Chapter 1

1. In 1999 the standard subscription paid by Labour party members was £17.50, or just under $30, per annum. The Conservatives did not have a standard subscription rate until recently, and donations were left to the discretion of individual members.

2. It should be noted, however, that in 1998 members of two government committees of inquiry—first the Committee on Standards in Public Life, examining the funding of political parties, and second the Independent Commission on the Voting System (the Jenkins Committee), examining electoral reform in the United Kingdom—stated that “political parties are essential to democracy,” that “political parties perform an indispensable role in a democracy,” and that “any Parliament endeavouring to function without any party organisation would be an inchoate mass, incapable not merely of giving effective sustenance to government . . . but even of organising its own business, from electing a speaker to deciding which issues should be debated on which day” (TSO 1998a: 24, 26; 1998c: 3).

3. Voter registration is an annual exercise conducted in the autumn, with a new register becoming operative in the following spring. The time from the cutoff date for voter registration to the end of the operative period of any register is sixteen months, and inevitably during this period of time mortality and mobility will diminish its accuracy. It has been estimated that over this sixteen-month period 1.5 percent of the adult population will die and a further 13 percent will move (Johnston, Pattie, and Rossiter 1996).

4. Epstein (1986: 36) writes that the APSA committee “did want American parties to be more like British parties.” Beer (1965: 86–102) describes the modern British party system as one with cohesive, programmatic mass-membership organizations. See also Birch 1964, chap. 9.

5. The Liberal Democrat party was formed in 1988. We propose to use this
contemporary title throughout rather than the titles Liberal party (pre-1981) or Liberal Alliance party (1981–87).

6. Membership fell to 387,776 in 1998 (see table 1.1).

7. See the speech by Clare Short on behalf of the National Executive Committee (Labour Party 1992b: 74–75).

8. The Liberal Democrats in their short lifetime have never attracted large corporate donations and therefore have been more reliant upon their membership for money. The Committee on Standards in Public Life reports that between 1992 and 1997 almost one-half of the party’s total annual income came from members’ subscriptions (TSO 1998a: 31).

9. These figures vary slightly from those reported in the Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (TSO 1998a: 30).

10. The results of the membership ballots were (1) Endorsement of Hague’s leadership, Yes 142,299 / No 34,092; (2) Endorsement of party reform, Yes 110,165 / No 5,970; (3) Ballot on the Euro, Yes 172,558 / No 31,492; (4) Leadership ballot, Iain Duncan Smith 155,933 / Ken Clarke 100,864.

11. For example, the announcement in January 1997 that a future Labour government would not increase the levels of personal income tax in the lifetime of a Parliament, a commitment of fundamental importance, was agreed by the two men with little consultation beyond their circle of advisers (Routledge 1998: 236, 277).

12. The joint policy committee is chaired by the prime minister and is composed of eight members each of the government and the National Executive Committee and three elected members from the national policy forum. The national policy forum is made up of 175 members who are elected for two years, representing constituency parties (54); regional parties (18); trade unions (30); the PLP (9); the EPLP (6); the government (8); local government (9); and socialist societies, the cooperative party, and black socialist societies (9). In addition, all 32 members of the National Executive Committee are automatically members. Eight policy commissions, composed of three representatives each from government, the National Executive Committee, and the national policy forum, have been established covering the following subjects: economic and social affairs; trade and industry; environment, transport, and the regions; health, education, and employment; crime and justice; democracy and citizenship; and finally Britain in the world.

13. The lack of power was demonstrated in a stark manner by the leadership’s inability to force eight rebel MPs to modify their opposition to the European Union.


15. One example is Liz Davies in Leeds North East (1997).

16. The Labour party’s northwest regional director argues in a paper (“The New Labour Party: A Vision for Organisational Modernisation”) that “New Labour politics should be matched by new Labour organisation” and goes on to suggest the replacement of fee-paying members with registered supporters and the abolition of the branch and constituency structure. Copy in the possession of the authors.
Chapter 2

1. Dr. Richard Taylor, an independent candidate, defeated the Labour and Conservative party candidates in the Wyre Forest constituency.

2. In their model of participation, the beta coefficient of the family income predictor variable is only 0.11 and is the weakest of seven predictors of participation used in this model (see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995: 342).

3. Turnout in presidential elections has declined by more than one-fifth between the 1950s and 1980s (see Miller and Shanks 1996: 39–69).

