

The Movers and the Shirkers

*Representatives and Ideologues
in the Senate*

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Ann Arbor

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To Avery, who, like any nine-year-old, tries to get away with as much as he can, but whose fundamental loyalty is never in doubt.

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Preface

Some time around 1982 my friend and colleague Joe Oppenheimer rushed into my office and handed me a paper to read. “It’s about Congress and a new way to measure personal ideology,” he said — or at least something pretty close to that. He asked for my comments. I had seen some similar work — especially Kalt 1981 — and doubted that anything such as personal ideology exists. I read the manuscript, liked its boldness, but found it difficult to accept *any* argument that labeled Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) and Harrison “Pete” Williams (D-NJ) as conservatives or Strom Thurmond (R-SC) and John Stennis (D-MS) as liberals (Carson and Oppenheimer 1984, 174–75). It made little difference that these characterizations were “relative” to their constituents. I was *not* convinced. I was even more surprised when Joe told me some months later that the paper had been accepted at the *American Political Science Review*.

About the same time I discovered a similar approach, developed independently by Joseph A. Kalt and Mark Zupan (1984). Two more articles, one in the most prestigious political science journal and the other in the premier economics journal, did not change my mind. But they made me take the approach more seriously. When an entire literature developed using this methodology, attention must be paid. I decided to put aside my disbelief and at least feign agnosticism.

What bothered me about the personal-ideology literature? And how did I come to terms with it? I was never comfortable with the argument, derived from principal-agent models, that legislators who voted contrary to their constituents were “shirking” their responsibility to the voters. I had long admired those handful of Southern moderates and liberals who sacrificed their careers to the defenders of Jim Crow. Midwestern Progressives were also heroes, especially legislators such as George Norris

and Robert La Follette who stood up to the Republican leaders in the Senate. Yet, I could never accept the argument that these legislators hid their ideology as deep secrets from their constituencies. A La Follette or a Norris was a product of the Midwest and its distinctive political culture. Many Southerners who would be lambasted for their civil-rights stands nevertheless came from districts that appreciated federal economic programs and still embraced much of the Democratic party's ideology.

I was bothered by the attempt to divorce a legislator's personal ideology and constituency attitudes. I was also worried that the estimates of constituency preferences were inadequate. The largest component of constituency ideology is party (Carson and Oppenheimer 1984; Kalt and Zupan 1984). Yet, party is a trait of the senator, not the constituency. When you drop party from the models estimating constituency ideology, you lose much of the predictive power. (See chapter 2 for an elaboration of both themes.) What would happen if we took party out of constituency attitudes and reformulated the whole problem by presuming that party is central? Legislators respond to masses and elites within their parties, rather than to their statewide electorates? What would happen if you dropped the assumption that legislators' values and constituency preferences had to be independent? What would happen if we had better measures of public attitudes?

And what would happen if we could solve all three of these puzzles at the same time and that the answer to one led to the answer to the other two? This fourth question reverses the traditional order in which we first ask, as at Passover, why this study is different from all others. My intellectual puzzle about why there should be such a thing as personal ideology led me to question the use of party as an indicator of constituency opinion and of a demographic approach to estimating public opinion. Dick Fenno (1978) laid out the theoretical framework of multiple constituencies, emphasizing the roles of party followers and elites. This led me to posit that an equation including party as a component of party attitudes really was estimating the ideology of a legislator's fellow partisans. That was the key to part of the problem. Adding elite opinions to the representational mix was also central. And the availability of real data on public opinion solved two difficulties at once: I could get reliable data on the attitudes of a senator's geographic constituency, as Fenno called it, and the member's reelection constituency, presumed to be partisan supporters. Real public-opinion data solve the core theo-

retical problem as well. We no longer need to presume that legislators' ideology and constituency values are independent of each other.

This is the journey ahead. To show why legislators and constituents' views are more often in sync than opposed, I decided to attack headfirst. I went with the principal-agent model that sees legislators as shirkers to show that they rarely are—and those who do face electoral sanctions. By the time I got into the project I found that the approach, though flawed, had a compelling theoretical focus. It led me to seek my own way of estimating personal ideology, ultimately falling back on the same methodology that I criticized. But by the time I am through with it in this study, I have a much richer discourse and a measure of pure personal ideology that is far less impressive than the shirking literature would lead us to expect.

The critique of principal-agent models would not have been possible without the original data on which one of the classic studies is based. Mark Zupan graciously shared his data on Senate roll call behavior in 1977–78. And Gerald C. Wright provided the public-opinion data, generating state party attitudes for me from his database of CBS News/*New York Times* polls from 1976 to 1982. He also kindly shared the CBS survey of Senate incumbent and challenger ideology in 1982 (see chap. 5). The Honorable Bob Michel (R-IL), former minority leader of the United States House of Representatives, provided data of a different sort. He was most helpful in discussing how he sees a leader's obligations to president, party, and constituency—and did it in his typically gracious manner.

Along the way, I delivered papers from this project at the 1994 and 1995 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association and at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. My original goal was to publish a few papers and move on to other projects. The research program expanded way beyond my expectations, and the book overtook my plans to prepare a series of articles. Early on I did set out the methodology and the core theoretical framework in “If You Can't Please Everyone, Must You Only Please Yourself: Personal or Party Ideologies and Senate Roll Call Voting,” published in *Public Choice* in 1997. This article, in revised form, is much of chapter 2 and a bit of chapter 1.

I have amassed a large number of debts along the way. The Dirksen Center for Congressional Leadership and the General Research Board of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland–College Park

provided valuable support. I could not have done the study at all without the data provided by Mark Zupan and Gerald C. Wright. Throughout the project my colleagues Jim Gimpel, Mark Graber, Paul Herrnson, and (of course) Joe Oppenheimer provided detailed comments on the manuscript and a wonderful sounding board for my ideas.

Friends elsewhere were just as helpful, even if I could not bother them quite so regularly. Mike Munger read much of an early draft and all of a later one, saving me from errors large and small. Linda Fowler, John Lott, Lynda Powell, Wendy Schiller, and Charles Stewart read the manuscript; Bernard Grofman, David King, and Paul Quirk read much of it. All provided sage advice, sometimes help that was too good. John Kingdon, Jan Leighly, and Brian Roberts all provided useful comments as panel chairs or discussants at the meetings where I presented papers. I owe them all a lot — some less than others, since I have repaid them in kind — even as I could not always bring myself to take all of their advice. When I apportion both credit and blame, Jim Gimpel, Paul Herrnson, and Mike Munger go first. They each read several drafts, which surely must qualify as real torture. And a collection of people, collectively known as the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, provided some of the data that I use. They are not responsible for any claims that I make (or fail to make). Charles T. Myers at the University of Michigan Press helped guide this project to completion and publication.

Even more central was the love and support of Debbie and Avery, who endured long hours while I struggled with what seemed a Sisyphean project. Each time I thought I was close to being finished, I thought of another angle or reread a chapter and recognized that it was far too long and convoluted. I hope that I did not shirk my familial obligations too much.

Lies, Damn Lies, and Ideology

Earl Long, Huey's younger brother, was big on promises in his campaigns for governor of Louisiana. Once he pledged to a movie theater lobbyist that he would fight for repeal of a 2 percent tax on movie admissions. The lobbyist (and presumably the theater owners) became avid supporters of the Kingfish's brother. One of Earl's first actions after the election was to announce to his legislature that he opposed annulment of the levy. The lobbyist went to the governor, demanding to know what he should say to his clients. Earl Long replied, "I'll tell you what to tell them. Tell them I lied" (Liebling 1970, 41).

Senator Frank Graham (D-NC), who was appointed to a Senate vacancy in 1949 and defeated in a primary the next year, didn't lie. That led to electoral problems. Graham was accused of being too soft on civil rights, too far away from the center of gravity in North Carolina or its Democratic party. He denied the accusation in the campaign but admitted as much in his "Farewell Address" to the Senate on September 23, 1950: "I have run the risk of taking sides in the midst of events which could not wait for certificates of safety and conformity while freedom was embattled. . . . I took sides in the South and in the nation for the fairer consideration of Jews, Catholics, Negroes, and the foreign born" (quoted in Pleasants and Burns 1990, 277).

Are legislators who ignore or even flout constituency pressures knaves or knights?¹ Do they deserve our scorn or our praise? More commonly, we think of independent sorts as "profiles in courage," following the advice of the young John F. Kennedy (1957, 14) before he ever took his seat in the Senate: "[W]e must on occasion lead, inform, correct and sometimes even ignore constituent opinion if we are to exercise fully that judgment for which we were elected. But acting without selfish motive or

private bias, those who follow the dictates of an intelligent conscience are not aristocrats, demagogues, eccentrics, or callous politicians insensitive to the feelings of the public.”

Legislators who revel in turning their backs on the public and those who stand above the “whims” of the moment justify their positions on higher principles and charge others who heed the call of the constituency with baser motives. As Representative Frank E. Smith (D-MS) argued, “All members of Congress have a primary interest in being re-elected. Some members have no other interest. Their participation in decisions of great national import is dependent entirely upon the reaction they expect from their own district or state” (Smith 1964, 127). A member of the House interviewed by Fenno (1978, 160) heaped scorn on some colleagues.

All some House members are interested in is “the folks.” They think “the folks” are the second coming. They would no longer do anything do displease the folks than they would fly. . . . I imagine if they get five letters on one side and five letters on the other, they die.

Nebraska Progressive senator George W. Norris (R), who reviled in flouting his party and his constituency too, appealed to a higher moral authority than the electorate: “In the end, the only worth-while pay in congressional services is that which comes from a satisfied conscience in the knowledge that you have done your duty as God gives you light, regardless of the effect it may have upon political fortunes” (Norris 1945, 198). And Edmund Burke, the English philosopher and legislator, rejected the notion that he was to represent the views of his Bristol constituents and dared the voters to punish him for his transgressions (which they did).² The House freshman class of the 104th Congress, the first controlled by Republicans in 40 years, saw itself as pledged to an ideological agenda, whatever the consequences. “We’re going to stand for principle. The consequences be damned,” said Rep. John Barden Shadegg (R-AZ). Rep. Charles Joseph Scarborough (R-FL) added: “50 to 55 of [the 73 GOP freshmen] don’t care if we get reelected if we fold on the budget” (both quoted in Gugliotta 1995, A10).

Since Burke, both theorists and empirical analysts of representation have followed his distinction between being a slave to one’s constituents and an independent thinker (either a knight or a knave). Legislators are

either “trustees” looking out for the public interest or “delegates” who heed the issue positions of their constituents (Eulau 1962; Davidson 1969). Some members split the difference, sometimes heeding constituents, at other times going their own way. They are “politicos.”

We presume that delegates are primarily interested in getting re-elected, while trustees are motivated by ideology. This distinction corresponds to alternative spatial models of candidate competition. The *Downsian* model is consistent with the demand that public officials be delegates. Voters cast ballots on the basis of issues. They insist that candidates faithfully reflect constituency positions. So candidates adopt the same positions, the preferred policy of the median voter. Since both candidates take the same stands, voters find little to choose from. They are consigned to using other factors, such as party identification or the performance of the incumbent administration, as voting cues (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984).

The *ideological-equilibrium* model holds that voters care about issues but prefer candidates who take distinct positions. Voters worry that candidates who converge to the median voter’s ideal stand are opportunists. They prefer sincere candidates. Officeholders gain reputations for honesty by taking clear policy stands that they stick with over the years. If voters worry about risk, they might prefer a candidate they don’t agree with to a nominee whose position is unclear. At least the devil you know will be consistent. You know what you are getting (Glazer and Grofman 1989; Dougan and Munger 1989; Richardson and Munger 1990). Voters have policy preferences, so why shouldn’t candidates? In a world where both voters and candidates care about policies, office-seekers can do better by stressing their true ideals than by catering to the public’s whims (Wittman 1983). It is quite acceptable to be a trustee. Ideology and electoral success can go hand-in-hand.

This great debate between Downsian delegates and ideological-equilibrium models has shaped our understanding of representation in American politics. Are all politics local, as former Speaker Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, would tell fellow House members?³ Or, is politics mostly about national issues, as the former Speaker, Newt Gingrich, admonished his flock?

This great debate is misplaced. So is most of our thinking about representation. We picture legislators as making choices between their own values and those of their constituents. Yet, most politicians don’t have to choose between their own ideals and constituency preferences.

Voters usually elect public officials who are in tune with public beliefs. When legislators fail to reflect constituency views, we presume that they jump ship. Perhaps they believe that ideological stands can bring them votes; perhaps officials believe that they must remain true to their own ideals.

Looking at representation in terms of delegates and trustees makes four fundamental mistakes. First, it presumes that there are but two actors, voters and legislators, in the great game of politics. Second, it assumes that one side (voters) tells the other (elected officials) what to do. Third, it presumes that what one wants is often different from what the other prefers. Fourth, it posits that legislators who want to get reelected must present bland policy alternatives to the electorate. Each assumption is wrong.

I shall outline below a model of representation based on principal-agent theory in economics that views voters as management and elected officials as employees. Each has its own preferences and, as in real workplaces, they often come into conflict. Legislators prefer to be trustees, while voters want to compel them to be trustees. This sets up the problem of how to ensure compliance. What steps do the “bosses” have to take to get their “employees” to do their bidding?

Not so much, I argue. Most of the time legislators and their constituents share similar views on key questions of public policy. There is no problem of compliance when both sides want the same thing. But the political world is not a two-person game. Legislators have more than one constituency. Elected officials heed the calls of voters. But they don't face an undifferentiated populace. They pay particular attention to their fellow partisans, in the electorate, in their party organizations, and in other elected bodies. When elected officials take positions that depart from those favored by their constituents, they are most likely responding to the preferences of their fellow partisans.

These claims rest on a very simple, but often overlooked, assumption: Legislative representation is not random. Liberal electorates elect liberal legislators. Conservative electorates choose conservative legislators. Moreover, liberal electorates choose Democrats and conservative constituencies vote for Republicans. Of course, there are exceptions, but they are just that: unusual cases. In constituencies that tilt leftward, Democratic activists are even more liberal than the rank and file. They put further pressure on elected officials to move in the direction of — and sometimes past — constituency opinion. The same dynamic holds on the

right for Republicans. When legislators go against public opinion, they are not simply behaving like trustees. They are responding to *different constituencies*, not just to their own whims. Principal-agent models miss the mark when they consider only one “principal.”

Even if they don’t make this mistake (and a few don’t), the principal-agent models miss the mark by treating legislator and constituency attitudes as if they were in conflict. Most often they aren’t. The big divide is not between legislators and constituents but between legislators *and* constituents in each party. Democrats and Republicans stand for different ideals. This is widely acknowledged for elected officials (Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 1997). Voters are also divided ideologically along partisan lines, though not as sharply as elites are. Legislators respond *more closely* to their partisan constituents and activists than to their state electorates. They can get away with this “misrepresentation” because statewide opinion is mostly a function of the attitudes of the dominant partisans. Massachusetts elects liberals such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy because its Democrats are progressive and *so is the statewide electorate*. The Democrats dominate Massachusetts because it is a liberal state.

Politicians don’t scatter to the winds when they hear a message based on issues, as a Downsian model would suggest. They are linked to their constituents by an *ideology*. A “belief system” or “ideology” is a pattern of intercorrelated positions across a set of issues (Converse 1964, 207). An ideology is a simplified way of viewing the world. It reflects a set of ethical prescriptions for how the world ought to work — or, as I shall argue later, a culture (Hinich and Munger 1994, 11–13). A highly constrained belief system *need* not be unidimensional. But the most straightforward ideology that is likely to be useful to both voters and candidates (as well as to developing a system of ethics) lies on one continuum, usually assumed to differentiate left from right (Converse 1964, 221). Ideologies become, as Downs (1957, chap. 3) himself argued, a short-cut for linking one’s own attitudes to a party affiliation. Simply put, they separate Democrats from Republicans. Converse had us believe that elites were polarized by consistent belief systems, but ordinary citizens aren’t. Achen (1975) showed that this isn’t true: Ordinary people have consistent belief systems, once we recognize the fuzziness of questions asked in surveys and the measurement error in administering polls.

Ideology isn’t the scourge of electoral politics, as in Downsian models and principal-agent theories. Instead, it is an electoral resource. Voters know what they are getting when they select a Democrat or a

Republican. Occasionally they might make a mistake and choose someone who is out of step ideologically with a party or a state. But most of the time this isn't a problem. Within limits, voters *want* ideological representation, and they use party affiliation as a cue to get it. Elected officials share the same values that their constituents espouse. Finding an elected official who consistently strays from public opinion should be a rarity.

Suppose we all woke up one day to find that chocolate ice cream is good for us. It helps *lower* cholesterol and makes us live *longer*. Downsians and principal-agent theorists (largely the same folks) would be no less surprised to find that moving to the left or right, as opposed to the center, helps a candidate win an election. What they believed to be an indulgence (either voting against the constituency or consuming a lot of ice cream) turns out to be the staff of life. Just as most doctors would be skeptical of the report on chocolate ice cream, most (though not all) spatial theorists would think twice before accepting the argument that ideology helps a candidate. Most doctors, even if they came to believe this new report, would urge us not to become chocoholics. They'd be right. Too much of a good thing can be harmful. And political advisors would do well to recommend ideology in moderation as well.

Elected officials face a dilemma under the ideological-equilibrium model. Voters prefer candidates who take distinctive positions. Elites, who know more about issues and care more about them than all but a handful of citizens (Converse 1966), will press officials to go further to the right or left. They are like the candy makers and grandmothers who keep advising: "Eat, eat!" Elected officials aren't in much danger of giving voters what they don't want. Instead, their cardinal sin may be giving them more of what they want than they can handle. That's when politicians get in trouble—for not knowing when to stop. The voters may decide to reign them in and put them on an ideological diet.

How far can elected officials go to the right or the left? Who sets the limits? In each state there is either a dominant ideology or roughly balanced competing ideals that determine the constraints. This dominant ideology is part of a state's political culture (Elazar 1972; cf. chap. 6). It stems from a state's history and the values of the different segments of the population. The Northeast is more liberal, the South and West more conservative, and the Midwest an ideological battleground. Where one value system predominates, elected officials are more constrained. The parties will be less polarized. The majority party will

reflect the dominant ideology best, and the minority party will be pressured to mimic the majority. Majority party legislators will feel “free” to go beyond the bounds of public opinion, but minority-party officials realize that their electoral success depends upon not seeming too out of touch with public attitudes. Mimicking the majority is the only way a minority party can be competitive. There is no guarantee that it will (or can) do so. If one party (or officeholder) so dominates a state’s politics, the opposition may become dispirited. Its candidates may go well beyond the bounds of acceptable values, and the party and its candidates will be doomed to long-term minority status (see chapter 5). In a state with a dominant ideology, either both parties will espouse it or only the majority will. In the first case, the parties need not offer me-too platforms, but the minority will be constrained as to how far from the existing consensus it can go. In the second instance, the minority will feel free to cast the consensus aside, but it will do so at its electoral risk.

In states without a dominant ideology, as in the Midwest (especially in states with moralistic cultures, as noted in chapter 6), the two parties will be more polarized. Each party will reflect the values of its stronger supporters, and elected officials will feel pressure to move toward activists in their own parties. A dominant ideology can set the limits for political actors. Without it, politics becomes more of a free-for-all between two parties that fight a real battle of ideas.

Who Is Represented?

The idea of “profiles in courage” suggests a lone wolf braying at political winds. So does much of our language of representation. A trustee is a person set apart from the constituency—often one who knows better. But politicians are hardly solitary agents. Even great moralists such as Norris and Smith—especially such legislators—did not go into battle alone. Nebraska Republican leaders tried to defeat Norris in the 1930 Republican primary and ultimately pushed him out of the party six years later (Norris 1945, chaps. 28, 34). Norris had little use for Nebraska Republicans or their leaders, whose victories “were obnoxious and detrimental to the public good” (Norris 1945, 371). Smith (1964, 280), who was gerrymandered out of his House seat in 1962 after urging moderation on civil rights, bemoaned the “disastrous mutation in Mississippi’s political character in the last forty years” that led state legislators to dismember his district.

Yet both legislators were creatures of their constituencies. For all of Smith's (justified) self-righteousness, he acknowledged that he was more than just a seer who stood out from the crowd. While he had to tread gently on his message of racial reconciliation, he had more leeway than other Southern moderates (Smith 1964, 246–47).

The fact that the largest town in my district was Greenville, the most urbane and progressive city in Mississippi, was an invaluable asset to me as a congressman. The business leadership of the community understood the role federal programs could play in the town's economic development. . . . Greenville was an oasis in the racial strife and obsession that smothered the rest of Mississippi.

Smith recognized that his independence reflected his overwhelmingly Democratic district. Norris was not a loner either. Nebraska had a long tradition of independence; it was one of Populist presidential candidate James B. Weaver's strongest states in 1892 and gave Progressive Robert M. La Follette 6 percent more of its vote than did the nation in 1924.

Even many of the freshmen Republicans of the 104th House admit that they are not pure profiles in courage. Rep. Mark Edward Souder (R-IN) maintained that “[Washington commentators] may think of us as extremists here, but none of us are extremists at home. For our constituents to acknowledge that we're extremists is to say either that we duped them or that we [the voters] are all extremists” (quoted in Gugliotta 1995, A10). It's not just on the right: Rep. Bernard Sanders (I-VT), the only self-proclaimed socialist in the House of Representatives, explained how someone with his beliefs could get elected to Congress: “It's not just me. Many hundreds and hundreds of people have been working for the same things I have. In Vermont, we have been doing third party politics for thirty years.”⁴

The view of representation as a battle between legislators and constituents misses something critical: context. Public officials don't stand naked before an undifferentiated mass public. Nor do they jump through ideological hoops. They are pushed—by their partisans, party activists, and fellow officeholders. Most legislators don't see constituencies as undifferentiated masses of voters: 60 percent of Kingdon's (1973, 33) congressional respondents see elites as a key component of constituency politics; legislators who view either elites (or both elites and voters)

as a key component of their constituencies are more likely to say that pressures from back home affect their roll call behavior.

Representation comes in concentric circles (Fenno 1978). What we consider to be *the* electorate is the most remote constituency. It acts as a check on members who stray too far from public attitudes. The other constituencies are a legislator's bases of support. They range from fellow partisans to other officeholders and party activists to close personal friends. As loyal supporters, they have a more direct effect on how a legislator behaves. As we move from fellow partisans to close personal friends, we see two related dynamics at work. First, successive groups care more about ideology. A legislator's party identifiers are less preoccupied with issues than party activists. Second, familiarity breeds likeness. Opposites don't attract each other in politics. The closer you are to a legislator's inner circle, the more likely you are to share his (her) ideology. If legislators stray from the ideological center of their constituents, they won't be able to count on their supporting constituencies to bring them back.

Candidates aren't free to adopt any policies they believe the electorate wants. To get a party's nomination, a potential office-seeker must gain the support of party activists. These devoted supporters of a party will push a candidate toward the party's preferred ideology, which will be more extreme than the mass public's (Aldrich 1983; 1995, chap. 6; Grofman 1993).⁵ Party activists monitor the behavior of incumbents, pushing Democrats more to the left and Republicans to the right. Both initially and once in office, this immoderate strategy will help candidates win primaries (Coleman 1971; G. Wright 1978a, 1978b). When candidates take distinctive positions, they energize their base—increasing turnout among party activists in the general election. This boost in participation might compensate for any votes lost from alienated voters in the center (Aldrich 1995, 191). Or it might not—and lead to a confrontation among the constituencies.

Multiple constituencies complicate the problem of representation. If you have many bosses, whom do you obey (cf. Denzau and Munger 1986)? The full electorate is the ultimate check on member behavior. But is an ideological mismatch between voters and officeholders misrepresentation? Or is it representation of someone else? When legislators pay more attention to their core supporters than to all voters, are they burrowing themselves into ideological holes at the expense of the public's ideology?

The central messages in the pages ahead are (1) legislators are creatures of their constituency; and (2) we need a broader view of representation. Fenno (1978) provides us with the key to the puzzle in his four-constituencies model. The full set of voters is the “geographic constituency.” It is most distant from the day-to-day life of the officeholder but has the ultimate check on how moderate or extreme legislators can choose to be. The other three blocs exert more ideological pressures on members. “Reelection constituencies” are the people who are *reliable* supporters at the ballot box. Much, though not all, of the time, fellow partisans in the electorate comprise the bulk of a member’s reelection constituency (Fenno 1978, 8). These reliable supporters not only produce the votes necessary to secure another term every second or sixth November (for the House or Senate, respectively) They also provide the bulk of a legislator’s base in primary elections. A legislator’s strongest supporters form the “primary constituency” (Fenno 1978, 18–24). Members call this bloc “my political base,” “my hard core,” and “my true believers.” They include, in Fenno’s characterization, the volunteers and financial contributors, and fellow elites (Fenno 1978, 18–19; cf. G. Wright 1978a, 1978b, 1994).

Finally, there is the member’s inner circle, the “personal constituency” (Fenno 1978, 24–27). These are a legislator’s closest friends, who see the outside world in the same way. One House member described his “group” as “philosophical soul mates” linked together by “an emotional grab” (Fenno 1978, 26). Others become valued advisers *because they share the same worldview*. Most of the time fellow partisans and elites share the values of the full electorate. Yet, they are usually more extreme than the full electorate. They push legislators to the left (if they are Democrats) or the right (if they are Republicans), beyond what the full electorate would wish.

Is representation a battle for legislators’ souls between centrist voters and immoderate partisans and fellow elites? Sometimes, but not usually. Mostly partisans and elites share the values of the full electorate. There is often no conflict between the demands of a legislator’s various constituencies (cf. Lascher, Kelman, and Kane 1993, 84). Kingdon’s (1973, 235–36) study of roll call voting among House members found that 47 percent of all decisions involved no conflict among *any* of the influences on legislative voting. Legislators’ own views were in conflict with constituency attitudes only 15 percent of the time.⁶ *Multiple constituencies don’t necessarily create cross-pressures. Most of the*

time the various constituencies are on the same side of the ideological divide. Elected officials are usually pulled between degrees of liberalism or shades of conservatism. But sometimes there is tension among the constituencies. When there are divisions, legislators run for cover. This is push-me pull-you politics, where the full electorate demands moderation and the core supporters expect fealty to an ideological program.

Bringing fellow partisans and elites into the representational mix makes us rethink the distinctions between delegates and trustees and between Downsians and ideological-equilibrium theorists. These “new” actors introduce more ideology into American politics than either delegate theorists or Downsians admit. But they also raise the threat of electoral sanctions against members who stray too far from the preferences of the full electorate, threatening trustees and violating the premises of ideological-equilibrium theories.

Politics can be local *and* ideological: The values that count most are rooted in one’s own constituency. We must take a broader view of constituency to see how one can be a hybrid of the Downsian delegate and the ideological-equilibrium trustee. When legislators vote against their districts or states, they generally reflect the values of their partisan base. When they “violate” their “responsibilities” to their constituents, they are representing followers who may be as important to them as the full electorate. In many cases, these core supporters pull legislators away from districtwide (or statewide) public opinion. I offer a more complex view of representation than we have. It acknowledges that both parties and elites matter even in an electoral world largely ruled by public opinion. Yet it is more than that: It is a different way of looking at representation, expanding the base of who matters. This way of looking at the world suggests that legislators fare very well at representation. Only a handful stray from statewide, state party, and state party elite ideology. Those who do pay an electoral price. When we incorporate these new actors into the representational equation, we find that legislators who go against their constituents are not so much profiles in courage who dance to a different drummer as much as fellow travelers with other partisans.

Whose Constituents?

The debate over representation has been dominated by Miller and Stokes’s (1963) “diamond” model. This framework begins with constituency opinions, which shape both legislators’ perceptions of constituency

attitudes and members' own values. Both in turn affect legislator roll call behavior.

This model served us well for a long time, but diamonds aren't forever. For Miller and Stokes, the critical—and weakest—linkage is between constituency attitudes and legislators' perceptions of these opinions. Only for salient issues is there a strong linkage between the two (Miller and Stokes 1963; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Holloway 1975). The rest of the diamond model isn't nearly as interesting if legislators don't know what's on voters' minds or if there is not much on voters' minds at all. For Miller and Stokes, ignorance runs both ways, making the representational nexus weak. Since 1963, there have been numerous challenges to Miller and Stokes. Members of Congress may not be able to tell you much about what people think on a particular roll call, but they have good ideas about what their constituents believe. This is what Fenno's concept of "home style" is all about. Powell (1982, 666) shows that constituents aren't so badly informed about their representatives either. There is a moderate correlation ($r = .50$) between legislator ideology and legislators' perceptions of these values.

A more profound challenge to the diamond model came from the recognition that legislators represent their core supporters, mostly composed of their fellow partisans, better than they do the full electorate. This is hardly a new idea. It dates to the early days of quantitative analyses of representation, in Huntington's (1950) study of legislator ideology and electoral marginality. Without public-opinion data, Huntington was forced to rely upon an ingenious argument about why marginal representatives are more extreme than safe legislators. Miller (1964) and Fiorina (1974) followed in the same tradition. Study after study concluded that legislators respond better to their reelection constituencies than to the geographic constituency.⁷

This two-constituencies perspective still treats legislators and constituents as combatants in a representational struggle. Fellow party identifiers enter into the picture to help explain why legislators don't always adhere to the ideology of the geographic constituency. But short of adding another actor to the mix—and sometimes referring to politicians' need to win primary elections—the two-constituencies perspective on representation remains a thin story. Fenno's account is richer. It provides a context for partisan representation.

The reelection, primary, and personal constituencies share a partisan base. Just as fellow party identifiers form the core of a legislator's

reelection base, party elites constitute a public official's inner circle. Party identifiers pull legislators to more extreme positions than the geographic constituency would prefer. And core supporters tug them even further. Party activists are generally more extreme—Democrats more liberal, Republicans more conservative—than either the full electorate or even blocs of party identifiers (McCloskey, Hoffman, and O'Hara 1960; Aldrich 1995, chap. 6).

Much of the received wisdom about American politics plays down linkages between parties and ideology. The Downsian/delegate model leads us to expect moderate parties that hue to the center of public opinion within each constituency. Bland parties make it difficult for voters to base their votes on issues (Downs 1957, 136–38). The “traditional” view of the American voter highlights this confusion: Party identification and ideology are not closely connected (Campbell et al. 1960, 211–12).

A new consensus is emerging. American politics is more ideological than we realized (Poole and Rosenthal 1984). Parties shape this conflict of values, and partisan divisions in Congress have been increasing in the past several decades (Rohde 1991). As Warren E. Miller (1988, 74) argues, “Party . . . is the principal carrier and organizer of mass issue preferences and helps provide a structure for national politics that articulates and integrates the issue concerns of leaders and followers” (cf. Hinich and Munger 1994, 86). Parties have a monopoly on office holding in the United States and every other democracy. Their nominations are valuable, even more so when they can control access to their lines on the ballot. Mostly they can't legally. They don't need to worry. Rarely are candidates—at least viable ones—out of step with their partisan ideologies. Party activists, who are motivated by issues more than the rank-and-file partisans and who are more ideologically extreme, play a central role in nomination politics (Aldrich 1995, 186–88).

Parties polarize politics in at least five distinct ways. First, party organizations organize the faithful and spread the word. When congressional candidates depended more on their local parties (in the 1950s), Miller and Stokes (n.d., chap. 5) found that party organizations transmitted information about voter preferences to elites. Congressional candidates who relied upon parties for information about constituency preferences were more likely to agree with voters than office-seekers without party ties. Fellow partisans and party elites are not just reliable supporters. They feel intensely about many issues and will thus be more motivated to

communicate their views both to legislators and to constituents. The intensity of constituency views weighs heavily on legislators' behavior (Kingdon 1973, 35–38). Fervent supporters feel stronger bonds with their elected leaders and will be loath to let them slip into ideological heresy. Second, fellow party members often share the same electoral fate. Standing together with common values will seal that collective fate—in both good times and bad (Cox and McCubbins 1993).⁸ Third, candidates for office must win primaries before they contest the general elections. The need to rally the faithful first—and then as key elements of the electoral coalition in November—pushes (Northern) Democrats further left and Republicans more to the right than we would expect were there but a single electorate.

Fourth, parties bring together people with similar viewpoints. A member of the House described his personal constituency to Fenno (1978, 26).

We're a group of people who have the same philosophy of government—we are philosophical soul mates. We all believe that people should be involved in their government. We've all been in politics and all came to the group through the Republican party.

All sorts of observers (including Downs 1957, 25) accept this argument. Frequent contact among party members reinforces common values and produces greater party solidarity. In the halls of Congress, the most important cue givers come from one's own *state party delegation* (Kingdon 1973; Matthews and Stimson 1975).

Finally, party elites form close bonds with each other. Fenno's member adds (1978, 26): “And then there is an emotional grab. We all like each other.” Solidarity can help build ideological consensus. Illinois senator Paul H. Douglas (D) wrote of the “healthy mutual respect” he had with Chicago alderman Jacob M. Arvey. Douglas was a reformer. Arvey was the machine incarnate. Yet Douglas's respect “grew into a warm friendship and later became a significant factor in my own political career.” Arvey, even though more concerned with delivering votes than anything else, had “an insight into liberal movements that the average politician lacked” (Douglas 1971, 91). The senator needed no prodding to cast his lot with liberals, but such camaraderie with fellow partisans must be reassuring when worrying about stepping out against public opinion. In both the Wisconsin and Ohio state legislatures, members

choose fellow partisans—particularly from the same or neighboring districts—as their close friends. Friends share similar ideologies and, even beyond the impact of shared values, vote together on roll calls (Caldeira and Patterson 1987; Arnold, Deen, and Patterson 1995).

Politicians view their support coalitions as more than simply a source of votes. Core backers tell officeholders what voters are thinking and spread the legislator’s message to a broader electorate (Fenno 1978, 237). Members communicate mostly with their base.

I don’t have time to speak to constituents who are uncommitted. I’m so badgered by people to whom I’m obligated politically that I spend most of my time performing ceremonially before the people who agree with me. (Fenno 1978, 192)

Legislators get a biased view of the world that largely reinforces their own predispositions. When we overlay issue agreement with personal friendship, we see an overwhelming tendency for legislators to develop tunnel vision. Legislators with close ties to party activists are likely to push themselves further away from public opinion and toward the extremes.⁹ A solid partisan base of support permits legislators to rally the faithful and ignore the opposition. Legislators feel more comfortable with their own supporters and even refer to opponents as “the usual nuts writing me a lot of crap”; one member told Kingdon about unions (1973, 35): “They’ve never supported me, and I never support them, so I’m not listening.” Legislators can adopt this strategy only if they have a robust support base that depends upon, but not solely upon, core partisan supporters. A weak partisan support base requires more attention to the geographic constituency.

Partisan constituents drive Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right of the median voter. Were this dual constituency (partisan and geographic) all that mattered, representation might not pose vexing problems. Party identifiers divide over ideology, but there is a partisan gap, not a chasm. Most incumbents could, if they wished, split the difference between these two constituencies. Go far enough to your base to energize it and to deter a strong primary challenge. Most legislators don’t face powerful challenges in primaries. So they needn’t overreact ideologically.

The reliance on party activists and other elites as information sources and cue-givers poses a different problem. Elites are typically

more polarized than the rank and file. They can pull officeholders farther than fellow partisans. Their friendship and frequent interactions with members of Congress magnifies their impact. Since fellow partisans already drive legislators away from the center, following the lead of the activist base may cross the danger zone *unless taking relatively extreme positions is an electoral equilibrium*. Sometimes it is, at other times not. Yet there is an irony ahead. The political marketplace offers solace to neither a Downsian delegate nor a trustee ideological-equilibrium model. We shall see that candidates are most likely to take similar positions when it helps to be ideological. They are most likely to diverge from each other when issues cost votes.

Representation is a dialogue among legislators and their multiple constituencies. Each actor (as well as others that I don't consider here) tries to sway the member to its position. The legislator balances competing demands, recognizing that (s)he has most influence over those people with whom (s)he speaks most frequently: fellow officeholders, party activists, and close friends. The most distant actors, the geographic constituency, largely sends messages one way — to the member. It is not attentive enough, cohesive enough, or trusting enough to permit the member to change its mind on critical questions of policy. At most, people will tolerate modest amounts of defection from less controversial issues (Bianco 1994, 79; Fenno 1978, 152). Most legislators must still contend with electorates that will sort them out if they have any temptation to bolt too far out of line.

Principals and Agents

The picture I have drawn so far suggests a world in which legislators forsake their constituents in favor of an ideological agenda. Are legislators and constituents engaged in an ideological war? One influential perspective says yes. It looks at constituents and legislators as employers and employees. Management wants to get the maximum effort out of workers. Employees prefer to take longer coffee breaks and otherwise to expend less effort. There is a battle between “principals,” the managers, and their “agents,” the workers. Without effective monitoring, the agents will “shirk” their responsibilities and put out insufficient effort (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).

If we view constituents as principals and legislators as agents, we have an analogy to the employer-employee relationship.¹⁰ Both voters

and public officials have values. Voters want legislators to be pure delegates. A *Time*-CNN survey in 1993 found that 68 percent of respondents wanted members of Congress to vote the district line, while just 24 percent were willing to let legislators use their own judgment.¹¹ Officeholders prefer to hew to their own ideologies. Much like an employee who prefers to exert his own level of effort, “a politician who shirks his constituents’ interests and votes in accordance with his own preferences is engaging in a consumption activity” (Davis and Porter 1989, 103). Such legislators “indulge” their own preferences at the expense of their responsibilities to their employers, the constituents. Kalt and Zupan (1984, 283–84; cf. also Kalt and Zupan 1990) argue: “The perquisites of political office [include] . . . the ability to use the power of government to impose one’s own pet theories of the ‘good’ society.”

An extensive literature on shirking has developed since Kalt and Zupan (1984) and Carson and Oppenheimer (1984) independently transferred the concept from the economics of the marketplace to legislative representation.¹² Many discussions, especially by economists, view legislative misrepresentation with the same opprobrium that they would mete out to a worker sleeping on the job or to Burke’s disdain for his constituents.¹³ There is little moral difference between a Burke, who told his Bristol constituents that he would not be bound by their dictates, and an Earl Long, who promised he would support some constituents and went back on his word.

Any deviation from the delegate role involves shirking; all violate the implicit contract between principals and agents. Shirking may occur on single roll calls that may not tap a general dimension of ideology (Coates and Munger 1995). Or it may represent a very different representational problem. Ferguson (1995, 381–84) posits a political world in which *both* political parties stand at the same place—but at a considerable distance from the median voter. The parties are driven by the need to raise large campaign contributions from business. They won’t represent the mass of voters, whose attitudes are at odds with big business. Legislators “shirk” their constituents by voting with the folks who paid for their campaigns.

Ferguson makes a strong case for the impact of money in politics, but his argument fails for two reasons. First, there is considerable evidence that American parties *generally* don’t converge to the same position (cf. Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Second, he doesn’t provide data to show that either party is consistently too far away from the public and too close to

business. Ferguson presumes that ideology *doesn't matter much* in American politics. But in an ideological world, there is less room for shirking from interest groups alone. Pressures from business — through lobbyists or political action committees — are most likely to be successful on narrow issues that depart from the usual left-right continuum that forms the core of ideology. They will have fewer conquests on questions that tap deeply held values such as the left-right divide (Frendreis and Waterman 1983). This is not to say that business lacks power. Quite the contrary. Business has a lot of clout — but it comes mostly through its ties to its conservative agenda and to Republicans (and in the 1970s and before) to Southern Democrats. To be sure, business gives lots of money to Democrats, but the literature on roll call voting provides scant evidence that it shifts many votes on the floor or in committee. It may lead members to push for legislation, but the greatest impact of business money comes from the already converted (Hall and Wayman 1990).

Picking up victories on lots of small issues may be important to business, but it isn't likely to induce a lot of shirking. If it did, two things would happen. First, the dominant single ideological dimension that characterizes so much of congressional voting would break down, and there would be evidence of a more scattered terrain in the Congress. Ideological consistency would give way to tiny islands of influence. Second, consistent voting against public opinion would yield much larger discrepancies between legislator voting and public opinion than I report in the chapters that follow. Business interests are not autonomous from the larger political system, even if they have (and contribute) far more money than anybody else.

Not everyone has a negative view of misrepresentation. Kalt (1981, 278) considers a legislator's own ideology to be based upon "altruistic" motives reflecting the "public interest" (cf. Carson and Oppenheimer 1984, 177). Lascher, Kelman, and Kane (1993, 99–100) found that ideology trumped constituency attitudes in a survey of House members on a proposed flag-burning amendment to the Constitution. They concluded that legislators are "moral agents, obligated to do what they believe is right" and that this result is "heartening."

Voters want their legislators to be pure delegates. Public officials want to be pristine trustees. Legislators bend to the public will because voters have power of them: They can put them out of office. Yet, the public doesn't pay attention all of the time. This gives legislators leeway to vote their own ideologies. If few are watching, they can be profiles in

courage. (Lying is more difficult, since people are apt to remember specific promises politicians make as quid pro quo for votes.) When voters pay attention, legislators act as good constituency agents. These antagonists don't dance the minuet. They are more like combatants in a mosh pit, strangers engaged in ideological combat (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 1990).

Legislators shirk because they can get away with it. Citizens don't monitor politicians' behavior well. Even if they decided to pay more attention, they would face an imperfect market. Representatives and senators come up for election every two and six years. And most face minimal competition (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 283). Voters have greater incentives to monitor officeholders when an election is approaching and fewer incentives when a legislator is retiring (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 1990; Lott and Reed 1989; Lott and Bronars 1993). If legislators deviate too much from their constituents too close to election time, they can wake up the sleeping giant of public opinion. They might even lose the next election.

Voters may not punish legislators simply for ideological voting. Some constituents want their legislators to be liberal or conservative. Others may prefer moderation. Voters should punish—or reward—legislators not for being liberal (conservative), but for being *too liberal* (*conservative*). Kalt and Zupan (1984), following Kau and Rubin (1982) and mimicking Carson and Oppenheimer (1984), seek to determine the *pure personal ideology* of a legislator, after removing the constituency's preferences. Once they obtain an estimate of a public official's own views, as distinguished from constituency attitudes, they show how personal values affect legislative voting and how proximity to elections influences personal values. Personal ideology is distinct from (and independent from) constituency preferences. It is thus a measure of legislator shirking.

Shirking models imply not only a delegate theory of representation, but also a Downsian approach to elections (cf. Richardson and Munger 1990, 14–15). Voting the district line is not only a moral obligation (some say), but also “an investment in political office-holding. The present opportunity to take a position contrary to that desired by the constituency is foregone” (Davis and Porter 1989, 102; cf. Erikson 1971). Trustee/ideological-equilibrium arguments deny that shirking costs votes or is a moral imperative. Personal ideology can be a positive force (Richardson and Munger 1990).

The shirking literature treats pure personal ideology as the key to representation. These studies are controversial. Many, including friends who read drafts of this book, don't like the language or the public-choice approach on which it is based. Some just don't believe that you can measure pure personal ideology (Jackson and Kingdon 1992; G. Wright 1994). I don't have problems with the language or the approach but was long a skeptic of the attempt to measure shirking from roll call data and constituency traits. I set out to bury the shirking literature rather than to praise it, or even just to replicate it.

The shirking perspective, more than other approaches to roll call voting and representation, pictures legislators and voters as antagonists (Kingdon 1988, 15). These studies begin with the premise that personal ideology is a central force in legislators' roll call behavior — and that it stands apart from constituency preferences. A distinctive legislator ideology is central to the theoretical perspective of principal-agent models. Principals and agents have incompatible goals that are only resolved by monitoring each other and imposing sanctions. They don't engage in dialogues with each other. One of the major contributions of this approach is a measurement strategy for deriving a legislator's pure personal ideology. This technique (see chapter 2) separates legislator values from constituency values. It purposefully puts legislators naked before their constituents. The multiple-constituencies approach views the theoretical argument and the measurement strategy that stems from it as wrongheaded. Politicians such as Burke who stand apart from all of their constituencies are anomalies, soon to be purged from the polity by a conspiracy as wide as that on Agatha Christie's *Murder on the Orient Express* (where everyone did it). And politicians find it difficult to get away with lying even once.¹⁴

But often ideas that seem wrong on their face provide a useful starting point. The shirking models see legislators and constituents in a struggle for representation. Only the geographic constituency matters. The multiple-constituencies approach holds that the full electorate is but one influence on legislators' behavior. It is critical, since it is final. But most citizens pay little attention to politics. The more proximate concentric circles — the personal and primary constituencies — make themselves felt daily. They also reinforce the beliefs of the members. There are two major problems with the principal-agent model of representation: (1) Principals and agents may not have conflicting values; and (2) unlike employees in economic organizations, legislators have multiple prin-

cipals. The multiple-constituency perspective gets around both of these difficulties. It also resolves several other, though less fundamental, problems: If shirking is important, there must be a fair amount of it. If many senators vote contrary to their constituents, why aren't more defeated? The answers are not obvious from principal-agent models but very much in line with the multiple-constituencies approach. When we broaden the concept of representation to include many constituencies, we find that legislators don't shirk very much. Voters (and the activists behind winning candidates) do a pretty good of selecting potential officeholders who are in sync with all of their constituencies. In addition to selection, there is sorting: Legislators who are out of step with their constituents will be sorted out of office in due course (Lott and Reed 1989, 83–84).

When we develop any model, it is useful to have a foil — a null model. The shirking perspective is just the null model we need to test claims of the multiple-constituencies perspective. For the multiple-constituencies thesis, context is critical. Legislators are creatures of the constituencies they represent. For principal-agent arguments, context is insignificant. The statistical models *presume* that there is no relationship between a legislator's personal values and the preferences of any constituents.

To test a competing argument, I have to accept many of the claims, both substantive and methodological, in the literature. Doubters should bear with me. Your incredulity will pay off. If I accept, however tentatively, the arguments of principal-agent models, I can measure pure personal ideology. Yet, it is *not* independent of the views of either one's geographic or reelection constituencies. And there isn't that much of it. When I separate out the attitudes of a member's core supporters from a legislator's ideology, there is even less left over. We may be able to measure a legislator's pure personal ideology, but there is little about it that is distinctive. Public officials' values are the shared beliefs of constituents and elites. And this means that voters are not just principals and legislators their agents. Most of the time legislators' and constituents' values don't conflict with each other. They have shared interests, so members can be trustees and delegates at the same time.

The contrast between the shirking and multiple-constituency models can help us understand the representational nexus more clearly. The shirking model is fundamentally Downsian. Legislators who hope to gain reelection will hue to the line of the median voter in the geographic constituency. If they "indulge" their personal ideologies, they will pay at the polls. The multiple-constituencies model permits a greater role for

values. Members may be pushed from the middle by their core supporters. But the multiple-constituencies approach is not a haven for ideologists. If legislators go too far or if partisan supporters are out of touch with the full electorate, straying can be costly, as Downs would suggest.

More so than most frameworks for roll call behavior, the shirking model is a natural null model. Its language focuses on how legislators and constituents stand apart from each other. The multiple-constituencies argument suggests how they come together. These fundamentally different assumptions let me manipulate the shirking model in a way that I could not with more traditional models of representation. And the manipulations will show that legislators do a fine job of representing their constituencies, even if they aren't always in sync with their (geographic) constituents.

The Road Ahead

This main components of the pages ahead are legislators' ideology, the preferences of various constituencies (geographic, reelection, and primary/personal), how they interact, and how representation affects reelection. My focus is on the interaction: How can we measure personal ideology, and how much of it is there? When legislators vote contrary to the wishes their mass constituencies — either the full geographic electorate or fellow partisans — are they really shirking? Are they representing themselves — or their core supporters, especially party elites? Can voters monitor their elected representatives? If they can, are they more likely to punish errant members in primaries or general elections? When does ideology count most? And whose ideology?

I offer a stern test of the shirking literature and find that much of it comes up wanting. A fair examination would put the original data up against new measures, measurements, and theoretical frameworks. This is the strategy I employ. Mark Zupan kindly provided me with the data that he and Joseph Kalt used in their studies of Senate roll call behavior in 1977–78. The ideology scores they use, primarily derived from League of Conservation Voters ratings (see Kalt and Zupan 1984; and chapter 2 below), though also from Americans for Democratic Action (Kalt and Zupan 1990; and chapter 7 below), are the starting point of my analysis. The Kalt-Zupan database has two strong limitations. First, it is based only on senators who served in one biennium, limiting my analyses to cross-sectional models. Bender and Lott (1996, 76–77) are cer-

tainly correct when they argue that testing assumptions about change in behavior demands time series models. Second, the data seem dated: Why employ measures from the 1970s as we prepare to enter the twenty-first century?

The best reason to use the Kalt-Zupan data is to present tests of their model and my alternative that make direct comparisons. Much of the literature on principal-agent theory applied to Congress uses the Kalt-Zupan data. Were I to collect a more recent data set, questions of comparability would inevitably arise. So I stick with the original source. A longer time series might in principle be welcome, but it would be difficult to get anything close to a comprehensive data set to test the many predictions from my revised theory. Elite opinion data are scarce. We take them when we can get them — and, fortuitously, there is a good match in time between the Kalt-Zupan scores for senators and elite ideology measures. The Kalt-Zupan data overlap with a data set on the ideological positions of senators *and their challengers* that lets me see how different types of constituency opinion matter (see chapter 5). Finally, I try when possible to bring a quasi time-series approach through what I shall call “stratified” measures of personal ideology.

Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical claims of the shirking literature and the measurement issues. My initial interest in the shirking literature stemmed from my mistrust of its indicator of constituency attitudes. Kalt and Zupan, as well as everyone else, estimate constituency opinion based upon demographic traits. Based upon some joint work with Ronald E. Weber (Uslaner and Weber 1983) earlier in my career, my reaction was, Been there, done that, been pummeled for it. Many people are skeptical of the ability of demographics to capture even the broad contours of public opinion (Krehbiel 1993). Now it was my turn, I thought, to beat up on someone else as part of my compensation for similar sins in the past. It was not to be. Demographics do a passable job in accounting for real-life public opinion. The shirking literature still makes lots of theoretical claims that don’t hold up. Its measure of public opinion is more appropriately an indicator of reelection constituency preferences. And its measure of legislator ideology is inappropriately independent of public preferences. I thus introduce an alternative measure, based upon real public-opinion data for statewide and state party ideology. These measures were developed by Erikson, Wright, and MacIver (1993) and graciously provided by Gerald C. Wright. When I substitute reelection constituency ideology for the values of the full geographic constituency,

there is considerably less shirking. The new measure of “pure” legislator ideology does not affect Senate roll call voting on a series of issues as much as the original Kalt-Zupan indicators.

In chapter 2 I relax the assumption that senator ideology must be independent of constituency preferences. Chapter 3 presents estimates of what influences senator ideology, from the perspectives of both the full geographic constituency and a member’s fellow partisans. Personal ideology reflects mass ideology and particularly the attitudes of elites, state party activists, and House candidates from a senator’s party, as well as some demographic factors. I also estimate multiple-equation models linking personal ideology to incumbent expenditures and vote shares in a senator’s next primary and general elections. For Northern Democrats, being more liberal than one’s reelection constituents provides a tiny boost in the primary. Being more progressive than the geographic constituency has no impact in November, though it does make it more difficult for an incumbent to raise campaign funds. For Republicans, “excess” conservatism (relative to GOP identifiers in a legislator’s state) brings more votes in the primary. But being further to the right of the geographic constituency has no electoral costs in the general election. It brings small benefits, as conservative shirkers raise more money.

What are we to make of the argument that senators’ values reflect mass and particularly elite attitudes? In chapter 4, I break down this “simple” measure of personal ideology into two components. The first is the predicted value from the regression of personal ideology in chapter 3. It represents the part of legislator values that senators share with their core supporters, especially party elites. I call this *induced* ideology. The residuals from the regression constitute what is left of senators’ values. This is as close as we are going to get to a measure of *pure personal ideology*. We obtain indicators of both induced and pure ideology for both geographic and reelection constituencies. I repeat the logits and ordinary least squares regressions of chapter 2 that test the impact of legislator and constituency ideology on the 14 issues Kalt and Zupan (1984) use to test their shirking model. Induced ideology, the set of values shared with other elites, is far more important than pure personal ideology. The impact of pure personal ideology is much greater for conservatives (Republicans and Southern Democrats) than for Republicans. And, finally, we have preliminary evidence that induced ideology, not pure personal values, affects vote shares in both primaries and gen-

eral elections. There is little evidence that senators are lone profiles in courage. Their personal ideologies reflect their core partisan supporters.

Senators are pushed to more ideological positions by reelection constituencies and state party elites. So why do most of them win handily? Chapter 5 examines the role of challengers, using data from a 1982 CBS News survey of both candidates in state races. To test Downsian and ideological-equilibrium theories, I need to consider alternative contexts, such as whether candidates take similar or distinct positions and whether the race is expected to be close or an easy victory for the incumbent. Incumbent pure ideology and challenger induced partisanship are most important when candidates take distinct stands (not surprising) and when the incumbent is heavily favored (not so apparent). In these low-key diverging races, incumbents are in sync with the prevailing ideology in their state parties, while challenger core supporters are out of step. The results are based upon small numbers of cases. I thus replicate the analysis for the 1988 Senate Election Study, since both involved the same class of senators — and mostly the same incumbents. Once again, ideology matters most in low-key diverging contests. Northern Democrats neither gain nor lose votes from ideology in the primary but suffer in the general election if their *personal* values are too liberal. GOP incumbents gain significantly in the primary if their personal partisan values are more conservative than either their fellow partisans or their core party supporters. Their ideology plays little role in the general election, where the major factor seems to be whether their Democratic opponents have core supporters who are too liberal. This is the first evidence that senators' personal ideologies have electoral consequences.

The message of chapter 5 is that context counts. Chapter 6 shows more of the same, in greater relief. I break down states by political culture (Elazar 1972). The differences in shirking are modest among the different environments, but the determinants and consequences of culture vary widely. In traditionalistic cultures, legislators respond mostly to elites. In moralistic cultures, they reflect both mass and elite attitudes. Individualistic cultures are, as Elazar hypothesized, marketplaces of ideas: Masses, elites, other party identifiers, and independents all shape legislator fealty to public opinion. Individualistic and traditionalistic states have dominant ideologies. The former are progressive, the latter conservative. Moralistic states are ideological battlegrounds. Northern Democrats are very liberal, Republicans strongly conservative, and their

respective elites even more so. Going further to the left than one's constituents wish *helps* in individualistic states. Bolting too much to the right *boosts vote shares* in traditionalistic states. These results support the ideological-equilibrium model.

In moralistic states, going with your base (liberal Northern Democrats and conservative Republicans) increases your primary vote shares — again backing ideological-equilibrium predictions. Yet moving to the extremes imposes heavy electoral costs in general elections, as Downsians would predict. Mostly senators gain or lose votes based upon their induced ideologies. But when we break results down by party, we find that senators' personal values matter, sometimes even more. In moralistic cultures, Northern Democrats who go further left than their core partisan base pay an electoral price. Republicans who bolt too far to the right also lose votes. In traditionalistic cultures, senators who are too liberal for their base are punished at the polls. The moralistic culture of the American Midwest and the South have been home to some of the most famous profiles in courage, such as Norris and Smith. They may have supporting constituencies, but many seem to be punished for their own transgressions.

Is representation all about the relationship between legislators and their diverse constituents? Langbein (1993) argues that shirking reflects the institutional demands placed upon legislators — especially presidential influence. Kalt and Zupan (1990) estimate an institutional model based upon committee positions, committee power, and monitoring costs (proximity to the next election and whether a senator will retire). I add leadership positions to a modified institutional model. There are modest effects for some measures of shirking, but they all disappear for the most “pure” form of senators' personal values: pure personal partisanship, where I eliminate the impacts of both state party identifiers and state party elites. Finally, I ask whether divided delegations have different patterns of shirking. In general, they don't. Split and unified delegations largely shirk for the same reasons. There are some differences. There is a follow-the-leader effect in single-party states. A senator with little seniority will look to the legislator with more service for cues on safe shirking. Single-party states appear to produce more support for ideological-equilibrium arguments, while senators from divided delegations are more likely to pursue Downsian strategies. There are few institutional effects: It's mostly in the supporting constituencies.

The message ahead is that constituencies in their many variations

shape legislative representation. Senators do have their own values that sometimes cost them votes. But mostly these values don't conflict with the ideologies of their fellow partisans and party elites. So legislators lose relatively few votes. The handful of members who pay an electoral price have been appropriately forewarned by previous elections in their state and its political culture. By the time the journey is finished, there isn't a whole lot of shirking going on.

If You Can't Please Everyone, Must You Only Please Yourself?

Downsian spatial models and the principal-agent frameworks that stem from them picture legislators balancing their own values against constituency preferences. The multiple-constituencies framework sees an even more complex web of interests that mostly reinforce each other, but sometimes may conflict.

How might we test these competing explanations? Ideally, we would like a “critical experiment” that would confirm one and reject the other. Yet that is doubly difficult to achieve. First, there are measurement issues. How do we get separate measures of attitudes of legislators, constituents, and elites? Even when we surmount this problem, can we estimate independent effects for each constituency? The second problem is more vexing. The principal-agent and multiple-constituency models make contradictory assumptions. The former presumes that legislator and constituency values are independent of each other — and often conflicting. The multiple-constituencies perspective assumes the contrary: The concentric circles of representation encompass a common set of beliefs. Circles can't be orthogonal to each other.

Things are not quite so bleak. The principal-agent models develop a novel measurement strategy that I first critique and then modify. In some key ways the critique hardly matters. But in others the differences matter a lot — and they suggest ways to compare the incomparable.

Representing Whom?

Picture a world in which voters are all moderates and candidates all extremists. This is the vision of principal-agent models. In the workplace, these modelers see lazy workers and angry bosses. Diligent

voters might induce politicians to adopt centrist policies, but the public positions of officials wouldn't represent their true values. Knowing how legislators vote doesn't tell you what they really believe. Now imagine a world where politicians are a random sample of the voters. Most of the time,¹ legislators would reflect constituency preferences. There would be no dilemma, as in principal-agent models, of candidates tailoring their positions to reflect voter attitudes. There would be no problem of shirking. Instead of lazy workers and angry bosses, we would have a team of employee-owners, each of whom would be rewarded according to some weight reflecting individual and joint production. In this idealized world, legislators' roll call votes are perfect reflectors of what they (and their constituents) believe.

There are no methodological problems in the second world, since masses and elites believe the same things and elected officials have nothing to gain by voting differently from these shared preferences. The first world is fraught with methodological problems. We observe a legislator voting to increase the minimum wage. Does her vote mean that both she and her constituents favor the hike? Or might she oppose the minimum-wage increase but fear that her constituents both favor the bill and care deeply about it, so that there might be electoral consequences for voting no? Or could she favor a salary increase for working people, even in the face of contrary public opinion?

Models of representation have a hard time distinguishing among these cases. Most of the time, we implicitly assume that there is *some* tension between the legislator and the constituency. So we model the representational nexus as follows:

$$\text{Roll Call Vote} = a + b*(\text{Legislator Ideology}) + c*(\text{Constituency Ideology}) + d*(\text{Controls}) + e,$$

where a is the constant, b , c , and d are regression coefficients (or vectors), and e is the residual. Simply stated, both legislator and constituency values affect roll call votes. Typically we measure member ideology through an index of roll call votes. And we measure constituency values any way we can—most often from some combination of district traits that act as a proxy for values.

What's wrong with this scenario? This simple model may tell us the relative importance of member and constituency ideology. But it tells us nothing about motivations. We might say that most legislators who vote

for the minimum wage are liberals (positive coefficient for b) even though their constituents are conservative (negative coefficient for c). Yet we would wonder how this could occur unless voters either don't care much about the minimum wage or later would punish these legislators for their heresy.² We can twist around the signs of the coefficients as much as we wish and we won't be able to tease motivations out of the model.

Ironically, the greatest indeterminacy of this type of model comes when prediction should be easiest. Suppose that there are perfect sorting effects, as in our first imaginary world. Liberal constituencies select liberal legislators, who vote in favor of the minimum wage. Conservative districts choose conservative members, who vote against the wage hike. Because member and constituency ideology are highly correlated, the estimates of the regression coefficients become unreliable. So it may seem that *neither* member values nor voters' preferences drive roll call voting, when *both* play equally powerful roles in shaping legislators' behavior. What is worse, this is *not* a measurement problem. Even if we have perfect measures of both legislator and constituency attitudes, the problem would not go away.

If legislators have interests (and values) that are distinct from constituents' preferences, we need some way of measuring them. This is one of the major contributions of principal-agent models. They derive estimates of legislators' pure ideology, purging typical estimates of member ideals of constituency preferences. This is both their strength and their weakness. The upside is the theoretical leverage that we get from estimating a measure of *pure* ideology, stripped of constituency values. The downside is the statistical assumption that member values must be completely independent of constituency beliefs. Yet even the downside has a silver lining: It will suggest an alternative way of looking at legislator ideology that is not independent of constituency preferences. This way of thinking about the problem has four advantages. It will permit me to show that

1. legislators' own views reflect their (multiple) constituencies' beliefs;
2. public officials' beliefs match their reelection constituencies more than the full electorate;
3. the impact of legislators' personal beliefs on roll call voting may be exaggerated in the principal-agent literature; and

4. we need to move beyond a simple Downsian spatial model to account for how legislators represent their diverse constituencies.

My task in this chapter is both methodological and substantive. The methodological effort involves introducing a superior method of measuring what the principal-agent literature calls “personal ideology,” while at the same time showing that the previous measures of shirking are strongly correlated with the new estimates. My alternative method has a stronger theoretical base and is not forced into the unrealistic assumption that legislators’ personal values are independent of constituency attitudes. It shows that legislators’ own values are not as strong a determinant of roll call voting as the traditional shirking studies have found.

I offer a caveat here. There is a lot about “personal ideology” in the pages to come, so much so that it will appear that I believe legislators act on it.³ Like Antony, who came to “bury Caesar but not to praise him,” my motives are not what they seem to be. I may seem to believe in personal ideology, but I seek to bury it. An ideology is a coherent belief system, so it theoretically can be “personal.” Yet, ideologies gain force when they are shared. A “pure personal ideology” may be possible in a world of hermits and eccentrics. But it has little place in politics, especially in democratic politics. If issues play a key role in electing candidates, it would be difficult to imagine voters purposefully selecting someone whose “personal” values were distinctive, much less significantly different from their own. To show that there is no such thing as personal ideology (at least among politicians), I must first pretend that there is such a thing — and that we can measure it. So I propose a better measure that is free of some of the difficulties of the current indicator. I shall twist it and turn it and tease out whatever influence I can find for “personal ideology.” It won’t be much — because ideology in politics is only meaningful when it is shared.

Much of the prominence of principal-agent models stems from their innovative measurement strategy. Kalt and Zupan (1984, 1990) — and others (Carson and Oppenheimer 1984; Fort et al. 1993; Kau and Rubin 1979, 1982; Langbein 1990) — suggest that legislators’ roll call behavior (and representation) can be expressed in a simple equation.

$$\text{total ideology} = \text{constituency ideology} + \text{legislator values}$$

Interest group ratings represent total ideology. Constituency attitudes are difficult to come by, so Kalt and Zupan employ a barrage of constituency demographics to estimate ideology. They regress the constituency demographics against the interest group scores. The predicted values from the regression represent the constituency component of a legislator's ideology. The residuals are the senators' personal values; they have a strong impact on legislators' roll call votes on a series of issues not related to the interest group ratings.

The residualization technique began as a methodological innovation to measure an elected official's pure personal ideology. It makes a rather strong prediction with less theoretical justification: Legislator's personal values are unrelated to constituency factors. The residuals must be independent of any constituency variables.⁴ Principal-agent models that make such assumptions are perforce drawn to Downsian spatial models (cf. Bender and Lott 1996, 80).⁵ If a legislator's ideology is distinct, even independent, from constituency preferences, then representation is a contest between a member's personal values and the electoral demands of policy-oriented voters. There is no possibility of an ideological equilibrium: Voters demand fealty to their positions, not to some conception of the public good. When legislators depart from the constituency median or mean (cf. Enelow and Hinich 1984), whether to respond to morality, their own beliefs, or the urgings of other elites, they are indulging their own preferences.

The multiple-constituencies perspective argues that legislators must pay attention to fellow partisans as well as their entire geographic constituency. Candidates, no less than voters, have preferences over policies. There are winning strategies that permit candidates to keep to their views, especially if they represent districts with a lot of their fellow partisans (Wittman 1983). Candidates respond to voters and activists in their own parties, who pull them away from centrist positions (Aldrich 1983). Legislators are more comfortable appealing to groups with whom they agree. Legislators will be closer to the preferences of their reelection constituency than to all voters (Richardson and Munger 1990, 18).

If we assume that all legislators, be they Democrats or Republicans, respond to the same constituencies, we may overestimate personal ideology. Legislators are more likely to know the issue positions of their reelection constituency than the entire geographic constituency. Incumbents must placate their fellow partisans to win or avoid a primary (Fenno 1978, 12–15). House candidates don't usually converge to the

median voter; divergent positions reflect partisan reelection constituencies (Sullivan and Uslaner 1978; G. Wright 1978b; Wright and Berkman 1986; Powell 1994). Senators respond to their electoral coalitions in their roll call voting, more so to their partisan bases than to the full electorate—at least as measured by the demographic correlates of each (Bullock and Brady 1983; Markus 1974) and direct measures of public attitudes (Shapiro et al., 1990; Langbein 1990).

Studies of shirking also find support for distinct geographic and reelection constituencies thesis. Krehbiel (1993, 34) argues that

at worst . . . legislators shirk only with respect to their geographic constituencies. . . . At best, they do not shirk at all—they simply faithfully represent the wishes of their reelection constituents.

Peltzman (1984, 210) estimates a model of Senate voting with imputed variables for a senator's reelection constituency and concludes that liberals draw votes from different sectors of the public than conservatives: "[T]hese systematic differences prove, by and large, capable of rationalizing voting patterns without much need for relying on 'shirking' explanations." Jung, Kenny, and Lott (1994) find that same-state senators in 1977–82 had different electoral coalitions in 81 percent of the states that they studied. These electoral coalitions were largely partisan. The further a senator's voting record is from the average Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) score for the *state party*, the lower the probability of winning reelection (Schmidt, Kenny, and Morton, 1996). When Goff and Grier (1993) split a 1977–84 Senate sample by party, they find that shirking (as measured by an ADA residual) no longer predicts reelection success. They take this—quite reasonably—as evidence that the legislators are sufficiently close to partisan attitudes in a state so that they have they have little to fear from their base.

If the only problem with principal-agent models were their focus on geographic constituencies, we could resolve it simply. Without realizing it, as I shall show below, these models have measured deviations from *reelection constituencies*, not the full geographic constituencies. If the only (other) problem were the use of demographics to estimate constituency ideology, we would also have little to worry about. The residualization technique does a tolerable job of estimating constituency attitudes. Even though we can derive reasonable estimates of both legislators' own values and constituency preferences from the

principal-agent methodology, we are stuck with the assumption that these two belief systems have to be statistically independent of one another. This leads us away from the idea that multiple constituencies can *reinforce* the values of public officials, since each constituency must have values independent of the others. It sets up a Downsian contest where separate ideologies conflict with each other.⁶ The residualization technique can accommodate at least two constituencies—the geographic and the reelection—but only with the assumption that their values are not reinforcing.

This is not only theoretically disquieting, but it is empirically problematic. Once we resolve the problems of getting reasonable estimates for the policy preferences of both geographic and reelection constituencies as well as a start on estimating the “pure” ideology of legislators, we find that the assumption of independence is implausible. As Fenno (1978) and Kingdon (1973) would predict, all of the components of ideology—as well as the primary and reelection constituencies (see chapter 4)—share the same core values.

Measuring Shirking

Kalt and Zupan (1984) take as their measure of ideology senators’ scores in 1977–78 from the League of Conservation Voters (LCV). They estimate a “kitchen sink” model to derive predicted scores for the LCV measure. The dependent variable is a transformation of the LCV scores into a log-odds ratio called PRO-LCV (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 185). The independent variables include per capita income, average education, the share of state personal income generated by manufacturing, voter age, the urban-rural distribution of the population, the growth rate of the state economy, a dummy variable for the South, the percentage of a state’s population belonging to any of the six largest environmental organizations, the 1972 McGovern vote in the state, and the senator’s political party (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 293 n. 22). The predicted value is the geographic constituency ideology, the residual is the senator’s personal values.

We immediately confront a problem of omission and one of commission, which turn out to be part of the same puzzle. Omitted is the role of the reelection constituency. Included without explanation is the party of the legislator in the residualization model. Kalt and Zupan recognize that inclusion of party is problematic in their residualization model.

They argue that it might reflect “senator-specific ‘non-economic’ factors . . . such as a senator’s world view” (1984, 294). They estimate models that both include and exclude party to derive estimates of shirking. Another interpretation of the role of party seems more plausible. Party is *not* a constituency trait in the same way that other variables are.

There are two possible interpretations. First, party is an attribute of the senator, in which case it should be left out. Second, and more pertinent, including party gives us an estimate of *reelection constituency ideology*. This approach seems quite reasonable—and it gives us a basis for comparing geographic and reelection electorates. The prediction for the model including party represents the preferences of the senator’s party following, while the prediction excluding party gives us the ideology of the geographic constituency. The residual excluding party represents the extent of a senator’s deviation from the full electorate; when party is included, we obtain an estimate of deviation from the senator’s reelection constituency.⁷ The inclusion of party in the equation to estimate legislator preferences inadvertently “solves” the problem of deriving reelection constituency ideology.

How good is either set of preferences? Are demographic and political factors good substitutes for more direct estimates of constituency sentiment? Some doubt that they are (Jackson and Kingdon 1992, 813; Krehbiel 1993). There is no longer a need to rely upon imputed scores. Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985, 471–72) have developed statewide estimates of ideology from CBS News/*New York Times* polls from 1976 to 1982 with an unweighted N of 76,614. The large sample size permits estimation of ideology (and partisanship) for each state except Alaska and Hawaii (which are not surveyed because of costs). I have obtained ideology estimates for both states and state parties.⁸ These estimates permit direct estimation of the difference between legislator and constituency ideology. The direct approach is a variation on the simple equation⁹

$$\text{personal ideology} = \text{legislator ideology} - \text{constituency attitudes.}$$

I cannot simply subtract one measure of ideology from the other because they are measured on different scales. So I standardized each measure. The legislator ideology comes from the Kalt-Zupan (1984) PRO-LCV score from the League of Conservation Voters; in later chapters I also employ the Kalt-Zupan (1990) transformed ratings from

Americans for Democratic Action. For constituency attitudes, I standardize the state mean (with higher values indicating conservatism). For party constituency attitudes, I standardize either the proportion of party identifiers who are conservative (for either Republicans or Southern Democrats) or the proportion of identifiers who are liberals (for Northern Democrats). I then reflect the scores for conservatism in constituencies so that higher values correspond to liberal positions. I take the difference of these standardized scores and again compute z -scores. These transformations take us further away from the original data than we might wish, but without them I cannot make any comparisons.

Measuring personal ideology is important because legislators' values affect their voting behavior on a wide variety of roll calls (Kalt and Zupan 1984). A change in measurement techniques leads us to two questions. Does direct survey measurement lead to different conclusions about the effects of personal ideology on roll call voting from the estimates derived from the residualization technique? Do senators deviate more from their geographic constituencies than from their reelection constituencies?

Both the Kalt-Zupan and the direct approach rely upon roll calls to measure legislator ideology and then to predict roll call behavior based upon legislators' values. Van Doren (1990) and Jackson and Kingdon (1992) argue that such an enterprise is flawed. Van Doren argues that roll calls constitute a biased sample of all congressional decisions—and so may lead us to erroneous conclusions about the policymaking process. Yet votes constitute *the* public record. The rest of the legislative process is invisible to most constituents—and even to most activists. And my task here is not to assess the representativeness of roll calls in policymaking, but to consider the representativeness of legislators. Members could do one thing in committee and another on the floor, but this is highly unlikely if their world is really shaped by a consistent ideology.

The point raised by Jackson and Kingdon is different, if not equally problematic: If legislators are consistent enough to have an ideology, then most roll calls one would try to predict would fall along the same dimension. Using votes to predict votes makes the job too easy. Point granted, but often we have no ready outside measure of ideology.

I offer two justifications for the use of roll call-based measures *beyond* often having no other alternative. First, there is an alternative measure for 61 of the senators, a CBS News survey of incumbent (and

challenger) ideology that I examine in chapter 5. The correlation with the Kalt-Zupan PRO-LCV measure is .829; with a similarly transformed measure from the ADA, the correlation with incumbent ideology in the CBS survey is .876 (see table 13 in chapter 5). The correlations with the untransformed LCV and ADA scores are .851 and .879. It seems to make little difference whether we use a direct measure of ideology or a roll call indicator based upon these ratings.¹⁰ I could use only the survey data, but this would restrict the size of the sample and limit comparability with previous studies. Second, the point of my analysis is not simply to relate ideology to roll call behavior, but to decompose ideology successively into its component parts and to indicate which ones matter more. By the time I am finished, there is a rather small role for personal ideology. The multiple-constituencies thesis argues that once we adopt a more inclusive approach to a legislator's following, we find that principals and agents are mostly on the same side of the ideological divide. There shouldn't be much shirking — and I don't find much. If even these modest estimates are *too generous*, this would please rather than upset adherents of the multiple-constituencies perspective.

The major contribution of the principal-agent model is *not* to demonstrate the power of shirking. Instead, it is to guide us in measuring a legislator's personal ideology. For this methodology, even as I criticize and modify it, will guide me to a measurement strategy that will show why members rarely stand alone. Without this framework to build on, we would fall back on the standard roll call models that at best predict legislative voting from demographics and others' beliefs. Looking for the impacts of different constituencies takes us further down the path of understanding how representation takes place.

I derive estimates for legislator and constituency opinion from the Kalt-Zupan data set (from the late 1970s) with and without party. Party is the best predictor of the LCV index. The model including party has an adjusted $R^2 = .710$ and a standard error of the estimate of .847; without party, adjusted $R^2 = .461$ and the SEE = 1.155. These models follow Kalt and Zupan (1984) and are presented in table A.1 of appendix A. As they found, the strongest determinant for the state party model is the senator's political party, followed by the McGovern vote in 1972. Democrats and senators from states where McGovern fared well have higher PRO-LCV scores. So do solons from states with a heavy concentration of manufacturing (indicative of a blue-collar base). High-growth states have more conservative senators.

For the direct estimates, I subtract the geographic constituency ideology mean from the LCV scores and standardize these “direct” estimates of shirking. For reelection constituency opinion, I do not use the overall state party means, since they are insensitive to the relative roles of liberals and conservatives in the two parties. I presume that liberals are the core of the reelection constituencies for Northern Democrats, while conservatives are key for Southern Democrats and Republicans. The reelection constituency estimates are derived analogously to the direct geographic measures, except that the proportion of liberals is used for Northern Democrats and the proportion of conservatives for Southern Democrats and Republicans.¹¹

Positive residuals *generally* indicate that senators are more liberal than their electorates; negative scores point to personal ideologies that are *usually* more conservative than the public. The sign is not a perfect indicator of the bias of a legislator’s personal ideology. The residuals must sum to zero even if every member were more liberal (conservative) than the electorate (Bender and Lott 1996, 80). But the multiple-constituencies approach would find it strange if all, or even most, legislators were to veer in one direction. Northern Democrats and Republicans have reelection bases that pull them in opposite directions. The more extreme the values, the greater the confidence that we have in individual personal-ideology scores.

I divide senators and constituencies in these ways because Southern Democrats and their constituencies in the late 1970s are more like Republicans than Northern Democrats. The mean “liberal quotient” from ratings by Americans for Democratic Action in 1977–78 is 28.0 for Republicans, 30.4 for Southern Democrats, and 72.2 for Northern Democrats. Southern Democrats represent the *most conservative geographic constituencies* of all three party blocs. Their fellow partisans are more likely to be conservative than liberal. Republican partisans are the most conservative, but Northern Democrats are more liberal than conservative.¹²

The geographic and reelection constituency models suggest different shirkers. I define a shirker as someone with an absolute value of the “residual” of 1.96 or greater, indicating $p < .05$ for a two-tailed test. The Kalt-Zupan geographic constituency model produces seven senators with pronounced personal ideologies (Democrats Dale Bumpers, AK; John Culver, IA; and Gary Hart, CO; and Republicans Carl Curtis, NE; S. I. Hayakawa, CA; William Scott, VA; and John Tower, TX). The direct

geographic constituency estimate yields three: Culver, Tower, and Edward M. Kennedy, D-MA). For the reelection-constituency models, Kalt-Zupan produces just two senators who deviate a lot (Culver and Tower), while the direct-survey measure yields four (Kennedy; Edward Brooke, R-MA; Culver; and Tower). All Democrats veer to the left of their constituents, and all Republicans except Brooke deviate to the right.

If my presumption that legislators should be closer to their reelection constituency than to geographic opinion is correct, senators should have smaller absolute residuals for their reelection constituencies than for geographic constituency opinion. For Kalt-Zupan, 66 of 100 estimates fit this prediction; so do 65 of 96 (67.7 percent) for the direct estimates. The correlations between the two methods are .789 for the geographic constituency estimates and .728 for the reelection constituency models. The two methods produce quite similar results, whatever the base.

Northern Democrats tilt leftward from their geographic constituencies, with a standardized score of .714, compared to $-.413$ for Southern Democrats and $-.621$ for GOP solons.¹³ Once we control for party, the three partisan blocs have almost identical personal ideologies (.032, $-.046$, and $-.015$, respectively). We see a similar dynamic for geographic-constituency opinion: Senators from states with centrist ideologies have liberal personal ideologies (mean = .550), while legislators from conservative states tilt rightward (mean = $-.650$). When we shift our base to the distribution of *reelection constituency ideology*, we see few differences. Senators from conservative, moderate, and liberal *state parties* deviate little from their reelection constituencies.¹⁴ Legislators may seem to ignore their geographic constituencies, but they are faithful representatives of their reelection constituencies. *When legislators go against their geographic constituencies, they almost always tilt toward their reelection supporters, just as the multiple-constituencies thesis would predict.* The case is not yet closed, and the choice of a base is critical. It forms the core of my argument.

Do Senators Indulge?

Does a senator's personal ideology affect roll call voting? What is the relative impact of constituency? Kalt and Zupan (1984) focus on a set of 27 roll calls in the Senate in 1977–78 on strip mining and develop a measure of ANTISTRIP voting across these issues.¹⁵ What is the relative

impact of senators' personal ideology, the opinions of diverse constituencies, and constituents' interests as reflected in a battery of predictors of environmental concerns and coal consumption and production? They extend their analysis to a series of other roll calls from the 95th Congress to see whether personal ideology has systematic impacts in Senate voting. How well does their analysis stand up to my two challenges? Does direct measurement of public opinion lead to different conclusions? What about the shift from geographic to reelection constituencies?

Table 1 presents the results of the estimation for ANTISTRIP for the party and nonparty scenarios.¹⁶ I restrict the analysis for the Kalt-Zupan models to the 96 senators for whom Wright et al. could generate constituency estimates. The predictors reflecting constituency interests include *long-run surface mining costs* in a state; *surface coal reserves* and *underground coal reserves* in a state, reflecting differing producer interests; *agriculture and timber revenue* on strip-mined land, indicating "the support of ranchers, farmers, lumberers, and other noncoal business interests" for legislation that would preserve their preferential rights to strip-mined land (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 287); *environmentalism*, the share of a state's population belonging to six major environmental groups; *coal share of electricity*, reflecting consumer interests; *unreclaimed land value*, the prospective value of mined but unrestored land; and Herfindahl indices for underground reserves, environmentalism, and coal share.¹⁷

Senators from states with high mining costs and large surface reserves should vote against ANTISTRIP provisions (negative signs). Since underground coal producers compete with strip miners, large underground reserves should induce a senator to back ANTISTRIP votes. Environmentalists, noncoal interests, and high unreclaimed land value should all press senators to back restrictions on strip mining. Consumers, recognizing that increased regulation would lead to higher coal prices, should press their senators to vote no. High values on the Herfindahl indices indicate the domination of larger interests; the measures for surface coal and consumers should have negative impacts, the others positive effects (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 285–87). The coefficients for personal ideology should all be positive.

Senators with liberal constituents should support ANTISTRIP legislation. For both Kalt-Zupan measures (for both geographic and reelection constituencies) and for the state party direct measure, higher scores indicate *more liberal constituents*. The sole exception is for the direct

measures for geographic-constituency attitudes, where higher scores mean more conservative citizens. For the two Kalt-Zupan models and the direct reelection constituency estimates, I expect positive coefficients between ANTISTRIP voting and public ideology. For the direct

TABLE 1. Determinants of Antistrip Voting in the United States Senate

	Geographic Constituency		Reelection Constituency	
	K-Z Model	Direct Estimate	K-Z Model	Direct Estimate
Personal ideology	1.440*	.744***	.402***	.444***
	(2.200)	(6.636)	(4.029)	(5.001)
Constituency ideology	.452***	1.558	.457***	-.470***
	(6.097)	(.963)	(6.741)	(-5.529)
Long-run surface mining costs	-.421**	-.410**	-.424**	-.485***
	(-2.741)	(-2.675)	(-2.812)	(-3.277)
Surface coal reserves	-.522	-.650	.447	-.364
	(-.407)	(-.505)	(-.356)	(-.294)
Underground coal reserves	4.63**	4.220**	4.044**	3.539*
	(2.525)	(2.603)	(2.530)	(2.232)
Agriculture/timber revenue	.132	-.595	.417	-3.151
	(.019)	(-.084)	(.061)	(-.468)
Environmentalism	37.629	37.304	19.189	73.434**
	(1.207)	(1.244)	(.746)	(2.789)
Unreclaimed land value	.015*	.014*	.014**	.015**
	(2.284)	(2.256)	(2.293)	(2.472)
Coal share of electricity	-.004	-.003	-.003	-.003
	(-1.243)	(-1.091)	(-1.221)	(-.971)
Herfindahl: surface reserves	.319	.354	.232	.362
	(1.138)	(1.247)	(.889)	(1.339)
Herfindahl: underground reserves	-.070	-.092	.060	-.018
	(-.183)	(-.238)	(.160)	(-.049)
Herfindahl: environmentalism	-1.048	-1.609	-1.056	-1.724
	(-.707)	(-.977)	(-.748)	(-1.188)
Herfindahl: coal share	-.795**	-.808**	-.666**	-.789***
	(-2.842)	(-2.911)	(-2.527)	(-3.120)
Constant	1.440*	-1.647	1.480**	1.476**
	(2.200)	(-.501)	(2.479)	(2.348)
Adjusted R ²	.551	.553	.549	.585

Note: Entries are regression coefficients; *t*-ratios are in parentheses.

p* < .05. *p* < .01. ****p* < .001.

measure for geographic constituency, the coefficients should be negative, reflecting coding differences among the publics. For all four indicators of legislators' personal ideology—deviations from geographic and reelection constituency attitudes for both the Kalt-Zupan and direct estimates—personal ideologies are positive. So senators with liberal personal values (positive scores) should back environmental legislation.

The four models show considerable similarities in terms of both the magnitude of coefficients and their *t*-ratios.¹⁸ The constituency interest variables that are significant in one model usually have high *t*-ratios in others. Personal ideology is significant in all models. The direct survey estimates of personal ideology are stronger than the Kalt-Zupan measures. Geographic-constituency opinion in the direct estimation does not have a significant impact on senators' roll call voting because geographic constituency opinion is highly correlated with both personal ideology and environmentalism—just as we would expect from the multiple-constituencies perspective. Personal ideology has a smaller coefficient for reelection constituencies than for geographic followers (the *b* is reduced by 25 percent). The impact of geographic constituency ideology is not significant for the direct estimates. But the reelection followers' ideology dwarfs all factors other than personal ideology in the direct-estimate model.

Legislators both indulge their own views *and* represent their constituents (especially those in their party coalitions). They also represent economic interests. Long-run surface-mining costs, the unreclaimed land value, and the Herfindahl index of coal's share of electricity production are significant in all four estimations. Underground coal reserves matter in all but one equation, while membership in environmental groups has a big impact in the direct party estimations. Legislators who base their votes on personal ideology also pay attention to their larger constituents and to economic interests. It is not a simple question of one or the other.

Kalt and Zupan consider other 13 other issues. I replicate their results. Since all but the Panama Canal index are single roll call votes, I employ logit analysis rather than ordinary least squares.¹⁹ Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the models without party and with party respectively. Table A.2 of appendix A presents the percent correctly predicted for each of the logits and R^2 measures for the regressions. For each issue in table 2 personal ideology is significant at least at $p < .05$. Moreover, the *t*-ratios are similar across both estimation procedures.

TABLE 2. Models for Geographic Constituency

	Kalt-Zupan		Direct Estimates	
	Legislators	Constituency	Legislators	Constituency
Communist immigration	2.138*** (4.075) .356	1.179*** (3.297) .175	2.678*** (4.076) .488	4.207 (.731) .039
Death penalty	2.426*** (3.616) .213	2.420*** (3.473) .141	3.516*** (2.695) .114	-13.849 (-1.230) -.100
Draft	1.279*** (3.624) .224	1.364*** (4.001) .224	2.230*** (3.993) .372	1.005 (.193) .011
Sex education	2.463*** (3.702) .222	1.424** (2.856) .113	3.212*** (3.547) .189	-5.621 (-.712) -.036
Neutron bomb	2.309*** (3.787) .288	1.904*** (4.119) .265	3.625*** (3.965) .635	1.855 (.293) .013
Desegregation	3.309*** (3.438) .213	3.389*** (3.415) .146	2.871** (2.661) .080	12.679 (1.184) .053
Abortion	.501* (2.138) .112	.744** (2.722) .160	1.169** (2.929) .191	-5.719 (-1.336) -.093
Pornography	.788** (2.627) .140	.821** (2.665) .160	.840* (1.809) .270	.860 (.164) .009
Pregnancy disability	1.407** (2.835) .073	1.337* (2.101) .062	1.609* (2.132) .061	-1.164 (-.164) -.006
Pregnancy discrimination	2.945** (3.011) .110	2.669** (2.410) .074	3.609** (2.378) .025	-5.313 (-.523) -.018
Cuba	2.441*** (3.540) .305	2.422*** (3.236) .200	3.801*** (3.597) .432	.828 (.106) .006
Communist loans	1.435*** (3.895) .233	.780** (2.572) .120	1.011* (2.129) .239	.957 (.176) .011
Panama Canal index	1.446*** (7.947)	1.281*** (4.523)	1.444*** (5.106)	-.022 (-.006)

Note: Entries are logit coefficients, except for the Panama Canal index and the social index, where they are regression coefficients; maximum likelihood estimates/standard errors (or *t*-ratios) are in parentheses. Bold numbers represent logit effects.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

TABLE 3. Models for Reelection Constituency

	Kalt-Zupan		Direct Estimates	
	Legislators	Constituency	Legislators	Constituency
Communist immigration	1.305** (2.642) .147	1.478*** (4.303) .368	1.061** (2.622) .149	-2.124*** (-3.965) -.269
Death penalty	1.804* (2.281) .115	2.592*** (3.868) .115	1.695** (2.680) .171	-1.816*** (-3.318) -.342
Draft	1.068** (2.493) .125	1.389*** (4.541) .303	1.225*** (3.266) .223	-1.221*** (-3.396) -.216
Sex education	1.725** (2.386) .114	1.812*** (3.839) .177	.710 (1.390) .100	-2.870*** (-3.265) -.374
Neutron bomb	3.228*** (3.796) .358	1.955*** (4.009) .326	2.372*** (4.351) .447	-1.235** (-2.566) -.109
Desegregation	4.852** (2.923) .180	3.542*** (3.451) .166	3.995*** (3.232) .194	-1.479** (-2.677) -.216
Abortion	.825** (2.375) .134	.541** (2.585) .144	1.076*** (3.296) .216	-.133 (- .495) -.111
Pornography	1.585*** (3.160) .209	.577** (2.246) .120	1.617*** (3.519) .302	-.464 (-1.155) -.006
Pregnancy disability	.847 (1.222) .041	1.650** (2.824) .059	.549 (1.053) .049	-1.517* (-2.332) -.206
Pregnancy discrimination	2.014* (1.707) .065	3.306** (2.872) .038	1.623* (1.665) .047	-20.975* (-1.707) -.360
Cuba	2.307** (2.734) .181	2.484*** (3.664) .359	1.702*** (3.270) .251	-1.728** (-2.962) -.242
Communist loans	1.111** (2.456) .130	1.055*** (4.031) .207	.525 (1.593) .100	-.892** (-2.972) -.264
Panama Canal index	1.081*** (4.164)	1.473*** (9.441)	1.103*** (4.621)	-1.449*** (-6.613)

Note: Entries are logit coefficients, except for the Panama Canal index, where they are regression coefficients; maximum likelihood estimates/standard errors (or *t*-ratios) are in parentheses. Bold numbers represent logit effects.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

We can't directly compare logit coefficients. But I can estimate the probability that a member will vote yea or nay based upon the values of the independent variables. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) propose a method of examining the *effect* of a variable, Z : Let all of the predictors except Z take on their "natural" values. Then assign all cases a low value of Z and estimate the probability that a member will vote yea (or nay). Next recode Z to a higher value and reestimate the probability of voting yea (nay). The difference in average probabilities is the effect. It tells us how much more likely a senator would be to vote yea (or nay) if we changed the independent variable by a standard deviation. One can select any meaningful "high" and "low" values of Z . Here I use one standard deviation above the mean and one standard deviation below the mean, as is common. The effects for the logit estimates are presented in bold in tables 2 through 4.

The choice of estimation method seems to make little difference, except for the failure of geographic-constituency opinion to affect roll calls for the direct method. Both personal and constituency ideology affect roll call voting in the state party models (table 3). Twelve of the Kalt-Zupan estimates of personal ideology are significant at $p < .05$ or better, compared to 10 for the direct method. All 13 Kalt-Zupan estimates and 11 of the direct coefficients for constituency opinion are significant. The effects suggest modest impacts for personal ideology. A standard-deviation change in personal ideology changes the probability of voting yea or nay by approximately 20 percent across the measures. The average effect is slightly greater for the direct estimates (.258 compared to .207 for the geographic-constituency models and .187 compared to .150 for the reelection constituency models).

For both methods the t -ratios for personal ideology are lower for reelection than for geographic-constituency estimates. The average t -ratio for the geographic-constituency model is 3.812; for the reelection constituency it is 2.855. Senators deviate less from their reelection constituencies. The impact of personal ideology on roll calls is smaller than departures from reelection constituency attitudes. While this could be an artifact of the residualization method for the Kalt-Zupan estimates,²⁰ there is no reason to expect a similar result to occur for the direct method. We see the same pattern for the effects. For both the Kalt-Zupan and direct estimates, the reelection constituency effects are about three-quarters as large as the geographical constituency models. *Legislators respond more faithfully to their partisan reelection constituencies than to the geographic constituency.*

The biggest effects for personal ideology in both the geographic- and reelection constituency models come on foreign-policy issues. The seven domestic-policy issues in tables 2 and 3 have average *t*-ratios that are two-thirds of those for foreign policy for the no-party models and three-quarters of those for the reelection follower estimates. The mean effects for domestic policy are between 30 percent as great as the foreign-policy impacts (for the Kalt-Zupan geographic-constituency estimates) to two-thirds for both reelection constituency models. Such issues often are of lesser concern to voters than domestic concerns (Fenno 1973, 141; Burgin 1991). Senators have greater freedom to follow their own ideology — or presidential dictates — on international issues (Wildavsky 1966; Langbein 1993). The thesis of two presidencies — a domestic leader who has to struggle for political support and a foreign-policy chief executive who rallies the nation around the flag — is controversial (Sigelman 1979; Edwards 1986). The most comprehensive treatment finds at least partial support on the lower-profile issues encompassed in these votes (Bond and Fleisher 1990, chap. 6).

Some of the initial shirking models were developed to explain an apparent anomaly. Democratic legislators voted for energy price regulation even though economists know that restrictions on the market lead to inefficiencies. Maybe they did so out of constituency interests, but these variables (as in the ANTISTRIP equations above) left much to be explained. The only reason Democrats could vote against economic sense, wrote Mitchell (1977), is if they are tied to an ideology that leads them astray. He refers to support for regulation as “ideologically chic” (Mitchell 1977, 6). Both Mitchell (1977, 1979) and Kalt (1981) report strong support for this thesis. Kalt employed a measure of ideology based upon residualization from interest group (Americans for Democratic Action) scores.

Are liberals more likely to cast votes on the basis of their personal ideology? I estimate regressions or logits for each roll call (index) with separate measures of personal and constituency ideology for two groups of legislators (see table 4). Each equation contains all of the demographic and constituency interest variables and indicators of personal state party ideology and state party constituency attitudes for liberals (Northern Democrats) and conservatives (Republicans and Southern Democrats).²¹

Personal ideology doesn't matter much for liberals. It counts for a lot among conservatives. Northern Democrats' personal ideology is

TABLE 4. Estimates of Legislator and Reelection Constituency Ideologies by Party Blocs

Vote	Northern Democrats		Southern Democrats + Republicans	
	Senator	Constituency	Senator	Constituency
Anti-strip mining	-.265* (-1.591)	-.733**** (-3.627)	.583**** (5.154)	-.316** (-2.555)
Communist immigration	.261 (.855)	-3.184*** (-3.081)	1.028** (1.970)	-1.447** (-2.100)
	.108	-.001	.106	-.049
Death penalty	-.370 (-.271)	-1.055 (-1.037)	1.789** (1.924)	-2.172*** (-2.449)
	.054	-.0001	.239	-.197
Draft	-.083 (-.112)	-2.431*** (-2.749)	1.404*** (2.985)	-.556 (-1.085)
	.119	-.015	.339	.042
Sex education	-5.699*** (-2.658)	-8.827*** (-2.563)	3.106** (2.267)	-3.717** (-2.376)
	-.158	.102	.300	.042
Neutron bomb	-.160 (-.134)	-4.328*** (-3.313)	3.005**** (3.648)	.809 (1.089)
	.236	-.007	.339	-.016
Desegregation	-7.161** (-1.974)	-2.379* (-1.301)	10.236*** (2.938)	-.262 (-.386)
	.026	-.001	.451	-.031
Abortion	.925 (.615)	-10.752 (-1.468)	1.245*** (2.573)	-.315 (-.766)
	.119	-.310	.274	-.004
Pornography	-.028 (-.037)	-2.022** (-2.238)	1.864*** (2.965)	1.004* (1.295)
			.183	.051
Pregnancy disability	— ^a	— ^a	.788 (1.098)	-1.420** (-1.775)
			.099	-.013
Pregnancy discrimination	— ^a	— ^a	22.676** (13.157)	^a
			.119	^a
Cuba	-.462 (-.397)	-2.852** (-2.248)	2.032*** (2.718)	-1.205* (-1.568)
	-.028	-.006	.531	.019
Communist loans ^b	.446 (.770)	-7.360 (-1.286)	.808** (1.832)	-.443 (-1.036)
	.039	-.193	.258	-.105
Panama Canal index	-.771** (-1.738)	-1.855**** (-3.899)	1.475**** (4.738)	-1.162**** (-3.429)

Note: Entries are logit coefficients (regression coefficients for anti-strip mining and the Panama Canal index); maximum likelihood estimates/standard errors (or *t*-ratios) are in parentheses. Bold numbers represent logit effects.

^a Insufficient variation in dependent variable for estimation for Northern Democrats.

^b Predictors limited to ideology measures for Northern Democrats.

p* < .10. *p* < .05. ****p* < .01. *****p* < .0001.

significant on just 3 of 12 roll call measures. On only 1 (sex education) is it significant at $p < .01$. Liberals are more affected by their reelection constituencies (significant in 9 of 12 comparisons)²² than by their own views. Republicans and Southern Democrats are more affected by their personal ideologies (significant in 13 of 14 comparisons at $p < .05$ or better, in 8 cases at $p < .01$ or better) than by their fellow partisans ($p < .10$ in 8 of 13 cases, $p < .05$ less than half the time). These results are *not* an artifact of lumping Southern Democrats together with Republicans. The personal-ideology results for the GOP alone are only marginally weaker than for the combined group of conservatives. The average effect for personal ideology, based upon the 10 roll calls estimated by logit, is .076 for Northern Democrats and .269 for Southern Democrats and Republicans. Personal ideology has an impact more than 3.5 times as great for conservatives as for liberals.

If liberal Democrats are tied to an ideology, it is to their state party attitudes. There are only modest differences between the share of liberals and conservatives in the geographic constituencies of Northern Democrats, Southern Democrats, and Republicans (see table 5). But there are big differences in these percentages for reelection constituency attitudes. Northern Democrats have more than twice as many liberal partisans as do Republicans (with Southern Democrats in between). Republican senators have twice as many conservative identifiers as Northern Democrats do (again with Southern Democrats in the middle). All states have considerably more conservatives than liberals, but only constituencies represented by Northern Democrats have many progressive partisans. Approximately one-third of all Northern Democratic senators have predominantly liberal reelection constituencies; under 15 percent have largely conservative fellow partisans.²³ Every Republican

TABLE 5. Distribution of Ideology among Senators' Constituencies

Senator Party	Geographic Constituency		Reelection Constituency	
	Liberal	Conservative	Liberal	Conservative
Republicans	20.9	35.9	12.3	48.3
Southern Democrats	18.1	38.6	21.6	32.3
Northern Democrats	21.4	33.7	28.5	24.4
Average: All senators	20.6	35.4	35.1	21.0

senator (and two-thirds of Southern Democrats) has a reelection constituency that is predominantly conservative.

The multiple-constituencies perspective suggests that legislators are closer to geographic than to reelection constituents. But otherwise the residualization method fares reasonably well. The Kalt-Zupan method yields estimates of personal ideology that barely differ from those of the direct method. The logit effects for the Kalt-Zupan and direct methods correlate at .758 for the geographic-constituencies estimates and .933 for the reelection-following models.²⁴ When public surveys are not available, the residualization approach is quite serviceable.

The reasonable performance of residualization models is a positive sign for a different reason. So far I have examined only the beliefs of geographic and reelection followers. When I move further inside the concentric circles, to the primary and personal constituencies (chapter 4), I cannot simply subtract elite views from what we now call personal ideology. Residualization will offer a positive solution to getting to the “core” of personal ideology, but only once we are sure we have taken account of virtually all of the systematic components of constituency values.

The similarities between the two methods is only surface deep. Residualization cannot account for how personal ideology develops. Senators appear unrepresentative because the distribution of public attitudes pushes them toward the poles of their parties. The next chapter shows why the direct method is superior: Unlike the personal ideology of the Kalt-Zupan method, the values obtained by the direct method are linked to legislators' constituency dynamics. These, in turn, have electoral consequences. This next step in the representational linkage will begin to show why primary and personal constituents matter, how they are linked to reelection (and geographic) followers — as ideological equilibrium models imply — but why, after all, going too far away from your ultimate constituents (the full electorate) is risky. Were we to rely on measures that force statistical independence on the beliefs of diverse constituencies, we could not disentangle these relationships.

