart for the last two years, the development of an institute or department of instruction which should have the same sort of living connection with our administrative work, and particularly with the problems of colonial administration.”26 Noting that Yale had one professor who had done much study in the area and had others who could add “a great deal if we just knew what was most wanted,” Hadley maintained, “This last information can only be obtained by keeping our eyes open and seeing what there is to be seen.” Hadley greatly valued Taft’s appointment, as he concluded, “I believe that you will be in a position to tell better than any other man what kind of preparation is wanted for the men who are going to go out into our new possessions and what steps Yale can take toward meeting this need.”27

Taft and Hadley corresponded regularly about the administrative and personnel needs of the territory. Both saw the value of the school Hadley proposed, but the money necessary to make the program a reality was not immediately forthcoming. In a letter to Taft outlining a variety of fund-raising priorities associated with Yale’s bicentennial of 1901, Hadley estimated the amount necessary for starting an Institute of Colonial Administration and Public Law to be two hundred thousand dollars.28 However, neither Taft nor Hadley had as much fund-
raising success as Pinchot (who was able to call on his colleagues and especially his family for resources), and the school remained only an aspiration.

In November 1905, still frustrated in his fund-raising for the endeavor and worried about potential competition, Hadley proposed to Nicholas Murray Butler that Yale and Columbia undertake a jointly established program (the two had discussed the possibility earlier, in passing). Writing to Butler, Hadley recounted discussions he had recently had with a wealthy benefactor, Frederick Boas, regarding patronage for a school of colonial service: “I understand that there is a chance of funds being provided to help in the enterprise if we are prepared to formulate the scheme in the near future.”29 Butler had also spoken to Boas and was very receptive to the idea.30 Butler agreed that Yale and Columbia should offer such instruction without duplication.

For Butler, such an effort would not only be of great service to the national state; it would also underscore to other universities the value of alignment and the excesses of competition, especially in regard to specialized knowledge and expertise.

In addition to the possibility that such a grouping of courses might serve the present need, the act itself would serve to illustrate and carry out one of my favorite notions, which is that in the higher and special reaches of university work it is unwise and uneconomical for institutions to duplicate each other’s instruction, and that the end that we all have in view might be better served in many of these respects by cooperation. Perhaps we might be able in this way to set an example that would be followed in years to come.31

Butler and Hadley communicated throughout the holiday season, and by the middle of January 1906, they developed a scaled-back plan, which they detailed in an “outline of proposal to establish a course of study preparatory to diplomatic, consular, or commercial service in the East, through the cooperation of Yale and Columbia.” Both Yale’s corporation and Columbia’s trustees “gave hearty approval to the plan for cooperation between Yale and Columbia in preparation for a program in Oriental Life and Service.”32 While receiving the support of both governing boards, the program failed to attract more than a handful of students at a time and thus failed to become institutionalized as part of either school’s regular curriculum. Despite its limited success, the partnership revealed an entrepreneurial desire to anticipate and meet the expected needs of the federal state and its agencies.

Hadley pursued partnerships with the national state wherever and whenever possible. Demonstrating an entrepreneurship that was driven by both competition and coordination, he extended both the
breadth and the depth of Yale’s relationship to the federal government. As striking as Hadley’s achievement was his ambition. In his annual report of 1906, Hadley summarized a variety of programs, including the work of the forestry school, the placement of teachers in the Philippines, and the collaboration undertaken with Columbia.

Additionally, Hadley used discussion of a proposed forestry museum as an opportunity to stress the competitive importance of service to the national state. Summarizing the progress and importance of the forestry school as well as the plans for the forestry museum, Hadley stated:

I have purposely confined attention in this summary to the public activities which we already are in position to exercise without mentioning those which are projected. A word should, however, be said of the plan for a Forest Museum which is in the mind of Mr. Gifford Pinchot. The Yale Forestry School was organized just at a time when the American public was beginning to see the importance of the subject. We have had the good fortune to take the lead in this line of education, so that students come to us from every quarter of the world.

