Chapter 1

1. Long was not quite as inconsistent as this part of the story would have us believe, yet he was no less the villain. He told one of his aides who overheard the conversation that he intended to honor his commitment to repeal the levy. He didn’t want the theater owners to believe that their lobbyist could deliver the governor’s promise. Only Earl himself could do that, and the movie owners would have to visit him personally to acknowledge his power (Liebling 1970, 41).

2. For a summary of Burke’s views, see Pitkin 1967, chap. 8.

3. For clear statements about the minimal role of issues in party politics in Congress, see Mayhew 1966, 1974.


5. Kessel (1988, 114) reports that party activists in 1972 were more ideological than rank-and-file partisans. They “are not giving voice to their constituents’ views. Rather, they are urging policies that their colleagues think wise. American parties are not representative entities, but advocacy parties.”

6. This percentage was computed from Kingdon (1973, 235–36). It is based on the 208 votes on which no more than two actors disagreed with the rest of the “field.” It thus excludes the remaining 14 decisions, on which more than two actors disagreed with the field. Kingdon does not provide data on these 14 votes.


8. It is likely that the effect goes both ways: Members may share the same electoral fate because they share similar values. One could argue that this direction of causality is more critical.

9. See the discussion in chapter 7 of Ohio’s two senators in the late 1970s, Howard Metzenbaum and John Glenn. Metzenbaum had strong ties to party activists, Glenn weak bonds. Metzenbaum’s voting record reflected his reelection
constituency far better than the full Ohio electorate. Glenn’s ideology fit the geographic constituency much better than his Democratic partisans (or activists).

10. Kalt and Zupan (1984, 284) argue that “ideology plays the same role in the economic theory of the political process that managerial rules of thumb play in the profit-maximizing theory of the firm.”


12. I won’t summarize it here. It will unfold in succeeding chapters as relevant.

13. Davis and Porter 1989 is an example of one among many.

14. The political success of Louisiana’s Long dynasty, including Earl, suggests that they were strong keepers of the faith with the electorate.

Chapter 2

1. Or mathematically, in the probability limit.

2. In future sessions of the legislature, the estimates of $c$ would turn positive, as the newly elected conservative members from conservative constituencies would vote nay.

3. Or so say many friends who have read the manuscript.

4. If any constituency factors are correlated with the residuals, they should have been included as predictors of total ideology.

5. Shirking models that don’t use residualization are not forced into this assumption—and some important ones (Lott 1987; Lott and Bronars 1993) don’t make it.

6. Downs does not insist on this, but the logic is consistent only with a Downsian model.

7. Richardson and Munger (1990, 15–19) make a similar criticism of shirking models and also suggest adding party to a regression analysis of roll call voting to obtain estimates of reelection constituency effects. Their approach is similar in spirit to mine, though different in how party is handled. I was not aware of their contribution when I first developed my strategy. I am grateful to Michael Munger for bringing the similarities to my attention.

8. The data were provided by Gerald C. Wright. The statewide estimates differ slightly from the published version in Wright et al. 1985. Langbein (1990) derived statewide and state party estimates from the 1982, 1984, and 1986 American National Election studies, which has a far smaller number of observations. Langbein could obtain estimates for only 40 states.

9. Any measurement strategy for constituency opinions implies that there is a common frame of reference for ideology across the nation. If liberalism means something different to southerners than to northeasterners, we could be making spurious inferences. (I owe this insight to Bernard Grofman, personal communication.) To test this, I employed the 1992 American National Election Study and picked out seven diverse policy preferences (want more or less spending, preferences for defense spending, health care attitudes, government help blacks, equal role for women, civil rights for blacks too fast, and the death penalty) and ran cross-tabs by a three-point ideology for each census region. Then I ran analyses of variance for the policy areas by region within each ideology group. Only one
of the 28 cross-tabulations failed to be significant at \( p < .001 \) or less: Defense spending did not discriminate ideologically in the North Central region. For the regional ANOVAs, only 7 of 21 comparisons were significantly different from zero. All of the rest of the differences were due to ideology. Thus, one-third of the comparisons for region were statistically significant, compared to 96.4 percent for ideology. These are rough tests. So I factor analyzed the seven issue areas together with ideology five times: once for all respondents and then within each region. The results were strongly unidimensional, and the loadings for ideology were similar across the analyses. I computed factor scores and imputed values over regions for each solution (so that everyone gets scores for each region based on its loadings). The average correlations among the factor scores was .996. The lowest correlation is .993.

10. The correlations for shirking measures are not quite so robust. See chapter 7. The choice of LCV residuals rather than ADA residuals was based upon my desire to replicate the results in Kalt and Zupan (1984) as closely as possible so as to make comparisons direct. Linda Fowler (personal communication) has pointed out that ADA scores are typically more partisan than LCV scores, which often have more cross-cutting cleavages (though, as noted, both have high correlations with independent measures of ideology). If there are modest effects for personal ideology using LCV scores as a base, she argues, we can be even more confident that senators don’t shirk much.

11. I also tested a “survey regression” model, in which the LCV scores are regressed against the mean scores for statewide and state party constituencies. The residuals are legislators’ personal ideologies, as in the Kalt-Zupan model. The adjusted \( R^2 \)’s are not high (.262 for statewide estimates, .336 for state party measures). These estimates were redundant for the direct measures for statewide shirking and very close for the state party models. In no case using any criterion did they appear superior, so I do not discuss them further.

12. Here are the differences between liberal and conservative self-identification among the statewide and state party identifiers for each partisan bloc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Statewide</th>
<th>State Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>−15.009</td>
<td>−36.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Democrats</td>
<td>−20.525</td>
<td>−10.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Democrats</td>
<td>−12.255</td>
<td>4.023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Negative signs indicate that more of a bloc has more conservative than liberal identifiers.)

13. The \( p \)-level is zero until the eleventh decimal place.

14. The respective means are .004, −.012, and .011, differences that are not statistically significant. A state is conservative as opposed to centrist if the percentage of conservatives is at least 10 percent more than the percentage of moderates. No state has a liberal plurality or majority. A state party is liberal if the percentage of liberals is at least 10 percent greater than the share of conservatives.

15. Kalt and Zupan (1984, 285) estimate ANTISTRIP through a weighted logit designed to correct for heteroskedasticity. Let \( r = \) the number of votes cast
by a senator that are unfavorable to strip mining and \( n \) = the total number of votes cast by the senator of the 27 roll calls. Then the logit is \( \ln \left[ \frac{(r + .5)}{(n - r + .5)} \right] \). I employed the same transformation on their data.

16. In all regression, probit, or logit estimations in this book, I employ robust estimation when these results appear crisper than ordinary least squares or “simple” probit or logit estimations. Robust estimation does not affect the coefficients or summary measures such as \( R^2 \) or the standard error of the estimate. It corrects for heteroskedasticity and thus lowers the standard errors and increases \( t \)-ratios.

17. Herfindahl indices are also known as fractionalization indices.

18. The appropriate comparison is with table 4 in Kalt and Zupan 1984, 294, the final two columns. The unstandardized coefficients for the constituency interest variables vary widely from the estimates I present, most likely because of differing estimation techniques. However, the \( t \)-ratios are generally quite similar.

