CHAPTER 1

A Theory of Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Postcommunist States

This chapter will critique existing theories of civil-military relations and propose a theory of civil-military relations appropriate to the needs of postcommunist democratizing states. The military institutions of the former Soviet bloc must overcome patterns of interaction between civilian authorities and military leaders that contrasted sharply with the norms of interaction that their Western democratic counterparts experienced. The models of postcommunist civil-military relations developed here will focus on constructing two key elements of the military democratization process—democratic political control and democratic military professionalism. These theoretical underpinnings will then be applied to the military democratization process of two specific cases—Russia and the Czech Republic—in chapters 3 and 4. My hope is that the specific enumeration of democratic deficits across the two dimensions of military democratization outlined in the chapter will inform the efforts of policymakers—both within and external to transitioning states—who are dedicated to facilitating military institutions’ transitions to democracy.

The Need for a Theory of Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Postcommunist States

The experience of postcommunist states mandates a different theory of civil-military relations than has previously been pursued by states, whether authoritarian or democratic. The purpose of this section is to lay out the elements of democratic political control and democratic military professionalism characteristic of developed democracies in order to model the policy end point of states undergoing a democratic transition. My goal is to contribute to the delineation of a coherent set of civil-military relations that is responsive to the needs of newly democratizing states and that can also guide policy advisers in reforming these systems. In addition, this model can be used to inform the efforts of developed democracies to assist these states in transition.

Samuel Huntington, arguably the leading theorist of civil-military relations today, has argued that the interaction of the twin imperatives of security and accountability is at the root of the problem of civil-military relations. “The
military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.” A state’s civil-military relations, then, depend on forces that compel the military institution to strive to become a competent military force and the competing forces demanding that the military be accountable and responsive to the society it serves.

The central problem of civil-military relations is resolving the tensions that inevitably arise from these competing imperatives. The classical focus in the literature has been on civilian control of the military defined as “governmental control of the military.” This general characterization of the problem of civil-military relations has traditionally been accepted by theorists in the field.³

The Imperative of Democratic Political Control

In the case of a democratic state, or of a state engaged in the process of democratic transition, there exists the additional and more demanding challenge of ensuring that national security is achieved at the least sacrifice of democratic practices, norms, and values. With regard to military institutions within democratic societies, the most important of these values is that civilian authorities, elected and appointed, direct the military institution. The military must serve the democratic state and remain under its control. Although civilian control of the military is a goal for all states, its achievement in democratic states depends on the interaction between democratic institutions and military institutions charged with defending both the state and its democratic values.

Considering the total context of the military institution’s political environment is the most analytically powerful approach to take when studying its behavior. This is because the political role that the military institution can play within a state is derived from the position of the military subsystem within the overall political system. This insight implies that the type of political system that a military institution serves matters. Consequently, variances between political systems or transitions to new political systems must necessarily affect the behavior of the military. For this reason, analyzing the military institution in isolation from its social and political setting is a limited and insufficient approach.

Civilian control is best understood by considering a set of relationships. “The nature and extent of civilian control reflect shifting balances between the strengths of civilian political institutions on one side, and the political strengths of military institutions on the other.” It is appropriate, then, to attempt to illuminate which relationships are relevant and how they can best be structured to
enhance civilian control in general, and democratic political control in particular, especially as these relations apply to postcommunist reform efforts.

The conditions of postcommunist states engaged in democratic transition are distinct from the conditions that characterized the military institutions in stable political systems. Democratic states insist on military subordination to its civilian leadership and, by extension, to democratic processes of authority and control, resting ultimately on the freely expressed opinion of unfettered electorates in choosing officeholders. Therefore, many of the widely held assumptions underlying traditional approaches to civil-military relations need to be reexamined in light of the experience of the postcommunist states in transition from authoritarian rule.

The Deficiencies of Traditional Approaches to Civil-Military Relations

Samuel Huntington’s concepts of subjective and objective civilian control alternately emphasize the maximization of civilian power through ideological controls and the achievement of civilian control through the fostering of military professionalism.” Subjective civilian control assumes the military’s participation in politics and encourages the political socialization of the military so that its values mirror those of the state. In contrast, objective civilian control assumes complete apolitical behavior from military professionals. Indeed, Huntington contends that, since one of the basic foundations of military professionalism is obedience to any civilian group that secures legitimate authority in the state, professional officers would have no desire to interfere with questions of policy. Instead, their full attention would be devoted to carrying out the state’s political aims with maximum effectiveness and efficiency once these have been determined.

Objective civilian control is Huntington’s clear preference for modern states. “Subjective civilian control is fundamentally out of place in any society in which the division of labor has been carried to the point where there emerges a distinct class of specialists in the management of violence.” In Huntington’s view, objective civilian control is the only option that contains the power of the military vis-à-vis civilian groups while also maximizing the likelihood of achieving military security.

In The Soldier and the State, Huntington’s concept of the military professionalism characteristic of objective civilian control mandates that no political role, no matter how responsible, can be allowed for the military. Such a perspective does not sufficiently reflect the dynamics that operate within a democratic state. In the politics of democratic states all institutions compete for resources and attempt to influence policymakers who make decisions affecting
their organization. In reality, military institutions must cooperate with their oversight bodies to pass on professional expertise and lobby for the support of their professional recommendations regarding national security.

Even more important to the democratic adjustment of postcommunist militaries is Huntington’s assumption of a brand of military professionalism that is unquestionably loyal to whatever government has legitimately come to power. Such an analysis ignores the ideological adjustments that necessarily accompany shifts in political systems. As citizens of the states they serve, military personnel inevitably undergo some form of socialization that transmits the values of the state. Servicemembers develop a set of beliefs that forms the basis of their motivation for their service to the state. When society embraces a new set of values, as in the process of transition from authoritarian rule, some adjustments must also be made to reorient the motivation for service of military members.

Moreover, to assume that the military as a subunit of society, albeit a group isolated to some degree, is totally impervious to monumental political and economic changes that may sweep a state ignores the fact that military personnel, like all participants in the life of the state, are affected by significant changes within it. A liberalization of the political system or the transformation of economic patterns will inevitably affect the military whose members share many of the same expectations and values as their civilian counterparts. This is particularly true when political changes result in negative outcomes for the military that may undermine, threaten, or perhaps even destroy previous levels of status and material well-being. Such is the case in many of the transitioning postcommunist states. While the military increasingly comes to share the values of society, it also resists changes and the values underlying them if its status and well-being are threatened.

Huntington has great difficulty accepting the possibility of a professional military institution that is also socialized ideologically to defend a particular political system. Yet he assumes that soldiers born in democratic states will naturally act as democrats without any particular effort in the military socialization process to ensure that such behavior occurs. Huntington’s most recent writings continue to espouse universally accepted norms of military professionalism narrowly defined as accepting objective civilian control and focusing purely on military matters. No specific attention is given to differentiating between norms of military professionalism in authoritarian and democratic political systems.

Military professionals in modern democratic states, however, are socialized to defend a particular form of government. Military professionals in democracies believe that the protection of democratic institutions and of the individual freedoms of their countrymen depends on their service. In consolidated
democracies, there exist expectations within society at large and within the military that democratic values matter and that all organs of the government, including the military, should reflect and uphold them. The military not only defends the political order advanced by the democratic regime, it must allow itself to be shaped by that order. As such, human rights abuses within the military are not normally tolerated, nor are strategies of organization and leadership endorsed that conflict with standards prevalent throughout the rest of the democratic society. This emphasis on democratic values is carried out as long as military effectiveness is not sacrificed. In the routine conduct of their duties and especially in combat scenarios, military personnel enjoy limited freedom. Overall, though, military professionalism in a democracy is monitored by the civilian overseers to ensure that the norms, practices, and values of the democratic state are replicated in the behavior of its military arm to the greatest extent possible.

Some may argue that demanding such high standards of adherence to democratic values is unreasonable in light of the authoritarian heritage of the transitioning postcommunist states. Certainly the legacy of Soviet era norms of behavior is influencing the course of postcommunist military institutions across the region. This legacy and its specific impact will be discussed at length later in this chapter. However, the prevalence of nondemocratic patterns of political control and military professionalism in a state’s history precludes neither the possibility nor the expectation that democratic norms should ultimately prevail as the processes of democratization continue. The existence of “democratic” states with militaries that fall short of democratic norms, South Korea and Taiwan, for example, merely means that such states have not progressed far enough on the continuum of democratization. If the postcommunist states of the former Soviet bloc are to truly democratize there has to be a change in both the ideology and culture of their civil-military relations. Signals from advanced democracies in the West that professional norms and accountability to civilian authority may settle at a “reformed-authoritarian” or “quasi-democratic” state limits the course of military democratization and may dangerously commit NATO allies to the defense of states that are less than democratic.

In reality, a blend of subjective and objective control is found in advanced democratic states and in transitioning states aspiring to become consolidated democracies. An overreliance on universally accepted norms of professionalism that are supposedly applicable to militaries across political systems to ensure democratic political control ignores the ideological transition to democracy that transitioning militaries must make and takes for granted the ideological socialization of militaries that occurs in advanced democracies. Nonintervention in the professional military sphere also assumes that, left to its own devices, militaries in democracies will develop a set of norms and prac-
tices that reflect the values of the democratic state—or that if a set of norms and
democratic values does not develop, then such a result is
of no real consequence for the preservation of a democratic regime.