It is Mr. Pinchot’s belief that the museum would allow Yale “to take the same position before the public as a whole that our courses of instruction have given us in the minds of students and specialists, and to make Yale the center to which the whole world will turn for its record of progress in forestry in the past and its suggestions of possible lines of progress for the future.”

For Hadley, the success of the forestry school and the effort to build new partnerships were natural extensions of Yale’s evolving public role—a role that would not only rely on coordination with other institutions but also be the product of institutional entrepreneurship and initiative. Hadley concluded his discussion of the forestry school and museum by stressing their greater significance: “I mention it at this moment as indicating the kind of public work which makes the modern university something more than a mere group of schools and elevates it to its highest possible rank—that of public servant.”

Hadley and Pinchot did not limit their concept of service to within Yale’s walls. Among their more ambitious (albeit unrealized) efforts was an attempt to host “a series of talks . . . given by Government officials in New Haven, broadly upon the topic of university training for Government work and upon the opportunities for valuable service under the Government.” Pinchot had intended to invite various cabinet officials and others to address administrators and faculty of the leading universities, with the hope that this “would help very powerfully in setting the trend of student thought . . . toward Government work.”
Though this effort failed (in no small part due to the fact that Pinchot was unable to coordinate such a conference from the wilds of West Virginia, where he was stationed for most of the year), it still underscores the extent to which active partnership with the national state was gradually becoming an increasingly collaborative effort for America’s leading universities.

**Partnerships and Alignment: The AAU as National Coordinator**

Collaboration between leading universities involved more than informal advice, joint programs, and occasional conferences. The creation of the AAU established a formal alignment that greatly enhanced universities’ impact. The benefits of alignment were not unidirectional. On the one hand, the elite universities could petition the federal government as a unified body and, by virtue of their prestige, appear to speak for all of higher education. On the other hand, when the federal government wished to call on the specialized knowledge and expertise of the nation’s leading institutions, it no longer had to call on each institution individually. As I have discussed, individual acquaintance and connection still occasionally cemented active partnerships. However, universities increasingly began to see themselves as a collective body, not only in relation to one another, but in their coordination with the national state as well.

*Alignment and Ambassadorship: The AAU as National Representative*

The AAU was founded to facilitate acceptance of American degrees by foreign universities as well as simply to engender further and more formal communication between the institutional entrepreneurs who ran American universities. It quickly grew into an organization concerned with standards and practices in all of higher education. Having been involved with the organization from the outset, the federal government was well aware of the group’s concerns and interests. When the Bureau of Education needed American universities either as hosts for visiting dignitaries or as representatives at foreign meetings, it would call on the AAU. Both collectively and through its individual members, the AAU came to stand for American higher education internationally.

An early example of this partnership was the Bureau of Education’s request that the AAU send a delegation to Chile for the First Pan American Congress on Higher Education. The conference had been called in order to secure closer ties between Latin American universities and the
universities of the United States. The conference had been organized by the Chilean ministry, and the Latin American nations were represented by their ministers of education. The United States’ invitation had been sent to the federal Bureau of Education. The bureau in turn asked the AAU and other agencies and organizations to appoint delegates. Though not formally officials of the federal government, these delegates would be granted the “proper credentials to constitute them its lawful representative to serve under such instructions” as would be determined by the commissioner of education. The delegates of the AAU were thus ambassadors for American higher education. They served as both expert representatives, speaking authoritatively on the condition of higher education in the United States, and representatives of expertise, promoting the broad application and utility of specialized knowledge.

Spurred largely by the lobbying of Angell, Hadley, Butler, and other AAU presidents of influence, the Congress appropriated funds for ten delegates. The AAU would send four of them, the most from any one organization. Other delegates funded by Congress included representatives of the Department of Agriculture, the Smithsonian Institute, and the Isthmian Canal Commission. Additionally, the AAU contingent was supplemented by five professors from member institutions who were in South America for research and service, including Charles Curtis of Michigan and Bernard Moses of California. All told, over half of the delegates from the United States were from AAU institutions. The attendance of so many representatives from the nation’s leading universities was well appreciated by the conference’s hosts as well as by the other attending nations. At its outset, Curtis reported back to Angell that the conference was “arousing much interest in South America.” He continued, “The prompt action of the Government of the U.S. and the AAU in providing for a liberal representation at this Congress has made an exceedingly favorable impression in educational and official circles down here.”

