

Lies, Damn Lies, and Ideology

Earl Long, Huey's younger brother, was big on promises in his campaigns for governor of Louisiana. Once he pledged to a movie theater lobbyist that he would fight for repeal of a 2 percent tax on movie admissions. The lobbyist (and presumably the theater owners) became avid supporters of the Kingfish's brother. One of Earl's first actions after the election was to announce to his legislature that he opposed annulment of the levy. The lobbyist went to the governor, demanding to know what he should say to his clients. Earl Long replied, "I'll tell you what to tell them. Tell them I lied" (Liebling 1970, 41).

Senator Frank Graham (D-NC), who was appointed to a Senate vacancy in 1949 and defeated in a primary the next year, didn't lie. That led to electoral problems. Graham was accused of being too soft on civil rights, too far away from the center of gravity in North Carolina or its Democratic party. He denied the accusation in the campaign but admitted as much in his "Farewell Address" to the Senate on September 23, 1950: "I have run the risk of taking sides in the midst of events which could not wait for certificates of safety and conformity while freedom was embattled. . . . I took sides in the South and in the nation for the fairer consideration of Jews, Catholics, Negroes, and the foreign born" (quoted in Pleasants and Burns 1990, 277).

Are legislators who ignore or even flout constituency pressures knaves or knights?¹ Do they deserve our scorn or our praise? More commonly, we think of independent sorts as "profiles in courage," following the advice of the young John F. Kennedy (1957, 14) before he ever took his seat in the Senate: "[W]e must on occasion lead, inform, correct and sometimes even ignore constituent opinion if we are to exercise fully that judgment for which we were elected. But acting without selfish motive or

private bias, those who follow the dictates of an intelligent conscience are not aristocrats, demagogues, eccentrics, or callous politicians insensitive to the feelings of the public.”

Legislators who revel in turning their backs on the public and those who stand above the “whims” of the moment justify their positions on higher principles and charge others who heed the call of the constituency with baser motives. As Representative Frank E. Smith (D-MS) argued, “All members of Congress have a primary interest in being re-elected. Some members have no other interest. Their participation in decisions of great national import is dependent entirely upon the reaction they expect from their own district or state” (Smith 1964, 127). A member of the House interviewed by Fenno (1978, 160) heaped scorn on some colleagues.

All some House members are interested in is “the folks.” They think “the folks” are the second coming. They would no longer do anything do displease the folks than they would fly. . . . I imagine if they get five letters on one side and five letters on the other, they die.

Nebraska Progressive senator George W. Norris (R), who reviled in flouting his party and his constituency too, appealed to a higher moral authority than the electorate: “In the end, the only worth-while pay in congressional services is that which comes from a satisfied conscience in the knowledge that you have done your duty as God gives you light, regardless of the effect it may have upon political fortunes” (Norris 1945, 198). And Edmund Burke, the English philosopher and legislator, rejected the notion that he was to represent the views of his Bristol constituents and dared the voters to punish him for his transgressions (which they did).² The House freshman class of the 104th Congress, the first controlled by Republicans in 40 years, saw itself as pledged to an ideological agenda, whatever the consequences. “We’re going to stand for principle. The consequences be damned,” said Rep. John Barden Shadegg (R-AZ). Rep. Charles Joseph Scarborough (R-FL) added: “50 to 55 of [the 73 GOP freshmen] don’t care if we get reelected if we fold on the budget” (both quoted in Gugliotta 1995, A10).

Since Burke, both theorists and empirical analysts of representation have followed his distinction between being a slave to one’s constituents and an independent thinker (either a knight or a knave). Legislators are

either “trustees” looking out for the public interest or “delegates” who heed the issue positions of their constituents (Eulau 1962; Davidson 1969). Some members split the difference, sometimes heeding constituents, at other times going their own way. They are “politicos.”

We presume that delegates are primarily interested in getting re-elected, while trustees are motivated by ideology. This distinction corresponds to alternative spatial models of candidate competition. The *Downsian* model is consistent with the demand that public officials be delegates. Voters cast ballots on the basis of issues. They insist that candidates faithfully reflect constituency positions. So candidates adopt the same positions, the preferred policy of the median voter. Since both candidates take the same stands, voters find little to choose from. They are consigned to using other factors, such as party identification or the performance of the incumbent administration, as voting cues (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984).

The *ideological-equilibrium* model holds that voters care about issues but prefer candidates who take distinct positions. Voters worry that candidates who converge to the median voter’s ideal stand are opportunists. They prefer sincere candidates. Officeholders gain reputations for honesty by taking clear policy stands that they stick with over the years. If voters worry about risk, they might prefer a candidate they don’t agree with to a nominee whose position is unclear. At least the devil you know will be consistent. You know what you are getting (Glazer and Grofman 1989; Dougan and Munger 1989; Richardson and Munger 1990). Voters have policy preferences, so why shouldn’t candidates? In a world where both voters and candidates care about policies, office-seekers can do better by stressing their true ideals than by catering to the public’s whims (Wittman 1983). It is quite acceptable to be a trustee. Ideology and electoral success can go hand-in-hand.

This great debate between Downsian delegates and ideological-equilibrium models has shaped our understanding of representation in American politics. Are all politics local, as former Speaker Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, would tell fellow House members?³ Or, is politics mostly about national issues, as the former Speaker, Newt Gingrich, admonished his flock?

This great debate is misplaced. So is most of our thinking about representation. We picture legislators as making choices between their own values and those of their constituents. Yet, most politicians don’t have to choose between their own ideals and constituency preferences.

Voters usually elect public officials who are in tune with public beliefs. When legislators fail to reflect constituency views, we presume that they jump ship. Perhaps they believe that ideological stands can bring them votes; perhaps officials believe that they must remain true to their own ideals.

Looking at representation in terms of delegates and trustees makes four fundamental mistakes. First, it presumes that there are but two actors, voters and legislators, in the great game of politics. Second, it assumes that one side (voters) tells the other (elected officials) what to do. Third, it presumes that what one wants is often different from what the other prefers. Fourth, it posits that legislators who want to get reelected must present bland policy alternatives to the electorate. Each assumption is wrong.

I shall outline below a model of representation based on principal-agent theory in economics that views voters as management and elected officials as employees. Each has its own preferences and, as in real workplaces, they often come into conflict. Legislators prefer to be trustees, while voters want to compel them to be trustees. This sets up the problem of how to ensure compliance. What steps do the “bosses” have to take to get their “employees” to do their bidding?

