Chapter 1


2. For an example of this kind of argument applied to Soviet foreign policy, see Jan Triska and David Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1968). For a similar argument about risk propensity as a “national” attribute, also applied to the Soviet case, see Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1982).

3. The literature on these topics offers an array too vast to begin to list in any comprehensive fashion. For representative examples on: why nations go to war, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, War and Reason (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); on arms control and weapons procurement, see Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984); and on crisis management, see Sean Lynn-Jones, Steven Miller, and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).


5. This study concentrates on a unitary actor embodied by the president. Significant advisors are analyzed from this perspective as well. Prospect theory is less easily applied to the dynamics of group decision making, except to the extent that all members are assumed to share similar biases in risk propensity, although each may possess a different understanding of such crucial features as appropriate frame for discussion, applicable reference point, domain of action, and so on. For discussion of prospect theory applied to group decision making, see Tatsuya Kameda and James Davis, “The Function of the Reference Point in Individual and Group Risk Decision Making,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision


9. This is not to say these assessments are useless or insignificant. Probability assessments are particularly crucial in the area of epidemiological research and treatment planning. Even with sophisticated modeling techniques, predictions can be woefully misguided. Remember that CDC officials feared that the Ebola Fever epidemic of 1977 might kill thousands, but only 153 died in Zaire before the disease disappeared in that round. Meanwhile, in the early years of the AIDS epidemic, it was not judged to pose a widespread problem, but it has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. For more on how these early judgments of probability affected health policy in a way that failed to foster greater preventive efforts, see Randy Shilts, And the Band Played On (New York: Penguin Books, 1988).

10. The following discussion is distilled from Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty.


12. I am grateful to Lee Ross for this example, which I first saw dramatically demonstrated in his social psychology class.

13. Some of the ways this manipulation might be done include adding and deleting options that are more or less similar or dissimilar to the preferred options. See Amos Tversky, “Elimination by Aspects,” Psychological Review 79 (1972): 294–96.


15. The following discussion derives from Kahneman and Tversky, “Choices, Values, and Frames,” 341.

17. I am grateful to Paul Fischbeck for this useful analogy.

18. The distinction between decision values and experience values is discussed at greater length in Kahneman and Tversky, “Choices, Values and Frames.”


**Chapter 2**


2. Psychophysics has had a long and important tradition in the history of psychology. First comprehensively explicated in print by Gustav Fechner in his 1860 publication *Elements of Psychophysics*, the study of psychophysics originally sought to systematically, and mathematically, explore the relationship between the physical and psychological worlds. Fechner’s experiments, which drew on earlier work by Ernst Weber, investigated the relationship between stimulus and sensation, following the observation that the two phenomena did not increase in direct proportion to one another. He demonstrated that the relationship between the intensity of physical stimulus and sensate perception was a concave function. This is significant, given Bernoulli’s similar finding in his application of this approach to money and probability. Ironically, Fechner’s contribution to psychophysics was more seminal to the birth of the experimental method in psychology than to later explanations of the nature of sensation and perception.


4. This shift also allowed the analysis to be applied to the single play of a game. In earlier models, the analyst was restricted to a calculation that required multiple plays of a game, like the throwing of a die, in order to determine preferences.

5. Definitions for transitivity, dominance, and invariance come from Kahneman and Tversky, “Choices, Values and Frames.”


8. The following discussion of prospect theory draws most heavily on Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” and Kahneman and Tversky, “Choices, Values and Frames,” as well as extensive personal communication and class discussion on prospect theory with Amos Tversky.

9. For a more extensive discussion of the history of psychophysics in psychology, a good succinct account can be found in E. Heidbreder, *Seven Psychologies* (New York: Century Co., 1933).


11. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments concerning utility and prospect theory.


15. The following discussion essentially paraphrases the discussion in Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.”


17. This is true unless you believe that all value is not in whether you win or lose, but how the game is played. If this is true, your preferences require a different utility function than that of those betting money on the outcome of the game.


23. As Kahneman and Tversky mention in this quote, shifting the frame of a problem can also change the very experience of its outcomes. This is what Tversky and Kahneman refer to in their discussion of the use of framing as a potential mechanism of self-control: is drinking, eating, or smoking considered a “treat” for a job well done, or an “unwarranted indulgence,” demonstrating a lack of willpower? Clearly, a treat is enjoyed in a different way than an indulgence that produces shame, guilt, and regret. This framing phenomenon is well captured by the old adage of seeing a glass as half empty or as half full. Cognitive therapy for depression, for example, is fundamentally based on mentally reframing experience in a more positive light. For more on this approach, see Aaron Beck, A. John Rush, Brian F. Shaw, and Gary Emery, *Cognitive Therapy of Depression* (New York: Guilford Press, 1979).
24. This is not to discount the possibility that framing can be used in a motivated way, in order to structure and influence the choice of others. However, it need not be invoked in a motivated fashion in order to produce systematic and nonnormative results. I am grateful to Jon Mercer for helpful comments on the motivated possibilities for framing effects.


29. For more on how behavior itself (giving an explanation) can help to create a change in attitude (“I wrote it, therefore I must believe it to be true”), see Daryl Bem, “Self Perception Theory,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 6, ed. Leonard Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1972), 1–62.

30. I am grateful to Robert Jervis for this insight.

31. This explanation derives from Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 277.


35. The previous discussion is drawn from Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 280.


39. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, “Facts vs. Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk.” While the rates of homicide have clearly risen in the last decade, so have the rates of suicide. Thus, even if the specific numbers in this article are a bit dated, the underlying principle remains accurate.


41. Ibid., 345.

42. This discussion is distilled from Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 288–89.


48. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on individual differences.

49. For more on how other kinds of argument and evidence cannot definitely establish *causal* determinism and often fall prey to various forms of counterfactual bias, please see Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

50. I am grateful to Paul Fischbeck for explanation and clarification of the issues involved in the operationalization of the risk variable.


53. I am grateful to Amos Tversky for clarification of this point.


56. It should be noted, however, that the theory argues that reverse behavior is possible, indeed expected, when the probabilities are extreme (either certain or impossible). It can be very difficult, however, to get an accurate assessment of relative probabilities at this fine a level from available information. Moreover, taken to an extreme, this caveat can render the entire theory as unfalsifiable as global systems such as psychoanalysis or Catholicism. If a case fails in its prediction, one need only argue that it is because the probabilities were extreme. Although this
may really be the cause in certain instances, it is important to guard against this
danger of unfalsifiable theory. Therefore, the mitigating circumstances offered by
extreme probabilities must be treated carefully in any application of prospect the-
ory to international relations.

