The Logic of Democracy
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The Logic of Democracy

Reconciling Equality, Deliberation, and Minority Protection

Anthony McGann

The University of Michigan Press
Ann Arbor
For Karen, as promised
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter**

1. Introduction                                                        | 1    |
2. Groundwork: Political Equality and Political Institutions           | 5    |

**PART 1: POLITICAL EQUALITY**

4. Political Equality in Decision Rules: Equality Implies Majority Rule  | 60   |

**PART 2: MINORITY PROTECTION**

5. Minority Protection, Rights, and Supermajoritarianism               | 89   |

**PART 3: DELIBERATION**

6. Deliberation, Rationality, and Representation                        | 115  |
7. The Logical Bases of Deliberative Democracy: The Limits of Consensus | 153  |

**PART 4: STABILITY, ECONOMICS, AND OTHER VALUES**

8. Political Equality in Practice: Stability and Economic Outcomes in the Consensual Democracies | 177  |

Notes                                                                 | 211  |
References                                                            | 219  |
Index                                                                 | 233  |
Figures

3.1. Configuration of voters under Borda count 46
3.2. Configuration of voters under Borda count with new party 46
4.1. Cycling in a three-person majority-rule divide-the-dollar game 65
4.2. Global cycling in policy space 66
4.3. The covering relation 68
4.4. Logrolling implies intransitivity 72
4.5. A Prisoner’s Dilemma game 74
5.1. Configuration of eight voters 95
5.2. Configuration of five voters 95
5.3. Configuration of five voters with $q = 4$ and status quo point $S$ 96
5.4. Society’s preferences over alternatives under majority and supermajority rule 98
5.5. Mappings from the law to final payoffs 102
6.1. An assurance game 121
6.2. The trilemma of deliberative democracy 128
6.3. A three-party bargaining situation 139
8.1. Constitutional types in the OECD 186
8.2. Total government expenditure in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States 192
Tables

2.1. The Condorcet paradox 20
3.1. Typology of pure electoral systems 48
3.2. Proportional representation formulas 49
3.3. Typology of mixed-member systems 51
4.1. The Condorcet cycle 63
5.1. A Prisoner’s Dilemma game 106
6.1. Typology of representation 143
8.1. Electoral system proportionality and constitutional supermajoritarianism 183
8.2. Correlation between measures of consensual democracy 185
8.3. Variation in total government expenditure for different constitution types 190
8.4. Regression of constitutional type on deviation in total government expenditure 192
8.5. Regression of Tsebelis veto points on deviation in total government expenditure 193
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