**The Imperative of Democratic Military Professionalism**

Therefore, I propose that in addition to ensuring that processes of democratic
political control continue on course, specific attention should also be given to
developing appropriate patterns of democratic military professionalism. Dis-

**Professionalism Defined**

Civil-military relations theorists agree that the advent of modern technology
spurred the growth of specialization, which in turn produced the phenome-
non of professionalization. Huntington’s widely accepted model of profession-

According to Huntington’s model, the expertise of a professional stems
from a period of prolonged education and experience during which the profes-
sional must demonstrate competence in the objective standards of the profes-
sion. Military professionals are distinguished from other professionals by the
nature of their expertise as managers of violence. The military profession is
unique because of the distinct function that society has entrusted to it. The
singular responsibility of the military professional is to direct, operate, and con-
trol an organization whose primary function is the threat or use of deadly mil-
itary might against enemy forces and targets designated by the political leader-
ship. Military professionals in all political systems share a mandate to be as
competent as possible in their military expertise in order to defend the political
ends of their respective states.

**Military Professionalism in Democratic States**

States seeking to maximize their military security, without compromising dem-
ocratic values in the national security effort, need to pursue a form of profes-
sionalism that incorporates Huntington’s principles of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness and also fosters the penetration of democratic values within the military institution. Both efforts must be deliberately thought out, planned, and executed. In addition, civilian and military participants in the process should be aware of the need to monitor the growth in functional professionalism so that it does not outstrip the concurrent need to ensure that societal values are also internalized. The ultimate goal is to promote the development of both professionals and democrats.

The Legacy of Soviet Patterns of Civil-Military Relations

The legacy of the Soviet era must be considered as the foundation on which adjustments to a democratic system of government will be made. The soldier in the Soviet Union and his comrades in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) experienced completely different sets of dynamics in relating to their states than did their counterparts in democratic states. The Party relied on the military as an instrument of enforcing and imposing authoritarian rule, yet these political authorities also feared the military because of its potential to employ its resources against the state.

Although Party leaders maintained a monopoly of power within the political system, they did not have a similar monopoly of force. The possession of the instruments of coercive power by states’ militaries mandates that all states cultivate stable relations between the military and the civilian leadership so that militaries do not stray from their designated role in the political system. The imperative of Party control in Communist systems was complicated by the fact that no process of orderly transfer of power was present. Potential rivals, then, could always seek to manipulate the military institution for their own purposes, while the opportunity also existed for the military to take sides in political fights as the primary managers of violence in the state. Therefore, continued Party control depended on complete control of the military institution.

In comparison to militaries functioning in democratic societies, the characteristics of military professionalism were markedly affected by the military institutions’ roles as instruments of the Communist Party. Such service emphasized subordination to an authoritarian ideology and state rather than upholding the primacy of the individual and the protection of his rights as the central focus of state institutions.

A Comparison of Norms of Democratic Political Control and Political Control in the Soviet Era

Table 1 lays out the norms of democratic political control and contrasts these features with the patterns of political control that were prevalent across the
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<th>Elements of Political Control</th>
<th>Democratic Features</th>
<th>Soviet Features</th>
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<td><strong>Constitutional Provisions</strong></td>
<td>Mechanisms for civilian control sufficient and clearly codified.</td>
<td>Communist Party vested with supreme authority</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Executive Oversight and Control</strong></td>
<td>Clear chain of command from military leaders to the executive. Presence of expert civilian national security staff. Effective civilian oversight within the MOD. Transparent and responsive MOD and military. Expert advice of military leaders one input to national security decisions. Mutual confidence between civilian and military leaders. Corruption not tolerated. Executive actively educates public on national security policies and priorities.</td>
<td>Clear chain of command from military leaders to party leaders. General Secretary is Communist Party leader and directs party apparatus that carries out party policies. Military exerted influences over military policy and issues of professionalism but accepted the Party as the sovereign authority. Military relatively free of corruption in Soviet era, but corruption rises as transition begins.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative Oversight and Control</strong></td>
<td>Sufficient expertise to oversee budgetary and other oversight issues. Broad control over policy issues and ability to conduct hearings. Transparent MOD and military that allow unrestricted access to information to legislatures. Military responsive to legislative inquiries. Legislators motivated to ensure accountability of the military institution.</td>
<td>Legislature is no counterweight to the party leadership. No real oversight role. Loyal ratifiers of party policy.</td>
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<td><strong>Relationship Between Military Institution and Society</strong></td>
<td>No serious tensions between military institution and society. Respect for the military as the guardians of societal freedoms. Limits on the military’s access to influence and public participation.</td>
<td>Party was source of military’s prestige and status and bestowed upon the military a privileged place in society in exchange for defending the regime. Party controlled all levels of socialization and instilled militarism and respect for the military as hallmark of Soviet political culture. However, the degree of military prestige varied across the Soviet bloc.</td>
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Soviet bloc. The elements of political control considered across the variant political systems are the importance of constitutional provisions that enumerate responsibility for political control; the quality of control exercised through the executive, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the parliament; and, finally, the relationship of the military to the society at large. The democratic norms presented in this chapter offer a general framework that links professional norms with infused democratic values and socialization. While drawn from American practice, they have potentially greater and more universal applicability, subject to qualifications and adaptations that are sensitive to the historical experience, habits, and current needs of transitioning states.

The Importance of Constitutional Provisions for Ensuring Democratic Political Control

One of the first tasks that a society seeking to become a democracy sets out to complete is the composition of a constitution that codifies its societal goals and values. A constitution is vital for the success of a democratizing society. It ensures democratic political control of the military and defines the powers of governing institutions and their oversight authority over the military. Such constitutional constraints on the military routinely include vesting command of the armed forces in the civilian head of state or government and ascribing to the legislature the power to approve appropriations and to declare war. Power to act in emergency situations without the specific consent of the legislature may be reserved to the executive. Constitutional provisions may also ascribe to legislatures broad oversight capabilities over the military. These normally include the approval of major appointments, the organizational structure of the defense establishment, the powers of civilian and military officials within it, and special investigative powers to ensure democratic accountability. While the legislature may have broad constitutional powers “to make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces,” the executive may also have broad powers of internal management that allow him to issue orders that may affect internal procedures, responsibilities, and the distribution of authority in the armed forces.

While such provisions are important to include in a written constitution, one must be careful not to confuse shadow with substance when evaluating the effectiveness of civilian control within a democratic state. Theorists agree that formal prescriptions alone are not sufficient for civilian control. Huntington even argues that civilian control is achieved in the U.S. model *despite* rather than because of constitutional provisions. The constitutions of most democratic states contain such formulas as popular sovereignty, policy supervision, and budgetary control. The essential point of evaluation is the reality of the enumerated relationships. Are the formal prescriptions lived out in the life of
the state? Is the influence of the military balanced vis-à-vis the influence of civilian institutions? When valid constitutional designs do not work well in practice, citizens and civilians in positions of political authority must recognize their legitimate power to correct abuses. Action should be taken to right the balance of coordinated authority and control of the armed forces among constitutional bodies, a balance essential to the maintenance of democratic political control.

Constitutional constraints enhance the legitimacy of civilian authorities. If democracy can be crystallized in its most simplistic sense to mean that “the power resides in the active people,” then the elected representatives of the people serving in the various organs of the government must set the policy for a democratic state. Legal prescriptions legitimize the ultimate authority of the people through their representatives, and this legitimation may prevent a potential coup when the possibility of intervention is considered.

Political Control in the Soviet Era

Political control in the Soviet era was characterized by different degrees of centralization at different levels of administration. This enabled the political leadership, embodied in the upper echelons of the Communist Party, to prioritize and concentrate its resources and attention on areas in which it had the greatest interest. Party control extended over every aspect of society’s life in the Soviet bloc. While an elaborate bureaucratic structure developed over time separating every conceivable functional area, only the Party leadership had the authority to formulate policy and to oversee its execution. The role of the rest of the institutions of government was to ratify Party policy and to implement it.

The military institution, in this respect, was not unlike other institutions in the Eastern bloc. However, its unique function, managing violence, meant that the Party-military relationship would be characterized by a high degree of mutual dependence. The professional officer in the Soviet bloc resented the constraints on professionalism that service to an authoritarian state entailed, yet he also remained indebted to the state for the opportunity to serve it and to maintain a privileged position within it.

The Soviet experience with the presence of civilians within the defense ministry differed from that of the democratic model, which mandates the presence of civilian staffers in the upper echelons of the body and also has a civilian at the head of the ministry. In the Soviet model, the MOD was essentially militarized; when an occasional civilian was given a top position, that individual was given a military rank and wore a military uniform, as occurred with the installation of Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov in 1976.

