CHAPTER 5

The Effectiveness of U.S. Military to Military Democratization Initiatives in Russia and the Czech Republic

Chapters 3 and 4 illustrated that the democratization needs of the Russian and Czech militaries are great. Chapter 2 laid out the general U.S. response to the needs of postcommunist militaries across the former Soviet bloc and began to make the case that although some effort has been made to take advantage of military assistance opportunities in the region, failure to operationalize the concepts of *democratic political control* and *democratic military professionalism* severely limited the effectiveness of the outreach programs created. This chapter will highlight the disparities between the democratization needs of the Russian and Czech militaries and the specific steps taken through U.S. assistance programs to facilitate their transitions to democracy.

U.S. Military Presence in the Soviet Era

U.S. military presence in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in the Soviet era was primarily in the form of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) attaché personnel charged with collecting as much intelligence information as possible as they conducted their military diplomatic duties in the U.S. Embassy. The need for expert intelligence collectors merited an extensive period of preparation, to include language training, before these officers deployed in-country. These officers also usually had some regional or country-specific expertise. These positions have remained a constant presence from the Soviet era through the present and have affected subsequent efforts to influence the militaries of the region.

In the Soviet era, the military relationship between the USSR and the United States was centered around planning to wage war against each other and searching for ways to gain the upper hand in this endeavor. The intelligence work of attachés in Czechoslovakia also centered around collecting intelligence on the Soviet Union. Military diplomacy focused on dangerous activities or the prevention of them such as monitoring incidents at sea, air intercepts, and arms control compliance. In this respect, the relationship was adversarial with a focus on negative activities.¹
The openness created by perestroika and glasnost led to the possibility of initiating positive defense and military contacts between the superpowers. As noted earlier, the first exchange of this kind was in 1988 when General Akhromeev came to the United States to visit his counterpart, Chairman of the JCS, Admiral William Crowe. At this meeting a two-year plan for defense and military contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States was developed jointly by representatives of the JCS and the Soviet General Staff. Ten events were approved by both sides focusing mostly on high-level visits that were centered on reciprocity and protocol. By the second year of the program Generals Powell and Moiseev were the chiefs of their respective militaries, and the program was broadened at the request of Powell to include more exchanges with less formality overall. The military to military relationship that has developed with Russia in the postcommunist era has its origins in these early attempts to establish a series of friendly defense and military contacts during the Bush administration.

U.S. Military Presence in the Postcommunist Era

The overall relationship between the Soviet Union’s main successor, Russia, and the United States can be characterized by two main dimensions. First, it is a strategic relationship rooted in the enforcement and negotiation of arms control treaties and, more recently, the management of Russian reaction to NATO expansion. Second, there is an assistance dimension aimed at promoting democracy, economic reforms, and the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. The military to military programs explored throughout the rest of this chapter are just one small part of this overall bilateral relationship. These initiatives are a natural outgrowth of friendly relations and reflect the historic tendency in American foreign policy to foster democracy when such opportunities arise.

The first attempts at outreach toward the transitioning Czechoslovak state beyond the traditional exchange of information between attachés came in 1990 with initial military contacts between American and Czechoslovak general officers. Some key visits occurred early on during which some assistance was given with respect to the organization of a new military doctrine and strategy and processes of acquisition management. These early meetings also paved the way for Czechoslovak participation in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program through which the United States sent the first Czechoslovak officer to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1991. The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) deployed its seventh MLT to the Czech Republic in July 1993 and four Czech senior officers were among the first class to graduate from the Marshall Center in December 1994.
U.S. Military to Military Programs in Russia and the Czech Republic

The survey of regional military to military programs in chapter 2 noted that the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) and the program for Defense and Military Contacts with the former Soviet Union (FSU) have virtually the same broad policy guidance. The stated goals of the program of contacts with the FSU is “to facilitate a military responsible to democratically elected civilian authorities, a demilitarized market economy, and a smaller military with defense-oriented forces.” Similarly, the mission of EUCOM’s Joint Contact Team Program is “to assist the governments of Central and Eastern European countries and the republics of the former Soviet Union in developing civilian controlled military forces which foster peace and stability in a democratic society.”

The following analysis of events that have occurred under the auspices of these programs indicates that there is a significant gap between events that can be categorized as directly or even indirectly addressing the task of democratization facing the Czech and Russian militaries and those that cannot be classified as democratization events. Indeed, a substantial portion of events can be categorized only as supporting postcommunist militaries’ quests to be better militaries—a goal that does not coincide with the stated missions of the JCTP or the program of Defense and Military Contacts with the FSU, which are ideologically driven and justified.

The events are broken into “pre-reform” and “post-reform” eras for the Czech Republic. The implementation of “Focused Engagement” in mid-1997 coincided with a deliberate shift away from democratization events toward interoperability events, although neither the legal basis nor the mission statement of the JCTP has changed in the “post-reform” era. The analysis will show that even in the portion of events dedicated to military democratization objectives, poor conceptualization and operationalization of the components of military democratization still result in less than effective activity. The events for the Russian case run chronologically and are not separated into separate eras, since no major reforms in the administration of the military to military program with Russia have been attempted. The tables in appendixes A and B detail the events that have occurred under the auspices of these programs.

It is difficult to detect any particular focus areas of emphasis through an analysis of program activity. It is especially difficult to come to the conclusion that any sort of operationalization of the programs’ mission statements was ever done and that some effort was made throughout the implementation of the program to facilitate the occurrence of events that would contribute to the democratic transitions of the militaries.

In Russia, between January 1991 and December 1997, 329 defense and military contacts occurred under the official auspices of the Program of Contacts Between the Department of Defense of the United States and the Ministry
of Defense of the Russian Federation. Of the events recorded in the tables, I categorized 79.9 percent as not directly contributing to the democratization focus areas outlined in the models. Only 20.1 percent of the defense and military contacts recorded could be classified as contributing to one of the focus areas of a military in transition to a democracy according to the framework developed in chapter 1.