19. The coefficients for pregnancy discrimination for the survey regression and direct estimations differ from others because I had to employ a different statistical program to obtain convergence. These models employ the same predictors as in table 3, as Kalt and Zupan do, even though the predictors do not clearly relate to these issues. I had to drop the Herfindahl indices, lest the logits not converge. The full list of roll call votes is in Kalt and Zupan 1983.

20. One could argue that there is less to explain in roll call voting in the with-party models since the \( R^2 \) is so much higher in the first-stage estimation. If a general concept of ideology affects roll call votes, the without-party model leaves more variance to explain in the second-stage explanation. Much of the variance in the with-party models has already been absorbed into the constituency part of ideology. The mean \( t \)-ratios for Kalt-Zupan are 3.581 (no-party) and 2.740 (with party) and for the direct method, 4.043 and 2.968 respectively.

21. The measures are interaction terms between a dummy variable for Northern Democrats times senator’s personal state party ideology and senator’s state party constituency attitudes. I also use similar measures with an interaction term for conservatives (Republicans or Southern Democrats). All of the estimations are from a single equation for each roll call (index).

22. Northern Democrats were unanimous on pregnancy discrimination and had only one defector on pregnancy disability.

23. A state party is categorized as liberal (conservative) if it has at least a plurality (by 10 percent or more) of liberals (conservatives) in its electorate. Otherwise it is classified as moderate.

24. These correlations are considerably higher than the simple \( r \)s between the party and no-party models for each measurement technique. The Kalt-Zupan measures correlate at .505, the direct measures at .728.

Chapter 3

1. Election and expenditure data were obtained from the 1978, 1980, and 1982 editions of Politics in America and The Almanac of American Politics.
2. I employed an 8 percent rule to classify dominant ideologies through inspection of data: A state with a dominant conservative ideology had 8 percent more conservatives than liberals and moderates combined. No state had a dominant liberal majority. Forty of the 96 senators for whom I have constituency ideology scores represented conservative statewide majorities; the rest were from moderate states. Fifty-four of 96 senators represented conservative state party electorates, 13 liberal state parties, and 29 moderate voters.

3. Fenno (1978) does not provide clear demarcations between these two constituencies. And there is no data set for elites that permits one to get at personal constituents as distinct from primary constituents (especially since the sample size for most legislators' personal following is so small). So I treat elite values as reflecting the beliefs of both primary and personal constituencies.

4. Because the two types of shirking are clearly related and because they share so many predictors, I estimated the equations by the seemingly unrelated equation method, which produces more efficient estimates of the standard errors (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1976, 279–83). The system $R^2$ is .681.

5. The composite measure is a factor score. The state legislator data come from Uslaner and Weber 1977.

6. Gerald Wright provided me with the party elite data and (separately) the congressional candidate scores.

7. Strangely, this result does not hold up for the regression for Republican senators in table B.2.

8. Simultaneous-equation estimation for 26 to 33 cases is hazardous, so I also estimated the same equations by ordinary least squares with no appreciable differences. There are fewer cases in these equations than in tables B.1 and B.2 in appendix B because some senators either did not seek reelection or did not make it through the primaries.

9. The sign for other party congressional candidates is reversed because of coding.

10. Incumbents get a boost in the primary from how well they did in the last general election ($p < .05$). Each year of seniority costs an incumbent half a percentage point in the primary ($p < .01$). So does each additional percent identifying with the senator's party ($p < .001$). One-party states may encourage more competition in the primary than two-party areas. States with heterogeneous electorates in the other party also have more competition in the senator's primary. A more heterogeneous opposition party might be able to run a stronger race against the incumbent; signs of a weak senator may in turn induce a primary challenge. The quality of the primary challenger makes the biggest difference—a 34 percent difference ($p < .0001$).

11. Most analyses of the impact of expenditures on elections employ the log of money spent. The equations for primary and general elections showed small increases in predictive power using the log specification, but I was unable to come up with a suitable instrument for logged expenditures.

12. The indicator is the average absolute value of committee members' Americans for Democratic Action scores (in weighted log-odds form), further averaged across a senator's committees.
13. The share of identifiers in both the senator’s party and the opposition boosts incumbent senators’ election expenditures in thousands of dollars ($p < .005$). Senators can raise a lot of money in states populated by their fellow partisans; they need to raise cash in less friendly territory. The more money challengers raise, the more the incumbents need to—and can—catch up ($p < .0001$). Incumbents spend less in high-growth states ($p < .005$), presumably because legislators from these states are more electorally secure.

14. Challenger funds don’t matter ($p < .10$), while challenger quality is insignificant. Electoral heterogeneity hurts a senator’s November vote share ($p < .01$), while population diversity helps ($p < .05$). Senators don’t benefit from strong local party organizations; the coefficient for the Cotter et al. (1984) index is negative. Traditional party organizations, clustered in the industrial states (Mayhew 1986), still can deliver the goods ($p < .05$).

15. A heavy Democratic advantage in party identification works against a strong showing in the primary for incumbents.

16. These results stem from probit analyses including challenger quality, the share of identifiers in the incumbent’s party, and incumbent expenditures.

17. For both Northern Democrats and Republicans, the share of party identifiers is a strong determinant of general election success. Challenger quality matters for Northern Democrats, while challenger expenditures are important for Republicans. A traditional party organization boosts vote shares for both Northern Democrats and Republicans. The Cotter et al. (1984) measure of state party organization was not significant in the GOP equation.

18. Most of the results discussed herein also hold for the ADA residuals. The comparisons among different party constituencies are equally clear in the two models. I chose the LCV residuals for this paper in part for continuity with Uslaner 1997, but mostly because the three-stage least squares estimates were crisper for the LCV residuals.

19. The loadings are PRO-LCV (804), state mean ideology (−.693), party mean ideology (−.596), and party elite ideology (.703). The single dimension accounts for 49.4 percent of the total variance. Republicans dwell in a more constrained world than Democrats. The factor analysis for GOP senators accounts for 73.3 percent of the total variance, with respective loadings of −.852, .925, .843, and −.799. The Democratic single dimension accounts for 48.8 percent of the total variance, with loadings of −.664, .751, .654, and −.721, respectively. Note that, consistent with the impacts for shirking found in the text, the elite effect is relatively stronger for Democrats than for Republicans.

20. All are significant at $p < .05$.

21. Stafford’s state party shirking was the Republicans’ sixth highest. The most liberal party shirker was Edward Brooke (MA), who lost to moderate Democrat Paul Tsongas.

Chapter 4

1. Other senators sharing this pattern include Republicans John Danforth (MO) and James McClure (ID) and Democrats Lloyd Bentsen (TX), Thomas
Eagleton (MO), Gary Hart (CO), and John Sparkman (AL). Senators pushed to the right by their personal constituencies but whose personal ideology is moderate relative to their state partisans include Republicans John Chafee (RI), Robert Dole (KS), William Roth (DE), Richard Schweiker (PA), and Lowell Weicker (PA) and Democrats John McClellan (AK), Frank Church (ID), and Lawton Chiles (FL).