The federal government was eager to have the service of America’s leading universities, and attendance at the conference was not a burden to the AAU schools. In addition to further solidifying the AAU’s position as the primary defining body for American education, AAU members could also pursue relations with the developing nations of Latin America. No formal exchanges between the United States and the countries of Latin American were adopted at the Congress, but informal agreements between South American governments, such as Chile and Argentina, and members of the AAU were. For example, the universities of Michigan and California agreed to accept eligible and inter-
ested Chilean engineering students. The Chilean government had been sending such students to France but were displeased with that arrangement, as they felt that the students returned “strong in theory, but not in ability and practice.”

With the advent of World War I, the AAU would coordinate active partnerships of much greater breadth and of far larger significance to the national state. Additionally, because of its members’ extensive relations to international institutions, the AAU would often facilitate relationships with foreign ministers of education implicitly on behalf of, rather than actively in conjunction with, the national state. The seemingly minor coordination and partnership involved in supplying representatives to such gatherings as the First Pan American Congress on Higher Education highlighted two factors that would be crucial to the AAU’s broader coordinated efforts as active partner and independent agent of the state. The first was the association’s ability to position itself as a representative of and spokesman for all of higher education. The association did not necessarily include every institution of higher learning in the United States, but to the federal government and foreign officials, it essentially included all those that mattered. The second factor was the ability of the association to maintain publicly uniform and cohesive positions even in the face of competition and disagreement.

A neatly emblematic example of this ability can be seen in the initial debate over the role of AAU delegates at the Chilean conference. James Warren of Harvard, the secretary of the AAU, upon initially receiving the invitation from the Bureau of Education, wrote Angell, who was serving as president of the AAU, to suggest that the association’s members possibly bypass the meetings. He felt the AAU had been slighted, since it had not been extended a formal invitation by conference organizers. Angell replied that he felt such a suggestion was rash as the oversight could easily be explained by “the lack of a comparable organization in Latin American countries.” The conflict never spread beyond the confines of the organization, because at the same time, various member presidents and the association itself were making appeals to Congress for delegate funding. The AAU’s members certainly had their differences of opinion on a variety of issues, but when working as active partners, they spoke with a collective voice.

Alignment and Armaments: Universities and Military Preparedness

Since the passage of the Morrill Act, military training had been a characteristic of American university life. The act stipulated that land-grant
institutions offer military training; it did not require that such training be compulsory. A few prominent institutions, such as Cornell, initially mandated that students partake in such training, but they quickly abandoned that idea in the face of student protests and a shortage of equipment and instructors. While not a required part of the curriculum, military instruction remained an aspect of campus life, though other demands on the military often made provision for such a partnership difficult.

Not until World War I would universities’ formal coordination and alignment influence its partnerships with the military. Before the advent of the conflict in Europe, such partnerships were almost haphazard in nature. From plans for naval architecture to professorships in military science, universities worked as active partners of the federal government on a school-by-school, case-by-case basis. Institutional tradition and personal relationships, rather than standards and systemization, defined collaboration, with no appreciable defects or notable complaints. However, the rise of formal alignment among universities, coupled with the advent of the Great War, would change these partnerships and solidify the importance of coordination among universities as active partners.

*The Great War and Formal Alignment: Seeking to Maximize the Resources of Expertise*

Both debate over U.S. involvement in the Great War and the eventual entry of the United States into it would have a profound impact on partnerships between universities and the federal state. In addition to developing a more formal and extensive relationship with the American military, universities also publicly debated, for the first time, the proper nature and extent of their service to the state. Providing manpower as well as expertise, universities and the institutional entrepreneurs who oversaw them stressed their utility, relevance, and necessity. Most significantly, while the war did not start the process of formal alignment and coordinated service, it did greatly accelerate and clarify it.

