Legislator Ideology: Roots and Consequences

How deep is the tension between legislators’ views and constituency preferences? The shirking literature pictures a world in which members struggle with their consciences over what the public interest is. They seek cover from the wrath of their constituents to back what they believe is right. When we look at Congress, we are supposed to picture 535 brave little boys and girls holding their fingers in the dike against the torrents of contrarian public attitudes. Legislators of conscience buck not only constituency preferences and state parties. If members only cared about reelection, they would take positions right at the center of public opinion, as Anthony Downs (1957) argued (cf. Enelow and Hinich 1984). Legislators who vote contrary to public attitudes may pay an electoral price.

The principal-agent models suggest that legislators must either please their constituents or themselves. Michael L. Davis and Philip K. Porter (1989, 103) give a good summary of this either-or model:

[A politician’s decision to shirk] provides immediate gratification while reducing the expectation of future ideological consumption. The expected price of ideological consumption is determined by the value of reelection and the effect that ignoring the interests of constituents will have on the probability of future elections. . . . Ideological consumption, when it is not consistent with constituent interests, is costly to the politician insofar as it reduces the probability of reelection.

Norris and Smith paid the electoral price.

Yet something is amiss with the simple dichotomy between personal ideology and electoral insecurity. Some legislators, especially Southern-
ers such as Maury Maverick, Carl Elliott, and Brooks Hays, have gone down to defeat when they took stands at variance with their constituents’ preferences (see chapter 6 for stories on these members). But the Nebraska senator is different. Norris lost in 1942, running as an Independent against the victorious Republican and an also-ran Democrat. But he had a pretty good run, serving in the House and the Senate for 40 years. Why didn’t Nebraskans oust him earlier? Why did it take them so long to catch on to his game? Had he given up good Republican principles in a largely one-party state? He never really had them and had won handily as an Independent in a three-way race in 1936—even as he endorsed Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt for president. One can construct all sorts of explanations for why Norris lost in 1942, but they cannot include a sudden ideological transformation. Any other ideological explanation would be most unkind to Nebraska voters, who surely must have noticed Norris’s progressivism during the past four decades.

Simply being an ideologue doesn’t mean that a legislator is out of touch with his or her constituents. States and congressional districts vary. Senators from Massachusetts and Utah who pursue a pure Downsian strategy of appealing to their state’s median voter would compile very different voting records. Even so, some members pay an electoral price, others don’t. Edward Brooke (R-MA) and John Culver (D-IA), two legislators who stood apart in chapter 2, lost their bids for reelection. Brooke was too liberal for his party and lost the general election to a Democrat running to his left. John Tower (R-TX) won reelection to the Senate three times, albeit by narrow margins, though he was more conservative than either the full electorate or fellow Republicans. And Brooke’s former colleague, Edward Kennedy (D-MA), continues in the Senate in his seventh term despite his “misrepresentation” by moving too far left for his constituents’ tastes. Where Brooke bolted away from his party and lost, Tower and Kennedy survived (the latter quite handily) when they moved toward their party’s elites.

There are two interrelated reasons why personal ideology might not cost legislators votes. Both stem from the multiple-constituencies approach and stand in contrast to Downsian spatial models. First, legislators may need to shore up their bases. They play to their strongest supporters to fend off a tough primary or simply to rally the faithful for campaign work and fund-raising. These activists—in the primary and personal constituencies—are more ideologically driven than most citizens, even fellow partisans. To please them, legislators have to
disappoint the rank and file. Second, some voters, especially one’s core partisans, may prefer candidates who take issue positions. More ideological legislators do not suffer more electorally than those in the middle (Lott and Bronars 1993, 140).

A legislator’s personal ideology does not stand at one pole and constituency preferences at the other. Most legislators don’t worry about the tension between their own values and public opinion in their districts (states) because the two largely agree. When they aren’t in accord, legislators share values with their closest supporters. The residualization technique can’t account for sharing. The direct-survey method can. The task ahead is to develop a model of the linkage between voting contrary to constituents’ wishes and election outcomes.

I estimate a simultaneous-equation model of personal ideology and its electoral impacts. Senators who move toward party activists and away from their reelection constituents boost their primary performance. This extra vote margin translates into a small gain in the general election. Straying from geographic constituents boosts incumbent campaign contributions but reduces a senator’s vote share in the next general election. Activists won’t push many legislators far from geographic or reelection constituency opinions because the electorate won’t tolerate big deviations. These are general results that don’t apply equally to Democrats and Republicans. There are considerable interparty differences that are reflections of the distribution of ideology of fellow partisans. These results challenge the idea that legislators are autonomous agents who shape their voting decisions without constituency influence.