Not so much, I argue. Most of the time legislators and their constituents share similar views on key questions of public policy. There is no problem of compliance when both sides want the same thing. But the political world is not a two-person game. Legislators have more than one constituency. Elected officials heed the calls of voters. But they don't face an undifferentiated populace. They pay particular attention to their fellow partisans, in the electorate, in their party organizations, and in other elected bodies. When elected officials take positions that depart from those favored by their constituents, they are most likely responding to the preferences of their fellow partisans.

These claims rest on a very simple, but often overlooked, assumption: Legislative representation is not random. Liberal electorates elect liberal legislators. Conservative electorates choose conservative legislators. Moreover, liberal electorates choose Democrats and conservative constituencies vote for Republicans. Of course, there are exceptions, but they are just that: unusual cases. In constituencies that tilt leftward, Democratic activists are even more liberal than the rank and file. They put further pressure on elected officials to move in the direction of — and sometimes past — constituency opinion. The same dynamic holds on the

right for Republicans. When legislators go against public opinion, they are not simply behaving like trustees. They are responding to *different constituencies*, not just to their own whims. Principal-agent models miss the mark when they consider only one “principal.”

Even if they don’t make this mistake (and a few don’t), the principal-agent models miss the mark by treating legislator and constituency attitudes as if they were in conflict. Most often they aren’t. The big divide is not between legislators and constituents but between legislators *and* constituents in each party. Democrats and Republicans stand for different ideals. This is widely acknowledged for elected officials (Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 1997). Voters are also divided ideologically along partisan lines, though not as sharply as elites are. Legislators respond *more closely* to their partisan constituents and activists than to their state electorates. They can get away with this “misrepresentation” because statewide opinion is mostly a function of the attitudes of the dominant partisans. Massachusetts elects liberals such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy because its Democrats are progressive and *so is the statewide electorate*. The Democrats dominate Massachusetts because it is a liberal state.

Politicians don’t scatter to the winds when they hear a message based on issues, as a Downsian model would suggest. They are linked to their constituents by an *ideology*. A “belief system” or “ideology” is a pattern of intercorrelated positions across a set of issues (Converse 1964, 207). An ideology is a simplified way of viewing the world. It reflects a set of ethical prescriptions for how the world ought to work — or, as I shall argue later, a culture (Hinich and Munger 1994, 11–13). A highly constrained belief system *need* not be unidimensional. But the most straightforward ideology that is likely to be useful to both voters and candidates (as well as to developing a system of ethics) lies on one continuum, usually assumed to differentiate left from right (Converse 1964, 221). Ideologies become, as Downs (1957, chap. 3) himself argued, a short-cut for linking one’s own attitudes to a party affiliation. Simply put, they separate Democrats from Republicans. Converse had us believe that elites were polarized by consistent belief systems, but ordinary citizens aren’t. Achen (1975) showed that this isn’t true: Ordinary people have consistent belief systems, once we recognize the fuzziness of questions asked in surveys and the measurement error in administering polls.

Ideology isn’t the scourge of electoral politics, as in Downsian models and principal-agent theories. Instead, it is an electoral resource. Voters know what they are getting when they select a Democrat or a

Republican. Occasionally they might make a mistake and choose someone who is out of step ideologically with a party or a state. But most of the time this isn't a problem. Within limits, voters *want* ideological representation, and they use party affiliation as a cue to get it. Elected officials share the same values that their constituents espouse. Finding an elected official who consistently strays from public opinion should be a rarity.

Suppose we all woke up one day to find that chocolate ice cream is good for us. It helps *lower* cholesterol and makes us live *longer*. Downsians and principal-agent theorists (largely the same folks) would be no less surprised to find that moving to the left or right, as opposed to the center, helps a candidate win an election. What they believed to be an indulgence (either voting against the constituency or consuming a lot of ice cream) turns out to be the staff of life. Just as most doctors would be skeptical of the report on chocolate ice cream, most (though not all) spatial theorists would think twice before accepting the argument that ideology helps a candidate. Most doctors, even if they came to believe this new report, would urge us not to become chocoholics. They'd be right. Too much of a good thing can be harmful. And political advisors would do well to recommend ideology in moderation as well.

Elected officials face a dilemma under the ideological-equilibrium model. Voters prefer candidates who take distinctive positions. Elites, who know more about issues and care more about them than all but a handful of citizens (Converse 1966), will press officials to go further to the right or left. They are like the candy makers and grandmothers who keep advising: "Eat, eat!" Elected officials aren't in much danger of giving voters what they don't want. Instead, their cardinal sin may be giving them more of what they want than they can handle. That's when politicians get in trouble—for not knowing when to stop. The voters may decide to reign them in and put them on an ideological diet.

How far can elected officials go to the right or the left? Who sets the limits? In each state there is either a dominant ideology or roughly balanced competing ideals that determine the constraints. This dominant ideology is part of a state's political culture (Elazar 1972; cf. chap. 6). It stems from a state's history and the values of the different segments of the population. The Northeast is more liberal, the South and West more conservative, and the Midwest an ideological battleground. Where one value system predominates, elected officials are more constrained. The parties will be less polarized. The majority party will

reflect the dominant ideology best, and the minority party will be pressured to mimic the majority. Majority party legislators will feel “free” to go beyond the bounds of public opinion, but minority-party officials realize that their electoral success depends upon not seeming too out of touch with public attitudes. Mimicking the majority is the only way a minority party can be competitive. There is no guarantee that it will (or can) do so. If one party (or officeholder) so dominates a state’s politics, the opposition may become dispirited. Its candidates may go well beyond the bounds of acceptable values, and the party and its candidates will be doomed to long-term minority status (see chapter 5). In a state with a dominant ideology, either both parties will espouse it or only the majority will. In the first case, the parties need not offer me-too platforms, but the minority will be constrained as to how far from the existing consensus it can go. In the second instance, the minority will feel free to cast the consensus aside, but it will do so at its electoral risk.

In states without a dominant ideology, as in the Midwest (especially in states with moralistic cultures, as noted in chapter 6), the two parties will be more polarized. Each party will reflect the values of its stronger supporters, and elected officials will feel pressure to move toward activists in their own parties. A dominant ideology can set the limits for political actors. Without it, politics becomes more of a free-for-all between two parties that fight a real battle of ideas.

Who Is Represented?