Chapter 3

1. Selected Hearings, President to Congress, “Hostages in Iran, Selected Con-
gress, 11/79 [CF, O/A 749] [2],” Box 61, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library.
2. This quote, as well as the information on the earlier seizure, from Memo,
Gary Sick to Jerry Schecter, “American Hostage in Iran, 11/7/79–11/30/79” Box
75, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library.
3. Memo, David Aaron to Carter, October 31, 1979, “Staff Office,” Box 154,
WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library.
4. A good account of the entire Iranian hostage crisis can be found in Gary
Sick, All Fall Down (New York: Penguin Books, 1986). Specific references to the
seizure of the hostages by the students are made in chapter 10, especially on page
230.
5. Thirteen of the hostages, all either black or female, were subsequently
released on November 18 and 19. One additional hostage, Richard Queen, was
released on July 11, 1980, for medical reasons that were later diagnosed as multiple
sclerosis. AP Chronology, “American Hostages in Iran-Chron (Partial),” Box 75,
WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library.
6. A complicated legal document, mediated by the Algerians to bring about
the release of the hostages in exchange for the unfreezing of Iranian assets in
United States banks, was called the Declaration of Algiers. This statement was
released by White House Press Secretary Jody Powell on January 21, 1981, after
three weeks of intensive negotiations that required Secretary of State Warren
Christopher to fly to Algiers. Declaration of Algiers, 1/21/81, “CO-71,
4/26/80–1/20/81,” Box CO-32, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library. Gary Sick has since
claimed that the Reagan campaign was independently negotiating with the Iranian
Revolutionary Council over the timing of the hostages’ release in order to nega-
tively affect Carter’s bid for reelection. He argued that the Carter administration
was unaware of these illicit negotiations involving the exchange of hostages for
arms through Israeli intermediaries. See Gary Sick, “The Election Story of the
with the Financial Times of London, has conducted a series of investigations into
these allegations. Much of the evidence offered in support of Sick’s arguments is
circumstantial and thus the accuracy of his claims remains inconclusive.
7. Executive Summary, Special Opera-
tions Review Group to Joint Chiefs of
Staff, “Iran Rescue Mission, 4–8/80,” Box 92, Counsel, Jimmy Carter Library.
9. All statistics above from record, “American Hostages in Iran,
11/7/79–11/30/70,” Box 75, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library.
Box 155, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library.
15. In the president’s defense, Carter’s statement of progress on hostage negotiations made on April 1 had been prompted by what was viewed at the time as a genuine breakthrough by the administration and was not simply designed to manipulate the outcome of the primaries in Wisconsin and Kansas that day. Hamilton Jordan, Crisis (New York: Putnum, 1982); Jody Powell, The Other Side of the Story (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984). This contention is also supported by a wide variety of archival evidence on the Iranian hostage situation in the Jimmy Carter Library.
16. All statistics in this paragraph are from Time, April 14, 1980, 28.
19. Sick, All Fall Down, 347.
24. For judgment of the International Court of Justice and official U.S. response, see Background memo, United States State Department, “Iran-ICJ, 2/79–3/80,” Box 88, Counsel Files, Jimmy Carer Library and Draft Statement, “Iran-ICJ, 5/80,” Box 89, Counsel Files, Jimmy Carter Library.
26. It will be remembered from the discussion in the theory chapter that frames are difficult to predict, as well as complex to explain. See Fischhoff, “Predicting Frames.”
28. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 495. The fact of the matter is that rescue raids have a high historical failure rate; the Iran rescue mission may offer an almost classic example of the availability heuristic in foreign policy, where base rates were underestimated in light of a salient successful case. In this instance that notable
case was Entebbe, a rescue raid that was successful, although it took place in quite different terrain.

In the case of American rescue attempts, the historical track record is dismal at best. The Son Tay raid on a Vietnamese war camp, which included soldiers who later participated in the Iran mission, failed because the prisoners had been moved to another location prior to the arrival of the rescue team. The raid on the Palestinians who took nine Israeli athletes hostages during the 1972 Munich Olympics resulted in the death of all the hostages and five of the right-wing terrorists. The 39 hostages in the Mayaguez incident were indeed freed, but it appears that their release was under way prior to the rescue mission itself. Even so, that mission cost the lives of 41 American soldiers, and another 50 were wounded. Another relatively similar case, that of the Hammelburg raid to release prisoners of war in Germany during World War II, was only partly successful as well, because fighting with German forces subsequent to the raid was heavy.

In fact, Entebbe and Mogadishu stand as relative anomalies in the history of these kinds of missions both for their success and their lack of casualties: three hostages and one Israeli officer were killed at Entebbe; and three terrorists were killed by the West Germans in Somalia. The key to both these successful raids was total surprise combined with a relatively isolated area of attack. In spite of the critical geographical differences, Entebbe was the operative analogy for most of the principals involved in the Iranian rescue mission. For a quick rundown of these other cases, see Warren Christopher et al., American Hostages in Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 386. Time magazine also offers a brief description of some of these cases in the May 5, 1980, issue, 19, 25. For a more extensive analysis of the Mayaguez incident, see Paul Ryan, Iranian Rescue Mission (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 142–44.

29. For Carter’s shared view, see Gary Sick, “Military Options and Constraint,” in American Hostages in Iran, 161. For Carter’s speech request, see Jordan, Crisis, 252.

30. This information and the following analysis of the understood hierarchy of risks derives extensively from a telephone interview by the author with Gary Sick in July 1990 in New York City.

31. As National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski comments, it is crucial to keep in mind the distinction between military and political risks throughout this analysis (interview by author with Zbigniew Brzezinski, July 1990, in Washington, DC). In this case in particular, these political and military risks increased and decreased inversely. Moreover, it was clear that there was a trade-off between domestic and international imperatives as well; while the allies were cautious, the American public was impatient.

32. Sick’s arguments are also supported by author interview with Harold Saunders in Washington, DC, in July 1990.

33. At this point, I want to reiterate that the following characterization of the five options that were considered, and who supported which position and why, derives from a telephone interview conducted by the author with Gary Sick in New York City in July 1990. The following discussion draws heavily upon that conversation. It must be noted, however, that there is no information in any of the printed
or archival material, or any of the other interviews I conducted, that contradicted Sick’s analysis in any way. Thus, in the following discussion of the options that were considered, interested readers are directed to the relevant memoirs, noted elsewhere, in order to either confirm or expand upon specific analysis presented here.

34. Interview by author with Harold Saunders in Washington, DC, in July 1990.

35. Prospect theory does not directly discuss the role of emotion in decision making. Nonetheless, it is an important topic. For more on the role of affect in decision making, see that section in the concluding chapter. For a work that discusses those issues in greater depth, see Irving Janis and Leon Mann, **Decision Making** (New York: Free Press, 1977).

36. For some of these actions, see Statement by the President, April 7, 1980, “Iran-Leg 4/1–16/80,” Box 89, Counsel Files, Jimmy Carter Library; Press Conference No. 56 by the President of the United States, April 17, 1980, “Press 4–11/80,” Box 92, Counsel Files, Jimmy Carter Library; Memos, “Isolation Package” and “Non-Military Options,” “Hostages in U.S. Embassy in Iran, 1980 No. 1 [CFR, O/A 749] [1],” Box 62, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library. Also Memo, “Additional Options for Economic Measures against Government of Iran,” “Iran-Freeze 10–12/79,” Box 87, Counsel Files, Jimmy Carter Library. For a comprehensive narrative of these actions, also see Sick, **All Fall Down**, especially 339.


40. Statement by the President, April 7, 1980, “Iran-Leg 4/1–16/80,” Box 89, Counsel Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

41. Press Conference No. 56 by the President of the United States, April 17, 1980, “Press 4–11/80,” Box 92, Counsel Files, Jimmy Carter Library.


43. This is noted above in the State Department telegram to Rome/Ottawa.
Allied response was also noted above in the joint action that placed May 17 as the deadline for the release of the hostages. See note 24.


45. Both argue this in their respective books: Sick, *All Fall Down*; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*. Both spontaneously emphasized this point to the author during interviews as well.

46. This reasoning is reminiscent of Jervis’s arguments concerning irrational consistency in service of the avoidance of value trade-offs in decision making. See Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Also note that it may be easier to calculate the risks associated with military action than with political failure. This bias may predispose decision makers to take advantage of concrete options that offer an estimable chance over options that present inestimable probabilities of unknown outcomes.

47. This is consistent with the human rights campaign, which directed Carter’s foreign policy emphasis throughout his administration.

48. The rescuers did not have the information about the location of the hostages within the rather large compound until less than twenty-four hours before the mission. Even then the information was obtained by accident. The Iranian students had released a Pakistani cook from the compound who happened to sit next to a covert CIA operative on a flight out of Tehran; on the long journey, the cook unintentionally provided the crucial location information to the operative. (So much for the optimal nature of rational planning; this was pure chaos theory in action.) For the dramatic story, see Zvi Lanir, Baruch Fischhoff, and Stephen Johnson, “Military Risk-Taking: C3I and the Cognitive Functions of Boldness in War,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 11 (1988): 96–114.