2. Andrews's colleague Quentin Burdick (D-ND) followed his induced ideology in moving to the right of his Democratic electorate (and the full state), even though he was slightly more liberal than his state (standardized pure partisanship score \(=.411\)). Burdick, who was a legend in North Dakota, was able to satisfy both his close associates and the statewide electorate by moving to the right of his preferred positions. Andrews's predecessor, Republican Milton Young, was somewhat to the right of statewide public opinion \((-1.397\)} as well as attitudes in his own party \((-1.945\)}). While the North Dakota GOP was moderately conservative relative to state partisans \((-2.240\)}), Young personally was further to the right \((-2.705\)}). The North Dakota GOP is considerably to the right of all state parties and somewhat more conservative than even state Republican electorates. The North Dakota Democratic electorate is almost perfectly at the mean of all state parties and somewhat to the right of Democratic electorates. Young veered to the right of his personal constituency, Burdick to the left—exactly the opposite of what a Downsian argument might expect. They both won handily across many elections.

3. The overall correlation between induced partisanship and the mean ideology for the reelection constituency is \((-1.134\)} (higher scores for induced partisanship and lower values for state party means indicate greater liberalism). The correlation is smaller for Democrats \((-1.193\)} than for Republicans \((-0.585\)}). The smallest correlation is for Northern Democrats \((-0.139\)}.

4. The lack of significance for any of the three measures for pregnancy discrimination indicates that collinearity may be a problem here.

5. The variable in question is coal share of electricity. The coefficients and maximum likelihood ratios divided by their standard errors for both pure personal and induced ideology are largely unaffected by dropping this variable. Most differences were minute; the pornography vote produced a significant coefficient for personal ideology, while the barely significant estimate on pregnancy discrimination fell further.


7. On domestic votes, which comprise the large majority of roll calls in the Congress, the differences are less pronounced. The two components of legislators' values predict 4.1 percent more votes accurately. Sixty-three percent of the gain (2.6 percent of all votes) comes from induced ideology. Only 22 percent of the increment stems from personal ideology. Senators' own partisan values account for less than one vote \((.9\)} on each domestic roll call. There is little evidence that personal ideology is prominent, especially on issues that are salient to either voters or elites. Of the three components of ideology, “pure personal” values seem to be least powerful in explaining legislators’ votes.
8. The models were estimated, as were those in chapter 3, by three-stage least squares (3SLS). For the subsamples, the Ns are not large (ranging from 42 for all Democrats to 26 for all Republicans), so I employed three estimation strategies: 3SLS, seemingly unrelated equations, and ordinary least squares. The Democratic and Northern Democratic results are from the 3SLS estimations (which are very similar to the ones from the other methods). For the Republicans, I report the ordinary least squares results. Republican senators get no boost in the general election from the primary, so the issue of simultaneity is not critical. Seemingly unrelated equations loses two key cases for the Republicans—senators who lost in primaries. Hence, I use ordinary least squares.

9. The computation is \(-2.94\) (the regression coefficient for induced state party shirking in table 13) divided by the standard deviation of state party induced deviations (.779).

10. The overall tau between the trichotomous measure of reelection constituency ideology (conservative, moderate, and liberal) and the dichotomous (conservative and moderate) measure of geographic constituency values is .763. Aside from the 13 Northern Democratic liberals, 9 senators (3 of them Northern Democrats) come from states with moderate reelection constituencies and conservative geographic constituents. Nineteen senators (all but two Republicans) have conservative reelection followings but moderate geographic constituents. The problem is more acute for liberals: None of the 13 members with supportive reelection constituents have progressive geographic constituents. But 65 percent (35 of 54) of the senators with conservative reelection constituents also have geographic electorates tilting to the right. Perhaps surprisingly, Republicans are not advantaged: All Republicans come from conservative state parties, but just 54 percent have right-leaning geographic constituencies.

11. The Republican is Robert Stafford (VT) The Democrat is Howard Cannon (NV). But note that Erikson, Wright, and MacIver (1993, 19–20) caution that the ideology score for Nevada is the least reliable for the 48 states. They choose not to use it, though I found that it rarely affects any of the estimates in this book.

Chapter 5

1. New York Republicans (at least before the 1980s) combatted the majority Democrats with candidates such as Nelson Rockefeller, Jacob Javits, and Kenneth Keating. Their party leaders were also moderate to liberal. Democrats echo Republicans in hostile territory: The induced partisanship scores of John Melcher (MT) and Edward Zorinsky (NE) are negative, indicating conservative party followings.

2. Dominant parties have an advantage of 10 percent or more in party identification over the opposition. The mean percentage difference is 28. Only 17 percent of Senate challengers from states dominated by the other party have held elective office before, compared to 43 percent from more competitive environments.

3. Westlye (1991, chap. 6) supports this reasonable claim from individual
voting decisions in the tight 1982 California Senate race and the lopsided 1978 Wyoming contest. I also considered another context: whether a state's party system is competitive or dominant, following Huntington (1950), Fiorina (1974), and W. Miller (1964). All argue that party representation is stronger for dominant majority parties. I found few differences among party systems however I divided them up. Previous studies have concentrated on the House, with more homogenous constituencies, so my results do not contradict theirs.

4. I am grateful to Jerry Wright for making these data available. Since CBS obtained the interviews in confidence, I shall not identify individual senators or challengers in the analyses below. The issues that comprise the scale scores are a constitutional amendment allowing states to ban abortion, a constitutional amendment permitting prayer in public schools, a balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution, the Equal Rights Amendment, a nuclear freeze with the Soviet Union, requiring that half of the foreign cars sold in the United States be manufactured here, canceling the tax cut due to take effect in July 1983, cutting increases in military spending, reducing spending on domestic social programs, and government regulation of air pollution.

5. Senator Spark Matsunaga (D-HI) was eliminated because there is no public-opinion data available for Hawaii.

6. Senators up in 1982 received about the same vote share (58 percent) as did those running in 1978 or 1980 (57.5 percent). Their primary vote share was slightly, though not significantly, higher (87.7 compared to 83.4 percent). The differences in challenger quality were modest (30.8 percent compared to 34 percent). The CBS sample has 35 percent Republicans, 15 percent Southern Democrats, and 50 percent Northern Democrats, compared to 40, 18, and 43 percent for all senators. There are no significant differences in either LCV or ADA scores (p < .60 and p < .92, respectively). None of the roll call measures of shirking varied significantly between the two samples. All except pure personal partisanship had p levels (two-tailed tests) at least as great as .25. Senators running in 1982 had an average pure personal partisanship that was slightly more conservative than the average (−.173 compared to .064), but this result was only significant at p < .12. But these same senators came from statewide electorates that were slightly more liberal (standardized score = −.208) than those senators given a pass in 1982 (.077, p < .12).

7. I also constructed shirking measures that placed incumbents and challengers on the same standardized scale. This made it difficult to make comparisons with the incumbent scores derived from the roll call analyses. The measures of ideology employed here use the same logic: Subtract the (standardized) score for each constituency (geographic or each candidate's reelection bloc) from the standardized ideology measure and standardize once more. The measures of induced and personal ideology/partisanship are derived from the regressions in appendix C (see table C.1) analogously to the method in chapter 4.