In the Czech Republic, of the 340 events recorded through FY 1998, I categorized 81.2 percent of them as not contributing to the military democratization goals of the program. I classified 18.8 percent of the events as contributing to one of the focus areas of a military in transition to a democracy. Breaking this data into the “pre-reform” and “post-reform” eras reveals remarkably similar results. Of the 238 events that took place through June 1997, 81.1 percent did not contribute to military democratization objectives, 81.4 percent of the 102 events from June 1997 through FY 1998 were categorized as not contributing to military democratization objectives. It appears, then, that the reforms have had little effect on the emphasis of military democratization goals in terms of percentage of program activity dedicated to achieving them.

These remarkably similar statistics across the cases speak to the amount of attention that is likely to be paid to democratization issues within programs that do not specifically attempt to ensure that program activity achieves this goal. The degree of success, however, must be considered to be an accidental occurrence since there is no evidence that either the policymakers or policy implementers had any knowledge of such a framework as they directed and carried out the programs’ activities. Any such classifications are the result of applying the framework after the events have been carried out.

In the Russian case many of the events recorded in tables B.1 and B.2 (see appendix B) were exchanges of high-level delegations of various defense officials and personnel whose trips in-country did not necessarily focus on democratization needs. I categorized many of these events as contributing to democratization needs simply because civilian defense officials were involved or because the exchange occurred between educational institutions, with the assumption that at least exposure to representatives from these components of the U.S. defense community might have some impact on perceptions of civilian control and issues involving education and training. In contrast, events that fell into the democratization category in the Czech case tended to be more clearly focused on achieving specific democratization needs of postcommunist militaries in transition. It should also be kept in mind that the Russian contacts recorded include only the list of official contacts agreed to by the two governments under the auspices of the defense and military contacts program. The tables do not include contacts associated with arms control implementation, cooperative threat reduction, or other less formal contacts that may have occurred. Experts estimate that contacts related to arms control inspections and scientific and technical military contacts comprise 75 percent of the overall defense and
military contacts between the United States and Russia. But these types of technical assistance contacts make no claims to be facilitating democratization outcomes.

The use of frequency criteria is limited since it does not consider the qualitative impact of particular events. It may be that one particular event was many times more successful than another and that great program impact could have occurred within just a few events. However, I began with this assessment tool because, at least in the “pre-reform” era of the JCTP, it was the only assessment tool that the program had applied to itself. There was a management mentality in the first six years of the JCTP that equated degree of program activity with success. An excerpt from USAF Pentagon briefing papers offers a self-congratulatory appraisal: “Probably the best measure of our success is they like what they see and keep asking for more. Here are some numbers on how many air force contacts we’ve had.” These comments accompanied a chart that illustrated through the use of bar graphs the increase in event activity across two fiscal years. By 1997, however, the increased operations tempo of active duty forces in Europe combined with the drawdown in active duty forces in the theater by 50 percent since 1992 resulted in a 10 percent drop in overall event activity and a greater dependence on Reserve Component forces to support them.

The focus on activity over the achievement of specific objectives created a dilemma for the team chiefs in-country who had been accustomed to fulfilling specific mission objectives in their daily duties. A team chief in the Czech Republic in the 1994–95 time frame shared his frustration that no clear definition of victory had been laid out for his team by the program’s policymakers. “When can we declare success?” He added that it was an interesting position to be in, when U.S. military thinking at the time was putting such a premium on laying out objectives and criteria for success.

Additionally, he noted that no one at USEUCOM had ever asked him about specific aspects of progress in the Czech Republic. When he did offer information indicating that progress had been made in a particular area, no one asked him how this progress was achieved. Indeed, his desk officer back at the program’s headquarters requested that such information be deleted from future reports since it was not relevant to the specific administrative function of recording how much money was spent and which particular events took place in the previous week.

The MLT in place in the Czech Republic during my field research was motivated to achieve program success, but limited by its directives and policy guidance. Their in-country experience resulted in the frustrating realization that those charged with overseeing the program had low expectations of what could substantively be accomplished by their team and had set up a bureaucratic mode of operations that practically guaranteed that only limited progress was possible.
A partial explanation of this phenomenon is that the JCTP is a political-military program in which operators have been allowed to both develop the flawed policy guidance and implement the program on the ground. A National Defense University scholar observed that those running the program have to learn as they go, but that this was unlikely since operators cannot be expected to understand the theoretical issues that should underpin and subsequently drive program activity. Improved guidance did not come until mid-1997 and consisted of an intermediary level of oversight within EUCOM to ensure that program activity supported the objectives of the European theater.

Previously, an approach that was generally passive and focused on offering a menu of services versus the development of a particular product (democratic military institutions) had developed. This led to a situation where the team in place lacked the means to maximize the possibilities for contributing to the deepening of military democratization as the potential for greater sophistication developed. The management of the program in the “pre-reform” era made it almost impossible for a conscientious, and perhaps uniquely enlightened, operator to improve the quality of the activity that had preceded him or her.

In Russia there were similar complaints from the U.S. attachés about policy guidance in their military to military contacts program. Policy planners at the Pentagon described the process of choosing which events should be proposed from the U.S. side as “unsophisticated.” The U.S. defense attaché charged with the duty of presenting the list of proposed U.S. events to his counterpart in the Russian General Staff Foreign Liaison Office said that he starts with a list of 150 unprioritized proposed events from the U.S. side that is comprised of inputs from all of the services. Then the Russian and U.S. officers review the list and winnow it down based often on reciprocity issues, that is, offering to host a type of delegation that the other state had hosted previously. He said that there is no specific guidance other than this in determining many of the contacts and that “in general the process of choosing events will not grow in sophistication until we push it.” He added that the United States has never figured out what it wants the military to military contact program with Russia to be. Do we want it to show how successful our system is, break down barriers from the Cold War, achieve interoperability, or influence senior decision makers?

The Army officer at the Pentagon with the responsibility for determining the Army’s inputs to the annual list of proposed events also complained about the absence of prioritization on the part of the United States about what its goals for military contacts with Russia should be. He said that in the honeymoon period right after Yeltsin took over, the DOD threw too much too fast at the Russians without focusing on objectives. “Powell’s guidance to engage at all levels often and anywhere was well-intentioned, but not practical.” He went on to say that this lack of prioritization was regrettable because the scarcity of
Russian economic resources severely constrained their level of participation in exchanges and other contacts.