49. It is interesting to note that insurance companies considered the risk of American military action in the region to be so serious that rates for maritime shipping were increased enormously and rapidly. Lloyd’s of London, for example, declared the Arabian Sea to be a War Zone and increased rates for ships going into the area by 400 percent. Needless to say, this action had the premeditated effect of reducing trade to the region. See Selected Hearing, Carter before Congress, “Hostages in US Embassy in Iran Selected Congress [CF, O/A 749] [2],” Box 61, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library.

50. I remind the reader that the majority of the seemingly unsubstantiated assertions throughout this section of the chapter derive from the author’s interview with Gary Sick, National Security Staff member for Iran.

51. Recall that the rescue mission was the only option that offered the possibility of directly bringing about the release of the hostages. If successful, the administration need not worry about antagonizing the captors because the Iranians would no longer have control over the hostages.

52. Note that for the predictions of prospect theory to hold true, the option chosen need not be the riskiest one available. The theory is one of tendency. Therefore, if the chosen option is relatively risky, that is, if the actual choice decision is riskier than many alternatives of equal or greater expected value, the predictions of
the theory are borne out. To reiterate, if the choice made is risky relative to the other options that are available, or if a sure thing is taken over a gamble that presents equal or greater expected value, the predictions of prospect theory are supported.


55. The details of this exchange were recently released to the author under Freedom of Information Act requests. See drafts, “Possible Scenario,” “Revised Scenario,” “Final Scenario,” and “Updated Scenarios”; and “[Iran], Scenario,” Chief of Staff, Jordan, Jimmy Carter Library.


57. The use of distinct historical analogies to inform arguments appeared to play an important role in this crisis. For more on the specifics of how these analogies informed predictions and biases in this case, see Rose McDermott, “Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission,” *Political Psychology* 13 (1992): 237–63. For more general discussion concerning the use of analogies in decision-making processes, see Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*; and Yuen Fung Khong, *Analogies at War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). Jon Mercer has also pointed out to the author in personal communication that it seems likely that analogies are often chosen to fit the preferred decision, rather than the analogy driving the preference beforehand. To support this point, Mercer notes that hawks tend to pick hawkish analogies, just as doves prefer dovish ones. However, it is also possible that preferred analogies work through an availability heuristic for given decision makers and serve to bolster that person’s predetermined beliefs. For more on belief perseverance, see Lord, Ross, and Lepper, “Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence.”


61. Author interviews with Sick and Saunders.

62. Author interviews with Sick and Saunders.


65. Sick, *All Fall Down*, 358.

66. Sick notes this phenomenon in his book, *All Fall Down*, as well as in his interview with the author. Carter’s descriptions of his perspectives in *Keeping Faith*
are consistent with this interpretation, although he doesn’t make an explicit point of the power shift in the inner circle.

67. Sick, All Fall Down, 342–43.


69. Ibid., 484.


73. Ibid., 499.

74. Ibid., 492.


77. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Failed Mission,” 29–30. Note the operation of the conjunction fallacy in this assessment. The conjunction fallacy demonstrates how events that require lots of sequences, each with a low probability of failure, will be judged to be more likely to succeed than is normatively warranted. This is because the probability of failure across many events of low probability is higher than the probability of failure of any one sequence in the event and people fail to take this factor into account in their judgments about the overall probability of success or failure. The classic example is the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger, where each component had a very low probability of failure. But, over time, the probability of failure rose sharply because of the combination of many components over many iterations. For more on the conjunction fallacy, see Tversky and Kahneman, “Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment.”

78. Jordan’s memoirs are by far the most psychologically candid and sophisticated of the plethora of books written by Carter administration officials. In fact, Jordan is quite open about his anger at Vance for not believing early on in the likelihood of the rescue’s success, and also for abandoning Carter in his time of greatest need after the mission failed. His book seems less affected by hindsight and impression management in this way than the others. See Jordan, Crisis.


80. Jordan, Crisis. For the best example of Carter’s anger and frustration at the press about his decision to stay at the White House and not campaign across the country, see Press Conference No. 56 of the President of the United States, April 17, 1980, “Press 4–11/80,” Box 92, Counsel, Jimmy Carter Library.

81. Jordan, Crisis, 229.

82. Note that this outcome assessment would have remained true even if the hostages had lost their lives.

83. Hearings, President to Congress, 12/5/79, “Hostages in US Embassy in Iran Selected Congress 11/79 [CF. O/A 749] [2],” Box 61, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library. Again, for more on the role of affect in decision making, see that section in the concluding chapter.
84. For more on the groupthink effect, see Irving Janis, *Groupthink*. Janis describes the phenomenon of groupthink as a “quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (9). This clearly did not happen in the Carter administration as evidenced by the drastic differences in opinions espoused by Vance and Brzezinski, among others. The reasons for this are no doubt many, but are certainly due in part to deeply held personal animosities between these participants, as well as the differing personal styles of some participants, such as Brzezinski, who did not shy away from confrontation.


86. It is interesting to note that the mission failed during the phase of the operation that was judged to be the most risky in advance. The planners were most confident of the phase of the plan that involved actually liberating the captives from the Embassy. See Briefing by Harold Brown, April 25, 1980, “Iran-Leg 4/24–30/80,” Box 90, Counsel, Jimmy Carter Library.


94. The following account of the rescue mission is culled from a number of different sources. A good general source is Ryan, *The Iranian Rescue Mission*. The more detailed accounting is found in U.S. Defense Department, “Rescue Mission Report,” August 1980 (typescript; this is the report issued under the direction of Admiral Holloway). Also see report, Special Operation Review Group to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Iran-Rescue Mission 4–8/80,” Box 92, Counsel, Jimmy Carter Library; and Report Harold Brown/David Jones to Jody Powell, “Hostages in US Embassy In Iran 1980 No. 2 [CF, O/A 749] [1],” Box 62, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library.


97. It is easier to understand this incident if one imagines the scene at Desert One. It was pitch black, and there was total radio silence. Yet despite radio silence, there was tremendous noise coming from the engines of six helicopters and four C-130s (two others had already departed). This, combined with the sand kicked up from the engines, made visual and voice communication next to impossible. The
helicopter pilots were no doubt exhausted from flying for hours with heavy goggles, under difficult conditions and across unfamiliar terrain. Moreover, there was no central point of command, and no one really knew who was in charge of what, because there had never been a full dress rehearsal, and the obsession with secrecy had prevented many participants from meeting beforehand. Thus, the assumption that visual recognition was sufficient for command was incorrect. As a result, it was very difficult for anyone to know who to take orders from, where to get orders, or what exactly was going on. To make matters worse, central command, headed by General Vaught, head of the task force, was based in Qena, Egypt, and commands had to be made by satellite between Iran, Egypt, and Washington.

In addition, the mission location was near a traveled road, and Iranians who were passing through the desert during the mission were detained, providing a continual cause of concern for the leaders of the mission. Under these circumstances, it is easy to see why an accident of this nature might have taken place. Indeed, it is rather surprising that more casualties did not result. A couple of technical points help explain the outcome of the mission. First, helicopters are not designed to fly long missions under these conditions. All pilots were working off visual flight rules at low altitudes to avoid radar detection (scudrunning), using infrared night vision goggles to track terrain. Under this method of flight, navigation is often by dead reckoning, that is, the pilot uses heading, ground speed, adjustment for wind, and time to calculate where he is and where he is going. In the midst of dust clouds such as those encountered by the mission, it is virtually impossible for a pilot to see where he is going and to figure out how to get there. The helicopter crews did not have navigators and were not equipped with terrain following (TFR) or forward looking infrared (FLIR) navigation systems. Indeed, upon encountering the dust clouds, the pilots were forced to rely on passive navigational systems such as the PINS and OMEGA: the PINS is a self-contained inertial navigation system that provides up/down and right/left readings; the OMEGA is an automatic system that picks up readings from ten stations around the world and adjusts latitude and longitude, wind direction, and speed relative to these known posts. The pilots of the RH-53D helicopters had received little training in these systems and expressed low confidence in their ability to use them effectively.