The dominance of full-time Party apparatchiks at the highest levels of the decision-making process ensured that all policies would serve the Party’s in-
terests. Chief among these interests was controlling the military institution. To achieve this end, the Party created military Party organs to carry out Party work within the military. Its latter-day version was embodied in the structure of the Main Political Administration (MPA). Though there is disagreement on whether the Party or state security services exercised more control over the Soviet military and the militaries of the East European regimes, the state security services at least complemented the more formal and open activities of the Party carried out by the political officer.28

The patterns of Party control in the East European states modeled those relied upon in the Soviet Union. Governmental structures paralleled those found in the Soviet Union. With regard to control of the military, local versions of the MPA ensured the political reliability of the armed forces and carried out their programs through political officers and basic Party organizations.29 However, in the East European states, control was exercised at multiple levels: at the domestic level by the Communist Party, on a bilateral level with the Soviet Union, and at the multinational level through the mechanisms of the WTO.30

Political control in the Soviet military depended greatly on the symbiotic nature of the relationship between the Party and the military. The Party needed the military to defend the regime from external and internal enemies, to serve as the guardians of the revolution, and to socialize society through military service. On the other hand, the Party was the source of the military’s prestige and material status, and the insurer of the continuation of a stable system of government.31

In Eastern Europe, however, the legitimacy of ruling communist parties was weak because they had not come to power either through a revolution or by popular demand. Power was handed to the local Communists through the coercive means of Red Army occupation. Consequently, the legitimacy of the armed forces committed to defend the communist regimes was also weak.32 This complicated the problem of achieving political control. East European Communists were wary of the loyalty of their armed forces and considered the Soviet military, whose troops were present within the WTO states alongside the national militaries, as their ultimate line of defense.33 For the Soviet Union to permit conditions that would enhance the political legitimacy of the local Communist regimes would necessarily mean loosening Moscow’s control over them. Similarly, allowing the development of greater military professionalism within the East European militaries could have led to greater competence and contributed to the enhanced legitimacy of the armed forces, but the price would have been some loss of Soviet control.34

A necessary condition of service for the military in both the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states was the forfeiture of much of its professional autonomy throughout the Soviet era. Ensuring the military’s continued reliability within political systems suffering from legitimacy problems of varying
degrees required a conscious decision on the part of the political leadership to trade off maximum military efficiency and competence for the objective of political reliability. Political control was maintained through a network of nonautonomous political-governmental bodies that were responsible to the centralized authority embodied in the Politburo and the General Secretary of the Communist Party. In the Eastern European states, these local Party mechanisms were additionally accountable to Party mechanisms within the Soviet Union.

Democratic Political Control in Democratizing Postcommunist States

The gradual advent of democratization across the Soviet bloc has resulted in the simultaneous decentralization of the Soviet era’s system of control and the rising influence of other legitimate centers of power characteristic of democratic political systems. These changes have inevitably had a seismic effect on civil-military relations in the postcommunist states. The armed forces of the former Soviet bloc have been forced to adapt to new environments characterized by a new political ideology requiring a conversion of loyalties and patterns of thinking.

The form of democratic political control of the military will vary in the transitioning states depending on whether they have selected presidential or parliamentary political systems. For instance, in Russia, democratic institutions are dominated by a strong executive, and most of the responsibility for democratic political control is lodged in the executive by design. In contrast, the Czech Republic has chosen a system with a strong parliament and a weak president. Control in this case is largely administered through the prime minister and the defense minister who are accountable to Parliament. The model of democratic norms of political control presented in this chapter constructs a general framework of civil-military relations in transitioning states. It must be adapted to the specific historical circumstances, current needs, and future imperatives of democratizing states. Some states may choose to have greater reliance on executive controls, others on parliamentary ones, and still others on a separation of powers between institutions. The important benchmark for success is the proper implementation of whatever system of control is chosen.

The Importance of Executive and Ministry of Defense (MOD) Control in Democratic States

The exercise of democratic political control through the executive is reflected first and foremost through the military’s responsiveness to the executive’s constitutional powers. Day-to-day executive control, however, is administered
through a ministry of defense accountable to the executive and/or to parliament, as applicable, through the legislature’s oversight powers. Militaries in democracies are further characterized by civilian defense ministers whose departments have authority for the organizational and administrative control of the armed forces. Furthermore, sufficient civilian expertise must exist in military matters so that civilian overseers in the MOD can execute their oversight functions effectively.

Executive control also depends on the transparency of the defense ministry and the military services. Defense officials and military officers must be responsive to outside inquiries. Violations of democratic norms and practices or of military procedures and regulations should be swiftly investigated and resolved. Additionally, corruption in any form that may jeopardize the public trust must not be tolerated. Civilian defense officials must also have the capability of accurately assessing the readiness of the nation’s military forces and have access to military bases and the appropriate information to make this assessment.

One of the factors that can limit democratic political control is the monopolization of national security information by the military. It is difficult for civilian authorities to maintain control of the military institution if they feel incompetent in matters of national security. Civil-military relations theorists recommend the establishment of a national security council comprised of civilian expert advisers on military affairs to counsel the executive or the prime minister, as applicable, on national security issues. A staff of civilian experts can serve as a filter between the military chiefs and civilian officials while also formulating its advice based on an understanding of the broadest aspects of domestic and international affairs.

The authority of the executive is also vested in the civilian chiefs of the military services and their staffs. The presence of competent civilian bureaucrats capable of overseeing the military organization because of their technical expertise, while also remaining accountable to elected officials, is essential to democratic political control as well. In addition, such officials are an important source of institutional continuity and memory. Under the guidance of a national security council, these civilians are responsible for preparing the budget, allocating missions and responsibilities between the services, and advising the foreign ministry and the prime minister or president on military aspects of foreign policy. Their presence ensures that matters of state policy are initiated by civilian authorities who are accountable to elected members of the government.

While matters of policy may be initiated by civilian authorities, civilian supremacy in any political system depends on a sense of mutual confidence between military and civilian leaders. Military leaders must perceive that their expertise matters and their advice is weighed with great care by competent civil-
ian authorities. Military leaders at least want to be assured that they have access to civilian policymakers and that any strategic decision of the executive is made after considering their expert advice.37

Finally, the head of government can play a role in strengthening the relationship between the society at large and the military institution by helping to educate the public on the nation’s security policies.38 The national security policies of a democratic state should be well known and understood by its citizens. The public should understand the efforts of military professionals charged with carrying out the policies, and recognize as well that some national sacrifice of treasure and individual freedoms may be necessary to achieve the nation’s security ends.

Elements of Parliamentary Control in Democratic States

One of the chief means for democratic political control in states with parliamentary systems or with a separation of powers between institutions is legislative oversight of military affairs. This supervision may be carried out by specialized defense committees (as is the case in the United States), through broad oversight powers exercised by the entire legislative body, or through a combination of the two. The primary means of parliamentary or alternative forms of control is budgetary.39 Effective budgetary control depends on access to accurate and specific information regarding proposed programs and expenditures. Control of the budget, like all other aspects of legislative control, also depends on sufficient parliamentary expertise in defense matters to make appropriate judgments.

Legislative oversight of the military also typically includes control over broad matters of military policy, such as the size and organization of the military and the defense ministry, and the confirmation of key military promotions and civilian appointments. Legislative authority may extend, too, to the regulation of recruitment and training practices, approval of salaries, monitoring of housing conditions, and the deployment of troops abroad. Legislative control may rival that of the executive due to specific powers reserved for the legislature that may limit the authority of the executive, such as the confirmation of appointments and control of the purse. However, some constitutions may reserve these powers for the executive or for the prime minister. The multi-party makeup of most legislatures limits somewhat their effectiveness because they lack the focus and unity of the executive.

The quality of legislative oversight varies with the competence and interest of the overseers, as with the executive oversight previously discussed. Do the legislators have the technical expertise, through their own training or by access to expert staffs, to consider carefully different aspects of the budget and relate them to the long-term strategic needs of the state? Are they willing to ap-
appear to be unpatriotic if they question the needs of the military? Are the supervisors too close to those that they supervise to rein them in when appropriate? Is the military responsive to legislative inquiries? Finally, are the civilian overseers sufficiently motivated to invest a lot of energy and resources into overseeing an area of national policy in which their electorate is typically disinterested?

One way to enhance the defense expertise of parliamentarians is through the participation of staffs made up of functional experts to assist in the decision-making process. Unrestricted access to defense ministry, outside civilian, and uniformed military experts through the conduct of hearings on military policy can also improve the defense oversight process. In this respect, the executive and legislature have similar interests in access to the expertise of the military leaders. Just as the executive can call on military leaders directly for their input into national security issues, legislators must also be able to hear directly from military experts when they so desire.

Legislative oversight, like executive oversight, varies according to an array of factors. The most important of these is the relative responsibility for control granted to the parliament by the constitution. Although the powers of budgetary oversight, investigation, and general legislative authority on matters of military organization and policy may reside within civilian bodies, their effective control may be low either by design or because the legislature is not fully implementing its designated authority. Civilian oversight must be evaluated according to the competence and motivation of the civilians filling the relevant positions as well as the resources available to assist them in their supervisory task. The existence of oversight positions alone does not guarantee democratic political control of the armed forces.

Relationship of the Military to the Organs of Government in the Soviet Bloc

The most obvious difference between discussions of civil-military relations in the Soviet era and the norms of democratic civil-military relations previously discussed is that there are not as many axes of the relationship to explore. The only relationship that really mattered was that between the Party and the military. Neither the legislature, the executive, nor the judiciary had separate autonomous realms of authority vis-à-vis the military. Each was present in the Soviet system, but only the authority of the Party, which controlled all institutions of government, mattered. Even the enumeration of powers and rights in the Soviet and East European constitutions mattered little in comparison to the will of the Party.

Political control of Eastern European armed forces, however, depended on both the nature of the Soviet-East European relationship at the interstate level
and the relationship between the military and the Party within each individual Communist state. A variety of coercive and socialization mechanisms were employed to ensure loyalty to both the Soviet Union and the national regime. These included control through the Party apparatus and the establishment of Soviet Army norms and practices throughout the Warsaw Pact nations.