Legislator Ideology: Roots and Consequences

How deep is the tension between legislators' views and constituency preferences? The shirking literature pictures a world in which members struggle with their consciences over what the public interest is. They seek cover from the wrath of their constituents to back what they believe is right. When we look at Congress, we are supposed to picture 535 brave little boys and girls holding their fingers in the dike against the torrents of contrarian public attitudes. Legislators of conscience buck not only constituency preferences and state parties. If members only cared about reelection, they would take positions right at the center of public opinion, as Anthony Downs (1957) argued (cf. Enelow and Hinich 1984). Legislators who vote contrary to public attitudes may pay an electoral price.

The principal-agent models suggest that legislators must either please their constituents or themselves. Michael L. Davis and Philip K. Porter (1989, 103) give a good summary of this either-or model:

[A politician's decision to shirk] provides immediate gratification while reducing the expectation of future ideological consumption. The expected price of ideological consumption is determined by the value of reelection and the effect that ignoring the interests of constituents will have on the probability future elections. . . . Ideological consumption, when it is not consistent with constituent interests, is costly to the politician insofar as it reduces the probability of reelection.

Norris and Smith paid the electoral price.

Yet something is amiss with the simple dichotomy between personal ideology and electoral insecurity. Some legislators, especially Southern-

ers such as Maury Maverick, Carl Elliott, and Brooks Hays, have gone down to defeat when they took stands at variance with their constituents' preferences (see chapter 6 for stories on these members). But the Nebraska senator is different. Norris lost in 1942, running as an Independent against the victorious Republican and an also-ran Democrat. But he had a pretty good run, serving in the House and the Senate for 40 years. Why didn't Nebraskans oust him earlier? Why did it take them so long to catch on to his game? Had he given up good Republican principles in a largely one-party state? He never really had them and had won handily as an Independent in a three-way race in 1936—even as he endorsed Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt for president. One can construct all sorts of explanations for why Norris lost in 1942, but they cannot include a sudden ideological transformation. Any other ideological explanation would be most unkind to Nebraska voters, who surely must have noticed Norris's progressivism during the past four decades.

Simply being an ideologue doesn't mean that a legislator is out of touch with his or her constituents. States and congressional districts vary. Senators from Massachusetts and Utah who pursue a pure Downsian strategy of appealing to their state's median voter would compile very different voting records. Even so, some members pay an electoral price, others don't. Edward Brooke (R-MA) and John Culver (D-IA), two legislators who stood apart in chapter 2, lost their bids for reelection. Brooke was too liberal for his party and lost the general election to a Democrat running to *his* left. John Tower (R-TX) won reelection to the Senate three times, albeit by narrow margins, though he was more conservative than either the full electorate or fellow Republicans. And Brooke's former colleague, Edward Kennedy (D-MA), continues in the Senate in his seventh term despite his "misrepresentation" by moving too far left for his constituents' tastes. Where Brooke bolted away from his party and lost, Tower and Kennedy survived (the latter quite handily) when they moved toward their party's elites.

There are two interrelated reasons why personal ideology might not cost legislators votes. Both stem from the multiple-constituencies approach and stand in contrast to Downsian spatial models. First, legislators may need to shore up their bases. They play to their strongest supporters to fend off a tough primary or simply to rally the faithful for campaign work and fund-raising. These activists—in the primary and personal constituencies—are more ideologically driven than most citizens, even fellow partisans. To please them, legislators have to

disappoint the rank and file. Second, some voters, especially one's core partisans, may prefer candidates who take issue positions. More ideological legislators do not suffer more electorally than those in the middle (Lott and Bronars 1993, 140).

A legislator's personal ideology does not stand at one pole and constituency preferences at the other. Most legislators don't worry about the tension between their own values and public opinion in their districts (states) because the two largely agree. When they aren't in accord, legislators share values with their closest supporters. The residualization technique can't account for sharing. The direct-survey method can. The task ahead is to develop a model of the linkage between voting contrary to constituents' wishes and election outcomes.

I estimate a simultaneous-equation model of personal ideology and its electoral impacts. Senators who move toward party activists and away from their reelection constituents boost their primary performance. This extra vote margin translates into a small gain in the general election. Straying from geographic constituents boosts incumbent campaign contributions but reduces a senator's vote share in the next general election. Activists won't push many legislators far from geographic or reelection constituency opinions because the electorate won't tolerate big deviations. These are general results that don't apply equally to Democrats and Republicans. There are considerable interparty differences that are reflections of the distribution of ideology of fellow partisans. These results challenge the idea that legislators are autonomous agents who shape their voting decisions without constituency influence.

Senators and Their Constituencies

Separating a member's personal ideology from constituency preferences through regression analysis ensures that each is independent of the other. Residuals are, by definition, uncorrelated with independent variables. If personal ideology is unrelated to constituency traits, variations in shirking must be idiosyncratic to the personal tastes of legislators — and not reflective of constituency preferences or the legislator's political environment. All constituency traits have to be included in the first equation segregating public and legislator opinions.

A multiple-constituencies perspective invites skepticism about the independence of legislator ideology from systematic forces within a constituency or state. Senators represent their fellow partisans better than

their full geographic constituencies. This is not surprising but suggests a richer story than a simple principal-agent model. First, there is more than one principal. Legislators are pulled, sometimes in different directions, by their statewide and reelection constituencies.

The more compelling story is not how partisans sometimes tempt legislators away from their geographic constituencies, but rather why most of the actors have similar preferences. Deviations from both geographic and reelection constituencies are modestly (for Northern Democrats) to strongly (for Republicans) correlated with *both* geographic constituency *and* party elite attitudes. The residualization approach has no narrative to account for these correlations. As Jackson and Kingdon (1992, 813) argue: “Both the votes that make up the interest group score and the vote being modeled are affected by a large set of systematic factors that are not captured by the variables generally used in this research.” The shirking literature focuses on factors internal to Congress—committee and subcommittee activities, presidential agendas, and the persuasion of party leaders—but external factors such as the views of other elites are at least as important. It is not simply a matter of including measures of these causal agents in the first-stage regression, since that would still leave the residuals uncorrelated with elite attitudes. The residualization technique will be useful when I first take into account the story of how legislators’ views are shaped by elites (see chapter 4). These linkages are central and cannot be ignored.

The direct survey estimates seem more at home with spatial models that presume that politicians balance off policy and electoral goals. The distribution of constituency preferences and the closeness of electoral outcomes matter (Wittman 1983, 150). Candidates respond to constituency cues—especially to voters and activists in their own parties (Aldrich 1983). They are pulled away from both geographic and reelection constituency opinions. Liberal states will have liberal activists, who tug senators to move further leftward than the reelection constituency prefers. The same dynamic applies to conservative Republicans.

Senators deviate less from their reelection constituents than from statewide public opinion. The standardized measures of personal ideology indicate that Republicans, Democrats, and each party wing of the majority are very close to state party opinion (with mean scores ranging from .009 for all Democrats to $-.046$ for Southern Democrats). Deviations from the geographic constituency have a wider spread—from .389 for all Democrats to .714 for Northern Democrats and $-.621$

for Republicans (positive scores indicate deviations to the left, negative ones to the right).

The Constituency Bases of Personal Ideology

If primary and personal constituencies matter, legislators should reflect their values above and beyond the impact of the preferences of their geographic and reelection constituencies. The residualization technique has no room for the shared values of primary and personal constituents with legislators. Legislators' personal ideology *must* be uncorrelated with estimated public opinion. The residuals must also be uncorrelated with any systematic component of the political environment, such as primary or personal constituencies. If the residuals are correlated with other political variables, the original equation is misspecified. We then would need to incorporate the indicators for primary and personal constituencies into the initial estimation for constituency opinion. But this creates the fallacy of lumping all publics into one equation. When we start to include extraneous factors as predictors, we wind up with a more extreme variation on the multiple-constituencies problem. Adding party to the demographics produces estimates for reelection constituencies. What do we get when we add elite attitudes? We just don't know. Direct estimation doesn't face this problem. Personal ideology is not defined as a residual, but as a difference between two sets of attitudes (or a behavior and an attitude). This difference may be correlated with any number of measures of the legislator's primary and personal constituencies.

I first estimate models for deviations from geographic and reelection constituencies, reflecting the best predictions I could obtain. Then I trim these models to obtain multiple-equation models of the representative process. The more complex models include joint estimations of deviations from geographic and reelection constituencies, primary and general-election results, and incumbent expenditures (which are endogenous to election results).¹

There is a wide range of explanatory variables that might explain representation. The major contenders are the means and standard deviations of geographic and reelection constituency ideology. Also important might be the dominant ideology in a state or a state party.² *Legislators don't take positions that directly conflict with their publics. Instead, they drift toward their constituents and pass them by.* So the signals from the electorate indicate the direction of the excess (if any). The standard devia-

tions indicate a more heterogenous electorate (cf. Bender 1994, 158). Elites, reflecting both primary and personal constituencies,³ should be a key element in pushing legislators beyond the ideology of both geographic and reelection followers. Party elites and candidates will be a central part of a legislator’s primary constituency and are likely to form part of the personal constituency.

It is statistically reassuring but theoretically worrisome that the Kalt-Zupan residuals are independent of a wide range of predictors. The residualization residuals should be uncorrelated with omitted variables. They are. But this is where the theoretical troubles begin. These error terms do a serviceable job, at least based on a comparison with the direct survey method. But they suggest that there is nothing more to representation than constituency and legislator attitudes.

When we shift to the direct estimates, there are clear connections between personal ideology and both constituency and elite views. See tables 6 and 7 for the regressions.⁴ I also estimate these regressions separately for Northern Democrats and Republicans, following the logic in chapter 2. I give the details of these estimations in appendix B (tables B.1 and B.2). For deviations from both geographic and reelection constituency positions, three types of public opinion matter: geographic, reelection, and other party. Indicators include state means,

TABLE 6. Geographic-Constituency Personal-Ideology Model, All Senators

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-Statistic
Constant	12.123	2.363	5.131**
State mean ideology	-3.836	1.006	-3.815****
Other party standard deviation	-2.420	.800	-3.027**
Electoral heterogeneity	-.023	.013	-1.761**
Party congressional candidates	.034	.003	10.149****
Other party elite	.083	.029	2.841**
Growth rate	-.018	.004	-4.638****
Union share	-.019	.009	-2.147**
$R^2 = .763$ $\text{Adjusted } R^2 = .744$ $\text{SEE} = .506$			

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. **** $p < .0001$.

shares of the electorate with particular ideologies, and voting histories. In addition to means and distributions, standard deviations are also relevant. A more dispersed distribution of opinions gives legislators more leeway. A concentrated distribution indicates a more united party that gives legislators less license and constrains them more. Each opinion distribution (geographic, reelection, and other-party constituency) has a standard deviation.

Standard deviations are more than just measures of dispersion in this case. A higher variance indicates a more liberal electorate—for both parties. Only 11 of the 96 senators—all Democrats—represent liberal constituencies; all 37 Republicans have conservative state parties. The geographic and reelection constituency variances don't matter much, but the *other party's* standard deviation does. A Downsian logic suggests that Northern Democrats would tilt less to the left in heterogeneous states and Republicans less to the right—as each seeks votes

TABLE 7. Reelection-Constituency Personal-Ideology Model, All Senators

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Statistic
Constant	8.634	3.006	2.872
State mean ideology	-2.696	1.386	-1.945**
Electoral heterogeneity	-.033	.018	-1.827**
Party congressional candidates	.029	.005	5.772****
Party congressional candidates: Northern Democrats	.036	.003	10.416****
State party elites: Republicans	.172	.045	3.850****
Other party congressional candidates	.008	.002	3.229***
Growth rate	-.022	.005	-4.091****
Union share	-.024	.012	-1.922**
$R^2 = .763$ Adjusted $R^2 = .744$ SEE = .506			
System $R^2 = .647$ $N = 96$			

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. **** $p < .0001$.

from a more fertile political landscape than in states with more homogenous opposition parties.

Kalt and Zupan (1990) employ a measure of electoral heterogeneity in the same spirit, the deviation of a state's 1972 vote for liberal Democratic nominee George McGovern from the national average. They argue that a measure of heterogeneity reflects monitoring costs for a state's electorate. A measure of intrastate volatility might tell us this, but this is not what the Kalt-Zupan heterogeneity measure gives us. Instead, it is an additional measure of a state's ideology. States that gave McGovern a higher than average vote are more liberal. The more liberal a state, the more its senators should have progressive personal ideologies.

State party elites are the core elements in a legislator's primary and personal constituencies. They share each other's values, and their interactions reinforce senators' "personal" values. Erikson, Wright, and MacIver (1993, chap. 5) develop a measure of state party elite attitudes. They employ a composite measure based upon surveys of county party leaders, delegates to national party conventions, congressional candidates, and state legislators.⁵ The more progressive state party elites are, the more liberal senators' personal values should be. Some elites are special. State party colleagues in the House — and fellow partisans who aspire to the lower chamber — are the most ready cues for senators. The congressional-candidate scores are part of the overall index, yet it is important theoretically to separate them. The congressional-candidate index is only moderately correlated with the overall scores ($r = .52$), so I included it separately.⁶ For both state party elites and congressional candidates, positive scores indicate more liberal ideologies.

Elements of a party coalition also matter. Unions are a core element of the Democratic party; they have become increasingly conservative since the late 1960s (Bailey 1992). Where unions are strong, they should drive Democratic senators away from moving too far left. Unions should have a smaller impact on Republicans, leading them to deviate less to the right. One key demographic variable should also affect representation: The 1970s was a decade of economic uncertainty for much of the United States. Many states, especially in the South and West, boomed. These states were largely conservative. Their growth rates should push senators from both parties to the right, even beyond what we would expect from geographic and reelection constituency opinions. High growth rates produce a distinctive political culture that discourages leaning too much to the left.

Geographic-constituency attitudes affect deviations from both geographic and reelection constituencies. Three results stand out. First, we can predict deviations from the geographic constituency with just seven variables (adjusted $R^2 = .744$) and from the reelection constituency with eight (adjusted $R^2 = .488$). Five variables are common to the two equations. Second, partisan ties pull legislators further away from their reelection constituencies than from their geographic constituencies. Three of the eight predictors in the regression for the reelection constituency reflect a senator's party, compared to one of seven for geographic constituency deviations. Third, *state party elites polarize legislators rather than lead to convergence*. Reelection constituency opinion distributions have no impact once elite views are taken into account.

The mean ideology for the geographic constituency shapes both statewide and state party representation. Higher scores for either constituency ideology measure indicate more conservative electorates, while positive scores indicate deviations to the left. The negative regression coefficients suggest a moderating influence. Liberal electorates limit the tendency of conservatives to deviate to the right — and vice versa for left-leaning legislators. The effect of geographic-constituency opinion is powerful in both models but is greater (both in the magnitude of the unstandardized coefficients and the t -ratios) for statewide deviations. For Senate Democrats, reelection constituency beliefs do not affect deviations from the reelection constituency (see the tables in appendix B). Beyond the impact of ideology, senators from high-growth states are more likely to bolt to the right ($p < .0001$), a result that holds for both parties. Heterogenous electorates restore some of the balance ($p < .05$) for both types of personal ideology, moderating the ideological proclivities of senators.

High unionization rates lead to less liberalism ($p < .05$) in both equations. High unionization rates push Northern Democrats away from party activists, leading them to go further to the right ($p < .005$). They have a similar moderating effect on Republicans, leading them to deviate slightly to the left ($p < .10$). GOP legislators are tugged to the right indirectly by the share of fundamentalist Christians in their states. While the percentage of fundamentalists does not lead to a more pronounced personal ideology by either measure, it has an indirect effect through its impact on reelection constituency opinions and state party elites (see chapter 8).

Reelection constituents push senators to extremes. A positive coef-

ficient indicates a polarizing effect. Congressional candidates from the senator's party push senators to move in the direction of the dominant ideology in their state parties. Liberal senators vote even more liberally; conservatives tilt more to the right ($p < .0001$). These results hold for both parties. Fellow candidates push Northern Democrats even further to the left of their reelection following ($t = 10.416$, $p < .0001$ for the all-senator model). Republican senators are pushed in the direction of their dominant state party ideology by the composite party elite score ($p < .0001$).⁷

The only *potential* moderating force for elites comes from other-party congressional candidates, who push senators away from their reelection constituencies and toward greater moderation ($p < .005$). Liberals tilt rightward when the opposition party's candidates are conservative; conservatives become more moderate when the opposition fields liberal candidates. Were congressional candidate ideologies similar in both parties, this dynamic could produce a Downsian convergence to the middle. But they are not; the correlation is negative ($-.433$), tempering the tendency to moderation. Opposition activists seem to push legislators toward *their own reelection constituents*.

Neither the Downsian nor the ideological-equilibrium model tells the whole story. Senators' partisan ties push them to more extreme positions. The opinions of the geographic constituency, electoral coalitions, and the prospect of gaining support from the opposition leads them back to the center. The tendencies to diverge are more powerful than those to locate at the median. Senators jump *after they are pushed*. Two of the moderating forces that Gerald Wright (1989) found critical in Senate roll call voting and incumbent campaign messages—the share of independents in a state and their dominant ideology—had no impact on either measure of personal ideology (cf. Shapiro et al. 1990).

Truth or Consequences

Do senators who go farther than their constituents prefer pay a price in the next election? Lott and Reed (1989, 83–84) develop a formal model in which legislators who stray too much will ultimately be defeated. In a somewhat different vein, Kalt and Zupan (1990) argue that senators approaching reelection are less likely (conditional upon seniority and electoral history) to vote against their electorates.

Primary voters may not differ significantly from general-election




Fig. 1. The impact of personal ideology

voters (Geer 1988). Yet party activists are more ideological and can energize support or opposition to an incumbent officeholder. Candidates must reposition themselves between the primary and general elections, but this is costly. Legislators develop a reputation based upon their ideology; trying to shift course might be worse than sticking with one's record (Downs 1957). Incumbents usually don't adjust as much as they decide at the outset what their reputation will be.

Figure 1 suggests a schematic account of the impact of personal ideology.

Legislator ideology may have different effects when measured as deviations from the geographic and reelection constituencies. Misrepresenting the geographic constituency may cost legislators votes in November but gain support from campaign contributors who don't have the same agenda as the mass public. The contributions should compensate—at least in part—for deviations from the geographic constituency by boosting vote share in November. Members who are more extreme than the reelection followers will energize the activists, who are most likely to vote in primaries. Highly ideological voting, leading to more state party shirking, should boost a legislator's vote share in the primary. Big primary victories give incumbents a boost in the general election (Abramowitz 1988)—at least partially offsetting the vote losses from taking stands against the geographic electorate's wishes.

This model is much more complicated than the estimations for personal ideology. We need predictors for each of the five components of the model; many of the variables that will work in one are unrelated to another dependent variable. To keep the focus clear, I shall limit my

discussion to the core relationships in the above diagram. Other findings are discussed in the notes.

We have a potentially large number of variables and a modest number of cases (68 senators running for reelection with complete data). So I truncate and modify the models, which I estimate by three-stage least squares for all 68 senators. I present simpler models for the 33 Northern Democrats and 26 Republicans, dropping a range of variables (including those with missing values).⁸ To conserve space and the reader's patience, I discuss the logic of the predictors together with the results (see fig. 2).


Results for All Senators

Consider first the results for all of the senators running for reelection. What leads senators to take positions more extreme than their reelection and geographic constituencies would prefer? Elites, particularly Northern Democratic activists, lead senators to take positions more extreme than their fellow partisans would wish. State party elites, the party's congressional candidates, and especially Northern Democratic congressional candidates all lead senators to go beyond their reelection constituency's ideology.⁹ So does state party ideology. The more liberal a state is (a negative score on mean ideology), the more a senator will go beyond his/her own *party ideology* (and vice versa). When legislators stray from their partisan constituents, they move in the direction of the prevailing sentiments in their state, as well as among their elites. Only one's own party elites matter. Senators *don't* respond to the ideologies of opposition activists. High growth rates and electoral heterogeneity lead senators to become more conservative than their fellow partisans. So does general population diversity, as measured by Sullivan's (1973) index.

Voting contrary to the reelection constituency has no impact on primary vote share for all senators. Primary performance is largely driven by the ideological makeup of the state, the balance of contending partisan forces, and the quality of the challenger.¹⁰ Do senators have an ideological free ride in the primary? We shall see below that they don't. The null finding hides differences between Northern Democrats and Republicans.

For the full geographic constituency, once again both elite and mass views lead senators to take positions that are more extreme than the public would prefer. The effects of state party elites are about the same.

Mean ideology	-3.909 (.001)	Challenger expenditures
State party elite	.401 (.0001)	Senator party ID
Other party elites	.305 (.001)	Other party ID
Other party congressional candidate	-.028 (.0001)	Growth rate
		Committee ideology




Mean ideology	-2.873 (.05)	
State party elite	.417 (.0001)	
Party congressional candidate	-.012 (.05)	
Party congressional candidate (ND)	-.042 (.0001)	
Growth rate	-.009 (.05)	
Population diversity	-2.714 (.05)	System R² = .474
Electoral heterogeneity	-.026 (.05)	N = 68

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients estimated by three-stage least squares. Significance levels in parentheses.

Fig. 2. Model estimation for all senators

The regression coefficients barely differ: .417 for reelection constituency deviations compared to .401 for geographic constituency differences. *However*, there is no additional impact from other party activists (notably party congressional candidates). Instead, senators take their cues from the other party. When the opposition party elites and (especially) congressional candidates are more liberal (conservative), senators feel freer to move leftward (rightward) beyond their constituents. It's easier for a liberal to move further left if the opposition is also liberal. When



the opposition party is more conservative, this brings a liberal senator back to the center. And public attitudes matter more for the geographic constituency: The regression coefficient for mean ideology is almost 40 percent higher for the geographic constituency than for fellow partisans (and significant at $p < .001$ compared to $p < .05$).

Senators who deviate rightward spend more money — and thus raise more ($p < .005$). Money flows to legislators who take distinctive positions.¹¹ Committee ideology is Kalt and Zupan’s (1990) “taste” variable.

It is a measure of the extremism of all of a senator's committees.¹² Senators serving on highly ideological committees spend more on their campaigns ($p < .01$), either because they have greater need to protect their reputation or because they have an easier time raising money because of their high-profile assignments.¹³ Ideology produces money, but cash provides little solace for more extreme legislators. It doesn't buy votes (but it doesn't cost any either).

Voting contrary to what your constituents want is electorally costly in November. A senator who is one standard deviation to the left of the geographic constituency will lose more than 4 percent of the vote in the fall ($p < .005$). Each 4 percent of the vote in the spring brings an additional 1 percent in the general election ($p < .005$). This is minimal protection against the impact of personal ideology in November. The strongest determinant of general election vote shares is the proportion of party identifiers in a state. Each 1 percent increment in the share of party identifiers boosts general election votes by 0.7 percent.¹⁴

The all-senator estimation produces a lot of puzzles. Moving away from the geographic constituency helps raise money, but incumbent expenditures don't help out in the general election. Wandering from the full electorate costs votes in November. A strong performance in the primary boosts the November electoral margin, but primary vote shares are unrelated to deviations from the reelection constituency. The only benefit senators get from voting according to their own values comes in fund-raising, which does not translate into vote shares; the other significant effect is losing votes in November. So why don't senators toe the constituency line?

Results by Party

Separate analyses of Northern Democrats and Republicans can help (figs. 3 and 4). State party elites drive both Republicans and Northern Democrats past their fellow partisans. In the model for all senators, congressional-candidate ideology drove Northern Democrats further to the left. When we restrict the analysis just to Northern Democrats, there is no longer a significant effect for this variant of ideology. The only other factor that drives Northern Democratic deviations from the reelection constituency is the growth rate: Senators from high-growth states, which are largely in the Sunbelt, are *less* likely to deviate to the left of their reelection constituents. For the Republicans, overall statewide ide-


ology matters too. A conservative statewide ideology leads senators to tilt to the right of their fellow partisans.

When we look at each party separately, deviations from the reelection constituency now play a role in primary-election results. The effect is powerful for Republicans. For each standard-deviation increase in conservative personal values, GOP senators gain 7.4 percent in the primary. Northern Democrats gain by being more liberal, but their increment is much smaller (2.4 percent) and barely significant ($p < .10$). The opposing signs explain why the overall result is insignificant. Deviations from fellow partisans is the *only* significant variable affecting Republican vote shares in the primary. Northern Democrats' success in the spring is mostly a function of the strength of the primary challenge and the partisan balance of power in a state.¹⁵

On deviations from the geographic constituency, both Northern Democrats and Republicans are pushed (by identical amounts!) by their state party elites. Republicans, but not Northern Democrats, also follow public opinion. More conservative geographic constituencies give GOP senators the leeway to bolt further rightward. Northern Democrats respond to *Republican* elites. When GOP activists are liberal, Northern Democrats feel free to move even further to the left than their geographic constituents would wish. The signals that opposition party primary constituents send are useful only for the geographic constituency. They don't serve as cues for where to stand relative to one's own reelection followers.

Voting to the right of the geographic constituency increases incumbent campaign expenditures for Republicans, but not Northern Democrats. While spending is not the same as receipts, the logic is similar. Democrats attract money from a wider range of sources than Republicans (including both labor and business). Corporate funding is more pragmatic than ideological, especially when the Democrats are in the majority. GOP money is more ideological. For both parties, the more incumbents spend, the worse they do.

Bond, Covington, and Fleisher (1985, 524) argue that "incumbent [House members] with voting records that are too liberal or too conservative for the type of district they represent are more likely to attract well-financed opponents." I find support for their claim for the Senate as well. There is a weak effect for Northern Democrats ($p < .10$), but a stronger one for Republicans ($p < .05$). Liberal Northern Democrats and conservative Republicans attract better-financed challengers.¹⁶ Consistent with




Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients estimated by three-stage least squares. Significance levels in parentheses.

Fig. 3. Model estimation for Northern Democrats

Bond, Covington, and Fleisher, quality challengers are *not* more likely to emerge when incumbents wander from public opinion. Voting against constituency preferences doesn't bring better candidates, but it does reward good candidates with more resources.


Republicans garner more primary votes by deviating rightward. There is no direct reward for their ideology in the fall. Nor is there a carryover effect from the spring: The boost from ideology in the spring ends there. Primary-vote shares don't translate into bigger votes in November. There is a small indirect gain, as conservative deviations lead to more spending, which might help out candidates in close races. GOP senators can rest somewhat easy, since moving to the right of reelection



followers has no electoral cost in November. Republican senators appear strategic: They are more likely to deviate to the right if they come from conservative states. In turn, they have little to fear in November.

Ideology doesn't seem to matter in November for Northern Democrats either. There is no direct effect from geographic-constituency deviations on general-election vote shares. There is a spillover from the primary: Each 2 percent gain in primary-election votes produces a 1 percent boost in November. But the effect of deviations from the reelection constituency on primary-vote support is tiny: A standard-deviation change in deviations from fellow partisans leads to an indirect boost of just 1 percent of the vote in November.¹⁷

Mean ideology	-5.125 (.001)	Other party ID
State party elite	.388 (.001)	Growth rate
		Committee ideology



Mean ideology	-4.936 (.01)	
State party elite	.507 (.001)	
Growth rate	-.003 (n.s.)	System R² = .645


Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients estimated by three-stage least squares. Significance levels in parentheses.

Fig. 4. Model estimation for Republicans

A Further Test

These results are robust, even considering that the personal-ideology measures are all from 1977 and 1978, even though most of the senators in this sample were not up for reelection in 1978. I computed “stratified” shirking measures. These stratified indicators are deviations from the geographic and reelection constituencies based upon LCV scores of senators in their reelection years. This is not a theoretically interesting variable to “explain” but is more appropriate in estimating the impacts on fund-raising and elections—especially if senators moderate their voting behavior as they approach their reelection year (Wright and Berkman 1986). Senators facing voters in 1980 and 1982 did not move noticeably closer to their geographic constituents in reelection years than they had been in 1977–78: 46 percent moved closer (in absolute values) to the

97.309 (.005)	Challenger expenditures	-.006 (.005)
-45.960 (.05)	Senate party ID	.654 (.0001)
3409.0 (.01)	State party organization	1.248 (n.s.)
	Traditional party organization	2.922 (.01)



statewide electorate. But 57 percent were in greater sync with their reelection constituents. The correlations between 1977–78 personal ideology and election year deviations were modest (.721 for geographic and .535 for reelection deviations), given the staying power of ideology for most members (Poole and Rosenthal 1984).

The relationships among the five endogenous variables remain intact. No variable falls to insignificance in any of the new estimations, nor does any previous null relationship change. There are minor differences: the connection between deviations from the reelection constituency and the increase in primary votes strengthens for Democrats. So does the Democratic boost from the primary to the general election; the negative impact of expenditures on votes also strengthens for the majority party. The only change for the Republicans is the weakening of the expenditure-votes linkage in the general election. Senators move even closer to

their partisan base than to the full electorate in reelection years. However measured, the results in figures 2 through 4 hold up.

Different Parties or Different Partisans?

Northern Democrats and Republicans have different dynamics resulting from deviating from constituency preferences. Why? The answer lies in the different nature of reelection constituencies. All 37 Republican senators in the original analysis and the 26 who sought reelection come from conservative party constituencies. Of all Democrats (northern and southern) who ran for reelection, 11 came from conservative constituencies, 11 from liberal party electorates, and the balance from moderate state parties. I estimated simple ordinary least squares models for primary and general election results for the three types of Democrats employing four and three predictors respectively—and confirmed these results by examining bivariate correlations. The contextual basis of partisan differences comes through clearly.

Personal ideology has minor effects for Democrats from moderate state parties. Being more liberal than your reelection constituency opinion helps very modestly in the primaries ($r = .218$); veering leftward from the full electorate hurts just a tad in November ($r = -.302$). For Democrats from conservative states, moving away from fellow partisans causes them no problems in the primary ($r = .021$), but wandering leftward from all voters costs them dearly in November ($r = -.771$, $p < .0001$). Democrats from liberal state parties get a boost in the primary for their loyalty to the activist ideology ($r = .604$); they pay no penalty in November ($r = .061$). A liberal personal ideology helps, though only in primaries, in progressive territory.

The key linkage is not between Republicans and Democrats from conservative districts. It is between the partisan groups most typical of party activists. Republicans from conservative state parties and Democrats from liberal constituencies benefit from ideological stands in the primaries without paying a penalty in the general election (see chapters 5 and 6 for elaborations on this theme).

The message is that personal ideology isn't very personal. Variables reflecting senators' various constituencies (and some demographics) account for 50 to 74 percent of the variance in the shirking estimates. If we use Americans for Democratic Action scores rather than the LCV index, the adjusted R^2 's increase to between .80 and .86.¹⁸ We should be

wary of explanations of roll call voting that posit legislators as autonomous agents who either do—or can—flout public and elite attitudes in their states or districts. The dichotomy between legislator and constituency ideology is false.

The disjunction between Downsian frameworks and ideological-equilibrium models is also overdrawn. Both elite and public opinion push legislators to adopt *more* ideological voting records. Legislators tilt toward the dominant ideology in their states, among fellow partisans, and among elites. A liberal (conservative) reelection constituency will lead legislators to stray further to the left (right), but not nearly as much as liberal (conservative) elites will (cf. G. Wright 1994). *Principal-agent models lead us to expect that shirking means voting contrary to public opinion. Instead, it means going beyond both public and elite attitudes—in the same direction, but further.* Public opinion pushes legislators away from the opposite party, not toward it, as Downs (1957) suggests. All major forces push senators in the same direction. A factor analysis of LCV scores, the geographic-constituency ideology, the mean ideology of a senator's reelection constituency, and the primary/personal-constituency (party elite) score strongly suggests that the four measures form a common dimension.¹⁹

Mayhew (1966, chap. 6) argues that the Democrats pursue a policy of “inclusive compromise” by being “all things to all people.” Republicans have less ideological diversity. These divergent strategies have made the Democrats the majority party in American politics. His analysis holds up well for the 1970s and 1980s: Republican senators flourished in states with conservative majorities—and conservative state parties. Democrats win in all types of constituencies. The correlations for population diversity and general-election vote share are .276 for Northern Democrats, .544 for Southern Democrats (reflecting the higher share of blacks in the South), and $-.383$ for Republicans.²⁰

Republicans do poorly in heterogenous constituencies because they are less tolerant of ideological diversity. Part of the reason for the weak linkage between personal ideology and general-election vote share for Republicans is the strong connection in the primaries. Republican senators who wander leftward of their reelection constituencies face a difficult ride in the primaries. In this sample, the second and third biggest shirkers to the left—Jacob Javits (NY) and Clifford Case (NJ)—lost their primary bids. Another liberal, Robert Stafford (VT), was the only other Republican to win less than a majority in his primary.²¹

There is strong evidence in support of ideological equilibrium. Only a few senators pay an electoral price for going further than public opinion — and these are the handful who manage to get elected from an environment that should be hostile to their parties (Democrats from conservative constituencies). Most often, electoral sorting solves the problem of representation before electoral sanctions are necessary. The world so far does not seem Downsian. Senators' ideological stands represent their reelection and primary/personal constituencies. But this is only the first step in our journey, and it is too early to declare victory for the ideological-equilibrium model. There is some bounce left in Downs, but not as much as principal-agent models would have us believe. The world seems largely ideological — and it will continue to do so in most contexts as our journey proceeds.

Personal ideology may bring votes, especially in primaries, or cost them, especially in November. But deviations from both geographic and reelection constituency opinions are more than simple residuals. They reflect state political attitudes and the personal and primary constituencies of legislators. If personal values are so well structured, does it make sense to say that legislators are either rewarded or punished for their own values? Might the voters judge senators by the company they keep rather than by their own preferences? The task in chapter 4 is to attempt a separation of these Siamese twins of ideology. When we can — by going back to residualization — we see that when we finally get to a “pure” measure of ideology, there is not much there there. When all is said and done, senators do a good job of representation, be it of their geographic or reelection constituency or of their primary and personal supporters. They do a poor job of indulging their own preferences, once we remove the portion of their ideology that they share with others. Shirking may matter — but not because senators please themselves. They are true to their partisan followers.

Triple Play: Constituency, Elite, and Legislator Opinions

The dichotomy between constituency views and legislators' consciences is misplaced. Legislators are creatures of their districts, even when they stray from the position of the median voter. The message of chapter 3 is that legislators respond to their geographic constituencies, but also, and to a greater extent, to their reelection constituencies. There is considerably less misrepresentation than the principal-agent models would suggest. Is there, after all, such a thing as *pure* personal ideology?

The traditional linkage between legislator and constituency attitudes (Miller and Stokes 1963) is incomplete. The missing link is the part of legislator beliefs that reflects constituency and, particularly, elite attitudes. Legislators are responsive not only to their full geographic constituencies, but also to their partisan reelection constituencies and to the elites and activists of their parties. Deviations from public opinion reflect more than members' personal values. In addition to members' personal values and the ideologies of their constituents, there is a third factor: "Induced ideology" reflects both shared values and pressures from the electorate, especially fellow partisans, as well as activists and other elites. It is the systematic part of shirking. What mass and elite attitudes in a state cannot account for is a better measure of personal ideology. Stripped of its constituency component, personal ideology has far less power in accounting for roll call behavior. Induced ideology reflects a combination of a legislator's reelection, primary, and personal constituencies (Fenno 1978).

Pure and Induced Ideology

Senators with supportive state parties have a ready-made personal constituency. Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) serves as a leader of his party. He recruits candidates for lower offices, who become a key support base: “[A] lot of my friends, people who have been with me a long time, are running themselves, all over the state” (Fenno 1991a, 201). Domenici’s famed moderation stems from similar views among New Mexico GOP elites, who are to the left of the state party electorate (standardized induced-ideology score = .333). Domenici himself is more conservative than his partisan electorate (standardized pure partisanship = $-.623$).¹

Legislators without a large personal constituency may find themselves out of touch with both their state parties and voters. North Dakota Republican Mark Andrews was targeted for defeat in 1986 by the National Conservative Caucus; he lost to a populist Democrat. Andrews lamented: “My situation is made worse by the absence of any Republican party in this state. They are inept and incompetent and almost nonexistent” (Fenno 1992, 177, 252). Andrews seemed to engage in the typical Downsian strategy of moving toward the center and away from his personal constituency — and he lasted just one term.²

For most senators, supportive personal constituencies are the key to reelection because they can ensure themselves, with John Donne, that “no man is an Island, entire of itself.” Legislators share a common fate with fellow partisans. They talk politics, share ideas, and give each other comfort. They look to each other for political advice. Few confront a unified field in opposition to them, largely because only a handful could survive in a hostile environment. Most senators can’t build coalitions that are heavily dependent upon the other party. They need their own party base.

The closest we are likely to get to a measure of pure personal ideology is the residuals left over after we estimate induced values. These residuals don’t include internal factors such as party leadership persuasion, agenda effects, interest group pressures, and similar factors cited by Jackson and Kingdon (1992, 813). We rarely can get decent measures of these influences. Kingdon (1973) has shown that the internal and external pressures on members generally flow in the same direction. So we may not have much to worry about if we exclude factors specific to a particular vote in an overall index of ideology. It would be more problem-

atic if we left out larger influences such as party elite pressures on senators.

Fenno's multiple-constituencies model seems reasonably taut. It is unlikely that we are missing anything systematic across a wide range of votes. Critics used to refer to Senators Henry Jackson and Warren Magnuson (both D-WA) as "the Senators from Boeing" (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1973, 1057). Jackson and Magnuson were both hawks who looked out for the interests of their state's largest employer. But such fealty to specific interests is not likely to cause us difficulties in estimating personal ideology. If Washington voters accept the key role of Boeing in their economy, they are likely to support policies favored by the company, so representation will be reflected in (statewide) public opinion. If Washington voters are hostile to Boeing, but the company takes few stands on policy questions, then the impact on a member's overall ideology will range from negligible (if Jackson and Magnuson would have supported these policies anyway) to minor (if the two senators vote contrary to their basic ideology on scattered votes). Only when an interest has stands on many issues that are at variance with public opinion will there be a representational dilemma (Denzau and Munger 1986) — and the possibility that we have missed something systematic in the environment. It is probably safe to say that this is a rare occurrence (especially for *both* of a state's senators).

The multiple constituencies exhaust virtually all of the direct and systematic pressures on elected officials. With this assumption and the better-than-expected performance of residualization in chapter 2, it seems reasonable to apply the technique to derive better measures of pure ideology than we currently have. By the time I have purged legislators' ideology of the direct constituency preferences and induced ideology, there is not much of a story to tell. What remains is probably a good approximation of pure personal ideology.

There are a lot of concepts floating around, and I shall endeavor to minimize the gobbledygook, though I can't get rid of all of it. I reserve the terms *simple shirking* and *simple partisanship* for geographic and reelection constituency deviations, as presented in chapter 2. The predicted part of simple shirking is *induced* values. This reflects the combined impact of the multiple constituencies, measured using statewide (geographic) opinions. The predicted segment of state party shirking is *induced partisanship*. This is the idealized measure of elite influence: It

reflects the primary and personal constituencies, as well as (to a lesser extent) the reelection constituency's ideology.³ It is as close as we are going to get to a measure of partisan forces that pressure a public official. *Pure personal values* (or pure values) are the residuals from geographic (statewide) constituency; *pure personal partisanship* (or pure partisanship) reflects the residuals from the reelection followers. It is personal values stripped of all supporting constituencies, our best approximation of any beliefs that a legislator might have that are not shared by either masses or elites.

Is there much left once we take out the shared values with the legislator's personal constituency? The four senators with the largest scores (absolute values greater than 1.5) are moderate Republicans. Edward Brooke, John Chafee, Robert Stafford, and Lowell Weicker represent states with conservative party elites and partisan supporters, but moderate-to-liberal opposition parties. All but Brooke face a strongly conservative base, and all but Stafford confront an opposition that is not only liberal but also the dominant party in the state. Some senators don't have supportive personal constituencies.

Do these residualized measures predict roll call voting in the Senate? I estimate the effects of personal ideology on the 12 roll calls and two indices (anti-strip mining and the Panama Canal index). As before, the equations include the full range of state economic and political interests. I do not present them since they are not of immediate concern. Because this is the payoff question on whether personal ideology matters, I present a series of tests that will compare pure ideology with the more general measure developed in chapter 2.

The simplest test compares the significance levels of the alternative measures of personal ideology (since logit coefficients have no straightforward interpretation). Each logit equation has a test statistic for each variable equivalent to the *t*-test in regression (the maximum-likelihood estimate divided by its standard error), which can be compared directly (and with the *t*-tests for the two equations estimated by ordinary least squares). I present the results in table 8.

For geographic constituencies, the impact of personal ideology drops by more than half for the draft, abortion, pregnancy disability, loans to Communist countries, and the antistrip index. The impact of pure personal values matches "simple shirking" (the model of chapter 2) for the neutron bomb. The *t*-ratios for 5 of the 14 new equations are cut in half from the direct survey estimates in chapter 2. The average *t*-ratio

is cut almost in half—from 4.043 to 2.332. There is also less variation across impacts; the standard deviation of t -ratios is 1.631 across the 14 votes for simple ideology and .886 for the pure personal ideology.

All but 1 of the 14 coefficients for pure personal values are significant at $p < .10$ or better; 8 make the grade at $p < .01$. The coefficients

TABLE 8. Estimates of Residualized Ideology on Roll Calls

Vote	Geographic Constituency		Reelection Constituency	
	Pure Personal Ideology Coefficient	Induced Coefficient	Pure Personal Partisanship	Induced
Anti-strip mining	.447*** (2.427)	-5.202*** (-3.191)	.313** (2.092)	.513**** (-5.461)
Communist immigration	1.475*** (2.443)	-11.536*** (-2.452)	.383 (.728)	-1.744**** (-4.112)
Death penalty	2.275*** (2.447)	-36.411*** (-3.035)	1.845** (2.349)	-1.893**** (-3.754)
Draft	1.401** (2.260)	-13.884*** (-2.967)	1.039** (2.171)	-1.100**** (-3.356)
Sex education	1.397** (1.765)	-21.491*** (-2.937)	1.346** (1.765)	-3.227** (-2.937)
Neutron bomb	3.050**** (3.702)	-18.789*** (-3.149)	2.174**** (3.527)	-.912*** (-2.711)
Desegregation	2.098*** (2.843)	-12.988** (-2.268)	1.866*** (2.726)	-1.284*** (-2.268)*
Abortion	.683* (1.352)	-8.732** (-2.106)	.633* (1.567)	-.166 (-.657)
Pornography	1.448** (2.102)	-5.583 (-1.245)	.814* (1.452)	-.420* (-1.310)
Pregnancy disability	.520 (.584)	-11.078* (-1.616)	.211 (.269)	-1.756*** (-2.737)
Pregnancy discrimination	1.455* (1.518)	-16.148** (-2.087)	.239* (1.518)	-10.982** (-2.087)
Cuba	2.093*** (2.657)	-13.490** (-2.129)	1.765*** (2.537)	-1.458** (-3.075)
Communist loans	1.530*** (2.528)	-10.688** (-2.112)	1.518*** (2.698)	-1.030*** (-3.186)
Panama Canal index	2.196**** (4.016)	-15.340**** (-3.777)	1.404**** (3.539)	-1.537**** (-6.774)

Note: Entries are logit coefficients (regression coefficients for anti-strip mining and the Panama Canal index); maximum likelihood estimates/standard errors (or t -ratios) are in parentheses.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

for the draft, sex education, and pornography are significant only at $p < .05$; abortion and pregnancy discrimination only meet the .10 level, while the coefficient for pregnancy disability is less than its standard error.

Pure personal ideology is not strongly correlated with statewide public opinion. We can thus see the impact of public attitudes more clearly in models that replace the direct survey estimates with the induced values. Eight of the constituency coefficients are significant at $p < .01$ or better and all but two (pregnancy disability, which is significant at $p < .10$, and pornography) at $p < .05$. The mean t -ratio for statewide public opinion is 2.505, slightly higher than that for legislators' personal ideology. The impact is more consistent across votes: the standard deviation of t -ratios for statewide public opinion is .481, about half the value for induced values. *For geographic constituencies, public opinion plays a larger and more consistent role than pure personal values.*

The impact of legislators' personal ideology also drops for the reelection constituency models. The decline is not quite so sharp because deviations from the reelection constituency were not as great to begin with. Nine of the 14 direct survey estimates in Chapter 2 are significant at $p < .01$ or better; only five of the coefficients for pure personal partisanship meet this criterion. Only the death penalty vote has an impact as great for pure personal partisanship as it had in the reelection constituency model of Chapter 2.

On five votes the impacts for pure partisanship are cut more by half. These are all highly charged issues on which legislators might invite the wrath of their constituents if they strayed too far from public opinion: immigration from communist nations, abortion, pornography, pregnancy disability, and the Panama Canal votes. Only on the latter is there evidence of that personal ideology (deviations from reelection constituencies) matters; the others all have insignificant coefficients or t -ratios that meet only the weak test of $p < .10$. The revised effects are substantially weaker than the simple shirking models. The mean t -ratio falls to 2.067 from 2.969 — and the standard deviation is cut from 1.219 to .940, drops of 30 and 23 percent, respectively. Reelection constituency ideology retains its powerful impacts. Only two issues — abortion and pornography — show weak or nonexistent effects for state party opinions. The mean t -ratio is 3.068, just about the same as the direct shirking estimate (3.067). It is half again as powerful as pure personal partisanship.

Once again there is less deviation from the reelection constituency than from the geographical constituency. Public opinion, especially that

of state partisans, matters more than legislators' personal ideology in shaping roll call voting in the Senate. Comparing *t*-ratios is a very rough guide to impacts. Significance tests are not measures of the strength of relationships. Instead, I focus on the *effects* of personal ideology, the difference in probabilities derived from setting personal ideology first at its minimum value and then at its maximum. The difference between the two is the effect (cf. chapter 2). The results are presented in table 9.

The direct estimates for geographic constituencies (from chapter 2) suggest powerful impacts for simple shirking. Four of the 12 votes have effects of more than .80. Moving one standard deviation in each direction almost completely determines roll call behavior on communist immigration, the neutron bomb, desegregation, and Cuba. A liberal would have a .90 probability of voting for desegregation (or against the neutron bomb), while a conservative would have just a .10 probability. Simple ideology also moves the draft, the death penalty, and loans to communist

TABLE 9. Logit Effects on Roll Calls

Vote	Geographic Constituency		Reelection Constituency	
	Simple	Pure	Simple	Pure
Communist immigration	.803	.295	.277	.070
Death penalty	.669	.289	.351	.236
Draft	.720	.279	.401	.232
Sex education	.698	.195	.119	.125
Neutron bomb	.856	.449	.625	.434
Desegregation	.895	.314	.689	.282
Abortion	.404	.152	.457	.183
Pornography	.393	.227	.397	.159
Pregnancy disability	.322	.052	.082	.019
Pregnancy discrimination	.474	.151	.092	.011
Cuba	.876	.383	.471	.322
Communist loans	.605	.305	.191	.320
Mean	.643	.258	.346	.199
Standard deviation	.202	.109	.201	.130

Note: Entries are *changes* in probability on roll call voting from a spatial location one standard deviation below the mean (zero) to one standard deviation above the mean, keeping all other predictors at their observed values.

countries—each with impacts of .60 or more. The mean effect for the original model for geographic constituencies is .643, with a standard deviation of .202. The estimates are cut almost in half when we shift to the reelection constituencies: The mean effect is now .346—with only two figures above .60 (desegregation and the neutron bomb) and four below .20 (the two pregnancy votes, sex education, and loans to communist countries). The standard deviation remains the same (.201). Once more, most of the controversial issues show the biggest drops in—and smallest amounts of—personal ideology.

The new estimates from the residualization technique suggest that personal ideology is far less important than the principal-agent models would suggest. The mean effect for pure personal ideology (.258) is 60 percent lower than the methodology of chapter 2 suggests. Only the neutron bomb has an effect greater than .40; abortion, the two pregnancy votes, and sex education—the great moral issues once more—show effects less than .20. The standard deviation is cut in half—to .109. For reelection constituencies, the effect is even more dramatic. The effect for pure personal partisanship, the clearest measure of shirking from all partisan constituencies, is cut by 40 percent—to .199. The standard deviation falls to .130. Moral issues bring greater conformity to state partisans. Only three foreign policy votes—the neutron bomb, Cuba, and communist loans—have effects greater than .30 (cf. chapter 2). If we focus on the other nine votes—recognizing that immigration and the draft are a mixture of domestic and foreign concerns—the mean effect of shirking drops to .178 and the standard deviation to .112.

The Third Element of Representation

Something is missing. The models I have examined so far focus on constituency ideology and senators' pure personal ideology. The fundamental equation of the original shirking literature is that overall ideology equals the sum of constituency and personal values. My new perspective adds the third element to the mix: the part of a legislator's ideology that reflects mass and elite attitudes in a senator's state (and state party). If pure ideology is the residual from the equation predicting personal ideology from mass and elite traits, induced ideology is the systematic part of the same equation. Induced ideology reflects the linkage between a member's personal values and those of the supporting constituencies.

What happens when I add induced ideology to the mix? Pure per-

sonal ideology should not be affected much. These two components of legislator ideology must be uncorrelated with each other, as the systematic and residual components of regression analyses always are. Any impact on pure personal ideology will be indirect—in the pattern of intercorrelations among these two aspects of legislator ideology and other predictors (especially constituency attitudes).