Second, one of the difficulties with these helicopters is that once the engine is shut off, it is quite difficult to get it started again. More specifically, huge amounts of air must be sent into the turbines to get the blades started rotating, requiring the kind of jump start that a car gets by rolling it down a hill. In some recently made helicopters, auxiliary power units are used to provide this power. However, in most cases, lacking an external power source, cans of compressed air are used to start the engines. The problem is that these strategies don’t always work. In the case of the Iranian rescue mission, the helicopters could only carry in something like two cans of compressed air per helicopter to restart the engines. As a result, it was necessary to have at least six operational helicopters at Desert One because the plan assumed that at least one of them would not start later in the mission due to this engine-starting problem.

While the proximal cause of the rescue mission failure was the inadequate number of helicopters, the more distal limitations imposed by such concerns as opera-
tional security were equally influential. For instance, the problem with dust clouds in the area was known to certain weather specialists but, because of the overriding security concerns, this information was not passed on to the actual pilots. In addition, the statistical information on failure rates of blade inspection method warning was known to those who serviced the craft, but again was not passed on in a usable fashion to those who flew the mission. Thus, when one of the warning lights went on in one helicopter, the pilot erroneously assumed it was accurate and turned back.

Indeed, part of the original difficulty with designing the mission had to do with finding the appropriate crews. The original squadron was a navy group tasked to minesweeping. These men were familiar with the plane, but not with the complex aspects of special operations missions. In fact, almost all the original pilots were replaced right before Christmas. Indeed, one of the JCS recommendations for future actions suggested the use of soldiers familiar with the mission who need only learn the relatively minor specifications of a new craft, rather than relying on those who knew the helicopter, but not the mission requirements. The JCS report mentioned experience gained in Project Jungle Jim (1961) that supported this contention. For more on this incident, see U.S. Defense Department, “Rescue Mission Report,” August 1980 (typescript).


102. Although the first telephone calls and telegrams ran about 80 percent positive and 15 percent negative on the rescue mission, within a matter of hours, support as directly expressed to the White House had dropped to about 60 percent positive. Report, Hugh Carter to Hamilton Jordan, April 25, 1980, 10:50 A.M., “Iran,” Box 37, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library. Also Reaction, April 25, 1980 7:40 P.M., “American Hostages in Iran 4/25/80,” Box 75, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library.

103. As mentioned previously, the explicit agreement exchanged the hostages for the unfreezing of Iranian assets and property that were being blocked by the United States. See Declaration of Algiers, 1/21/81, “CO 71 4/26/80–1/20/81,” Box CO-32, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library.

104. It is highly debatable whether any American action would have had a significant or determinate impact on Iranian policy. It is more likely that Iranian actions were dictated primarily by the internal political imperatives of Iran.

Chapter 4

1. Carter was aware that Americans in Iran were in danger and feared a replay of events that had taken place there the previous February 14. According to the
Congressional Research Service background document, the previous event unfolded as follows: “On February 14, 1979, an armed group of Iranian leftists attacked the U.S. embassy, which Ambassador Sullivan surrendered after some initial bloodshed. Some 70 Americans were taken captive, but were later released on orders from Khomeini’s supporters. The decision to surrender the embassy was criticized in the U.S., although the positive intervention of pro-Khomeini groups might have been taken as a positive sign . . .” Issues definition, CRS-1, 2/20/80, “Iran-Regulations, Publications, 1–4/80, Box 79, Staff Office Files, Counsel’s Office, Jimmy Carter Library.

2. The following general history is culled from a number of sources and draws heavily on archival material. Interested readers are directed to the following works: for the best general history of the Iranian hostage crisis, see Gary Sick, All Fall Down. The State Department’s position is best represented by Cyrus Vance’s Hard Choices. The National Security Advisor’s position is characterized in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Power and Principle. Carter’s reminiscences can be found in Keeping Faith. For something completely different, see the Shah’s memoir, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 1980).


4. It is interesting to note that this residence was not seen as acceptable by the Shah’s ambassador to Washington, Ardeshir Zahedi, for security reasons, due to anti-Shah protests in California. Nelson Rockefeller’s staff found an alternative site on the grounds of Callaway Gardens, a resort in Georgia. However, by that time, the administration had decided not to admit the Shah. Terence Smith, “Why Carter Admitted the Shah,” New York Times Magazine, May 26, 1981.

5. There are several theories as to why the Shah chose not to come to America directly. The general consensus is that the Shah wanted to stay close to Iran in the event that the situation reversed itself, and the revolution was suppressed by the military or his other supporters. The Shah hoped to return to Iran in glory, much as he had in 1953, following a previous attempt on his crown by the nationalist then-premier, Mohammed Mossadegh (see Pahlavi, Answer to History, 13–14). At that time, with the help of the CIA and British intelligence, the Shah had returned to power relatively quickly and continued to rule for 26 more years (see Salinger, America Held Hostage, 20). During the interim period in 1953, the Shah had fled to Italy, and returned only after the coup had succeeded in restoring him to power (I am grateful to Robert Jervis for reminding me of the specifics of the Shah’s flight in 1953). The experience in 1953 was no doubt a powerful anchor of experience for everyone involved, including the Iranian revolutionaries. This provides at least part of the explanation for why they were so insistent that the Shah be returned to stand trial once he had entered the United States. The Iranians believed that as long as the Shah remained alive and involved with U.S. leadership, the two forces might conspire together to engineer an overthrow of the new Iranian government and endanger the Islamic revolution, in much the same manner as the nationalists had been destroyed by these same powers in 1953.

The Shah, understanding these fears, no doubt wanted to be able to return to Iran from an Islamic country, rather than from the United States. This was espe-
cially true since the Shah had suffered much criticism for being a “puppet” of the American government in the months prior to his exile. The Shah provides the following explanation for why he did not go directly to the United States from Iran in his memoirs:

I had intended to go to the United States soon after leaving Iran, but while in Morocco I began receiving strange and disturbing messages from friends in the U.S. who were in touch with the government and Carter administration. The messages although not unfriendly were very cautious: perhaps this is not a good time for you to come; perhaps you could come later; perhaps you should wait and see. About a month after my departure, the tone of the messages became warmer and they suggested that I could, of course, come to the United States if I were so inclined. But I was no longer so inclined. How could I go to a place that has undone me? (Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, 13–14).

Note that this comment does not explain why the Shah’s initial move from Iran was to Egypt, not America.

6. Rockefeller and Kissinger had long-standing relationships with the Shah that dated back to at least 1951. Much of the Rockefeller fortune was from oil interests, and these interests helped exert pressure on the U.S. government in 1953 to help overthrow the coup attempt by National Premier Mossadegh, who had nationalized Iranian oil interests, among other things. After the Shah regained power in 1953, all of his business dealings went through Chase Manhattan Bank. David Rockefeller was chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, which was principally responsible for Iran’s Eurodollar deposits. In 1975, about two billion dollars in Iranian transactions were handled by Chase. Kissinger was also chairman of Chase’s international advisory board (indeed, it was Nelson Rockefeller’s recommendation to Richard Nixon that got Kissinger appointed as National Security Advisor). This information is distilled from Salinger, *American Held Hostage*, 19–20; and Smith, “Why Carter Admitted the Shah,” May 26, 1981, 37, 40.

10. Ibid., 276–77.
11. These dates are a matter of public record. However, somewhat differing ideological accounts of these events can be found in the various memoirs cited in note 2.
15. It is actually not entirely surprising that the information about the Shah’s medical treatment was not uncovered earlier. The Shah went to great lengths to conceal this information. Even French intelligence was not aware of his condition, though he was being treated by French doctors. As Sick, *All Fall Down*, notes in describing an article concerning the Shah’s medical condition that appeared in the *New York Times Magazine* on May 26, 1981, under a byline by Lawrence K. Alt-
man, M.D., entitled, “The Shah’s Health: A Political Gamble”: “His account was fully consistent with (and considerably more comprehensive than) the information made available to the U.S. Government” (413).