4. Turnout in the 1979 election was 76 percent (see fig. 1.2). Participation in higher education has more than doubled from about 800,000 students in 1980–81 to more than 1,600,000 in 1996–97 (see Times Higher Educational Supplement, no. 1,299, September 26, 1997).


6. They can of course be jailed for refusing to pay taxes, which is the standard way the government ensures that the provision of collective goods in society is funded.

7. If actors know how many rounds of the game are going to be played, it is rational for them to defect on the last round, which implies that it is rational to defect on the second to last round, and so forth, which reinstates defection as the dominant strategy for all rounds.

8. It will be recalled that they argue: “Three answers come to mind: because they can’t; because they don’t want to; or because nobody asked.” (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995: 269).

Chapter 3

1. “Not at all” = 1; “Rarely” = 2; “Occasionally” = 3; “Frequently” = 4. These scales applied to all the variables except the last two in table 3.3, which are dummy variables scoring 1 = yes; 0 = no.

2. In LISREL modeling this statistic measures the difference between the observed and fitted correlation matrix (see Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993: 122) and is a goodness-of-fit measure, the smaller the better. In the case of Labour the one-factor solution produced a chi-square goodness-of-fit test of 4,264.91 with twenty-seven degrees of freedom, whereas the two-factor solution was 3,796.18 with twenty-six degrees of freedom. Thus the chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic improved by 468.7 for the loss of one degree of freedom. The corresponding figures for the Conservatives were 1,971.61 for a one-factor solution with twenty-seven degrees of freedom and 1,963.66 for a two-factor solution with twenty-six degrees of freedom. In this case the chi-square statistic improved by 7.95 for the loss of one degree of freedom. Clearly the two-factor solutions are superior in both cases.

3. This is measured by the contact scale in one model and the activism scale in the second.
4. These are statements that are coded using a five-point scale that varies from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” with “neither” as the midpoint.

5. Individuals who strongly agree with the two indicators score five for each, and individuals who strongly disagree with them score one for each measure.

6. The measure is a dummy variable, scoring one if the individual was recruited in this way and zero otherwise.

7. In earlier work we have argued that, since much policy-making takes place at the local level in Britain, a highly active individual may have a significant influence over collective outcomes in his or her locality, since there are relatively few such individuals in local politics. Under these circumstances actors have an incentive not to free ride, making participation motivated by collective incentives rational (see Whiteley, Seyd, Richardson, and Bissell 1994).

8. For a discussion of different conceptions of rationality and the problems they pose see Elster 1983.

9. The number of households with incomes below 50 percent of the average increased from 9.4 percent in 1979 to 19.4 percent in 1987, the last year for which statistics were available under the Conservative government (see Bradshaw 1992).

10. In the foreword to the Labour party’s 1992 election manifesto Neil Kinnock set out various objectives that he argued were “fundamental to improving the quality and quantity of provision in health and social services, and to combating poverty” (Labour Party 1992: 7), indicating that public spending to alleviate poverty was a priority for Labour at that time.


12. Again in the 1992 election manifesto Neil Kinnock wrote: “We have absolute commitment to a high-quality National Health Service, free at the time of need and not fractured or weakened by under funding” (Labour Party 1992: 7).

13. In practice the Conservative government has had little success in achieving this goal, but it was still committed to it.

14. Labour party members were asked about the effectiveness of these activities in helping the party achieve its goals, whereas Conservatives were asked whether they could personally influence politics by undertaking the activity. This difference of wording affects the reliability but not the validity of the indicators, since, as mentioned earlier, in social psychological theory no distinction is made between individual and group effectiveness. Thus the underlying scales should be accurate measures of the individual’s sense of the effectiveness of different types of participation.

15. It can be seen that only one of the social norms indicators is common to both parties. Additional tests (not shown) were conducted to see whether this influenced the findings in the later models. When one common indicator is used in both the Labour and Conservative models, this did not significantly affect the estimates.

16. The critical value of $\chi^2$ with five degrees of freedom at the 0.05 level is 11.1.

17. Note that the negative sign on the social class variable is merely an artifact of the coding—the salariat in table 3.6 are coded one and the working class five.

18. In the case of social norms the negative coefficient implies that respondents
who disagree with the statements in table 3.11 participate more than those who agree with them, a finding that accords with expectations.