For reelection constituencies, there is little change from table 8. Nine of the 14 coefficients for induced partisanship are significant at $p < .01$ or better; one more makes the grade at $p < .05$ (table 10). The two pregnancy votes together with sex education and loans to Communist countries are not affected by induced partisanship. All but pregnancy discrimination are driven largely by the opinions of the senator's reelection constituency rather than by the legislator's own values.⁴ The issues on which induced partisanship has the strongest impacts—abortion, environment, pornography, civil rights, and the neutron bomb—are arenas in which activists have polarized the parties. The pattern is largely the same for geographic constituencies, so I don't dwell on repetitious results.

Partitioning the Effects

Personal ideology appears to be an important determinant of roll call voting when I measure it as the simple difference between interest group ratings and constituency beliefs. Once we recognize that deviations from public opinion are rooted in mass and especially elite attitudes, personal ideology is less idiosyncratic—and less personal. Yet, an 18 to 20 percent shift in the likelihood of voting for a bill is impressive if not determinative. There still seems to be a role, however reduced, for personal ideology in explaining legislative votes.

Neither t -ratios nor changes in probabilities are the best measures for estimating the impact of personal ideology. Roll calls are discrete events. The yeas and nays are more visible to any constituents who may be paying attention than the underlying probability distributions. The nuances of how close a legislator is to a yea or nay may entrance political activists seeking to nudge members toward their preferred positions. Probabilities become important to constituents only when they push a legislator from the yea to the nay column (or vice versa).

We can derive probabilities of voting yea or nay on a roll call from logit analysis. These probabilities yield predictions of voting behavior: A probability of voting yea greater than .5 leads to a prediction of a yea

vote. These predictions, compared to senators' actual votes, give us a measure of how well we have predicted the roll call. If personal ideology matters, including it in a logit analysis should lead to greater predictive accuracy. More accurate than what? The simplest base model includes *no predictors*. A null model leads us to a straightforward prediction: The

TABLE 10. Three Components of Ideology as Determinants of Roll Call Voting

Vote	"Pure Personal" Partisanship	Induced Partisanship	State Party Ideology
Anti-strip mining	.344*** (2.555)	.514**** (4.535)	-.471**** (-5.539)
Communist immigration	.442 (.789)	1.610*** (2.761)	-2.455*** (-3.758)
Death penalty	2.475*** (2.579)	1.400** (2.034)	-1.951*** (-3.285)
Draft	1.296*** (2.472)	1.182*** (2.719)	-1.216*** (-3.387)
Sex education	1.441* (1.635)	.406 (.704)	-3.106*** (-3.163)
Neutron bomb	2.864**** (3.699)	2.117**** (3.619)	-1.145*** (-2.469)
Desegregation	4.988*** (3.074)	3.900*** (3.109)	-1.725*** (-2.683)
Abortion	.787** (1.739)	1.285*** (3.132)	-.141 (-.516)
Pornography	1.230** (1.992)	1.844*** (3.364)	-.513 (-1.281)
Pregnancy disability	.227 (.272)	.753 (1.099)	-1.491** (-2.272)
Pregnancy discrimination	-1.387 (-.563)	4.946 (.866)	-32.524 (-.911)
Cuba	1.823*** (2.398)	1.622*** (2.582)	-1.718*** (-2.959)
Communist loans	1.510*** (2.683)	-.081 (-.188)	-1.042*** (-3.160)
Panama Canal index	1.428*** (3.768)	.899*** (2.983)	-1.441**** (-6.579)

Note: Entries are probit coefficients (or regression coefficients for anti-strip mining and the Panama Canal index); maximum likelihood estimates divided by standard errors (or *t*-ratios) are in parentheses.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

percentage of members we expect to vote yea is simply the actual percentage that did vote yea. The mean majority vote on the 12 discrete roll calls is 67 percent. Now let us estimate a model with *only* legislators' values included. How much better does it do than a null model, with no predictors at all? The simple ideology estimates of chapter 2 improve on these predictions by 15.3 and 11 percent, respectively, for geographic and reelection constituencies. The pure personal (residualized) measures lead to gains over the null model by 3.4 percent and 2.3 percent for geographic and reelection constituencies. *When I shift to a measure of personal ideology that purges legislator ideology of elite as well as mass effects, the impact of values unique to legislators almost evaporates.*

This model incorporating only legislator ideology is too simplistic. A better way of assessing the impact of legislators' private values is through a "multivariate null model," which includes all predictors from the models in chapter 2 *except* personal ideology. I estimate a series of models that include different components of ideology: direct shirking only (from chapter 2), pure personal ideology plus induced ideology, pure personal ideology but not induced ideology, and induced but not pure personal values. For each of these models, I estimate the percent predicted correctly by the logit model. The model that includes both pure personal and induced values is the most comprehensive. So it should, and usually does, have the greatest predictive success. But how much better does it do than leaving one (or both) component(s) of personal ideology out?

Comparing the percentages predicted correctly is tricky statistically. It is analogous to partitioning the variance in regressions through increments in R^2 values. This is legitimate only if the variables added are uncorrelated with the predictors in the null model. The predictors in the various logit equations are routinely correlated with each other, either moderately or even strongly. However, I can legitimately assess the impacts of pure personal ideology and partisanship compared to other variables. They are purged of constituency effects, so they are by construction uncorrelated with other predictors in the logit analyses. (The adjusted R^2 's for the residualized measures with the other predictors are $-.018$ for the statewide estimates and $.062$ for the state party measures).

Induced ideology represents a greater problem. Since it is based upon the reelection, primary, and personal constituencies and legislators, there should be strong correlations between induced ideology and other predictors. The problem is severe for the geographic-constituency

estimates, where the adjusted R^2 between the other predictors and induced ideology is .447. It is less of a problem for the state party estimates, where the adjusted $R^2 = .169$. When I drop one predictor of the roll call indices, the adjusted R^2 drops to .114.⁵ Deleting this offending variable reduces the adjusted R^2 's with the other predictors of simple partisanship to .140 and induced state party ideology to .110. The assumption of independence does not hold among the predictors, but it comes tolerably close. I can estimate the increment in prediction success if we recognize that the figures will still slightly *underestimate* the impact of incremental changes.

The multivariate null model averages 77 percent correct predictions, a 10 percent improvement over the naive null forecast (table 11). The biggest improvements over the multivariate null for the direct estimate of personal ideology occur on the neutron bomb, desegregation, abor-

TABLE 11. Comparison of Predictions from Truncated and Full State Party Models

Vote	Null	Multi- variate Null	With Direct Shirking	Pure Personal Plus Induced	Pure Personal No Induced	Induced No Pure Personal
Communist						
immigration	57.0	77.9	83.7	80.2	79.1	81.4
Death penalty	72.2	84.3	85.5	84.3	81.9	85.5
Draft	50.6	70.8	73.0	71.9	68.5	68.5
Sex education	71.4	86.0	90.5	90.5	88.1	88.1
Neutron bomb	62.0	67.4	84.8	85.9	76.1	75.0
Desegregation	69.8	80.2	88.4	88.4	80.2	81.4
Abortion	57.6	62.0	68.5	69.6	65.2	68.5
Pornography	75.9	78.3	80.7	81.9	77.1	79.5
Pregnancy						
disability	86.8	90.4	90.4	90.4	89.2	90.4
Pregnancy						
discrimination	84.0	92.6	93.8	93.8	92.6	93.8
Cuba	52.1	73.2	83.1	81.7	78.9	83.1
Communist loans	62.5	69.3	69.3	73.9	73.9	69.3
Mean % predicted correctly	66.8	77.0	82.6	82.7	79.2	80.4
Mean % correct: domestic	69.4	79.3	83.8	83.4	80.2	81.9

tion, and the Cuba votes. Including the direct measure of personal ideology — or its two components combined (pure personal ideology and induced values) — improves predictions by a further 5.6 percent to almost 83 percent.

When I split simple partisanship into its two components, induced partisanship outperforms pure personal values. Augmenting the multivariate null model to include induced partisanship leads to an average of 80.4 percent correct predictions, for a gain of 3.4 percent. Adding only pure personal ideology gets us 2.2 percent more correct predictions (79.2 percent). The induced-only model performs worse than the multivariate null only for the draft. It does about as well on the Communist immigration, death penalty, sex education, desegregation, pornography, the two pregnancy votes, and Communist loans. Most of these are moral issues on which legislators pay close attention to constituency attitudes. Only on the neutron bomb, abortion, and Cuba — two foreign-policy votes and an issue on which partisan elites are far more polarized than the rank and file — does pure partisanship have powerful effects.

Pure personal partisanship, the presumed best measure of legislators' own values purged of influences from fellow partisans, performs worse than the multivariate null on three votes — the draft, pornography, and pregnancy disability. Only on the neutron bomb and Cuba does it lead to substantially improved predictions. Induced values have a considerably greater impact than senators' own values on abortion — just as we would expect on a highly volatile issue that is highly charged electorally and divisive among elites. Pure personal partisanship outperforms the constituency component of the reelection constituency (induced partisanship) on two votes — the neutron bomb and loans to Communist countries, both low-visibility foreign-policy roll calls that might tap legislators' own ideals.⁶ The Cuba vote, which is more electorally salient (especially to elites within the Republican party), is better predicted by induced than by personal partisanship.

On average, when I add both personal and induced partisanship to the multivariate null model, there is a 5.7 percent gain in predictive success compared to the multivariate null model (which includes all predictors except the two components of personal ideology). Since induced and personal partisanship are (by construction) independent of each other, I can partition the gains in predictive success. Induced beliefs account for 3.4 percent more votes, personal partisanship 2.2 percent more. Sixty percent of the gain in predictive success comes from the

shared views of elites and constituency demographics; less than 40 percent is due to personal partisanship.⁷

The Policy Indulgent and the Electorally Indigent

Which legislators are most likely to “indulge” themselves in pure personal ideology? We saw (in chapter 2) that Northern Democrats are less likely to shirk than Republicans and Southern Democrats. What happens when I change focus to all three components of legislator ideology?

The results are the same — but more so — in the estimations for pure personal partisanship. Of the 14 roll calls, Northern Democratic pure personal partisanship is significant at $p < .10$ on only 3: the neutron bomb ($p < .005$), ANTISTRIP, and pornography (both $p < .05$). (See table 12.) For Republicans and Southern Democrats, 11 of the 14 coefficients are significant at $p < .10$. Ten meet at least the $p < .05$ level, and

TABLE 12. Summary of Partisan and Regional Effects of Three Components of Legislator on Roll Call Voting

Vote	Northern Democrats			Republicans and Southern Democrats		
	Personal	Induced	Constituency	Personal	Induced	Constituency
Communist immigration	—	.05	.005	—	.05	.05
Death penalty	—	—	—	.05	.10	.10
Draft	—	.05	.01	.05	.05	—
Sex education	—	.10	.05	.05	.05	.05
Neutron bomb	.005	.01	.001	.005	.005	—
Desegregation	—	.10	—	.05	.05	.10
Abortion	—	.05	—	.10	.05	—
Pornography	.05	.05	.05	—	.005	.10
Pregnancy disability	—	—	—	—	—	.05
Pregnancy discrimination	—	—	—	.05	.005	—
Cuba	—	.05	.05	.05	.05	—
Anti-strip mining	.05	.10	—	.005	.0001	.05
Panama Canal	—	.01	.0001	.0001	.005	.0001

Note: Entries are p -levels (one-tailed tests) for logits or regressions predicting roll call behavior with models as laid out in chapter 2.

3 votes (the neutron bomb, Communist loans, and the Panama Canal index) qualify at $p < .005$ or less. Conservatives go beyond their core partisan constituents on all votes except Communist immigration, pornography, and pregnancy disability. In contrast, we see that induced partisanship matters, especially for Northern Democrats. Ten of the 14 coefficients for the combined effects of the reelection and the personal/primary constituencies are significant at least at $p < .10$. For conservatives (Southern Democrats and Republicans), 12 of the 14 coefficients are significant, four at $p < .005$ or better.

Induced Ideology and Elections

Do senators who vote their own consciences suffer electorally? I estimated a simultaneous-equation model for primary- and general-election vote shares based upon the results in chapter 3 to examine the distinctive effects of pure personal and induced ideologies. There is no need to estimate anything as complex as the models in that chapter, since pure personal ideology is presumed to be independent of electoral forces.⁸ The results for all senators are presented in table 13. When we split legislator ideology into its two components, the dynamics of chapter 3 become clearer. Pure ideology, either from the geographic or the reelection constituency, is unrelated to electoral success in *either the primary or the general election. A more liberal induced ideology costs a few votes in the primary, but it takes a much greater toll in November.* Senators who move one standard deviation in a liberal direction away from induced partisanship party lose 4 percent of the vote in the primary.⁹ Moving a similar amount to the left of statewide induced ideology costs 4.7 percent in the general election. The pattern resembles that of chapter 3, but points to the *shared* component of ideology with other elites, rather than legislators' purely personal values, as the reason senators lose votes in November.

These models are tentative because they focus only on incumbents. When we examine both incumbents and challengers in chapter 5, we shall see greater effects for personal ideology for both primary and general elections. The big impacts in November still reflect induced values, but challenger partisan constituencies carry the load. We shall also see greater impacts across partisan blocs. We can get a glimpse of the impacts for challengers from these data. The more liberal a Democrat's pure personal

ideology—either from the geographic or the reelection constituency—the more money the challenger raises and spends ($r = .385$ and $.459$, respectively). The impact of personal ideology is indirect: Liberal Democrats who bolt too far left are likely to draw stronger challengers, who will

TABLE 13. Simultaneous Equation Model of Primary and General Election Effects of Induced and Pure Personal Ideology

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Statistic
Primary Election Model			
Constant	80.573	8.743	9.216
Pure personal partisanship	-2.938	2.341	-1.255
Induced partisanship	-2.940	1.830	-1.607*
Senator's party ID	-.438	.179	-2.447***
Seniority	-.470	.222	-2.116**
Primary challenger quality	-41.700	7.102	-5.872****
Last general election	.433	.169	2.564***
$R^2 = .406$	Adjusted $R^2 = .348$	SEE = 12.823	$N = 68$
General Election Model			
Constant	-10.701	18.462	-.580
Pure personal ideology	-.378	2.172	-.174
Induced ideology	-3.920	1.504	-2.607***
Challenger expenditures	-.006	.001	-4.318****
Senator's party ID	.803	.134	5.995****
Population diversity	60.558	24.266	2.496***
Primary vote	.239	.108	2.206**
$R^2 = .417$	Adjusted $R^2 = .360$	SEE = 9.378	$N = 68$
System $R^2 = .410$			

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

be more likely to unseat them in November. The effects of deviating from both state partisans and induced values are indirect.

The splitting of the two types of member values obliterates the straightforward relationship of chapter 3. It may well be that voters in November are not as issue oriented as primary electorates. They may simply see shirking and punish it without caring what drives senators away from the center. We should not make too much of this debate about ideology, because the models in chapter 3 and in table 13 show that the key determinant of (Northern) Democratic success in general elections is the party's edge in party identification. Most of the Democratic senators who lost in 1980 came from minority parties in their states. In a Republican year, their times were up.

The money game plays both ways. The more liberal Republican senators are relative to their geographic and reelection constituencies, the *less* money their challengers raise ($r = -.364$ for statewide pure ideology and $-.409$ for state party pure ideology). Moderate Republicans who survive primary challenges will face Democratic challengers with smaller war chests. Once they make it past the first race, moderate Republicans are relatively home free—just as conservative Democrats are. They need this protection in their moderate-to-liberal states because they are most likely to face quality challengers (who will be well funded) in states where their party has a smaller share of identifiers ($r = -.486$). The one tool that incumbents use to drive away good challengers—huge war chests—are less likely to be available to liberal Republican shirkers (Jacobson and Kernell 1983). Republican senators with more *conservative* induced ideologies raise more money than those with liberal activists ($r = .338$ for statewide and $.323$ for state party models). Liberal Republicans don't scare challengers away with their money. They do it with their roll call votes.

Campaign contributors seem to have different interests than voters, activists, or legislators (cf. Denzau and Munger 1986). They may be driven toward special interests, but they are not ideological. The Republican incumbents who raise the most money are the ones who are closest to their constituents—both statewide and state party. Democratic incumbents *of all stripes* appear to raise money with equal ease (or difficulty). The money tree shakes best for challengers taking on incumbents out of step with both constituents and activists. If campaign contributors seek influence with incumbents, getting too close to out-of-step legislators or activists is risky.

Masses, Elites, and Legislators

Personal ideology may not shape legislators' votes, but it may send signals to activists. The significance and the modest shifts in probabilities of voting yea on roll calls may be subtle cues to the activists in a senator's primary constituency, the very people who push the member to the left or the right. Elites pay more attention to nuances, to legislators' policy statements, and to committee and subcommittee activities. They may be more interested in position taking (Mayhew 1974) or behind-the-scenes activities (Hall and Wayman 1990) than in roll call behavior.

Senators, like entrepreneurs in any other enterprise, need to establish reputations (Kreps 1990). Reputations signal to voters and elites where legislators stand; they show constituents that leaders are consistent and credible (Dougan and Munger 1989; Glazer and Grofman 1989). They also help deter potential challengers within the party and boost the shirker's vote share in the primary. Yet, too strong an ideological stance will cost votes in November. Legislators want to show voters that they have principles. They don't want to stand too far away from their constituents, who might ultimately turn on them.

The dyadic legislator-constituency linkage suggests a simple representational dilemma: Do you vote your conscience or your constituency? A third dimension complicates the problem: You need to protect your base, ranging from your loyal supporters to your political allies and confidants to your campaign contributors. Legislators' success in November depends upon how close they are to their constituents. Elections make legislators the most responsive of all elites. They can use ideology to develop reputations that will give them name recognition, but since party identifiers, elites, and legislators share similar values, voters may use rational shortcuts by placing more emphasis on induced rather than personal ideology. We continue to see support for the ideological-equilibrium model, but it is not quite as straightforward. It pays to be ideological—even more so than your reelection constituency—in the primaries. Yet, the benefits legislators reap come from the ideological positioning of their core partisan supporters, not from their own personal ideology. It *hurts* legislators to be too ideological come November. The tendency to move toward your core partisan supporters can be costly in the general election. Once again, the problem doesn't appear to be legislators' own values. Instead, they pay a price for sticking too closely to their reelection, primary, and personal followers.

The principal-agent models err when they posit legislators with interests that are opposed to those of their constituents. Legislators rarely stray far from their base, their reelection, primary, and personal constituencies. And most of the time there is little conflict with the geographic constituency. For 55 of 96 senators (57.3 percent), the dominant ideology is the same for geographic and reelection constituencies. In principle, legislators can be both ideologues *and* Downsians. They get into trouble only when they follow their elites too far. And it is liberals who face a more hostile environment. All 13 senators with progressive reelection constituencies come from moderate geographic electorates.¹⁰ No senator faces a reelection constituency with an ideology that directly conflicts with the full electorate. Legislators can get into trouble for going too far. But it would take considerable effort to go against *both* geographic and reelection constituents. Only one Republican senator of the 20 with conservative geographic and reelection constituents had an ADA score of more than 50; only one Democrat of the 13 with a liberal reelection following had an ADA score below 50.¹¹

When voters punish legislators, they take out their frustrations on senators' fellow partisans, not on the "personal" ideology of the legislators. For legislators don't exercise their own judgment as much as they reflect the multiple constituencies they represent. Not one senator has a pure personal partisanship that qualifies as a "shirker" (with a score of 1.96 or greater in absolute value). Moreover, the next chapter shows why legislators don't need to worry so much about going past their reelection constituents: Challengers and their parties are often more out of step with public opinion than incumbents. Sitting legislators can often afford the luxury of getting out of step a little because their opponents stand so far outside the mainstream.

Representation and Elections

Something is missing. Senators may lose votes because they or their supporting constituencies stray too far from public opinion. If voters pay enough attention to where senators and their core constituencies stand, they should also heed the spatial locations of challengers and their key supporters. Our attention thus far has concentrated on incumbents. What about challengers?

Opponents matter mightily in Senate contests. Senators are more vulnerable than representatives because they face stronger challengers (Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Krasno 1994) and are more likely to be punished because of their voting records (Abramowitz 1988; Wright and Berkman 1986; G. Wright 1989). Asking whether shirking senators lose more than legislators who hew to their constituents' lines ignores electoral dynamics. Incumbent A may appear to be out of step with her constituents, but the challenger may be even further away. Incumbent B may be just as far removed from public opinion as A, but he may face a challenger who is right on the mark. Current officeholders are only half of the story (Sullivan and Uslander 1978). If challengers are more extremist than incumbents, sitting legislators may escape the electorate's wrath when they deviate from public opinion.

Studies of representation, and of roll call voting more generally, concentrate on incumbents because data on challengers are elusive. Opposition candidates don't have voting records. Many don't even have backgrounds in public service from which we could impute an ideology. This time we get lucky. CBS News surveyed both incumbents and challengers in 1982 about a wide range of issues that cohere quite well. I can derive measures of ideology for both candidates that will permit, albeit with small samples, estimates of the impact of shirking on fortunes in

both the primary and general elections. I test models similar to those in chapters 3 and 4.

When we break down a small sample even further, it is right to be cautious. So I rely upon another database that makes comparisons between incumbents and challengers less tenuous: the 1988 Senate Election Study of the National Election Studies—to augment the aggregate findings from the CBS candidate survey. The survey results confirm the impact of both incumbent and challenger ideology on Senate elections. When I analyze Northern Democrats and Republicans separately, there is little support for the idea that candidates gain votes by taking immoderate positions. Northern Democrats who tilt rightward and Republicans with moderate-to-liberal state parties who are liberal gain votes.

Challengers are essential for understanding representation, but they don't all tell the same story. Good opponents are more likely to surface when they are most likely to win. Strong challengers, according to the conventional wisdom, can exploit issue differences better than weak pretenders (Westlye 1991). When candidates take distinct positions on issues, the ideologies of both incumbents and challengers should play a more critical role in elections when the aspirants have similar views.

The conventional wisdom doesn't survive intact: The biggest impact for issues in general elections comes in contests where candidates take distinct positions (quite reasonable), but where the incumbent is expected to win easily (quite surprising). In these states the big impact comes from challenger-induced partisanship. Downsian models and principal-agent frameworks would expect issues to be most prominent when candidates take different positions. This is the voter's grand opportunity to punish incumbents who insist on voting their own preferences rather than the electorate's. A challenger closer to public opinion can bring the errant incumbent to heel by waging a highly public campaign on the issues.¹ According to Downs (1957, 55–60), a well-placed challenger can *always* beat an incumbent if the issue space is multidimensional.

Yet this is *not* how issues shape Senate elections. When issues matter, they work to the *advantage* of incumbents whose ideology is more extreme than their geographic constituents would prefer. There is a great ideological divide, but it is not between an out-of-touch incumbent and a centrist challenger. It is between an ideological incumbent and an even more extremist challenger. The opposition candidate does not wage a highly publicized campaign that highlights how immoderate the

incumbent is. Instead, these races heavily favor the incumbent. Moderate challengers pass up the opportunity to run, leaving the field to candidates who are further away from the center than the incumbent is. So voters reward the incumbent for ideological stands that are less extreme than those offered by the challenger. Hard-fought races, in contrast, are not nearly the ideological battlegrounds that races with “lost cause” challengers are. Even hard-fought races where candidates are ideologically distinct don’t lead to a great role for issues. Principal-agent models cannot readily account for such a result. They would expect that voters would be better able to monitor shirking in races with the high levels of publicity that accompany hard-fought races.

Immoderate challengers make sense in a world of ideological equilibrium (cf. G. Wright 1989). Most challengers represent minority parties.² Their parties are likely out of sync ideologically with statewide opinion. Challengers start from behind and must first shore up their base by taking more extreme positions. Strongly ideological candidates give up a key advantage that accrues only to challengers: the ability to exploit multidimensionality of issues to defeat an incumbent. Minority party candidates have to build support across partisan and ideological lines. A single dimension of conflict helps the incumbent solidify her support across the geographic constituency. Multiple dimensions let the challenger pick off some incumbent supporters and perhaps forge a majority. Strongly ideological outsiders give up this strategy and cede the issue advantage to incumbents.

Not all incumbents find ideology a blessing. An extreme position may bring extra votes in primaries but can be costly in general elections (chapter 4). It is not the positions of legislators, but those of their core partisans, that are costly in November. And most senators, even those who are out of sync with the electorate, manage to win. The answer lies in part with challengers, who are even more out of touch than incumbents (who don’t do that badly).

Some races find challengers echoing incumbents, others don’t. Incumbents don’t have a distinct advantage over challengers in getting to the middle (though they are almost always closer to their own reelection constituencies). And there is no clear connection between proximity to the public and which candidate wins. *Closeness to public opinion doesn’t count. The direction of shirking matters* (cf. Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). It helps to veer rightward to win votes in November. But not too far. Incumbents gain votes if they are more conservative than their

geographic constituency. But challengers lose votes when they get too far to the right of their own partisan supporters. In primaries, more *liberal* reelection constituencies bring extra votes, but this is balanced off by an even larger increment when a legislator's *own partisan values* tilt rightward.

I consider three types of contexts: whether candidates converge or diverge, whether a senator's race is tough or easy, and whether the senator is a Democrat or Republican. Conventional wisdom yields easy predictions for each scenario. Ideology matters more to voters when candidates take distinctive positions (Abramowitz 1981; Wright and Berkman 1986). We shouldn't ask voters to pore over issue positions when candidates are vague (Downs 1957, chap. 12; Page and Shapiro 1992, 9). Issue voting should also be greater in states when senators face sharper challenges. In hard-fought races quality challengers can get their (ideological) message across and make incumbents sweat (Westlye 1991, 13–14). There is little room for issues in low-key races.³

Ideology matters most in elections when candidates take distinct positions and in races where the incumbent is highly favored. Close races are not doctrinal battles. Republicans can win extra primary votes if their own partisan values are more conservative than their core partisans. Northern Democrats neither gain nor lose from being too liberal for their reelection constituents in spring elections. If they are more liberal than their reelection and primary constituents, Northern Democrats will lose votes in November. And Republican incumbents gain when their challengers' partisans veer *leftward*.

Incumbent and Challenger Ideology

The analysis thus far has employed roll call measures based upon League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores as the basis of legislator ideology. Jackson and Kingdon (1992) criticize roll call–based measures of ideology as predictors of other votes. Mostly we have no other alternative. This time we do. CBS News surveyed Senate incumbents and challengers in 1982 on a series of issues. Wright (1989; cf. Wright and Berkman 1986) obtained the interview data from CBS and derived incumbent and challenger conservatism scales from questions on individual issues.⁴ The survey yielded 61 usable responses for all incumbents and 26 incumbents seeking reelection in 1982.⁵ This sample is somewhat biased: 1982 was kind to incumbents. Only two lost, one of whom was

not in the CBS sample. The sample reelection rate is 96.2 percent, compared to 65.3 percent for other senators in my sample ($p < .003$, two-tailed). On a wide variety of other measures, there are no significant differences between the CBS and larger samples.⁶

While the recession of 1982 and voter discontent with President Ronald Reagan's ideology hurt House Republicans (Abramowitz 1984), the GOP picked up a seat in the Senate. The country was still in a conservative mood, and GOP senators up for reelection seem to have profited from their ideology (Stimson 1991, 61–62; Hurley 1991).

The incumbent measures of personal ideology should be similar across methods. I used the same procedure to construct the shirking indices as I did in chapters 2 and 4, substituting the (standardized) CBS scores for the (standardized) roll call indices. These analyses are based on comparisons of standardized measures of shirking analogous to those presented in previous chapters. I standardized the incumbent and challenger ideology scales separately.⁷

The correlations are far from perfect, either for the roll call measures (table 14) or the shirking indices (table 15). To test whether the problem could be due to period effects—whether changing issues from

TABLE 14. Correlations between Roll Call Measures and CBS Conservatism Index

	PRO-LCV	PRO-LCV Stratified	ADA
	Full Sample		
All senators (57)	-.784	-.771	-.808
Republicans (25)	-.811	-.706	-.831
Northern Democrats (24)	-.624	-.648	-.628
Northern Democrats without 3 moderates (21)	-.761	-.689	-.646
	Senators Running in 1982		
All senators (26)	-.660	-.681	-.846
Republicans (9)	-.931	-.538	-.981
Northern Democrats (13)	-.383	-.637	-.719
Northern Democrats without 3 moderates (10)	-.550	-.667	-.815

Note: Entries are correlation coefficients between conservatism index from CBS survey and the roll call measures. Entries in parentheses are numbers of cases.

1977–78 to 1981–82 could lead to different LCV scores—I computed stratified indices for the LCV measure. I computed PRO-LCV measures for senators up for reelection in 1980 and 1982 based upon their group ratings for the preceding biennium.

For the 57 senators for whom I can make comparisons, the LCV ratings and liberalism scores from Americans for Democratic Action (cf.

TABLE 15. Correlations between Roll Call and CBS Personal-Ideology Measures

	PRO-LCV	PRO-LCV Stratified	ADA
Full Sample: Geographic Constituency			
All senators (57)	.829	.775	.876
Republicans (25)	.891	.846	.939
Northern Democrats (24)	.612	.561	.698
Northern Democrats without 3 moderates (21)	.754	.573	.648
Full Sample: Reelection Constituency			
All senators (57)	.630	.719	.807
Republicans (25)	.860	.652	.880
Northern Democrats (24)	.561	.596	.581
Northern Democrats without 3 moderates (21)	.721	.635	.515
Senators Running in 1982: Geographic Constituency			
All senators (26)	.668	.743	.895
Republicans (9)	.934	.860	.987
Northern Democrats (13)	.384	.561	.783
Northern Democrats without 3 moderates (10)	.550	.633	.854
Senators Running in 1982: Reelection Constituency			
All senators (26)	.587	.755	.853
Republicans (9)	.898	.409	.976
Northern Democrats (13)	.339	.754	.700
Northern Democrats without 3 moderates (10)	.542	.654	.776

Note: Entries are correlation coefficients between personal-ideology measures from CBS survey and the roll call personal-ideology estimates. Entries in parentheses are numbers of cases.

Kalt and Zupan 1990) have similar correlations with the CBS conservatism index.⁸ The correlations center around .80. There is little gain from using stratified group ratings. The LCV measure does not fare as well for the 26 senators up for reelection in 1982. The correlation falls to $-.660$ —and to $-.383$ for Northern Democrats. The ADA correlations remain strong. Much of the problem is attributable to differences in scores for three moderate Democrats. When we remove them, the correlation increases to $-.550$. The story is pretty much the same for the personal ideology measures (table 15).

Some of the modest correlations give pause, but they do not suggest that a “Stop” sign is in order. The correlations with measures based on ADA scores are respectable. Virtually all of the analyses in previous chapters were replicated with ADA-based measures; the differences in interpretation are marginal. And the analyses to follow strongly confirm my larger thesis: When legislator ideology matters, it is the “induced” component—the shared values of legislators and their supportive constituencies—that looms largest in the electoral connection.

Spaced Out?

Do incumbents defeat challengers because they are closer to their common geographic constituencies? No. Only 14 of 26 (53.9 percent of incumbents) are closer to statewide public opinion than are their challengers. When the incumbent and challenger adopt similar ideological positions, 58 percent of incumbents are closer to public opinion; when they diverge, the incumbent wins the ideological race only half of the time.⁹

Incumbents who are closer to public opinion get 56.6 percent of the vote; those who are further away secure 59.7 percent. Senators who take the same position their challengers take do just a tiny bit better (59.1 percent) than legislators who take different positions (57.1 percent, not significant). *When the candidates diverge and the incumbent is closer to public opinion, the incumbent is still stuck with about the same vote share (55.9 percent) as other senators (58.8 percent). Sitting senators get no electoral boost when the candidates converge and the incumbent is closer (57.4 percent compared to 58.3 percent).* The message so far seems ironic: Regardless of the context, ideological proximity conveys no electoral benefits.¹⁰

A majority (14 of 26) of *challengers* are closer to their reelection

constituencies than incumbents are to their own fellow partisans. When candidates converge, incumbents hew more to their party line than challengers do to theirs: 75 percent of sitting senators (9 of 12) are closer to their reelection constituencies than are challengers to their own partisans. When an incumbent and challenger take distinct positions, the challenger is more in tune with her reelection constituents (by 78.6 percent). Why, then, do incumbents win, generally with votes to spare? The key lies in breaking ideology into its component parts.

Another Triple Play

I construct measures of pure personal and induced ideology for both incumbents and challengers from the CBS survey. I report the equations for pure personal ideology and pure partisanship for incumbents and challenger-induced partisanship in table C.1 in appendix C. These are the variables that affect primary- and general-election vote shares, so I concentrate on them. The equations for induced partisanship employ familiar predictors.¹¹ The correlation between statewide induced partisanship for the roll call and survey measures is .742; the linkage for induced partisanship is slightly weaker ($r = .602$).¹²

Personal ideologies vary widely among incumbents and challengers. Even though, as in chapter 4, induced ideologies include both the reelection and primary constituencies, I shall sometimes refer to induced partisan constituencies — the predicted part of senator deviations from their reelection constituencies — as primary constituency attitudes.

Neither measure of pure legislator ideology — measured as deviations from either the geographic or the reelection constituency — is related to challengers' personal values ($r = .036$ and $.0003$, respectively). Statewide supporting constituencies — the induced ideologies of geographic constituencies — aren't similar for incumbents and challengers ($r = .045$). However, *core partisan constituencies* — induced partisanship for reelection constituencies — are very similar for incumbents and challengers. The correlation between incumbent and challenger induced partisanship is .772. *When one party's core supporters and activists are liberal (conservative), so are the other's.*

Incumbents and challengers have similar *reelection constituencies*. The correlation between incumbent and challenger induced partisanship is high across the contexts I examine: whether candidates converge or diverge and whether the upcoming election is expected to be tough or

one-sided. The correlation between reelection constituencies of incumbents and challengers is .860 for all 96 senators and .890 for the 26 senators in the CBS sample. And the primary/personal constituencies of the two parties are similar: The correlation between party elite ideologies is .609 for all senators and .671 for the CBS sample.¹³

Incumbents and challengers have reelection, primary, and personal constituencies that tilt in the same direction. This would suggest that candidates should converge, as Downsian models predict. They don't. Northern Democratic incumbents are moderate to liberal (with a mean score on the 10-point CBS conservatism scale of 4.115), while their opponents are quite conservative (mean = 8.538, $p < .05$). GOP incumbents are moderate to conservative (mean = 6.000), and they run against very liberal Democrats (mean = 2.444, $p < .0001$).¹⁴ Incumbents occupy positions slightly to the left (Northern Democrats) and right (Republicans) of center. Challengers are the outliers. As Wright and Berkman (1986, 572) argue, using the same CBS sample, "Challengers . . . run much more as good ideological representatives of their parties than as seekers of middle-of-the-road votes." And they lose because they are *too ideological*.

Misrepresentation is not simply a matter of ideological challengers facing moderate incumbents. When incumbents deviate from their constituencies, they take advantage of the limited leeway their constituents give them. The correlations between statewide opinion and core partisan supporters are higher for incumbents than for challengers except in hard-fought races (where they are almost equal) and where candidates converge.¹⁵

Incumbents, Challengers, and Ideology

I begin with a general model of incumbent vote share in the general and primary elections for the full CBS sample. It includes the challenger's pure partisan ideology and both pure and induced partisanship for the incumbent. I then estimate truncated models for the different contexts (convergence versus divergence, hard-fought versus low-key races, and separate analyses for Northern Democrats and Republicans). I include the candidate ideology measures that matter most across the contexts: incumbent pure and induced partisanship and challenger induced partisanship.

In primaries, incumbents face a trade-off (see table 16). They gain

votes when their own partisan values are conservative and when their *core partisan supporters are more liberal* (both $p < .0001$). The gain from conservative personal principles (13.5 percent) is stronger than the boost from liberal supporters (10.6 percent). In a conservative era, voters reward legislators for being even more conservative than their strongest supporters. But they don't want their senators going too far out on a limb.¹⁶

TABLE 16. Election Models

Independent Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Statistic
A. Primary Election Model			
Constant	327.200	44.635	7.330****
Incumbent pure partisanship	-13.476	3.035	-4.440****
Incumbent induced partisanship	10.575	1.896	5.577****
Other party opinion standard deviation	-339.900	63.880	-5.321****
Polarized parties	6.942	4.047	1.715*
$R^2 = .662$ Adjusted $R^2 = .598$ SEE = 9.729 $N = 26$			
B. General Election Model			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Ratio
Constant	43.786	6.451	6.787****
Incumbent pure ideology	-2.675	1.233	-2.170**
Challenger induced partisanship	-3.174	0.744	-4.264****
Primary votes	.173	.070	2.474**
Challenger quality	-2.993	1.568	-1.909**
$R^2 = .643$ Adjusted $R^2 = .575$ SEE = 3.825 $N = 26$			

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. **** $p < .0001$.

In the general election, conservative personal values wins votes two ways. There is a direct effect ($p < .05$) from pure ideology on vote share in November. And there is an indirect effect from pure partisanship through the primary. Every additional primary vote boosts November vote shares by almost one-fifth of a vote ($p < .05$).¹⁷ While this is not a big impact, the powerful force of pure partisanship in the spring translates into an indirect effect (2.334) that rivals the coefficient on pure ideology. Yet moving to the right is not an unambiguous blessing. If *challengers' primary constituents* are too conservative, the incumbent reaps extra votes ($p < .0001$). When challengers move too far to the right, they can make a liberal incumbent appear moderate. Challenger extremism brings in slightly more votes (3.2 percent compared to 2.7 percent) compared to incumbent ideology.

Context Matters

Member ideology and supporting constituencies have different effects in different contexts. Breaking the small number of cases for the CBS sample (26) into different contexts leads to precariously small *Ns*. So I estimate truncated models for each context: whether candidates diverge or converge, whether a race is expected to be close or lopsided, and Northern Democrats versus Republican incumbents. Issues should play a most prominent role when candidates take distinctive issue positions and when races are hard-fought. I classify elections as either low-key or hard-fought (see n. 17) based upon criteria suggested by Westlye (1991, chap. 2). While I used Westlye's logic, our results differ significantly. The classifications agreed only 62 percent of the time ($\tau\text{-}b = .231$, $\gamma = .438$).¹⁸ My classification scheme yields crisper results for the models estimated below.

These models include only the ideology measures and (for general elections) the primary vote shares. I present the regression coefficients, significance levels, and impacts in table 17. The impact is simply the regression coefficient times the standard deviation. It provides a way of assessing how powerful each measure of partisanship is.

What happens when I break the samples down by context? First, consider the results for primaries. Not surprisingly, whether candidates converge or diverge in November has only modest impacts on the importance of issues in primaries.¹⁹ The expectation of a hard-fought race in November makes the primary battle a contest about the incumbent's

personal partisan values. When there is smoother sailing ahead, the primary revolves around induced partisanship – what the party faithful believe. In hard-fought races, an incumbent should tilt rightward in her personal values; in low-key contests, it helps to have a *liberal* supporting constituency. When I control for partisan contexts, the only significant result comes from pure partisanship for Republicans. Ideology doesn't seem to matter for Northern Democrats; for Republicans, it helps to go further than your fellow partisans wish if you want to prosper in the primary. A standard-deviation change in pure partisanship can yield 11.3 percent more votes. Note, however, that these trimmed models don't perform terribly well. Two have negative adjusted R^2 's and only two

TABLE 17. Effects of Ideology under Different Contexts

	Converge	Diverge	Hard Fought	Low Key	Northern Democrats	GOP
Primary Vote Share						
Incumbent pure partisanship	-15.045 (.01)	7.394 (n.s.)	-12.329 (.001)	-3.378 (n.s.)	-5.516 (n.s.)	-21.871 (.05)
Incumbent induced partisanship	-9.539 2.838 (n.s.)	3.305 13.288 (n.s.)	-8.026 2.770 (n.s.)	-1.317 4.956 (.0001)	-3.078 7.743 (n.s.)	-11.307 5.025 (n.s.)
	3.474	10.192	2.950	4.629	4.096	3.593
Adjusted R^2	.156	.166	-.004	.280	-.083	.245
N	12	14	13	13	13	9
General-Election Vote Share						
Incumbent pure ideology	-7.384 (.01)	-4.841 (.05)	1.135 (n.s.)	-5.835 (.001)	-6.191 (.0001)	-.649 (n.s.)
Challenger induced partisanship	-3.352 -2.775 (.0001)	-3.084 -5.108 (.0001)	.452 -2.748 (.05)	-2.486 -3.380 (.01)	-2.860 3.100 (n.s.)	-.249 -3.719 (.05)
Primary votes	-2.939 -.034 (n.s.)	-4.531 .352 (.0001)	-2.781 .203 (.01)	-3.184 .164 (.05)	.825 .305 (.0001)	-1.183 .058 (n.s.)
Adjusted R^2	.633	.807	.708	.456	.880	.346
N	14	12	13	13	13	9

Note: Entries on the first line are unstandardized regression coefficients from models based on table 16. Significance levels are in parentheses (n.s.: not significant) on the second line; the third line is the total impact (regression coefficient multiplied by standard deviation).

account for as much as 20 percent of the variance even with tiny numbers of cases.

For the general elections, the equations fare much better, and there are bigger impacts for ideology. Incumbent pure ideology matters across a variety of contexts in the fall. Moving too far to the left of the full electorate hurts incumbents when candidates converge and when they diverge. It hurts incumbents in low-key races and Northern Democrats — and in each case, the effect is between 2.5 and 3.5 percent. Only incumbents in hard-fought races and Republicans escape the effects of personal ideology. In hard-fought contests, there is a spillover from the primary. Incumbents in these contests gain 1 percent of the vote for every 5 percent of the vote in the primary; in these contests pure conservative partisanship produces a bonus of 8 percent, so even the small gain from primary vote shares can be substantial. In the two other cases where primary votes help substantially in November, there are *no* significant effects of ideology in the spring (when candidates diverge and for Northern Democrats).

Again, there is an asymmetry. When challengers' *induced* partisans are too conservative, incumbents gain votes — in almost every context. (Alternatively, when challenger induced partisanship is too liberal, incumbents lose votes.) The sole exception is where we might expect a strong relationship: for Northern Democrats. Incumbents should tilt to the right in their own values. They also gain when their challengers' supporting blocs move in the same direction. Here is evidence that *ideological balancing matters*. But it matters more for races when candidates diverge (impact = -4.531) than when they take the same positions (impact = -2.939). And it matters more in low-key races (impact = -3.184) than in hard-fought contests (effect = -2.781). And Democratic challenger induced partisanship helps Republican incumbents; Democratic incumbents have no gain when Republican challenger ideology is too conservative.

Northern Democrats seem to pay a bigger price from ideology than Republicans. Northern Democrats lose votes in November for being too liberal, without any compensating gain in the primary. Republicans benefit from conservative pure partisanship in their primaries; they get no direct spillover in the fall, but they do benefit when Democratic core supporters are too liberal. Beyond the context of party, issues matter both when candidates converge and when they diverge and more in low-

key races than in closer contests. What about low-key races where candidates diverge? Is this the key to the puzzle?

Low-Key Divergence and Issues

We don't need an elaborate model to explain why issues matter more when candidates take distinct stands. The stronger effect of ideology in low-key races is less intuitive, at least according to Downsian arguments. Hard-fought races should lead candidates to race toward the center of their constituencies. But this is not what we find: Candidates are more likely to converge in low-key races (53.9 percent) than in hard-fought contests (38.4 percent). The races in which issues matter most — low-key elections where candidates take distinct stands — comprise just 23 percent of all Senate elections in 1982.

Low-key races where candidates diverge are the mark of ideological-equilibrium models. One candidate is strongly advantaged by a brand name. And that brand name is associated with a strong — and dominant — ideology, shared by the elites and both the reelection and the geographic constituencies. The opposition candidates are out on an ideological limb. It's easy for incumbents to run on issues when most people agree with you and when you have challengers who are scornful of public (and elite) opinion.

Low-key diverging races provide a fertile culture for strong effects of issues. These six races involve three Northern Democratic incumbents and three Republicans. These senators are strong ideologues. They are not more electorally secure than other senators. Nor have they built up an immunity to issues over time, since they are more junior than their colleagues. They have a secure base, being more likely to come from dominant party systems (66.7 percent) than other senators (45 percent). They face challengers who are their ideological opposites and less in touch with mass or elite opinions, from either statewide or state parties.

Table 18 summarizes differences between low-key diverging (LKD) contests and other races by party. Even with a small number of cases, I must control for party. Small *N*s make it difficult to obtain significant differences, yet they abound in these comparisons. LKD Northern Democrats have an average ADA rating of 86.4 percent, compared to 59.1 percent for others ($p < .04$). LKD Republicans average a meager 0.6 percent on the ADA scale, compared to 45.9 percent for their colleagues

($p < .004$). Both Northern Democrats ($p < .05$) and Republicans ($p < .05$) face more conservative challengers than their colleagues.²⁰ The ideological spread between incumbents and challengers is twice as great in low-key diverging races as in others, for both Northern Democrats ($p < .01$) and Republicans ($p < .035$).

LKD Northern Democrats don't share a distinctive personal ideology. But Republicans from these states are slightly more likely to have conservative personal values ($p < .11$). Their primary constituents are

TABLE 18. Attributes of Low-Key Races Where Candidates Diverge

	Northern Democrats			Republicans		
	Other Races	LKD Races	p -level ^a	Other Races	LKD Races	p -level ^a
ADA rating	59.1	86.4	.04	45.9	.600	.004
Incumbent ideology	4.273	2.667	.16	4.667	8.667	.002
Challenger ideology	7.727	10.333	.05	2.000	3.333	.05 ^b
State ideology	2.188	2.029	.05	2.090	2.208	.01
Party ideology (standardized)	-.777	-.379	.09	.809	1.437	.025
Independent liberal share	23.437	27.217	.09	24.663	20.283	.06
Independent conservative share	30.926	28.713	.12	28.567	39.353	.001
Incumbent party elite	.445	.828	.20	1.024	-.478	.01
Challenger party elite	-.007	1.308	.005	-.056	-.195	.40
Senator party ID-opposition party ID	5.140	17.467	.025	-6.967	.400	.13
Incumbent induced partisanship (CBS survey)	-.964	-.354	.07	1.264	.241	.04
Incumbent induced partisanship (LCV measure)	-.261	.721	.01	1.068	-.763	.01

Note: Entries are mean scores for predictors.

^a All p -levels are based on one-tailed tests except as indicated.

^b Two-tailed test.

no different ($p < .26$) than GOP legislators from non-LKD states. As the ideological-equilibrium model would expect, there are strong differences between LKD and non-LKD states for both parties. LKD Northern Democrats have more liberal ($p < .05$) and LKD Republicans more conservative ($p < .01$) geographic constituents than their non-LKD colleagues. The differences extend to state partisans. Half of the incumbents in low-key diverging races come from states with polarized reelection constituencies,²¹ compared to 20 percent of incumbents in other states ($p < .08$).

LKD Northern Democrats are more likely to represent liberal reelection constituencies ($p < .09$), and similarly situated Republicans reflect more conservative party identifiers ($p < .025$). Core partisan supporters (induced partisanship) are more liberal for this Northern Democratic group, whether measured from the CBS survey of candidate ideology ($p < .07$) or the LCV construct ($p < .01$). The Republicans' primary constituents are more conservative by either measure ($p < .04$ and $.01$, respectively). Democratic party elites tend to be slightly more liberal in LKD races ($p < .20$), while Republican activists are decidedly more conservative ($p < .01$).

These Senate races are ideological because both masses and elites are polarized. But why are they low-key? Northern Democrats benefit from an advantage in party identification. Their party affiliation advantage—the difference between Democratic and Republican identification—is 17.5 percent compared to 5.1 percent for other Northern Democrats ($p < .025$). LKD Republicans have a smaller advantage (0.4 percent), though they don't share the deficit of other GOP senators (-7.0 percent, $p < .13$).

Incumbents and challengers are sharply polarized in LKD states. The correlation between their ideologies is $-.991$. In other states, the two candidates are more likely to converge (with a correlation of $.352$). Incumbent ideology is almost perfectly related to state mean opinions ($r = .957$), state party attitudes ($r = .935$), and to state party elites ($r = .947$). In other states, incumbent ideology is not as closely tied to statewide attitudes ($r = .558$). Nor are senators' values linked to their own party identifiers ($r = -.070$) or their party's elites ($r = .628$).

Challengers flout statewide opinion in LKD states. There is almost a perfect negative correlation ($r = -.951$) between state attitudes and challenger ideology. In other states, challengers hover somewhere around the state mean ($r = .419$). But contestants in these low-key races are not

driven toward extremes by party elites. They run away from both activists and fellow partisans as far as they can ($r = -.961$ and $-.985$, respectively). *Challengers in LKD races are the “real” shirkers. They don’t represent masses or elites.* Incumbents manage to play to a variety of crowds—the full state electorate, fellow partisans, party activists, and independents—simultaneously. This gives them an instant advantage. Their challengers make life even easier for sitting senators by standing so far out afield.

Incumbents in LKD races have a lot going for them. They and their parties stand close to statewide public opinion. Independents also stand closer to the senator’s party. This strategic wealth scares off quality challengers. Only one of the six LKD incumbents (16.7 percent) faced a quality challenger, compared to twice as many other sitting senators. Challengers may be more extreme in these races because good moderates may be frightened away. State party leaders expressed outright hostility to three of the six challengers in 1982 and were none too comfortable with a fourth (Ehrenhalt 1983). The only way weak candidates can gain any media attention is to stake out strong ideological distinctions.