8. The correlations are negative because the LCV and ADA ratings give higher scores to liberals, while the CBS index gives points for conservatism. I reflected the shirking scores so that they would be positively correlated. The higher each shirking score, the more a senator bolts to the left.
9. I categorized each incumbent and challenger as either liberal (scale score 1 to 3.5), moderate (scale score 4 to 6), or conservative (scale score 7 to 11) based upon the CBS candidate conservatism index. Candidates converged when they both fell into the same category; otherwise, they diverged. In 12 of 26 races (46.2 percent) candidates converged.

10. There is some evidence that voters prefer incumbents who are closer to public opinion than their opponents. But it is weak. I constructed measures of absolute proximity to statewide and state party opinions between incumbents and challengers. The measure subtracts the absolute value of the challenger’s distance from attitudes from the incumbent’s absolute value. Absolute proximity to statewide opinion leads to greater success in the general election ($r = .501$). The impact vanishes when we control for the quality of the challenger, the share of senator’s party identifiers in a state, the liberalism of congressional candidates from the incumbent’s party, and the incumbent’s vote share in the primary.

11. In the challenger equation, parties polarized indicates at least a 10 percent gap in ideological identification between Democratic and Republican partisans. The other party state party organizational strength is the measure derived by Cotter et al. (1984). To facilitate comparison with previous chapters, incumbent and challenger measures are standardized separately rather than together.

12. For both statewide and state party induced ideology, the correlations are stronger among Republicans (.737 and .821) than among Northern Democrats (.624 and .552).

13. The 1982 sample is different in one key respect. For all senators, the correlation is smaller for Northern Democrats ($r = .374$), who often have very liberal primary and personal constituencies even as their GOP challengers range from moderate to conservative. Democratic elites tend to converge to GOP positions ($r = .701$), reflecting the greater conservatism of the public and their own reelection constituencies. For the 1982 sample, elite attitudes are more highly correlated in states with Northern Democratic senators ($r = .689$) than in states with GOP incumbents ($r = .481$).

14. The four Southern Democrats are conservative (mean = 7.625), while their opponents are at the end of the continuum on the right (mean = 10.375).

15. The correlations are as follows (an asterisk indicates that the sign is incorrect):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbent Core Supporters</th>
<th>Challenger Core Supporters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Democrats</td>
<td>.463</td>
<td>.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>.851</td>
<td>.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converge</td>
<td>.651</td>
<td>.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverge</td>
<td>-.224*</td>
<td>-.535*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard fought</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low key</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td>-.204*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16. Apart from incumbent ideology, legislators do well when they face a united and ideological opposition. When the standard deviation of partisan opinion in the opposition party is small, the challenger’s party is united around a dominant ideology. The more cohesive the opposition party is, the better the incumbent will do ($p < .0001$). Primary voters will also rally around the incumbent senator when the two parties in the state are ideologically polarized ($p < .05$). A united and polarized opposition galvanizes the faithful to rally behind their incumbents.

17. Because primary vote shares are clearly endogenous, I also estimated simultaneous-equation models for primary and general elections. I don’t present the results because any efficiency gains with such small samples are doubtful. The single-equation results hold up quite well.

18. I took the classifications of races in the October 9, 1982, issue of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. Races with no clear favorite or leaning toward the incumbent were classified as hard-fought. If $CQ$ called an incumbent safe, the election was low-key. The remaining contests favored the incumbent. Where the sitting senator had less than two-to-one spending advantage over the challenger, the race was hard-fought. Otherwise it was low-key. While Westlye examined more detailed accounts of specific races, my classification has the advantage of being less subjective and easier to replicate. Objective tests show that neither measure is correlated with the whether either the senator’s party or any party dominates a state’s politics.

19. When candidates converge in the fall and the incumbent moves leftward in pure partisanship, he loses votes (9.5 percent).

20. For Republicans I employ a two-tailed test, since the direction of challenger ideology is different from what I would expect in a polarized race.

21. In polarized states, Democrats are mostly liberal and Republicans mostly conservative.

22. These races are obviously not based on the CBS database for 1982. All of the candidates were promised anonymity by CBS, and I have honored this guarantee (to CBS and then to Jerry Wright). However, the races were chosen because they reflect the same dynamics as the 1982 contests.

23. The correlation does not reflect party differences because Democratic challengers to Republican incumbents are more conservative than most other Democratic challengers. This reflects who the LKD GOP senators are: They are all conservative stalwarts. GOP challengers to Northern Democrats are more conservative than other Republican contenders.

24. The proximity measures are constructed by trichotomizing voter perceptions of the ideological stands of incumbents and challengers into liberal, moderate, and conservative categories so that they can be compared to the three-point measure for respondents. I then subtracted the candidate score from the respondent scale. Higher scores indicate that the candidate is more conservative than the respondent. The measure of challenger party ideology is constructed from the Democratic and Republican party ideology measures (V1422 and V1423) that are updated versions of Bartels’s (1988) indices. Higher scores indicate more conservative state parties.
25. The party identification measure is coded as 1 if the voter identifies with
the same party as the incumbent, −1 with the opposition party, and 0 otherwise.
Leaners are classified as identifiers.

26. The northeastern and midwestern states in these categories mostly have
individualistic cultures, while the Republican states in the West have mostly
traditionalistic cultures. See chapter 6.

27. The CBS measure reflects incumbent conservatism, so I reflect the signs of
the correlations.

28. The correlation for the full set of 58 members is .600, compared to .430
for the 26 who ran for reelection in 1982.

29. The correlations (reflected) between incumbent ideology in the CBS sur-
vey and opposition party values are .299 for hard-fought races, −.433 for low-
key contests, .522 when candidates converge and −.846 when they diverge; and
−.968 for LKD races compared to .666 for others. Again, the 1982 sample
underestimates the differences. The overall correlation for 1982 is −.046; for all
58 incumbents it is −.279.

30. Wright and Berkman use the same candidate data merged with voter
Abramowitz combines the 1978 American National Election Study with mea-
sures of the ideological clarity of 1978 Senate races from press reports.

Chapter 6

1. The respective means are 2.089 for senators from individualistic cultures,
2.148 for moralistic cultures, and 2.188 for traditionalistic. Higher scores indi-
icate greater conservatism.

2. For each party, I use the percentage of identifiers calling themselves lib-
eral minus the share calling themselves conservatives. The respective measures
by party are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individualistic</td>
<td>4.424</td>
<td>−31.470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moralistic</td>
<td>3.037</td>
<td>−36.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalistic</td>
<td>−8.012</td>
<td>−36.362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, the results are by senator (rather than by state), with higher scores
indicating greater liberalism.

3. Four of six candidates in traditionalistic states converged, compared to
two of six in moralistic states and just over half in individualistic states (tau-c = 
−.212, gamma = −.382). These correlations are based on small Ns, and the
relationship is not significant.

