Figures

3.1. Configuration of voters under Borda count 46
3.2. Configuration of voters under Borda count with new party 46
4.1. Cycling in a three-person majority-rule divide-the-dollar game 65
4.2. Global cycling in policy space 66
4.3. The covering relation 68
4.4. Logrolling implies intransitivity 72
4.5. A Prisoner’s Dilemma game 74
5.1. Configuration of eight voters 95
5.2. Configuration of five voters 95
5.3. Configuration of five voters with $q = 4$ and status quo point $S$ 96
5.4. Society’s preferences over alternatives under majority and supermajority rule 98
5.5. Mappings from the law to final payoffs 102
6.1. An assurance game 121
6.2. The trilemma of deliberative democracy 128
6.3. A three-party bargaining situation 139
8.1. Constitutional types in the OECD 186
8.2. Total government expenditure in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States 192