19. Each of the indicators of the collective benefits scale was multiplied by the two indicators of the personal influence scale, and the twelve resulting measures were used to estimate a personal influence times benefits scale, which was substituted for these measures in the model. The results were:

\[
\text{Activism} = 0.06(\text{influence} \times \text{benefits}) + 0.01(\text{costs}) + 0.25(\text{outcome}) \\
+ 0.11(\text{process}) - 0.02(\text{ideology}); \quad R^2 = 0.14.
\]

(2.5) \hspace{1cm} (0.8) \hspace{1cm} (13.7) \hspace{1cm} (9.8) \hspace{1cm} (1.1)

This suggests that the interactive model is inferior to the additive version. There are more elaborate ways of testing interactions in the LISREL framework (see Hayduk 1987: 190–243), and one other approach was adopted. The equality of the coefficients of the benefits scale variable was tested for groups of respondents in different categories of the personal influence variables. If interactions exist then these coefficients should shift over the separate groups (e.g., benefits becoming more important for high-efficacy groups). Tests indicated that these coefficients did not significantly change between groups, suggesting that no significant interactions occurred between the benefits and personal influence variables. The correlation of 0.09 between these variables in the additive model reinforces this point.

Chapter 4

1. The methodological details of the panel surveys are discussed in the appendix.

2. The National Trust is an organization devoted to the preservation and maintenance of Britain’s heritage, including parks, castles, large country estates, and sites of historical importance.

3. Probabilities were calculated from Butler and Butler 1994: 219.

4. In 1950 individual membership of the Labour party was 847,526, although this figure was distorted by the constitutional requirement that parties affiliate with a minimum of 800 members (Seyd and Whiteley 1992: 16). There are no records of individual membership of the Conservative party in that year, but Webb, writing in Katz and Mair’s handbook on party organization, asserts that the national membership in 1960 was 2,800,000 (1992: 847). By 1992 this picture had changed rather dramatically, with Labour having a published individual membership of 280,000 (Butler and Butler 1994: 147) and the Conservatives an estimated membership of about 750,000 (Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson 1994: 25).

5. Note that we have to assume that contemporaneous and longitudinal effects do not exactly cancel each other out, thereby producing a nonsignificant effect.

6. The way to avoid this problem would be to have the two waves of the panel
surveys conducted very close together in time, which should reduce the effects of longitudinal factors. However, the price paid for this is that the lagged endogenous variable would become very dominant in such a model, potentially eliminating important effects.

7. Another way of interpreting this is to say that the first wave variables apart from activism drive the system and ensure that 12 percent of the gap (i.e., 1–0.88) between an equilibrium level of participation and actual participation is closed over this two-year period. Thus the system is characterized by high levels of inertia.

8. Obviously, a shorter period of time between the two waves of the panel might well have produced significant effects.

9. Note that income was not statistically significant in any of the models and so is excluded from table 4.7.

Chapter 5

1. The party captured only 27.6 percent of the vote, the worst result since 1918, which itself was a unique postwar election in which the British party system fragmented (see Butler and Butler 1994: 218).

2. Prior to 1989 members were recruited only at the local constituency level and there were no central membership records.

3. The source of the information about the “Active Labour” campaign is interviews with party officials at Labour party headquarters at Millbank in London.

4. This is despite the fact that the letters accompanying the survey asked people to respond even if they no longer considered themselves to be Labour party members.

5. The mean score refers to the eight activities in table 4.3. The mean score is calculated by adding together the responses for each individual on the scales, where “not at all” = 1; “rarely” = 2; “occasionally” = 3; “frequently” = 4 (see also Seyd and Whiteley 1992: 95–97).

6. Again the total activity score for a party member is the sum of the scores for each of these eight activities, with the same coding as described in note 5.

7. We are assuming that expressive incentives are exogenous in this model.

8. The Tote is a lottery scheme run by many local parties for fund-raising purposes. Activists typically call around to see inactive party members to collect their lottery payments.

9. If the individual cited expressive motives for joining, the dummy variable scored one, otherwise it scored zero.

10. The scale explained 67.3 percent of the variance in the indicators with an eigenvalue of 1.35.

11. The scale explained 55.8 percent of the variance in the measures with an eigenvalue of 2.23.

12. The scale explained 42.1 percent of the variance in the measure with an eigenvalue of 1.26.

13. The scale explained 58.9 percent of the variance in the indicators with an eigenvalue of 1.77.
14. If an individual is New Labour he or she scores one, and Old Labour scores zero.