The idea of “profiles in courage” suggests a lone wolf braying at political winds. So does much of our language of representation. A trustee is a person set apart from the constituency—often one who knows better. But politicians are hardly solitary agents. Even great moralists such as Norris and Smith—especially such legislators—did not go into battle alone. Nebraska Republican leaders tried to defeat Norris in the 1930 Republican primary and ultimately pushed him out of the party six years later (Norris 1945, chaps. 28, 34). Norris had little use for Nebraska Republicans or their leaders, whose victories “were obnoxious and detrimental to the public good” (Norris 1945, 371). Smith (1964, 280), who was gerrymandered out of his House seat in 1962 after urging moderation on civil rights, bemoaned the “disastrous mutation in Mississippi’s political character in the last forty years” that led state legislators to dismember his district.

Yet both legislators were creatures of their constituencies. For all of Smith's (justified) self-righteousness, he acknowledged that he was more than just a seer who stood out from the crowd. While he had to tread gently on his message of racial reconciliation, he had more leeway than other Southern moderates (Smith 1964, 246–47).

The fact that the largest town in my district was Greenville, the most urbane and progressive city in Mississippi, was an invaluable asset to me as a congressman. The business leadership of the community understood the role federal programs could play in the town's economic development. . . . Greenville was an oasis in the racial strife and obsession that smothered the rest of Mississippi.

Smith recognized that his independence reflected his overwhelmingly Democratic district. Norris was not a loner either. Nebraska had a long tradition of independence; it was one of Populist presidential candidate James B. Weaver's strongest states in 1892 and gave Progressive Robert M. La Follette 6 percent more of its vote than did the nation in 1924.

Even many of the freshmen Republicans of the 104th House admit that they are not pure profiles in courage. Rep. Mark Edward Souder (R-IN) maintained that “[Washington commentators] may think of us as extremists here, but none of us are extremists at home. For our constituents to acknowledge that we're extremists is to say either that we duped them or that we [the voters] are all extremists” (quoted in Gugliotta 1995, A10). It's not just on the right: Rep. Bernard Sanders (I-VT), the only self-proclaimed socialist in the House of Representatives, explained how someone with his beliefs could get elected to Congress: “It's not just me. Many hundreds and hundreds of people have been working for the same things I have. In Vermont, we have been doing third party politics for thirty years.”⁴

The view of representation as a battle between legislators and constituents misses something critical: context. Public officials don't stand naked before an undifferentiated mass public. Nor do they jump through ideological hoops. They are pushed—by their partisans, party activists, and fellow officeholders. Most legislators don't see constituencies as undifferentiated masses of voters: 60 percent of Kingdon's (1973, 33) congressional respondents see elites as a key component of constituency politics; legislators who view either elites (or both elites and voters)

as a key component of their constituencies are more likely to say that pressures from back home affect their roll call behavior.

Representation comes in concentric circles (Fenno 1978). What we consider to be *the* electorate is the most remote constituency. It acts as a check on members who stray too far from public attitudes. The other constituencies are a legislator's bases of support. They range from fellow partisans to other officeholders and party activists to close personal friends. As loyal supporters, they have a more direct effect on how a legislator behaves. As we move from fellow partisans to close personal friends, we see two related dynamics at work. First, successive groups care more about ideology. A legislator's party identifiers are less preoccupied with issues than party activists. Second, familiarity breeds likeness. Opposites don't attract each other in politics. The closer you are to a legislator's inner circle, the more likely you are to share his (her) ideology. If legislators stray from the ideological center of their constituents, they won't be able to count on their supporting constituencies to bring them back.

Candidates aren't free to adopt any policies they believe the electorate wants. To get a party's nomination, a potential office-seeker must gain the support of party activists. These devoted supporters of a party will push a candidate toward the party's preferred ideology, which will be more extreme than the mass public's (Aldrich 1983; 1995, chap. 6; Grofman 1993).⁵ Party activists monitor the behavior of incumbents, pushing Democrats more to the left and Republicans to the right. Both initially and once in office, this immoderate strategy will help candidates win primaries (Coleman 1971; G. Wright 1978a, 1978b). When candidates take distinctive positions, they energize their base—increasing turnout among party activists in the general election. This boost in participation might compensate for any votes lost from alienated voters in the center (Aldrich 1995, 191). Or it might not—and lead to a confrontation among the constituencies.

Multiple constituencies complicate the problem of representation. If you have many bosses, whom do you obey (cf. Denzau and Munger 1986)? The full electorate is the ultimate check on member behavior. But is an ideological mismatch between voters and officeholders misrepresentation? Or is it representation of someone else? When legislators pay more attention to their core supporters than to all voters, are they burrowing themselves into ideological holes at the expense of the public's ideology?

The central messages in the pages ahead are (1) legislators are creatures of their constituency; and (2) we need a broader view of representation. Fenno (1978) provides us with the key to the puzzle in his four-constituencies model. The full set of voters is the “geographic constituency.” It is most distant from the day-to-day life of the officeholder but has the ultimate check on how moderate or extreme legislators can choose to be. The other three blocs exert more ideological pressures on members. “Reelection constituencies” are the people who are *reliable* supporters at the ballot box. Much, though not all, of the time, fellow partisans in the electorate comprise the bulk of a member’s reelection constituency (Fenno 1978, 8). These reliable supporters not only produce the votes necessary to secure another term every second or sixth November (for the House or Senate, respectively) They also provide the bulk of a legislator’s base in primary elections. A legislator’s strongest supporters form the “primary constituency” (Fenno 1978, 18–24). Members call this bloc “my political base,” “my hard core,” and “my true believers.” They include, in Fenno’s characterization, the volunteers and financial contributors, and fellow elites (Fenno 1978, 18–19; cf. G. Wright 1978a, 1978b, 1994).

Finally, there is the member’s inner circle, the “personal constituency” (Fenno 1978, 24–27). These are a legislator’s closest friends, who see the outside world in the same way. One House member described his “group” as “philosophical soul mates” linked together by “an emotional grab” (Fenno 1978, 26). Others become valued advisers *because they share the same worldview*. Most of the time fellow partisans and elites share the values of the full electorate. Yet, they are usually more extreme than the full electorate. They push legislators to the left (if they are Democrats) or the right (if they are Republicans), beyond what the full electorate would wish.