Senators and Their Constituencies

Separating a member’s personal ideology from constituency preferences through regression analysis ensures that each is independent of the other. Residuals are, by definition, uncorrelated with independent variables. If personal ideology is unrelated to constituency traits, variations in shirking must be idiosyncratic to the personal tastes of legislators — and not reflective of constituency preferences or the legislator’s political environment. All constituency traits have to be included in the first equation segregating public and legislator opinions.

A multiple-constituencies perspective invites skepticism about the independence of legislator ideology from systematic forces within a constituency or state. Senators represent their fellow partisans better than
their full geographic constituencies. This is not surprising but suggests a richer story than a simple principal-agent model. First, there is more than one principal. Legislators are pulled, sometimes in different directions, by their statewide and reelection constituencies.

The more compelling story is not how partisans sometimes tempt legislators away from their geographic constituencies, but rather why most of the actors have similar preferences. Deviations from both geographic and reelection constituencies are modestly (for Northern Democrats) to strongly (for Republicans) correlated with both geographic constituency and party elite attitudes. The residualization approach has no narrative to account for these correlations. As Jackson and Kingdon (1992, 813) argue: “Both the votes that make up the interest group score and the vote being modeled are affected by a large set of systematic factors that are not captured by the variables generally used in this research.” The shirking literature focuses on factors internal to Congress—committee and subcommittee activities, presidential agendas, and the persuasion of party leaders—but external factors such as the views of other elites are at least as important. It is not simply a matter of including measures of these causal agents in the first-stage regression, since that would still leave the residuals uncorrelated with elite attitudes. The residualization technique will be useful when I first take into account the story of how legislators’ views are shaped by elites (see chapter 4). These linkages are central and cannot be ignored.

The direct survey estimates seem more at home with spatial models that presume that politicians balance off policy and electoral goals. The distribution of constituency preferences and the closeness of electoral outcomes matter (Wittman 1983, 150). Candidates respond to constituency cues—especially to voters and activists in their own parties (Aldrich 1983). They are pulled away from both geographic and reelection constituency opinions. Liberal states will have liberal activists, who tug senators to move further leftward than the reelection constituency prefers. The same dynamic applies to conservative Republicans.

Senators deviate less from their reelection constituents than from statewide public opinion. The standardized measures of personal ideology indicate that Republicans, Democrats, and each party wing of the majority are very close to state party opinion (with mean scores ranging from .009 for all Democrats to −.046 for Southern Democrats). Deviations from the geographic constituency have a wider spread—from .389 for all Democrats to .714 for Northern Democrats and −.621
The Movers and the Shirkers

for Republicans (positive scores indicate deviations to the left, negative ones to the right).

The Constituency Bases of Personal Ideology

If primary and personal constituencies matter, legislators should reflect their values above and beyond the impact of the preferences of their geographic and reelection constituencies. The residualization technique has no room for the shared values of primary and personal constituents with legislators. Legislators’ personal ideology must be uncorrelated with estimated public opinion. The residuals must also be uncorrelated with any systematic component of the political environment, such as primary or personal constituencies. If the residuals are correlated with other political variables, the original equation is misspecified. We then would need to incorporate the indicators for primary and personal constituencies into the initial estimation for constituency opinion. But this creates the fallacy of lumping all publics into one equation. When we start to include extraneous factors as predictors, we wind up with a more extreme variation on the multiple-constituencies problem. Adding party to the demographics produces estimates for reelection constituencies. What do we get when we add elite attitudes? We just don’t know. Direct estimation doesn’t face this problem. Personal ideology is not defined as a residual, but as a difference between two sets of attitudes (or a behavior and an attitude). This difference may be correlated with any number of measures of the legislator’s primary and personal constituencies.