Personnel involved with the program agree that there really is no broad plan guiding the contacts or supervision over what happens. “The idea is to let 1,000 flowers bloom.”16 Brigadier General Reppert, a former army attaché to Moscow and U.S. Defense Attaché to Russia as of July 1995, said that the Russian General Staff assumes that there is a master plan to the U.S. approach and has repeatedly asked to see it. But the general admits, “There hasn’t been one. We’ve taken the Johnny Appleseed approach—throwing seeds everywhere and hoping that some trees grow. This is why when we look back over the program we can see that we’ve tended to pursue paths of least resistance.”17 This is due in part to the tighter micromanagement of the program of contacts with Russia vis-à-vis other FSU states. The Russian program is controlled at higher echelons with extensive Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) involvement with inputs from other interested departments. The result, perhaps counterintuitively, is a less coordinated and defined program than the others in the FSU. Complaints persist from officers charged with implementing the program of contacts that this “unsophisticated process” is due primarily to the lack of clear political guidance detailing what the program should do. This results in a “grab-bag, ad hoc program driven by the ‘good idea du jour’ of various department heads and appointees.”18

The primacy the United States placed on its relationship with Russia relative to the other postcommunist states in the region also affected program activity. Initially, many more high-level exchanges of civilian defense officials and generals occurred in Russia than in its postcommunist neighbors. “Everyone wants to do stuff with the Russians—not just the components that should rightfully be involved.”19 Eventually, though, bilateral and multilateral activity with other FSU states, and especially with Ukraine, surpassed the number of exercises with Russia. To date six exercises have occurred between the U.S. and Russian militaries, while nine have occurred with Ukraine.20

**Bureaucratic Limitations of the Programs’ Effectiveness**

The Czech Republic and the JCTP

The greatest bureaucratic limitation of the Joint Contact Team’s effectiveness is in the policy driving the manning of the MLTs and the Joint Contact Team at EUCOM. While the assignment of highly trained professional military personnel with some fluency in the host nation’s language and some area expertise would enhance the effectiveness of the in-country teams, in reality the quality of each MLT varies substantially, and there are no specific criteria for filling the available positions.
A team chief who had served in the Czech Republic said that from his vantage point manning of the teams is done by the “Hey you!” method.\textsuperscript{21} That is, anyone who wants to come and live in Central or Eastern Europe for six months to a year unaccompanied by their family has a good shot at the job. No special expertise is required, nor is any such training provided in preparation for the deployment. The weeklong orientation course at EUCOM headquarters does not include any country orientation, nor is it possible to attend a Defense Language Institute (DLI) course before deployment in-country.

A U.S. Army officer involved with program oversight at the Pentagon explained that the language ability to man the teams is not uniformly available in the database across services. In 1996, however, the Air Force took some first steps to self-identify personnel with language ability. Another contributing factor is that the greatest source of area specialists in the U.S. officer corps, the U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officers (FAO), has dwindled due to the disincentives of the U.S. Army’s personnel management system. The promotion rate of these officers lagged so substantially behind line officers that interest in becoming an FAO decreased significantly. This problem has been noted and is being addressed, but it has existed throughout the life of the JCTP and also affects the quality of attaché staffing at embassies.\textsuperscript{22} Meanwhile the Air Force has begun the process of instituting its own foreign area officer specialty, but it will be years before this initiative will be able to influence current programs.\textsuperscript{23}

In the case of the Czech Republic there are additional cultural obstacles that have affected the scarcity of U.S. military officers with Czech heritage. Again, these are related to the negative image that Czechs have traditionally had of military service. Since Czechs have not historically placed a cultural premium on military service, those who emigrated to America did not encourage their sons to make the military their profession. Consequently, the search for a team chief or team members with a Czech background has been difficult.\textsuperscript{24}

The Defense Attaché staffs remain the only military entities in which linguistic and area expertise training dollars are invested. These officers have the skills to influence military reform and are interested in doing so, but the strict separation of MLT and DAO duties relegates the DAO staff to its traditional intelligence collecting and representational functions. The MLT, although its members do not have the specific training investment of the DAO staff, typically has much greater access to their counterparts in the host military. The result is a situation where the U.S. military entity in-country with the most potential for influence is not prepared to take advantage of its unique opportunity.

The team chief in place during the course of my research in the spring of 1995, Colonel Peter R. O’Connor, was an active duty U.S. Army Colonel whose previous assignment was Chief of Personnel for the U.S. Army in Europe. He was aware of the opportunity to serve in the Czech Republic because his college classmate and U.S. Army colleague Colonel Paul B. East served in the
position of Team Chief for the second half of 1994. His previous experience as a member of the Military Assistance Group (MAG) in Korea as a young officer and his friendship with a Czech officer who was his classmate at the Army War College also contributed to his interest in the assignment and caused him to actively seek the six-month position.

His personal interest in personnel management reform resulted in an attempt to influence this aspect of Czech military democratization, even though he had no specific area expertise or language ability. Colonel O’Connor is an example of an individual who proactively promoted a personal agenda, which met a real need in the Czech military’s development as a democratic institution. It is important to note that neither this particular focus area nor the brief assignment of Colonel O’Connor to serve as team chief was a result of deliberate JCTP policies. Indeed, these events occurred despite the obstacles inherent in the JCTP bureaucracy. In the end, the positive influence he was able to have was limited to the length of his short tour in Prague. Over three years after his departure from Prague, none of the proposals he worked to advance had yet been implemented.

Another staffing issue is related to the involvement of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) in the program. As chapter 2 illustrated, its involvement is closely associated with its ability to garner congressional support and funding for its programs. This involvement also translates into the guard and reserve forces being allocated a portion of the MLT billets. However, there is a substantial difference between a career active duty colonel who has risen through the ranks in the up-or-out active duty service and a reservist of similar rank in terms of both being a professional role model and having professional expertise—a difference that host countries are surely capable of detecting.