Is representation a battle for legislators’ souls between centrist voters and immoderate partisans and fellow elites? Sometimes, but not usually. Mostly partisans and elites share the values of the full electorate. There is often no conflict between the demands of a legislator’s various constituencies (cf. Lascher, Kelman, and Kane 1993, 84). Kingdon’s (1973, 235–36) study of roll call voting among House members found that 47 percent of all decisions involved no conflict among *any* of the influences on legislative voting. Legislators’ own views were in conflict with constituency attitudes only 15 percent of the time.⁶ *Multiple constituencies don’t necessarily create cross-pressures. Most of the*

time the various constituencies are on the same side of the ideological divide. Elected officials are usually pulled between degrees of liberalism or shades of conservatism. But sometimes there is tension among the constituencies. When there are divisions, legislators run for cover. This is push-me pull-you politics, where the full electorate demands moderation and the core supporters expect fealty to an ideological program.

Bringing fellow partisans and elites into the representational mix makes us rethink the distinctions between delegates and trustees and between Downsians and ideological-equilibrium theorists. These “new” actors introduce more ideology into American politics than either delegate theorists or Downsians admit. But they also raise the threat of electoral sanctions against members who stray too far from the preferences of the full electorate, threatening trustees and violating the premises of ideological-equilibrium theories.

Politics can be local *and* ideological: The values that count most are rooted in one’s own constituency. We must take a broader view of constituency to see how one can be a hybrid of the Downsian delegate and the ideological-equilibrium trustee. When legislators vote against their districts or states, they generally reflect the values of their partisan base. When they “violate” their “responsibilities” to their constituents, they are representing followers who may be as important to them as the full electorate. In many cases, these core supporters pull legislators away from districtwide (or statewide) public opinion. I offer a more complex view of representation than we have. It acknowledges that both parties and elites matter even in an electoral world largely ruled by public opinion. Yet it is more than that: It is a different way of looking at representation, expanding the base of who matters. This way of looking at the world suggests that legislators fare very well at representation. Only a handful stray from statewide, state party, and state party elite ideology. Those who do pay an electoral price. When we incorporate these new actors into the representational equation, we find that legislators who go against their constituents are not so much profiles in courage who dance to a different drummer as much as fellow travelers with other partisans.

Whose Constituents?

The debate over representation has been dominated by Miller and Stokes’s (1963) “diamond” model. This framework begins with constituency opinions, which shape both legislators’ perceptions of constituency

attitudes and members' own values. Both in turn affect legislator roll call behavior.

This model served us well for a long time, but diamonds aren't forever. For Miller and Stokes, the critical—and weakest—linkage is between constituency attitudes and legislators' perceptions of these opinions. Only for salient issues is there a strong linkage between the two (Miller and Stokes 1963; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Holloway 1975). The rest of the diamond model isn't nearly as interesting if legislators don't know what's on voters' minds or if there is not much on voters' minds at all. For Miller and Stokes, ignorance runs both ways, making the representational nexus weak. Since 1963, there have been numerous challenges to Miller and Stokes. Members of Congress may not be able to tell you much about what people think on a particular roll call, but they have good ideas about what their constituents believe. This is what Fenno's concept of "home style" is all about. Powell (1982, 666) shows that constituents aren't so badly informed about their representatives either. There is a moderate correlation ($r = .50$) between legislator ideology and legislators' perceptions of these values.

A more profound challenge to the diamond model came from the recognition that legislators represent their core supporters, mostly composed of their fellow partisans, better than they do the full electorate. This is hardly a new idea. It dates to the early days of quantitative analyses of representation, in Huntington's (1950) study of legislator ideology and electoral marginality. Without public-opinion data, Huntington was forced to rely upon an ingenious argument about why marginal representatives are more extreme than safe legislators. Miller (1964) and Fiorina (1974) followed in the same tradition. Study after study concluded that legislators respond better to their reelection constituencies than to the geographic constituency.⁷

This two-constituencies perspective still treats legislators and constituents as combatants in a representational struggle. Fellow party identifiers enter into the picture to help explain why legislators don't always adhere to the ideology of the geographic constituency. But short of adding another actor to the mix—and sometimes referring to politicians' need to win primary elections—the two-constituencies perspective on representation remains a thin story. Fenno's account is richer. It provides a context for partisan representation.

The reelection, primary, and personal constituencies share a partisan base. Just as fellow party identifiers form the core of a legislator's

reelection base, party elites constitute a public official's inner circle. Party identifiers pull legislators to more extreme positions than the geographic constituency would prefer. And core supporters tug them even further. Party activists are generally more extreme—Democrats more liberal, Republicans more conservative—than either the full electorate or even blocs of party identifiers (McCloskey, Hoffman, and O'Hara 1960; Aldrich 1995, chap. 6).

Much of the received wisdom about American politics plays down linkages between parties and ideology. The Downsian/delegate model leads us to expect moderate parties that hue to the center of public opinion within each constituency. Bland parties make it difficult for voters to base their votes on issues (Downs 1957, 136–38). The “traditional” view of the American voter highlights this confusion: Party identification and ideology are not closely connected (Campbell et al. 1960, 211–12).

A new consensus is emerging. American politics is more ideological than we realized (Poole and Rosenthal 1984). Parties shape this conflict of values, and partisan divisions in Congress have been increasing in the past several decades (Rohde 1991). As Warren E. Miller (1988, 74) argues, “Party . . . is the principal carrier and organizer of mass issue preferences and helps provide a structure for national politics that articulates and integrates the issue concerns of leaders and followers” (cf. Hinich and Munger 1994, 86). Parties have a monopoly on office holding in the United States and every other democracy. Their nominations are valuable, even more so when they can control access to their lines on the ballot. Mostly they can't legally. They don't need to worry. Rarely are candidates—at least viable ones—out of step with their partisan ideologies. Party activists, who are motivated by issues more than the rank-and-file partisans and who are more ideologically extreme, play a central role in nomination politics (Aldrich 1995, 186–88).

Parties polarize politics in at least five distinct ways. First, party organizations organize the faithful and spread the word. When congressional candidates depended more on their local parties (in the 1950s), Miller and Stokes (n.d., chap. 5) found that party organizations transmitted information about voter preferences to elites. Congressional candidates who relied upon parties for information about constituency preferences were more likely to agree with voters than office-seekers without party ties. Fellow partisans and party elites are not just reliable supporters. They feel intensely about many issues and will thus be more motivated to

communicate their views both to legislators and to constituents. The intensity of constituency views weighs heavily on legislators' behavior (Kingdon 1973, 35–38). Fervent supporters feel stronger bonds with their elected leaders and will be loath to let them slip into ideological heresy. Second, fellow party members often share the same electoral fate. Standing together with common values will seal that collective fate—in both good times and bad (Cox and McCubbins 1993).⁸ Third, candidates for office must win primaries before they contest the general elections. The need to rally the faithful first—and then as key elements of the electoral coalition in November—pushes (Northern) Democrats further left and Republicans more to the right than we would expect were there but a single electorate.