As war began among the major European powers in August 1914, students from many of the leading American universities were concluding their time at military camps sponsored by the War Department. The camps had been started the summer before by General Leonard Wood, in conjunction with a collection of university presidents. Wood initiated the idea and was greatly assisted by the support of Arthur Twining Hadley of Yale, Lawrence Lowell of Harvard, and
John Grier Hibben of Princeton, who, along with Henry Sturgis Drinker of Lehigh, formed the Advisory Committee of University Presidents. This committee mobilized the support of their colleagues to build a national reserve among college students by training students at summer camps. The camps were well attended and deemed a success by all.

With the sinking of the Luisitania in May 1915, the European war became a pronounced American concern. As tensions grew and debate over America’s potential entry intensified, Hadley began to stress the need for military preparedness and the role of universities in such efforts. In his annual report of 1915, excerpts of which were reported in the *New York Times*, Hadley praised General Wood and the existing system of camps, stating, “I have no hesitation in saying that, wholly aside from their military value in preparing a reserve of trained officers for possible service in event of war, the events have an educational value that much more than justifies their organization and its maintenance.” In addition to promoting the camp system, Hadley also recommended giving college credit to those who attended the camps and extending the summer camp program to the school year by offering lectures on military duties on campus. He stressed, however, that he did not believe such classes or service should be compulsory.

Hadley was not alone in such sentiments. In November, Wood called a meeting of the Advisory Committee of University Presidents, in New York. Joining the committee and Wood were a number of other university leaders, including Michigan’s Harry B. Hutchins and Cornell’s James Schurman. Wood had not formally coordinated the War Department camps with the AAU, but its members were well represented. Three of the four advisory committee members came from AAU institutions, and 50 percent of the overall university attendees came from AAU schools.

In 1916, former Princeton University president Woodrow Wilson campaigned for and won reelection to the U.S. presidency, with the promise of keeping the United States out of the war in Europe. Despite such assurances, Wilson’s former colleagues in the AAU did not wish to be caught unprepared and continued with plans to discuss the place of military service in their institutions. At its January meeting, the association had planned the agenda for its next meeting, to be held that coming November. During those meetings, held less than a week after the election, one of the primary topics of discussion was military training in universities and colleges. The association did not wish to make any formal recommendations or proposals. The topic was addressed.
largely to specify alternatives for members and to further their relations with Wood and the War Department.

With the passage of the National Defense Act in the summer of 1916 came provisions for the establishment of the Reserve Officers Training Corps on college campuses. By the time of the November meeting, only a few AAU schools had organized ROTC units. However, the session offered the association’s members an opportunity to discuss how best to incorporate the program into their existing partnerships as well as a chance to collectively discuss their role in the preparedness effort with a member of the War Department. Three main presentations were made on the topic. The first presentation was made by Colonel Wood, who provided a general overview of the War Department’s needs and expectations. The other two were made by representatives of member institutions, who discussed their schools’ particular approaches to partnership with the military. Two alternatives were offered. Yale’s Hadley presented an overview of the summer camp system, and University of Illinois dean David Kinley spoke (in place of the university’s president, Edmund James) as a representative of an institution where military training had been in existence for some time. Hadley not only stressed the need for coordination between universities but also emphasized the importance of cooperation with military planners and authorities. Kinley did not disagree with the need for coordination and cooperation but cautioned against simply turning over universities to the military brass. Demonstrating universities’ concern with preparedness, the meeting underscored the importance of formal alignment in the universities’ partnership with the federal state. Unlike the Civil War, where individual schools established their own battalions with little concern as to what other schools were doing, America’s leading universities were working closely with one another to facilitate public service.