Military and political actors with only the democratic model of civil-military relations as a point of reference are consequently struck by the unidimensionality of the Soviet model. Limited experience with only one primary source of authority over Communist militaries in the Soviet era severely constrains postcommunist actors attempting to transition to a political system in which a more comprehensive set of democratic institutions has legitimate politcal influence over the military.

The Relationship between the Military Institution and Society in Democratic States

In democratic states, the attitude of the society at large is shaped by such factors as the congruence of military and societal values, the historical role of the military in the society, and the prevalence of outside threats to the society. In democracies it is essential that tensions between society and the military remain low. The gap between society and the military institution can be bridged to some extent through the mutual exchange of societal and military expectations about the role of each in a democratic society.

For instance, the society at large may expect that the military institution place a great value on remaining an instrument of state policy, that it place a premium on military members upholding military virtues, and that democratic principles be reflected in the procedures and practices of the military institution to the greatest extent possible without forfeiting a degree of military security. In order to ensure that these societal expectations are met, citizens may demand that local military commanders and defense and military officials at the national level respond to the military’s breaches of democratic norms as perceived by the public. The press can also play a key role in forcing the military and its civilian overseers to remain democratically accountable through its investigative reporting and demands for access to information that should rightly fall in the public domain.

The military institution, on the other hand, may have the expectation that its professionalism is respected and encouraged, that its service is rewarded with an appropriate level of compensation while on active duty and with the possibility of civilian employment upon discharge or retirement, and that the society at large entrusts it with the responsibility for protecting its physical security and way of life. The military can advance the fulfillment of its expectations vis-à-vis society at large by cultivating its relationship with the civilian
community, being responsive to demands for democratic accountability, and
upholding democratic values, such as the protection of civil rights, in its insti-
tutional practices.

The military institution must realize, though, that it is responsible to a great
extent for shaping its image within society. The armed forces must, first of all,
be aware of what their image in society is and what the sources and substance
of the societal perceptions are. In areas where societal perceptions do not match
reality, the military may have to actively seek ways to correct the mispercep-
tion. Where negative perceptions are valid, then the military should work to re-
form these practices that induce popular skepticism.

The Military and Society in the Soviet Bloc

Since the Party controlled all levers of socialization—the workplace, the
schools, the media, and to some extent the home—militarism and respect for
the military institution were deliberately fostered until they became hallmarks
of Soviet political culture. The authoritarian nature of the Soviet Union enabled
the political leadership to manipulate the terms of the military’s relationship
with society. High levels of respect were encouraged within the school system;
and, from the earliest age, Soviet youths were taught to look forward to their
time of compulsory military service.

The use of the military as the primary agent of political socialization
among conscript-age youths highlighted the compatibility of military and soci-
etal values in the Soviet system. The ideal soldier was, conveniently, also
the ideal New Socialist Man—patriotic, hard-working, Communist, morally
upright, and respectful of his Commander and comrades in arms. The system
of universal conscription that required virtually every Soviet man to perform
military service at the age of eighteen gave Soviet males firsthand experience
with military values and with the institution in general. Many continued their
military service in the reserves, thus carrying on a lifelong affiliation with the
military.

The deliberate presentation of military values through all vehicles of So-
viet socialization reduced the gap between military values and those desired by
the Party in society at large. The result was an overall controlled but positive
relationship between the military institution and society. The constant influx of
conscripts and their subsequent return to civilian life also contributed to a
greater sense of the permeability of the military and civilian worlds.

In the East European states the socialization process was complicated by
the anti-Russian and anticommunist sentiment that pervaded the Eastern bloc
to varying degrees throughout the Soviet era. First, some basic level of toler-
ance for Soviet values had to be established. Accomplishment of the political
socialization task in the East European militaries drew heavily on the Soviet
model, which was aimed at developing officers who were both “red” and “expert.” Moreover, the ideological message transmitted in the East European states was necessarily two-dimensional. Emphasis had to be placed on both socialist patriotism, or nationalism, and socialist internationalism, or obedience to Moscow.43

In contrast to democratic societies, whose professional military enlistees and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) voluntarily serve for relatively long periods of time, the militaries of the Soviet bloc were less isolated societal institutions inevitably affected by the social forces influencing its conscript pool. Any significant change in the compatibility of societal and military values has deep consequences for the military institution that must adapt itself to the changing society that it serves. Certainly, shifting from the homogeneous militaristic values of the Soviet era to the pluralist values of a transitioning democratic society challenges the conservative nature of the post-Soviet militaries in the former Soviet Union and across the former Soviet bloc.

The Legacy of Soviet Patterns of Military Professionalism

The unique features of the Soviet political system fostered a distinct form of military professionalism resulting from its tsarist legacy, the socialization processes of the Soviet era, and the constraints of Party control. Authoritarian models of officership and leadership, the harsh discipline of military life, an intense aversion to revealing its internal operations to the public, and the corruption of bureaucratic and personal ethics all came to characterize Soviet military professionalism.

The Soviet army reflected the values of its authoritarian state in that the relationship between officers and soldiers was like that of landowners and serfs. Some landowners were concerned about their serfs’ welfare, while others did not even think of them as real people. Consequently, the Soviet Army and its successor, the Russian Army, practiced the traits of slaves: forbearance, suffering, and pretending to get along;44 and a form of military professionalism developed in which officership was characterized by uneven standards of responsibility for subordinates, coercive rather than motivational forms of leadership, and protection of oneself from the potentially cruel disciplinary arm of the state.

A Comparison of Norms of Democratic Military Professionalism and Military Professionalism in the Soviet Bloc

Developed states strive to achieve the dual goals of professional competence and loyalty to the political regime. The task for consolidated democracies is the
development of an officer corps of expert soldiers who are also democrats, while the task for the communist states of the Soviet bloc was the development of soldiers who were both “red” and “expert.” The obvious task for postcommunist states in transition, then, is the conversion of the “red experts” into “democrat experts.” This section will focus on the desired professional characteristics of military institutions in service to democratic states and illustrate how inherited patterns of control and behavior from the Soviet era make such a shift in military professionalism difficult.

Table 2 compares characteristics of military professionalism across political systems. Although this model stresses the differences between the Soviet patterns of military professionalism and democratic norms, it is important to note that there is some overlap in several of the characteristics that could be appropriate for military professionals in either political system (indicated by a note). Criteria that ensure the presence of democratic norms and practices are essential for the development of democratically accountable military institutions. The goal is to offer a framework for institutional development that weighs heavily both the objective of defending the democratic state and that of remaining true to the societal values of the democracy it defends.

Both objectives can be achieved if the insertion of democratic norms in the following aspects of the military institution’s professional development is deliberately pursued: recruitment and retention, promotion and advancement, officership and leadership, education and training, norms of political influence, prestige and public relations, and compatibility of military and societal values. Each of these elements will be discussed in turn by comparing professional norms that emphasize democratic accountability and military competence with the legacy of the Soviet bloc’s pattern of professionalism.

Norms of Recruitment and Retention

Standards of selection into the ranks of military professionals are an essential part of democratic political control. Recruitment objectives can be achieved by manipulating the requirements for acceptance into the various commissioning sources and the enlisted ranks as a whole. For instance, the prestige of the profession can be boosted by increasing the prerequisites and criteria of admission in order to attract superior candidates. Of course, prestige also depends on the quality of the education and training offered as well as the overall status of the profession within society. De Tocqueville argued that the prestige of the military is essential to the recruitment of quality officers, particularly within democracies: “The best part of the nation shuns the military profession because that profession is not honored, and the profession is not honored because the best part of the nation ceased to follow it.”

It is essential that democracies have civil and military services whose
**TABLE 2. A Comparison of Democratic and Soviet Models of Military Professionalism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Military Professionalism in a Democracy</th>
<th>Democratic Features</th>
<th>Soviet Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recruitment and Retention</strong></td>
<td>Cross-societal, variety of sources. Entry based on merit. Prestige of commissioning sources high. Democratic values reflected in treatment of personnel.</td>
<td>Conscript system led to universal service. Entry into the officer corps related to merit and factors other than merit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promotion and Advancement</strong></td>
<td>Merit-based promotion system. Affirmative action based advancement may be used to fulfill democratic norms of inclusion. Performance and seniority balanced. Officers promoted who support democratic principles.</td>
<td>Political influence interferes with merit-based system. Patronage networks compromise bureaucratic norms for promotion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officiership and Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Styles of officiership and leadership reflect democratic principles and respect for individual human rights. Preference for non-authoritarian style of leadership.</td>
<td>Individual rights sacrificed beyond the constraints necessary for military competence. Preference for authoritarian style of leadership. Abuse of soldiers common.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education and Training</strong></td>
<td>Principles of democracy and the role of military professionals in the state taught throughout the military system. Allegiance to democratic institutions taught. Qualified civilian and military instructors with some civilian participation as students at some levels. Professional ethics emphasized along with military competence.a</td>
<td>Extensive and in-depth education and training network. Professional knowledge stressed. Marxist-Leninist ideological training emphasized. Limited appreciation of civilian expertise gained in training. Professional military competence also emphasized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norms of Political Influence</strong></td>
<td>Military fully accepts role in the political order.a No involvement of military in political feuds. Recognition that some limited degree of political interaction with oversight institutions is necessary. Direct participation in politics is not accepted. Attempts to influence the political process are nonpartisan.</td>
<td>Accepted junior partner role to sovereign Communist Party. Limited political influence in some areas of military affairs. Favored role in society and centralized economy reduced need to lobby for resources. Competed for resources within the “rules of the game.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
TABLE 2.—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Military Professionalism in a Democracy</th>
<th>Democratic Features</th>
<th>Soviet Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prestige and Public Relations</td>
<td>Public accountability high.</td>
<td>Low public accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full disclosure of information.</td>
<td>Controlled release of all information to outside inquiries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsive to outside inquiries.</td>
<td>Limited media access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media has full access.</td>
<td>Militarist socialization methods continuously connected military to society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military actively manages relationship with the public.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatibility of Military and Societal Values</td>
<td>Accepts legitimacy of democratic institutions.</td>
<td>Military and social values highly compatible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conceptualization of democracy is similar to society’s.</td>
<td>Military used as primary instrument of political socialization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adapts internal operations to reflect democratic societal values.</td>
<td>Internal operations reflected corrupted Soviet bureaucratic values.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Indicates characteristics that could be appropriate for military professionals in either system.