Consider LKD races involving Maryland’s Barbara Mikulski and Ohio’s John Glenn, both Democrats.²² Mikulski established herself as a powerful electoral force after taking over moderate Republican Charles McC. Mathias’s Senate seat in 1986. She won 61 percent of the vote against Linda Chavez, a former Democrat who served in the Reagan administration and pursued Mikulski with an ideological and personal vengeance. Six years later, Mikulski ran against another Reagan administration official, Alan Keyes, who also ran a stridently conservative campaign. Mikulski beat Keyes with 71 percent of the vote (Duncan 1993, 682–84). Mikulski’s ADA rating has never fallen below 90 since she was first elected to the Senate. Yet, she campaigns as a pragmatist and makes strong appeals to working-class ethnic neighborhoods (Duncan 1993, 683).

Republican candidates would be well advised to moderate their positions in a state dominated by Democrats and marked by relatively liberal voters and activists in both parties. Yet, both Chavez and Keyes tilted against the prevailing winds in the state and in their own party. They later became frequent talk show guests, and Keyes got his own radio show in Baltimore. Had they converged, they might have faded into the woods like so many Maryland Republicans before them.

Glenn, a former astronaut who has often clashed with the liberal

wing of Ohio's Democratic party (Fenno 1990, 106–9), voted with the ADA 80 percent or more of the time in only 6 of 12 years from his first election in 1981 through 1992. Glenn also campaigned from the center. As a moderate, he is an unlikely candidate for an LKD race. Like Mikulski, however, he drew a very conservative challenger in 1986, six-term Republican House member Thomas N. Kindness. Kindness only rarely permitted his ADA rating to rise to double digits. Well before states rights became a national concern for the right, Kindness was its champion (Ehrenhalt 1985, 1206). His campaign against Glenn was sharply negative, while Glenn portrayed himself as a centrist. The incumbent was able to stand above the fray, gaining two-thirds of the vote from every demographic category as well as from independents, 90 percent of all Democrats, and a full third of the ballots of GOP identifiers (Fenno 1990, 272–79). In March 1986 only 7 percent of voters knew enough of Kindness to rate his job performance (Fenno 1990, 269).

Well-entrenched incumbents can campaign from the center against ideological challengers in low-key races. Sitting senators who develop their own dependable reelection constituencies succeed because they stay close to statewide ideology. The strongest challengers pass up the chance to take them on. The only candidates left to the out-party are ideological extremists who start with little name identification, can't attract as much support from campaign contributors, and wind up losing much of their base because they stand too far outside all mainstreams, even that of their own party.

Contrast the Mikulski and Glenn campaigns with that of North Dakota Republican Mark Andrews, who lost his reelection bid in 1986 to Democratic state tax commissioner Kent Conrad. Andrews touted his moderation and distance from both the Reagan administration and the Republican party in North Dakota (Fenno 1992, 252). He had long been considered vulnerable. Early polls had shown him badly trailing his probable Democratic opponent, Rep. Byron Dorgan. The Andrews-Conrad race focused more on the performance of the Republican party on farm issues and on the economy more generally rather than on broad questions of ideology.

Fearing a widespread reaction against the GOP because of the depressed economy, Andrews *converged toward the challenger*. He obtained the endorsement of the popular former Democratic secretary of agriculture Bob Bergland. Voters who cited issues as the basis for their vote were

split between the two candidates. Retrospective evaluations about farming and the economy boosted the challenger, but Conrad benefited even more from personal evaluations of the candidates (Fenno 1992, 174, 243, 267–70). In hard-fought races where candidates converge — the opposite of low-key contests in which the nominees take distinctive conditions — neither candidate has an incentive to push voters toward issues. The challenger may be just as much (or more) in touch with statewide opinion. The incumbent has no strategic advantage on ideology.

Ideology is most important when a strong incumbent faces a weak challenger, not when a weak incumbent faces a strong challenger. Well-situated opponents will be wary of getting too far afield from public opinion, thus muting the effects of issues in the campaign. In low-key contests where candidates diverge, it is *challenger* ideology that overwhelms everything else. The correlation between challenger induced partisanship and vote share in November is $-.975$.²³ LKD challengers may get off lightly. Voters make their decisions on challengers' induced partisanship. Yet, the challenger's reelection and primary/personal constituencies are closer to statewide public opinion than the challengers are themselves. If the voters cast ballots on pure personal partisanship rather than induced partisanship, landslides would turn into wipeouts.

Sitting senators are protected in the primaries. Both when candidates diverge and in low-key elections, incumbents pay a small price if their personal partisanship is too liberal. Such deviations will cost them at most 4 percent of the vote in contests that they usually win with more than 80 percent (over 90 percent in LKD races). In most other contexts, incumbents can lose between 7 and 12 percent of the primary vote. Induced partisanship has a big effect in primaries when candidates diverge. Liberals rally around the flag to boost the vote shares of sitting senators who anticipate an ideological battle in November. But there is no similar effect for low-key races. Senators who have an easy ride in November also get a pass in the spring. When they do face opponents, they coast by with little impact from their voting records.

Voters in Low-Key Races When Candidates Diverge

How much confidence can we place in the results for low-key contests when candidates diverge? The analysis produces crisp results, but they are based on very small numbers of cases. The Senate Election Study of the American National Election Study offers an opportunity to test the

argument that ideological voting is most pronounced in low-key races where candidates diverge. I selected the 1988 wave of the Senate voter study since its contests comprise the same class as the 1982 sample.

I estimate a model of voting for incumbent senators in 1988 that is designed to incorporate much of what we know about Senate contests and the theoretical concerns from the analysis of LKD races. I include four indicators of ideology: (1) how much more liberal or conservative the incumbent is relative to the respondent; (2) a similar measure for the challenger; (3) an index of incumbent party ideology; and (4) the same measure for the challenger's party.²⁴ I also include a measure of whether the voter's party identification matches that of the incumbent.²⁵ Also included are variables tapping whether the respondent has met the incumbent or the challenger and the challenger's level of campaign spending. To classify races as low-key or hard-fought, I employed the *Congressional Quarterly* assessments (included as contextual data in the Senate study), with indeterminate races classified by the ratio of challenger to incumbent spending—the same procedure that I employed in the aggregate analyses. For convergence versus divergence, I used voters' classification of incumbent and challenger ideology. Only if more than half of the voters in a state agreed that the candidates took similar positions did I classify the race as converging. The six LKD contests in 1982 fell into the same category in 1988.

I present the probit results in table 19. I compare races in which candidates took distinct positions but were strongly favored first with *all other* contests and then with contests where candidates took different positions but the race was expected to be close. The table presents probit coefficients, standard errors, significance levels, a variety of summary statistics ($-2*\text{Log Likelihood Ratio}$ and the estimated McKelvey-Zavoina probit R^2 , and—in bold—the effect of each independent variable.

Issues are most important in LKD races. In these races, voters choose ideologically, but again they seek some balance. They prefer a liberal ideology for the incumbent, but a conservative challenger (effect = $-.229$). They also want to balance the incumbent's own liberalism by a more conservative ideology for the incumbent's party (effect = $-.332$). Outside of whether the voter met the challenger, the three measures of ideology dominate the vote choice model for LKD races. The direction of ideology seems to have shifted in 1988 races from the aggregate results in 1982. This may stem from the construction of the

TABLE 19. Effects of Ideology on Voter Choice in 1988 Senate Elections

Independent Variable	Diverge Low-Key	Other Races	Diverge Hard-Fought
Incumbent ideological proximity	.445**** (.127) .518	.237** (.090) .193	.215** (.124) .293
Challenger ideological proximity	-.184* (.094) -.229	-.136 (.094) -.199	-.127 (.132) -.182
Incumbent party ideology	-.013*** (.004) -.332	-.002 (.003) -.059	.012* (.007) .160
Opposition party ideology	-.002 (.007) -.041	.004 (.003) .107	.013** (.007) .205
Incumbent party identification	.287** (.142) .175	.278**** (.103) .152	.342** (.144) .244
Meet incumbent	.110** (.063) .133	.105** (.041) .152	.110** (.060) .154
Meet challenger	-.189** (.084) -.262	-.171** (.049) -.171	-.075 (.070) -.109
Challenger spending	-.00000009* (.0000006) -.146	-.00000003 (.00000003) -.076	.00000001 (.00000004) -.031
Constant	1.269* (.657)	.179 (.308)	-.548 (.559)
Estimated R^2	.343	.147	.201
% predicted correctly: model	70.7	62.2	62.1
% predicted correctly: null	67.8	58.3	56.9
$-2*\log$ likelihood	234.44	490.85	244.54
N	208	381	195

Note: Entries in the top row for each independent variable are probit coefficients. Entries in parentheses are standard errors; bold figures are impacts.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. **** $p < .0001$.

measures (there is no way to get at state party ideology or deviations from it), or changes over time in voter preferences and the issues stressed by challengers. The basic result holds: LKD races are ideological battlegrounds.

In other races, incumbent issues matter far less. In all other races, incumbent ideological proximity matters, but with an effect (.193) that is barely 40 percent as strong as I find for LKD races. The prototypical ideological contest should see candidates diverge in a hard-fought race, but here the effect of incumbent ideology (.293) is just 60 percent of the LKD result. In other races, challenger ideological proximity is not significant. Incumbent party ideology matters (with $p < .10$) only for hard-fought races where candidates diverge, but here the effect (.160) is only half as strong as for LKD races. To be sure, opposition party ideology is significant for hard-fought contests where candidates take distinct positions, but these contests are more marked by party identification than LKD races are.

The survey data confirm the aggregate results that incumbent, challenger, and incumbent party ideology affect vote choice for senators. They also suggest that voters reward legislators for going beyond their own preferred positions. There are 114 respondents with Northern Democratic incumbents and 94 with GOP senators in LKD races. I estimate models similar to that in table 19, eliminating only challenger party ideology because of multicollinearity. There are sharp differences in how ideology affects vote choice for Northern Democrats and Republicans. Voters reward Northern Democrats for progressivism. Incumbent ideological proximity is the strongest predictor of vote choice for Northern Democratic incumbents (effect = .741, $p < .0001$). Challenger proximity and incumbent party attitudes have no impact on voting for Democrats.

Northern Democrats in these contests are *closer* to the average constituent than their colleagues in other types of races, by a substantial margin. Republican challengers could meet the Democrats at the center and threaten to make a race of it. They don't. These Republican challengers are further to the right *than any other class*. Republican incumbents are further to the right of their constituents than any other GOP group—and again by a substantial margin. Their Democratic challengers are more out of touch—on the left—than the GOP challengers are. Republican incumbents in LKD races benefit from going right just as their Northern Democratic colleagues gain from going left.

Hard-fought races where candidates take distinct stands occurred primarily in the Northeast and Midwest in 1988. LKD races with Democratic incumbents also were northeastern contests, while those with GOP senators were mostly midwestern. As we shall see in chapter 6, these races fit political cultures with dominant political ideologies, natural sites for the politics of ideological equilibrium.²⁶

Ideology and Elections

Incumbents can prosper when they stake out an ideological turf that gives them a reputation they don't have to share with challengers (Glazer and Grofman 1989; Wright 1994, 10). They also do well when they converge. Incumbents who converge win 59.1 percent compared to 57.1 percent, an insignificant difference. There is no clear winner in the battle between the Downsian and ideological-equilibrium schools. The former school expects deviations from public opinion to cost legislators votes; the latter views ideology as a "sophisticated strategic choice for persuading voters in election campaigns" that constrains legislators to maintain their ideological reputations (Richardson and Munger 1990, 14–15).

Both perspectives make valid arguments, but neither is the correct model. The ideological-equilibrium thesis reminds us that both voters and candidates are motivated by issues. Most of the analyses in chapter 3 and in this chapter suggest that voters, especially in contests where candidates take distinct positions, select Senate candidates based upon their values. Electors care which values senators have. It doesn't matter whether a politician is close to your preferences. It does matter whether a senator is more liberal or more conservative than you are. Ideological-equilibrium advocates get so caught up in the importance of ideology that they don't recognize how deeply partisan conflicts structure competing belief systems. When I lump Northern Democrats and Republicans together, the polarizing effects of party overwhelm ideological differences. There are Republican legislators and elites mostly in the conservative quadrant and Northern Democrats in the liberal quadrant. It is easy to draw a line connecting the points clustered tightly in each segment. *Within* each domain, very different patterns emerge.

Equilibrium theories also presume, along with principal-agent models, that the legislator values that matter belong to the member alone. But the results of this chapter and the last suggest that legislators are rewarded or punished when they court their reelection and primary/

personal constituencies. There is little evidence so far that their own preferences, values not common to their mass and elite backers in their parties, seal their electoral fate. I present evidence in the next chapter that personal partisan values can matter, but the overall picture remains the same: Politicians are known by the company they keep.

Most senators, especially Northern Democrats, don't shirk much, once we take into account the pressures from their core partisan supporters. Challengers diverge more. And challenger ideology matters more in general elections. When issues matter most, in low-key races where candidates take distinct positions, the preferences of pretenders to the thrones are the key to incumbent electoral success.

Whether legislators respond to geographic or reelection constituencies, it is logical for people to base voting decisions on induced partisanship. People find it easier to get information about parties and party coalitions than about individual officeholders. One may not always be a perfect guide to the other, but the generally good fit of the models predicting induced ideology suggests that the big picture is a reasonable approximation of a senator's distance from geographic and reelection constituencies. Voters form accurate images of parties and their supporting coalitions (Brady and Sniderman 1985). And they infer candidates' issues positions from the stands they attribute to their parties (Conover and Feldman 1989; Feldman and Conover 1983). People need less information to form impressions about state parties than about individual officeholders. It makes sense that they also use them to cast ballots for the Senate.

Party ideology is a good cue in low-key races and when candidates take distinct stands. It fares less well in other contests. In low-key races, the correlation between incumbent ideology (as measured by the CBS survey) and reelection constituency values (as measured by the share of partisans identifying as liberal minus the percent calling themselves conservatives) is .742. For hard-fought contests it is .051.²⁷ When candidates converge, incumbent ideology has an *inverse* correlation ($-.102$) with partisan values; when they diverge, there is a strong relationship ($r = .883$). The relationship is almost perfect (.998) for low-key diverging races, almost zero (.108) for other contests. The 1982 sample underestimates the overall linkage between partisan ideology and incumbent values, so we shouldn't make too much of some of the very low correlations.²⁸ The very high relationships for contests where there are big impacts for ideology in general elections suggest that issues count more

in some contexts than in others. The results for incumbent ideology are mirrored in challenger values. Incumbent positions are further away from challenger partisan ideology in low-key races, when candidates take distinct positions, and especially when both conditions hold.²⁹

Voters make sharper distinctions between candidates' pure ideology when the opponents take distinct stands. This parallels claims by Wright (1978a), Wright and Berkman (1986, 582–83) and Abramowitz (1981).³⁰ If most senators don't deviate much from their reelection and primary constituents, it takes a fine eye to see these differences. When challengers draw stark differences with incumbents, minor differences become magnified and voters can look at candidate's own partisan values. Otherwise voters find it easier and more profitable to concentrate on the larger picture: How far away is the party elite from my values? Politicians' electoral fates depend on more than their own actions.

The representational nexus depends upon context. LKD races are different from contests where candidates converge and from hard-fought contests where candidates take distinct positions. Chapter 6 takes a journey to investigate what lies behind these political contexts: political culture.

Representation and Culture

The representational nexus is more complex than many have thought. Yet it is not complete. As chapter 5 makes clear, context matters in representation. Some states make it easier for senators to be more liberal than their fellow partisans. Others make it more difficult. What can we say about the dynamics of representation beyond the strategies of candidates (converging or diverging) and the closeness of a race? Are there societal forces that structure the relationship between legislators and constituents?

A logical place to look is a state's political culture. Culture is the doyen of contexts. It is more encompassing than electoral competition or ideology, though both depend on it. Culture is the set of common understandings of a polity or its sections. For that reason, it is also, many argue (see esp. Barry 1970, 50), so vague as to be either tautological or useless: We behave in certain ways because of our culture and our culture consists of how we behave. It's not worth fighting the big fight over tautologies. Instead, I hope to demonstrate the importance of culture empirically. It helps us to understand variations in legislator ideology and how these values affect elections.

Culture is an encompassing idea. It is a summary concept that incorporates political and social life in a polity. Dividing American states into distinct cultures implies that there are different patterns of values—and behavior. Distinct sets of values should lead to divergent patterns of representation. Elazar (1972, 85) divided the American states according to three dominant cultures, or “historical source[s] of . . . differences in habits, perspectives, and attitudes.” The *individualistic* culture portrays democratic governance as a marketplace. Political life in this culture depends upon strong parties, the only devices that prevent individualism from running rampant. Yet, individualism shuns ideological extremes

(Elazar 1972, 94–95). The *moralistic* culture glorifies politics as a great activity in the search for a good society. Parties may be useful, but they are not central to moralistic cultures. Party loyalty “can be abandoned with relative impunity” (96–98). The *traditionalistic* political culture emphasizes protection of the traditional social order, limiting power “to a small and self-perpetuating group drawn from an established elite.” Parties “encourage a degree of openness that goes against the fundamental grain of an elite-oriented political order” and thus play only a limited role in traditionalistic cultures (99).

The representational linkage in each culture follows the dominant worldview. In individualistic states each party has a well-defined set of core supporters, reflective of the ethnic and economic divisions that separate Democrats from Republicans. But these are the most competitive states. And parties often put a higher premium on the tangible rewards of holding office than on policies (Elazar 1972, 100–101, 135–39). A close balance between the parties in a marketplace culture suggests that the Downsian model would be most appropriate in this culture. More so than in other states, elected officials should pay heed not only to their own core supporters, but also to independents and opposition party identifiers. Strong party ties suggest that both mass and elite opinions within a legislator’s party should shape representation. Yet they should not pull legislators far away from the center of statewide opinion. The median voter reigns in the political marketplace. Deviations from the middle are costly.

Moralistic cultures are consumed with issues. Many are competitive, though several had dominant Republican parties when Elazar wrote (1972, 100–101, 135–39). By the late 1970s and early 1980s, GOP bastions such as Wisconsin, Iowa, Vermont, and the Dakotas had become more competitive electorally. Ideological politics in a competitive environment implies a polarized ecology. While issues often crossed party lines in the 1950s and 1960s, when Elazar first wrote, party coalitions became far more polarized in the 1970s and 1980s (W. Miller 1988). These divisions have long been — and still are — strongest in the moralistic culture. Moralistic states remain hotbeds of issue cleavages, but now with a much greater partisan undertow. So representation and elections should reflect the ideological-equilibrium model of representation rather than the Downsian. The values of independents and opposition party members don’t matter. In secure electoral environments, still mostly Republican in moralistic states, legislators can represent their

core supporters with little fear of electoral retribution. In more competitive arenas, mostly seats held by Northern Democrats in this culture, a polarized electorate might not provide legislators clear directions about where to go. So public officials might decide to stick with their base, even at the risk of offending voters at the other extreme—and in the middle of a state's distribution. This strategy is fraught with electoral hazards.

Traditionalistic cultures remain conservative. They should be less competitive than other states, but they are no longer the one-party bastions of the 1950s and 1960s. And the core constituents of Democratic parties in these states, even in the South, now tilt slightly leftward. Traditionalistic states have weak party organizations and give incumbents strong margins. The shape of representation remains one of elite domination (Elazar 1972, 100–101). Senators will pay close attention to the attitudes of fellow party elites in their states. Those who don't—who stake out their own agenda or become too close to their core supporters (for moderate-to-liberal Democrats) will pay an electoral price. Politics in traditionalistic cultures is a mixture of the party activist and Downsian models. Elites pay more attention to other elites. But if they stray too far from the conservative consensus in this culture, they are likely to pay an electoral price.

Traditionalistic states are not only dominated by elites. They are also conservative and (at least in the 1970s and early 1980s) still dominated by one party (mostly the Democrats). In a culture with a dominant worldview, legislators won't often be driven away from the values they share with their various constituencies. When deviations occur, they should be punished severely in elections. Individualistic cultures are marketplaces of ideas. They are more liberal than other cultures. Legislators don't stray far from public opinion; when they do they can often get away with it in elections. Voters are comfortable with their Northern Democratic liberals and give them leeway to be even more progressive than they are. The real clash of ideas comes in moralistic cultures, which are more polarized than other states. Conservative Republicans battle liberal Northern Democrats. Elites push each bloc to be more extreme than the public would like, and voters devote considerable effort to bringing legislators back in line.

Elazar's typology of political culture is dated. It was originally formulated in the early 1960s. I make no pretense that the world has stayed the same. Yet culture is presumed to be an enduring force. I shall note how

changes in the societies (especially in the traditionalistic states of the South) have affected representation since the 1960s. Yet, overall, Elazar's categories stand up well. The social and political environment about two decades later still differs across Elazar's categories of culture. And others find that this three-decade-old typology still helps predict key aspects of the social and political terrain today. Putnam (1995, 682 n. 17) finds that Elazar's typology is strongly correlated with state-level differences in social trust and membership in voluntary organizations.

The Ecology of State Political Culture

Individualistic cultures are concentrated in the large industrial states of the East and Midwest. Moralistic cultures dominate in the Midwest and Prairies, especially in rural states with a strong Progressive tradition. Traditionalistic states are prominent in the South and the West. I classified each state according to the dominant category Elazar assigned it (see his table, 1972, 118).

There is modest variation among the cultures in geographic constituency opinion.¹ If we look instead at the difference in percentages identifying as liberal and conservative, we see greater polarization. Traditionalistic cultures are the most conservative (with a mean score of -19.6 , indicating a conservative electorate), followed by moralistic (mean = -15.4) and individualistic (-9.6). These overall scores hide variations within and across parties. Individualistic cultures are the most liberal for Democrats and the least conservative for Republicans. The moralistic cultures are slightly less liberal for Democrats. For Republicans, moralistic and traditionalistic cultures are equally far to the right. Traditionalistic cultures are the only conservative bastions for the Democrats.² Individualistic states are the most liberal, traditionalistic the most conservative. Reelection constituencies are strongly polarized in individualistic states but not in traditionalistic cultures, as Elazar would expect. However, the parties are every bit as polarized in moralistic states as they are in individualistic states.

Elite opinions follow a similar pattern (see table 20). For congressional candidates and party elites from the senator's party, for candidates and elites from the opposition, for senators' interest group ratings, and for three measures of personal ideology, traditionalistic cultures stand alone on the right. Moralistic and individualistic cultures fight for the honor of being centrist across these measures. On four measures

(simple partisanship, induced partisanship, and the two opposition party measures), moralistic cultures are more centrist than individualistic states. Senators' own elites are more liberal in moralistic cultures.

In polarized party systems Democratic identifiers tilt to the left and Republicans to the right. Fifty-two percent of these polarized reelection studies are found in moralistic cultures. Of the states with elections in 1982, candidates were slightly more likely to take distinct stands in moralistic states.³ Only in moralistic states are party elites polarized. Contrary to Elazar's expectations, individualistic states *don't have polarized parties*. Instead, the minority party adopts the same ideological platform that the majority espouses. Both parties tilt toward the left of center. The only contest in traditionalistic states is how far right one can get.⁴

Beyond ideology, there are other differences across cultures. Individualistic states have strong party organizations, on both Mayhew's traditionalistic scale and for local party organizations for both the in-party and the out-party.⁵ These states are also wealthy, with a lot of union members and few fundamentalists. Individualistic cultures dominate in industrial states, especially in the Northeast. Moralistic states have weak party organizations, but highly educated residents who hunt and fish. They are largely, though hardly exclusively, found in the Midwest. The traditionalistic culture, which is prominent in the South, has weak parties (cf. Key 1949, 399) and lower education and income. In

TABLE 20. Elite Ideology and Political Culture

	Traditionalist	Moralist	Individualist
Party congressional candidates	43.703	28.079	33.609
Other party congressional candidates	51.015	41.531	34.496
State party elite ideology	-.808	.643	.303
Other party elite ideology	-.755	.350	.251
Incumbent PRO-LCV score	-.891	.689	.475
Incumbent ADA score	.273	.614	.535
Simple personal ideology	-.662	.326	.274
Simple personal partisanship	-.481	.114	.330
Induced partisanship	-.379	.075	.276

Note: All comparisons across cultures are significant at least at $p < .002$. Positive values for congressional candidate ideology indicate greater conservatism. (The signs for candidate ideology are reflected in regression and probit analyses for ease of interpretation in this and preceding chapters). For party elites and personal ideology and partisanship, positive values indicate greater liberalism.

this conservative environment, there are many fundamentalists and few environmentalists.

Culture Clashes

Traditionalistic states are conservative, individualistic more liberal, and moralistic cultures are battlegrounds between competing ideologies. Culture is more than ideology. It is a synopsis of how beliefs are *structured*. Traditionalistic states are not just conservative. They are dominated by elites. Individualistic states are more than just liberal. They are both economic and political marketplaces—in the classical sense of liberalism. Moralistic states are battlegrounds among highly educated masses and polarized elites.

If culture is about how ideas are structured, representation should reflect the traits of each culture. When senators deviate from public opinion in moralistic cultures, they should reflect the polarization between the parties among both the masses and the elites. Traditionalistic states should see greater conflicts among elites than among fellow partisans. Individualistic states, as marketplaces, should have the widest range of actors: fellow partisans, out-party members, independents, masses, and elites should all participate in the battle for senators' ideological souls. I present the results of regressions for simple personal ideology (as defined in chapter 2) in table 21. The models I estimate include variables beyond mass and elite actors. I focus on these masses and elites in the text.

Moralistic cultures are driven more by mass opinions than by elite attitudes. Senators with conservative primary/personal constituencies bolt more to the right than their geographic constituencies would prefer ($p < .05$). Northern Democrats move to the left when their fellow congressional candidates are more liberal ($p < .10$). And senators of both parties shift leftward when the *opposition party's* congressional candidates are liberal ($p < .10$). The biggest impact comes from one's own partisans. A liberal reelection constituency leads to a more progressive personal ideology ($p < .001$). In each case, we see support for the ideological-equilibrium model: Legislators go in the direction of—and beyond—the dominant ideology of their reelection and primary/personal constituencies. But there is also support for a Downsian perspective. A more heterogeneous electorate—states that voted Democratic for Congress but Republican for president in 1972—sends a message to senators

TABLE 21. Determinants of Simple Personal Ideology in Different Cultures

Independent Variable	Moralist	Traditionalist	Individualist
Constant	5.113*** (1.554)	3.416*** (.700)	-.884 (.551)
Senator's party liberal-conservative difference	.044*** (.012)	.041** (.012)	.005 (.007)
Other party liberal-conservative difference			.014** (.005)
Electoral heterogeneity	-.114** (.045)		
Congressional candidate ideology: Northern Democrats	.023* (.015)	.040**** (.010)	.049**** (.006)
Congressional candidate ideology: opposition party	.020* (.012)		
State party elite ideology: Republicans	.671** (.266)	.423**** (.104)	.524**** (.131)
Last general election	-.030* (.017)	-.001 (.003)	
Union percentage	-.005** (.016)		
Growth rate	-.031** (.013)	-.023** (.008)	
Percentage independent			.034** (.018)
Other party state elite ideology			.480**** (.118)
State party centrist			1.090*** (.307)
Traditional party organization		-.303** (.089)	
Opposition state party strength		-2.455**** (.542)	
Adjusted R^2	.381	.759	.673
SEE	.724	.397	.604
N	33	25	32

Note: Entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. **** $p < .0001$.

that they must heed the call of the center of their geographic constituency. A heterogenous electorate tempers liberalism ($p < .05$). So does a close race in the last election ($p < .10$).

There aren't many ideological differences between masses and elites in traditionalistic states. Elite views largely trump the attitudes of reelection constituents. One's own party identifiers matter ($p < .05$), but they are dwarfed by elite attitudes. For the handful of Northern Democrats in traditionalistic states, congressional candidate views exert a powerful pull. But in this more conservative environment, even elites push senators to the right ($p < .0001$). Republican party elites also move GOP senators rightward ($p < .0001$). While party organizations are weak in traditionalistic states, any signs of life push senators further to the right ($p < .05$). So does opposition party identification ($p < .0001$). The Democrats dominate in most traditionalistic states. When the Republicans show strength, the Democrats need to fight fire with fire. They need both stronger organizations and a more conservative ideology. Opposition party identification breeds stronger organization and both pushes senators to the right, much as Key (1949, chap. 18) argued over four decades ago. Opposition party strength and strong organization only temper elite dominance in traditionalistic cultures. They have no effects in more competitive environments.

Individualistic states are marketplaces for political ideas. Senators pay attention to their reelection constituencies, opposition party identifiers, independents, and the primary and personal constituencies of *both* parties. Moralistic states are political battlefields between competing ideologies. Individualistic states are more homogenous politically. Northern Democrats are liberal. Republicans may not be quite so liberal, but they are often moderate. And independents are more progressive in these states than elsewhere. So senators respond to the entire gamut of forces. They face a less contentious environment than legislators in moralistic states. GOP senators can veer leftward because their state party elites are more progressive ($p < .0001$). Northern Democrats respond similarly to their party's congressional candidates ($p < .0001$). Legislators from *both* parties respond to more progressive elites of the *other party* ($p < .0001$).

Elites are hardly the whole story. If a senator's own reelection constituency is centrist (as opposed to conservative), (s)he will tilt leftward ($p < .001$). *If the other party's identifiers are more liberal*, senators feel free to vote more progressively than the electorate would prefer ($p <$

.05). Liberalism also thrives in states with a large bloc of independents — whose ranks take voters away from the GOP more than from Democrats in this culture ($p < .05$). Individualistic cultures are a mixture of mass and elite influence, but they are not the battlegrounds that moralistic states are. Both voters and activists are relatively progressive. Liberal senators rely upon this (relative) consensus to build up support for their own agendas. Moderate senators find themselves pressured to tilt more to the left. By going beyond public opinion toward party elites, senators in individualistic states garner extra support in primaries that will help them — at least indirectly — in November, as I shall argue below. Senators from moralistic states can only please their fellow partisans. They are thus always fighting for their political lives. Legislators from individualistic states build broader coalitions that give them comfortable electoral cushions unavailable to other liberals.

The story of the effects of political culture largely supports Elazar's view, updated to reflect changes since he described the different environments. Both partisans and elites lead senators from moralistic states to go beyond their geographic constituents. Representation in traditionalistic cultures depends most strongly on primary and personal constituencies, much as Elazar and Key argued. Today's traditionalistic states are no longer one-party bastions dominated by insulated leaders.

In each case we see a mixture of Downsian and ideological-equilibrium motivations. Legislators must pay attention to electoral consequences, but how much they deviate from their reelection constituencies depends upon both mass and elite ideologies. Only in individualistic states do we see anything approaching a straightforward Downsian model: Legislators respond to the full range of attitudes. Yet, even here primary/personal constituencies matter a lot.

Elections as a Context Sport

The payoff for representation is the electoral connection. The payoff for a contextual approach comes when different cultures produce distinct electoral connections. Simple partisanship differs across contexts. Do electoral patterns follow suit? I first consider general elections and then move on to primaries.

Party strength follows political culture. Traditionalistic states lack political competition. Over 80 percent of senators from this culture come from one-party dominant states. Almost 40 percent of voters identify with

their senator's party. Democratic senators in this culture are particularly advantaged: 43.8 percent of voters in traditionalistic states identify with their party, while just 24.8 percent say that they are Republicans. Individualistic states occupy a middle ground. Half of the senators come from one-party states; 29 percent identify with their senator's party. The Democrats have an advantage (32.7 percent to 24.8 percent), but it is far narrower than in the traditionalistic culture. The moralistic states are the most competitive. Only 20 percent are single-party. The parties are evenly balanced, each with about 30 percent of the electorate.⁶

These party distributions have electoral consequences. Incumbents average only 53 percent of the vote in their next election in moralistic states, compared to 62 percent in traditionalistic cultures and 60 percent in individualistic states. Incumbents face quality challengers 44 percent of the time in moralistic cultures, compared to 32 percent of the time in traditionalistic cultures. Most surprising is the dearth of good challengers in *individualistic* cultures, where only 22 percent of out-party candidates held prior office.⁷

Party affiliation helps explain these patterns. In moralistic states, Northern Democrats are most vulnerable (with an average vote share of 50 percent), but Republicans are safe (average vote share of 61 percent). Northern Democrats are most secure in individualistic cultures (average vote share of 63.1 percent), followed closely by traditionalistic cultures (60.4 percent average vote). Republicans are weakest in traditionalistic cultures (52 percent) and almost competitive with Northern Democrats in individualistic states (56 percent). Traditionalistic cultures have become more competitive than Elazar could have imagined. They are no longer one-party bastions that promise officeholders an easy ride.

For both parties, about 40 percent of senators from this culture face challengers who have held previous office. Moralistic cultures give safer haven to GOP incumbents, who never in this sample face quality challengers. Over 60 percent of Northern Democrats from moralistic states face strong contenders. These Democrats get their revenge in individualistic states, where just 8 percent face top challengers, compared to 39 percent of Republican incumbents. *Northern Democratic incumbents are doubly advantaged in individualistic cultures: They have an edge in party identification and face weak challengers. They also face the least conservative geographic constituencies⁸ and the most liberal reelection and primary/personal constituencies. The Republican advantage in moralistic states stems from weak Democratic challengers, not from their dominance of*

party strength. They also benefit from the relative conservatism of moralistic states.

Moralistic cultures are a tale of party polarization in moderately conservative electorates. This should provide fertile grounds for Republicans, but they hold just 29 percent of Senate seats in these states. Individualistic states have big advantages in Democratic-identification, moderate statewide electorates, liberal Democratic partisans, and weak GOP challengers. Yet Republicans and Democrats split these states equally. What drives electoral outcomes in different political cultures? I present regressions for general-election vote shares in each environment in table 22. As I have done in previous analyses, I use legislator ideology

TABLE 22. Determinants of General-Election Vote Shares in Different Cultures

Independent Variable	Moralist	Traditionalist	Individualist
Constant	28.194** (9.744)	87.405** (26.068)	42.619**** (9.092)
(Simple personal ideology)	-2.581* (1.481)	-7.809** (2.938)	2.926** (1.405)
Pure personal ideology	-1.880 (2.581)	-2.692 (3.664)	5.164** (1.763)
Induced ideology	-3.340* (.176)	-11.897** (3.484)	3.633** (1.088)
Opposition party moderate ideology percentage		-1.374** (.550)	
Opposition party mean ideology			10.184** (4.383)
Last general election	.362** (.194)		
Challenger quality	-8.887** (4.196)		-4.994** (1.922)
Challenger expenditures	-.003 (.003)		-.009*** (.001)
Senator's party identification		.668** (.212)	
Adjusted R^2	.534	.531	.718
SEE	7.157	10.484	4.153
N	22	22	23

Note: Entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. **** $p < .0001$.

(deviations from the geographic constituency) rather than partisanship (deviations from the reelection constituency) in the equations for general-election results. To get a clearer handle on what shapes elections in the three cultures, I divide simple ideology into its two component parts, pure and induced ideologies. For each model, I also estimate the same regression using simple ideology instead of its two component parts. The coefficients for simple ideology are presented right after the constant, with the variable listed in parentheses. Finally, I focus on how legislator ideology affects vote shares, leaving the explanation of other variables in the models to notes.

Simple ideology matters in each culture, but with different consequences. Voting more liberally than one's constituents costs votes in moralistic and traditionalistic cultures but adds ballots in individualistic states. A standard-deviation shift to the left of the geographic constituency costs a senator 2.7 percent of the vote in moralistic states and 3.1 percent in traditionalistic cultures.⁹ It produces a 2.6 percent bonus in individualistic states. The numbers are more dramatic when I break simple ideology into its component parts. A liberal pure personal ideology costs 1 percent in moralistic states and 1.5 percent in traditionalistic states. Neither of these effects is statistically significant. Only in individualistic states is there a significant effect ($p < .05$) for pure ideology, and here it *helps incumbents*.

Induced ideology trumps pure personal partisanship. It is significant in all three cultures. Only in individualistic states do the values of a senator's core supporters matter less than personal ideology. An induced ideology that is a standard deviation further left costs senators from moralistic states 2.9 percent and legislators from traditionalistic cultures 7.3 percent ($p < .10$ and $p < .05$, respectively). Elites and to a lesser extent party identifiers are polarized in moralistic cultures. Voters punish senators for associating with the wrong crowd.

Induced ideology is most costly in traditionalistic states, where masses and elites are conservative. If senators go against both, they pay dearly. A standard deviation shift leftward yields a vote loss of 7.3 percent. Individualistic states are more hospitable to liberals. A leftward pure personal ideology will gain 2.5 percent of the vote ($p < .05$), while a similar shift in induced values will gain 2.9 percent.¹⁰

These results make some sense and raise some puzzles. Induced ideology matters more than personal values. The message most of the time is: Going further right is an ideological equilibrium. Going too far

left summons the wrath of a Downsian electorate. These results confirm the findings of chapters 3 through 5; they stem from the dominance of conservatives among statewide electorates. Where liberalism is more in fashion, in individualistic cultures, moving leftward helps. Yet, there are some nagging questions: Why are there weak electoral effects in the polarized moralistic states? And why should traditionalistic cultures, mostly one-party states with lopsided races, be so much more responsive to roll call deviations than the other cultures?

The puzzles are explained by partisan differences. The inferences about parties in distinct cultures are tentative, since they are often based on small number of cases.¹¹ When I break the results down by party, pure ideology matters more in moralistic cultures than induced values. Northern Democrats lose 16.3 percent of the vote for each standard-deviation move to the left in pure ideology and (an insignificant) 1.2 percent for induced ideology. Republicans drop 15.5 percent for each standard-deviation move *to the right* and an additional 5.4 percent for induced ideology. Democrats lose votes when they are too liberal, and Republicans lose votes when they are too conservative. Voters in moralistic cultures, which have produced some of the most famous profiles in courage (Norris, the La Follette family in Wisconsin, William Proxmire, Hubert Humphrey), punish senators more for their own transgressions than for the behavior of their core supporters. *It would not make much sense to be a profile in courage if you didn't face any risks.*

In traditionalistic states ideology matters only for Democrats. A one unit shift leftward in pure personal ideology costs 5.4 percent of the vote, while a similar shift in induced values penalizes the incumbent by 9.2 percent. The South has had more than its share of courageous legislators, including Senator Frank Graham (NC) and Representatives Frank Smith (MS) and Carl Elliott (GA).¹² All complained that their stands on civil rights ultimately cost them their seats. Miller and Stokes (1963) tell of Rep. Brooks Hays (AK), who lost his seat to a write-in candidate in 1958 on the same issue. Lyndon B. Johnson, who won many elections on his path from local office to the White House and lost a few as well, learned a lesson from the 1938 defeat of his friend Maury Maverick in a Democratic primary. Maverick was an aptly named liberal member of the House. Johnson wrote of his loss in a memo to himself that he reread often: "Maury got too far ahead of his people, and I'm not going to do that. Don't get too far away from those Texans" (quoted in M. Miller 1980, 68).

Each member was penalized for his personal ideology but was also a creature of his district (or state). They all represented constituencies that were more progressive than the South as a whole or even their states (for representatives). So when voters cast ballots against these legislators, they were reacting even more strongly against their supporting coalitions than legislators' personal values. Politicians can balance their own ideology with their core supporters' values or play to the dominant ideology in their states. Senator John Tower (R-TX), one of the biggest "shirkers" in chapter 2, was less out of touch when I break his personal partisanship into pure and induced components. Both measures put him considerably to the right of center. He was going too far in the right (and correct) direction, so he was safe. His Democratic colleague Lloyd Bentsen was somewhat more liberal than his geographic constituency, but he was to the right of his reelection and primary/personal constituencies (as his induced partisanship score indicates). He struck just the right balance and was electorally safe. On the other hand, Graham's fellow North Carolinian Robert Morgan was slightly to the left of his reelection constituents. His pure personal partisanship and induced partisanship were also somewhat liberal, especially for a Southern Democrat from a traditionalistic state. Morgan lost to conservative Republican John East in 1980.¹³

The big surprise is that pure ideology is more costly for Republicans than Democrats in moralistic states. GOP incumbents win a larger vote share than Northern Democrats, are at parity in terms of party identification, and are no more extreme in their ADA ratings or either measure of statewide personal ideology. They should benefit from the relative conservatism of moralistic states. Yet, they pay a somewhat greater electoral price. GOP candidates may be the victims of favorable circumstances. Their advantages are so great that they scare off quality challengers. No Republican in a moralistic culture faced a quality challenger, while over 60 percent of Northern Democrats from these states had to run against a candidate who held some elective office. So Republican races are likely to be low key, with candidates taking distinct stands—where ideology counts most (see chapter 5). Democratic contests may also involve diverging candidates, but they are usually hard fought—and ideology is not quite so powerful.

There is a similar dynamic with the roles reversed in individualistic states. Northern Democrats largely get a free ride: Only 1 in 13 faced a quality challenger (7.7 percent). Republicans have a rougher time: Al-

most 40 percent (5 of 13) faced opponents who previously held elective office. Moralistic Democrats and individualistic Republicans each lost almost 10 percent of the vote if they faced a quality challenger.¹⁴ Northern Democrats from individualistic cultures also run in low-key races where candidates take distinct stands, so they have big advantages over their Republican counterparts, who may face strong challengers with similar issue positions. Senators who get out of step with their geographic constituencies are likely to face stronger challengers. When Republicans in individualistic states go too far to the right, they are more likely to invite a strong challenge.

Each culture has a distinct pattern of representation. In moralistic states, Democrats are drawn to the left and Republicans to the right by reelection, primary, and personal constituencies. Both pay a price in the general election if they stray too far from their geographic constituencies. Legislators in traditionalistic states are pushed to the right by elites and lose votes if they don't go far enough. Senators in individualistic cultures respond to a marketplace of ideas, but in this more progressive environment they prosper most when they go further leftward than the full electorate would wish. Democrats fare better than Republicans when they flaunt their liberalism, but even Republicans have little to fear from moderation in these states.

Each culture's ideology shapes its pattern of representation. Traditionalistic cultures are elite driven and punish excess liberalism. Individualistic states are more progressive and responsive to a wide range of ideas; here liberals flourish. Moralistic states are the ideological battlegrounds of American politics, with partisan identifiers and elites pushing senators to take distinct stands and a moderately conservative statewide electorate jostling toward moderation.

Most of the country penalizes senators for being too liberal. In a country where most voters identify as conservative, legislators should emphasize either concordance with prevailing winds or at least some semblance of moderation. Follow the center, Downs argued, and for most of the country this is good advice. One bloc of states stands out twice: Northern Democrats from individualistic cultures have more liberal constituents than any other senators (first), and they are rewarded for going further left than their constituents would wish (second). Their personal ideology doesn't affect their vote shares. But, for each standard-deviation shift leftward in their induced values, they gain 3.7 percent. Northern Democrats gain extra votes when the opposition is

conservative ($p < .05$). For each standard-deviation increase in the state mean ideology scale (where positive scores indicate greater conservatism), the incumbent gains 2 percent of the vote. The impact holds only for Northern Democrats. Republicans neither gain nor lose from ideology in individualistic states. Their electoral fate depends upon the quality of the challengers they face.¹⁵

The cultural story provides a message for liberals. Go with the majority and moderate in conservative areas. Go with your core supporters in your heartland. Conservatives have less to fear from issue voting. Either they gain from it (Democrats in traditionalistic cultures) or largely escape its effects (Republicans in both traditionalistic and individualistic states). Democratic and Republican voters are polarized in individualistic states, but *both sets of primary/personal constituencies are relatively liberal*. In traditionalistic cultures, both masses and elites are on the right in each party. *Only when masses and elites are both polarized, as in moralistic states, will both liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, pay a price for being out of step with the public*. Democrats lose votes when they are too liberal, Republicans when they are too conservative.

The Downsian message still rings true: Candidates should not stray too far afield. They should resist the temptation to follow their reelection, primary, and personal constituencies. If they listen too closely to the people to whom they are closest, they will pay at the polls. Only when they are in a supportive environment can they “indulge” themselves. You can binge with other bingers. And you know you are not alone. When voters punish you, these results indicate, they take out their frustrations on how far afield your *personal* ideology is. When they reward you, they salute your supporters as well.

Yet, Downs is wrong in a fundamental sense. Most legislators are not moderates. In traditionalistic and individualistic cultures, they espouse the *dominant* ideology in their state. Downs would have no problem with this, since his legislators converge to the median. But many, if not most, senators go *beyond* mass attitudes to reflect party activists. While deviations from public opinion have electoral costs, legislators don't hew the center line to keep themselves safe. Either they are secure already (as in traditionalistic and individualistic states), or they feel such a strong pull from party activists that they willingly risk vote loss. In one culture, we have sufficient cases to make comparisons between incumbents and challengers in 1982. We might expect out-party candidates to

converge to the incumbent's ideology in individualistic cultures. They don't. Only 43 percent of the 13 races in 1982 have candidates taking similar positions. One-third of Northern Democratic incumbents find their GOP opponents taking liberal stands, while just over 40 percent of Republican incumbents have Democratic challengers adopting their stands.

If party elites lead legislators away from the geographic constituency and deviations from public opinion cost votes in November, why do rational legislators stand apart from public attitudes? One key linkage emphasized so far is that ideology helps legislators gain votes in primaries, and the extra votes in the spring bring more ballots in the fall. Does this logic hold across cultures? I turn now to an examination of how legislators' partisan values affect their primary vote shares.

Primaries and Culture

As with general elections, primary outcomes are driven by different forces in each culture. The differences are not quite so stark, largely because senators overwhelmingly win their primary contests regardless of context. Senators fare best in moralistic cultures, with an average vote share of 87.3 percent. But the other two ecologies are not far behind, with an average vote share of 84 percent. The differences among cultures are not significant. Democrats and Republicans fare equally well in primaries across all cultures.

I present the regressions for primary election vote shares in table 23. The first cut at ideology finds no effect for simple partisanship in any culture. When I break ideology into its components, the story changes. In moralistic culture a liberal induced ideology costs votes in the primary ($p < .001$), just as it does in the general election. Each standardized move to the left costs incumbents 7.2 percent of the vote. The only other impact for any type of personal ideology is in individualistic cultures: A liberal pure personal ideology *costs incumbents about 5 percent of the vote for each standardized change*. This is most puzzling. In the most progressive culture, it is better to be too liberal (relative to all voters) in the general election than to be too liberal (relative to one's partisan bloc) in the primary.

The enigma disappears when we look at partisan as well as cultural divisions.¹⁶ Liberal pure partisanship *helps* Northern Democrats in individualistic cultures ($p < .05$). Each standard-deviation shift leftward

gives them an additional 5.3 percent of the vote. Induced values, which help in the general election, have no impact in the primary. Republicans in individualistic states get neither a boost nor a punishment from ideology in the general elections But *both pure personal ideology and induced partisanship matter in primaries*. A standard-deviation shift *rightward* in personal partisanship brings Republican incumbents 8.6 percent more of the vote ($p < .0001$). A conservative induced ideology gives individualistic Republicans an additional 6.4 percent of the vote ($p < .01$).

TABLE 23. Determinants of Primary-Election Vote Shares in Different Cultures

Independent Variable	Moralist	Traditionalist	Individualist
Constant	131.600**** (11.999)	123.100**** (9.020)	113.000**** (25.337)
(Simple personal partisanship)	-3.530 (2.991)	.081 (2.878)	-3.484 (3.565)
Pure personal partisanship	3.365 (4.048)	-.707 (5.058)	-8.953* (5.582)
Induced partisanship	-12.439*** (3.400)	.451 (4.346)	-.416 (3.362)
Senator's party identification	-1.761**** (.400)	-.628** (.183)	
Polarized ideology among state partisans	-20.734**** (5.748)		
Percentage rural	.359** (.135)	-.202** (.114)	
Primary challenger quality		-50.585**** (10.539)	-44.994**** (9.897)
Percent independent liberals			-1.999** (1.026)
Percent environmental activists			2.963** (1.587)
Other party opinion distribution			-9.690** (4.164)
Adjusted R^2	.318	.636	.362
SEE	12.101	11.078	14.960
N	26	22	26

Note: Entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. **** $p < .0001$.

As in the general election, Northern Democrats gain by voting more liberally than their partisans wish. Republicans gain votes in primaries by appealing to their conservative core. They pay no price for their ideology in the general election, though they get no boost either. While some GOP senators in this culture prevail in primaries, others do pay a price. In two instances the conservative core of the party dumped incumbents deemed to be too liberal, Clifford Case (NJ) and Jacob Javits (NY). They wounded Edward Brooke (MA) and almost upset Charles McC. Mathias (MD). Brooke lost in November, but Mathias won a substantial victory in the fall. Conservatives in individualistic cultures can take out their frustrations on moderate-liberal GOP legislators in primaries. Once legislators get past the first hurdle, they are in less danger from ideology.

Republicans lose votes in November by moving to the right of their geographic constituents in moralistic cultures. Yet they *gain* support in primaries by being more conservative than their reelection and primary/personal constituencies. Each standard-deviation shift rightward in induced partisanship brings a GOP incumbent an extra 16 percent of the vote! A similar movement in personal partisanship gains an additional 5.2 percent of the primary vote ($p < .0001$ and $p < .01$, respectively). Ideology is important for both parties in November in moralistic cultures. Yet neither type of partisanship affects primary votes for Northern Democrats. Democrats in moralistic cultures largely get a free ride. None face quality challengers, and 40 percent have no primary opposition at all. Even Northern Democratic incumbents who have opposition do better than any other cultural/partisan bloc but one (Northern Democrats from traditionalistic cultures).