16. Sick, All Fall Down, 208.
18. Sick, All Fall Down, 205–6.
20. Sick, All Fall Down, 212.
22. Sick, All Fall Down, 212.
23. John McCloy had served as the U.S. military governor and high commander for Germany after World War II. He was also CEO of Chase Manhattan Bank at the time of the Shah’s original overthrow in the 1950s. Although at the time he wrote this letter he worked as a lawyer for a New York law firm, he was nonetheless considered an influential high statesman of American foreign policy. For more on McCloy, see Sick, All Fall Down, 413.
24. Correspondence, Brzezinski to McCloy, McCloy to Vance, Vance to McCloy, 5/7/79, “CO 71,” Box 31, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library. It is also interesting to note that much of McCloy’s argument rests on the importance of reputation for sustaining the credibility of American foreign policy. For a brilliant analysis of why this argument is fundamentally fallacious, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
25. Ibid., “Correspondence.”
26. Ibid., “Correspondence.”
27. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 472.
28. For more on how people search for evidence that supports their preexisting beliefs, while systematically discounting evidence that contradicts those beliefs and enhancing evidence that supports them, see Charles Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark Lepper, “Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37 (1979), 2098–2109.
29. Sick, All Fall Down, 209.
30. Ibid., 210.
31. Ibid., 211.
32. Jordan, Crisis, 29.
33. Ibid., 29.
34. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 472. Also see Smith, “Why Carter Admitted the Shah.”
35. Carter, Keeping Faith, 452–53.
36. Ibid., 448.
37. Ibid., 453.
38. In spite of being unremitting in their opposition to the Shah’s entrance into the United States, the Carter administration did make several concessions to the Shah’s family concerning their ability to enter the United States. As Vance, Hard Choices, 344–45, recounts:
In response to an appeal by the Shah and after consulting with Naas (U.S. Chargé D'affaires in Tehran), we decided to allow the Shah's children to attend school in the United States. When Naas discussed this matter with Bazargan, the prime minister agreed that it should cause no problem, although he reiterated his warning about the dangers of admitting the Shah himself. The President determined that the empress could come to the United States for medical treatment, if necessary, but not to reside with the children. In permitting the empress to enter even temporarily for medical treatment, we would be skirting dangerously close to confirming suspicions in Iran that the United States still supported the Shah. Humanitarian concerns, however, demanded that we do whatever we could to help his family, as long as American lives and national interests were not subjected to unacceptable risks.

39. Sick, All Fall Down, 213.
40. The Shah had been diagnosed with a cancer of the lymph system called Waldenstrom's macroglobulinemia in 1974. He had been under the care of two French physicians, Drs. Flandrin and Bernard, since that time. He had been treated with chlorambucil, a drug that reduced the swelling in his lymph nodes and spleen. This illness resembles chronic lymphocytic leukemia, and the average lifespan after diagnosis is six to eight years.

The Shah's condition worsened after his exile, and a new form of cancer, Richter's syndrome, was diagnosed in March of 1979 in the Bahamas. The standard treatment for Richter's would have been to remove the spleen and thus prevent the further production of damaged cells. However, the Shah refused surgery and chose to be treated with chemotherapy, a remedy with limited effect, which often leads to secondary infections resulting from a weakened immune system. The specific treatment he chose was a combination of four drugs, known by its acronym, MOPP. MOPP is a standard treatment for Hodgkin's disease. In the Shah's case, the side effects of these drugs were too severe, and he was forced to stop treatment sooner than desired. An excellent overview of the specifics of the Shah's medical condition can be found in Lawrence K. Altman, "The Shah's Health: A Political Gamble," 48–52.

41. By the time the Shah reached Mexico in June, he was suffering from severe jaundice as a result of the Richter's syndrome, which Mexican doctors misdiagnosed as malaria. This incorrect diagnosis is what compelled the search for a tropical disease specialist to treat the Shah.
42. Carter, Keeping Faith, 452–56.
43. Ibid., 454.
44. Jordan, Crisis, 41–42. It is interesting to note Carter's aversion to being the sole dissenter in a crowd. Asch's famous conformity experiments elegantly demonstrate how difficult and unusual it is for an individual to resist the conformity of the crowd, even in the realm of "objective" measurements of reality, like the length of lines; see Solomon Asch, "Opinions and Social Pressure," Scientific American 193(5) (1955): 31–35. In this case, it is highly probable that Carter's ultimate agreement was influenced by the defection of Vance into the other coalition's camp. Even one other dissenter makes lack of conformity much more comfortable and
thus much more likely. Once Carter lost the confederate he had in Vance, it would have been much more difficult for him to remain the lone holdout against admitting the Shah.

45. Carter, Keeping Faith, 455. Note that this comment is very susceptible to retrospective hindsight bias. Whether Carter made this comment at the time, or how seriously he took it if he did make it, is suspect given the foresight it appears to give him. If he really thought that such an outcome would be virtually inevitable if he admitted the Shah, he would not have done so.


47. It appears in retrospect, however, that this was not true. Although the equipment was not all available in one place in Mexico, adequate diagnostic equipment and adequately trained technicians did exist in that country. Moreover, no independent examination of the Shah was ever conducted by the U.S. government to confirm the severity of the Shah’s condition while he was still in Mexico. The State Department medical officer, Dr. Eben Dustin, simply accepted Kean’s recommendation for the Shah’s transfer to New York. See Altman, “The Shah’s Health: A Political Gamble."

48. Carter, Keeping Faith, 455.


50. Sick, All Fall Down, 218.


52. At that time, it was determined that the jaundice was caused by an obstruction in his gallbladder, and the Shah was operated on for its removal several days later.

53. Carter, Keeping Faith, 469.


57. Ibid.


59. This was a costly decision for Panama. A $32 billion oil deal between Iran and Panama had just been signed at $2 a barrel below market price. This deal was instantly and unilaterally canceled by the Iranians upon learning of the Shah’s asylum in Panama. In addition, rioting in Panama took place in response to the Shah’s presence, and tourism declined significantly. Moreover, the Shah was not a gracious guest, and his American advisors made constant unsubstantiated charges against the Panamanians for everything from spying to overcharging. However, Torrijos in particular was very committed to helping the United States deal with the Shah out of his personal gratitude to Carter for pushing the Panama Canal treaties through Congress.

61. News Conference, 12/15/79, “Iran, Shah, 12/79,” Box 93, Counsel Files-
Cutler, Jimmy Carter Library.

ler, Jimmy Carter Library.

Also see Jordan, Crisis, and Sick, All Fall Down.

64. In attempting to stave off this extradition request, Panamanian officials 
became embroiled in the negotiation process between the American government 
and the Iranians concerning the release of the hostages. In a recently declassified, 
utterly fascinating report, Jordan describes his interaction with Panamanian 
officials concerning their discussions with Iranian leaders. Writing a memo 
directed to Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski, Jordan describes a Panamanian 
official’s characterization of Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh’s reasoning for 
the American embassy takeover: “He [Ghotbzadeh] said that the plot to overthrow 
the American Embassy was an ‘American conspiracy’ involving Rockefeller, 
Kissinger, and others who had a dual purpose: First, to create an international cri-
sis that would undermine the Ayatollah’s efforts to establish an effective and 
strong Islamic republic; and second, to create a crisis of great magnitude for Presi-
dent Carter that would lead to his political defeat and would result in the election 
of a Republican that was controlled by Kissinger and Rockefeller who would work 
to have the Shah reinstated as the leader of the Iranian people. . . . He said that 
President Carter was in danger of losing his Presidency if he did not successfully 
resolve the hostage situation. He said that the Ayatollah was in a very difficult 
position in Iran—he said that while he and Khomeini had no hope or desire to 
recover the Shah, that the students had become an increasingly powerful and 
difficult group with which to deal and that some way had to be found to resolve the 
crisis that did not make it appear that Khomeini had given in to U.S. pressure. He 
said that the Ayatollah had resorted to trying to substitute students totally loyal to 
him for the ‘regulars’ holding the hostages, but that once inside the compound they 
all behaved the same way.” Note the power of conformity effects and groupthink 
that are implied in that statement about the actions of the students. Memo, Jordan 
to Carter, Vance and Brzezinski, n.d., “[Iran], Shah-Panama,” Chief of Staff, Jor-
dan, Jimmy Carter Library. Although this story sounds incredibly conspiratorial, 
it does not diverge drastically from Gary Sick’s New York Times argument.