Social origins and attitudes are broadly representative of society at large.\(^{46}\) Emphasis on national service academies that draw candidates from across the nation helps to weaken regional ties and develop a broader sense of national identity. Additionally, the existence of scholarships to pay for the education received at the various commissioning sources ensures that officer candidates will be drawn from all economic sectors of the society. Control over the selection and subsequent socialization of its members contributes to the ability of the profession to successfully institutionalize societal and institutional values deemed necessary for democratic accountability and professional competence.

Standards of selection for the Soviet officer corps were boosted by the Party’s efforts to enhance the political, economic, and social status of the Soviet officer. Indeed, the emergence of a professional officer corps depended on its portrayal within Soviet society as a prestigious job that also came with a generous package of pay and perks, such as specialized shopping facilities and better than average apartments. The emergence of the commissioning schools as degree-granting institutions also enhanced the prestige and status of the military profession, since Soviet parents placed a high value on careers requiring a degree.\(^{47}\)

The extensive network of 140 commissioning schools located throughout the Soviet Union and the relative desirability of the profession ensured cross-societal representation throughout the officer corps. The political authorities in the Soviet era placed a high priority on establishing the appropriate incentives of pay and prestige to attract to the Soviet officer corps sufficient numbers of well qualified youths from all spectra of Soviet society. Officers’ pay was gen-
erally one-third more than that received by civilians with similar qualifications. Throughout the Soviet era, the promise of housing, access to goods, and a generous pension attracted quality prospects to serve in the officer corps.

In East European militaries, the remaking of the officer corps according to the demographic preferences of the Soviet Union resulted in the replacement of officers from aristocratic or bourgeois backgrounds with those from peasant–working class backgrounds. While these individuals were thought to be more ideologically reliable, their educational qualifications were substantially below those who had previously served. The establishment of East European military academies to educate the second generation of postwar Eastern bloc officers improved the situation. However, even through the 1980s the East European officer corps lacked the level of educational attainment that characterized the Soviet officer corps.

The type of student attracted to service in East European militaries was typically a cut below what the Soviet military colleges could recruit. Those who became military officers came largely from the strata of society that did not place a great premium on university education, but wanted opportunities and material benefits that would be denied them without some postsecondary education. Material incentives rather than ideological motives were the prime motivations for service across the Eastern bloc. The maintenance of an attractive package of pay, housing, and other material perks was a key element of the recruitment and retention programs of the Soviet and East European militaries. The salaries of East European officers were generally 30 to 50 percent higher than their civilian counterparts. Additionally, generous pensions, vacations, and the promise of good civilian jobs upon retirement motivated many to choose military life.

Retention issues focus on offering incentives of adequate pay, quality of life, and opportunities for advancement within the military profession for officers and professional noncommissioned officers (NCOs). These factors enhance the retention of military professionals across all political systems. Military professionals in service to democratic political systems have the additional expectations that standards of treatment in military service will be commensurate with democratic societal values and that procedures for the redress of grievances through oversight authorities exist when civil liberties, human rights, or other standards of democratic accountability are violated.

Norms of Promotion and Advancement

A merit-based, objective system of promotion is one of the fundamental elements of a professional military. Militaries in democracies may also be monitored to ensure that democratic values of inclusion are reflected in promotion patterns. Harmonizing societal aims with institutional preferences without sacrificing military effectiveness, however, is a complex task. Incorporating vari-
ous ethnic and demographic groups within the military is important because such action helps the military’s institutional values remain in step with those of society. A comprehensive system of evaluations, periodic testing on essential professional skills, especially those related to technical competence, and the balancing of performance criteria with seniority contribute to professional competence.

On the surface, the Soviet era promotion system seems to have had many of the elements of a merit-based system. Evaluations considered both professional and political characteristics and were reviewed by the officer’s immediate supervisors, the political officer, the Secretary of the Party and Komsomol committee, and the chief of the personnel office. However, commanders were required to weigh heavily the strength of officers’ ideological convictions in the promotion process. The emphasis on nonprofessional qualities and the involvement of authorities outside the cadre of professional officers meant that even in the most equitably administered version of this system, subjective, nonprofessional factors would come into the process.

The Soviet officer promotion system, however, had other problems besides living with the mandated requirements of considering political qualities and subjecting evaluations to outside reviewers for approval. Corruption within the system, much of it perpetuated by the professional military, made the promotion process, in reality, less than a merit-based system. Supervisors would often manipulate the system to fulfill their own needs by downgrading the reports of good performers in order to retain them or inflating the report of a poor performer in order to get rid of him.

Means of advancement within the Soviet military were also corrupted by the prevalence of a patronage system in which senior patrons could be relied upon to ensure that promotions and desirable assignments went to their protégés, regardless of their qualifications. It was also well known that patrons could protect more junior officers from punishments that could be ruinous to their careers. There were complaints that officers with patrons or good family ties received promotions and desirable assignments near their families regardless of their records. Numerous accounts of such complaints were featured in the Soviet press during Gorbachev’s period of glasnost indicating the corruption that had become prevalent in the promotion system through the Brezhnev years and that still continued.

Such abuses are likely in a system that gives so much authority to the immediate commander instead of evaluating officers for promotion through a centralized promotion board. Additionally, the frequency of longer assignments at one post in the Soviet system provided incentives for commanders to keep good junior officers within their unit. A system with more frequent rotations, such as the U.S. system of moving every three to four years, is more resilient to such abuses.

In the East European militaries, professional credentials and reputation
gradually became more important as conditions for promotion, but they never replaced political reliability as the ultimate indicator of success. Additionally, promotion to advanced leadership positions within East European militaries depended on selection for attendance at Soviet military academies. These graduates subsequently formed the pool of candidates for staffing the top command jobs within the WTO. The control of such opportunities essential to career advancement ensured a confluence of interests between Soviet military leaders and East European military elites. The existence of such a Soviet-controlled patronage network also helped to balance the conflicting demands of socialist internationalism and patriotic nationalism.

The postcommunist states need to focus on the establishment of bureaucratic norms for promotion to replace the previous emphasis on the political criteria of military or political leaders. Democratic governments must balance fostering loyalty to democratic institutions with professional competence. This balance is achieved through the creation of merit-based promotion systems and widely known career patterns that standardize requirements for career progression throughout the military. These requirements for advancement should be reinforced and taught in the professional military education (PME) system. In transitioning states, promotions can also be used to promote supporters of democratic military professionalism.

Norms of Officership and Leadership

The core issues of professional officership—who, why, and how an officer serves—differ markedly in authoritarian and democratic states. Soldiers in democratic states are conditioned to believe that standards of treatment central to life within their democracy are expected within all societal institutions. In addition, in democracies laws come from those elected to create them, and all citizens are subject to them. A commander’s individual order cannot supersede the law of the land. Democratic control of the military is partially dependent on the shared democratic socialization of all citizens about democratic principles and the requirements of democratic accountability. While not all democratic states have progressed equally in this aspect of democratization, the standard set forth in the democratic military professionalism model challenges all democratic and democratizing states to meet this ideal.

The model of democratic military professionalism may be challenged on cultural grounds for ignoring the unique authoritarian traditions of democratizing states that continue to influence postcommunist patterns of officership and leadership. While cultural and historical distinctions are important to recognize and account for dissimilar paths of democratization for each case, over time these societies and their civil-military relations will necessarily adapt authoritarian patterns to democratic ones. To accept incomplete adaptations in the
name of cultural and historical uniqueness is to condemn such democratizing states and their militaries to something less than complete democratic consolidation. Indeed, the military democratization programs conducted by the United States and other developed democracies across the former Eastern bloc should take aim at highlighting patterns of behavior that may be attributed to cultural and historical foundations, but are incompatible with democratic norms of behavior. The existence of some militaries in democracies that fall short of the ideals set forth in the democratic military professionalism model should not deter democratizing states from proceeding as far as possible toward the achievement of democratic norms. Indeed, no democratic state epitomizes the ideal on every dimension of the democratic military professionalism model, but such imperfection does not quell societal demands to more closely approximate the goals of the model.

Military leadership in a democracy places a high premium on paying attention to the individual needs of the soldier. In an essay excerpted for use at the service academies, General Edward C. Meyer, a former Chief of Staff of the Army, wrote that “the kind of leadership we need is founded upon consideration and respect for the soldier.” The emphasized traits “leading by example,” “taking care of the troops,” and “respect for the soldier” can be found across political systems, because, over time, these leadership methods have been proven to produce more competent and motivated military forces.