As one of the key Pentagon civilians charged with the oversight of the JCTP put it, “The idea of using reserve and guard personnel would make more sense if they were the only source of talent.” However, manning the teams with reserve and guard personnel is more a function of bureaucratic politics and the reluctance of active components to offer their best and brightest for these positions than any particular expertise or talent that only these forces possess.

There are also numerous disincentives for the participation of active duty officers to serve in the program. First, for most team members, the assignment is not a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) that is considered a reassignment to new duties, but a Temporary Tour of Duty (TDY) that requires a leave of absence from one’s current assignment. This presents several hurdles for these officers. First, the officer’s commander must release him for the length of the duty. Many jobs simply cannot be left for six months at a time without some negative impact on mission accomplishment; this is especially the case with outstanding officers, particularly those of higher rank, who may be serving in crit-
ical positions. Second, since that officer is not replaced in his primary duties, colleagues may not be enthusiastic about assuming the officer’s duties in his/her absence. Third, the temporary duty status of the assignment does not allow for the shipment of household goods or for the officer to be accompanied by his/her family. There are, then, several deterrents on both the career enhancement and the family support front that adversely affect the manning of the program.

The policy of rotating the teams every six months also negatively impacted the effectiveness of the program. Despite its obvious drawbacks, the rotation policy has, for the most part, endured because it is less expensive to support a service member in a temporary billet than to pay for a move. Indeed, 180 days is the maximum length of a temporary duty before regulations mandate that a permanent change of station be executed. Program managers exploit this provision to the greatest extent possible. However, the greatest complaint of the host countries involved this particular policy. Generally, when directly asked about what aspects of the program could be improved, personnel from the host country are reluctant to make any negative comments for fear that the U.S. side might be offended, but the rotation issue is the one exception to this otherwise strict protocol.26 The MLT Team Chief admitted that the frequent turnover of U.S. personnel interrupts continuity and that the Czechs are frustrated by it. “They build a team with us. The U.S. side of it leaves, and then they have to build another team.”27 This policy was modified in late 1996 when the Team Chief for the MLT in Belarus was the first assigned to a yearlong assignment. Deputy Team Chiefs are also eligible for the one-year tours. These are permanent change of station assignments, but they are still considered to be remote tours and therefore are still unaccompanied.28

The short duration of the assignments also limits the application of the learning curve that each new team member must endure. By the time cultural and professional acclimation is accomplished, the team member only has a few months left in the position before a replacement comes on board and must re-learn many lessons. Such circumstances do not foster the feeling that there is enough time in-country for any great commitment to linguistic, cultural, or academic study related to the mission to pay off. The provision for one-year tours for some team members will alleviate this long-standing problem with the program somewhat.

Through 1996, the program lacked a requirement for keeping accurate records of the substantive content or impact of accomplished events. This compounded the difficulty of maintaining continuity in the program. There were no standardized procedures for the completion of after-action reports from either the host country or from the TCT deployed to assist it in some way. Remarkably, the officer with the chief day-to-day oversight of the program at the Joint
Staff explained that “a conscious decision was made not to get involved with assessment. Our approach has been to give them the information and let them act on it.”

The MLT files were in such a shambles in some locations that it was difficult for follow-on teams even to know which particular events had taken place. One policy overseer also admitted that this policy was a “complication” when the JCTP defended its budget requests every year. At these times advances in democratic civilian control were talked up, because program managers did not want to say that they were intentionally not pursuing specific goals in the program.

All of this is related to the “exposure mentality” of the program, which was present at the start, and also to the policy of not having specific goals. The theory that all exposure was good and that it was not necessary to track specific types of exposure made it impossible to exploit the lessons learned or to provide the appropriate follow-up events as the program matured in each host country.

Beginning in mid-1997 with the implementation of country work plans organized around specific objectives and metrics, assessment has taken on a greater role. However, assessment initiatives will not significantly improve the effectiveness of the program if the objectives selected for assessment do not sufficiently address the designated key result areas or if the key result areas are inappropriately selected.

In the case of the Czech Republic, the key result areas selected to focus events are:

1. Promote Stability through Regional Security
2. Promote Democratization
3. Promote Military Professionalism
4. Closer Relationships with NATO

As discussed in chapter 2, in general the development of focus areas has highlighted the general shift in program emphasis toward NATO interoperability goals. The analysis of event activity earlier in this chapter clearly showed that these events comprise the vast majority of all events. My analysis here will concentrate on the failure to effectively operationalize the key result areas related to military democratization.

The key result area focused on promoting democratization is supported by three specific goals: (1) develop a transparent democratic defense planning system, (2) develop a system of military law, and (3) improve/promote civil-military cooperation. This “model” of promoting military democratization barely touches on the multidimensional model posed in chapters three and four. Furthermore, even the accomplishment of these limited goals is hindered due
to the selection of events to support the desired goals. For instance, the events selected to support the development of a transparent democratic defense planning system are a familiarization tour on the research and development of military uniforms and field equipment and the visit of a team of experts on system program offices. These two events will have a limited impact on achieving the goal of transparent defense planning systems.

The Country Work Plan’s development of the key result area of military professionalism is of particular relevance to my model of democratic military professionalism. Its particular goals are to (1) increase respect for human dignity and individual rights of service members, (2) establish a professional NCO corps, (3) establish a professional officer corps, and (4) establish standardized military training and education. As with the democratization key result area discussed above, these particular goals, though important, represent only a small part of the comprehensive model of democratic military professionalism developed in chapter 4. Furthermore, the selection of events to support even these limited goals suggests their achievement is at risk. For instance, events selected to increase human dignity and individual rights include only chaplaincy events (which can potentially influence only the small portion of soldiers with religious faith) and medical events. Similarly, events selected to support the establishment of a professional officer corps are a series of interactions with various career specialties. There are no events related to the development of an officer Professional Military Education (PME) system or to other leadership development activities. Discussion of these two particular focus areas illustrates that the achievement of military democratization goals will not be significantly advanced in the “post-reform” era. A comparison of the types of events that have occurred in both the “pre-reform” and “post-reform” eras reveals that the same types of events continue to occur, although they have been assigned to specific program goals. However, the pertinence of many events to specific goals, especially to the only remaining goals related to democratization, is certainly questionable.

