Tables

2.1. The Condorcet paradox ........................................ 20
3.1. Typology of pure electoral systems ......................... 48
3.2. Proportional representation formulas ....................... 49
3.3. Typology of mixed-member systems ......................... 51
4.1. The Condorcet cycle .......................................... 63
5.1. A Prisoner’s Dilemma game .................................. 106
6.1. Typology of representation .................................. 143
8.1. Electoral system proportionality and constitutional supermajoritarianism .......................... 183
8.2. Correlation between measures of consensual democracy ..................................................... 185
8.3. Variation in total government expenditure for different constitution types ......................... 190
8.4. Regression of constitutional type on deviation in total government expenditure ..................... 192
8.5. Regression of Tsebelis veto points on deviation in total government expenditure ..................... 193