For instance, German NCOs in World War I were particularly adept at these methods. However, these traits are especially appropriate in democratic, open societies due to the expectations of their citizens that human rights will not be unduly sacrificed and also to the existence of oversight procedures capable of monitoring violations of democratic norms and practices. Such characteristics are required elements of democratic military professionalism and are often found lacking in authoritarian systems where similar expectations and oversight capabilities do not occur.

Indeed, Soviet military professionalism was characterized by its lack of rule-bound behavior. While democratic models of military professionalism limit officers’ actions through legal mechanisms, the system of edinonachilie (one-man command) essentially meant that there were no illegal orders in the Soviet military. The absolute power that commanders held over their subordinates “was exercised by their exclusive right to issue orders, and the assurance that these orders, regardless of what they might entail, would be followed unquestioningly.” The system of Soviet-style officership was one that was based on the absolute control and authority of the commander and the denial of legal rights to his subordinates. Junior officers complained that “innovation, initiative, personal pride and motivation” were drained by the exploitation of their superiors and that “those with the right, have more rights” while “those who command, get what they want.”
The system relied on personal power and political and personal loyalty. In this respect the military institution was not unlike any of the others within Soviet and East European society. Senior officers routinely used their positions for their own ends—trading the benefits of the influence of their position to another individual willing to trade the benefits of influence within his.

These patterns of officership can be attributed to the traditional Russian attitude toward discipline. Nine hundred years of living under authoritarian systems of government conditioned the Russian people to accept and to expect force as a valid method of rule. Such attitudes were certainly evident in the Soviet military disciplinary system, which was and remains draconian by Western standards. While the East European states did not share the same authoritarian heritage of Russia and the Soviet Union, the patterns of Soviet military professionalism extended to the militaries of the satellite states as well. As a result, behaviors attributed to Soviet military professionalism could also be found throughout the Soviet bloc.

Soviet military professionalism was also characterized by the toleration of dedovshchina, or “nonstatutory relations” among soldiers, which was essentially a systematized program of hazing new conscripts. Hazing within the Soviet and East European militaries was much more than some sort of good-natured, morale-building rite of passage as might be found in other militaries. Rather it was a system of controlling behavior not through motivation or leadership, but through the threat of brutal physical punishments. The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, formed during the liberalizations of the Gorbachev period, reported in 1989 that 3,900 Soviet recruits lost their lives as a result of hazing and hazing-related suicides that can be attributed to the humiliating actions of senior soldiers and officers toward conscripts.

The toleration and reliance on dedovshchina for the maintenance of good order and discipline within the armed forces is evidence of a corrupt sense of military professionalism. It perpetuates a sort of slave mentality of officers and senior enlisted men toward their subordinates and a style of officership based on instilling fear within subordinates. Though prohibited in the criminal code, the disincentives against commanders admitting the existence of violations within their units induce commanders to conceal them.

The Soviet model of military professionalism in these respects falls far short of the democratic model’s emphasis on “leading by example,” “taking care of the troops,” and teaching officers the importance of respecting their soldiers. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which outlines behavioral norms in the U.S. military, obligates superiors to be models of faultless discipline and high moral standards. Any violations are widely publicized, and procedures exist for subordinates to report cases that superiors refuse to forward to the appropriate authorities.

Gorbachev’s reforms emphasizing the creation of a political system based
on legal rights threatened the very foundation of officership within the Soviet military as its members began to examine in a new light practices denying individual rights. Subordinates began to question the actions of their superiors and to call for reforms in the press. However, the reliance on these practices throughout the life of the institution and the equating of them with military professionalism has led to deep resistance among senior officers and some junior officers wary of the prospect of incorporating democratic values into post-Soviet styles of officership and leadership.

The transparency of democratic military institutions fosters democratic accountability and makes the existence of institutional corruption less likely. This sense of societal responsibility also contributes to an institutional emphasis on professional ethics. These norms of democratic officership and leadership can be encouraged with officer evaluations that assess leadership qualities that contribute to the achievement of democratic military professionalism. Steady progression in the development of these attributes will then enhance an officer’s potential to achieve command positions and advanced rank. Likewise, the presence of an NCO corps with standards of democratic military professionalism similar to those of the officer corps leads to the enhanced technical competence of military forces in all political systems and to the infusion of principles of democratic military professionalism throughout the entire chain of command in democracies.

Officership necessarily undergoes changes when the expectations of the society that it serves change. Transitioning states must incorporate the lessons of democratic military professionalism practiced in consolidated democracies. In democratic systems, styles of officership and leadership are characterized by accountability to democratic values, respect for civil liberties and human rights, stewardship of the public trust, and ethical behavior manifested in the honor code of the profession. The motivation to institute these changes depends on military leaders’ own dedication to democratic principles as well as the realization that such changes will result in a more motivated and competent professional military institution.

Norms for Education and Training

Experts have estimated that modern officers spend approximately one-third of their professional careers in formal schooling. In these courses officers acquire their knowledge of subjects ranging from the liberal arts and engineering while studying at a military college, to technical aspects of their craft while training at an artillery officer school or flight training base, to the complexities of joint operations and international relations while studying at the senior service schools. Such comprehensive training is characteristic of professional militaries across political systems. However, some systems place different em-
phases on the value of a broad, general versus a narrow, technical military education.

The preparation of the Soviet officer, though extensive, was narrower than that received by officers with broader responsibilities in other systems. Beyond the particular specialization of the school attended, the core subjects common to all the commissioning schools included Marxism-Leninism, political economy, and CPSU history in the social sciences; math and physics among the general disciplines; and some military subjects such as tactics and military art and science. The inclusion of some type of common core curriculum was supposed to produce “specialists with a broad profile.” In comparison with the less specialized philosophy of the U.S. system, however, the Soviet officer’s training was less conducive to the preparation of officers who would eventually work with more broadly educated civilians in the policy-making process or to interacting with educated civilians in general.

For the most part, officer education in the East European states among WTO members was part of an integrated system controlled by the Soviet Union. The exception was Romania, which did not allow its officers to be educated abroad. The same methods and curriculum characterized schools across the region. Additionally, the Soviets trained faculty for the East European military schools and academies and sent lecturers and instructional materials to Eastern Europe.

An officer’s commissioning source is his first exposure to the principles of the military profession. In these critical formative years of professional socialization, officer candidates are taught what their role in society will be as a military professional. Cadets are taught who, why, and how they serve. Obedience to the orders of legitimate authority is the first principle of civilian control. Therefore, the question to whom a military professional’s obedience is owed cannot be left ambiguous. In a democratic state, commissioning sources emphasize the requirements of democratic military professionalism. Ideally, this process of professional socialization should include deliberate training on the imperatives of democratic political control and the responsibilities inherent in serving a democratic system of government. Such an approach emphasizes that although officers may have a tradition of serving a “nation,” “motherland,” or “fatherland,” their constitutional allegiance is to a democratic government and society. Officers trained in this way learn that their role is to develop their military expertise with the understanding that its employment is subordinate to the directives of political authorities.

Political socialization processes differed substantially between the democratic and Communist systems. In both systems, the prior socialization processes of the school systems ingrained general societal values in the new recruit that could then be refocused to emphasize the specific values of military professionalism. However, with the exception of youths raised in military families,
the typical officer candidate or recruit in a democracy has had very little or perhaps no prior experience in military subjects. In the Soviet system, the prior socialization experience included heavy doses of militarism and political training. Beginning in kindergarten, Soviet children were subjected to patriotic education and military themes in their earliest readers. Such training continued through elementary and secondary school and was supplemented by membership in youth organizations in which military training was a featured aspect of the overall political indoctrination program.77

Military-political indoctrination comprised 30 percent of cadets’ training time at the higher military training schools.78 Upon graduation, the new officers’ political indoctrination was continued by their units’ political officers, who were graduates of a specialized commissioning school for political officer specialists. The main function of the political officer in the military’s political socialization program was to generate support for the Communist Party, its leadership, goals, and policies.79 Short-term political socialization attempts were aimed at instilling minimal social values in conscripts whose terms of service ranged from twelve to thirty-two months.80 The goal was to mold the “New Socialist Man” who would return from military service properly motivated to continue to build communism in civilian life.81 Long-range political socialization was aimed at professional soldiers, noncommissioned and commissioned officers alike, with the goal of creating a more enduring bond between professional soldiers and the system.82

The same methods of political socialization developed for use in the Soviet military were applied to the East European militaries. Parallel goals were pursued: ensuring the subordination of the military to Party and Soviet rule, transmitting communist ideology to the nation’s citizenry by exploiting the opportunities provided by mass conscription, and improving combat effectiveness by instilling in the troops the motivation to defend communist ideals.83 However, the ideological message varied somewhat in the East European states because it was focused on both building allegiance to Moscow, through socialist internationalism, and loyalty to the domestic Communist Party through an emphasis on the martial traditions of each individual state.84

A key element of the postcommunist militaries’ successful transitions to democracy would be to revamp the curriculum of the commissioning, precommissioning, and postcommissioning schools. Additionally, attention must be given to socializing soldiers and officers to the values of democratic states. Many of the elements of Soviet military professionalism discussed in this chapter were first learned through the process of professionalization that occurs at the commissioning schools and in the pre-military training that precedes it at the high school level. These topics were then reinforced through the political education that occurred in military units and continued later through the work of Party propagandists in civilian life.85
Especially critical areas of instruction would be the role of the military in a democratic state and characteristics of military professionalism in a democracy such as standards of officership and leadership that emphasize respect for the individual, professional ethics, responsibility to a democratic society, and an aversion to corrupted meritorious processes that detract from professionalism and the prestige of military service. These same issues must also be discussed at the higher military academies and general staff colleges as crucial elements of the postcommunist militaries’ transitions to service within a democratic state. The extensive infrastructure of the military educational system and the value placed on learning professional military topics throughout the course of an officer’s career are positive aspects of the Soviet legacy. These features can be redirected in the postcommunist era to orient postcommunist officers to the professional qualities most compatible to the service of a democratic system of government.