Fourth, parties bring together people with similar viewpoints. A member of the House described his personal constituency to Fenno (1978, 26).

We're a group of people who have the same philosophy of government—we are philosophical soul mates. We all believe that people should be involved in their government. We've all been in politics and all came to the group through the Republican party.

All sorts of observers (including Downs 1957, 25) accept this argument. Frequent contact among party members reinforces common values and produces greater party solidarity. In the halls of Congress, the most important cue givers come from one's own *state party delegation* (Kingdon 1973; Matthews and Stimson 1975).

Finally, party elites form close bonds with each other. Fenno's member adds (1978, 26): “And then there is an emotional grab. We all like each other.” Solidarity can help build ideological consensus. Illinois senator Paul H. Douglas (D) wrote of the “healthy mutual respect” he had with Chicago alderman Jacob M. Arvey. Douglas was a reformer. Arvey was the machine incarnate. Yet Douglas's respect “grew into a warm friendship and later became a significant factor in my own political career.” Arvey, even though more concerned with delivering votes than anything else, had “an insight into liberal movements that the average politician lacked” (Douglas 1971, 91). The senator needed no prodding to cast his lot with liberals, but such camaraderie with fellow partisans must be reassuring when worrying about stepping out against public opinion. In both the Wisconsin and Ohio state legislatures, members

choose fellow partisans—particularly from the same or neighboring districts—as their close friends. Friends share similar ideologies and, even beyond the impact of shared values, vote together on roll calls (Caldeira and Patterson 1987; Arnold, Deen, and Patterson 1995).

Politicians view their support coalitions as more than simply a source of votes. Core backers tell officeholders what voters are thinking and spread the legislator’s message to a broader electorate (Fenno 1978, 237). Members communicate mostly with their base.

I don’t have time to speak to constituents who are uncommitted. I’m so badgered by people to whom I’m obligated politically that I spend most of my time performing ceremonially before the people who agree with me. (Fenno 1978, 192)

Legislators get a biased view of the world that largely reinforces their own predispositions. When we overlay issue agreement with personal friendship, we see an overwhelming tendency for legislators to develop tunnel vision. Legislators with close ties to party activists are likely to push themselves further away from public opinion and toward the extremes.⁹ A solid partisan base of support permits legislators to rally the faithful and ignore the opposition. Legislators feel more comfortable with their own supporters and even refer to opponents as “the usual nuts writing me a lot of crap”; one member told Kingdon about unions (1973, 35): “They’ve never supported me, and I never support them, so I’m not listening.” Legislators can adopt this strategy only if they have a robust support base that depends upon, but not solely upon, core partisan supporters. A weak partisan support base requires more attention to the geographic constituency.

Partisan constituents drive Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right of the median voter. Were this dual constituency (partisan and geographic) all that mattered, representation might not pose vexing problems. Party identifiers divide over ideology, but there is a partisan gap, not a chasm. Most incumbents could, if they wished, split the difference between these two constituencies. Go far enough to your base to energize it and to deter a strong primary challenge. Most legislators don’t face powerful challenges in primaries. So they needn’t overreact ideologically.

The reliance on party activists and other elites as information sources and cue-givers poses a different problem. Elites are typically

more polarized than the rank and file. They can pull officeholders farther than fellow partisans. Their friendship and frequent interactions with members of Congress magnifies their impact. Since fellow partisans already drive legislators away from the center, following the lead of the activist base may cross the danger zone *unless taking relatively extreme positions is an electoral equilibrium*. Sometimes it is, at other times not. Yet there is an irony ahead. The political marketplace offers solace to neither a Downsian delegate nor a trustee ideological-equilibrium model. We shall see that candidates are most likely to take similar positions when it helps to be ideological. They are most likely to diverge from each other when issues cost votes.

Representation is a dialogue among legislators and their multiple constituencies. Each actor (as well as others that I don't consider here) tries to sway the member to its position. The legislator balances competing demands, recognizing that (s)he has most influence over those people with whom (s)he speaks most frequently: fellow officeholders, party activists, and close friends. The most distant actors, the geographic constituency, largely sends messages one way — to the member. It is not attentive enough, cohesive enough, or trusting enough to permit the member to change its mind on critical questions of policy. At most, people will tolerate modest amounts of defection from less controversial issues (Bianco 1994, 79; Fenno 1978, 152). Most legislators must still contend with electorates that will sort them out if they have any temptation to bolt too far out of line.

Principals and Agents

The picture I have drawn so far suggests a world in which legislators forsake their constituents in favor of an ideological agenda. Are legislators and constituents engaged in an ideological war? One influential perspective says yes. It looks at constituents and legislators as employers and employees. Management wants to get the maximum effort out of workers. Employees prefer to take longer coffee breaks and otherwise to expend less effort. There is a battle between “principals,” the managers, and their “agents,” the workers. Without effective monitoring, the agents will “shirk” their responsibilities and put out insufficient effort (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).

If we view constituents as principals and legislators as agents, we have an analogy to the employer-employee relationship.¹⁰ Both voters

and public officials have values. Voters want legislators to be pure delegates. A *Time*-CNN survey in 1993 found that 68 percent of respondents wanted members of Congress to vote the district line, while just 24 percent were willing to let legislators use their own judgment.¹¹ Officeholders prefer to hew to their own ideologies. Much like an employee who prefers to exert his own level of effort, “a politician who shirks his constituents’ interests and votes in accordance with his own preferences is engaging in a consumption activity” (Davis and Porter 1989, 103). Such legislators “indulge” their own preferences at the expense of their responsibilities to their employers, the constituents. Kalt and Zupan (1984, 283–84; cf. also Kalt and Zupan 1990) argue: “The perquisites of political office [include] . . . the ability to use the power of government to impose one’s own pet theories of the ‘good’ society.”

An extensive literature on shirking has developed since Kalt and Zupan (1984) and Carson and Oppenheimer (1984) independently transferred the concept from the economics of the marketplace to legislative representation.¹² Many discussions, especially by economists, view legislative misrepresentation with the same opprobrium that they would mete out to a worker sleeping on the job or to Burke’s disdain for his constituents.¹³ There is little moral difference between a Burke, who told his Bristol constituents that he would not be bound by their dictates, and an Earl Long, who promised he would support some constituents and went back on his word.