University service included more than training of students. The founding of the National Research Council (NRC) in 1916 was also a significant part of the preparedness campaign and later war efforts. Established by congressional charter and placed under the auspices of the National Academy of Science and the National Science and Technology Society, the NRC was chaired by George Ellery Hale, an MIT-trained astronomer who had overseen observatories for both the University of Chicago and the Carnegie Institute. The NRC was established with the purpose of linking academic, governmental, and industrial research efforts. The NRC and its leadership worked closely with AAU members upon its founding, though its influence would be more pro-
foundly felt in the decade to follow. The NRC would largely define the development of academic science, helping define parameters and procedures in a particular area of expertise. The NRC would help facilitate partnerships between universities and the national state, but it also would rely heavily on the efforts of institutional leaders and coordinating institutions.

The AAU continued to extend its role as the primary representative and coordinator of higher education institutions. Congress declared war in April 1917. By early May, the AAU’s members had been called to Washington for a meeting organized by Hollis Godfrey of the Council of National Defense, a quasi-governmental organization whose mission was to gauge and facilitate national preparedness. To meet this goal, Godfrey called a meeting between representatives of major universities and of the various agencies of the federal government, “to consider the vital problems for our institutions of higher education arising out of the war and the immediate creation of a great army.”

Though not the only universities invited, AAU institutions were a prominent force, owing to their prestige and the public presence of their leaders. According to the association’s president, G. Stanley Hall of Clark University, the AAU viewed the purpose of the meetings as twofold:

1) to impress upon the National Government, through concerted action, the fundamental importance of conserving and properly utilizing our institutions of higher education.
2) to mobilize all our educational forces, not only for the service of the country through the war, but also for the difficult period after the war.

Academic leaders throughout the country pretty much shared the AAU’s position. Out of patriotic obligation as well as entrepreneurial opportunism, university leaders sought to extend their partnerships with and service to the federal state.

Among the AAU’s primary functions was to speak collectively on behalf of the leading research institutions, both to facilitate partnerships and to protect their interests. At its 1917 meeting, the AAU passed a resolution that acknowledged the need to suspend trade “with the enemy” (Germany), but it also called on the Congress to grant such importation “so far as such action assists important work of research and is consistent with the safety of the US or the successful prosecution of the war.” Often coordinated by the AAU, the nation’s leading universities were active partners with the federal state. However, it would be mistaken to assume that the universities’ agendas simply became whatever the state demanded.
The passage of the Selective Service Act in May 1917 had had a significant impact on student enrollment and campus life. With the start of the fall term, universities witnessed dramatic changes in their student and faculty populations. In an effort to mitigate the impact of the draft, the association discussed the necessity of placing certain students and highly trained men in one of the later draft classes. Following these meetings, a special committee organized by the association to address the issue proposed new regulations regarding opportunities for enlistment. At the time, medical students and interns could maintain their schooling and enlist with the surgeon general. The AAU committee requested that this privilege be extended to a variety of other specialties. The committee believed their plan was a reasonable modification of existing policy that would benefit both the national state and the university, stating, “these requests are prompted by the firm conviction that if granted the most efficient service of scientifically trained men will be secured for the conduct of the War, and that some of the unforeseen, unfortunate complications which have resulted from the first draft will be obviated.”

The committee stressed that its proposal was motivated and justified by a number of observations. Their first observation was that “the maintenance of the National interest, other than purely military concerns does not seem to have been given sufficient weight by the District Boards.” Second, the committee believed that many highly trained professional scientific men (engineers, chemists, physicists, etc.) could be more effectively used if they were assigned properly. Finally, the AAU committee argued:

by voluntary enlistment of university men in service for which they are not best fitted the ranks of the educational institutions have already been alarmingly depleted as regards students, teachers, and research men. The university men have shown the highest type of patriotism irrespective of their own interests and have probably responded to the country more enthusiastically than any other class of men. There is an immediate danger that without specific provision to the contrary the universities will lack the teachers and students necessary to provide the Army and Navy with the highly trained men who will be required for the successful conclusion of the War.