Chapter 6

1. That is, voter utilities only have one modal point or maximum value along the left-right continuum (see Mueller 1989: 179–85).
2. This assertion, however, can be exaggerated (see Seyd and Whiteley 1992: 214–17 and Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson 1994: 63–64).
3. The Granger causality tests differ in this case from those in chapter 4, since we cannot estimate the effects of exiting at time one on the predictor variables at time two. With a two-wave panel it is only possible to measure exiting at time two.
4. The membership went from 405,000 in 1997 to 388,000 in 1998 (see table 1.1).
5. Each of the independent variables involving two or more observable indicators is the factor score derived from a factor analysis of the indicators with the extraction criterion restricted to one factor.
6. The Wald statistics for process and outcome incentives are significant at the 0.14 level in each case.

Chapter 7

1. Objective efficacy as discussed in this model should not be confused with subjective efficacy, or the feelings that individuals might have about their ability to influence politics and the political system. Survey work suggests that many people have a sense of political efficacy, but there is no basis for this sense in objective reality when it comes to voting (see Margolis 1982).
2. For example, the election study has no indicators of the probability that an elector will vote Conservative, Labour, or for another party; it merely records party preference. This has changed in the 2001 British Election Study, which now carries such measures.
3. The Gallup Political Index contains aggregate indicators from monthly surveys of the British electorate. The data used in the present chapter are taken from report 377 (January 1992) and every subsequent report through to 424 (December 1995).
4. A research grant from the U.S. National Science Foundation allowed a team of researchers to buy in questions on the Gallup Political Index from the start of 1992. This represents the start of the party identification series in the Gallup Political Index, a variable that had not been measured on a continuous basis before that time. Thus earlier observations cannot be used to estimate these models. The team consisted of Marianne Stewart and Harold Clarke, from the University of Texas at Dallas; and Paul Whiteley from the University of Essex (see Clarke, Stewart, and Whiteley 1998).
5. Versions of the models that included prospective and egocentric economic evaluations were tested as alternative measures of the subjective economy. How-
ever, none of these proved to be statistically significant predictors of voting intentions.

6. Formally a stationary series has a mean and variance that is time invariant, such that $E(x_t) = \mu$ and $E(x_t^2) = \sigma^2$ for all $t$, and the autocovariances are a function only of the time lag separating observations (see Vandaele 1983: 12–28).

7. Hendry (1980) provides an amusing example of this when he demonstrates a highly statistically significant relationship between cumulative rainfall in Britain and the rate of inflation.

8. Two series are cointegrated if they are in long-term equilibrium, such that a deviation from the long-run growth of one series produces a deviation from the long-run growth of the other. If this is true, then the difference between the two series measured over time must be stationary or constant, since if this difference grew larger (or smaller) they could not be in equilibrium. See Engle and Granger 1987 for a formal discussion of cointegration.

9. The RESET test is Ramsey’s (1969) test of functional form; the normality test is the Jarque-Bera test (1980) of the normality of the regression residuals; the ARCH test is the autoregressive-conditional heteroscedasticity test developed by Engle (1982); and the heteroscedasticity test is the Breutsch-Pagan test (1979).

10. The RESET test suggests, however, that the functional form of the model is problematic. Further analysis with a logarithmic version of the most parsimonious model renders the RESET test nonsignificant. However, there is no substantive difference between the logarithmic and the original version of the model; accordingly the former is not reported or analyzed.

11. Although many of them do!

Chapter 8

1. Kavanagh (1998: 42) argues in a similar vein: “people wishing to be active and to promote a cause seem more willing to engage in an interest group than in a political party.”

2. Maloney and Jordan (1997) suggest that members of the “protest business” organizations are more accurately “financial supporters” only and that their continuity of support is unlikely to be maintained for long.

3. Such a claim would be possible to verify in Italy, where such a regular audit of group life is carried out.

4. These acronyms stand for the Automobile Association and the Royal Automobile Association, both of which have members but strongly restrict their participation.

5. Central government in Britain funds a large proportion of local government spending, such that changes in national policies have large implications for changes in local policies. Thus the provision of national and local collective goods is significantly related.