Any deviation from the delegate role involves shirking; all violate the implicit contract between principals and agents. Shirking may occur on single roll calls that may not tap a general dimension of ideology (Coates and Munger 1995). Or it may represent a very different representational problem. Ferguson (1995, 381–84) posits a political world in which *both* political parties stand at the same place—but at a considerable distance from the median voter. The parties are driven by the need to raise large campaign contributions from business. They won’t represent the mass of voters, whose attitudes are at odds with big business. Legislators “shirk” their constituents by voting with the folks who paid for their campaigns.

Ferguson makes a strong case for the impact of money in politics, but his argument fails for two reasons. First, there is considerable evidence that American parties *generally* don’t converge to the same position (cf. Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Second, he doesn’t provide data to show that either party is consistently too far away from the public and too close to

business. Ferguson presumes that ideology *doesn't matter much* in American politics. But in an ideological world, there is less room for shirking from interest groups alone. Pressures from business — through lobbyists or political action committees — are most likely to be successful on narrow issues that depart from the usual left-right continuum that forms the core of ideology. They will have fewer conquests on questions that tap deeply held values such as the left-right divide (Frendreis and Waterman 1983). This is not to say that business lacks power. Quite the contrary. Business has a lot of clout — but it comes mostly through its ties to its conservative agenda and to Republicans (and in the 1970s and before) to Southern Democrats. To be sure, business gives lots of money to Democrats, but the literature on roll call voting provides scant evidence that it shifts many votes on the floor or in committee. It may lead members to push for legislation, but the greatest impact of business money comes from the already converted (Hall and Wayman 1990).

Picking up victories on lots of small issues may be important to business, but it isn't likely to induce a lot of shirking. If it did, two things would happen. First, the dominant single ideological dimension that characterizes so much of congressional voting would break down, and there would be evidence of a more scattered terrain in the Congress. Ideological consistency would give way to tiny islands of influence. Second, consistent voting against public opinion would yield much larger discrepancies between legislator voting and public opinion than I report in the chapters that follow. Business interests are not autonomous from the larger political system, even if they have (and contribute) far more money than anybody else.

Not everyone has a negative view of misrepresentation. Kalt (1981, 278) considers a legislator's own ideology to be based upon "altruistic" motives reflecting the "public interest" (cf. Carson and Oppenheimer 1984, 177). Lascher, Kelman, and Kane (1993, 99–100) found that ideology trumped constituency attitudes in a survey of House members on a proposed flag-burning amendment to the Constitution. They concluded that legislators are "moral agents, obligated to do what they believe is right" and that this result is "heartening."

Voters want their legislators to be pure delegates. Public officials want to be pristine trustees. Legislators bend to the public will because voters have power of them: They can put them out of office. Yet, the public doesn't pay attention all of the time. This gives legislators leeway to vote their own ideologies. If few are watching, they can be profiles in

courage. (Lying is more difficult, since people are apt to remember specific promises politicians make as quid pro quo for votes.) When voters pay attention, legislators act as good constituency agents. These antagonists don't dance the minuet. They are more like combatants in a mosh pit, strangers engaged in ideological combat (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 1990).

Legislators shirk because they can get away with it. Citizens don't monitor politicians' behavior well. Even if they decided to pay more attention, they would face an imperfect market. Representatives and senators come up for election every two and six years. And most face minimal competition (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 283). Voters have greater incentives to monitor officeholders when an election is approaching and fewer incentives when a legislator is retiring (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 1990; Lott and Reed 1989; Lott and Bronars 1993). If legislators deviate too much from their constituents too close to election time, they can wake up the sleeping giant of public opinion. They might even lose the next election.

Voters may not punish legislators simply for ideological voting. Some constituents want their legislators to be liberal or conservative. Others may prefer moderation. Voters should punish—or reward—legislators not for being liberal (conservative), but for being *too liberal* (*conservative*). Kalt and Zupan (1984), following Kau and Rubin (1982) and mimicking Carson and Oppenheimer (1984), seek to determine the *pure personal ideology* of a legislator, after removing the constituency's preferences. Once they obtain an estimate of a public official's own views, as distinguished from constituency attitudes, they show how personal values affect legislative voting and how proximity to elections influences personal values. Personal ideology is distinct from (and independent from) constituency preferences. It is thus a measure of legislator shirking.

Shirking models imply not only a delegate theory of representation, but also a Downsian approach to elections (cf. Richardson and Munger 1990, 14–15). Voting the district line is not only a moral obligation (some say), but also “an investment in political office-holding. The present opportunity to take a position contrary to that desired by the constituency is foregone” (Davis and Porter 1989, 102; cf. Erikson 1971). Trustee/ideological-equilibrium arguments deny that shirking costs votes or is a moral imperative. Personal ideology can be a positive force (Richardson and Munger 1990).

The shirking literature treats pure personal ideology as the key to representation. These studies are controversial. Many, including friends who read drafts of this book, don't like the language or the public-choice approach on which it is based. Some just don't believe that you can measure pure personal ideology (Jackson and Kingdon 1992; G. Wright 1994). I don't have problems with the language or the approach but was long a skeptic of the attempt to measure shirking from roll call data and constituency traits. I set out to bury the shirking literature rather than to praise it, or even just to replicate it.

The shirking perspective, more than other approaches to roll call voting and representation, pictures legislators and voters as antagonists (Kingdon 1988, 15). These studies begin with the premise that personal ideology is a central force in legislators' roll call behavior — and that it stands apart from constituency preferences. A distinctive legislator ideology is central to the theoretical perspective of principal-agent models. Principals and agents have incompatible goals that are only resolved by monitoring each other and imposing sanctions. They don't engage in dialogues with each other. One of the major contributions of this approach is a measurement strategy for deriving a legislator's pure personal ideology. This technique (see chapter 2) separates legislator values from constituency values. It purposefully puts legislators naked before their constituents. The multiple-constituencies approach views the theoretical argument and the measurement strategy that stems from it as wrongheaded. Politicians such as Burke who stand apart from all of their constituencies are anomalies, soon to be purged from the polity by a conspiracy as wide as that on Agatha Christie's *Murder on the Orient Express* (where everyone did it). And politicians find it difficult to get away with lying even once.¹⁴