Jimmy Carter Library. Also see letter dated 3/11/80 for similar sentiments.

34, WHCF, Jimmy Carter Library. The mention of the U.S. military hospital no 
doubt refers to Gorgas, the U.S. military hospital in Panama that was considered 
as a possible site for the Shah’s required splenectomy. This option was a possible 
alternative to Paitilla, the Panamanian hospital. The Shah was afraid of the possi-
bility of sabotage at Paitilla, but the Panamanians refused to allow the operation 
to take place at Gorgas for political reasons and said that the Shah would not be 
allowed to remain in Panama after his operation if he were to have surgery at Gor-
gas. See Memo, Jordan and Raphael to Carter and Vance, 3/21/80, “Iran-Shah, 
68. Ibid.
69. Jordan, Crisis, 222.

Chapter 5

2. Memo of Conversation, Special Assistant to the President with Eisenhower, 5/31/60, “1060-Meetings with the President-Vol 1 (3),” Box 4, OSANSA, Special Assistant to the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
3. This behavior is reminiscent of a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby a person creates the very reality he expects to encounter. For the best review of the literature on this phenomenon, which can occur in both positive and negative contexts, see Mark Snyder, “When Belief Creates Reality,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 18, ed. Leonard Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1984), 248–306.
4. It is interesting to note that when the administration first accepted partial responsibility for the overflights, without acknowledging Eisenhower’s role in authorizing such activity, they blamed Soviet secrecy for America’s need to conduct espionage. Soviet rejection of Eisenhower’s 1955 Open Skies proposal was particularly emphasized as cause for extraordinary measures to ensure U.S. security interests. See Statement, Lincoln White to Press, May 7, 1960, “U-2 Incident [Vol. I] [May 1960] (1)” Box 25, OSS Alpha, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
5. The substance of the following discussion about the U-2 is culled from a variety of different sources, including extensive archival material. Two good general references on the subject can be found in the following works: For an account written shortly after the event that contains a bit of an apologist approach with a Pollyanna coating, see David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The U-2 Affair (New York: Random House, 1962). For an exceptionally well-written and exhaustive account, see Michael Beschloss, Mayday (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).
7. Concerning the downing of the plane itself, an editorial in the New York Times many years later revealed for the first time that there were three shots aimed at Powers’s craft. The first was a near miss that disabled the craft, lowering its altitude. This is the point at which Powers apparently bailed out. The second shot hit the craft and damaged it. The third shot destroyed a Soviet fighter plane sent to intercept the U-2. This information is based on recent reports by Col. Gen. Georgi Mikhailov, who was deputy head of Soviet Air Command in 1960 (Stephen Ambrose, 27 December 1990, A19).


18. For the importance of keeping the project secret, see Memo of Conversation, Special Assistant to the President with Eisenhower, 5/31/60, “1060-Meetings with the President-Vol 1 (3),” Box 4, OSANSA, Special Assistant to the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.


25. The discussion of this event is from “Events Relating to the Summit Conference, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate together with...


27. Beschloss, Mayday, 246.

28. Ibid., 247.

29. Ibid., 248. Also Wise and Ross, The U-2 Affair, 105; and Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 550.


33. Ibid., 252.


38. Apparently Eisenhower called off the U-2 flights in an informal conversation following a cabinet meeting on May 12. In the memo of conversation between General Goodpaster and Secretary Herter, “Goodpaster said he found what had happened was that the President and Gates stood up at the end of the Cabinet meeting that day and at that time the President told Gates to call off any provocative action by Defense in addition to cessation of the U-2 flights. Goodpaster said then the President and the Secretary (Herter) went into the President’s office and the President told the Secretary and asked Goodpaster to inform Allen Dulles, which Goodpaster did.” Memo, telephone call of Goodpaster to Herter, 6/1/1960, “Presidential Telephone Calls, 1–6/60 (1),” Box 10, Herter, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.


Most scholars agree that Khrushchev was under tremendous domestic political pressure at the time of the U-2 incident from hard-liners within his government who urged him to be "tougher" with the West. With the failure of his agrarian reforms, he was vulnerable to forces of opposition. See Beschloss, *Mayday*, on these points. From the perspective of prospect theory, Khrushchev's behavior at the summit occurred while he was operating in his own domain of losses. Thus, Khrushchev, like Eisenhower, may have been more willing to take greater risks with the "peace process" at the time of the U-2 incident and the Summit Meeting than he had been during his visit to the United States the previous September. This could certainly help account for his Berlin threats as well. However, there is not enough information available to speculate on all the factors that might have contributed to Khrushchev's behavior at the time of the Summit, and that analysis is certainly beyond the scope of this work. However, it is provocative to note that both leaders may have each been operating in a domain of losses without realizing that the other one was subject to those same considerations; in other words, each may have been more likely to accept risks himself, while simultaneously misunderstanding the motivations behind the gambles the other was taking. Regardless, the U-2 incident, and the controversy it caused, brought about the dissolution of the Summit little more than two weeks after the downing of Powers's plane.

44. Powers was released in Berlin, along with Frederick Pryor, another American, on February 10, 1962, in a prisoner exchange for the Soviet spy Rudolf Abel, the highest ranking agent that had been apprehended up to that point by the U.S. government. After quitting the CIA and being fired by Lockheed, Powers was killed on August 1, 1977, in a helicopter crash during a routine assignment reporting on traffic for a radio station in Los Angeles. Apparently, his craft ran out of fuel. His widow contended that he had been sabotaged by the CIA. It was upon the CIA's recommendation that President Jimmy Carter allowed Powers to be buried in Arlington National Cemetery. See Beschloss, *Mayday*, 400–401.

45. Careful review of the archival material makes evident that as much time as Eisenhower spent playing golf, however greatly exaggerated by the press, he never appeared to be either neglectful or disrespectful of the business of state. Anyone wishing independent confirmation of this contention is directed to a careful reading of the records from the National Security Council meetings in particular, 1952–1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. For a concurring opinion, see Fred Greenstein, *The Hidden Hand Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 1982).


49. The U-2 was a top secret project that was developed under the auspices of the CIA by Captain Kelly Johnson, who was at Lockheed at the time. Captain Johnson had a long history of success with designing aircraft: during World War I, he developed America's first tactical jet fighter, the F-80, in 141 days; by 1953, he had developed the nation's fastest plane, the Lockheed F-104 as well. The F-104 was transformed into the U-2. From the start, the goal of the U-2 was to fly higher and faster than any other aircraft. In 1954, the highest aircraft could reach 54,000 feet. The U-2 eventually flew at over 70,000 feet routinely. The final model was developed in 88 days at a cost of 19 million 1955 dollars. After the U-2 was shot down by the Soviet military in 1960, Richard Bissell commissioned Captain Johnson to develop a new plane capable of evading the Soviet military. In response to this request, Johnson produced the SR-71 “Blackbird” that flew at over 80,000 feet traveling at three times the speed of sound. By 1985, when a remote control version obviated the need for piloted flights, the SR-71 had survived over 1,000 attempts at interception by the Soviet military. For more on the development of the U-2, see Beschloss, *Mayday*.