4. Some of the differences appear to be attributable to the distribution of
Senate seats. Northern Democrats have 71 percent of the seats in moralistic
states, compared to an even split in individualistic states. Yet, within partisan
blocs, there is more partisan polarization between in-party and out-party elites
in moralistic states than in individualistic cultures.
Why is there so much polarization in moralistic cultures? Democratic liberalism in moralistic states reflects the party’s distinct bases: the upper-income environmental activists and lower-middle-class workers susceptible to being laid off. Republican conservatism is driven by rural white fundamentalists who hunt and fish, precisely the opposite profile of the most liberal Democrats in these states. These characterizations stem from regressions of Democratic and Republican identifiers’ ideology. Both equations have the percentage of partisans identifying as liberal minus the percentage claiming to be conservative as the dependent variable. The Democratic equation includes income, the percentage of environmental activists in the population, the unemployment rate, percentage nonwhite, and the growth rate (adjusted $R^2 = .860, N = 35$). The Republican equation includes the percentage of fundamentalists, population diversity, the number of hunting and fishing licenses in the state, percentage of the population that is blue collar, and the unemployment rate (adjusted $R^2 = .814, N = 32$). The Republican equation excludes Utah, because of problems estimating the fundamentalist population there. For Democrats, the biggest impact comes from income (positive). For the GOP, the strongest effects are for fundamentalists and population diversity (both negative). Party elites are driven by similar forces: Democratic party elites are more likely to be liberal in moralistic states where George McGovern fared well in 1972, with high incomes, large numbers of environmental activists, but few union members. Republican party elites are drawn to the right by rural fundamentalists and by highly educated people. The Democratic elite equation includes the McGovern vote, income, environmental activists, and union membership (adjusted $R^2 = .805, N = 35$). For Republican elites, the predictors are fundamentalist share, manufacturing share, and population diversity (adjusted $R^2 = .759, N = 32$, with Utah excluded). Party identifier ideology is not significant in either estimation. The biggest impact for Democratic elites comes from the McGovern vote, while the strongest effect for GOP elites is the fundamentalist share.

5. The local party organization variables come from Gibson et al. 1985. These and succeeding characterizations are based upon correlations between the variables in questions and dummy variables for each type of political culture. Details about the correlations are available upon request.

6. The correlations of dominant party with political culture are $-0.481$ (tau-c) and $-0.738$ (gamma). The calculations for party identification are by senator rather than by state.

7. This difference is significant only at $p < .13$ for a one-tailed test and $p < .25$ for a two-tailed test.

8. The mean statewide liberalism-conservatism difference is $-9.0$ for Northern Democrats from individualistic cultures (indicating a modest tilt to the right), compared to $-9.7$ for Republicans from these states, $-12.6$ for Northern Democrats from traditionalistic cultures ($-19.6$ for Republicans), and $-14.2$ for Northern Democrats from moralistic states ($-17.3$ for Republicans).

9. I compute these effects by multiplying the coefficient for each culture in table 23 by its standard deviation (for the group of states comprising each culture).
10. In both traditionalistic and individualistic cultures, there are moderating forces that pull legislators toward the center. In traditionalistic states, if opposition party identifiers are primarily moderate (as opposed to conservative), this will cost an incumbent votes \( (p < .05) \). However, if the opposition party identifiers are conservative, the incumbent will benefit. In individualistic cultures, the more conservative the opposition party is, the greater the vote share for the incumbent \( (p < .05) \). This should induce moderation among incumbents.

11. For senators up for reelection (who made it through their primaries) there are 17 Northern Democrats and 7 Republicans from moralistic cultures, 15 Democrats (5 from the North) and 7 Republicans from traditionalistic states, and 10 Northern Democrats and 12 Republicans from individualistic cultures. The estimates for party blocs below come from simple regressions with the two components of ideology as the only predictors. The effects in the text do not control for other factors. Nevertheless, they appear to be reasonable.

12. Elliott voted with Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) to expand the House Rules Committee in 1961, a move widely viewed as supportive of civil rights and other progressive legislation. He wrote in his autobiography (Elliott and D’Orso 1992, 204–5): “I’d always been secure that my own district was behind me. I’d gotten used to running unopposed in recent years, including in 1960. But now I was seeing a sharp increase in unhappy mail from people in my own district. Something was happening down there, and it wasn’t good. Still I wasn’t about to turn against my party, my principles and my word because of rumblings back home.”

13. The personal ideology scores for Bentsen, Tower, and Morgan are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bentsen</th>
<th>Tower</th>
<th>Morgan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statewide simple</td>
<td>-0.381</td>
<td>-2.543</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State party simple</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-2.479</td>
<td>0.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Induced partisanship</td>
<td>-0.675</td>
<td>-1.176</td>
<td>0.448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal partisanship</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>-1.163</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mean for personal partisanship for Southern Democrats from traditionalistic states is .046.

14. Republicans from individualistic states with a quality challenger won 50.6 percent, compared to 59.5 percent for GOP incumbents with a free ride. The corresponding figures for Northern Democrats from moralistic states are 46.2 percent and 56.6 percent. Multivariate models including the two measures of personal ideology reduce the impacts in both cases to slightly more than 2 percent.

15. A regression of the electoral margins of these 13 senators with challenger quality \( (b = -6.866, t = -3.218) \) and challenger expenditures \( (b = -0.010, t = -3.491) \) has an adjusted \( R^2 = .606 \).

16. Again, the following regressions employ only induced and pure partisanship as predictors in regressions. The adjusted \( R^2 \) values range from \( -0.048 (N = 19) \) for Northern Democrats from moralistic cultures to \( .863 \) for Republicans from the same ecology \( (N = 7) \).
17. Republicans in moralistic cultures don’t face quality challengers either. Yet, just 30 percent of GOP races are uncontested, the smallest share of any Republican bloc of senators. And Republican incumbents in this culture gain “only” 84 percent of the vote, a weak share for primaries.

18. In moralistic cultures, one-party states lead to a decline in incumbent primary vote shares \( (p < .0001) \), as do polarized parties — where a plurality of Democrats are liberals and a plurality of Republicans are conservatives. The polarization effect is largely traceable to Republican incumbents. A large rural population, which might induce face-to-face campaigning rather than media blitzes, increases vote shares—though ruralism in traditionalistic states brings incumbents fewer votes. In individualistic states, a large share of environmentalists boosts a senator’s vote share \( (p < .05) \). Where more independents are liberals, incumbents fare worse. Progressive independents encourage GOP senators to moderate their ideology, which in turn puts them at risk in primaries. When the other party is predominantly conservative, the incumbent’s vote share drops \( (p < .05) \).

19. Northern Democrats from individualistic cultures have slightly more liberal induced statewide ideology than those from moralistic cultures. This does not hold for the smaller sample examined in chapter 5.

20. The pure personal ideologies of Republican senators did not vary according to whether they faced the electorate in 1982.

21. The mean score of liberal percent minus conservative percent for GOP identifiers is \(-9.7\) for individualistic states, \(-21.6\) for moralistic cultures, and \(-17.3\) for moralistic states.

22. The difference between conservative and liberal identifiers of the two blocs is 17 percent in moralistic cultures, 14.7 percent in traditionalistic, and 10.2 percent in individualistic states. These results are for Republican senators.

23. For overall means, the standard deviations are .052 for traditionalistic states and .098 for moralistic ones. For percentage liberal minus percentage conservative, they are 4.61 and 9.44.