The committee emphasized that they were not seeking special privileges for all men that fit the categories described. The students, faculty, and researchers who received such privileges would only do so “on recommendations of the presidents of the institutions concerned.” "For others,” the committee maintained, “the decision [would] rest with the authorities designated by Secretary of War.”
The AAU special committee had succeeded in fully mobilizing its members and other organizations, such as the NRC and the Bureau of Education, in support of the proposal, but it was not able to convince the War Department of the proposal’s merits. Speaking for the War Department, Newton Baker wrote to the AAU committee to inform them of his decision. Baker noted that the War Department’s judgment was shared by the officers of the Naval War College and by the army’s chief of engineers.52

Baker assured AAU president Ray Wilbur that the department appreciated the difficulties the war situation presented to the nation’s universities and technical schools, but he did not think the AAU had offered a viable or workable alternative.53 Baker’s response underscored a limit of institutional entrepreneurship and active partnership: in times of crisis, such as war, universities and academic leaders, no matter their institutional prestige or personal connections, found their initiatives constrained.

Perhaps no single incident reflected the constraint placed on individual initiatives as much as the experience of Gifford Pinchot while trying to work on behalf of the Agriculture Reconstruction Committee of the National Board of Farm Organizations (NBFO). Reflecting the growing pains associated with the new American state and its application of expertise, Pinchot’s career had taken an interesting turn. He was relieved of his duties as head of forestry by William Taft in 1910 after a conflict with the secretary of the interior, Richard Ballinger. The Ballinger-Pinchot Affair, as it was known, is credited with being one of the driving forces in Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive Party candidacy of 1912. Pinchot himself ran a losing campaign for senator of Pennsylvania as a progressive Republican in 1914. He would find electoral success later, being elected governor in 1922 and 1930.54

In September 1918, with the war still raging, Pinchot wrote to tell Arthur Twining Hadley of plans to visit European nations55 in order to examine the status of European farmers, to determine what changes should be made in farming practices during reconstruction after the war and how these changes could best be brought about. He asked Hadley for letters of introduction and suggestions as to whom he should see. He apologized for imposing on Hadley with such a request but noted that he was less hesitant because his work was of academic and public value.56 Hadley questioned the timing of Pinchot’s research trip but said he would be happy to assist in any way he could.57

Hadley was not the only one who wondered about the timing of such an excursion. In November, with the armistice declared but
wartime restraints still in place, Pinchot wrote Hadley stating that when he asked for letters of introduction, he thought there would be no difficulty in securing his passport. He was sorry to say this was not the case. Pinchot attached a letter to the NBFO from Alvey Adee, a second assistant to the secretary of agriculture, saying that it did not appear that Pinchot’s proposed trip was “of such urgent necessity as to warrant the issuance of passports at this time.” Pinchot also attached a letter he addressed directly to Robert Lansing, asking the decision be reversed.

The organized farmers of the US have the unquestionable right to seek, in their own way and through their own agents, first hand information on any agricultural subject provided only that their doing so does not interfere with the military operations of the govt. The denial of this right would be in line not with American democratic ideals but rather with the policy and practice of autocratic governments. No free people could afford to accept it.

To refuse any but official information to the people of a democracy amounts to destroying their power to check up and control their official servants. In numerous instances passports have been issued to enable commercial and other organizations to secure unofficial info of value to them. It does not appear why an org of farmers should be treated differently.

Despite his impassioned plea, Pinchot’s appeal was denied.

Pinchot’s appeal raised an interesting question regarding the democratic right of private citizens and their organizations to pursue their own research agenda. Though not working on behalf of a university, Pinchot was still affiliated with Yale’s forestry school, and his effort reflected the desire to apply specialized knowledge to particular problems. He was denied the opportunity to do so, because his application was not in keeping with the national state’s priorities. This does not mean that partnerships between universities and the national state were exclusively defined by the federal government, but it does show that the crisis of World War I tipped the balance of partnership primarily toward state interests.