55. Ibid., 118.


63. This process raises the issue of the role of motivational bias in decision making. For more on the effect of motivational bias in political decision making, see...

Also note how the probability of success and secrecy was misjudged due to the conjunction fallacy. For more on that fallacy, see chapter 3, note 77. In this instance, a low probability was overweighted, and it was assumed that failure was next to impossible. This was true for both the success of the project militarily as well as the ability to keep it secret politically.

65. Ibid., 118.
66. Ibid., 8.
67. Ibid., 404.
69. Litchenstein et al., “Judged Frequency of Lethal Events.”
70. Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.”
71. It is ironic to note that the U-2 overflights would have soon become a moot issue anyway. In August, 1960, the United States launched its first reconnaissance satellite which was able to photograph Soviet targets more systematically and comprehensively than the U-2 had been able to do. More importantly, it was well beyond the Soviet military’s ability to intercept.

Chapter 6

1. Notes from NSC Meeting, August 31, 1956, “295th NSC Meeting, 8/30/56,” Box 8, NSC-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
2. This discussion of the Suez Canal and the crisis that its nationalization produced is culled from a complete and careful reading of all relevant archival sources in the Eisenhower Library. For more accessible and generally accurate reviews of the crisis see: for an account that is somewhat legalistic in nature, Robert Bowie, *Suez 1956* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); the most engaging and informative memoirs on the subject can be found in Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1964), chapter 26, “Suez” (1956); and Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), chapter 13, “Showdown at Suez.”
3. The Suez Canal concession had been given to France by Khedive Osmol of Egypt in 1866; the Sultan of Turkey agreed to the concession. The agreement was to last 99 years from the opening of the Canal to traffic, which meant that it was due to expire in 1967. The Suez Canal itself was designed by a French engineer, De Lessees, and built with international financial support. Construction of the Canal
was completed in 1869. In 1875, while Disraeli was Prime Minister of Great Britain, the British bought 44 percent of the Canal Company’s holdings from Egypt. At the time of the crisis, the British owned about 400,000 shares in the Canal Company. See Diary, Dwight D. Eisenhower, August 8, 1956, “Diary,” Box 17, DDE Diary-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. It later operated under the 1888 Constantinople Convention. Although the United States was not a party to this agreement, the treaty was signed by nine countries, including Britain, France, and Russia. The Company and the freedom of passage rights of the signatories were reaffirmed in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954. Transcript of Television speech, John Foster Dulles to nation, August 3, 1956, “Suez Canal Report (Dulles) 8/3/56 Speech,” Box 16, Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.


6. “Points to be raised with Harold Macmillan and Roger Makins,” September 25, 1956, “Suez Problem July–Nov 1956-Feb–Mar 1957 (6),” Box 7, Subject-Dulles, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This document also makes the point, however, that many other vessels that transitted the Canal were operated by Panamanian and Liberian subsidiaries of American companies and were registered under the flags of those nations.


10. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 418–21.


23. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, 368. While Eden and Mollet drew analogies between Nasser and Hitler, Eisenhower saw the Soviet leaders as being more like Hitler. Also note that Eisenhower’s characterization of the Soviet leaders as “furious and scared” and thus dangerous represents an implicit acknowledgment of prospect theory’s argument that those in a domain of loss (“scared”) are more likely to take risks (and thus be “dangerous”).

24. Notes from Bipartisan meeting, November 9, 1956, “Nov 56 Misc (3),” Box 20, DDE Diary-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

25. Memo of Conversation, with President by Goodpaster, November 6, 1956, “Nov 56 Diary, Staff Memos,” Box 19, DDE Diary-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.


30. All statistics in the above paragraph are from Norman Ornstein et al., Vital Statistics on Congress, 1984–5, 177, 180–81.

31. State of the Union Speech, Eisenhower to Congress, January 5, 1956, “State of Union Jan 56 (1),” Box 14, Speech-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Eisenhower’s optimism arose from his belief that what he said about the positive state of America was not only true, but that much of it was a direct result of the success of his programs and policies.


34. Notes from NSC Meeting, November 1, 1956, “302nd NSC Meeting 11/1/56,” Box 8, NSC-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.


37. I must note that in carefully reading through every one of the open docu-
ments concerning the Suez crisis in the Eisenhower archives (over 1000 pages), there are less than a handful of private mentions of the moral necessity of supporting an anticolonialist position. In almost all of these cases, the “moral” discussions were pragmatically manipulative in nature, as when all present recognized the need to frame a presentation to the United Nations or Nasser in such a way as to make it more acceptable. While there is no overt support of the allies’ imperialist designs, neither is there an overriding philosophical emphasis on condemning it. Rather, as demonstrated by the great focus placed on such concerns in later memoirs, it is clear that this concern is emphasized as a more attractive retrospective explanation for behavior than the real one that clearly drove all policy discussions at the time. Such discussions were overwhelmingly preoccupied with doing whatever it took to maintain adequate access to oil supplies, including, but not limited to: accepting Egyptian sovereignty rights over the Canal territory, if not the Canal Company; condemning imperialist designs over former colonials; and so forth. While some of the statements in support of respect for Egyptian sovereignty and those expressing contempt for colonialist interests may appear to make the policy motivation moral in nature, the public nature of these sentiments belie their pragmatic intent. When I first glanced at the public documents and the memoirs, American foreign policy during the Suez crisis looked remarkably like a case of morality in action. (For a brilliant look at morality in American foreign policy, see Robert McElroy, Morality in American Foreign Policy [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992]. The Suez crisis is not specifically addressed in this work.) However, after carefully examining the private documents recorded at the time, which were not as biased by memory or impression management as the memoirs, I arrived at a different conclusion. These contemporary papers express overriding preoccupation, to the point of absolute obsession, with maintaining cheap and easy access to oil. The administration was, however, not stupid in pursuing their economic goals. Eisenhower officials knew that statements couched in politically correct anticolonial language was much more likely to achieve their goals, particularly within the United Nations and with Nasser himself, than pronouncements that neglected to mention the importance of sovereignty and anti-imperialism. This is not to say that the administration openly advocated deception, manipulation, or express racial prejudice among themselves; in private, morality was not consciously considered utilitarian, simply irrelevant. Only when the discussion turns to public statements do such moral concerns come into explicit focus. It must be noted, however, that a few administration officials were genuinely opposed to colonial motives. These moral arguments, however infrequent in spontaneous private discourse, were mostly pronounced by John Foster Dulles. A representative sample upon which to confirm this analysis can most efficiently be found in the NSC meetings, July 1956–Feb. 1957, NSC-Whitman collection, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

38. Eisenhower speaks of this fear numerous times in various NSC meetings, but nowhere more directly than in a letter to his friend Swede Hazlett: “But I can tell you one thing . . . the existence of this problem does not make sleeping any easier—. . . because of the opportunities that we have handed to the Russians.” Letter, Eisenhower to Hazlett, November 2, 1956, “Nov 56 Misc (4),” Box 20, DDE Diary-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
40. Ibid.
41. This included the First and Second User’s Conferences in London. For a daily record of the events of these conferences, see “Suez Summaries,” Box 43, International-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
42. Memo of Conference, President by Goodpaster, October 29, 1956, “Oct 56 Diary-Staff Memos,” Box 19, DDE Diary-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
43. Memo, Eisenhower by Goodpaster, November 21, 1956, “Nov 56 Diary-Staff Memos,” Box 19, DDE Diary-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
44. The relationships between France, Britain, and Israel during the course of the crisis is beyond the scope of this work. However, interested parties are directed to Sylvia Crosbie, *Tacit Alliance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), for an excellent examination of the French–Israeli link.
47. This domino theory is pervasive in British and French communications with the United States concerning the Suez crisis. For a representative sample of this, see the Eisenhower–Eden correspondence, “Eden 7/18/56–11/7/56 (1),” Box 19, International-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
51. Ibid., 518.
53. Ibid.
54. Intelligence Notes, August 10, 1956, “OCB 350.05 (File #3) (6) (Feb–Oct 56),” Box 111, NSC, OCB, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
55. Notes from NSC Meeting, August 31, 1956, “295th NSC Meeting, 8/30/56,” Box 8, NSC-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
59. Telegram, Barbour to Dulles, September 1, 1956, “Dulles, F Sept 56 (2),”
Box 7, D-H, Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Emphasis added. Note that the argument that operations could be narrow, successful, and relatively costless is reminiscent of Jervis’s discussion of the pursuit of irrational consistency and the avoidance of value trade-offs in political decision making. See Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, esp. 128–143.