But often ideas that seem wrong on their face provide a useful starting point. The shirking models see legislators and constituents in a struggle for representation. Only the geographic constituency matters. The multiple-constituencies approach holds that the full electorate is but one influence on legislators' behavior. It is critical, since it is final. But most citizens pay little attention to politics. The more proximate concentric circles — the personal and primary constituencies — make themselves felt daily. They also reinforce the beliefs of the members. There are two major problems with the principal-agent model of representation: (1) Principals and agents may not have conflicting values; and (2) unlike employees in economic organizations, legislators have multiple prin-

cipals. The multiple-constituency perspective gets around both of these difficulties. It also resolves several other, though less fundamental, problems: If shirking is important, there must be a fair amount of it. If many senators vote contrary to their constituents, why aren't more defeated? The answers are not obvious from principal-agent models but very much in line with the multiple-constituencies approach. When we broaden the concept of representation to include many constituencies, we find that legislators don't shirk very much. Voters (and the activists behind winning candidates) do a pretty good of selecting potential officeholders who are in sync with all of their constituencies. In addition to selection, there is sorting: Legislators who are out of step with their constituents will be sorted out of office in due course (Lott and Reed 1989, 83–84).

When we develop any model, it is useful to have a foil — a null model. The shirking perspective is just the null model we need to test claims of the multiple-constituencies perspective. For the multiple-constituencies thesis, context is critical. Legislators are creatures of the constituencies they represent. For principal-agent arguments, context is insignificant. The statistical models *presume* that there is no relationship between a legislator's personal values and the preferences of any constituents.

To test a competing argument, I have to accept many of the claims, both substantive and methodological, in the literature. Doubters should bear with me. Your incredulity will pay off. If I accept, however tentatively, the arguments of principal-agent models, I can measure pure personal ideology. Yet, it is *not* independent of the views of either one's geographic or reelection constituencies. And there isn't that much of it. When I separate out the attitudes of a member's core supporters from a legislator's ideology, there is even less left over. We may be able to measure a legislator's pure personal ideology, but there is little about it that is distinctive. Public officials' values are the shared beliefs of constituents and elites. And this means that voters are not just principals and legislators their agents. Most of the time legislators' and constituents' values don't conflict with each other. They have shared interests, so members can be trustees and delegates at the same time.

The contrast between the shirking and multiple-constituency models can help us understand the representational nexus more clearly. The shirking model is fundamentally Downsian. Legislators who hope to gain reelection will hue to the line of the median voter in the geographic constituency. If they "indulge" their personal ideologies, they will pay at the polls. The multiple-constituencies model permits a greater role for

values. Members may be pushed from the middle by their core supporters. But the multiple-constituencies approach is not a haven for ideologists. If legislators go too far or if partisan supporters are out of touch with the full electorate, straying can be costly, as Downs would suggest.

More so than most frameworks for roll call behavior, the shirking model is a natural null model. Its language focuses on how legislators and constituents stand apart from each other. The multiple-constituencies argument suggests how they come together. These fundamentally different assumptions let me manipulate the shirking model in a way that I could not with more traditional models of representation. And the manipulations will show that legislators do a fine job of representing their constituencies, even if they aren't always in sync with their (geographic) constituents.

The Road Ahead

This main components of the pages ahead are legislators' ideology, the preferences of various constituencies (geographic, reelection, and primary/personal), how they interact, and how representation affects reelection. My focus is on the interaction: How can we measure personal ideology, and how much of it is there? When legislators vote contrary to the wishes their mass constituencies — either the full geographic electorate or fellow partisans — are they really shirking? Are they representing themselves — or their core supporters, especially party elites? Can voters monitor their elected representatives? If they can, are they more likely to punish errant members in primaries or general elections? When does ideology count most? And whose ideology?

I offer a stern test of the shirking literature and find that much of it comes up wanting. A fair examination would put the original data up against new measures, measurements, and theoretical frameworks. This is the strategy I employ. Mark Zupan kindly provided me with the data that he and Joseph Kalt used in their studies of Senate roll call behavior in 1977–78. The ideology scores they use, primarily derived from League of Conservation Voters ratings (see Kalt and Zupan 1984; and chapter 2 below), though also from Americans for Democratic Action (Kalt and Zupan 1990; and chapter 7 below), are the starting point of my analysis. The Kalt-Zupan database has two strong limitations. First, it is based only on senators who served in one biennium, limiting my analyses to cross-sectional models. Bender and Lott (1996, 76–77) are cer-

tainly correct when they argue that testing assumptions about change in behavior demands time series models. Second, the data seem dated: Why employ measures from the 1970s as we prepare to enter the twenty-first century?

The best reason to use the Kalt-Zupan data is to present tests of their model and my alternative that make direct comparisons. Much of the literature on principal-agent theory applied to Congress uses the Kalt-Zupan data. Were I to collect a more recent data set, questions of comparability would inevitably arise. So I stick with the original source. A longer time series might in principle be welcome, but it would be difficult to get anything close to a comprehensive data set to test the many predictions from my revised theory. Elite opinion data are scarce. We take them when we can get them — and, fortuitously, there is a good match in time between the Kalt-Zupan scores for senators and elite ideology measures. The Kalt-Zupan data overlap with a data set on the ideological positions of senators *and their challengers* that lets me see how different types of constituency opinion matter (see chapter 5). Finally, I try when possible to bring a quasi time-series approach through what I shall call “stratified” measures of personal ideology.

Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical claims of the shirking literature and the measurement issues. My initial interest in the shirking literature stemmed from my mistrust of its indicator of constituency attitudes. Kalt and Zupan, as well as everyone else, estimate constituency opinion based upon demographic traits. Based upon some joint work with Ronald E. Weber (Uslaner and Weber 1983) earlier in my career, my reaction was, Been there, done that, been pummeled for it. Many people are skeptical of the ability of demographics to capture even the broad contours of public opinion (Krehbiel 1993). Now it was my turn, I thought, to beat up on someone else as part of my compensation for similar sins in the past. It was not to be. Demographics do a passable job in accounting for real-life public opinion. The shirking literature still makes lots of theoretical claims that don’t hold up. Its measure of public opinion is more appropriately an indicator of reelection constituency preferences. And its measure of legislator ideology is inappropriately independent of public preferences. I thus introduce an alternative measure, based upon real public-opinion data for statewide and state party ideology. These measures were developed by Erikson, Wright, and MacIver (1993) and graciously provided by Gerald C. Wright. When I substitute reelection constituency ideology for the values of the full geographic constituency,

there is considerably less shirking. The new measure of “pure” legislator ideology does not affect Senate roll call voting on a series of issues as much as the original Kalt-Zupan indicators.