Weak competition makes for an issueless politics in primaries, if not general elections. Low-key races where candidates take distinct positions are not walkaways. Incumbents in these contests average 60 percent of the votes, a far cry from the almost 90 percent garnered by Northern Democrats from moralistic cultures in their primaries.¹⁷ Incumbents who face either no opposition or weak challengers are less likely to benefit from — or lose votes because of — issues.¹⁸

Where do we stand? In chapters 3 and 5, I reported that Northern Democrats lose votes in general elections if their pure ideology is too liberal. We now see that this holds only for moralistic states. In individualistic states, they gain votes in the primary if their personal partisanship is liberal and in the general election if their induced partisanship tilts

leftward. Initially, I reported (chapter 3) that Northern Democrats win extra votes in primaries by bolting leftward. Now we see that this reasonable expectation is more compelling than the contrary finding in chapter 5, but only for moralistic states. Legislators represent constituents in different cultures. Northern Democrats have more liberal pure and induced ideologies in moralistic cultures than in other cultures with one exception.¹⁹

Northern Democrats go leftward in the primary because that is where their reelection constituents are. A leftward tilt helps them in November only in individualistic cultures, where the sum of Northern Democrats and independents who identify as liberal is greater than the share who call themselves conservatives. The progressive position may not be the ideal point of the median voter, but it is of the support coalition needed to win: one's own party identifiers and independents, who constitute 70 percent of the electorate for each of the Northern Democratic groups. Individualistic Democrats don't need to converge to the center of all voters. They have a secure base. Moralistic Northern Democrats face a more conservative statewide electorate. Independents in moralistic states are relatively conservative, so Northern Democrats from these states are forced to adopt a more explicitly Downsian strategy in November. These legislators have more liberal personal partisanship than their colleagues from individualistic states. More pronounced positions in less friendly environments lead to more competitive elections, just as Downs foretold.

In chapters 3 and 5 I showed that Republicans fare better in primaries as they vote more conservatively than their reelection constituents would prefer. Republican senators' ideology, either simple or pure, plays no role in the general election. But the results in this chapter tell a somewhat different story. Some of the differences reflect who was up for reelection in 1982: GOP senators facing the electorate in that year had more liberal induced ideologies (both statewide and state party).²⁰ So the "liberalizing" impact of induced values may reflect the more liberal class of Republicans that I examined in chapter 5. Almost 80 percent of Republican senators up for reelection in 1982 came from individualistic cultures, where the negative impact of induced liberalism in primaries is smallest.²¹ In the two other cultures, largely unrepresented in chapter 5, conservative core supporters bring extra votes. And voters in these states sympathize more with the right than the left. The reelection, primary, and personal constituencies of Republican senators are most conservative in

moralistic states, followed by traditionalistic, and then individualistic.²² So it is not surprising that conservatism helps in primaries.

Why does conservatism hurt GOP incumbents *only* in moralistic states? Neither pure nor induced ideology affects Republican vote shares in traditionalistic cultures. Statewide ideology is only marginally (and not significantly) more progressive for GOP-held moralistic Senate seats compared to traditionalistic ones. And the same holds for the various measures of personal ideology, as well as straightforward measures such as ADA or LCV ratings. What differs is the spread of ideology in moralistic states. The standard deviations for both the ideology of the geographic constituency and the share of liberals minus conservatives are about twice as large for moralistic states as in traditionalistic ones.²³ Being a strong conservative is more risky in moralistic cultures than in traditionalistic states for Republicans, just as taking too progressive a stand can be hazardous to Northern Democrats.

Culture Clash

People may see ideology similarly across regions. But the dynamic of representation varies across cultures. The traditionalistic culture is still dominated by elite views. The individualistic culture is more of a marketplace, where even opposition partisans' views matter. And moralistic states are ideological battlegrounds among both masses and elites. Representation reflects the dominant worldview in each culture. The most conservative culture relies most heavily on elite views, the most liberal on public attitudes. Electoral battles are most hard fought in moralistic cultures (at least those states with Democratic incumbents). And there senators gain votes in the primary from going with the dominant ideology in their party and lose votes in November if they stray too far away from the center and toward their parties. In individualistic states Northern Democrats gain votes in both the primary and general elections by veering leftward. Southern Democrats gain by progressivism in the spring but need to shift rightward in the fall. Republicans from traditionalistic cultures are the mirror images of Northern Democrats from individualistic states: They gain votes in both the primary and general elections by deviating rightward.

We come to a hybrid of the ideological-equilibrium and Downsian models: Go to the left (or right) in the primary and to the center in the general election. The model is plausible and has the great virtue of

putting together two plausible accounts. There are three problems that give us pause. First, if most senators don't face quality challengers in the primary and average 85 percent of the vote, why do they need to worry about satisfying their core partisans? Couldn't they moderate their behavior in the spring to prepare themselves for the fall?

No. Changing positions is electorally risky. And a strong ideological identification brings out the faithful. For Republicans in traditionalistic and individualistic cultures, there is an astonishingly high correlation between primary vote share and induced partisanship (in both cases the correlation is greater than $-.9$). Southern Democrats gain from a liberal induced partisanship ($r = .65$). *Primaries give primary and personal constituencies the chance to energize the reelection constituencies for the race in November.* Induced rather than personal partisanship shapes primary vote shares. Senators' personal partisanship is largely independent of past electoral history. The correlation with *previous* primary vote share is just $-.058$.²⁴

Many senators face little opposition in primaries, so there is little need to adjust their voting records after an election. The strong effects of candidate partisanship (especially induced partisanship) on the *next* primary election together with the generally weak effects of the *last* primary on current ideology suggest that legislators stand pat, but voters do not. Senators mostly don't change their positions in response to a poor primary showing last time out. Their ideology is largely shaped by pressures from their reelection, primary, and personal constituencies. But the reelection constituencies sometimes respond to legislator behavior. Even those who lose votes because they are not sufficiently politically correct don't (at least in this sample) actually lose their primaries.

The first objection wouldn't matter if you could please your base, who would then mobilize on your behalf and boost your vote share in November. The relationship between ideology and electoral success would be indirect. You wouldn't need the extra votes in the spring because you feared losing the primary. These additional ballots would be an insurance policy for November. Except that they're usually not, and this is the second problem. In only two contexts—Northern Democrats from individualistic states and Republicans from moralistic cultures—is there a spillover from the spring to the fall.²⁵ And these are the cultures where incumbents need help *the least*. They are the essential liberal and conservative constituencies, where legislators *don't need to*

moderate their positions to get extra votes in the fall. Where senators face a real dilemma of representation, they find it difficult to play the ideologue in the spring and the centrist in the fall. Traditionalistic Southern Democratic states, moralistic Northern Democratic cultures, and individualistic Republican states are the key electoral battlegrounds. The latter two have close races. All three have different optimal strategies in the primary and general elections.

Third, legislators who shift their positions from the primary to the general election, or at any time during their terms, risk being accused of waffling. It may be riskier to change your position than to take an unpopular one (Downs 1957, 103–10). Stratifying roll call behavior by election years has little effect on either general ideological stands or the relationships between personal ideology and election outcomes (chaps. 3 and 4).

If we view legislators as creatures of their constituencies, we see that their values reflect their environments. This is not a question of determinism versus free will or of any similar philosophical debate. Instead, it is an argument about the type of person who *can win* first a primary and then a general election, who *can energize a base* to get nominated and elected. If you are out of step with your core supporters, you won't be taken seriously by the activists who can get you your first nomination and mobilize resources for your first election. In an era when parties don't matter as much as in the past for nominating and electing politicians, it is easy to dismiss the role of party activists in representation. Some candidates have such a wide personal following that they can afford to keep their distance from party activists. John Glenn (D-OH), a former astronaut who long battled his state's party organizations, is a prominent example (see chapter 7). Most don't have such a base and must court fellow partisans who will do the legwork required to put them and keep them in office. Even those who have the name recognition and resources usually come to the Senate from a different route than Glenn did. They come up through the ranks, holding lower-level elective office before they get to the Senate (or the House). They have neither the opportunity nor the desire to stake out an ideology distinct from their fellow partisans. They share values with others like them.

These "others" are hardly the same everywhere. This is the message of both Fenno's *Home Style* and Elazar's *American Federalism*. Different constituencies make distinct representational demands on their

members. Some are service providers, others ideologists. Some districts (or states) expect their senators to be liberals, others conservatives, and still others moderates. This is the message of *Home Style*.

Ideological appeals can be a viable strategy when there is greater ideological consensus among a state's voters, as in individualistic and traditionalistic cultures. When party identifiers are polarized, as in moralistic cultures, there are greater pressures for each party's candidate to respond to elites — and to take stands that could hurt them in the general election. Two-thirds of races in traditionalistic cultures find candidates converging, compared to 46.7 percent of races in individualistic and 33.3 percent of contests in moralistic states.²⁶ Candidates are most likely to take similar stands when party identifiers take similar positions: 28.6 percent of races find converging candidates when Democratic and Republican identifiers are divided ideologically, compared to 52.6 percent when they are not.²⁷ In traditionalistic cultures, it is safe to be a conservative — and both candidates are. In individualistic states, liberalism is acceptable, especially for Northern Democrats. There is no safe strategy in moralistic states. It is better to be a conservative than a liberal. Yet, Republicans who lurch too far to the right face electoral difficulties, as do Northern Democrats who tilt too much to the left.

Moralistic states have weak party organizations on Mayhew's (1986) scale.²⁸ So do traditionalistic cultures. Weak organizations in a competitive environment make ideology a trap. Parties are collections of like-minded citizens who place a greater emphasis on ideology than on winning elections. Party elites push candidates to extremes. There are few organizational loyalists to bring candidates back to the center. Democrats move to the left, Republicans to the right, and both pay an electoral price. Parties in traditionalistic states are also weak, but there is an ideological consensus with less electoral competition. Elites still play a larger role in traditionalistic cultures than elsewhere. They reinforce the conservative ideology of the electorate. So it is safe for legislators to hue to a conservative line. In the more liberal individualistic culture, strong party organizations are compatible with ideological politics. Senator Paul Douglas (D-IL) believed that political machines could even foster liberal sentiments among candidates (see chapter 1). And going to the left, at least for Northern Democrats, is a profitable strategy in a progressive environment.

Culture shows us that neither the ideological equilibrium/party activist model nor the Downsian framework tells the whole story. The

ideological-equilibrium account is fundamental to understanding the dynamics of primary elections everywhere. It also explains voting behavior where there is a dominant ideology — and where there is less electoral competition (as in the low-key diverging races of chapter 5). The Downsian account still has power, but in nonobvious ways. Candidates are most likely to converge where there is an ideological consensus. Yet incumbents who are in sync with their electorates and are lucky enough to draw an opponent who takes the minority position are sitting pretty. They can use ideology to their advantage, satisfying both their party faithful and the broader electorate. Ideology hurts candidates in the traditional Downsian sense where parties are most polarized.

Representational styles, and the consequences of not following public opinion, vary by culture. These patterns conform to most of Elazar's expectations. When we "update" his expectations to account for both political and demographic changes, the cultural trichotomy is even more helpful in explaining both how and why legislators vote with or against their constituents. Is it all in the constituencies? What about the Washington environment? Before the journey is over, we need to look at the institutional context of Congress. Legislators face many temptations to desert their constituents in the nation's capital. The next chapter examines the institutional connection.

The Institutional Bases of Ideology

Are senators mostly creatures of their states? Don't they "go Washington"? Legislators can't be experts on everything; they rely upon their colleagues for voting cues (Matthews and Stimson 1975). Spend any time at the Capitol and you will realize that its culture is unlike any of the 50 states. The accoutrements of power shape one's worldview. Presidents and lobbyists cajole legislators in an attempt to pull them away from constituency pressures. Everett McKinley Dirksen (R-IL) became Senate minority leader in 1957. He came to believe, as other leaders did, "in the Senate with a reverence that approached religious intensity" and believed that "the Senate became an end in itself" (MacNeil 1970, 156).

Fenno (1991a, 108) speaks of a committee "chairman's vision" that "explains the need for party leadership — for someone to take a broader political view." Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), chair of the Budget Committee, admitted that his leadership position demanded that he not "always vote the way [New Mexicans] would want me to on everything, but I try my best and I am genuinely concerned about everyone in my state" (quoted in Fenno 1991a, 187). And former House minority leader Robert Michel (R-IL) argued, "There are some issues that I'd like to represent the people back home on, but that's not the will of my conference. If I do that [reflect constituency preferences] too many times, the conference will accuse me of being parochial."¹

If institutions matter, the Washington environment should help to shape personal ideology. I test three institutional models in this chapter. First, do leaders pay more attention to their institutional duties — and less to their constituents — than followers? Second, I consider a variant on the Kalt-Zupan (1990) institutional model. Its principal concern is monitoring costs: Do senators who face imminent reelection toe the

constituency line more than legislators whose next contest is further away? Do retiring members indulge themselves more than others? Do more desirable or more ideological committees lead senators to ignore their constituents more often? I add committee and party leadership positions to this model to capture a wider range of structural effects. There are scattered institutional effects across different cultures. But they are not consistent and sometimes are counterintuitive.

The final test looks at whether senators from the same state have similar personal ideologies. If senators' personal ideologies reflect their constituencies, the two senators from each state should vote similarly to each other. Same-state senators vote alike only if they are from the same party. This is an institutional challenge to the argument that public opinion shapes roll call voting. Once again, differences that seem to reflect structure reflect different constituency dynamics—and some strategic behavior by incumbents from minority parties.

Take Me to My Leader—and Away from My Voters?

Leaders have different responsibilities from rank-and-file members. Members of the House and Senate use the committee system to bring benefits back home. Leaders (and “control committees” such as Appropriations, Finance/Ways and Means, Budget, and House Rules) impose some order on this grabbing for goodies. They restrain constituency demands to preserve institutional authority. Leaders must also speak either for—or against—the president. The electorally secure are most likely to become leaders, largely because they are the only ones with sufficient electoral capital to spare in a job that *demand*s that they pay less attention to their constituents and more to their institutional needs (Mayhew 1974, 145–58).

Party leaders and committee leaders face different incentive systems.² Party leaders have responsibilities to the president or opposition party. This will tear them away from constituency demands. Rep. Joseph Martin (R-MA) noted that he toned down his “comparative” liberalism when he became House minority leader in 1939 to adopt an “at-least-near approach to the center of the Republican spectrum” (Martin 1960, 83). Michel cited the need to “take a leadership position to help the president” on foreign policy. Leaders are given free rein to loot the Treasury for their states (as exemplified by Howard Baker, R-TN, and especially Robert Byrd, D-WV). In return, they are expected to put

their own and their constituency's policy preferences aside in deference to the dominant views of their parties. Democratic leaders will generally be more liberal than their constituents, Republicans more conservative.

There are countervailing pressures. Because party leaders are symbols to the nation, parties are generally reluctant to select their most prominent ideologues, no matter how secure they are electorally. Party chieftains are expected to be faithful representatives, even servants, of their party in the Senate (Matthews 1960; Davidson 1985). Yet, they must also protect their own electoral flanks so that they can continue in their Washington roles. Byrd, never widely admired by fellow Democratic senators as a policy leader, believes that his first obligation is to *all* West Virginians (quoted in *Congressional Record*, Daily Edition, December 20, 1995, p. S18966):

[P]arty has a tendency to warp intelligence. I was chosen a Senator by a majority of the people of West Virginia seven times, but not for a majority only. I was chosen by a party, but not for a party. I try to represent all of the people of the state—Democrats and Republicans—who sent me here. I recognize no claim upon my action in the name and for the sake of party only.

Byrd practices what he preaches. His simple ideology scores are slightly to the left of his geographic constituency (.165) but considerably more conservative than his reelection constituency (−.687). His pure personal ideologies follow suit: slightly to the left of all West Virginians (.191) and more to the right of fellow Democrats (−.487). Byrd racked up huge electoral margins—his lowest vote share was his first Senate election in 1958 (59 percent), and he was not even challenged in 1976. This security gave him the leeway to seek out a leadership position. But, like Michel, he never forgot who sent him to Washington. His core partisan supporters are considerably to the right of other Northern Democrats (−.617 compared to a group mean of .038). So are his fellow party elites (−.627 compared to .511). Even for party leaders, constituency ties may come first.

Committee leaders are not tied tightly to—or against—the president. Only a handful of committee chairs have “institutional” responsibilities in running control committees. Ranking minority members have even fewer restraints. Since committees vary in their goals and strategic

premises, we cannot assume that there is an overarching design to committee leaders' behavior (Fenno 1973). Some committees want to pursue ideological agendas, others to ensure the reelection of all of their members (including the leaders). Committee leaders must satisfy their members, but their responsibility is to their panels, not to their parties. Republican party leaders gain public exposure by drifting to the right; there is no corresponding political currency for committee chairs, who must work with Democrats to gain projects for their states. Committee leaders have a shield of protection that party leaders don't: the seniority system. Especially in the Senate, where individualism is highly prized, senators are reluctant to overthrow committee leaders. In 1977–78, 35 percent of committee chairs were Southerners, compared to 27 percent of all Senate Democrats. Southern conservatism ensured that committee leaders were less liberal than the rest of the Democratic caucus (Matthews 1960, 164–65; Sinclair 1989, 107).

This was also the period that marked the end of moderate-to-liberal Eastern Republicans. Before their retirements or defeats (often in primaries), Javits, Case, Brooke, and Stafford secured successive reelections by appealing to Democratic and independent voters. They accumulated a lot of seniority and the ranking minority positions that went with them. Together with other moderates such as James Pearson (KS), Mark Hatfield (OR), and Charles Percy (IL), they held more than half of all ranking minority member positions in 1977–78.³ Republican committee leaders, in the aggregate, should well represent their geographic constituents but tilt to the left of their reelection constituents.

Party leaders are more conservative than the rank-and-file members.⁴ Table 24 presents the personal ideology scores for nonleaders and party leaders for simple ideology and partisanship and pure personal ideology and partisanship. The italicized entries in the third row are the p levels from an analysis of variance (one-tailed tests) when $p < .10$. Party leaders are more conservative (more negative scores) for all comparisons except for pure partisanship. The conservatism of all party leaders is *not* based upon their institutional positions, but rather upon the nature of their reelection constituents. Party leaders reflect the induced ideology of their state party constituencies.

Across all four comparisons, there are no significant differences between Democratic leaders and other Democratic senators. The simple ideology and pure partisanship scores indicate that Democratic party leaders are more *liberal* than the rank and file, but because there are

only two Democratic party leaders,⁵ these differences are not significant. Republican party leaders are more conservative than other GOP senators on three of the four comparisons. When I purge legislator positions of both the reelection and primary/personal constituencies, Republican leaders remain more conservative than other senators, but the difference is no longer significant. The pressures of core partisan supporters, not personal or institutional pressures, push Carl Curtis (NE), Clifford Hansen (WY), and John Tower (TX), to the right. Once I remove the impact of induced ideologies, both Democratic and Republican leaders follow Matthews's (1960, 131) "middle member" model. Such leaders are right in the center of their parties. They are as much servants of their partisans as leaders.

Southern representation may reflect the time period of my analysis. Southern Democratic unity has increased dramatically since the late 1970s (Rohde 1992), and Southern committee chairs have become more ideologically representative of all Democratic members (Sinclair 1989, 107). The South has become more competitive politically with the growth of Republican representation in both houses of Congress. In 1977–78 Southern senators averaged 13.9 years of seniority, com-

TABLE 24. Personal Ideologies of Nonleaders and Party Leaders in the Senate

	Simple Ideology	Simple Partisanship	Pure Personal Ideology	Pure Personal Partisanship
All senators	.050 -.744 (.030)	.051 -.766 (.025)	.019 -.277 (.093)	.011 -.167
Democrats	.376 .770	.009 .029	.027 .098	.018 .329
Republicans	-.514 -1.501 (.020)	.124 -1.164 (.015)	.005 -.464 (.035)	.000 -.415

Note: Entries in the first row are the (standardized) scores for simple ideology, simple partisanship, pure personal ideology, and pure personal partisanship for senators who are *not* party leaders. Entries in the second row are the scores for party leaders. Positive scores indicate that senators vote more liberally than their constituents would prefer; negative scores indicate that senators vote more conservatively than their constituents would prefer. Italicized entries in the third row represent one-tailed tests of significance in an analysis of variance. Where there is no entry, the results are not significant at $p < .10$ or better.

pared to 9.3 for others. Southern committee chairs averaged 30.2 years of service, compared to 6.0 for other Southerners. The figures for other senators were 17.6 and 6.5. Southern committee chairs averaged 76.2 percent of the vote in their previous elections, compared to 63.8 percent for other senators. The difference was less pronounced for non-Southerners: 62.5 percent versus 57.3 percent. The correlation between committee leadership and chamber seniority was .947 for Southern Democrats, .612 for Northern Democrats, and .708 for Republicans. As party competition increases, the duration of senators' careers will shrink. Only Southern Democrats show moderate-to-strong correlations between personal ideology and seniority. As total seniority falls and the strong linkage between tenure and leadership wanes, committee heads will be less prone to vote against their constituents.

Committee leaders are representative of both their states and nonleaders (see table 25). The only significant difference for all senators occurs on pure personal ideology. The gap in standardized scores is modest (.156) and is significant only at $p < .09$. Republican committee chairs, despite their Eastern bias, are no less attentive to their constituents than nonleaders. Democratic committee chairs tilt more to the right

TABLE 25. Personal Ideologies of Nonleaders and Committee Leaders in the Senate

	Simple Ideology	Simple Partisanship	Pure Personal Ideology	Pure Personal Partisanship
All senators	.078 -.182	.027 -.062	.049 -.107 (.090)	.043 -.100
Democrats	.504 .054 (.038)	.129 -.341 (.042)	.118 -.210 (.025)	.112 -.218 (.041)
Republicans	-.734 -.435	-.169 .238	-.075 .003	-.089 .027
Northern Democrats	.750 .584	.115 -.272	.148 -.134 (.092)	.049 -.207
Southern Democrats	-.235 -.741 (.021)	.171 -.445 (.035)	.035 -.324	.303 -.236 (.052)

Note: For an explanation of the table, see the note to table 24.

than their fellow partisans. The differences are greater for the two simple measures (.450 for geographic and .470 for reelection constituencies) than for pure ideology or partisanship (.328 and .330 respectively). The Democratic bias is largely attributable to Southern senators. While Northern Democratic chairs are slightly to the right of the rank and file, these differences are generally not significant. Southern Democratic chairs have more conservative personal ideologies than nonleaders.⁶

Leading a committee may require special devotion to the internal politics of the Senate. Tending to Washington doesn't mean that you have to ignore state interests. Domenici (R-NM) often sided with what he believed to be his constituents' — and his own — moderate views on economic policy to oppose Ronald Reagan's more austere budgets. New Mexicans viewed him favorably both as a national leader and as a faithful servant of the state (Fenno 1991a, 171–80). The senator worked hard to promote the image that he was a national leader but still very much a New Mexican (Fenno 1991a, 186). Leaders face the same set of constraints as other senators, perhaps magnified by the need to reassure voters that they have not lost touch. The case is not closed, however, and I shall include both committee and party leadership in the more complete institutional model that follows.

The Kalt-Zupan Institutional Model

The Kalt-Zupan (1990) institutional model mixes the internal world of Senate politics and the pressures to conform to state ideology from the pressures of upcoming elections. Their model makes two key assumptions. First, senators prefer to vote their personal ideology, while voters want legislators to adhere to public opinion (see chapter 1). Senators are most likely to indulge themselves when they have less to fear from the public. Constituents are most attentive to senators when they are running for reelection. Senators pay far more attention to the public in the fifth and sixth years of their terms than they do in the first four (Fenno 1982). The further away the next election is, the more leeway senators have. The electoral cycle is not part of the inner workings of Congress. But it is an institutional effect nonetheless. It is the calendar, rather than political pressures, that leads legislators to represent their constituents in distinctive ways. Change the calendar and legislators will vote differently, this argument implies. Second, legislators play a different game in Washington than at home. The most important work of Congress is done

in committees, so Kalt and Zupan base their Washington model on these “little legislatures.”

I test a variant of the Kalt-Zupan model (see chaps. 3 and 4).⁷ Just as drivers will go too fast when there are too few police around, legislators should vote contrary to their constituents’ wishes when there is little chance that they will be caught. High monitoring costs gives senators leeway (Kalt and Zupan 1990, 120–21). Members just reelected have time on their side. Voters won’t pay attention to their voting records until later in their terms. Retiring senators have an infinite time horizon. They don’t have to worry about the voters’ wrath and should be most likely to indulge their own ideologies (cf. Schmidt et al., 1996).⁸

The two-year House term inhibits voting against constituency views. The six-year Senate cycle provides greater leeway (Fenno 1982, 37). As one new senator said, “The six year-term gives you insurance. Well, not exactly—it gives you a cushion. It gives you some squirming room” (quoted in Fenno 1982, 37). A large number of studies have shown that senators moderate their voting behavior as they approach reelection (Ahuja 1994; Amacher and Boyes 1978; Elling 1982; Thomas 1985; Wright and Berkman 1986). Senators who were at the beginning of their terms in 1977–78 had less leeway, but still should be more likely to vote contrary to their constituents than legislators close to their next election.

Kalt and Zupan adopt a variant on the reputation argument: Senators build up political capital with constituents based upon their longevity. Senators with “brand names” are more likely to be reelected. As they gain tenure, legislators will also gather more leeway (Kalt and Zupan 1990, 119–20). Brand name is measured by a senator’s tenure, multiplied by the lowest margin of victory in the last primary or general election. Senators with “brand names” should be more likely to vote according to their personal ideology. They have more electoral security, with less to fear from an aggrieved electorate.

The two internal variables are “committee power” and “taste.” The former is the sum of the average length of time it takes senators to become members of each of their committees. Senators use committee positions to bring benefits to their constituents. It takes more time to get on the most powerful committees. Senators with a lot of committee power can bring home the bacon and keep constituents’ eyes off the prize of ideological voting. If you do enough good things for the voters, they won’t care how you vote (Kalt and Zupan 1990, 122). “Taste” reflects a member’s *preference* for ideological voting. Even if each member were to

have equal opportunities to vote against their states, not all would want to “indulge” themselves. Kalt and Zupan argue that legislators are known by the company they keep. Liberal legislators will seek out positions on progressive committees. Conservative senators will prefer assignments on right-leaning committees. Senators who surround themselves with like-minded colleagues are sending signals that they would prefer to vote more ideologically than their states would like. Taste is the average Americans for Democratic Action score for all members of each committee on which a senator serves. My more complete model adds committee and party leadership.⁹

Kalt and Zupan test their model using the absolute values of residuals from ADA ratings, not the PROLCV scores they employ in their earlier work. I shall continue to examine directional ideology. It pays to be cautious of results for all senators, so I shall estimate separate regressions for Northern Democrats and Republicans. Northern Democrats may have a “taste” for liberal committees and GOP senators a preference for conservatism. These contradictory effects may cancel each other out, so it is safer to estimate separate models.

Results in previous chapters are not very sensitive to whether I use ADA or LCV ratings. This time they are. There is no apparent reason why the two group measures yield different results, so I report both. We can impart too much power to structural effects if we stick to just the LCV-based measures. There is a lot of data to summarize, since I use two interest group measures and then compare results for Northern Democrats and Republicans and among the three cultures. So I restrict the discussion to pure personal partisanship. If there is a conflict between “going Washington” and representing one’s state, it should show up in pure personal values rather than in induced ideology. It doesn’t matter much whether we use personal ideology or partisanship. The models are largely the same.¹⁰ For the regression I employ to obtain the “residualized” measures for the ADA scores, see appendix D. Table 26 presents the results for the institutional model for all senators, Northern Democrats, and Republicans.

The LCV results suggest important structural effects. Four of the seven predictors for all senators are significant at $p < .05$ or better. Senators who serve on powerful committees believe that they can deflect unpopular issue positions. They are more liberal than their constituents ($p < .01$). Senators with brand names, long tenure, and high margins of victory also vote against their constituents’—and core supporters’—

TABLE 26. Institutional-Ideology Models

Independent Variable	All Senators	Northern Democrats	Republicans
PRO-LCV Models			
Taste	.379 (1.029)	1.332*** (2.814)	-.827** (-2.007)
Committee power	.008*** (2.602)	.084** (2.117)	.047** (2.163)
Brand name	-.0003** (-1.946)	-.0004*** (-2.567)	.00009 (.235)
Election proximity	-.068** (-1.887)	-.090** (-1.812)	-.014 (-.232)
Retire	-.338** (-2.185)	-.404** (-2.257)	-.252** (-1.973)
Committee leader	.006 (.038)	-.176 (-1.218)	.137 (.688)
Party leader	-.234 (-.876)	.151 (.909)	-.371** (-2.163)
Constant	-.716 (-.747)	-3.445** (-2.914)	1.755 (1.452)
Adjusted R^2	.077	.307	.201
SEE	.631	.574	.517
N	96	42	37
ADA Models			
Taste	.092 (.273)	.597 (1.249)	-.136 (-.299)
Committee power	.001 (.705)	.024 (.609)	-.009 (-.313)
Brand name	-.0001 (-1.067)	-.0004** (-1.666)	.0008 (1.289)
Election proximity	-.091** (-1.970)	-.054 (-.753)	-.010 (-.136)
Retire	-.151** (-.809)	.251 (1.116)	-.293 (-1.123)
Committee leader	.069 (.432)	-.456** (-2.334)	.418 (1.423)
Party leader	-.045 (-.241)	.262 (1.025)	-.106 (-.396)
Constant	-.071 (-.080)	-1.444 (-1.093)	.268 (.204)
Adjusted R^2	-.012	.058	.005
SEE	.692	.699	.693
N	96	42	37

** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

preferences. These electorally secure and senior members vote more conservatively than voters wish.¹¹ Monitoring matters, as principal-agent models suggest (see chapter 1). Senators are more likely to vote *more conservatively* than their core partisans would wish if they intend to retire or have a long time until their next election.

But not so fast. The model does not perform that well. The adjusted R^2 is just .077, and the standard error of the estimate is .631, about the same as the standard deviation for the ideology measure (.657). It is unclear why senators with longer time horizons—a longer electoral cycle, retirement looming ahead, or electoral safety through a brand name—would tilt to the right. The puzzle is hardly resolved when we see (column 2 in table 26) that Northern Democrats prefer to vote more *conservatively* than their core backers and reelection constituencies wish. If legislators secretly want to be ideologues but are constrained by voters (and elites), Northern Democrats should pine to go left. Going right is like a chocoholic at Hershey Park insisting on vanilla. Yes, Republicans who retire (column 3) indulge their conservatism. Like Northern Democrats, they use their committee power to bolt *leftward*. Two institutional findings make sense for the GOP. Republicans on liberal committees fight fire with fire: They veer to the right. So do Republican party leaders, as Michel indicated he faced pressure to do.

The ADA personal-partisanship scores resolve some of these contradictions by eviscerating most of the significant relationships. In the model for all senators electoral proximity is the only significant variable. It retains its negative sign, but it is not significant in the equations for *either party bloc*. The perplexing negative sign (and significant result) reappears in the Northern Democratic equation, together with a more understandable tilt to the right for Democratic party committee leaders. Nothing is significant in the GOP equation. And none of the models performs particularly well.¹²

We have a dismal choice. If we prefer the measures based on LCV group scores, we have more potent findings. Yet, these results defy the predictions of principal-agent models of representation. We can choose pure personal partisanship based on ADA ratings, but we come up almost empty-handed in our search for structural effects. Things don't improve if we shift from the reelection to the geographic constituency. The models are even less impressive, with fewer significant coefficients and patterns just as puzzling.

Maybe there is structural order somewhere else. Institutional factors

vary across cultures: Committee power and brand names are strongest in traditionalistic states. Senators from moralistic states are most likely to be retiring and least likely to be committee leaders. And legislators from individualistic states in 1978 had the longest average time horizon to their next election. Dummy variables for culture have inconsistent effects when added to the model. Yet we know that *patterns of representation*, not just mean scores, vary across cultures. What happens when I estimate the same structural model for each culture?

Not much. Electoral proximity is now significant in four more equations: for all three cultures with the LCV scores, and for the ADA measure for moralistic culture. Committee power in traditionalistic and individualistic cultures leads senators toward greater liberalism (for the LCV indices only). The ADA scores provide some support for monitoring: Senators with brand names bolt rightward in traditionalistic cultures and leftward in individualistic states.

What happened to the corporate culture of Capitol Hill? To a considerable extent, it is a myth. Sure Congress feels like no other place on earth. But largely that's because Capitol Hill is the only place where the entire country comes together. Congress is a very representative institution, sometimes too much so. Senators and representatives talk the Washington talk but walk the constituency walk. There is something beneath it all that reflects an interaction between constituency dynamics and legislative structure. We just haven't found it yet.

The place to look is the interaction between party and culture. But is hazardous because of small *N*s: There are but five Northern Democrats from traditionalistic cultures, 10 GOP moralists, 10 Republican traditionalists, and about 15 from either party who hail from individualistic states. Keeping those caveats in mind, the patterns that I find make a lot of sense.

Northern Democrats from moralistic cultures who join liberal committees vote more progressively than their constituents would wish. Republicans on similar committees from moralistic and individualistic cultures shift rightward. GOP committee and party leaders do have responsibilities.¹³ They seek to *moderate* their parties. Retirement makes Northern Democrats more liberal. Retiring Republicans from individualistic states bolt rightward. And GOP senators from moralistic states vote more conservatively when there is more lead time to the next election. Monitoring matters in moralistic cultures, where the culture is already polarized and voters have shown that they are ready to punish legislators

who get too far afield. It also counts for the minority party in individualistic states.¹⁴ In moralistic states, senators' preferences for ideology (the taste variable) lead Northern Democrats to vote more liberally and Republicans more conservatively than their constituents would prefer. Taste also pushes Northern Democrats to the left in individualistic states and GOP solons to the right in traditionalistic states.

Where parties are polarized, legislators move toward their primary and personal constituencies. Their close ties to like-minded members in the chambers push them even further to the left or right. Legislators are most likely to go beyond their core supporters when they feel most electorally secure. Constituents don't need to expend much effort on monitoring representatives who agree with them on most issues. Policy accord builds trust, which in turn translates into votes (Bianco 1994). This padding gives members the leeway they need to go beyond their constituents' preferences. Such a strategy is not costless. It is difficult for members to get away with going too far beyond their reelection constituencies. In polarized party systems and when one's party is in the minority, it is electorally risky to go too far. When legislators can boldly go beyond their core supporters, structural factors play a lesser role.

Monitoring costs, retirement, and election proximity are significant in several contexts. If legislators maintain consistent voting records and may be able to profit from their ideological stands, why should monitoring matter? First, senators' ideological stands are not frozen solid. The correlation between the 1977–78 LCV scores and later values for members whose terms expired in 1980 or 1982 is .800. The correlations between simple ideology measures is .721; for simple partisanship, it is .535 (cf. chapter 5). Do changes in roll call behavior lead to smaller deviations, especially as the next election approaches? Are senators who face imminent reelection more faithful servants of their geographic constituents? No. For simple ideology, the correlation between stratified personal ideology and election proximity is .196, barely higher than the .160 for the original ideology measure among Republicans. Among Northern Democrats, the correlation drops to $-.014$ from $-.203$. The measures for simple partisanship are similar.

Yet, there are some variations. There is a drop-off in the correlation between simple ideology and stratified values *in the middle of a senator's term*. Senators who have just been elected stay with their ideologies. The correlation between simple ideology and stratified values is .803 for this group, compared to .694 for senators who have three years to go

until they face the voters. The drop in correlations in the middle of a senator's term is particularly noticeable in traditionalistic cultures, as legislators move to the left in the middle of their terms. Democrats, both Northern and Southern, are most likely to shift their positions in the middle of their terms.

Most of the time retiring senators don't indulge themselves in values that run counter to their constituents' preferences. *They are at least as consistent in their values as legislators who plan to run again.* Lott and Reed (1989, 87) argue that such consistency is a hallmark of a politics where ideology is a more powerful motivator than reelection. The correlation between simple and stratified ideology is .846 for retiring senators and .799 for legislators who seek another term. When I divide senators by party and political culture, a slightly different picture emerges. In almost all cases—senators from individualistic cultures are the sole exception—the correlation between simple and stratified personal ideology is *stronger* for members seeking another term than among those who are retiring. For each of these groups (again with individualistic cultures being the exception) the correlation between simple partisanship and stratified partisanship is *higher* for retiring senators than for solons seeking reelection. Retiring members seem to side more with their core supporters, paying less attention to the larger electorate. When we look at the difference in simple ideology and partisanship scores, we see less dramatic differences. No bloc of senators moves sharply to the right or left of the geographic constituency as the election approaches. Legislators from traditionalistic cultures, especially Democrats, move marginally ($p < .07$) to the left to shore up their primary bases.

In only two instances is there any evidence of an electoral effect from shifting positions. Republicans from traditionalistic cultures appear to lose primary votes when they move too far to the left ($r = .817$). But this result is suspect, since five of the seven senators had uncontested primaries and the only close race occurred in Vermont, represented by Robert Stafford, one of the most moderate Republicans in the Senate (who moved leftward as the election neared). A clearer picture of electoral effects occurs in moralistic states, where conservative Republican senators who move to the center of their geographic constituencies gain votes in the general election ($r = -.761$). But most GOP senators from moralistic states move to the *right* of their geographic constituencies. And it is not simply a matter of shoring up their electoral base. Retiring Republican

senators in moralistic states move just as far toward their reelection constituents as legislators who seek another term. Senators who retire and solons who run again, legislators just elected and members whose terms are expiring, behave alike. Most are simply consistent over time. There's no big payoff for big shifts in personal ideology or partisanship. Moving toward your geographic constituents and away from your reelection constituents doesn't create an electoral safety net. The six-year term for senators creates different monitoring problem for some senators. Voters pay more attention to senators who are up for reelection and know less about incumbents who don't face the electorate (Born 1991, 770–71). But this does not mean that senators have a free ride until the campaign has begun. They regularly hear from their primary/personal constituencies — which may drive them to extremes in the early-to-middle years of the campaign. If they go too far left or right, they could set themselves up for danger in the future. They might find it tough to get close to their geographic constituencies. Or they could jump all over the place and let their opponents charge them with inconsistency.

Yet, legislators don't establish reputations for consistency just to win elections. They have their own values. If reputations were largely foils, legislators should cast them off when they announce their retirement. But they don't. Sometimes politicians are even willing to tell voters that their *next term* will be their last.¹⁵ Nor is there consistent evidence that an approaching election will temper the ideological commitment of most legislators. As Lott (1987) argues, the crucial selection occurs at the beginning: People vote for candidates who value the same things they do. This “solves” most of the problem of misrepresentation, since there is no incentive for legislators to vote differently from what their constituents wish. The major dilemma they face is how to balance the demands of their multiple constituencies. But most of the time they get similar messages from each. When problems arise, they come from conflicts among the constituencies. And these difficulties can arise just as easily for members just starting their careers as they can for retiring members.

Legislators' strategy is not the only reason monitoring costs matter. Some senators make it easier for voters to follow their records than others, both by taking highly ideological positions and by maintaining consistency over time. Most voting records are similar over time, and senators are most likely to take extreme positions if they come from supportive environments.

Institutional factors such as committee or party leadership are rarely significant. Committee and party leaders face the same mass and elite constraints as other members. Republican committee leaders have personal partisanship more to the left than other GOP senators. Their reelection constituents are no different from those of other GOP senators, but their primary and personal constituents are more liberal. GOP party leaders have more conservative personal-partisanship scores than other Republican senators. Again, their reelection constituents are typical of other Republican senators, but their primary/personal constituencies tilt more to the right.¹⁶ Northern Democratic senators are in sync with their personal and primary constituents.

Leaders deviate more than followers from public opinion because they are more committed to their primary and personal constituencies. Michel said that his voting pattern was mostly similar before and after he assumed a leadership role. He was grateful to come “from a district that was basically conservative.” Most important, he said, was the need to court his constituents every two years.

I had an opponent every time, and some of my races were close. It made me more understanding of some of my colleagues. I had to work to get reelected if I wanted to continue to be a moderate conservative. So other members couldn't come up to me and say, “Bob, you don't understand my problem. You have a safe seat.”

Successful leaders recognize that they must be middle members in more than one way. They must represent the core of their districts or states as well as of their legislative parties.

The only exception is for Northern Democratic committee chairs, who have more conservative pure partisan values than other Northern Democrats, but whose constituents and party elites are more liberal.¹⁷ Committee leadership is significant in the Northern Democratic equation employing ADA scores. The nine leaders are more conservative than their geographic, reelection, or primary/personal constituents. And they get away with it. They have substantially more seniority (19.8 years compared to 7.5 for other Northern Democrats) and win both their primaries (94.1 percent compared to 78.0 percent) and general elections (70 percent compared to 58.3 percent) with few worries. Personal ideology matters some of the time, but hardly in the way principal-agent models suggest. These Northern Democrats are *too conservative* for

their constituents; despite their personal values, their constituents elect them again and again by overwhelming margins.

Committee leaders are different from other Northern Democrats. But their relative conservatism (ADA scores of 64.5 compared to 74.1 for others, $p < .08$) reflects strategic choices as much as it does personal values. Northern Democrats who become committee chairs come mostly from individualistic cultures, but they don't pursue the same ideological electoral strategy that most of their colleagues do. They are Downsians. They are closer to their geographic constituents' opinion than to their reelection followers'.¹⁸ Their personal partisan values tilt rightward, as independents and especially Republicans become more conservative in their states. Other Northern Democratic senators are immune to independent ideology; they become marginally more *liberal* when GOP identifiers lurch rightward.¹⁹

There is no clear way to tell whether this effect is generational (more senior Democrats are more conservative), strategic (reflecting a Downsian rather than ideological-equilibrium electoral plan), or structural (only moderates or conservatives can gain committee leadership positions).²⁰ No doubt it is some of each, but there is some evidence that personal partisanship reflects constituency dynamics. Committee chairs are far more likely than other Northern Democrats to shift their ideology rightward as the next election approaches. Their colleagues place their ideologies out in front for all to see and judge; chairs risk being charged with inconsistency to gain the votes of opposition party identifiers and independents.²¹

Most of the time structural factors reinforce the ideological proclivities of legislators, their reelection, primary, and personal constituencies. When they don't, they seem to reflect a legislator's reelection strategy. The search for structural effects is not over. I turn now to the puzzle of divided-party Senate delegations.

Birds of a Feather?

Constituency-based theories of legislative behavior have foundered on one of the enduring problems of recent American politics: the waning of partisan attachments and the frequency of split-party delegations. In 1977–78 24 of the 50 Senate delegations had one Republican and one Democrat. Senators in divided delegations vote like Democrats and Republicans, not as representatives of their states. Constituency traits

are of little help in accounting for how split delegations vote (Grofman, Griffin, and Glazer 1990; Poole and Rosenthal 1984). If senators' voting behavior cannot be explained by constituency factors, institutional factors such as party leadership influence may account for differences between Democrats and Republicans (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

Senators from single-party delegations vote alike far more than those from split delegations. The correlations between the PROLCV scores of the two groups are .772 and .284 (see table 27).²² The correlations are similar for simple ideology but drop sharply for simple partisanship and virtually vanish for pure personal ideology and partisanship. So do the differences between same-party senators and members of split delegations. Some of the correlations among same-state senators are depressed by the Arkansas travelers, John McClellan and Dale Bumpers. McClellan was the last of a breed of segregationist conservatives in the Democratic party, Bumpers the harbinger of a new era. I report correlations without Arkansas in the bottom half of table 27; now the correlations for unified delegations uniformly exceed those for split delegations, and often by quite a lot.

These correlations indicate that senators from divided delegations respond to similar forces. They don't mean that split-bloc legislators vote the same way. The biggest differences remain *between the parties, not within them*. The average Republican from a unified delegation is marginally more conservative than one whose colleague is a Democrat:

TABLE 27. Correlations among Ideology Measures for Same-State Senators

	All Senators	Same-Party Delegations	Split Delegations
<i>With Arkansas</i>			
PRO-LCV scores	.507	.761	.263
Simple ideology	.528	.772	.284
Simple partisanship	.449	.483	.416
Pure personal ideology	.176	.220	.101
Pure personal partisanship	-.031	-.041	-.034
<i>Without Arkansas</i>			
PRO-LCV scores	.546	.859	.263
Simple ideology	.568	.868	.284
Simple partisanship	.524	.677	.416
Pure personal ideology	.260	.394	.101
Pure personal partisanship	.088	.146	-.034

Their average ADA scores are 23.7 and 30.5, respectively ($p < .22$). A Northern Democrat with a colleague from the same party is slightly more liberal than a colleague from a divided contingent: Their average ADA scores are 74.2 and 69.5 ($p < .21$). Even these modest differences fade when we look at pure personal partisanship, where the difference between split and unified delegations is .064 for Republicans ($p < .376$) and .001 for Northern Democrats ($p < .500$).

Poole and Rosenthal (1984, 1071) argue that “the support coalition interests within each state” drive similarities among same-party senators (cf. Markus 1974; Jung, Kenny, and Lott 1994). What drives personal ideology in unified and divided delegations? I rearranged the database by state, subtracting one senator’s personal ideology scores from the other’s. I focus on the estimates for personal partisanship since the differences between pure personal ideology and partisanship are minute. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the difference in pure partisanship scores for a state’s senators. I use the absolute value because there is no natural way of ordering a state’s senators. The bigger the absolute difference, the more polarized the two senators are.

The portrait of the two types of delegations suggests that we need two different types of models. If senators are divided more by party than by constituency traits (Poole and Rosenthal 1984; Grofman, Griffin, and Glazer 1990), same-party senators should agree with each other far more than divided-party contingents. This is captured well in the concept of induced partisanship, which is necessarily the same for both solons for a single-party delegation and is far less consistent for senators from divided delegations ($r = .616$). Party differences are mostly encapsulated in induced partisan values. The gap between divided and unified delegations is far smaller for pure partisanship. The absolute difference in personal partisanship is greater in states with divided delegations, but not by much. The mean scores are .761 for split contingents and .666 for unified delegations.

For divided contingents, the key determinants of differences in personal ideology ought to be different support coalitions for the two parties. I could make the same argument for unified delegations if I had data on each senator’s electoral base. But I do not. I have assumed that senators’ reelection constituencies are primarily partisan. Senators from the same state party have, by assumption, identical supporting coalitions (so there is no need to estimate models for induced ideology or partisanship). There are also differences among senators that may reflect their

institutional positions, their own styles or strategies, or unmeasured aspects of their support coalitions. I report the regressions in table 28.

Split delegations do reflect senators' different supporting coalitions. Senators are more likely to have different personal partisan values when they represent states with a diverse populations and when party elites are strongly polarized (both $p < .0001$). *The greater the share of conservatives among independents, the larger the differences in partisan values among solons of different parties. There is an unexpected source of*

TABLE 28. Models of Absolute Ideology for Divided and Unified Senate Delegations

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-Ratio
A. Divided Delegations			
Constant	-8.040	1.935	-4.155***
Absolute difference in elite attitudes	.474	.082	5.760****
Population diversity	10.788	2.057	5.245****
Absolute difference in partisans' ideology	-.020	.011	-1.901**
% conservatives: independents	.136	.034	4.017****
$R^2 = .709$ Adjusted $R^2 = .645$ SEE = .301 $N = 23$			
B. Unified Delegations			
Constant	2.557	.708	3.611**
Absolute differences in seniority	.028	.009	3.109***
Elite ideology	.497	.086	5.751****
Dominant party	.530	.174	3.048***
Population diversity	-5.721	1.637	-3.494***
$R^2 = .601$ Adjusted $R^2 = .521$ SEE = .432 $N = 25$			

** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

moderation: fellow partisans. The greater the absolute difference in reelection constituents' ideology (as measured by the absolute difference in party identifiers' liberalism-conservatism), the less polarized senators are ($p < .05$). Senators from divided party delegations are pushed to extremes by their reelection and primary/personal constituencies and by strongly conservative independents. *Constituency dynamics lead senators from split delegations to take different ideological stands.* The divisive effects of constituency seem to do the entire job. No institutional variables are significant for split delegations.

Unified delegations are only marginally (and not significantly) more similar in their personal ideologies than divided contingents. The typical pattern in single-party contingents is for one senator to pursue a Downsian strategy and the other to be a stronger ideologue. Same-state senators may vote similarly, but much of the linkage reflects their common base of core supporters. Not all politics reflect strong party ties. Senators from single-party delegations have their own rivalries and distinct support coalitions. And the differences in personal partisanship reflect these distinctions.

Primary and personal constituencies are the major driving force for unified delegations, as they are for split contingents. The more liberal state party elites are, the greater the ideological difference between the two solons ($p < .0001$). One legislator typically follows the middle course, tilting just left or right of center. The other is a faithful ideologue. A strongly liberal Democratic party elite will push the ideologue further leftward, creating a larger gap between the two senators. Elite pressures matter mightily in unified delegations, since Democratic core supporters are more liberal and Republican elites more conservative in single-party states (though neither is significant). States with a dominant party are also more likely to have senators who differ from each other ($p < .01$). In a competitive environment, both senators need to seek the middle ground. It is safer for at least one to be an ideologue in a one-party state.

Population diversity in single-party states *minimizes the differences* between a state's senators ($p < .01$), while it separates senators in divided delegations. In a highly diverse and competitive state, each party will claim part of the population as its base. The two parties will divide the electorate and will make strong ideological appeals to its own segment. Where there is less competition — in one-party states — the two senators will find that diversity creates uncertainty. They can't, or won't, divide up the electorate by ethnic group. Instead, each will make similar

appeals to keep each bloc within the party. A diverse base will thus bring the two senators together, not split them apart.

Finally, there is an institutional effect for same-state senators that is lacking in divided delegations. Senators whose careers largely coincide with each other will have similar partisan values ($p < .01$). A state with one very senior and one junior member will have greater divisions among its senators. More often than not (although not significantly so), the senior solon is conservative, the junior member more progressive. The senior senator is more likely to be the Downsian, the junior colleague the ideologue. Senior members may see themselves as power brokers in their state parties. This might lead to greater moderation. Too strong an ideological stance might alienate some party officials, especially if there is even a modest degree of factionalism within the party.

