

The Logic of Democracy

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*The Logic of Democracy: Reconciling Equality, Deliberation,
and Minority Protection*

The Logic of Democracy

**Reconciling Equality, Deliberation,
and Minority Protection**

Anthony McGann

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For Karen, as promised

Contents

List of Figures	ix
List of Tables	x
Acknowledgments	xi

Chapter

1. Introduction	1
2. Groundwork: Political Equality and Political Institutions	5
PART 1: POLITICAL EQUALITY	
3. Political Equality in Electoral Systems: Equality Implies Proportionality	35
4. Political Equality in Decision Rules: Equality Implies Majority Rule	60
PART 2: MINORITY PROTECTION	
5. Minority Protection, Rights, and Supermajoritarianism	89
PART 3: DELIBERATION	
6. Deliberation, Rationality, and Representation	115
7. The Logical Bases of Deliberative Democracy: The Limits of Consensus	153
PART 4: STABILITY, ECONOMICS, AND OTHER VALUES	
8. Political Equality in Practice: Stability and Economic Outcomes in the Consensual Democracies	177
9. Conclusions: Political Equality and the Beauty of Cycling	202
Notes	211
References	219
Index	233

Figures

3.1. Configuration of voters under Borda count	46
3.2. Configuration of voters under Borda count with new party	46
4.1. Cycling in a three-person majority-rule divide-the-dollar game	65
4.2. Global cycling in policy space	66
4.3. The covering relation	68
4.4. Logrolling implies intransitivity	72
4.5. A Prisoner's Dilemma game	74
5.1. Configuration of eight voters	95
5.2. Configuration of five voters	95
5.3. Configuration of five voters with $q = 4$ and status quo point S	96
5.4. Society's preferences over alternatives under majority and supermajority rule	98
5.5. Mappings from the law to final payoffs	102
6.1. An assurance game	121
6.2. The trilemma of deliberative democracy	128
6.3. A three-party bargaining situation	139
8.1. Constitutional types in the OECD	186
8.2. Total government expenditure in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States	192

Tables

2.1. The Condorcet paradox	20
3.1. Typology of pure electoral systems	48
3.2. Proportional representation formulas	49
3.3. Typology of mixed-member systems	51
4.1. The Condorcet cycle	63
5.1. A Prisoner's Dilemma game	106
6.1. Typology of representation	143
8.1. Electoral system proportionality and constitutional supermajoritarianism	183
8.2. Correlation between measures of consensual democracy	185
8.3. Variation in total government expenditure for different constitution types	190
8.4. Regression of constitutional type on deviation in total government expenditure	192
8.5. Regression of Tsebelis veto points on deviation in total government expenditure	193

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