24. The only instance in which senators seem to adjust their personal partisanship to the past primary occurs in individualistic cultures where senators had relatively close calls (winning less than 80 percent last time out). Even though most senators in this group are hardly extremists (only one has a personal partisanship score greater than 1.0), they do seem to tailor their own partisanship to their vote shares in the last primary \( (r = .793, N = 11) \): Senators from individualistic states, especially Northern Democrats, have a more liberal personal partisanship when they win more votes in the previous primary —but only if they face a somewhat contested race to begin with.

25. The estimates are from regressions for general election vote shares with induced and personal values and primary vote shares as predictors.

26. The convergence data come from the CBS survey. The value of Yule’s \( Q = .382 \).

27. The value of gamma is .471.

28. Every senator from a moralistic state has a score of 1 (weak organization) on Mayhew’s traditional party organization scale. Forty-three percent of senators from traditionalistic states also have a score of 1, with an additional 37
percent receiving a 2. Forty-four percent of senators from individualistic states have a score of 5, the maximum, and an additional 17 percent receive a score of 4. On the Gibson et al. (1985) scale of local party organization strength, individualistic states have the most vibrant structures, with moralistic and then traditionalistic far behind.

Chapter 7

1. Interview with Robert Michel, May 23, 1995. Other uncited references to Michel are from this interview.

2. Party leaders include the majority and minority leaders and whips, conference secretaries (both parties), and the chairs of the Republican Policy Committee and the Republican Conference. This gives five Republican and three Democratic party leaders. Since the president pro tempore of the Senate is not a policymaking leadership position, I do not include it. Committee leaders are the chairs or ranking minority members of the 15 Senate standing committees.

3. The arithmetically astute will notice that this list totals only seven, which is less than half of the 15 Senate standing committees. Robert Stafford (VT) was the ranking member of both Environment and Public Works and Veterans’ Affairs, solving the puzzle.

4. These findings are based once more on LCV scores. I focus primarily on directional measures. I also tested relationships for all leaders, but since the number of committee leaders dwarfed that for party leaders, the all-leader results overwhelmingly replicated those for committee leaders.

5. There are no scores for the geographic or reelection constituencies in Hawaii, so Democratic Conference secretary Daniel Inouye is excluded. For the Republicans, Whip Ted Stevens of Alaska is similarly excluded.

6. All of the Southern chairs are more conservative than any of their constituencies except for John Sparkman (D-AL), who is more liberal than three of the four constituencies (simple ideology is the exception). All but John McCain (D-AR) deviate less as we move from geographic to reelection constituencies and from simple to pure personal ideology.

7. I exclude the heterogeneity of the constituency’s voting behavior since it reflects electoral rather than structural effects. I also drop the two interaction terms involving electoral proximity (proximity times brand name and proximity times heterogeneity) because their logic is not clear.

8. The variable for retiring members is not an exact replica of the Kalt-Zupan formulation. I corrected for several data errors.

9. Kalt and Zupan (1990) include two additional variables, interactions between election proximity and brand name and between proximity and electoral heterogeneity. I could not ascertain the logic of these variables, so I omitted them from my models.

10. This is not surprising since and state party personal values correlate at .716 for the PRO-LCV-based measures and at .888 for the ADA-based scores.

11. Brand name has a correlation of .685 with vote share in the last general election and .625 with seniority.
12. The model for all senators has an adjusted $R^2 = -.012$; for Northern Democrats, the adjusted $R^2 = .058$, and for Republicans it is .005. In each case, the standard error of the estimate is just about equal to the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

13. For these analyses I put party and committee leaders together in a single leadership variable. I report only correlations greater than .3. Most are greater than .5. Details are available from the author.

14. There are some anomalies. Republicans calling it quits in traditionalistic states vote more conservatively, and Southern Democrats from the same culture veer to the left. Neither makes a lot of sense, especially since the retiring Southerners were always quite conservative, and there is no reason for GOP legislators from this conservative culture to fear voting too conservatively (see chapter 6).


16. The mean score of Republican state elites for committee leaders is .32, compared to -.067 for other GOP senators ($p < .15$). The mean score for Republican elites for party leaders is -.586, compared to .163 for other GOP senators ($p < .10$).

17. Northern Democratic committee chairs have a mean personal partisanship score of -.370, putting them to the right of their core supporters, compared to .018 for other Northern Democratic senators. Their fellow partisans have an average liberalism minus conservatism percentage of 9.487, compared to 2.533 for all Northern Democratic senators ($p < .015$). Their party elites average .740, compared to .448 ($p < .16$), with higher scores indicating liberalism.

18. Northern Democratic committee chairs have an average pure personal ideology (statewide) score of -.134, compared to -.370 for pure partisanship. Their colleagues have scores of .148 and .018, respectively.

19. Northern Democratic committee chairs' personal partisanship is correlated at -.390 with the percentage of independents who identify as conservative in their state and at -.701 with the Republican identifier difference in liberal/conservative ideology. For other Northern Democratic senators, the correlations are -.122 and .190. Though based on tiny numbers, it is interesting to note that two of three Northern Democratic committee chairs and their opponents converged in 1982, compared to 4 of 11 (37 percent) of other Northern Democrats.

20. The correlation between personal partisanship and ideology is far stronger for committee chairs than for the rank and file among Northern Democrats (−.512 compared to .032). Yet seniority is so much higher among committee leaders that the comparison does not resolve the quandary.

21. The stratified personal partisanship score for Northern Democratic committee chairs is −.775 compared to the “unstratified” average of −.398. For other Northern Democrats, the difference is far smaller (−.272 compared to .114).

22. Using the Pro-ADA scores, as in Kalt and Zupan (1990), yields very similar results. The correlations are .455, .742, and .128 for all senators, unified delegations, and split contingents.

23. Among the 14 Republicans from single-party delegations, the correlation between senators' personal partisanship is −.440.
24. Boxer herself sees the regional, ethnic, and gender issues as something that unites her with Feinstein (Boxer with Boxer 1994, 81).
25. In states with divided delegations, the share of dominant party identifiers falls to 37.5 (compared to 45.5 percent for unified blocs, \( p < .0005 \)).

Chapter 8

1. Many people don’t like the term *shirking*, as I have learned from countless conversations since I began this project. Some are simply expressing a hostility to rational-choice theory (a position that I obviously do not share). Others see the terminology as confusing, since the real issue is what constitutes representation. The careful reader will note that I have played down the term *shirking* throughout the book and concentrated instead on personal ideology and multiple constituencies.
2. Both Republican results are consistent with chapter 5.
3. One-third of senators up for reelection from moralistic states in 1982 converged with their challengers, compared to 47 percent in individualistic cultures and 67 percent in traditionalistic states (\( \tau-u = -.212 \), \( \gamma = -.382 \)).
4. The reason Northern Democrats from moralistic cultures do worse than their Republican colleagues may be independent ideology. Independents in moralistic states are more conservative than independents in individualistic states (though not compared to their counterparts in traditionalistic cultures). Independents in moralistic cultures with Democratic incumbents are no more liberal than their counterparts with GOP sitting senators.
5. Northern Democratic incumbents in moralistic states have just 30 percent of voters identifying with their party (smaller than for either of the other cultures). While GOP senators in moralistic cultures have only a slight edge (at 32 percent), they fare better than their colleagues in other cultures. Perhaps ironically, at least during this period, moralistic states were least likely to have split-party delegations.
6. This result seems anomalous compared to Republicans, since GOP legislators go toward their state party elites and Southern Democrats move away from their core partisan supporters. Given the key role of blacks in Southern Democratic primaries, the impact of liberal partisan supporters is understandable.
7. This may explain why my friend Mike Munger is so enamored of ideological-equilibrium models.
8. The exception is for Northern Democrats from individualistic states, who benefit from a more liberal induced ideology.
9. The measures employed for party identifiers and statewide attitudes are the shares of liberals minus conservatives. Ironically, GOP elite views are correlated more strongly with Democratic identifiers’ ideology (.589) than with their own adherents’ views. Democratic elites had only a modest relationship (\( r = .181 \)) with Republican identifiers’ views.
10. The equation for Republicans excludes Utah because of problems with the fundamentalist variable.
11. The percentage of liberals minus the percentage of conservatives averages \(-34.9\) for the GOP compared to 3.0 for Northern Democrats.
12. They are a tiny share everywhere. Environmental activists constitute 0.46
percent of the population in traditionalistic states, compared to 0.78 percent in individualistic and 0.88 percent in moralistic cultures.