The military is unique as a profession because there are multiple points throughout the career of an officer when he or she can be influenced by an educational experience. Such courses should be monitored to ensure that their curricula reflect changing priorities in the profession and within society at large. Concepts or values that may have changed since an officer underwent training at his commissioning source can be readdressed at later points in his career. In the case of transitioning states striving to incorporate the traits of democratic military professionalism, use of the military education system to reorient officers schooled in authoritarian values is an excellent means of achieving democratic military reform.

A comprehensive understanding of the democratic form of government by military members also entails the acceptance of political conflict as characteristic of the political system. The military must also become comfortable with the uncertainty and problematic nature of political authority in an open society and resist the temptation to intervene in political processes for the sake of its own interests and those of the officer corps. Officers in transitioning political systems will find it particularly difficult to adjust to the multiple axes of democratic oversight and accountability that characterize democracies.

Norms of Political Influence

Another essential component of democratic military professionalism is the degree to which the military institution can participate in the politics of its society without sacrificing its professionalism. Huntington allowed for only an extremely limited role for the military professional in politics. The reality, though, is that armed forces are inherently political institutions. They must compete for resources within democratic states, and their sense of professional responsibility motivates them to seek to influence the conduct of national security by of-
ferring their professional expertise to civilian policymakers. Military leaders in a democracy can, accordingly, be expected to lobby legislators and government officials on matters related to enhancing the professionalism and competence of the armed forces and the assessment of national security needs.

Democratic military professionals, however, fully accept their role in the political order and do not offer their services to civilian leaders involved in political feuds. Institutional safeguards exist to ensure that allegiance to democratic institutions supersedes allegiance to particular political figures or policy agendas. Democratic officer corps respect as a priority of professionalism the importance of remaining nonpartisan in political battles—even those that directly impact the future of the military. Their efforts should be focused on the military security of the state and the maintenance of a professional military institution in service to a democratic state.

Indeed, in the United States, military regulations are quite specific in their prohibition and permission of particular forms of political activity. Active duty military members may register and vote in elections, express personal opinions as individual citizens on candidates and issues, make financial contributions to political parties and organizations, attend political gatherings as spectators if not in uniform, and display political stickers or badges when not in uniform and not on duty. Active duty military members may not campaign for or hold elective office, make financial contributions to individual candidates, directly participate in political campaigns, speak before partisan political groups, or march or ride in partisan political parades. In addition, candidates for public office cannot make political speeches or distribute campaign materials at military installations.87

Such a nonpartisan orientation not only supports a democratic military institution’s emphasis on defending a system of government, but also enhances the influence that the military institution can have on matters of primary importance to it. Military leaders have learned that continued success over time in gaining resources for their services and in influencing strategic national defense policies depends on the careful preservation of a nonpartisan stance.88 However, military professionals in democracies also understand the importance of balancing this constraint with their advisory role as functional experts on matters of national security that may result in promoting certain matters of military policy to civilian authorities.

The Soviet military’s participation in politics was limited in both its scope and political means employed. Most of the Soviet military’s participation in politics was confined to internal matters or the dispensation of expert advice to civilian authorities in order to resolve institutional issues. Only a small portion of political behavior crossed into the territory of outright political bargaining,89 and there was no movement toward direct military rule until the 1991 coup.90

The military had some experience with exerting political power vis-à-vis...
the Party in the Soviet era, but mostly confined this activity strictly to matters involving military affairs. At times, Party control was loosened and greater professional autonomy granted when the Party was more dependent on the military due to domestic or international crises. It was in these periods that political participation increased. However, ultimate authority always remained with the Party, and military influence generally did not extend beyond limits that were acceptable to the political leadership. Military officers, as agents of civilian leaders, were delegated the authority to make routine decisions on such matters as military training, living conditions, weaponry, and strategy. Additionally, institutional issues such as share of the state budget and demands on the science infrastructure and other national resources to support the military were often based on the advice of military officers whose monopolization of defense expertise gave them special weight in these areas. In general, the interests of the military and the Party coincided, and the acceptance of civilian supremacy was undisputed in the Soviet officer corps.

In the East European states, however, the interests of the military and the state did not coincide as closely as in the Soviet Union. For instance, the push for reform in the military at times surpassed the state’s conservatism; and the armed forces of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania have been implicated in coup attempts throughout the Communist era. The civilian leadership of the East European states questioned the political reliability of their militaries due to the armed forces’ reluctance to support the domestic regime against its internal foes in politically tense situations. Finally, the overall influence of the military in the political system of the East European states lagged that of their Soviet counterparts because of the less extensive representation of military personnel in the highest policy-making bodies of the state. While military membership in the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party varied from 7 to 9 percent since 1972, the level of such membership in Eastern Europe was only 3 percent. These factors combined with the limited legitimacy of the East European regimes and external Soviet military interference prevented the East European militaries from becoming interest groups to the degree that the Soviet military did.

Democratization has resulted in multiple axes of civil-military interface. The evolution of democratic institutions competing for authority in the transitioning states will require the simultaneous evolution of the militaries’ liaison skills in working with these transformed and newly instituted levers of civilian oversight. For instance, lobbying for military interests in parliamentary bodies constitutes a new avenue of political influence previously unavailable in the Soviet era. On the other hand, there is a loss of political influence in the overall political process due to the elimination of the Party structures in which Soviet, and to a lesser extent East European, soldiers were represented in the various decision-making bodies of the state.

Officers in postcommunist states, however, must be careful to avoid direct
participation in politics, which undermines professionalism by involving the officer in political trade-offs that might damage the military institution and its ability to achieve its primary function of ensuring the state’s military security. A balance must be struck between competence in matters of domestic and international politics (in order to effectively realize the constraints on resources and to offer expert military advice based on an understanding of the comprehensive context of an issue) and active participation in political affairs. The military officer in a democracy must prize his advisory role and so must remain personally above politics. Officers in democratic and democratizing states must be aware of the established norms of influencing the political process while remaining focused on respecting the constraints of democratic accountability.

Norms of Prestige and Public Relations

Centralization of command, the hierarchical arrangement of authority, and the rule of obedience are all necessary and contribute to the mechanical solidarity of an army, but esprit de corps gives an army its life. Esprit de corps is grounded in service to a cause and depends greatly on the general sense of prestige that society attributes to the military. Adequate pay, good living conditions, and respect within society for the skills learned by military specialists enhance the prestige of the armed forces.

The degree of prestige that the military institution can earn within society also depends on how well the military meets the expectations of society in practicing military virtues. The military gains a certain amount of respect and political power in society to the extent that society finds the military to be an institution that places a high premium on the military virtues of service, bravery, discipline, obedience, self-denial, poverty, and patriotism. In democratic states, militaries must meet the additional expectation of upholding and practicing democratic norms and practices in the fulfillment of their specialized tasks.

The Soviet military officer enjoyed a considerable amount of status in the Soviet Union and was held in higher esteem than a great majority of occupational groups. The status of military officers in the Soviet Union was “unsurpassed among contemporary world powers.” The Soviet Union’s preoccupation with national security and fear of encirclement by hostile states led to the military’s assumption of a preferential position in the society and the economy that afforded the armed forces influence, privilege, and status greater than any other group.

East European regimes also tried to ensure the loyalty of the military by granting the military material benefits and prestige. However, the prestige of the military profession in the East European states always lagged that found in the Soviet Union because of the lack of legitimacy of the national Communist
regimes. The citizens of these regimes considered the members of the armed forces to be defenders of Soviet international interests and of unpopular subordinate political regimes.\textsuperscript{107}

The one-party states were in command of all organs of the media and the release of information to the public. For this reason, the Soviet and East European states were able to fashion a popularized image of the armed forces and the military officer. However, as mentioned earlier, these image-shaping campaigns had less effect in Eastern Europe due to the populations’ greater reluctance to embrace the ideological underpinnings of their political regimes. Additionally, the capacity to control the economic incentives of the state enabled it to reward the military profession materially, thus contributing to its overall status in society.

The absence of feedback mechanisms between the citizens and the state resulted in low public accountability of all of the institutions of the state—including the military. A lack of accountability to its own members within the military institution also characterized the Soviet military and the East European militaries molded in its image. As previously discussed, Soviet styles of officership and leadership often resulted in negative outcomes for subordinates who had little recourse to report ill-treatment or neglect on the part of their superiors. In comparison with the democratic model of military professionalism, the Soviet model was concerned with only a contrived sense of public accountability.

Disclosure of all information was controlled, and the responsiveness of all institutions to outside inquiries was virtually nonexistent. Certainly, many of the negative aspects of the military institution became known to society at large through firsthand experience, such as the universally poor treatment of conscripts, but no efforts were made to change the source of these negative images. Instead, the dissonance between firsthand or secondhand accounts of military life and the images propagated by the media organs of the state continued until democratization began across the region under Gorbachev.