I first estimate models for deviations from geographic and reelection constituencies, reflecting the best predictions I could obtain. Then I trim these models to obtain multiple-equation models of the representative process. The more complex models include joint estimations of deviations from geographic and reelection constituencies, primary and general-election results, and incumbent expenditures (which are endogenous to election results).¹

There is a wide range of explanatory variables that might explain representation. The major contenders are the means and standard deviations of geographic and reelection constituency ideology. Also important might be the dominant ideology in a state or a state party.² Legislators don’t take positions that directly conflict with their publics. Instead, they drift toward their constituents and pass them by. So the signals from the electorate indicate the direction of the excess (if any). The standard devia-
tions indicate a more heterogenous electorate (cf. Bender 1994, 158). Elites, reflecting both primary and personal constituencies, should be a key element in pushing legislators beyond the ideology of both geographic and reelection followers. Party elites and candidates will be a central part of a legislator’s primary constituency and are likely to form part of the personal constituency.

It is statistically reassuring but theoretically worrisome that the Kalt-Zupan residuals are independent of a wide range of predictors. The residualization residuals should be uncorrelated with omitted variables. They are. But this is where the theoretical troubles begin. These error terms do a serviceable job, at least based on a comparison with the direct survey method. But they suggest that there is nothing more to representation than constituency and legislator attitudes.

When we shift to the direct estimates, there are clear connections between personal ideology and both constituency and elite views. See tables 6 and 7 for the regressions. I also estimate these regressions separately for Northern Democrats and Republicans, following the logic in chapter 2. I give the details of these estimations in appendix B (tables B.1 and B.2). For deviations from both geographic and reelection constituency positions, three types of public opinion matter: geographic, reelection, and other party. Indicators include state means, 

| Table 6. Geographic-Constituency Personal-Ideology Model, All Senators |
|----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Independent Variable       | Coefficient     | Standard Error  | t-Statistic     |
| Constant                   | 12.123          | 2.363           | 5.131**         |
| State mean ideology        | -3.836          | 1.006           | -3.815****      |
| Other party standard deviation | -2.420        | .800            | -3.027**        |
| Electoral heterogeneity    | -0.023          | .013            | -1.761**        |
| Party congressional candidates | .034           | .003            | 10.149****      |
| Other party elite          | .083            | .029            | 2.841**         |
| Growth rate                | -0.018          | .004            | -4.638****      |
| Union share                | -0.019          | .009            | -2.147**        |

\[ R^2 = .763 \quad \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .744 \quad \text{SEE} = .506 \]

*p < .10  \quad **p < .05  \quad ***p < .001  \quad ****p < .0001.
shares of the electorate with particular ideologies, and voting histories. In addition to means and distributions, standard deviations are also relevant. A more dispersed distribution of opinions gives legislators more leeway. A concentrated distribution indicates a more united party that gives legislators less license and constrains them more. Each opinion distribution (geographic, reelection, and other-party constituency) has a standard deviation.

Standard deviations are more than just measures of dispersion in this case. A higher variance indicates a more liberal electorate—for both parties. Only 11 of the 96 senators—all Democrats—represent liberal constituencies; all 37 Republicans have conservative state parties. The geographic and reelection constituency variances don’t matter much, but the other party’s standard deviation does. A Downsian logic suggests that Northern Democrats would tilt less to the left in heterogeneous states and Republicans less to the right—as each seeks votes

### TABLE 7. Reelection-Constituency Personal-Ideology Model, All Senators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>t-Statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.634</td>
<td>3.006</td>
<td>2.872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State mean ideology</td>
<td>-2.696</td>
<td>1.386</td>
<td>-1.945**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral heterogeneity</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>-1.827**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party congressional candidates</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>5.772****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Democrats party candidates:</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>10.416****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>3.850****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other party congressional candidates</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>3.229***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>-4.091****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union share</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>-1.922**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \( R^2 = .763 \)  
Adjusted \( R^2 = .744 \)  
SEE = .506  
System \( R^2 = .647 \)  
\( N = 96 \)

\( *p < .10 \)  
\( **p < .05 \)  
\( ***p < .001 \)  
\( ****p < .0001 \).
from a more fertile political landscape than in states with more homogenous opposition parties.

Kalt and Zupan (1990) employ a measure of electoral heterogeneity in the same spirit, the deviation of a state’s 1972 vote for liberal Democratic nominee George McGovern from the national average. They argue that a measure of heterogeneity reflects monitoring costs for a state’s electorate. A measure of intrastate volatility might tell us this, but this is not what the Kalt-Zupan heterogeneity measure gives us. Instead, it is an additional measure of a state’s ideology. States that gave McGovern a higher than average vote are more liberal. The more liberal a state, the more its senators should have progressive personal ideologies.