In chapter 2 I relax the assumption that senator ideology must be independent of constituency preferences. Chapter 3 presents estimates of what influences senator ideology, from the perspectives of both the full geographic constituency and a member’s fellow partisans. Personal ideology reflects mass ideology and particularly the attitudes of elites, state party activists, and House candidates from a senator’s party, as well as some demographic factors. I also estimate multiple-equation models linking personal ideology to incumbent expenditures and vote shares in a senator’s next primary and general elections. For Northern Democrats, being more liberal than one’s reelection constituents provides a tiny boost in the primary. Being more progressive than the geographic constituency has no impact in November, though it does make it more difficult for an incumbent to raise campaign funds. For Republicans, “excess” conservatism (relative to GOP identifiers in a legislator’s state) brings more votes in the primary. But being further to the right of the geographic constituency has no electoral costs in the general election. It brings small benefits, as conservative shirkers raise more money.

What are we to make of the argument that senators’ values reflect mass and particularly elite attitudes? In chapter 4, I break down this “simple” measure of personal ideology into two components. The first is the predicted value from the regression of personal ideology in chapter 3. It represents the part of legislator values that senators share with their core supporters, especially party elites. I call this *induced* ideology. The residuals from the regression constitute what is left of senators’ values. This is as close as we are going to get to a measure of *pure personal ideology*. We obtain indicators of both induced and pure ideology for both geographic and reelection constituencies. I repeat the logits and ordinary least squares regressions of chapter 2 that test the impact of legislator and constituency ideology on the 14 issues Kalt and Zupan (1984) use to test their shirking model. Induced ideology, the set of values shared with other elites, is far more important than pure personal ideology. The impact of pure personal ideology is much greater for conservatives (Republicans and Southern Democrats) than for Republicans. And, finally, we have preliminary evidence that induced ideology, not pure personal values, affects vote shares in both primaries and gen-

eral elections. There is little evidence that senators are lone profiles in courage. Their personal ideologies reflect their core partisan supporters.

Senators are pushed to more ideological positions by reelection constituencies and state party elites. So why do most of them win handily? Chapter 5 examines the role of challengers, using data from a 1982 CBS News survey of both candidates in state races. To test Downsian and ideological-equilibrium theories, I need to consider alternative contexts, such as whether candidates take similar or distinct positions and whether the race is expected to be close or an easy victory for the incumbent. Incumbent pure ideology and challenger induced partisanship are most important when candidates take distinct stands (not surprising) and when the incumbent is heavily favored (not so apparent). In these low-key diverging races, incumbents are in sync with the prevailing ideology in their state parties, while challenger core supporters are out of step. The results are based upon small numbers of cases. I thus replicate the analysis for the 1988 Senate Election Study, since both involved the same class of senators—and mostly the same incumbents. Once again, ideology matters most in low-key diverging contests. Northern Democrats neither gain nor lose votes from ideology in the primary but suffer in the general election if their *personal* values are too liberal. GOP incumbents gain significantly in the primary if their personal partisan values are more conservative than either their fellow partisans or their core party supporters. Their ideology plays little role in the general election, where the major factor seems to be whether their Democratic opponents have core supporters who are too liberal. This is the first evidence that senators' personal ideologies have electoral consequences.

The message of chapter 5 is that context counts. Chapter 6 shows more of the same, in greater relief. I break down states by political culture (Elazar 1972). The differences in shirking are modest among the different environments, but the determinants and consequences of culture vary widely. In traditionalistic cultures, legislators respond mostly to elites. In moralistic cultures, they reflect both mass and elite attitudes. Individualistic cultures are, as Elazar hypothesized, marketplaces of ideas: Masses, elites, other party identifiers, and independents all shape legislator fealty to public opinion. Individualistic and traditionalistic states have dominant ideologies. The former are progressive, the latter conservative. Moralistic states are ideological battlegrounds. Northern Democrats are very liberal, Republicans strongly conservative, and their

respective elites even more so. Going further to the left than one's constituents wish *helps* in individualistic states. Bolting too much to the right *boosts vote shares* in traditionalistic states. These results support the ideological-equilibrium model.

In moralistic states, going with your base (liberal Northern Democrats and conservative Republicans) increases your primary vote shares — again backing ideological-equilibrium predictions. Yet moving to the extremes imposes heavy electoral costs in general elections, as Downsians would predict. Mostly senators gain or lose votes based upon their induced ideologies. But when we break results down by party, we find that senators' personal values matter, sometimes even more. In moralistic cultures, Northern Democrats who go further left than their core partisan base pay an electoral price. Republicans who bolt too far to the right also lose votes. In traditionalistic cultures, senators who are too liberal for their base are punished at the polls. The moralistic culture of the American Midwest and the South have been home to some of the most famous profiles in courage, such as Norris and Smith. They may have supporting constituencies, but many seem to be punished for their own transgressions.

Is representation all about the relationship between legislators and their diverse constituents? Langbein (1993) argues that shirking reflects the institutional demands placed upon legislators — especially presidential influence. Kalt and Zupan (1990) estimate an institutional model based upon committee positions, committee power, and monitoring costs (proximity to the next election and whether a senator will retire). I add leadership positions to a modified institutional model. There are modest effects for some measures of shirking, but they all disappear for the most “pure” form of senators' personal values: pure personal partisanship, where I eliminate the impacts of both state party identifiers and state party elites. Finally, I ask whether divided delegations have different patterns of shirking. In general, they don't. Split and unified delegations largely shirk for the same reasons. There are some differences. There is a follow-the-leader effect in single-party states. A senator with little seniority will look to the legislator with more service for cues on safe shirking. Single-party states appear to produce more support for ideological-equilibrium arguments, while senators from divided delegations are more likely to pursue Downsian strategies. There are few institutional effects: It's mostly in the supporting constituencies.

The message ahead is that constituencies in their many variations

shape legislative representation. Senators do have their own values that sometimes cost them votes. But mostly these values don't conflict with the ideologies of their fellow partisans and party elites. So legislators lose relatively few votes. The handful of members who pay an electoral price have been appropriately forewarned by previous elections in their state and its political culture. By the time the journey is finished, there isn't a whole lot of shirking going on.