13. In most cases, the legislator-elite correlations are the highest. These correlations are based upon the shares of liberal and conservative shares of party identifiers and statewide public opinion, state elite attitudes, and senators’ voting records from both PROLCSV and ADA scores.

14. No senator, not even the shirkers as defined in chapter 2 (with standardized scores less than $-1.96$ or greater than $1.96$), has either a statewide or state party pure ideology that qualifies as a shirker. The two statewide shirkers have an average absolute score of 1.204, compared to .383 for the nonshirkers; for the three state party shirkers, the differences are smaller: .886 compared to .522.

15. If we divide the mean scores by the overall standard deviations for each party, the distances are greater. The Northern Democratic personal ideology score rises from .189 to .346 and the GOP mean increases from .130 to .266.

16. Ragdale’s (1980) Senate model is for 1974; 1980 is an exception. It is the only year in which induced ideology is significant and personal values are not.

17. In 1982, 67 percent of candidates converged in traditionalistic cultures, 47 percent in individualistic races, and 33 percent in moralistic states.

18. I owe the statement on the quality of House challengers to a personal communication from Gary C. Jacobson.

19. The GOP offered quality challengers in 40 percent of races, compared to 30 percent for Democrats. This difference persists under a variety of controls. See, however, Squire 1989, which finds no partisan advantage in challenger quality among Senate challengers in the 1980s.

20. Despite the professed statement by many freshmen that they would rather be right than reelected, the first-termers have been aggressive in raising funds for their reelection contests, securing almost twice as much as their Democratic colleagues in the first six months of 1995. Much of the fund-raising effort has been through a coordinated national strategy by the House Republican leadership (Maraniss and Weisskopf 1995, A8).

21. The data, which were computed for me from the 1994 American National Election Study by Dianne Hollern of the University of Maryland — College Park, show the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOP Identifiers: Freshman Districts</th>
<th>All Respondents: Freshman Districts</th>
<th>All Respondents: Other Districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More emphasis on values:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion as guidance:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great deal</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New lifestyles break down society:</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant of other values:</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree + agree</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
22. I divided Senate electorates into homogenous and heterogenous groupings based upon their scores on Sullivan’s (1973) population diversity index. For the 50 senators with scores below the mean (.45) — homogenous electorates — the correlation between state mean opinions and mean partisan attitudes is .468, compared to .255 for the more heterogenous electorates. The correlations between state means and party elite views (with signs reflected) are .540 and .150, respectively. Statewide personal ideology and pure personal partisanship are also more strongly correlated in homogenous states (.415) than in heterogenous ones (.280).

23. The correlation between pure personal ideology and general election vote share was .075 in 1976, −.163 in 1980, and −.070 in 1982. When we break down the results by party, they do not change markedly for 1978 and 1982, but do for 1980. Liberal Northern Democrats lost votes in the general election (−.382), as we would expect from the large number of Northern Democrats who lost. Even — indeed, especially, in 1980, Republicans won more votes if they were moderate. The correlation between vote share and pure personal ideology is .703.
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224 References


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Name Index

Arvey, Jacob, 14
Baker, Howard, 143
Bergland, Bob, 109
Boxer, Barbara, 164, 216, 220
Brooke, Edward, 39, 51, 76, 135, 145, 169, 204
Bumpers, Dale, 38, 159
Burke, Edmund, 2, 17, 20
Byrd, Robert, 143, 144, 185
Case, Clifford, 7, 17, 35, 39, 56, 71, 104, 122, 125, 135, 145, 148, 169, 179, 201, 215
Chavez, Linda, 108
Chiles, Lawton, 205
Church, Frank, 205
Clark, Dick, 163
Conrad, Kent, 109, 110
Culver, John, 38, 39, 51, 163
Curtis, Carl, 38, 146
Danforth, John, 204
Dershowitz, Alan, 185
Dirksen, Everett, xi, 142, 224
Domenici, Pete, 74, 142, 148, 163
Donne, John, 74
Dorgan, Byron, 109
Douglas, Paul, 14, 140, 219, 221
Eagleton, Thomas, 205
East, John, 120, 130
Elazar, Daniel, 6, 25, 117–20, 125, 126, 221
Elliott, Carl, 51, 129, 212, 221
Erikson, Robert, 12, 19, 23, 35, 57, 206, 221, 227
Feinstein, Dianne, 164, 216
Fenno, Richard F., x, 2, 9, 10, 14–16, 32, 34, 46, 73, 74, 109, 110, 142, 145, 148, 149, 163, 174, 183, 184, 186, 203, 222
Fulbright, J. William, 185
Glenn, John, 108, 109, 139, 163, 199, 222
Graham, Robert, 1, 129, 225
Hart, Gary, 38, 205
Hatfield, Mark, 145
Hayakawa, S. I., 38
Hays, Brooks, 51, 129
Heinz, John, 163, 221
Hollings, Fritz, 185
Humphrey, Hubert, 129
Jackson, Henry, 20, 35, 36, 53, 74, 75, 95, 223
Javits, Jacob, 71, 135, 145, 169, 206
Johnson, Lyndon B., 129
Kalt, Joseph, ix, x, 17–19, 22–24, 26, 31, 32, 34–46, 49, 57, 59, 63, 98,
Keating, Kenneth, 206
Kennedy, Edward M., 5, 39
Keyes, Alan, 108
Kindness, Thomas N., 109
Kingdon, John, xii, 14, 15, 20, 34–36, 53, 74, 95, 183, 184, 199, 223
Koppel, Ted, 185
LaFollette, Robert M., 129
Long, Earl, xii, 19, 21, 22, 32, 33, 38, 52, 59, 74, 109, 155, 156, 160, 164, 165, 169, 199, 200, 215, 220, 223, 224
Martin, Joseph, 143, 224, 226
Mathias, Charles McC., 135
Maverick, Maury, 51, 129
Mayhew, David R., 71, 90, 143, 164, 181, 199, 204, 224
McClellan, John, 159, 205, 214
McClure, James, 204
McGovern, George, 34, 37, 57, 191, 211
Melcher, John, 206
Metzenbaum, Howard, 163, 199
Michel, Robert, xi, 142–44, 152, 157, 184, 214
Mikulski, Barbara, 108, 109
Morgan, Robert, 130, 212
Norris, George W., ix, x, 2, 7, 8, 26, 50, 51, 129, 225
Pearson, James, 145
Percy, Charles, 145
Proxmire, William, 129
Rayburn, Sam, 212
Reagan, Ronald, 108, 109, 187
Scarborough, Charles Joseph, 2
Schmiyth, Harrison, 163
Schweiker, Richard, 205
Scott, William, 38
Shadegg, John Barden, 2
Smith, Frank E., 2, 7, 8, 26, 50, 129, 168, 226
Souder, Mark Edward, 8
Sparkman, John, 205, 214
Specter, Arlen, 163
Stafford, Robert, 71, 76, 145, 155, 206, 214
Stokes, Donald E., 12, 13, 73, 129, 165, 199, 220, 225
Tower, John, 38, 39, 51, 130, 146, 212
Tsongas, Paul, 204
Weicker, Lowell, 76, 205
Westlye, Mark, 93, 95, 102, 206, 209, 227
Wright, Gerald C., xi, xii, 9, 10, 20, 23, 53, 35, 40, 57, 59, 68, 71, 92, 94, 95, 100, 114, 116, 149, 171, 181, 199, 200, 203, 206, 207, 209, 210, 221, 227
Young, Milton, 1, 205
Zorinsky, Edward, 206
Subject Index