State party elites are the core elements in a legislator’s primary and personal constituencies. They share each other’s values, and their interactions reinforce senators’ “personal” values. Erikson, Wright, and MacIver (1993, chap. 5) develop a measure of state party elite attitudes. They employ a composite measure based upon surveys of county party leaders, delegates to national party conventions, congressional candidates, and state legislators. The more progressive state party elites are, the more liberal senators’ personal values should be. Some elites are special. State party colleagues in the House—and fellow partisans who aspire to the lower chamber—are the most ready cues for senators. The congressional-candidate scores are part of the overall index, yet it is important theoretically to separate them. The congressional-candidate index is only moderately correlated with the overall scores ($r = .52$), so I included it separately. For both state party elites and congressional candidates, positive scores indicate more liberal ideologies.

Elements of a party coalition also matter. Unions are a core element of the Democratic party; they have become increasingly conservative since the late 1960s (Bailey 1992). Where unions are strong, they should drive Democratic senators away from moving too far left. Unions should have a smaller impact on Republicans, leading them to deviate less to the right. One key demographic variable should also affect representation: The 1970s was a decade of economic uncertainty for much of the United States. Many states, especially in the South and West, boomed. These states were largely conservative. Their growth rates should push senators from both parties to the right, even beyond what we would expect from geographic and reelection constituency opinions. High growth rates produce a distinctive political culture that discourages leaning too much to the left.
Geographic-constituency attitudes affect deviations from both geographic and reelection constituencies. Three results stand out. First, we can predict deviations from the geographic constituency with just seven variables (adjusted $R^2 = .744$) and from the reelection constituency with eight (adjusted $R^2 = .488$). Five variables are common to the two equations. Second, partisan ties pull legislators further away from their reelection constituencies than from their geographic constituencies. Three of the eight predictors in the regression for the reelection constituency reflect a senator’s party, compared to one of seven for geographic constituency deviations. Third, *state party elites polarize legislators rather than lead to convergence*. Reelection constituency opinion distributions have no impact once elite views are taken into account.

The mean ideology for the geographic constituency shapes both statewide and state party representation. Higher scores for either constituency ideology measure indicate more conservative electorates, while positive scores indicate deviations to the left. The negative regression coefficients suggest a moderating influence. Liberal electorates limit the tendency of conservatives to deviate to the right—and vice versa for left-leaning legislators. The effect of geographic-constituency opinion is powerful in both models but is greater (both in the magnitude of the unstandardized coefficients and the $t$-ratios) for statewide deviations. For Senate Democrats, reelection constituency beliefs do not affect deviations from the reelection constituency (see the tables in appendix B). Beyond the impact of ideology, senators from high-growth states are more likely to bolt to the right ($p < .0001$), a result that holds for both parties. Heterogenous electorates restore some of the balance ($p < .05$) for both types of personal ideology, moderating the ideological proclivities of senators.

High unionization rates lead to less liberalism ($p < .05$) in both equations. High unionization rates push Northern Democrats away from party activists, leading them to go further to the right ($p < .005$). They have a similar moderating effect on Republicans, leading them to deviate slightly to the left ($p < .10$). GOP legislators are tugged to the right indirectly by the share of fundamentalist Christians in their states. While the percentage of fundamentalists does not lead to a more pronounced personal ideology by either measure, it has an indirect effect through its impact on reelection constituency opinions and state party elites (see chapter 8).

Reelection constituents push senators to extremes. A positive coef-
Legislator Ideology

59

efficient indicates a polarizing effect. Congressional candidates from the senator’s party push senators to move in the direction of the dominant ideology in their state parties. Liberal senators vote even more liberally; conservatives tilt more to the right \( p < .0001 \). These results hold for both parties. Fellow candidates push Northern Democrats even further to the left of their reelection following \( t = 10.416, p < .0001 \) for the all-senator model). Republican senators are pushed in the direction of their dominant state party ideology by the composite party elite score \( p < .0001 \).

The only potential moderating force for elites comes from other-party congressional candidates, who push senators away from their reelection constituencies and toward greater moderation \( p < .005 \). Liberals tilt rightward when the opposition party’s candidates are conservative; conservatives become more moderate when the opposition fields liberal candidates. Were congressional candidate ideologies similar in both parties, this dynamic could produce a Downsian convergence to the middle. But they are not; the correlation is negative \((- .433\)\), tempering the tendency to moderation. Opposition activists seem to push legislators toward their own reelection constituents.