Russia and the Defense and Military Contacts Program

In contrast to the Czech case, significantly greater bureaucratic constraints are present within the Russian defense bureaucracy that limit the effectiveness of the U.S. program. Defense attachés implementing the program of contacts report that numerous obstacles are put up by the Russian Ministry of Defense to impede the process. The Russian military hierarchy in general is very cautious about links between the two militaries and strictly controls all contacts at the highest levels of the MOD. The perception among the U.S. attachés in-country is that the whole MOD organization exists to thwart U.S. cooperation efforts and that a “gatekeeper mentality” prevails among their Russian coun-
The Russian military has for several years been showing signs of wanting to cooperate more, but has been constrained by obstructionism at high MOD levels.

An additional obstacle on the Russian side is that Russia still has a predominantly military-run Ministry of Defense while the U.S. Department of Defense is led primarily by civilians. It is difficult for the Russians to comprehend that a high-ranking civilian defense official has the same or higher status as a multi-star general officer. “The Russians understand general officers—not high-ranking civilian equivalents. They don’t really deal with civilians in their military culture and in fact detest them.” Overall, this network of defense ministry counterparts has been difficult to develop on both sides, and the Russian military seems set on perpetuating the myth of civilian nonexpertise.

On the U.S. side officers carrying out the program at the Pentagon complain that staffing is grossly inefficient to handle the program effectively. “Just a few action officers are working on it. Senior officers at the Joint Staff need to be actively engaged in order to develop a long-range strategy.” From 1995 to 1998 JCS staffing of the offices in charge of contacts with all the FSU increased from two to four to twelve personnel. However, officers still complain that the increased staffing has not been commensurate with the rapidly growing programs in twenty-one separate states, including an extremely active Ukrainian program. The Joint Staff has been significantly “outgunned” by the State Department’s staffing, which has assigned individual desk officers to each country in addition to the embassy staffs working issues in-country.

Overall Impact of Military to Military Contacts in Russia and the Czech Republic

Russia

The reviews are mixed from the field on the overall impact that the U.S. effort to conduct defense and military contacts has had on the Russian military. One school of thought argues that the more contacts there are, the greater the external influence will be. Such interactions help to encourage an awareness of global military standards and may be an impetus to reform. Another school posits that the contacts as they have proceeded are useful to a point, but not as much as we might think. “We have the attitude, ‘If only you were like us.…’ We show them things that don’t have a lot of relevance to them like recruiting stations and $10 million child-care centers. They have a concept of what’s ‘Russian’ and what will work for them.” A third school thinks that the cultural differences between the two societies are so great and the Russians so fundamentally resistant to change that change will take no less than a generation—
if it even happens then. One observer thought that, in general, Russians and Americans could not even agree on what specific problems existed.42

Anecdotal evidence exists supporting the argument that the various exchanges have left lasting impressions. A former U.S. Defense Attaché to Moscow who served a term during the perestroika era, Brigadier General Gregory Govan, remembers Russian officers’ first impressions on their first visits to the United States. “They commented on the real patriotism that they saw, the respect of officers and the military that was earned instead of bestowed, and the importance of NCOs.”43 He added that he hoped that the Russians learned the lesson that the people in the U.S. military were more valued because the U.S. military is a reflection of a society that values all people. Govan’s predecessor, then Brigadier General Ervin Rokke, concurred that the “higher-ups who have gone to the United States on trips appreciated the quality they saw and were curious about how it was achieved.”44

Others complained that the endless exchange of delegations accomplishes little. Many of the U.S. military attachés in Moscow mentioned a phenomenon that they have dubbed “delegation euphoria”—when one-time participants in exchanges get charged up over visiting the other country for the first time and discovering that their counterparts are human beings who superficially appear to be very much like themselves. These critics argue that too much “military tourism” takes place and that more emphasis should be put on exercises where military personnel from both states get to work together as professionals on a common problem. Proponents of this approach put a high premium on the achievement of interoperability above all other goals.

While there is some disagreement on how much positive impact the interactions that have taken place between the Russian and U.S. militaries have had on Russia, all observers agree that the receptivity of the Russians to the U.S. outreach effort has been disappointing. “As the program was originally conceived, we thought that the Russian military would be a key player in a lot of issues and could use its channels to push certain agenda items. But it turned out that the military was unwilling to talk about substantive issues. [In the end] they proved to be poor interlocutors.”45 In this vein an Army planner at the Pentagon added, “We’re a lot more interested in engaging them than they are in being engaged. We have a sort of messianic ‘military in a democracy’ approach while they don’t even perceive the need for such reform. They will only participate in activities of value to them like exercises and high-level visits.”46 The Russians have also been concerned about spying, cultivation, and recruitment of their officers who have participated in various exchanges and opportunities for education in the United States.47 In the year preceding the issuance of NATO invitations at the July 1997 Madrid Summit, the Russians were particularly stand-offish in protest of NATO expansion. However, some pragmatism re-
turned to the relationship since the signing of the May 1997 Founding Act, which details the NATO-Russia relationship and created processes for Russia to have a voice in NATO. 48

It seems, then, that the potential to influence the course of democratic reform in the Russian military through defense and military contacts with the United States has been limited by the Russians’ unwillingness to be objects of such efforts. In this respect, had the continuation of contacts depended on Russian enthusiasm, then many agree that the relationship would have died. U.S. personnel driving the program should be credited with prodding the relationship and keeping it alive. However, even the presence of formidable obstacles on the Russian side does not excuse the lack of prioritization and poor policy management that has characterized the U.S. effort. The program can still benefit from the laying out of clear goals, the recognition of the democratization needs of the Russian military, and the prioritization of program activity to further whatever ends are deemed worthy of pursuing.

The Czech Republic

Despite the legion of problems previously outlined, some progress has been made toward the democratization of the ACR because of the presence of the American MLT. First and foremost, the day-to-day contact that the U.S. team members have with members of the ACR exposes the Czechs to the U.S. military’s approach to leadership and its mode of operations in general. Regardless of the subject of the interaction, there is some role modeling benefit to be gained just by working with each other.