This wartime shift in the balance of partnership did not preclude all university initiatives. The leading universities continued to seek ways to both support the war effort and avoid wholesale disruption of their campuses due to enlisting volunteers and the draft. As head of a War Department advisory board on educational interests, University of Chicago dean James Rowland Angell offered a plan in May 1918 “to provide military instruction for the college students of the country during the present emergency.” Working closely with a number of AAU presidents, especially Yale’s Arthur Twining Hadley, the son of the leg-
endary Michigan president James Burrill Angell proposed the establishment of a Student Army Training Corps. The purpose of the SATC was to “1) develop as a military asset the large body of young men in the colleges, and 2) prevent unnecessary and wasteful depletion of colleges through indiscriminate volunteering, by offering students a definite and immediate military status.”

AAU presidents quickly signaled their support, and the program was soon in place. The SATC allowed students to be both scholars and soldiers, as they took classes and participated in training. Introduced to minimize disruption, the program largely led to chaos. The effort to merge military and academic demands did little to help the military and much to disturb the university. Students were called out of class to participate in drill, professors were required to show passes to enter buildings, and the campus began to resemble encampments. The armistice of November 1918 thankfully cut the program short. Despite its limited existence, the program demonstrated that universities could effectively bring their experience and knowledge to bear on a variety of problems, but assisting the military in organizing students was difficult and demonstrated the strains the war placed on efforts at active partnership.

The Evolving Partnership and an Accelerated Return to Normalcy

As the war ended and the nation attempted to return to normalcy, the nation’s leading universities also sought to return to prewar conditions, not only in their own activities, but in their relations with the American state. Writing in Harper’s Monthly, Yale’s Arthur Twining Hadley summarized the reflection that the end of the war had brought to American campuses.

For two years past the American public has been interested in knowing what our schools and colleges have done for the war. Today it is beginning to ask what the war has done for our schools and colleges. What merits has it emphasized and what defects has it brought to light? What improvements in the course of study has it suggested? What direction is it likely to give to the development of our educational system?

The crisis of war had produced greater state control and definition of its active partnerships with the nation’s leading universities. Hadley, however, did not view this imbalance as permanent: “the American college of 1919 looks singularly like the American college of 1916. The military excitements of 1917 and the military organizations of 1918 have left few visible traces behind them.” Hadley contended that while universities were returning to broader, less militaristic missions, the
primacy of partnerships with and service to the national state should
and would remain: “underneath this quiet there is a sense of impend-
ing change. Professors, students, and graduates realize that their
responsibilities to the nation have not ended with the armistice, and
that we must use the lessons taught by the war to enable us to meet the
country’s problems in time of peace.”

For Hadley, the key to further partnerships and service did not lay
only in the improvement of the intellectual rigor and quality of indi-
vidual institutions. It also lay in even greater coordination among these
institutions.

The problem of the higher education of the community can never be solved
unless we realize that it is a national and not an individual one, an economic
and not a psychological one.

We must find some means of regulating an indiscriminate competition
which results in multiplying specialists in subjects for which there is no con-
siderable or elastic demand. In other countries division of labor between
universities is recognized as a legitimate and natural thing. This will mean
real nationalization of our educational system; not the sort of nationalization
which is involved in imposing one scheme or method of instruction upon
everybody, but that which comes from appropriating the work to those who
are likely to do it best, and leaving each group of men free to do it in their
own way.

If we can grasp these great economic principles affecting education, the
high cost of living may prove to be a blessing in disguise to the teaching pro-
fession, by compelling the public to face the problem of national education
in its entirety, as part of the great problem of national efficiency.

The disruptions of the war were therefore offset by the opportunities of
partnership and service they exposed.

Hadley’s colleagues shared his views. The war had confirmed—at
times painfully—the importance of active partnerships between univer-
sities and the national state. It also had underscored the value of formal
alignment among universities and the need for coordination. However,
while the war effort had demonstrated that the institutional entrepre-
eurs who ran America’s universities were adroit in their attempts to
link with the state and to offer it specialized knowledge and manpower,
it had also demonstrated that there were limits to the institutional capac-
ity of even the elite universities to meet the demands for service and
coordination. The Great War did not begin a new process of partnership,
but it did heighten, intensify, and accelerate the already existing one.