Prestige and competence are mutually dependent concepts. Prestige falters when the military institution fails in its function to protect the national security interests, while competence is enhanced when prestige of the military is high. Both society, including the activity of civilian institutions, and the military need to appreciate this relationship and work to improve prestige and professional competence through all means available. This chapter has posited that one means of improving the competence of armed forces in democracies is to foster the traits developed in the model of democratic military professionalism.

Prestige rooted in democratic accountability to civilian society is a trait of democratic military professionalism. Military institutions in democracies work to gain the support of the societies they serve by charging military professionals specifically with the task of managing the military’s relationship with the public. In the United States, in all services, the public affairs field is a separate
specialty requiring specific training and expertise like any other career field in order to be effective. These specialists focus on shaping a positive image for the armed forces while also fielding investigative requests from the press, civilian authorities, and the public.

In this way the military institution fulfills the expectation that it will operate according to democratic principles when interacting with the rest of society. The press expects and is normally granted access to military leaders and authorities. The value of disclosure to the public is respected—even if such revelations have a negative impact on the armed forces’ reputation in society. However, claims that full disclosure may compromise national security limit the transparency of military institutions in all states. In democratic states, however, transparency of budgets, management planning, strategy, and doctrine are all essential elements of democratic oversight and civilian control. Democratic militaries must have routines of communicating this information to the public and civilian authorities through public affairs specialists and accessibility of military officials before authoritative civilian panels. In general, democracy and secrecy are thought to be incompatible unless measures of the utmost national security are at stake.\textsuperscript{108} Even then, appropriate civilian authorities in oversight roles will have access to otherwise restricted information.

The self-image of the military professional is also important, and it is essential that this self-image closely parallel the image of the military professional in society. For instance, professional military officers, and even enlisted troops, place a value on the self-image of service to country versus the image of working as a mercenary. There is also a prevalent self-image that mastery of their jobs requires quite a bit of expertise—an expertise that should be recognized by society at large and rewarded by a society that recognizes the transferability of military skills to the civilian sector.

As discussed earlier when analyzing the importance of the mutual cultivation of the prestige of the military institution by itself and society, such attention will help to attract quality recruits and enhance the professional competence of the military institution. The maintenance of a high level of prestige for the military institution is a critical factor in successfully achieving the dual roles of military professionalism and professional competence. It is important to keep in mind the responsibility of all pillars of a democratic society to foster it.

The Importance of the Compatibility of Military and Societal Values

The most fundamental value that must be mutually held by the military institution and the society it serves concerns what constitutes the legitimate authority of the state. “Where there are competing authorities, or competing ideas as to what ought to be the authority, professionalism becomes difficult if not im-
possible to achieve."109 Yet a democratic political system assumes that its military officers are positively committed to the principles of civilian supremacy and civilian leadership.110

The compatibility of military and societal values was high in the Soviet Union. The ideal Soviet officer was only a slight variation of the ideal Soviet civilian manager—the “New Socialist Man.” Those who internalized and valued Party ideals flourished in both the military and civilian worlds.111 The lack of distinctiveness between military and civilian values, as perceived by the Party leadership, led to less tension between them than might be found in democratic political systems. Militarism pervaded all the Communist states and was prevalent in all phases of political socialization. Conscription, in particular, with its secondary function of socializing conscripts in the values of the Communist regime, fostered the process of transmitting a common set of values across these societies.112

In the East European states the interests of the ruling party and the military were generally compatible. However, the legitimacy problem of the imposed Communist regimes led to a greater gap between the values of the societies at large and the military institutions that allegedly defended them. As a result, the quality of the recruited professional soldier was lacking because he did not represent the ideals of the citizenry in the same way that the Soviet officer did for the Soviet people.

As Gorbachev’s political liberalization began to unleash new forces in society and within Soviet institutions, the military’s social standing and institutional role in society was adversely affected. The most fundamental change was the de-emphasis of the military pillar of Soviet power in favor of increased reliance on economic reform. “Reasonable sufficiency” became the new defense posture, and great economic constraints were placed on military spending.113

The sea change in the Party leadership’s perception of geopolitics necessarily affected the military’s role and, ultimately, its prestige in the transitioning state. The concurrent expectation to participate in the process of perestroika, which entailed enduring increasingly harsh criticism of the military bureaucracy and external public pressure to “restructure” in order to respond to societal needs, proved to be an enormous strain on the military.

In contrast, in the East European states the disconnecting of the militaries from the Communist political regimes has been an opportunity for the divisions between transitioning postcommunist societies and their militaries to heal. The political leaders in the former WTO states have been faced with the challenge of remolding the image of their military forces as defenders of democratic states. Their success depends on the exploitation of the democratic oversight powers granted to them through their constitutions and their determination to inculcate the transitioning militaries in democratic values.

In mature democracies, democratic institutions are strong, and military
professionals are accustomed to the political conflict that takes place between them and to the need for mutual accommodation consistent with democratic structures. There are multiple axes of democratic oversight making demands on the military, and ensuring that oversight authority between institutions remains in balance according to the design of society outlined in either constitutional provisions or other accepted norms is essential. In transitioning states, however, the legitimate authority of state institutions may not be widely agreed upon. When the political system of a state is changing, it is important to assess the degree to which military and societal values are diverging and aggressively employ the levers of civilian oversight and control to bring them back together.

Organizational procedures and methods appropriate under one ideological system may seem to undermine rather than support societal values, in another. When a society shifts from holding subordination to the state as the highest ideal to promoting the rights of the individual, its institutional practices should also change. Military professionalism does not exist within a vacuum that is completely unaffected by changes within the society it serves—especially revolutionary changes. States in transition face the problem of an increasing level of disparity between societal and military values. Conservative leaders of military institutions\textsuperscript{114} may reject the notion that the brand of military professionalism developed within an authoritarian political system is inappropriate within a democratic political system. The democratization of society at large may result in less tolerance for such practices as the abuse of conscripts or other harsh practices that exceed the limits of discipline required for the maintenance of a professional military force. The public and civilian authorities will increase outside efforts to humanize and increase the transparency of the military and force the accountability of military officials who resist. An analysis of the cases in chapters 3 and 4 will illustrate the differences between transitioning states where societal consensus on democratic consolidation exists and where some democratization has occurred but there is not an overall consensus on its consolidation across all aspects of society.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the imperatives of democratic political control and democratic military professionalism as essential elements of military institutions in democratic states. Elements of Soviet military professionalism that are incompatible with military professionalism in a democracy have also been highlighted. The goal has been to create a model demonstrating how militaries can be democratically accountable and reflect democratic principles while also functioning as effective instruments of national security.

The survey of the processes of political control and accepted standards of military professionalism in the Soviet bloc has revealed some serious discrep-
ancies between democratic and Soviet era perceptions of military professionalism. Some of these deficiencies can be related to the necessities of authoritarian rule while others can be attributed to practices that were allowed to endure within it. One can expect that characteristics of Soviet era political control that are incompatible with democratic systems of government will eventually adapt to more appropriate forms associated with democratic models of legitimate government. More troublesome will be the corrupt habits of Soviet military professionalism that have been tolerated for decades and that paralleled the pervasive bureaucratic corruption of life in the Soviet bloc.

The process of democratization has had a seismic effect on postcommunist societies and especially on their military institutions. The relationship between the military and democratic institutions in postcommunist states continues to evolve within transitioning political arenas. The penetration of democratic values with the conservative postcommunist militaries has proven to be a slow process. Chapters 3 and 4 will illustrate that many of the norms and practices developed in the Soviet era continue to persist in the postcommunist states.

The task of achieving civilian control and military professionalism in states undergoing democratic transitions is complicated by the shift in the political system from authoritarianism to democracy. In transitioning states, the requirements of democratic political control must replace the previous understanding of civilian control. Similarly, the criteria of democratic military professionalism must replace earlier concepts of military professionalism practiced under authoritarian political systems. However, this phenomenon of shifting from authoritarian to democratic political systems and the subsequent impact on military professionalism has not been adequately addressed by traditional civil-military relations theory.

Those charged with democratic oversight in the transitioning states and external actors from the West attempting to assist with the process of democratization in the region should be familiar with the discrepancies between methods of political control and patterns of military professionalism in democratic and authoritarian states. Only with such an understanding can legacies of the Soviet era be overcome and new democratic patterns of behavior adopted. These states are confronted with the dual challenge of instituting democratic political control through still evolving democratic institutions while simultaneously inculcating their armed forces with the values of democratic military professionalism. Specific steps must be taken to ensure the political loyalty of the transitioning states’ military managers of violence while also focusing on improving the effectiveness of the armed forces. The approach to reform must recognize the interdependent nature of civilian and military institutions and also demand that the military conduct internal institutional reforms.

Most importantly, though, transitioning military institutions, and mature democracies that recognize the need to assist them, need to be well-versed in
the theoretical principles of civil-military relations in a democracy. The imperatives of civilian control in a democratic society and professionalism should guide all efforts to adapt to the ideological sea changes that continue to challenge transitioning states. The prescription is complex, and necessarily incomplete, but ignorance of its contents will lead to something less than the emergence of mature democratic societies with competent and respected military institutions that maximize military security at the least sacrifice of democratic values.

The next chapter will focus on the efforts made by one external actor—the United States—toward assisting the democratic transition of the postcommunist militaries. I will argue that the military assistance programs set in motion since the end of the Cold War have been ineffective predominantly because U.S. policymakers have not understood or applied the theoretical underpinnings that should guide these programs’ activities. These programs will only be successful when the contrasting models of political control and military professionalism in democracies and the Soviet bloc are comprehended and applied to them.