The United States has distinguished itself from the other Western allies by investing more resources into its military outreach effort than any other player. The Germans, British, French, and Dutch have all offered various assistance opportunities, but none of these is as large as the U.S. effort. The Czechs have rewarded the U.S. commitment with the granting of enviable access to its top military policymakers through the assignment of prime office space in the corridor of the Chief of the General Staff. This allows frequent contact with Czech officers at the highest levels and puts the MLT, particularly the Colonel who heads the team, in a prime position to influence these individuals and the path of reform. It is a position of access much envied by the U.S. defense attachés. However, the limitations placed on the program, its focus on soft issues, and the poor preparation of the U.S. personnel serving within it result in much of this access being wasted.

Specific strides were made in the area of personnel management reform because of the efforts of Colonel Peter R. O’Connor, who served as team chief in the first half of 1995. Several TCTs related to these reforms took place dur-
ing his tour, and he used his personal influence and access to politics among senior Czech officers for progress in this area. He was regularly briefed on the Czech proposals for reform, and his feedback on these measures was solicited and often incorporated into the next revisions that appeared. However, none of these reforms was implemented before his tour ended in May 1995. The leadership of the ACR continues to stall the implementation of significant reforms within the personnel system, and outside observers uniformly point to this issue as a major obstacle to NATO accession.

On the leadership front, the prevalence of U.S. NCO participation on many of the TCTs has had a positive impact on ACR reform. Again, regardless of the specific purpose of the visit or exchange, the opportunity to see U.S. NCOs in positions of responsibility and expertise has illustrated to the Czechs the void within their own chain of command. All descriptions of further ACR reform feature prominently the goal of building such a system and can be directly attributed to the exposure to Western militaries that has been possible in the post-communist era.

Beyond these general observations, it is difficult to point to other specific accomplishments related to the democratization goals of the program. Given the degree of program activity, it is credible to assume that many other ideas may have been adopted due to the exchanges of ideas that have occurred on multiple occasions. It is not unrealistic to assume that a discussion on the differences between the U.S. and Czech militaries’ approaches to officership could take place during a TCT set up with the purpose of exchanging information on air traffic control systems. However, all that policymakers can be sure of is that air traffic control topics were discussed. The mere linking of certain events to the newly stated focus areas implemented in 1997 does not necessarily ensure progress toward a certain goal.

Similarly, the Czechs have probably received many intangible benefits from participating in the numerous familiarization tours to the United States and Germany that have exposed them firsthand to the way of life of democratic, free-market societies. While general exposure is necessary, following initial visits up with appropriate visits focused on making particular strides in the ACR’s democratization needs would result in more tangible progress.

An objective analysis of the MLT’s alleged mission and the resulting program activity in the case of the Czech Republic reveals an enormous gap between the program’s stated goals and the outcomes that resulted from the events generated under the program. This deficit can be directly attributed to the unwillingness and inability of program overseers to evaluate the progress of their program’s activity for its first five years. The decision not to assess resulted in the acceptance of random activity as satisfactory, the failure to operationalize the stated goals of the program until its fifth year of existence, and, ultimately,
the expenditure of millions of dollars without a clear plan to maximize their effectiveness.

**Assessment of IMET Effectiveness**

A separate effort to influence the process of military reform has been made through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Clearly, the Russian MOD has not embraced this U.S. initiative, and consequently what little participation takes place has little or no influence on the military reform process. Whereas many of the Eastern European armed forces look to the United States as their role model and actively seek U.S. training, the Russian armed forces do not. The Czech military, in contrast, has embraced the program and has been an influential tool in the overall military assistance effort in the Czech Republic.

Russian participation in IMET began in 1992 with the attendance of a few officers at U.S. senior service schools. U.S. attachés on the ground in Moscow reported that getting the program off the ground was difficult due to the lack of English language training among Russian line officers, suspicions on the part of the Russians that the program was a U.S. attempt to recruit spies, and general obstructionism within the MOD. Additionally, the program suffered a major setback when the second Russian student sent to the United States defected.

The officially stated U.S. objectives for the Russian IMET program are “to actively engage officers of the Russian military (from junior to senior grades) and civilians who may influence government policy formulation via military education and training courses in an effort to promote the concepts of civilian authority and respect for human rights during the conduct of military operations.”

Only a handful of Russian officers have participated in IMET since 1992. Of the three officers who attended courses in the United States in the first year, one defected, one was discharged upon his return to Russia as a security risk, and U.S. attachés were informed by MOD officials to “stay away” from the third. However, six officers were allowed to participate in the program in FY 1994. Only five Russian officers attended professional military education courses (PME) in the United States in FY 1995 while the remaining nineteen Russian participants went to defense management courses, but most of these attendees were civilians. In fiscal years 1996 and 1997 participation averaged twenty-three students per year. A recent focus area for the Russians has been English language training.

Initially, the United States designated the lion’s share of the FSU IMET budget for Russian participation, but by FY 1996 Ukraine was receiving the greatest portion of IMET funding for the FSU. Russia turned back $200,000
Militar y Democratization Initiatives

of the $700,000 offered by the United States to fund Russian students in FY 1995. In contrast, Ukraine spent all of its $600,000 IMET budget for FY 1995 and asked for more funding.\(^55\) In fiscal years 1996 through 1998, Russia received an average of $817,000 to participate in IMET.\(^56\)

A major problem affecting the IMET program in Russia is that

The Russian MOD neither requested U.S. security assistance nor desires it. Although some element within the MOD apparently agreed to the U.S. IMET initiative, or else was forced to accept it, other factions have been waging a war to negate it. Elements within the Russian military leadership mistrust U.S. intentions and consider American trained officers as tainted/corrupted.\(^57\)

As a result, all of the criteria on which IMET effectiveness is measured in other cases indicate that the impact of IMET in Russia has been negligible. American officers complain that the MOD does not send officers who could benefit from participation in the program professionally. Most of the officers sent have either been close to retirement or GRU officers interested in the opportunity to gather military intelligence in the United States. “Some of the guys they send over to the United States are on a boondoggle—it’s some kind of payback vacation in the United States. When some get back, the Russians don’t seem to know what to do with them because they’ve been ‘infected.’”\(^58\)