Neither the Downsian nor the ideological-equilibrium model tells the whole story. Senators’ partisan ties push them to more extreme positions. The opinions of the geographic constituency, electoral coalitions, and the prospect of gaining support from the opposition leads them back to the center. The tendencies to diverge are more powerful than those to locate at the median. Senators jump after they are pushed. Two of the moderating forces that Gerald Wright (1989) found critical in Senate roll call voting and incumbent campaign messages— the share of independents in a state and their dominant ideology— had no impact on either measure of personal ideology (cf. Shapiro et al. 1990).

Truth or Consequences

Do senators who go farther than their constituents prefer pay a price in the next election? Lott and Reed (1989, 83–84) develop a formal model in which legislators who stray too much will ultimately be defeated. In a somewhat different vein, Kalt and Zupan (1990) argue that senators approaching reelection are less likely (conditional upon seniority and electoral history) to vote against their electorates.

Primary voters may not differ significantly from general-election
voters (Geer 1988). Yet party activists are more ideological and can energize support or opposition to an incumbent officeholder. Candidates must reposition themselves between the primary and general elections, but this is costly. Legislators develop a reputation based upon their ideology; trying to shift course might be worse than sticking with one’s record (Downs 1957). Incumbents usually don’t adjust as much as they decide at the outset what their reputation will be.

Figure 1 suggests a schematic account of the impact of personal ideology.

Legislator ideology may have different effects when measured as deviations from the geographic and reelection constituencies. Misrepresenting the geographic constituency may cost legislators votes in November but gain support from campaign contributors who don’t have the same agenda as the mass public. The contributions should compensate—at least in part—for deviations from the geographic constituency by boosting vote share in November. Members who are more extreme than the reelection followers will energize the activists, who are most likely to vote in primaries. Highly ideological voting, leading to more state party shirking, should boost a legislator’s vote share in the primary.

Big primary victories give incumbents a boost in the general election (Abramowitz 1988)—at least partially offsetting the vote losses from taking stands against the geographic electorate’s wishes.

This model is much more complicated than the estimations for personal ideology. We need predictors for each of the five components of the model; many of the variables that will work in one are unrelated to another dependent variable. To keep the focus clear, I shall limit my...
legislator ideology

61
discussion to the core relationships in the above diagram. Other findings are discussed in the notes.

We have a potentially large number of variables and a modest number of cases (68 senators running for reelection with complete data). So I truncate and modify the models, which I estimate by three-stage least squares for all 68 senators. I present simpler models for the 33 Northern Democrats and 26 Republicans, dropping a range of variables (including those with missing values). To conserve space and the reader's patience, I discuss the logic of the predictors together with the results (see fig. 2).

**Results for All Senators**

Consider first the results for all of the senators running for reelection. What leads senators to take positions more extreme than their reelection and geographic constituencies would prefer? Elites, particularly Northern Democratic activists, lead senators to take positions more extreme than their fellow partisans would wish. State party elites, the party's congressional candidates, and especially Northern Democratic congressional candidates all lead senators to go beyond their reelection constituency's ideology. So does state party ideology. The more liberal a state is (a negative score on mean ideology), the more a senator will go beyond his/her own party ideology (and vice versa). When legislators stray from their partisan constituents, they move in the direction of the prevailing sentiments in their state, as well as among their elites. Only one's own party elites matter. Senators don't respond to the ideologies of opposition activists. High growth rates and electoral heterogeneity lead senators to become more conservative than their fellow partisans. So does general population diversity, as measured by Sullivan's (1973) index.

Voting contrary to the reelection constituency has no impact on primary vote share for all senators. Primary performance is largely driven by the ideological makeup of the state, the balance of contending partisan forces, and the quality of the challenger. Do senators have an ideological free ride in the primary? We shall see below that they don't. The null finding hides differences between Northern Democrats and Republicans.

For the full geographic constituency, once again both elite and mass views lead senators to take positions that are more extreme than the public would prefer. The effects of state party elites are about the same.
The Movers and the Shirkers

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients estimated by three-stage least squares. Significance levels in parentheses.