abortion, 43, 44, 47, 76–82, 84–86, 192, 207
activist ideology, 70
ANTISTRIP, 39–41, 46, 47, 76, 77, 82, 86, 201
Boeing, 75
brand names, 105, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 214
CBS News, 25, 35, 36, 92, 95, 210
Christian Right, 183, 222
collective representation, 171
committee chairs, 144–47, 157, 158, 215
committee power, 26, 149, 152, 153
communist immigration, 79, 82, 85, 87
communist loans, 43, 44, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 87, 192
competitive cultures, 7, 118, 119, 124, 126, 136, 140, 146, 162, 166–69, 206, 207
concentric circles, 9, 20, 28, 49
Congressional candidates, 13, 57, 59, 61, 62, 66, 120–22, 124, 203, 208
Congressional Quarterly, 111, 209, 221, 222
conservatives, ix, 24, 33, 38, 46, 48, 58, 59, 87, 115, 129, 132, 135–37, 140, 158, 159, 161, 163, 166, 172, 201–3, 210, 213, 216
convergence, 58, 59, 100, 111, 173, 202, 213
core partisan supporters, 15, 25, 90, 100, 101, 107, 115, 144, 146, 164, 176, 187, 216
Cuba, 43, 44, 47, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84–86, 192
death penalty, 43, 44, 47, 77–79, 82, 84–86, 192, 200
delegates, 3, 4, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 57
desegregation, 43, 44, 47, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84–86, 192
diamond model, 12, 180
direct estimates, 35, 38, 39, 42–45, 55, 79
divergence, 100, 105, 111
divided delegations, 26, 158–67, 169, 216
draft, xii, 43, 44, 47, 76–80, 82, 84–86, 192
environmentalists, 34, 40, 42, 134, 182, 191, 196, 211, 216
fundamentalists, 58, 121, 122, 177–79, 182, 183, 211, 216
general elections, 9, 24, 25, 51, 52, 60, 63, 64, 67, 69, 70, 87, 88, 90, 101, 102, 123, 127, 131, 133–37, 139, 140, 149, 155, 167, 174, 175, 203, 204, 206, 208, 213, 214, 218
geographic constituencies, x, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 24, 32–36, 38, 39, 41–43, 45, 48, 53, 58, 63–65, 73, 76–81, 91, 94, 95, 97–99, 105, 120, 122, 124, 128, 130, 131, 133, 137, 144, 152, 155, 156, 163–65, 168, 169, 177, 179, 183, 193, 194, 200, 206
hard-fought elections, 103, 130, 137, 208
heterogeneity, electoral, 57, 61–63, 123, 204, 214
heterogenous constituencies, 55, 56, 58, 71, 122, 124, 165, 182, 186, 187, 203, 218
home style, 12, 139, 140, 186, 222
homogeneity, 57, 124, 169, 181, 186, 187, 207, 218
ideological-equilibrium model, 3
inclusive compromise, 71, 181
individualistic cultures, 25, 119–21, 125, 126, 129, 131–33, 135, 136, 138, 153, 155, 158, 167, 175, 210–13, 216
individualistic states, 26, 118, 120–22, 124–28, 130–32, 134–38, 140, 153, 154, 166, 176, 177, 179, 210, 212–14, 216
induced partisanship, 25, 75, 81, 85, 87, 93, 99, 100, 103, 104, 107, 110, 115, 121, 130, 134, 135, 138, 160,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>163, 166, 174, 180, 182, 195, 196, 197, 198, 201, 202, 204–13, 215, 216, 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama Canal, 42–44, 47, 76–78, 82, 86, 87, 192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party leaders, 53, 57, 108, 143–46, 152, 153, 157, 163, 206, 214, 215, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal constituencies, 10, 12, 14, 49, 51, 54, 55, 57, 72–74, 76, 83, 91, 100, 110, 115, 122, 124–26, 130–32, 135, 136, 138, 146, 154, 156–58, 162, 164, 168, 173, 176, 177, 184, 203, 205, 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politicos, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pornography, 43, 44, 47, 77–79, 81, 82, 84–87, 192, 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pregnancy disability roll call, 43, 44, 76, 78, 79, 82, 85, 87, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pregnancy discrimination roll call, 78, 81, 202, 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary constituencies, 10, 20, 55, 72, 87, 90, 99, 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary elections, 88, 101, 133, 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>principal-agent model, 4, 5, 164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>profiles in courage, 1, 7, 8, 11, 25, 26, 129, 185, 187, 223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proximity, 19, 26, 94, 98, 112, 113, 151–54, 208, 209, 214, 219, 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>induced values, 74, 75, 78, 83, 85, 87, 89, 128, 129, 131, 134, 136, 163, 167, 171, 172, 174, 175, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Conservation Voters (LCV), 22, 34, 35, 37, 38, 68, 70, 71, 95–98, 106, 107, 121, 137, 150–54, 159, 191, 201, 204, 207, 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberals, ix, 5, 14, 30, 33, 36, 38, 46, 48, 59, 91, 110, 119, 125, 128, 131, 132, 134, 137, 140, 163, 169, 201–3, 206, 207, 213, 216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low-key diverging races (LKD), 105–11, 113, 114, 116, 168, 209, 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>misrepresentation, 5, 9, 17, 18, 51, 73, 100, 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitoring, 16, 20, 26, 57, 142, 149, 152–54, 156, 164, 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moralistic cultures, 7, 25, 26, 118–22, 126–29, 133, 135–38, 140, 153, 169, 175, 176, 210–13, 216, 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiple constituencies, x, 9, 10, 16, 34, 42, 75, 91, 156, 164, 165, 216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutron bomb, 43, 44, 47, 76, 77, 79–82, 84–87, 192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times, 35, 210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>