Most of the Russians who have studied in the United States are reluctant to maintain contact with the U.S. military attachés when they return home citing the possibility of future “difficulties” if they do so. Those who have communicated with the U.S. attachés report that they are frustrated that they are not using what they have learned and are losing their ability to speak English.\(^59\) Clearly IMET participation is not considered to be a “merit badge” for promotion. Officers are often criticized for becoming “Westernized” and sometimes specific retribution is exacted, such as being removed from housing lists.\(^60\)

Only the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is taking full advantage of slots allocated to it under the Expanded IMET (EIMET) program that funds educational opportunities for civilians involved in defense. The MFA has sent many of its “rising stars” to courses in the United States and stands in line to accept fallout money that the MOD turns back. Most of the MFA participants have attended defense resource management courses in the United States.\(^61\)

One bright spot in the Russian IMET program is the Russian interest in some of the programs offered through the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Civil-Military Relations. This program was established and continues to be supported by IMET funds. Russia’s interest in moving on military reform resulted in a MOD request for a team of experts from the Center for Civil-Military Relations to come to Moscow in January 1998 to conduct a workshop
on the transition from a conscript to a professional force. However, the request for this information was a rare display of initiative and interest on the part of the MOD with regard to its participation in IMET.

An additional problem affecting Russian participation is the systemic difference between U.S. and Russian military education systems. Attendance at IMET does not fit in with the career patterns of Russian officers, which would affect participation even if the MOD was more enthusiastic about the program. U.S. officers attend PME throughout their careers, while Russian officers attend at fewer points in their careers. A U.S. attaché used a two-ladder analogy to explain this difference.

The American ladder is six feet tall with rungs equally spaced; the Russian ladder is two meters tall with fewer rungs unequally spaced. In terms of this example, the American educational rung does not fit into the Russian ladder of professional military development. Unfortunately, this gulf between the two systems is widest at the junior officer level, where the bulk of traditional IMET opportunities are centered.

In sum, the combination of xenophobia, systemic differences, and sporadic willingness to consider military reform have severely constrained the potential impact that IMET can have on the Russian military. One constant positive influence of the program has been the participation of civilians in EIMET. U.S. program administrators will continue to push for progress in this area. However, the impact on the Russian military has been negligible, and the program’s only value in this respect has been through its symbolism as a U.S. gesture of military cooperation.

Czechoslovak participation in the IMET program began in 1989 with the enrollment of a CSA officer at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College. Participation expanded in the following years to reach the level of thirty to fifty officers taking part in courses in the United States per year at an annual cost of approximately $760,000. In FY 1998 the IMET budget for the Czech Republic and the other NATO invitees rose dramatically by over 50 percent.

While the overall impact of the IMET program is limited due to the small numbers of officers participating, a few of these graduates have made a substantial impact on the progress of democratic reforms in the ACR. One name that was repeatedly mentioned in-country and in Washington, DC, was ACR Colonel Peter Luzny who graduated from the U.S. Army War College under the auspices of the IMET program.

Upon his return to the Czech Republic he became the Chief of Strategic Planning at the General Staff. His ability to apply his knowledge of the defense budget rationalization process taught at the U.S. Army War College enabled the
ACR to receive a 20 percent increase in its budget over Parliament’s initial allocation. Colonel Luzny had been marked as a bright young star within the General Staff, however, he eventually came into conflict with other more senior officers who were resistant to other changes that he recommended, and he resigned from the ACR in May 1995.

Officers who have studied in the United States and in programs of other Western allies have been placed in important command positions in the units serving in Bosnia and the Rapid Deployment Brigade—the elite units of the ACR. The chief of staff of the ACR, Major General Jiri Sedivy, graduated from the U.S. Army War College in 1994. In addition, the commander of the ground forces, the Chief of the Air Force, and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the ACR have all attended IMET courses in the United States. The civilian leadership within the MOD has asserted that the intellectual potential of the ACR rests in the officers who have studied at U.S. military schools. “They are men who are not only very well prepared in their field of expertise, but also newly motivated for service in the transforming Army of the Czech Republic.” In addition, the ACR Chief of Staff has stated his preference that study in the West should be a criterion for promotion and command. However, NATO officials are concerned that officers linked with the Communist regime attend programs abroad as part of a “people laundering” process in order to advance their careers.

The Czechs lean on their IMET participation to lend credibility and prestige to their officer corps. Some fear that these officers will be given undue preference in promotions if the merit-based promotion system goes into effect, but such an opinion does not necessarily mean that IMET graduates are successfully making great inroads into the democratization and general transformation of the ACR or that their specific training is being applied.

Because IMET participation is such an individual experience, it is difficult for lone officers to change their unit upon their return. Czech junior and mid-level officers, who have participated in U.S. courses, report that when they relate the stories of their experiences in the United States to their colleagues, the reaction is if they had been to the moon. Their colleagues were convinced that such things could not be possible. Junior officers also reported that senior officers did not welcome suggestions rooted in the younger officers’ Western experience. Not until many officers of a single unit have had the experience of studying in the West will the lessons learned there be more likely to be applied at home.