**Fig. 2. Model estimation for all senators**

The regression coefficients barely differ: .417 for reelection constituency deviations compared to .401 for geographic constituency differences. However, there is no additional impact from other party activists (notably party congressional candidates). Instead, senators take their cues from the other party. When the opposition party elites and (especially) congressional candidates are more liberal (conservative), senators feel freer to move leftward (rightward) beyond their constituents. It’s easier for a liberal to move further left if the opposition is also liberal.
the opposition party is more conservative, this brings a liberal senator back to the center. And public attitudes matter more for the geographic constituency: The regression coefficient for mean ideology is almost 40 percent higher for the geographic constituency than for fellow partisans (and significant at $p < .001$ compared to $p < .05$).

Senators who deviate rightward spend more money—and thus raise more ($p < .005$). Money flows to legislators who take distinctive positions. Committee ideology is Kalt and Zupan’s (1990) “taste” variable.
It is a measure of the extremism of all of a senator’s committees. Senators serving on highly ideological committees spend more on their campaigns \((p < .01)\), either because they have greater need to protect their reputation or because they have an easier time raising money because of their high-profile assignments. Ideology produces money, but cash provides little solace for more extreme legislators. It doesn’t buy votes (but it doesn’t cost any either).

Voting contrary to what your constituents want is electorally costly in November. A senator who is one standard deviation to the left of the geographic constituency will lose more than 4 percent of the vote in the fall \((p < .005)\). Each 4 percent of the vote in the spring brings an additional 1 percent in the general election \((p < .005)\). This is minimal protection against the impact of personal ideology in November. The strongest determinant of general election vote shares is the proportion of party identifiers in a state. Each 1 percent increment in the share of party identifiers boosts general election votes by 0.7 percent.

The all-senator estimation produces a lot of puzzles. Moving away from the geographic constituency helps raise money, but incumbent expenditures don’t help out in the general election. Wandering from the full electorate costs votes in November. A strong performance in the primary boosts the November electoral margin, but primary vote shares are unrelated to deviations from the reelection constituency. The only benefit senators get from voting according to their own values comes in fund-raising, which does not translate into vote shares; the other significant effect is losing votes in November. So why don’t senators toe the constituency line?

**Results by Party**

Separate analyses of Northern Democrats and Republicans can help (figs. 3 and 4). State party elites drive both Republicans and Northern Democrats past their fellow partisans. In the model for all senators, congressional-candidate ideology drove Northern Democrats further to the left. When we restrict the analysis just to Northern Democrats, there is no longer a significant effect for this variant of ideology. The only other factor that drives Northern Democratic deviations from the reelection constituency is the growth rate: Senators from high-growth states, which are largely in the Sunbelt, are less likely to deviate to the left of their reelection constituents. For the Republicans, overall statewide ide-
Legislator Ideology

A conservative statewide ideology leads senators to tilt to the right of their fellow partisans.

When we look at each party separately, deviations from the reelection constituency now play a role in primary-election results. The effect is powerful for Republicans. For each standard-deviation increase in conservative personal values, GOP senators gain 7.4 percent in the primary. Northern Democrats gain by being more liberal, but their increment is much smaller (2.4 percent) and barely significant ($p < .10$). The opposing signs explain why the overall result is insignificant. Deviations from fellow partisans is the only significant variable affecting Republican vote shares in the primary. Northern Democrats’ success in the spring is mostly a function of the strength of the primary challenge and the partisan balance of power in a state.$^{15}$

On deviations from the geographic constituency, both Northern Democrats and Republicans are pushed (by identical amounts!) by their state party elites. Republicans, but not Northern Democrats, also follow public opinion. More conservative geographic constituencies give GOP senators the leeway to bolt further rightward. Northern Democrats respond to Republican elites. When GOP activists are liberal, Northern Democrats feel free to move even further to the left than their geographic constituents would wish. The signals that opposition party primary constituents send are useful only for the geographic constituency. They don’t serve as cues for where to stand relative to one’s own reelection followers.

Voting to the right of the geographic constituency increases incumbent campaign expenditures for Republicans, but not Northern Democrats. While spending is not the same as receipts, the logic is similar. Democrats attract money from a wider range of sources than Republicans (including both labor and business). Corporate funding is more pragmatic than ideological, especially when the Democrats are in the majority. GOP money is more ideological. For both parties, the more incumbents spend, the worse they do.