Single-party states are not happy bands of liberals or conservatives hewing to the party line. They are marked by personal rivalries, often based on seniority, that are reflected in different partisan values. For every pair as close as John Culver and Dick Clark (both D-IA), there is a couplet (or two) such as Pete Domenici and Harrison Schmitt (R-NM). Domenici and Schmitt did not get along well personally, and their personal ideologies differed: Schmitt was an unreconstructed Reaganite, while Domenici often fought his president even from a position of leadership (Fenno 1991a, 32–33, 176).

John Glenn and Howard Metzenbaum, Ohio Democrats who battled each other in a 1970 primary and had little nice to say about each other until 1984, pursued different electoral strategies. Glenn initially ignored party leaders and activists, while Metzenbaum courted them and won their 1970 endorsement. Glenn's constituency was all of Ohio, while his colleague courted blacks, labor, and the party faithful (Fenno 1990, 15, 108, 225). Their pure ideologies reflect these differences. Glenn is faithful to his geographic constituency (with a standardized score of $-.009$ for induced values), but to the right of his reelection constituency ($-.187$ for induced partisanship). Metzenbaum is to the left of the Ohio electorate ($.193$), but on target with his Democratic party constituents ($-.045$).

Same-party senators are often rivals for control of their party organization, even when they are ideologically close. Arlen Specter and John Heinz, moderate Pennsylvania Republicans, had a testy relationship (Fenno 1991b, 149). Both strove to please activists, as the effects of elites and induced ideology demonstrate. They also endeavored to differentiate

themselves from each other.²³ And California's Barbara Boxer (D) admits that she has never been close to her colleague Dianne Feinstein, even though they are both from the same part of the state and are both Jewish women: "Dianne and I have never been close. We had always moved within different coalitions within the Democratic party in California. . . . We had taken different positions over the stands on issues several times over the years, and certainly had always presented our stands differently" (Boxer with Boxer 1994, 81, 157).²⁴

Senators in both types of delegations are divided by elite ideologies. Yet, this is not what we would expect in a world dominated by political parties. We would envision a world of cohesive single-party states and polarized divided delegations. To a large extent this is true, but not when we move to personal partisanship, with the values of core partisan supporters removed. The key difference between split delegations and single-party states is in *how rivalries among senators are played out*. In two-party states, both masses and elites matter. In states with unified delegations, only elite attitudes (as well as conflicts within the parties) determine how different senators will be. Senators respond to variations on the same song in single-party states — and these conflicts reflect elite attitudes and competing goals of senators more than the values of the larger electorate. Geographic and reelection constituencies play larger roles in shaping battles among divided delegations because the overall ideological divide is much greater and the fight cannot be contained among elites.

Multiple Constituencies Matter

I have found some structural effects, but far fewer than Kalt and Zupan (1990). Even the evidence on monitoring, so prominent in the principal-agent models and the empirical studies of shirking (but cf. Lott and Reed 1989; Lott and Bronars 1993), gets inconsistent support. What accounts for the differences? Multiple constituencies. Leaders, like other senators, may not always reflect the views of their geographic constituencies. But they are just as faithful representatives of their reelection and primary/personal constituencies as other legislators. Taking multiple constituencies into account means that I don't have to make ad hoc assumptions about party and committee leaders. Mayhew (1974, 145–56) proposes a model of legislative organization based on the reelection motivation. Yet he treats leaders as different. Since they are more

electorally secure, they can make sacrifices for the collective good of the chamber. They forsake their constituents' preferences to tend to institutional and partisan goals. Once we take multiple constituencies into account in a multivariate model, leaders don't have distinctive personal ideologies.

If leaders are constrained by party constituents and activists, they will remain creatures of their states rather than of the Senate. This will limit their opportunities for "rent-seeking," or employing their institutional positions to secure a profit (usually policy benefits) for themselves (cf. Bates 1988). Leaders who must respond to voters are in a poor position to plunder others (but cf. Levi 1988). Whatever benefits they obtain will be of little assistance back home. They might even lead to the charge that the member has "gone Washington." So it is rational for members to hew to the district (party) line and not become creatures of the Washington establishment.

Divided delegations also pose a theoretical challenge to the multiple-constituencies perspective. Why are some delegations divided? Both the Downsian and ideological-equilibrium theses agree that divided delegations reflect more heterogeneous electorates than single-party delegations (Bender 1994, 157–60; cf. Bender and Lott 1996, 86–87). Legislators from single-party contingents have a more secure partisan base: 36 percent of their constituents identify with their party, compared to 29 percent for legislators from divided delegations ($p < .0001$). Independents are more critical in divided blocs, where they comprise 37.1 percent of a senator's electorate compared to 32.2 percent for legislators from one-party delegations ($p < .001$). The best predictor of unified versus split delegations is the share of independents among a senator's geographic constituency.

Downsians argue that independent voters are more likely to be centrists. Together with other moderates, they want to balance the ideological tendencies of the two parties. These middle-of-the-road voters split their ballots in an attempt to bring both Republicans and Democrats closer to the center (Fiorina 1992, chap. 5). The ideological-equilibrium model holds that a more even balance between the parties (with many independents) stems from a spirited contest over ideas. One-party dominance symbolizes the triumph of one vision over its competitors (Fiorina 1974, 54; Huntington 1950, 675; W. Miller 1964; Miller and Stokes n.d., chap. 7).

The CBS sample (see chapter 5) supports the ideological-equilibrium

view: 63.6 percent of candidates from one-party states converge, compared to 37.5 percent of those from divided delegations ($p < .09$, $\phi = -.257$, $Q = -.489$). Voters may rationally divide their delegations because they want different, though perhaps contradictory, things from each party (Jacobson 1990, chap. 6).

Unified delegations reflect truncated competition, the domination of one ideology over the other. Divided blocs suggest a greater competition among both parties and, especially, ideas. Yet, the fight over ideas *between the parties* occurs within a *less conflictual party system*. Split delegations are found mostly in individualistic states, where 72 percent of the delegations are divided. The ideological conflict is between Democrats and Republicans who are to the left of their national parties: 39 percent of Northern Democratic senators from divided delegations have liberal reelection constituencies, compared to 25 percent from unified blocs. All Republicans represent conservative reelection constituencies, but the share of conservatives falls from 50.6 for unified delegations to 46.9 percent in divided contingents. Republican induced partisanship is more liberal in divided delegations ($p < .07$).

One cannot, at least for the late 1970s and early 1980s, simply compare unified and divided delegations. There are different paths to each, with predictable consequences. Candidates may win either because their party has an overwhelming advantage in a state or because they are strong campaigners. Dominant parties are more likely to produce unified delegations, but the relationship is modest: 65 percent of one-party systems lead to one-party Senate delegations, while 54 percent of competitive party systems produce divided delegations ($\phi = .172$, $Q = .359$, $p < .05$). There are only three states dominated by Republicans, one with a unified bloc and two with split delegations, so we cannot make firm statements about them. The overall patterns between dominant and competitive party systems are clear and comport well with what I have argued in preceding chapters.

When I break down the data by both party system and delegation unity, there is support for *both* the Downsian and ideological-equilibrium models — though not precisely as either might expect. I present correlations between general-election vote shares and pure personal and induced ideologies in table 29, with the usual caution about very small N s. Yet, the patterns are clear: Ideology plays a lesser role in Senate elections in competitive party systems. Of the eight correlations for competitive systems, five are less than .4 in absolute value. *All of the correlations greater*

(in absolute value) than .4 support a Downsian interpretation. Northern Democrats lose votes in either split or unified delegations when their pure personal ideology veers leftward. Republicans lose votes in unified delegations when their core supporters are conservative.

For one-party states, there is a mixture of Downsian and ideological-equilibrium dynamics. Northern Democratic senators from one-party states and *unified* delegations pay an electoral price for their liberalism. The correlation between induced ideology and general election vote share is $-.829$ (significant at $p < .04$). Almost 90 percent of these Democratic members come from moralistic states. In this culture, even a strong Democratic advantage in party identification does not shelter senators from the electoral effects of an unpopular ideology. In one-party states with divided delegations (all of which are individualistic cultures), Northern Democratic incumbents gain votes when their pure personal ideology or induced values are liberal ($r = .699$ and $.658$, respectively). There is indirect evidence that GOP senators from divided delegations and dominant parties win more votes as their core supporters veer rightward. The correlation between induced ideology and general-election vote shares for divided delegations among all Republicans is $-.419$, higher than the r for GOP senators from competitive districts ($r = -.244$).

There are two major paths to divided delegations. Competitive party systems make it possible for both parties to claim Senate seats. But even in a one-party world, strong candidates can sometimes prevail through their own strengths. In competitive systems, ideology has sporadic and modest effects on elections across both unified and divided

TABLE 29. Correlations Between Ideology Measures and General Election Vote Shares

	Unified Delegations	Split Delegations	Ns
Northern Democrats Dominant			
Pure personal ideology	-.109	.699	5,5
Induced ideology	-.829	.658	
Northern Democrats Competitive			
Pure personal ideology	-.472	-.459	15,7
Induced ideology	.149	-.155	
Republicans Competitive			
Pure personal ideology	.056	.272	7,16
Induced ideology	.473	-.244	

delegations in competitive party systems. And these impacts benefit candidates who tilt against their party's dominant ideology. Incumbents and challengers are likely to converge in competitive arenas. The battle in November is for the center of the geographic constituency. The minority party has less ground to make up; mimicking the majority party can change a unified delegation into a split one. Competitive states seem classic examples of the Downsian model: Strong competition breeds moderation. And centrism makes it difficult for voters to cast ideological ballots. When voters can overcome this information problem, they punish legislators who go too far toward their reelection, primary, and personal constituencies.

In one-party dominant systems senators out of step with their geographic constituency pay a steep price for staying too close to their core supporters. All incumbents and challengers from one-party systems take divergent ideological stands. Northern Democrats from one-party states face a more liberal geographic constituency ($p < .05$). Issues do play a more critical role in one-party states, but not as we might expect. Senators from one-party states with unified delegations might seem to prosper more from ideology than their colleagues from split blocs. They don't. Northern Democrats from unified delegations lose votes for having liberal reelection and primary/personal constituencies. Their brethren from divided blocs *gain votes* when their personal and induced ideologies are liberal. While these states might appear to be havens for ideological politicians such as a Kennedy in Massachusetts or a Hatch in Utah, this logic doesn't always hold. Even in one-party states, the majority party does not constitute a majority coalition: It averages 42.6 percent of identifiers.²⁵ Going too far toward your base might alienate the majority of voters you need to attract.

These results reflect both the time period under study and the dynamics of distinct cultures. Consider Republican senator Jones from a strongly Democratic state. Her Democratic colleague Smith gains votes by being liberal. Smith has the further advantage of anticipating a race against a conservative Republican. This is the prototypical Democratic LKD race. Any Republican who succeeds in getting elected here must go against the grain of her party. Jones must fight to make the race competitive — and this means adopting a more Downsian strategy. And so these GOP incumbents do. The correlation between their ADA ratings and those of their Democratic colleagues is .972. By being *relatively moderate*, though still conservative enough to remain Republicans, they

can establish a personal vote that will allow them to split what should be a united Democratic delegation. Their primary and personal constituents (state party elites) are relatively moderate, and a liberal induced ideology brings them extra votes (see table 29).

Now consider a Northern Democrat from a strongly Democratic state with a colleague from the same party. Institutional and political rivalries will lead one member to become more moderate than the other. The states that elected two Democrats in the late 1970s and early 1980s were largely moralistic cultures in the Midwest. Despite the dominance of Democrats, these states are largely conservative. So going against the geographic constituency can be costly. Senators are tempted to stick with their base in one-party states. But their base is not big enough to win an election. While their personal and primary constituencies are as liberal as those of their colleagues with divided delegations, their reelection constituency is decidedly less progressive. Only 25.4 percent of Democratic identifiers in one-party unified states call themselves liberals, compared to 31.1 percent in one-party divided delegations ($p < .015$). When these senators cater to their core supporters, they lose votes.

As Lott (1987) argues, voters won't tolerate this behavior long. So the 1980s brought about a sorting in both types of single-party delegations. Moderate Republicans such as Javits, Case, and Brooke fell prey to intraparty battles. They were mostly replaced by Democrats, who had a stronger claim to the liberal mantle. By the mid-1980s, the ideological politics of the individualistic culture led to a decline in split delegations in the one region of the country where liberalism still rules. The Democratic edge in moralistic culture has since given way to a more even balance between the parties—in some cases even united Republican delegations. Moralistic states still have polarized parties, but the balance better reflects the ideological division within them.

Structural effects are greatest, though hardly overwhelming, where the political system is most homogenous: in one-party states. Senators from unified delegations are often rivals for power in their state parties. They don't face the same pressures at the ballot box that solons from divided contingents do. So they can turn their attention inward. The core of the difference for these types of delegations is different environments. Institutional rivalries emerge in one-party environments, much as Key (1949, chap. 14) argued about the South many years ago. Factionalism may not be endemic in one-party states, but it flourishes there. Competitive environments lead senators to pay more attention to their fellow

partisans and less to power games for control of state parties and for influence in Washington. In the bigger picture, senators from different parties are separated by their electoral coalitions.

What you get out of an institution such as the Senate depends a lot on what you put into it. And we put a lot more into our structures of governance than simple constituency demands. Representation — and its structures — varies with partisan and elite demands and a state's environment and culture.

Ideology and Its Consequences

Representation is not a simple matter of how close legislators hew to their constituents' preferences. Public officials consider the views of many different constituencies, from the full set of voters to their party faithful to party elites and fellow candidates. Once we include these other constituencies, there is little that is personal in personal ideology. If we had better information on which actors influence our legislators, we *might* account for the balance of pure personal ideology, leaving nothing to explain.

Yet, we can take this claim too far. We get carried away in looking for members' pure personal ideology as if each legislator were like a snowflake, with a unique configuration of preferences. And we can go too far the other way as well, looking for Senator X's clone somewhere in the electorate, what Weissberg (1972) calls "collective representation." A "complete" model of policy representation would include constituency preferences, elite attitudes, induced values, and a host of other considerations such as committee and subcommittee positions, leadership obligations, presidential influence, interest group pressures (including mail, telephone calls, faxes, e-mail), political action committee contributions, testimony at legislative hearings by experts, and the like. In a world of perfect information, we might fully account for every vote a legislator casts.

There is always something left over when we extricate both mass and elite views from legislators' own ideology. This error term, whether we get it from subtraction or as a residual, contains more than legislators' pure ideology. Gerald Wright (1994) argues that shirking residuals are just that, random error.¹ Kalt and Zupan (1984, 1990) offer two rejoinders (see also Carson and Oppenheimer 1984, on the first). First,

personal ideology predicts roll call behavior quite well (see also chapter 2). Second, when senators go against public views, voters punish them (see also chaps. 3–5 and 7). If these numbers were merely noise, they wouldn't predict either legislative voting or vote shares (in both the primary and general elections).

Yet residuals impose a simplistic model of representation. All voting reflects either constituency or pure personal ideology. This is a Weight Watchers utility function. The residual contains too much fat. We can trim it by estimating a more direct method of simple ideology and then teasing induced values out. Our final residuals, pure personal ideology and partisanship, are leaner but gentler. Personal ideology seems more ephemeral. It doesn't affect roll call voting as systematically. The big impacts on voting come from the part of simple ideology that we can squeeze back into the utility function. Have we pummeled personal ideology back into randomness? Alas, no. It may not be the unmoved mover of roll call voting, but voters seem sufficiently attuned to values in Senate campaigns to punish deviations from their ideal points. There is something left and both helps and hurts senators in elections. Most of the good news comes in primaries, and most of the bad news comes in November.

There are exceptions, and they largely occur where we might expect them: Liberal senators do better in liberal states and conservatives fare well in November where the right dominates. The candidates who are most severely punished for their personal ideologies (as I call them) are *challengers*. These not-so-great pretenders often enter Senate (or other) races to prove Downs wrong. They run because they are committed to issues. Minority parties and their candidates often have no other rationale for plodding along. We can't expect candidates to run for office simply to provide the public good of a second candidate on the ballot. So challengers fighting the good fight feel free to go further left—or right—than their partisans might wish. They emulate former Alabama governor George Wallace, who sought to “send them a message” in his 1968 presidential campaign. And the voters send a message back to the challengers *and their core supporters*: You're too extreme. Incumbents are more mainstream—which probably explains why they win office in the first place.

Perhaps we can make sense out of larger challenger errors compared to incumbent residuals. Why do voters punish challenger noise more than incumbent randomness? After all, random is random. Yet, voters

pay closer attention to the core supporters (induced ideology or partisanship) of incumbents than those of challengers. When citizens punish or reward incumbents, they express their support for or opposition to the fellow travelers of the sitting senator. Since challengers often go far beyond even their primary and personal constituencies, it makes sense for voters to reject these strong ideologues (see chapter 5).

Will the Center Hold, or Will the Center Fold?

Legislators have their own values, but they need to hide them from voters much as I covered myself under the blanket at summer camp to keep counselors from seeing me reading *The Catcher in the Rye*. Sometimes I was caught—you can't hide flashlights very well—and paid the consequences. I survived, since camps are loathe to punish paying customers too severely. Legislators have more to fear, at least in principle. If they indulge their own ideologies too often, they will be expelled and sent back to being just another voter in the unidimensional issue space.

The big problem with Downsian models is that American politics are not centrist. It is tough to explain absolute deviations from geographic or reelection constituency opinions. Absolute differences don't make a difference in elections. It is *how* you misrepresent your constituents that counts, both in primaries and general elections. Voters don't want legislators to be *near* them. They want their solons to answer the old labor question, "Which side are you on?" (cf. Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989).

Ideology matters. First, legislators' values more closely reflect state party preferences than statewide views. Second, senators pay attention to the views of party elites and other core supporters. And third, ideological voting often boosts vote shares in primaries. *Ideology is not an aberration, a realm left for politicians who are hiding under the covers. It is central to contemporary American politics.* When we look for convergence to the median voter and fail to find it, we presume either that politicians are not strategic or that they are trying to outfox their constituents. If the two parties represent distinct constituencies, there is less reason to expect that their elected leaders would "shirk" one master to serve another. Politicians need to shore up their base first, gaining enough support to get the nomination and garner sufficient resources for the fall election.

The ideological-equilibrium folks get the ideological nature of

American politics right. They get it wrong when they presume that values are more of a help than a hindrance. Challengers often find ideologies an albatross that they can't shake. Incumbents stake out a claim. They pay a bigger price for inconsistency than for being too far afield (Downs 1957, 103–10; Glazer and Grofman 1989). Incumbents have a cushion that challengers don't. They represent a coalition that at some point has secured a majority in the state. Often that coalition comprises the majority party.

Perhaps we can split the difference between ideological-equilibrium and Downsian models. Legislators see party activists and other core supporters as their inner circle. They share deep-seated values with their personal and primary constituents. Fenno (1978, 66) quoted a member of the House: "My strongest supporters are the people who know me and whom I have known and with whom I have communicated over the years. . . . in the oldest counties, that means thirty to forty years." These ties to fellow partisans help boost the member's primary vote share. Sticking with one's closest allies will alienate some potential supporters in the general election. So the legislators who bolt too far in the direction of their induced constituencies will lose votes in November.

There is considerable support for this hybrid model (see chapter 3). Voters are more likely to respond to induced ideology or partisanship than to personal ideology (chapter 4). When I bring challenger ideology into the picture, *both* pure and induced values matter. Induced partisanship is more critical for challengers, pure ideology for incumbents (chapter 5). Republicans running in 1982 were well advised to bolt rightward, since they gain substantially in the primaries and don't lose anything in November by this strategy. Liberalism doesn't help Northern Democrats in primaries, but it does cost them votes in the general election. In a conservative country, Northern Democrats need to converge more than Republicans. Yet, ideology doesn't matter everywhere. It counts most in low-key races where candidates take distinct stands (chapter 5).

Values and Voting

Political culture helps us understand this jumble of results. The traditionalistic culture is conservative, the individualistic progressive. In each environment, it helps to go with the flow. Southern Democrats in traditionalistic cultures are pressured to bolt leftward, and this helps them in the primary but hurts in November. Republicans in individualistic cul-

tures are impelled to vote conservatively. This helps in the primary and imposes no toll in November.² *Ideology is either a costly force or has no impact in the general elections for partisan blocs that are out of sync with statewide and state party public opinion.* When you tilt against prevailing winds, you can gain votes in the primary but may have to pay a price in the general election. Republicans in traditionalistic states and Northern Democrats in individualistic cultures benefit in both primaries and general elections from being “too” conservative and “too” liberal, respectively. *Legislators representing the dominant ideology in their states benefit from going “too far.”* This is a quasi-Downsian world. Ideology helps senators who are in touch with their fellow partisans in both the spring and the fall. It may lull out-of-step legislators into a false sense of security. Personal ideology might bring extra votes in the primary by shirking, but cost ballots in the general election.

The hybrid model works best in moralistic cultures, where parties are polarized and candidates are less likely to converge.³ Northern Democrats do best in primaries when they tilt leftward; Republicans prosper when they are most conservative. The opposite holds in general elections. Extremists gain the primary votes of loyalists in primaries but pay a price in November. This ideological division draws legislators away from the median voter and toward their core supporters. But the bimodal distribution of voters creates fault lines in the general election.⁴ Neither party has sufficient strength to prevail in November.⁵ So legislators left out on either pole fare worse.

The full range of results suggests that senators representing dominant ideologies in *both their geographic and reelection constituencies* are the prototypical ideological-equilibrium legislators. All other legislators, be they from the minority ideology in a state where one value system prevails or from a system with polarized parties, reflect the hybrid model. They don’t quite conform to Downsian expectations, but they do pay a price when they stray too far from their geographic constituents.

Voters punish representatives who misrepresent. Yet most legislators don’t wander too far from public opinion (see chapter 2). When I break personal ideology into its induced and pure personal components, personal values account for a minuscule share of roll call behavior compared to constituency preferences and core partisan supporter ideology (chapter 4). The initial results indicate that induced values matter more in elections than personal ideologies (chapter 4). When I break the analyses down by party (chaps. 5 and 6), the picture becomes

more complicated. For senators up in 1982, personal values seem to matter more. For the full range of legislators, both induced and personal ideologies count.

Issues matter most for Republicans in primaries and Northern Democrats in general elections. In all three cultures, a conservative induced ideology brings GOP incumbents more votes. Republicans also benefit from going beyond their core partisan supporters in individualistic and moralistic cultures. (Southern Democrats benefit from *liberal* induced ideologies in primaries).⁶ For Republicans, bolting rightward can help only in primaries—and the further to the right one gets, the better off one is. Conservatism brings votes in the spring for Republicans *but has no impact in November* in any model (in either chapter 5 or chapter 6). The only exceptions (for both induced and personal ideology) occur in moralistic states. Republicans benefit from taking strongly conservative stands: They win extra votes in the primary and don't lose anything in the general election.⁷

Are Northern Democrats Downsians? Yes and no. They gain little, particularly in individualistic states, by their personal partisanship in primaries. In moralistic states they can lose a lot in general elections if their own values are too liberal, just as their Southern colleagues will be punished if their personal values tilt too far leftward. Voters react primarily to legislators' own beliefs in November and are more likely to take out their frustrations on Democrats.⁸ The impact of these values on their roll call voting is *smaller* than that for Southern Democrats and Republicans (chaps. 2 and 4). Democrats seem to get the worst of both worlds: They don't deviate very much, but face the wrath of the electorate anyway. Republicans fear ideology only in moralistic states with polarized parties.

Northern Democrats bear the brunt of ideology because they are more likely to be out of sync with their statewide electorates. Conservatism is the dominant ideology in American politics. Even though Northern Democrats have personal-partisanship scores no greater than their Republican colleagues, ideology costs them more votes. Voters don't take out their frustrations out on all Democrats. In individualistic states, Northern Democrats are very much in touch with their constituents. Their personal ideology is .007 on a standardized scale. They seem to be unreconstructed Downsians. So their personal values don't hurt them in November. In moralistic states, they are considerably to the left of even their reelection and primary/personal constituencies (a standardized

score of .189). Nor is it surprising that the only Republicans who face the wrath of an electorate are from moralistic states. GOP senators from individualistic states have personal ideologies that are slightly more liberal (relative to their core constituents and fellow partisans) than Democratic senators (with a standardized score of .086). They are also Downsians. But in moralistic states, they shirk to the right (with a score of $-.130$). What mutes the impact of values for Republicans is the tilt of this culture toward conservatism.

If elites push public officials beyond their constituents, who pushes elites? Much of the time, there is no conflict between the mass public and activists. Democratic party elite attitudes are strongly correlated with reelection constituency ideology (.570) and moderately related to geographic constituents' views (.490). Republican primary/personal constituency views have a moderate relationship with reelection constituency ideology (.441), but a more powerful correlation (.576) with geographic constituency attitudes.⁹ But sometimes elites will push legislators beyond where voters want them to go. For both Northern Democrats and Republicans, elite ideology is only partially shaped by their fellow partisans' views. (See tables 30 and 31.)

TABLE 30. Determinants of Northern Democratic Elite Ideology

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-Ratio
Constant	-4.968	1.135	-4.377***
Democratic identifier ideology	.016	.008	1.921**
Moralistic culture	.992	.119	8.303****
Fundamentalists	-.017	.003	-5.013****
Population diversity	7.725	1.683	4.589****
Democratic party identification	.025	.010	2.518***
Republican party identification	.026	.009	2.981***

$R^2 = .740$	Adjusted $R^2 = .716$	SEE = .442	$N = 72$
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** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

Northern Democratic elites are pushed slightly leftward by their fellow partisans (see table 30). The regression coefficient is small and it is significant only at $p < .05$. Far more potent in pushing Northern Democratic elites to the left are an ethnically diverse population ($p < .0001$) and a large share of either Democratic *or* Republican identifiers in a state's population (both $p < .01$). A more diverse population base makes Northern Democratic elites responsive to calls for redistribution. A big base of fellow Democrats provides a cushion for elites. It lets them tilt leftward. But so does a large GOP foundation. Northern Democratic elites fight fire with fire. When there are many Republican identifiers, Northern Democratic party activists become polarized. Elites in moralistic states are even more liberal than we would otherwise predict ($p < .0001$). This culture has the strongest effects of any variable that accounts for elite ideology. The only factor that systematically brings Northern Democrats back to the center is the share of fundamentalists in a state's population. Neither statewide public opinion or the union share affects Northern Democratic elite ideology. Each would be a temporizing force, but neither reaches significance.

TABLE 31. Determinants of Republican Elite Ideology

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Ratio
Constant	-.537	1.155	-.465
Republican identifier ideology	.066	.012	5.337****
Fundamentalists	-.020	.010	-1.982**
Environmentalists	39.606	23.953	1.653**
Population diversity	5.032	1.498	3.359***
Manufacturing share	2.776e-002	6.837e-003	4.060***
Democratic party identifiers	-.004	.010	-.430
Republican party identifiers	.007	.010	.759

$R^2 = .774$ Adjusted $R^2 = .755$ SEE = .486 $N = 92$

** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

Republican party identifiers have a much stronger impact on their elites (see table 31).¹⁰ The regression coefficient is more than four times as great (.066) as we find for Northern Democrats; the *t*-ratio is almost three times as powerful. It is easier for Republican identifiers to push their elites, since GOP voters have more consensus. Their mean ideology is far to the right, while Northern Democrats are virtually centrists.¹¹ As with Northern Democrats, a more diverse ethnic base pushes senators to the left ($p < .01$), as does a large share of the state's economy devoted to manufacturing ($p < .0001$). A manufacturing state will have a large blue-collar population and should push elites toward a more favorable view of governmental programs. The larger the percentage of environmentalists in a state, the more progressive elites will be, though the impact is not strong ($p < .05$). Fundamentalists help push GOP activists to the right, though again not by much ($p < .05$). Neither Democratic nor Republican party identification—nor statewide ideology—affects GOP activist attitudes.

Northern Democratic opinion plays a less central role in elite ideology than GOP attitudes because party identifiers are more centrist. For both parties, there are systematic forces in their state environments that push activists toward more extreme positions. And they are somewhat similar in each case. Minority groups make elites more progressive, fundamentalists make them more conservative. Groups at the fringes of a party often have powerful effects on elite attitudes. Fundamentalists are a small share of the population of individualistic states, about 8 percent (compared to 14 percent for moralistic states and 25 percent in traditionalistic states). Yet their impact on elite attitudes is at least as great in this culture ($r = -.608$ for Northern Democrats and $-.914$ for Republicans) as anywhere else. Environmentalists are a smaller share of the population of traditionalistic states than elsewhere.¹² But their impact is greater on elite attitudes there ($r = .489$ for Northern Democrats and $.621$ for Republicans) than elsewhere. These groups push senators away from their partisan identifiers.

Elites help make politics ideological. Sometimes they help and sometimes they hinder the search for votes. Yet, legislators can't simply ignore them. They are too central to officeholders' world. Party elite ideologies are at least as close to legislators' own voting records as those of their fellow partisans or their full geographic constituency for every party group in each culture.¹³ Elites and officeholders are more than just support networks. They are ideological soul-mates. They

push legislators toward their base, but often away from the prize in November.

Traditional models of representation (including the diamond model), positing a legislator responding to an entire state or district, miss the tension between the geographic and reelection constituencies. Incorporating the views of the reelection constituency is but a first step. Most of simple party shirking stems from induced partisanship, shared values of party followers and activists. Once we do this, our understanding of representation is more complete, and the principal problem of principal-agent models dissipates.

Principals and Agents

Principal-agent models pose an attractive puzzle because principals find it difficult to monitor their proxies. If oversight were easy, agents wouldn't shirk. They couldn't get away with it. Legislators are tough to police. Voters face limited competition just once in six years. They have few reasons to become informed, and legislators face few pressures to keep campaign promises (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 283). Senators thus have ample opportunity to shirk. Yet few deviate from either their geographic or reelection constituencies. Those who do are pulled away by core supporters.¹⁴ Even in moralistic states, where parties are sharply polarized, the average scores are modest: Northern Democrats tilt somewhat to the left and Republicans slightly less to the right.¹⁵

Despite the predictions of principal-agent theory, voters are quite sophisticated. When there are scant differences, voters don't heed them. But even modest distinctions can produce a reaction from the electorate. The political arena works far better than critics imagine. And it works like a marketplace should: Consumers are most likely to pay a lot of attention to personal ideology when there are larger differences in values. During the era from which our data comes Senate (and House) elections were less referenda on national politics than on candidate traits, including issues (Ragsdale 1980).¹⁶ If voters pay more attention to candidates than parties, they should punish (or reward) senators for their *personal* beliefs, not for their core supporters' preferences.

If voters are so smart and can pass judgment on even moderately ideological candidates in polarized races, why does a conservative electorate continue to elect Democrats to office? In 1980 (and again in 1982) it didn't. These same people restored Democrats to majority status in

the Senate in 1986 and kept them in control until 1994. Ideology is but a part of the story of Senate elections (Abramowitz 1988). It is not always uppermost in voters' minds. When candidates don't take distinct issue positions, as in traditionalistic and—to a lesser extent—individualistic cultures, rational voters would waste their time focusing on ideology (Downs 1957, chap. 13).¹⁷ Polarized environments where candidates disagree with each other make voters stand up and pay attention (Wright and Berkman 1986).

Democrats have persevered against contrary ideological tides by downplaying issues, relying on their long-standing advantage in party identification, and having better candidates than the Republicans. The party adopted a strategy of “inclusive compromise,” being all things to all people. Reconciling interests was more critical than ideological purity (Mayhew 1966)—at least until the 1970s. The long-term advantage in party identification persisted well into the 1970s, even as many in the electorate had little connection to the progressive realignment of the 1930s that led the party out of the electoral wilderness. At least in the House, Democrats offer higher-quality challengers who are more strategic in deciding when to run for Congress (Jacobson 1989).¹⁸

The Democratic advantage was self-perpetuating for four decades. And it is easy to see why. Candidates' inner circles include party elites and activists. The dominant party elite will be more moderate because it has won, or helped to win, elections. Minority party activists are more likely to be ideological purists (McCloskey, Hoffman, and O'Hara 1960). Democrats established camaraderie with their large contingent of House incumbents and challengers, state legislators, and other activists. The Republican farm team was smaller and more ideologically homogenous. It pulled GOP legislators further to the right than the Democratic elites tugged their senators to the left. And then came the 1970s. The Democratic elite tilted as far to the left as the GOP did in the other direction (W. Miller 1988). The seesaw did not balance out. It still inclined toward the old majority party, which still had far more lower-level officeholders. By the late 1970s, the balance tipped for the Senate: Republicans offered better-quality challengers than Democrats.¹⁹

The increasing tilt to the left produced a drain in Democratic identification. By the early 1980s the Democrats were no longer the “normal” majority party (Petrocik 1987). I need not retell the familiar story of the travails of the Democrats, who made a habit of losing the presidency and

then gave up the Senate and ultimately the House as well. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, environmental activists played a key role in pushing moralistic Democrats to the left, just as fundamentalists jostled Republicans to the right. Without a supporting cast of elected officials that moderate the higher-ups, the majority party would likely have fallen farther and faster. Not until 1994 did the Democrats lose both the House and the Senate.

Was a Downsian model more appropriate in the 1950s through the early 1970s? Without better time series data (especially on ideology) we can't tell. But there were plenty of ideologues in the Senate (and the House) during this era. Many were conservative Southern Democrats, a breed that has become passé, just as many Southern voters have abandoned the Democrats for the GOP (Petrocik 1987). Heterogeneous parties may still be ideological.

The polarization of the 1970s can explain why the Democrats lost standing. Its effect on representation is not to introduce ideology to American politics, but to change its effects. It may be more difficult now for out-of-sync legislators to get elected (or, if they defy the odds, to get reelected). The positive effects for induced ideology in primaries may now extend to Northern Democrats as well as Republicans. And if more general-election races find candidates diverging, issues may become more important in November in a wider range of contexts — and for both parties. If there is greater ideological solidarity within state party elites, induced values might even supplant personal ideologies as determinants of November elections.

We might see a shrinking of shirking, or at least personal deviations. If you are out of touch with your state party, you will have a tougher time getting the nomination. Once nominated, you owe more to your base than you did before. So if you go against either statewide or state partisan attitudes, you need to heed the call of your activist core more than in the past. This sets up a battle in November of two candidates who are poles apart. Voters might use ideology as a more important cue. The 1994 elections, especially those for the House, suggest that induced partisanship may come to dominate representation. Many amateur candidates won Republican nominations and succeeded in general elections. Amateurs with little name recognition are more extreme once elected than “quality challengers” (Canon 1990, 146–49). Many claim that the contract's the thing, even if it causes them not to get reelected. They pledge to limit their terms even if they can't amend the Constitu-

tion to guarantee a minimal tenure. These members owe their souls to their constituency *party* and other party elites. They are not afraid to shirk their responsibilities to the full constituency.

When elected officials abjure the electoral connection, they grant themselves greater freedom. And they make voters judge their party, not just themselves.²⁰ The 73 Republican freshmen view themselves as messengers of a cause, even if they risk their electoral future (Gugliotta 1995). Yet, messengers perforce speak for someone. A key component of the electoral base of the new members is the Christian Right. New members secured votes from evangelical voters, and many legislators identify with the Christian Coalition (Green 1995). When we look at geographic constituencies, the new members' constituents are more conservative on religious and moral issues than people in other congressional districts. Their reelection constituencies are even more fundamentalist than the full geographic constituencies.²¹ Even members who flout the reelection motivation are good representatives of their strongest supporters.

Representing Whom?

Legislators are primarily faithful representatives, but not simply of their geographical constituencies. Yet they are not automatons. They respond to *different* constituencies. Their geographical constituencies don't always agree with their fellow partisans or with their core supporters. They often have to choose which constituency they represent. Sometimes they don't follow any of them terribly well. Yet, this "sometimes" is not often. Kingdon (1977, 586) finds that only 10 percent of the roll calls he studied showed conflict among either the actors a member consults or between Washington and constituency goals. He argues that members make voting decisions through a "consensus mode."

Legislators continually confront the dilemma of whether they wish to emphasize reelection, the pursuit of policy, or the inside-the-Beltway game of power (Fenno 1978, 218–23). The "powerful Washington legislator can actually get pretty far out of touch with his supportive constituents back home" (Fenno 1978, 218–19). In Washington, members face a wide range of temptations leading them away from *all of their home constituencies*. Party conferences and the president (Langbein 1993) and lobbyists and political action committees (Denzau and Munger 1986) are perhaps the most prominent suspects.

Why is there so little pure personal ideology, especially among leaders? Part — though not a great deal — of the reason is methodological. As I argued in chapter 1, pressures, especially from political action committees and lobbyists, are more likely to be successful on narrow legislation that cuts across the issues that normally divide Democrats from Republicans. Representation studies focus on the ideological match between legislators and their different constituencies. So we are looking for the impact of the Washington culture where we should least expect to find it.

Most constituents don't know that much about either their senators or Representatives. What they have is diffuse ideas about policy stands — or ideology. And this is what people care about. We don't hear much about legislators who are defeated because of their votes on trucking deregulation or similarly arcane issues (cf. Denzau and Munger 1986). Legislators have more wiggle room on such policies.

If we expanded our domain, we might find more personal ideology, though less punishment for such malfeasance. Yet we still would not be too far off the mark. The left-right spectrum characterizes the overwhelming share of legislative votes in any one Congress and over time (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Even studies designed to mix and match types of issues find few tensions when inside-Washington pressures conflict with constituency demands (Kingdon 1973, 1977). When I asked Michel how often he found it tough to meet both his leadership responsibilities and his constituency interests, he replied, "Not most of the time." Legislators don't let themselves get too far away from constituency opinion because they worry about the electoral consequences. If you stray too far from your public, no amount of explanation will save your soul. Explanations carry weight only when legislators are generally faithful to their publics (Fenno 1978, 152; Bianco 1994, 49–50, 154–55).

The electoral connection isn't the whole story either. If it were, we would find more straightforward Downsians than we do. Republicans are generally too conservative and Northern Democrats too liberal for their constituents. Yet they stay close enough, often with the help of more extreme challengers, so that most don't pay an electoral price. Legislators have to make strategic calculations about how far afield they can go. Yet, they are not cold calculators who play off one interest over another. They respond to their reelection, primary, and personal constituencies because they are comfortable with them. These partisan followers and close allies provide the support for the ideological stands that members take. Just as we regularly choose our friends

because of common interests, legislators surround themselves with cue-givers who have similar ideologies and constituencies (Matthews and Stimson 1975).

There are few loners in politics. In everyday life we see the occasional eccentric who marches to the tune of a different drummer. Such people are not likely to get elected to public office. The major electoral connection doesn't occur after two years (for the House) or six (for the Senate). It occurs *before the candidate is nominated and elected the first time*. The multiple levels of political evolution explain why there is so little shirking. An out-of-touch politician will sit on the sidelines. Politicians in sync with many constituencies will prosper.

If we look for shirking from constituents' views, we'll find it somewhere. Somewhere, sometime *every* legislator will vote against the district line. Maybe she'll need a campaign contribution from a political action committee. Maybe she'll respond to party or presidential pressures. Maybe she'll simply think that she knows more about an issue than her constituents do (see Bianco 1994). But this won't happen often enough to change a member's ideology.

What may seem like a legislator's personal ideology is likely to be an indicator of a member's agenda priorities. Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) is an ardent deficit hawk and opponent of free trade. Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) is a passionate defender of the institutional prerogatives of Congress, especially when there is a potential conflict with the White House. Are these issues central in the minds of their constituents? Most likely they are not. Yet, they do not go against the basic ideology of voters in their states. Senators can and do place different priorities on issues than their constituents do. But they rarely put strong emphasis on issues that they know will be unpopular back home. And when they do, as Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR) did on the Vietnam War in the 1960s, they risk electoral retaliation. These are the profiles in courage of which Kennedy wrote. They are sufficiently rare to warrant a book (and many biographies) of their exceptionalism.

Some years ago *Nightline* host Ted Koppel asked celebrity lawyer and Harvard professor Alan Dershowitz: Are you bothered that such a large share of defendants in American criminal trials are found guilty? Dershowitz replied that he would be more worried if most defendants were actually innocent. So we might be more concerned if we had too many profiles in courage, for this would not speak well for our system of representative government.

No Plague on Either of Your Houses?

This is a study of the Senate. I cannot make direct comparisons with the House because there are no district-level data on public, much less partisan, preferences. Yet there are good grounds for speculation on the implications for the “other body.”

Principal-agent theory would expect less shirking in the House because it is easier to monitor representatives than senators. Elections are biennial, so representatives don't have the ideological grace period of senators. Senators put aside electoral concerns in their second, third, and fourth years to concentrate on policymaking (Fenno 1982). Representatives always focus on the next election. House constituencies are smaller and more homogenous, making monitoring easier.

It may be easier in theory for voters to police their representatives rather than their senators, but practice suggests some difficulties. Information is much more widely available about both incumbents and challengers in Senate elections than in House races. Because House districts are more homogenous, it is riskier for challengers to stake out an ideological claim that is out of sync with the median voter. In a heterogenous constituency, it is easier to adopt a “home style” that appeals to only part of one's district (Fenno 1978, 22). Diverse demands and easy information increase the opportunities for monitoring. And this is what we find. House elections are mostly referenda on incumbent performance, while Senate elections focus on challengers as well (Krasno 1994). Issues matter more in Senate elections than in House contests (Uslaner 1981).

So senators have more opportunity to shirk — and, as members of the “world's greatest deliberative body,” lots of incentives to cast themselves as statesmen, even at the risk of electoral retribution. Yet most don't deviate very much, at least from state partisan attitudes. Representatives might do a better job of representing their entire constituency. It is easier for them to do so. The distance between the state party median and the center for the geographical constituency should be smaller in more homogenous constituencies. House members have protection against a big impact of issues by the distribution of voter preferences. In homogenous constituencies, statewide attitudes, partisan opinions, and elite values are more strongly related than in heterogenous electorates.²² This consensus makes issues less critical in House elections. Voters aren't robbed of critical information when the media turn away from House

contests — often for their own reasons (House districts often don't correspond with media markets).

To complete the story of constituency dynamics we need to make the leap from representation to elections. Legislators from heterogeneous constituencies should pay a greater electoral price for their deviations. They don't. The correlation between pure personal ideology and November vote share is virtually zero for heterogeneous electorates ($r = .069$) and modest for homogeneous constituencies ($r = -.242$). I resolve this puzzling pattern by looking at the partisan connections. Northern Democrats with homogeneous electorates pay a big price for being liberal ($r = -.669$), while their values don't hurt at all in heterogeneous constituencies ($r = -.021$). Republicans lose votes when they are too conservative in both environments but lose slightly more in heterogeneous states ($r = .365$, compared to $r = .276$). Homogeneous states are conservative. They are kinder to GOP legislators on the right than to Northern Democrats on the left. There are both liberal and conservative "safe" and homogeneous constituencies in the House, so we might expect that the overall correlation between pure personal ideology and electoral success would be higher in heterogeneous districts.

The Senate is an ideal laboratory for examining how the nature of constituencies shapes both representation and elections. Personal ideology should be more important in the Senate than in the House, given the six-year term and the professed independence of senators (at least compared to representatives). The 1978–82 election cycle also provides a fine test of representation. In 1978, almost a quarter of incumbents lost, but legislators' personal ideology had a negligible impact on vote shares. Two years later, with Reagan at the top of the GOP ticket, 35 percent of incumbents lost, with a somewhat greater impact for ideology. In 1982, 93 percent of incumbents won, largely deflecting the impact of issues.²³

Issues matter in elections because issues matter to politicians and to voters. Representation works. And it works at the beginning of the tie between legislators and constituents, where it counts most: Most incumbents don't need to converge to public opinion. They already agree with it. Almost all elected officials stay close to state party attitudes. When voters apply electoral sanctions, they correct their own "mistakes." They punish legislators who are out of step with their various electorates, from the geographical constituency to core partisan supporters. The legislators who pay the price may be "profiles in courage." They are neither liars nor turncoats. They did not campaign right and vote left (at

least most of the time). These members usually represent minority political coalitions in their states. And whatever we think of their courage or their ideologies, their electoral tenure was in jeopardy from the outset. If voters got their preferences right the first time, there would be no impact of roll call behavior on general-election outcomes. It speaks well of a rational electorate that the impacts are modest and selective and that senators reflect their constituencies well.

We can eat our cake and have it too: Politicians do care about issues. Competing candidates largely take different positions from each other. And yet victorious candidates are generally more in accord with public attitudes than the challengers who lose. Candidates don't converge, but they do.

This is precisely what we would expect if ideology were a *shared belief system*. If it weren't, our politics would have hundreds of dimensions, little coherence, and an awful lot of personal ideologies. In a less coherent world of multiple issue dimensions, politicians would find themselves constantly threatened. Any incumbent can always be defeated by a coalition of minorities (Downs 1957, 55–60), which almost inevitably results from multiple dimensions (McKelvey 1976). Ideological straight fights bring stability to politics (Black 1958). They also make political battles more fun. No wonder both voters and public officials don't run away from issues.

Appendix

Appendix A: Supplement to Chapter 2

TABLE A.1. Regressions Predicting PRO-LCV Scores

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Ratio
Without Party			
Constant	-7.647	4.548	-1.681**
South	.454	.454	1.000
McGovern vote	.114	.025	4.563****
Environmental activists	62.579	49.001	1.277
Education	.191	.301	.636
Manufacturing	.018	.016	1.122
Average age	.051	.065	.782
Growth rate	-.026	.011	-2.404***
Urbanization	.010	.006	1.564*
$R^2 = .505$ Adjusted $R^2 = .461$ SEE = 1.155 $N = 100$			
With Party			
Constant	-10.787	3.355	-3.216***
South	.014	.336	.041
McGovern vote	.092	.018	4.998****
Environmental activists	51.327	35.963	1.427*
Education	.374	.221	1.690**
Manufacturing	.027	.012	2.211**
Average age	.055	.048	1.145
Growth rate	-.018	.008	-2.281**
Urbanization	.006	.005	1.284
Political party	1.624	.183	8.896****
$R^2 = .736$ Adjusted $R^2 = .710$ SEE = .847 $N = 100$			

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

TABLE A.2. Predictive Success of the Logits and Regressions

	Geographic Constituency		Reelection Constituency		Null Predictions
	Kalt- Zupan	Direct Survey	Kalt- Zupan	Direct Survey	
Communist					
immigration	81.1	82.6	77.8	79.1	57.0
Death penalty	90.8	90.4	87.4	86.7	72.3
Draft	78.5	79.8	75.3	73.0	50.6
Sex education	90.7	89.3	89.5	89.3	71.4
Neutron bomb	85.4	84.8	85.4	83.7	62.0
Desegregation	92.2	91.9	93.3	91.9	70.0
Abortion	72.6	72.8	70.5	68.5	57.6
Pornography	79.1	80.7	80.2	79.5	75.9
Pregnancy					
disability	90.7	92.8	91.9	90.4	86.8
Pregnancy					
discrimination	95.3	93.8	92.9	92.6	84.7
Cuba	87.8	85.9	87.8	83.1	52.1
Communist loans	79.4	77.3	78.3	70.5	62.5
Panama Canal index	.579	.583	.585	.550	

Note: Entries are percentage predicted correctly by each logit for the four equations in tables 2 and 3, together with the predictions from the null model based upon the modal vote. For the Panama Canal index, the entries are the adjusted R^2 values.

Appendix B: Supplement to Chapter 3

TABLE B.1. Constituencies and Personal-Ideology Models for Democrats

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Statistic
A. Geographic-Constituency Personal-Ideology Model: Northern Democrats			
Constant	10.812	3.646	2.966**
State mean ideology	-3.308	1.538	-2.151**
Other party standard deviation	-1.218	1.272	-.958
Electoral heterogeneity	-.038	.021	-1.799**
Party congressional candidates	.039	.013	3.041***
Other party elite	.026	.049	.527
Growth rate	-.022	.007	-3.273***
Union share	-.038	.012	-3.083***
$R^2 = .569$ Adjusted $R^2 = .481$ SEE = .532			
B. Reelection-Constituency Personal-Ideology Model: Democrats			
Constant	6.526	4.623	1.412
State mean ideology	-1.494	2.145	-.696
Electoral heterogeneity	-.055	.030	-1.829**
Party congressional candidates	.056	.019	3.002***
State party elite	.020	.058	.350
Other party congressional candidates	.004	.005	.763
Growth rate	-.031	.009	-3.319***
Union share	-.048	.018	-2.706**
$R^2 = .524$ Adjusted $R^2 = .426$ SEE = .757			
System $R^2 = .540$ $N = 42$			

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$.

TABLE B.2. Constituencies and Personal-Ideology Models for Republicans

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Statistic
A. Geographic-Constituency Personal-Ideology Model, Republicans			
Constant	8.603	3.626	2.373
State mean ideology	-3.770	1.332	-2.831***
Other party standard deviation	.529	2.321	.228
Electoral heterogeneity	-.030	.019	-1.631*
Party congressional candidates	.030	.009	3.523****
Other party elite	.007	.050	.131
Growth rate	-.013	.004	-2.897***
Union share	.018	.013	1.331*
$R^2 = .774$ Adjusted $R^2 = .720$ SEE = .483			
B. Reelection-Constituency Personal-Ideology Model, Republicans			
Constant	9.365	3.832	2.444
State mean ideology	-3.501	1.807	-1.937**
Electoral heterogeneity	-.005	.026	-1.888**
Party congressional candidates	.041	.012	3.435****
State party elites	.042	.008	.510
Other party congressional candidates	-.002	.008	.293
Growth rate	-.016	.006	-2.578**
Union share	.026	.018	1.442*
$R^2 = .731$ Adjusted $R^2 = .666$ SEE = .658			
System $R^2 = .748$ $N = 37$			

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. **** $p < .0001$.