60. Roy Fullick, *Suez: The Double War* (London: H. Hamilton, 1979), 160. In the middle of the crisis, four weeks prior to his departure for Jamaica, Eden was running a fever of 106 degrees.


63. Telegram, Dillon to Dulles, July 31, 1956, “Dulles, John Foster, July 56,” Box 17, Dulles-Herter-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Mollet went so far as to compare Nasser’s book *The Philosophy of Revolution* to Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, arguing that “all leading officials in the Dept of State should read this book promptly.” Throughout the crisis, Mollet never failed to invoke the Munich analogy consistently in his arguments about the necessity of containing Nasser’s influence immediately before he was allowed to gain control over all of North Africa: “He [Mollet] said that Munich had cost the world dearly in lives and he only hoped that the present situation would not lead to even more dire results within the next 3 to 5 years.” See Telegram, Dillon to Dulles, November 12, “Dulles, Foster Nov 56 (2),” Box 8, Dulles-Herter-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Mollet apparently consistently failed to grasp that Nasser taking control of his own land in Suez from the French was not entirely analogous to Hitler’s taking control of Czechoslovakia from the Czechs.

64. Standard interpretations of the Suez crisis often focus on the American desire to create and sustain the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For standard examples of such interpretations see the following: For an example that notes the importance of NATO, see Alexander DeConde, *A History of American Foreign Policy*, 3d ed. (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1978), 287–91. For an interpretation that mentions the moral imperatives, please see Walter LaFeber, *American, Russia, and the Cold War*, 4th ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), 190–95. The interpretation taken in this book argues for the central importance to the administration of open access to Middle Eastern oil for Western Europe. Please see note 37 in this chapter for the justification of that perspective.


69. Ibid., 122.

70. Ibid., 35.
71. Notes from NSC meeting, August 9, 1956, “292nd Meeting of NSC Aug 9 56,” Box 8, NSC-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.


77. Notes from NSC, 11/30/56, “305th NSC meeting 11/30/56,” Box 8, NSC-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.


82. Adams, Firsthand Report, 246.


90. Ibid., 40.


92. Letter, Eisenhower to Hazlett, “Aug 56 Misc (1),” Box 17, DDE Diary-Whitman, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Eisenhower’s prescience of Carter’s later imbroglio in Iran is interesting. In an ironic reversal of Suez, Carter tried to
entice the Western allies into supporting his position to engage in force to release
the hostages, while the British and French advocated caution without reservation.
In both cases, caution proved to be the better part of valor in the end.


95. See, for example, LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 192; and DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, 291.


98. As noted, Eden spent 21 days in Jamaica in the middle of the crisis. See Roy Fullick, Suez: The Double War. Dulles was hospitalized on November 3 for emergency stomach cancer surgery and essentially spent most of the rest of the crisis in the hospital. Eisenhower himself was not in great physical shape either. He had had a heart attack barely a year before the start of the crisis and had surgery for ileitis on June 8, little more than a month before Nasser announced the nationalization of the Canal. See Letter, Howard to Persons, September 29, 1955, “The President-Illness,” Box 1, L.Author Minnich-OSS, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

Chapter 7


4. For an exposition of the specifics of the psychometric approach, see Fischhoff et al., “How Safe is Safe Enough?”
5. Slovic, “Perception of Risk.”
7. Fischhoff et al., “How Safe is Safe Enough?”
8. Slovic, “Perception of Risk.”
9. A nice summary of these findings can be found in Daniel Goleman, “Hidden Rules Often Distort Ideas of Risk,” The New York Times, February 1, 1994. In addition, it now appears that the use of chemical weapons extends to American soldiers stationed in the Middle East during the Gulf War, although no actual deaths have been officially attributed to that cause as yet.
10. Slovic, “Perception of Risk.”
11. This notion is characterized in the paradigmatic biblical tale of John the Baptist, whose “repent now” message foretold the coming of the end of the world, when the chance for repentance would evaporate.
12. In fact, people often go to great comparative lengths to convince themselves of how they differ from the victim, so that they can convince themselves that a similar negative outcome will not befall them. This is not uncommon in the case of women responding to a rape victim, for example; the desire to distance is often quite strong because of the fear that it might happen to them as well. One of the protective aspects of the fundamental attribution error is that if we believe that something bad happened to someone because of what they are like as a person, and we can convince ourselves that we are not like the victim on the relevant criteria, we can use our positive illusions to perpetuate a false sense of security about all sorts of threats. For more on these biases, see Shelley Taylor, “Adjustment to Threatening Events: A Theory of Cognitive Adaptation,” American Psychologist 38 (1983): 1161–73; and Shelley Taylor and J. D. Brown, “Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health,” Psychological Bulletin 103 (1988): 193–210.


17. For more on this interface, see Izard, Kagan, and Zajonc, *Emotions, Cognition, and Behavior*.


19. Richard Nisbett and T. Wilson, “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes.” The classic example of this phenomenon involves people learning word pairs, like moon–ocean. Later, those same subjects are asked to name a detergent and subjects overwhelmingly respond by mentioning “Tide,” even when they do not use that detergent. When asked if the word pairs influenced their later choices, the majority of subjects vehemently denied that one task had any impact on the other.

20. While some will argue that how people understand emotion has to do with how they feel, it is equally plausible to offer a social cognition explanation for the subjective importance that individuals place on their emotional states. How people think about their emotions tells us as much about how people think as it does about how they feel. A social cognition interpretation would argue that emotions are neither wholly essential nor totally constructed. Rather, the way individuals come to instill meaning into their various emotional states betrays a great deal about how stimulus is processed to arrive at meaning. For the most sophisticated example of this kind of social cognition argument applied to gender, see Lawrence Kohlberg, “A Cognitive Developmental Analysis of Children’s Sex Role Concepts and Attitudes,” in *The Development of Sex Differences*, ed. Eleanor Maccoby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966).


22. Gordon Bower, “Mood and Memory,” *American Psychologist* 36 (1981). As an aside, this provides an interesting explanation for why depressed people have such a hard time remembering positive events from their past. Mood-incongruent memories are indeed less cognitively accessible to them than mood-congruent events that function to remind depressives of the events that made them sad in the past, thus reinforcing their depressive mood.

23. The ideas in this section largely derive from an extended personal discus-
sion with Amos Tversky. I am deeply indebted to Tversky for the challenging and intriguing questions he posed about this issue, as well as for the wisdom and insight of his responses to my queries. While I of course remain wholly responsible for any faults, the structure and content of this section is largely influenced by Tversky’s critical contribution to my thinking about this topic.

24. Eldar Shafir, I. Simonson, and Amos Tversky, “Reason-Based Choice,” *Cognition* 49 (1993): 11–36. The following discussion is heavily based on this article. I am also indebted to Amos Tversky for personal communication and further insights on this topic.


33. This discussion draws heavily upon Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky, “Reason Based Choice.”

In addition to the following publications, there is substantial use of archival materials from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Archives Library in Atlanta, Georgia, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Archives Library in Abilene, Kansas. Interested readers are directed to specific citations in the relevant case chapters.


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