Bond, Covington, and Fleisher (1985, 524) argue that “incumbent [House members] with voting records that are too liberal or too conservative for the type of district they represent are more likely to attract well-financed opponents.” I find support for their claim for the Senate as well. There is a weak effect for Northern Democrats ($p < .10$), but a stronger one for Republicans ($p < .05$). Liberal Northern Democrats and conservative Republicans attract better-financed challengers.$^{16}$ Consistent with
### The Movers and the Shirkers

#### Model estimation for Northern Democrats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State party elite</td>
<td>.388 (.005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other party elite</td>
<td>.266 (.005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical-constituency</td>
<td>-.033 (n.s.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2 = .368$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent expenditures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2 = .477$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State party elite</td>
<td>.476 (.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party congressional candidates</td>
<td>.022 (n.s.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate</td>
<td>-.013 (.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2 = .299$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

System $R^2 = .558$

$N = 33$

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients estimated by three-stage least squares. Significance levels in parentheses.

**Fig. 3. Model estimation for Northern Democrats**

Bond, Covington, and Fleisher, quality challengers are *not* more likely to emerge when incumbents wander from public opinion. Voting against constituency preferences doesn’t bring better candidates, but it does reward good candidates with more resources.

Republicans garner more primary votes by deviating rightward. There is no direct reward for their ideology in the fall. Nor is there a carryover effect from the spring: The boost from ideology in the spring ends there. Primary-vote shares don’t translate into bigger votes in November. There is a small indirect gain, as conservative deviations lead to more spending, which might help out candidates in close races. GOP senators can rest somewhat easy, since moving to the right of reelection...
followers has no electoral cost in November. Republican senators appear strategic: They are more likely to deviate to the right if they come from conservative states. In turn, they have little to fear in November. Ideology doesn’t seem to matter in November for Northern Democrats either. There is no direct effect from geographic-constituency deviations on general-election vote shares. There is a spillover from the primary: Each 2 percent gain in primary-election votes produces a 1 percent boost in November. But the effect of deviations from the reelection constituency on primary-vote support is tiny: A standard-deviation change in deviations from fellow partisans leads to an indirect boost of just 1 percent of the vote in November.17
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients estimated by three-stage least squares. Significance levels in parentheses.

Fig. 4. Model estimation for Republicans

A Further Test

These results are robust, even considering that the personal-ideology measures are all from 1977 and 1978, even though most of the senators in this sample were not up for reelection in 1978. I computed “stratified” shirking measures. These stratified indicators are deviations from the geographic and reelection constituencies based upon LCV scores of senators in their reelection years. This is not a theoretically interesting variable to “explain” but is more appropriate in estimating the impacts on fund-raising and elections — especially if senators moderate their voting behavior as they approach their reelection year (Wright and Berkman 1986). Senators facing voters in 1980 and 1982 did not move noticeably closer to their geographic constituents in reelection years than they had been in 1977–78: 46 percent moved closer (in absolute values) to the
statewide electorate. But 57 percent were in greater sync with their reelection constituents. The correlations between 1977–78 personal ideology and election year deviations were modest (.721 for geographic and .535 for reelection deviations), given the staying power of ideology for most members (Poole and Rosenthal 1984).

The relationships among the five endogenous variables remain intact. No variable falls to insignificance in any of the new estimations, nor does any previous null relationship change. There are minor differences: the connection between deviations from the reelection constituency and the increase in primary votes strengthens for Democrats. So does the Democratic boost from the primary to the general election; the negative impact of expenditures on votes also strengthens for the majority party. The only change for the Republicans is the weakening of the expenditure-votes linkage in the general election. Senators move even closer to
their partisan base than to the full electorate in reelection years. However measured, the results in figures 2 through 4 hold up.

**Different Parties or Different Partisans?**

Northern Democrats and Republicans have different dynamics resulting from deviating from constituency preferences. Why? The answer lies in the different nature of reelection constituencies. All 37 Republican senators in the original analysis and the 26 who sought reelection come from conservative party constituencies. Of all Democrats (northern and southern) who ran for reelection, 11 came from conservative constituencies, 11 from liberal party electorates, and the balance from moderate state parties. I estimated simple ordinary least squares models for primary and general election results for the three types of Democrats employing four and three predictors respectively—and confirmed these results by examining bivariate correlations. The contextual basis of partisan differences comes through clearly.

Personal ideology has minor effects for Democrats from moderate state parties. Being more liberal than your reelection constituency opinion helps very modestly in the primaries ($r = .218$); veering leftward from the full electorate hurts just a tad in November ($r = -.302$). For Democrats from conservative states, moving away from fellow partisans causes them no problems in the primary ($r = .021$), but wandering leftward from all voters costs them dearly in November ($r = -.771, p < .0001$). Democrats from liberal state parties get a boost in the primary for their loyalty to the activist ideology ($r = .604$); they pay no penalty in November ($r = .061$). A liberal personal ideology helps, though only in primaries, in progressive territory.