Appendix C: Supplement to Chapter 5

TABLE C.1. Estimations of Induced State Partisanship and Ideology

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Ratio
A. Estimation of Induced Statewide Ideology for Incumbents			
Constant	24.656	6.152	4.008**
State mean ideology	-7.828	1.906	-4.108****
Other party standard deviation	-10.433	3.624	-2.879**
Electoral heterogeneity	.067	.020	3.294**
Congressional candidate ideology:			
Northern Democrats	.021	.012	1.735**
Other party elite	-.327	.130	-2.507**
$R^2 = .766$ Adjusted $R^2 = .708$ SEE = .469 $N = 26$			
B. Estimation of Induced State Partisanship for Incumbents			
Constant	.998	.458	2.178
Congressional candidate ideology:			
Northern Democrats	.062	.016	3.911***
State party elite ideology: GOP	.429	.179	2.397**
Other party congressional candidate ideology	.021	.009	-2.192**
Traditional party organization	.135	.066	2.053**
Senator's party opinion distribution	.281	.168	1.676*
$R^2 = .775$ Adjusted $R^2 = .719$ SEE = .594 $N = 26$			

(continued)

TABLE C.1. — *Continued*

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Ratio
C. Estimation of Induced State Partisanship for Challengers			
Constant	5.974	0.744	8.034****
Challenger party congressional candidate ideology	.048	.006	7.762****
Incumbent party identification	-.036	.010	-3.665***
Population diversity	6.563	1.297	5.061****
Environmental activists	30.095	12.062	2.495**
$R^2 = .899$ Adjusted $R^2 = .880$ SEE = .347 $N = 26$			
<p>*$p < .10$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .001$. ****$p < .0001$.</p>			

Appendix D: Supplement to Chapter 7

TABLE D.1. Regression Predicting Personal Ideology, ADA Scores

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Statistic
Constant	.525	.367	1.431
State party elites	.241	.060	3.996****
Independent identifiers:			
liberal share	.040	.013	3.077***
Other party congressional candidates:			
standard deviation	.017	.008	2.122**
Party congressional candidates	-.028	.004	-7.328****
Growth rate	-.014	.003	-4.304****
Other party centrist opinion	-.377	.139	-2.706***
<hr/>			
$R^2 = .816$	Adjusted $R^2 = .804$	SEE = .443	$N = 96$

** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

TABLE D.2. Regression Predicting Personal Partisanship, ADA Scores

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	<i>t</i> -Statistic
Constant	.937	.403	2.324
State elite opinions: GOP	.229	.153	1.502*
Party congressional candidates	-.010	.008	-1.286*
Party congressional candidates:			
Northern Democrats	-.042	.010	-4.068****
Growth rate	-.011	.005	-2.068**
State party opinion distribution	-.480	.154	-3.121***
State party elite opinions	.253	.102	2.475***
<hr/>			
$R^2 = .526$	Adjusted $R^2 = .494$	SEE = .711	$N = 96$

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .0001$.

Notes

Chapter 1

1. Long was not quite as inconsistent as this part of the story would have us believe, yet he was no less the villain. He told one of his aides who overheard the conversation that he intended to honor his commitment to repeal the levy. He didn't want the theater owners to believe that their lobbyist could deliver the governor's promise. Only Earl himself could do that, and the movie owners would have to visit him personally to acknowledge his power (Liebling 1970, 41).

2. For a summary of Burke's views, see Pitkin 1967, chap. 8.

3. For clear statements about the minimal role of issues in party politics in Congress, see Mayhew 1966, 1974.

4. Transcribed from *The Derek McGinty Show* on National Public Radio, July 28, 1997.

5. Kessel (1988, 114) reports that party activists in 1972 were more ideological than rank-and-file partisans. They "are not giving voice to their constituents' views. Rather, they are urging policies that their colleagues think wise. American parties are not representative entities, but *advocacy parties*."

6. This percentage was computed from Kingdon (1973, 235–36). It is based on the 208 votes on which no more than two actors disagreed with the rest of the "field." It thus excludes the remaining 14 decisions, on which more than two actors disagreed with the field. Kingdon does not provide data on these 14 votes.

7. See Achen 1978; Bender 1994; Bullock and Brady 1983; Jung, Kenny, and Lott 1994; Langbein 1990, 1993; Markus 1974; W. Miller 1964; Miller and Stokes n.d., chap. 7; Peltzman 1984; Powell 1982, 1994; Richardson and Munger 1990; Schmidt, Kenny, and Morton, 1996; Shapiro et al. 1990; G. Wright 1978b, 1994; and M. Wright 1993.

8. It is likely that the effect goes both ways: Members may share the same electoral fate *because* they share similar values. One could argue that this direction of causality is more critical.

9. See the discussion in chapter 7 of Ohio's two senators in the late 1970s, Howard Metzenbaum and John Glenn. Metzenbaum had strong ties to party activists, Glenn weak bonds. Metzenbaum's voting record reflected his reelection

constituency far better than the full Ohio electorate. Glenn’s ideology fit the geographic constituency much better than his Democratic partisans (or activists).

10. Kalt and Zupan (1984, 284) argue that “ideology plays the same role in the economic theory of the political process that managerial rules of thumb play in the profit-maximizing theory of the firm.”

11. Yankelovich, Clancy, Schulman press release, February 12, 1993.

12. I won’t summarize it here. It will unfold in succeeding chapters as relevant.

13. Davis and Porter 1989 is an example of one among many.

14. The political success of Louisiana’s Long dynasty, including Earl, suggests that they were strong keepers of the faith with the electorate.

Chapter 2

1. Or mathematically, in the probability limit.

2. In future sessions of the legislature, the estimates of c would turn positive, as the newly elected conservative members from conservative constituencies would vote nay.

3. Or so say many friends who have read the manuscript.

4. If any constituency factors are correlated with the residuals, they should have been included as predictors of total ideology.

5. Shirking models that don’t use residualization are not forced into this assumption—and some important ones (Lott 1987; Lott and Bronars 1993) don’t make it.

6. Downs does not insist on this, but the logic is consistent only with a Downsian model.

7. Richardson and Munger (1990, 15–19) make a similar criticism of shirking models and also suggest adding party to a regression analysis of roll call voting to obtain estimates of reelection constituency effects. Their approach is similar in spirit to mine, though different in how party is handled. I was not aware of their contribution when I first developed my strategy. I am grateful to Michael Munger for bringing the similarities to my attention.

8. The data were provided by Gerald C. Wright. The statewide estimates differ slightly from the published version in Wright et al. 1985. Langbein (1990) derived statewide and state party estimates from the 1982, 1984, and 1986 American National Election studies, which has a far smaller number of observations. Langbein could obtain estimates for only 40 states.

9. Any measurement strategy for constituency opinions implies that there is a common frame of reference for ideology across the nation. If liberalism means something different to southerners than to northeasters, we could be making spurious inferences. (I owe this insight to Bernard Grofman, personal communication.) To test this, I employed the 1992 American National Election Study and picked out seven diverse policy preferences (want more or less spending, preferences for defense spending, health care attitudes, government help blacks, equal role for women, civil rights for blacks too fast, and the death penalty) and ran cross-tabs by a three-point ideology for each census region. Then I ran analyses of variance for the policy areas by region within each ideology group. Only one

of the 28 cross-tabulations failed to be significant at $p < .001$ or less: Defense spending did not discriminate ideologically in the North Central region. For the regional ANOVAs, only 7 of 21 comparisons were significantly different from zero. All of the rest of the differences were due to ideology. Thus, one-third of the comparisons for region were statistically significant, compared to 96.4 percent for ideology. These are rough tests. So I factor analyzed the seven issue areas together with ideology five times: once for all respondents and then within each region. The results were strongly unidimensional, and the loadings for ideology were similar across the analyses. I computed factor scores and imputed values over regions for each solution (so that everyone gets scores for each region based on its loadings). The average correlations among the factor scores was .996. The lowest correlation is .993.

10. The correlations for shirking measures are not quite so robust. See chapter 7. The choice of LCV residuals rather than ADA residuals was based upon my desire to replicate the results in Kalt and Zupan (1984) as closely as possible so as to make comparisons direct. Linda Fowler (personal communication) has pointed out that ADA scores are typically more partisan than LCV scores, which often have more cross-cutting cleavages (though, as noted, both have high correlations with independent measures of ideology). If there are modest effects for personal ideology using LCV scores as a base, she argues, we can be even more confident that senators don't shirk much.

11. I also tested a "survey regression" model, in which the LCV scores are regressed against the mean scores for statewide and state party constituencies. The residuals are legislators' personal ideologies, as in the Kalt-Zupan model. The adjusted R^2 's are not high (.262 for statewide estimates, .336 for state party measures). These estimates were redundant for the direct measures for statewide shirking and very close for the state party models. In no case using any criterion did they appear superior, so I do not discuss them further.

12. Here are the differences between liberal and conservative self-identification among the statewide and state party identifiers for each partisan bloc.

	<i>Statewide</i>	<i>State Party</i>
Republicans	-15.009	-36.054
Southern Democrats	-20.525	-10.777
Northern Democrats	-12.255	4.023

(Negative signs indicate that more of a bloc has more conservative than liberal identifiers.)

13. The p -level is zero until the eleventh decimal place.

14. The respective means are .004, -.012, and .011, differences that are not statistically significant. A state is conservative as opposed to centrist if the percentage of conservatives is at least 10 percent more than the percentage of moderates. No state has a liberal plurality or majority. A state party is liberal if the percentage of liberals is at least 10 percent greater than the share of conservatives.

15. Kalt and Zupan (1984, 285) estimate ANTISTRIP through a weighted logit designed to correct for heteroskedasticity. Let r = the number of votes cast

by a senator that are unfavorable to strip mining and n = the total number of votes cast by the senator of the 27 roll calls. Then the logit is $\ln [(r + .5)/(n - r + .5)]$. I employed the same transformation on their data.

16. In all regression, probit, or logit estimations in this book, I employ robust estimation when these results appear crisper than ordinary least squares or “simple” probit or logit estimations. Robust estimation does not affect the coefficients or summary measures such as R^2 or the standard error of the estimate. It corrects for heteroskedasticity and thus lowers the standard errors and increases t -ratios.

17. Herfindahl indices are also known as fractionalization indices.

18. The appropriate comparison is with table 4 in Kalt and Zupan 1984, 294, the final two columns. The unstandardized coefficients for the constituency interest variables vary widely from the estimates I present, most likely because of differing estimation techniques. However, the t -ratios are generally quite similar.

19. The coefficients for pregnancy discrimination for the survey regression and direct estimations differ from others because I had to employ a different statistical program to obtain convergence. These models employ the same predictors as in table 3, as Kalt and Zupan do, even though the predictors do not clearly relate to these issues. I had to drop the Herfindahl indices, lest the logits not converge. The full list of roll call votes is in Kalt and Zupan 1983.

20. One could argue that there is less to explain in roll call voting in the with-party models since the R^2 is so much higher in the first-stage estimation. If a general concept of ideology affects roll call votes, the without-party model leaves more variance to explain in the second-stage explanation. Much of the variance in the with-party models has already been absorbed into the constituency part of ideology. The mean t -ratios for Kalt-Zupan are 3.581 (no-party) and 2.740 (with party) and for the direct method, 4.043 and 2.968 respectively.

21. The measures are interaction terms between a dummy variable for Northern Democrats times senator’s personal state party ideology and senator’s state party constituency attitudes. I also use similar measures with an interaction term for conservatives (Republicans or Southern Democrats). All of the estimations are from a single equation for each roll call (index).

22. Northern Democrats were unanimous on pregnancy discrimination and had only one defector on pregnancy disability.

23. A state party is categorized as liberal (conservative) if it has at least a plurality (by 10 percent or more) of liberals (conservatives) in its electorate. Otherwise it is classified as moderate.

24. These correlations are considerably higher than the simple r s between the party and no-party models for each measurement technique. The Kalt-Zupan measures correlate at .505, the direct measures at .728.

Chapter 3

1. Election and expenditure data were obtained from the 1978, 1980, and 1982 editions of *Politics in America* and *The Almanac of American Politics*.

2. I employed an 8 percent rule to classify dominant ideologies through inspection of data: A state with a dominant conservative ideology had 8 percent more conservatives than liberals and moderates combined. No state had a dominant liberal majority. Forty of the 96 senators for whom I have constituency ideology scores represented conservative statewide majorities; the rest were from moderate states. Fifty-four of 96 senators represented conservative state party electorates, 13 liberal state parties, and 29 moderate voters.

3. Fenno (1978) does not provide clear demarcations between these two constituencies. And there is no data set for elites that permits one to get at personal constituents as distinct from primary constituents (especially since the sample size for most legislators' personal following is so small). So I treat elite values as reflecting the beliefs of *both* primary and personal constituencies.

4. Because the two types of shirking are clearly related and because they share so many predictors, I estimated the equations by the seemingly unrelated equation method, which produces more efficient estimates of the standard errors (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1976, 279–83). The system R^2 is .681.

5. The composite measure is a factor score. The state legislator data come from Uslander and Weber 1977.

6. Gerald Wright provided me with the party elite data and (separately) the congressional candidate scores.

7. Strangely, this result does not hold up for the regression for Republican senators in table B.2.

8. Simultaneous-equation estimation for 26 to 33 cases is hazardous, so I also estimated the same equations by ordinary least squares with no appreciable differences. There are fewer cases in these equations than in tables B.1 and B.2 in appendix B because some senators either did not seek reelection or did not make it through the primaries.

9. The sign for other party congressional candidates is reversed because of coding.

10. Incumbents get a boost in the primary from how well they did in the last general election ($p < .05$). Each year of seniority costs an incumbent half a percentage point in the primary ($p < .01$). So does each additional percent identifying with the senator's party ($p < .001$). One-party states may encourage more competition in the primary than two-party areas. States with heterogenous electorates in the other party also have more competition in the senator's primary. A more heterogenous opposition party might be able to run a stronger race against the incumbent; signs of a weak senator may in turn induce a primary challenge. The quality of the primary challenger makes the biggest difference—a 34 percent difference ($p < .0001$).

11. Most analyses of the impact of expenditures on elections employ the log of money spent. The equations for primary and general elections showed small increases in predictive power using the log specification, but I was unable to come up with a suitable instrument for logged expenditures.

12. The indicator is the average absolute value of committee members' Americans for Democratic Action scores (in weighted log-odds form), further averaged across a senator's committees.

13. The share of identifiers in both the senator's party and the opposition boosts incumbent senators' election expenditures in thousands of dollars ($p < .005$). Senators can raise a lot of money in states populated by their fellow partisans; they need to raise cash in less friendly territory. The more money challengers raise, the more the incumbents need to—and can—catch up ($p < .0001$). Incumbents spend less in high-growth states ($p < .005$), presumably because legislators from these states are more electorally secure.

14. Challenger funds don't matter ($p < .10$), while challenger quality is insignificant. Electoral heterogeneity hurts a senator's November vote share ($p < .01$), while population diversity helps ($p < .05$). Senators don't benefit from strong local party organizations; the coefficient for the Cotter et al. (1984) index is negative. Traditional party organizations, clustered in the industrial states (Mayhew 1986), still can deliver the goods ($p < .05$).

15. A heavy Democratic advantage in party identification works against a strong showing in the primary for incumbents

16. These results stem from probit analyses including challenger quality, the share of identifiers in the incumbent's party, and incumbent expenditures.

17. For both Northern Democrats and Republicans, the share of party identifiers is a strong determinant of general election success. Challenger quality matters for Northern Democrats, while challenger expenditures are important for Republicans. A traditional party organization boosts vote shares for both Northern Democrats and Republicans. The Cotter et al. (1984) measure of state party organization was not significant in the GOP equation.

18. Most of the results discussed herein also hold for the ADA residuals. The comparisons among different party constituencies are equally clear in the two models. I chose the LCV residuals for this paper in part for continuity with Uslaner 1997, but mostly because the three-stage least squares estimates were crisper for the LCV residuals.

19. The loadings are PRO-LCV (804), state mean ideology ($-.693$), party mean ideology ($-.596$), and party elite ideology ($.703$). The single dimension accounts for 49.4 percent of the total variance. Republicans dwell in a more constrained world than Democrats. The factor analysis for GOP senators accounts for 73.3 percent of the total variance, with respective loadings of $-.852$, $.925$, $.843$, and $-.799$. The Democratic single dimension accounts for 48.8 percent of the total variance, with loadings of $-.664$, $.751$, $.654$, and $-.721$, respectively. Note that, consistent with the impacts for shirking found in the text, the elite effect is relatively stronger for Democrats than for Republicans.

20. All are significant at $p < .05$.

21. Stafford's state party shirking was the Republicans' sixth highest. The most liberal party shirker was Edward Brooke (MA), who lost to moderate Democrat Paul Tsongas.

Chapter 4

1. Other senators sharing this pattern include Republicans John Danforth (MO) and James McClure (ID) and Democrats Lloyd Bentsen (TX), Thomas

Eagleton (MO), Gary Hart (CO), and John Sparkman (AL). Senators pushed to the right by their personal constituencies but whose personal ideology is moderate relative to their state partisans include Republicans John Chafee (RI), Robert Dole (KS), William Roth (DE), Richard Schweiker (PA), and Lowell Weicker (PA) and Democrats John McClellan (AK), Frank Church (ID), and Lawton Chiles (FL).

2. Andrews's colleague Quentin Burdick (D-ND) followed his induced ideology in moving to the right of his Democratic electorate (and the full state), even though he was slightly more liberal than his state (standardized pure partisanship score = .411). Burdick, who was a legend in North Dakota, was able to satisfy both his close associates and the statewide electorate by moving to the right of his preferred positions. Andrews's predecessor, Republican Milton Young, was somewhat to the right of statewide public opinion (-1.397) as well as attitudes in his own party ($-.945$). While the North Dakota GOP was moderately conservative relative to state partisans ($-.240$), Young personally was further to the right ($-.705$). The North Dakota GOP is considerably to the right of all state parties and somewhat more conservative than even state Republican electorates. The North Dakota Democratic electorate is almost perfectly at the mean of all state parties and somewhat to the right of Democratic electorates. Young veered to the right of his personal constituency, Burdick to the left—exactly the opposite of what a Downsian argument might expect. They both won handily across many elections.

3. The overall correlation between induced partisanship and the mean ideology for the reelection constituency is -134 (higher scores for induced partisanship and *lower* values for state party means indicate greater liberalism). The correlation is smaller for Democrats ($-.193$) than for Republicans ($-.585$). The smallest correlation is for Northern Democrats ($-.139$).

4. The lack of significance for any of the three measures for pregnancy discrimination indicates that collinearity may be a problem here.

5. The variable in question is coal share of electricity. The coefficients and maximum likelihood ratios divided by their standard errors for both pure personal and induced ideology are largely unaffected by dropping this variable. Most differences were minute; the pornography vote produced a significant coefficient for personal ideology, while the barely significant estimate on pregnancy discrimination fell further.

6. Alternatively, foreign-policy votes might reflect presidential influence (Langbein 1993).

7. On domestic votes, which comprise the large majority of roll calls in the Congress, the differences are less pronounced. The two components of legislators' values predict 4.1 percent more votes accurately. Sixty-three percent of the gain (2.6 percent of all votes) comes from induced ideology. Only 22 percent of the increment stems from personal ideology. *Senators' own partisan values account for less than one vote (.9) on each domestic roll call.* There is little evidence that personal ideology is prominent, especially on issues that are salient to either voters or elites. Of the three components of ideology, "pure personal" values seem to be least powerful in explaining legislators' votes.

8. The models were estimated, as were those in chapter 3, by three-stage least squares (3SLS). For the subsamples, the N s are not large (ranging from 42 for all Democrats to 26 for all Republicans), so I employed three estimation strategies: 3SLS, seemingly unrelated equations, and ordinary least squares. The Democratic and Northern Democratic results are from the 3SLS estimations (which are very similar to the ones from the other methods). For the Republicans, I report the ordinary least squares results. Republican senators get no boost in the general election from the primary, so the issue of simultaneity is not critical. Seemingly unrelated equations loses two key cases for the Republicans — senators who lost in primaries. Hence, I use ordinary least squares.

9. The computation is -2.94 (the regression coefficient for induced state party shirking in table 13) divided by the standard deviation of state party induced deviations (.779).

10. The overall tau between the trichotomous measure of reelection constituency ideology (conservative, moderate, and liberal) and the dichotomous (conservative and moderate) measure of geographic constituency values is .763. Aside from the 13 Northern Democratic liberals, 9 senators (3 of them Northern Democrats) come from states with moderate reelection constituencies and conservative geographic constituents. Nineteen senators (all but two Republicans) have conservative reelection followings but moderate geographic constituents. The problem is more acute for liberals: None of the 13 members with supportive reelection constituents have progressive geographic constituents. But 65 percent (35 of 54) of the senators with conservative reelection constituents also have geographic electorates tilting to the right. Perhaps surprisingly, Republicans are *not* advantaged: All Republicans come from conservative state parties, but just 54 percent have right-leaning geographic constituencies.

11. The Republican is Robert Stafford (VT) The Democrat is Howard Cannon (NV). But note that Erikson, Wright, and MacIver (1993, 19–20) caution that the ideology score for Nevada is the least reliable for the 48 states. They choose not to use it, though I found that it rarely affects any of the estimates in this book.

Chapter 5

1. New York Republicans (at least before the 1980s) combatted the majority Democrats with candidates such as Nelson Rockefeller, Jacob Javits, and Kenneth Keating. Their party leaders were also moderate to liberal. Democrats echo Republicans in hostile territory: The induced partisanship scores of John Melcher (MT) and Edward Zorinsky (NE) are negative, indicating conservative party followings.

2. Dominant parties have an advantage of 10 percent or more in party identification over the opposition. The mean percentage difference is 28. Only 17 percent of Senate challengers from states dominated by the other party have held elective office before, compared to 43 percent from more competitive environments.

3. Westlye (1991, chap. 6) supports this reasonable claim from individual

voting decisions in the tight 1982 California Senate race and the lopsided 1978 Wyoming contest. I also considered another context: whether a state's party system is competitive or dominant, following Huntington (1950), Fiorina (1974), and W. Miller (1964). All argue that party representation is stronger for dominant majority parties. I found few differences among party systems however I divided them up. Previous studies have concentrated on the House, with more homogenous constituencies, so my results do not contradict theirs.

4. I am grateful to Jerry Wright for making these data available. Since CBS obtained the interviews in confidence, I shall not identify individual senators or challengers in the analyses below. The issues that comprise the scale scores are a constitutional amendment allowing states to ban abortion, a constitutional amendment permitting prayer in public schools, a balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution, the Equal Rights Amendment, a nuclear freeze with the Soviet Union, requiring that half of the foreign cars sold in the United States be manufactured here, canceling the tax cut due to take effect in July 1983, cutting increases in military spending, reducing spending on domestic social programs, and government regulation of air pollution.

5. Senator Spark Matsunaga (D-HI) was eliminated because there is no public-opinion data available for Hawaii.

6. Senators up in 1982 received about the same vote share (58 percent) as did those running in 1978 or 1980 (57.5 percent). Their primary vote share was slightly, though not significantly, higher (87.7 compared to 83.4 percent). The differences in challenger quality were modest (30.8 percent compared to 34 percent). The CBS sample has 35 percent Republicans, 15 percent Southern Democrats, and 50 percent Northern Democrats, compared to 40, 18, and 43 percent for all senators. There are no significant differences in either LCV or ADA scores ($p < .60$ and $p < .92$, respectively). None of the roll call measures of shirking varied significantly between the two samples. All except pure personal partisanship had p levels (two-tailed tests) at least as great as .25. Senators running in 1982 had an average pure personal partisanship that was slightly more conservative than the average ($-.173$ compared to $.064$), but this result was only significant at $p < .12$. But these same senators came from statewide electorates that were slightly more liberal (standardized score = $-.208$) than those senators given a pass in 1982 ($.077$, $p < .12$).

7. I also constructed shirking measures that placed incumbents and challengers on the same standardized scale. This made it difficult to make comparisons with the incumbent scores derived from the roll call analyses. The measures of ideology employed here use the same logic: Subtract the (standardized) score for each constituency (geographic or each candidate's reelection bloc) from the standardized ideology measure and standardize once more. The measures of induced and personal ideology/partisanship are derived from the regressions in appendix C (see table C.1) analogously to the method in chapter 4.

8. The correlations are negative because the LCV and ADA ratings give higher scores to liberals, while the CBS index gives points for conservatism. I reflected the shirking scores so that they would be positively correlated. The higher each shirking score, the more a senator bolts to the left.

9. I categorized each incumbent and challenger as either liberal (scale score 1 to 3.5), moderate (scale score 4 to 6), or conservative (scale score 7 to 11) based upon the CBS candidate conservatism index. Candidates converged when they both fell into the same category; otherwise, they diverged. In 12 of 26 races (46.2 percent) candidates converged.

10. There is some evidence that voters prefer incumbents who are closer to public opinion than their opponents. But it is weak. I constructed measures of absolute proximity to statewide and state party opinions between incumbents and challengers. The measure subtracts the absolute value of the challenger's distance from attitudes from the incumbent's absolute value. Absolute proximity to statewide opinion leads to greater success in the general election ($r = .501$). The impact vanishes when we control for the quality of the challenger, the share of senator's party identifiers in a state, the liberalism of congressional candidates from the incumbent's party, and the incumbent's vote share in the primary.

11. In the challenger equation, parties polarized indicates at least a 10 percent gap in ideological identification between Democratic and Republican partisans. The other party state party organizational strength is the measure derived by Cotter et al. (1984). To facilitate comparison with previous chapters, incumbent and challenger measures are standardized separately rather than together.

12. For both statewide and state party induced ideology, the correlations are stronger among Republicans (.737 and .821) than among Northern Democrats (.624 and .552).

13. The 1982 sample is different in one key respect. For all senators, the correlation is smaller for Northern Democrats ($r = .374$), who often have very liberal primary and personal constituencies even as their GOP challengers range from moderate to conservative. Democratic elites tend to converge to GOP positions ($r = .701$), reflecting the greater conservatism of the public and their own reelection constituencies. For the 1982 sample, elite attitudes are more highly correlated in states with Northern Democratic senators ($r = .689$) than in states with GOP incumbents ($r = .481$).

14. The four Southern Democrats are conservative (mean = 7.625), while their opponents are at the end of the continuum on the right (mean = 10.375).

15. The correlations are as follows (an asterisk indicates that the sign is incorrect):

	<i>Incumbent Core Supporters</i>	<i>Challenger Core Supporters</i>
Overall	.227	.067
Northern Democrats	.463	.351
Republicans	.851	.601
Converge	.651	.767
Diverge	-.224*	-.535*
Hard fought	.259	.295
Low key	.146	-.204*

16. Apart from incumbent ideology, legislators do well when they face a united and ideological opposition. When the standard deviation of partisan opinion in the opposition party is small, the challenger's party is united around a dominant ideology. The more cohesive the opposition party is, the better the incumbent will do ($p < .0001$). Primary voters will also rally around the incumbent senator when the two parties in the state are ideologically polarized ($p < .05$). A united and polarized opposition galvanizes the faithful to rally behind their incumbents.

17. Because primary vote shares are clearly endogenous, I also estimated simultaneous-equation models for primary and general elections. I don't present the results because any efficiency gains with such small samples are doubtful. The single-equation results hold up quite well.

18. I took the classifications of races in the October 9, 1982, issue of *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*. Races with no clear favorite or leaning toward the incumbent were classified as hard-fought. If *CQ* called an incumbent safe, the election was low-key. The remaining contests favored the incumbent. Where the sitting senator had less than two-to-one spending advantage over the challenger, the race was hard-fought. Otherwise it was low-key. While Westlye examined more detailed accounts of specific races, my classification has the advantage of being less subjective and easier to replicate. Objective tests show that neither measure is correlated with the whether either the senator's party or any party dominates a state's politics.

19. When candidates converge in the fall and the incumbent moves leftward in pure partisanship, he loses votes (9.5 percent).

20. For Republicans I employ a two-tailed test, since the direction of challenger ideology is different from what I would expect in a polarized race.

21. In polarized states, Democrats are mostly liberal and Republicans mostly conservative.

22. These races are obviously not based on the CBS database for 1982. All of the candidates were promised anonymity by CBS, and I have honored this guarantee (to CBS and then to Jerry Wright). However, the races were chosen because they reflect the same dynamics as the 1982 contests.

23. The correlation does not reflect party differences because Democratic challengers to Republican incumbents are more conservative than most other Democratic challengers. This reflects who the LKD GOP senators are: They are all conservative stalwarts. GOP challengers to Northern Democrats are more conservative than other Republican contenders.

24. The proximity measures are constructed by trichotomizing voter perceptions of the ideological stands of incumbents and challengers into liberal, moderate, and conservative categories so that they can be compared to the three-point measure for respondents. I then subtracted the candidate score from the respondent scale. Higher scores indicate that the candidate is more conservative than the respondent. The measure of challenger party ideology is constructed from the Democratic and Republican party ideology measures (V1422 and V1423) that are updated versions of Bartels's (1988) indices. Higher scores indicate more conservative state parties.

25. The party identification measure is coded as 1 if the voter identifies with the same party as the incumbent, -1 with the opposition party, and 0 otherwise. Leaners are classified as identifiers.

26. The northeastern and midwestern states in these categories mostly have individualistic cultures, while the Republican states in the West have mostly traditionalistic cultures. See chapter 6.

27. The CBS measure reflects incumbent *conservatism*, so I reflect the signs of the correlations.

28. The correlation for the full set of 58 members is .600, compared to .430 for the 26 who ran for reelection in 1982.

29. The correlations (reflected) between incumbent ideology in the CBS survey and opposition party values are .299 for hard-fought races, -.433 for low-key contests; .522 when candidates converge and -.846 when they diverge; and -.968 for LKD races compared to .266 for others. Again, the 1982 sample underestimates the differences. The overall correlation for 1982 is -.046; for all 58 incumbents it is -.279.

30. Wright and Berkman use the same candidate data merged with voter responses from the exit polls from CBS News and the *New York Times*. Abramowitz combines the 1978 American National Election Study with measures of the ideological clarity of 1978 Senate races from press reports.

Chapter 6

1. The respective means are 2.089 for senators from individualistic cultures, 2.148 for moralistic cultures, and 2.188 for traditionalistic. Higher scores indicate greater conservatism.

2. For each party, I use the percentage of identifiers calling themselves liberal minus the share calling themselves conservatives. The respective measures by party are as follows:

	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Republicans</i>
Individualistic	4.424	-31.470
Moralistic	3.037	-36.849
Traditionalistic	-8.012	-36.362

Again, the results are by senator (rather than by state), with higher scores indicating greater liberalism.

3. Four of six candidates in traditionalistic states converged, compared to two of six in moralistic states and just over half in individualistic states ($\tau\text{-}c = -.212$, $\gamma = -.382$). These correlations are based on small *N*s, and the relationship is not significant.

4. Some of the differences appear to be attributable to the distribution of Senate seats. Northern Democrats have 71 percent of the seats in moralistic states, compared to an even split in individualistic states. Yet, within partisan blocs, there is more partisan polarization between in-party and out-party elites in moralistic states than in individualistic cultures.

Why is there so much polarization in moralistic cultures? Democratic liberalism in moralistic states reflects the party's distinct bases: the upper-income environmental activists and lower-middle-class workers susceptible to being laid off. Republican conservatism is driven by rural white fundamentalists who hunt and fish, precisely the opposite profile of the most liberal Democrats in these states. These characterizations stem from regressions of Democratic and Republican identifiers' ideology. Both equations have the percentage of partisans identifying as liberal minus the percentage claiming to be conservative as the dependent variable. The Democratic equation includes income, the percentage of environmental activists in the population, the unemployment rate, percentage nonwhite, and the growth rate (adjusted $R^2 = .860$, $N = 35$). The Republican equation includes the percentage of fundamentalists, population diversity, the number of hunting and fishing licenses in the state, percentage of the population that is blue collar, and the unemployment rate (adjusted $R^2 = .814$, $N = 32$). The Republican equation excludes Utah, because of problems estimating the fundamentalist population there. For Democrats, the biggest impact comes from income (positive). For the GOP, the strongest effects are for fundamentalists and population diversity (both negative). Party elites are driven by similar forces: Democratic party elites are more likely to be liberal in moralistic states where George McGovern fared well in 1972, with high incomes, large numbers of environmental activists, but few union members. Republican party elites are drawn to the right by rural fundamentalists and by highly educated people. The Democratic elite equation includes the McGovern vote, income, environmental activists, and union membership (adjusted $R^2 = .805$, $N = 35$). For Republican elites, the predictors are fundamentalist share, manufacturing share, and population diversity (adjusted $R^2 = .759$, $N = 32$, with Utah excluded). Party identifier ideology is not significant in either estimation. The biggest impact for Democratic elites comes from the McGovern vote, while the strongest effect for GOP elites is the fundamentalist share.

5. The local party organization variables come from Gibson et al. 1985. These and succeeding characterizations are based upon correlations between the variables in questions and dummy variables for each type of political culture. Details about the correlations are available upon request.

6. The correlations of dominant party with political culture are $-.481$ (tau-c) and $-.738$ (gamma). The calculations for party identification are by senator rather than by state.

7. This difference is significant only at $p < .13$ for a one-tailed test and $p < .25$ for a two-tailed test.

8. The mean statewide liberalism-conservatism difference is -9.0 for Northern Democrats from individualistic cultures (indicating a modest tilt to the right), compared to -9.7 for Republicans from these states, -12.6 for Northern Democrats from traditionalistic cultures (-19.6 for Republicans), and -14.2 for Northern Democrats from moralistic states (-17.3 for Republicans).

9. I compute these effects by multiplying the coefficient for each culture in table 23 by its standard deviation (for the group of states comprising each culture).

10. In both traditionalistic and individualistic cultures, there are moderating forces that pull legislators toward the center. In traditionalistic states, if opposition party identifiers are primarily moderate (as opposed to conservative), this will cost an incumbent votes ($p < .05$). However, if the opposition party identifiers are conservative, the incumbent will benefit. In individualistic cultures, the more conservative the opposition party is, the greater the vote share for the incumbent ($p < .05$). This should induce moderation among incumbents.

11. For senators up for reelection (who made it through their primaries) there are 17 Northern Democrats and 7 Republicans from moralistic cultures, 15 Democrats (5 from the North) and 7 Republicans from traditionalistic states, and 10 Northern Democrats and 12 Republicans from individualistic cultures. The estimates for party blocs below come from simple regressions with the two components of ideology as the only predictors. The effects in the text do not control for other factors. Nevertheless, they appear to be reasonable.

12. Elliott voted with Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) to expand the House Rules Committee in 1961, a move widely viewed as supportive of civil rights and other progressive legislation. He wrote in his autobiography (Elliott and D'Orso 1992, 204–5): “I’d always been secure that my own district was behind me. I’d gotten used to running unopposed in recent years, including in 1960. But now I was seeing a sharp increase in unhappy mail from people in my own district. Something was happening down there, and it wasn’t good. Still I wasn’t about to turn against my party, my principles and my word because of rumblings back home.”

13. The personal ideology scores for Bentsen, Tower, and Morgan are as follows:

	<i>Bentsen</i>	<i>Tower</i>	<i>Morgan</i>
Statewide simple	-.381	-2.543	.154
State party simple	-.007	-2.479	.744
Induced partisanship	-.675	-1.176	.448
Personal partisanship	.399	-1.163	.212

The mean for personal partisanship for Southern Democrats from traditionalistic states is .046.

14. Republicans from individualistic states with a quality challenger won 50.6 percent, compared to 59.5 percent for GOP incumbents with a free ride. The corresponding figures for Northern Democrats from moralistic states are 46.2 percent and 56.6 percent. Multivariate models including the two measures of personal ideology reduce the impacts in both cases to slightly more than 2 percent.

15. A regression of the electoral margins of these 13 senators with challenger quality ($b = -6.866$, $t = -3.218$) and challenger expenditures ($b = -.010$, $t = -3.491$) has an adjusted $R^2 = .606$.

16. Again, the following regressions employ only induced and pure partisanship as predictors in regressions. The adjusted R^2 values range from $-.048$ ($N = 19$) for Northern Democrats from moralistic cultures to $.863$ for Republicans from the same ecology ($N = 7$).

17. Republicans in moralistic cultures don't face quality challengers either. Yet, just 30 percent of GOP races are uncontested, the smallest share of any Republican bloc of senators. And Republican incumbents in this culture gain "only" 84 percent of the vote, a weak share for primaries.

18. In moralistic cultures, one-party states lead to a decline in incumbent primary vote shares ($p < .0001$), as do polarized parties — where a plurality of Democrats are liberals and a plurality of Republicans are conservatives. The polarization effect is largely traceable to Republican incumbents. A large rural population, which might induce face-to-face campaigning rather than media blitzes, increases vote shares — though ruralism in traditionalistic states brings incumbents fewer votes. In individualistic states, a large share of environmentalists boosts a senator's vote share ($p < .05$). Where more independents are liberals, incumbents fare worse. Progressive independents encourage GOP senators to moderate their ideology, which in turn puts them at risk in primaries. When the other party is predominantly conservative, the incumbent's vote share drops ($p < .05$).

19. Northern Democrats from individualistic cultures have slightly more liberal induced statewide ideology than those from moralistic cultures. This does not hold for the smaller sample examined in chapter 5.

20. The pure personal ideologies of Republican senators did not vary according to whether they faced the electorate in 1982.

21. The mean score of liberal percent minus conservative percent for GOP identifiers is -9.7 for individualistic states, -21.6 for moralistic cultures, and -17.3 for moralistic states.

22. The difference between conservative and liberal identifiers of the two blocs is 17 percent in moralistic cultures, 14.7 percent in traditionalistic, and 10.2 percent in individualistic states. These results are for Republican senators.

23. For overall means, the standard deviations are .052 for traditionalistic states and .098 for moralistic ones. For percentage liberal minus percentage conservative, they are 4.61 and 9.44.

24. The only instance in which senators seem to adjust their personal partisanship to the past primary occurs in individualistic cultures where senators had relatively close calls (winning less than 80 percent last time out). Even though most senators in this group are hardly extremists (only one has a personal partisanship score greater than 1.0), they do seem to tailor their own partisanship to their vote shares in the last primary ($r = .793$, $N = 11$): *Senators from individualistic states, especially Northern Democrats, have a more liberal personal partisanship when they win more votes in the previous primary—but only if they face a somewhat contested race to begin with.*

25. The estimates are from regressions for general election vote shares with induced and personal values and primary vote shares as predictors.

26. The convergence data come from the CBS survey. The value of Yule's $Q = .382$.

27. The value of gamma is .471.

28. Every senator from a moralistic state has a score of 1 (weak organization) on Mayhew's traditional party organization scale. Forty-three percent of senators from traditionalistic states also have a score of 1, with an additional 37

percent receiving a 2. Forty-four percent of senators from individualistic states have a score of 5, the maximum, and an additional 17 percent receive a score of 4. On the Gibson et al. (1985) scale of local party organization strength, individualistic states have the most vibrant structures, with moralistic and then traditionalistic far behind.

Chapter 7

1. Interview with Robert Michel, May 23, 1995. Other uncited references to Michel are from this interview.

2. Party leaders include the majority and minority leaders and whips, conference secretaries (both parties), and the chairs of the Republican Policy Committee and the Republican Conference. This gives five Republican and three Democratic party leaders. Since the president pro tempore of the Senate is not a policymaking leadership position, I do not include it. Committee leaders are the chairs or ranking minority members of the 15 Senate standing committees.

3. The arithmetically astute will notice that this list totals only seven, which is less than half of the 15 Senate standing committees. Robert Stafford (VT) was the ranking member of both Environment and Public Works and Veterans' Affairs, solving the puzzle.

4. These findings are based once more on LCV scores. I focus primarily on directional measures. I also tested relationships for all leaders, but since the number of committee leaders dwarfed that for party leaders, the all-leader results overwhelmingly replicated those for committee leaders.

5. There are no scores for the geographic or reelection constituencies in Hawaii, so Democratic Conference secretary Daniel Inouye is excluded. For the Republicans, Whip Ted Stevens of Alaska is similarly excluded.

6. All of the Southern chairs are more conservative than any of their constituencies except for John Sparkman (D-AL), who is more liberal than three of the four constituencies (simple ideology is the exception). All but John McClellan (D-AR) deviate less as we move from geographic to reelection constituencies and from simple to pure personal ideology.

7. I exclude the heterogeneity of the constituency's voting behavior since it reflects electoral rather than structural effects. I also drop the two interaction terms involving electoral proximity (proximity times brand name and proximity times heterogeneity) because their logic is not clear.

8. The variable for retiring members is not an exact replica of the Kalt-Zupan formulation. I corrected for several data errors.

9. Kalt and Zupan (1990) include two additional variables, interactions between election proximity and brand name and between proximity and electoral heterogeneity. I could not ascertain the logic of these variables, so I omitted them from my models.

10. This is not surprising since and state party personal values correlate at .716 for the PRO-LCV-based measures and at .888 for the ADA-based scores.

11. Brand name has a correlation of .685 with vote share in the last general election and .625 with seniority.

12. The model for all senators has an adjusted $R^2 = -.012$; for Northern Democrats, the adjusted $R^2 = .058$, and for Republicans it is $.005$. In each case, the standard error of the estimate is just about equal to the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

13. For these analyses I put party and committee leaders together in a single leadership variable. I report only correlations greater than $.3$. Most are greater than $.5$. Details are available from the author.

14. There are some anomalies. Republicans calling it quits in traditionalistic states vote more conservatively, and Southern Democrats from the same culture veer to the left. Neither makes a lot of sense, especially since the retiring Southerners were always quite conservative, and there is no reason for GOP legislators from this conservative culture to fear voting too conservatively (see chapter 6).

15. I owe these ideas to John Lott. Cf. Bender and Lott 1996, 82.

16. The mean score of Republican state elites for committee leaders is $.32$, compared to $-.067$ for other GOP senators ($p < .15$). The mean score for Republican elites for party leaders is $-.586$, compared to $.163$ for other GOP senators ($p < .10$).

17. Northern Democratic committee chairs have a mean personal partisanship score of $-.370$, putting them to the right of their core supporters, compared to $.018$ for other Northern Democratic senators. Their fellow partisans have an average liberalism minus conservatism percentage of 9.487 , compared to 2.533 for all Northern Democratic senators ($p < .015$). Their party elites average $.740$, compared to $.448$ ($p < .16$), with higher scores indicating liberalism.

18. Northern Democratic committee chairs have an average pure personal ideology (statewide) score of $-.134$, compared to $-.370$ for pure partisanship. Their colleagues have scores of $.148$ and $.018$, respectively.

19. Northern Democratic committee chairs' personal partisanship is correlated at $-.390$ with the percentage of independents who identify as conservative in their state and at $-.701$ with the Republican identifier difference in liberal/conservative ideology. For other Northern Democratic senators, the correlations are $-.122$ and $.190$. Though based on tiny numbers, it is interesting to note that two of three Northern Democratic committee chairs and their opponents converged in 1982, compared to 4 of 11 (37 percent) of other Northern Democrats.

20. The correlation between personal partisanship and ideology is far stronger for committee chairs than for the rank and file among Northern Democrats ($-.512$ compared to $.032$). Yet seniority is so much higher among committee leaders that the comparison does not resolve the quandary.

21. The stratified personal partisanship score for Northern Democratic committee chairs is $-.775$ compared to the "unstratified" average of $-.398$. For other Northern Democrats, the difference is far smaller ($-.272$ compared to $.114$).

22. Using the Pro-ADA scores, as in Kalt and Zupan (1990), yields very similar results. The correlations are $.455$, $.742$, and $.128$ for all senators, unified delegations, and split contingents.

23. Among the 14 Republicans from single-party delegations, the correlation between senators' personal partisanship is $-.440$.

24. Boxer herself sees the regional, ethnic, and gender issues as something that unites her with Feinstein (Boxer with Boxer 1994, 81).

25. In states with divided delegations, the share of dominant party identifiers falls to 37.5 (compared to 45.5 percent for unified blocs, $p < .0005$).

Chapter 8

1. Many people don't like the term *shirking*, as I have learned from countless conversations since I began this project. Some are simply expressing a hostility to rational-choice theory (a position that I obviously do not share). Others see the terminology as confusing, since the real issue is what constitutes representation. The careful reader will note that I have played down the term *shirking* throughout the book and concentrated instead on personal ideology and multiple constituencies.

2. Both Republican results are consistent with chapter 5.

3. One-third of senators up for reelection from moralistic states in 1982 converged with their challengers, compared to 47 percent in individualistic cultures and 67 percent in traditionalistic states ($\tau\text{-}c = -.212$, $\gamma = -.382$).

4. The reason Northern Democrats from moralistic cultures do worse than their Republican colleagues may be independent ideology. Independents in moralistic states are more conservative than independents in individualistic states (though not compared to their counterparts in traditionalistic cultures). Independents in moralistic cultures with Democratic incumbents are no more liberal than their counterparts with GOP sitting senators.

5. Northern Democratic incumbents in moralistic states have just 30 percent of voters identifying with their party (smaller than for either of the other cultures). While GOP senators in moralistic cultures have only a slight edge (at 32 percent), they fare better than their colleagues in other cultures. Perhaps ironically, at least during this period, moralistic states were *least* likely to have split-party delegations.

6. This result seems anomalous compared to Republicans, since GOP legislators go *toward* their state party elites and Southern Democrats move *away from* their core partisan supporters. Given the key role of blacks in Southern Democratic primaries, the impact of liberal partisan supporters is understandable.

7. This may explain why my friend Mike Munger is so enamored of ideological-equilibrium models.

8. The exception is for Northern Democrats from individualistic states, who benefit from a more liberal induced ideology.

9. The measures employed for party identifiers and statewide attitudes are the shares of liberals minus conservatives. Ironically, GOP elite views are correlated more strongly with Democratic identifiers' ideology (.589) than with their own adherents' views. Democratic elites had only a modest relationship ($r = .181$) with Republican identifiers' views.

10. The equation for Republicans excludes Utah because of problems with the fundamentalist variable.

11. The percentage of liberals minus the percentage of conservatives averages -34.9 for the GOP compared to 3.0 for Northern Democrats.

12. They are a tiny share everywhere. Environmental activists constitute 0.46

percent of the population in traditionalistic states, compared to 0.78 percent in individualistic and 0.88 percent in moralistic cultures.

13. In most cases, the legislator-elite correlations are *the highest*. These correlations are based upon the shares of liberal and conservative shares of party identifiers and statewide public opinion, state elite attitudes, and senators' voting records from both PROLCV and ADA scores.

14. No senator, not even the shirkers as defined in chapter 2 (with standardized scores less than -1.96 or greater than 1.96), has either a statewide or state party pure ideology that qualifies as a shirker. The two statewide shirkers have an average absolute score of 1.204, compared to .383 for the nonshirkers; for the three state party shirkers, the differences are smaller: .886 compared to .522.

15. If we divide the mean scores by the overall standard deviations for each party, the distances are greater. The Northern Democratic personal ideology score rises from .189 to .346 and the GOP mean increases from .130 to .266.

16. Ragsdale's (1980) Senate model is for 1974; 1980 is an exception. It is the only year in which induced ideology is significant and personal values are not.

17. In 1982, 67 percent of candidates converged in traditionalistic cultures, 47 percent in individualistic races, and 33 percent in moralistic states.

18. I owe the statement on the quality of House challengers to a personal communication from Gary C. Jacobson.

19. The GOP offered quality challengers in 40 percent of races, compared to 30 percent for Democrats. This difference persists under a variety of controls. See, however, Squire 1989, which finds no partisan advantage in challenger quality among Senate challengers in the 1980s.

20. Despite the professed statement by many freshmen that they would rather be right than reelected, the first-termers have been aggressive in raising funds for their reelection contests, securing almost twice as much as their Democratic colleagues in the first six months of 1995. Much of the fund-raising effort has been through a coordinated national strategy by the House Republican leadership (Maraniss and Weisskopf 1995, A8).

21. The data, which were computed for me from the 1994 American National Election Study by Dianne Hollern of the University of Maryland—College Park, show the following:

	<i>GOP Identifiers: Freshman Districts</i>	<i>All Respondents: Freshman Districts</i>	<i>All Respondents: Other Districts</i>
More emphasis on values:			
Strongly agree	64.6	63.5	55.0
Religion as guidance:			
Great deal	42.9	39.5	34.7
New lifestyles break down society: Strongly agree	47.2	42.0	35.7
Tolerant of other values:			
Strongly agree	11.3	17.2	22.8
Strongly agree + agree	47.5	51.4	59.2

22. I divided Senate electorates into homogenous and heterogenous groupings based upon their scores on Sullivan's (1973) population diversity index. For the 50 senators with scores below the mean (.45)—homogenous electorates—the correlation between state mean opinions and mean partisan attitudes is .468, compared to .255 for the more heterogenous electorates. The correlations between state means and party elite views (with signs reflected) are .540 and .150, respectively. Statewide personal ideology and pure personal partisanship are also more strongly correlated in homogenous states (.415) than in heterogenous ones (.280).

23. The correlation between pure personal ideology and general election vote share was .075 in 1976, $-.163$ in 1980, and $-.070$ in 1982. When we break down the results by party, they do not change markedly for 1978 and 1982, but do for 1980. Liberal Northern Democrats lost votes in the general election ($-.382$), as we would expect from the large number of Northern Democrats who lost. Even—indeed, especially, in 1980, Republicans won more votes if they were moderate. The correlation between vote share and pure personal ideology is .703.

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