The key linkage is not between Republicans and Democrats from conservative districts. It is between the partisan groups most typical of party activists. Republicans from conservative state parties and Democrats from liberal constituencies benefit from ideological stands in the primaries without paying a penalty in the general election (see chapters 5 and 6 for elaborations on this theme).

The message is that personal ideology isn’t very personal. Variables reflecting senators’ various constituencies (and some demographics) account for 50 to 74 percent of the variance in the shirking estimates. If we use Americans for Democratic Action scores rather than the LCV index, the adjusted $R^2$’s increase to between .80 and .86. We should be
wary of explanations of roll call voting that posit legislators as autonomous agents who either do—or can—flout public and elite attitudes in their states or districts. The dichotomy between legislator and constituency ideology is false.

The disjunction between Downsian frameworks and ideological-equilibrium models is also overdrawn. Both elite and public opinion push legislators to adopt more ideological voting records. Legislators tilt toward the dominant ideology in their states, among fellow partisans, and among elites. A liberal (conservative) reelection constituency will lead legislators to stray further to the left (right), but not nearly as much as liberal (conservative) elites will (cf. G. Wright 1994). Principal-agent models lead us to expect that shirking means voting contrary to public opinion. Instead, it means going beyond both public and elite attitudes—in the same direction, but further. Public opinion pushes legislators away from the opposite party, not toward it, as Downs (1957) suggests. All major forces push senators in the same direction. A factor analysis of LCV scores, the geographic-constituency ideology, the mean ideology of a senator’s reelection constituency, and the primary/personal-constituency (party elite) score strongly suggests that the four measures form a common dimension.19

Mayhew (1966, chap. 6) argues that the Democrats pursue a policy of “inclusive compromise” by being “all things to all people.” Republicans have less ideological diversity. These divergent strategies have made the Democrats the majority party in American politics. His analysis holds up well for the 1970s and 1980s: Republican senators flourished in states with conservative majorities—and conservative state parties. Democrats win in all types of constituencies. The correlations for population diversity and general-election vote share are .276 for Northern Democrats, .544 for Southern Democrats (reflecting the higher share of blacks in the South), and −.383 for Republicans.20

Republicans do poorly in heterogenous constituencies because they are less tolerant of ideological diversity. Part of the reason for the weak linkage between personal ideology and general-election vote share for Republicans is the strong connection in the primaries. Republican senators who wander leftward of their reelection constituencies face a difficult ride in the primaries. In this sample, the second and third biggest shirkers to the left—Jacob Javits (NY) and Clifford Case (NJ)—lost their primary bids. Another liberal, Robert Stafford (VT), was the only other Republican to win less than a majority in his primary.21
There is strong evidence in support of ideological equilibrium. Only a few senators pay an electoral price for going further than public opinion—and these are the handful who manage to get elected from an environment that should be hostile to their parties (Democrats from conservative constituencies). Most often, electoral sorting solves the problem of representation before electoral sanctions are necessary. The world so far does not seem Downsian. Senators’ ideological stands represent their reelection and primary/personal constituencies. But this is only the first step in our journey, and it is too early to declare victory for the ideological-equilibrium model. There is some bounce left in Downs, but not as much as principal-agent models would have us believe. The world seems largely ideological—and it will continue to do so in most contexts as our journey proceeds.

Personal ideology may bring votes, especially in primaries, or cost them, especially in November. But deviations from both geographic and reelection constituency opinions are more than simple residuals. They reflect state political attitudes and the personal and primary constituencies of legislators. If personal values are so well structured, does it make sense to say that legislators are either rewarded or punished for their own values? Might the voters judge senators by the company they keep rather than by their own preferences? The task in chapter 4 is to attempt a separation of these Siamese twins of ideology. When we can—by going back to residualization—we see that when we finally get to a “pure” measure of ideology, there is not much there there. When all is said and done, senators do a good job of representation, be it of their geographic or reelection constituency or of their primary and personal supporters. They do a poor job of indulging their own preferences, once we remove the portion of their ideology that they share with others. Shirking may matter—but not because senators please themselves. They are true to their partisan followers.