U.S. officers who observe the implementation of IMET in the Czech Republic, including the selection process of those who attend U.S. courses and their utilization upon their return, report serious deficiencies on both fronts. First, the requirement that all participants speak English fluently limits the pool of officers who can participate. Selection, then, is not dependent on an officer’s
leadership skills or performance record, but on his language ability. Additionally, most of the officers with English language capability have already been selected to participate in one of the courses. Program administrators are trying to alleviate this problem by offering specialized English language training to officers with basic English skills selected to attend a specific training course. 74

The preferential treatment that officers who studied in the United States receive when they get home breeds resentment among those officers who are not English speakers. 75 Additionally, although the United States assumes that its dollars are being spent on the very best and brightest that the ACR has to offer, in reality the deficient selection process means that “the United States has been getting twos on a scale of one to ten.” 76 The Czechs still do not have the strategic planning skills to maximize the opportunities inherent in the IMET program. The personnel system presently is not set up to look for the most qualified people or to decide how best to utilize the program. The Czech Defense Minister has admitted that personal contacts rather than merit often drive participation in IMET. 77

Specifically, the ACR personnel system lacks a requirement for officers who have returned from U.S. IMET courses to be put in a job that uses their newly acquired skills. Many of these officers have gone on to serve in menial posts. 78 A Czech graduate of a German war college explained that officers who graduate from Western academies are often considered dangerous rivals for their aging superiors, who try to get rid of them. 79 Another problem is that regulations requiring officers who have received valuable training in the United States and polished their language skills to stay in the ACR for a specified period of time are not enforced. 80 NATO officials have been monitoring with dissatisfaction the fact that officers who have studied at the expense of NATO countries’ taxpayers in elite military colleges retire early or are permitted to leave the service. 81 The controversy surrounding the first Czech West Point graduate’s petition to leave the service after only a few months was remarkable for the absence of any public outrage over the failure of the MOD to expect several years of military service from him before he was free to employ his new computer science degree in the civilian job market.

To their credit, U.S. personnel charged with implementing the program have tried to make it clear that it is important for the integrity of the program and even continued participation that its administration be perceived as legitimate and fair. Program guidelines, however, reserve the rights of selection and career commitment to the host countries. In cases of extreme abuse U.S. officials have approached the parliaments of host countries to invite them to use their oversight authority to influence the process, but such a step has not yet occurred in the case of the Czech Republic. 82

The most significant IMET contribution to the democratization process of the ACR has been the participation of civilians in courses designed to enhance
civilian oversight. The Military Education Teams sent from the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School have been widely praised by the Czech civilians and military officers who participated. The first of these seminars, which focused on the problems of civil-military relations in a democracy, was attended by civilian officials, military officers, and parliamentary representatives in 1994. “Perhaps the seminar’s most important aspect was its establishment of an open forum for frank dialogue among military professionals and their civilian counterparts who, by their own account, had experienced few such opportunities in the past.”\(^8\) Military Education Teams also traveled to the Czech Republic in 1996 to host workshops for the MOD on military justice and Czech concerns over the processes of integration into NATO.\(^8\) Expanded IMET has concentrated on sending civilians and military personnel to defense resource management, civil affairs, Judge Advocate General, and National Defense University courses.

IMET has offered valuable opportunities for military personnel and civilians to benefit from participation in U.S. military education programs. Many individuals have personally benefited from their experiences, but without the systemization of lessons learned within the internal organs of the MOD and within military units, widespread impact is not possible. The real aim of IMET, some maintain, is to cultivate relationships between the United States and officers abroad so that former IMET participants who later reach positions of influence will be friendly to U.S. interests. The cost per participant is great, but the gamble is that the investment is well worth it if even just a few of the bets pay off.

While an influential tool in the overall U.S. military assistance effort in the region, and in the Czech Republic in particular, program implementation limitations and the limited number of participants restrict the transforming effect that this specific lever of influence can wield. Improved standards of student selection and utilization that are more actively monitored by the United States and appreciated by the participating militaries could make the effort more effective. Continuing to target more of the spending on English language training and on civilians motivated to apply their course work will also yield greater results. Or the resources could be focused on designing new programs aimed at influencing transitioning states’ education and training needs.

**The Marshall Center**

Six Russians and four Czechs have participated in each of the three classes that have gone through the Marshall Center since its inaugural class graduated in December 1994.\(^8\) It is difficult to assess the impact of this particular military democratization tool, because only a few officers and civilians have had the opportunity to attend since the program was launched. However, the comments of
some of the school’s first students indicate that they are benefiting from the opportunity to attend the Garmisch retreat.

The spokesman for the Russian students, Grigory Zaitsev of the Russian Foreign Ministry, said, “It’s important for us to keep sending people here—a lot of our military don’t have enough knowledge of questions of planning and civilian control of the army.” Another Russian graduate of the five-month course on the relationship between democratic governments and their militaries, Lt. Colonel Sergei Soldatenkov, said that, “They are trying to do good things [here]. I will tell other officers that the experience was worth it. But I’m not sure that I’ll be able to continue. Back in Moscow, it will be easy to lose touch.”

The Czech senior officers who attended as members of the first class universally found the experience to be worthwhile. The four officers, all members of the General Staff, related their experiences in a March 1995 interview. Led by General Pavel Jandacek, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, these officers agreed that the course was an opportunity to meet with democracy on a wider scope and to get familiar with the situation of security in Europe. General Jandacek added that his previous understanding of democracy was that it meant that everyone was entitled to their own opinion. He realized, though, by participating in the Marshall Center program with his colleagues from across the region that it was also important to get others to agree with his opinion if change was to be possible. His colleague added that he learned that in democratic thinking all conclusions on a particular issue may be different, but none of them is necessarily wrong.

The group of Czech graduates agreed that the success of the Marshall Center in the long run will depend on several factors. First, countries must responsibly select the students who attended. The ACR sent four of its most influential officers, but they were certain that other countries had sent their “second strings” who could not have the same relative impact when they returned home. They warned that countries currently sending top officers will refrain from doing so in the future if they perceive that a universal standard of student selection is not being employed.

Zaitsev said that it was difficult to find Russians to come to the course because the Russian mass media had labeled the school as an instrument of American propaganda. “Bosses were afraid of sending personnel.” An American faculty member confirmed that the typical Russian student was average to above average compared to the others, but they were more hard-line than most. He added that in a few instances attendance at the school seemed to be some sort of reward unrelated to any motivation to apply the lessons learned at Garmisch at home.

Zaitsev added, “The course is very one-sided, but it’s interesting for me to hear the opinions of others, particularly from the CIS countries.” The Rus-
sians’ classmates from the former Eastern bloc complained, though, that the Russians brought with them an adversarial conception of NATO, and this affected their attitude toward classmates from former Warsaw Pact states eager to gain NATO admittance. A Polish officer described this mentality as the biggest obstacle between them. “For them, it is all NATO, the United States and the West on one side, and Russia and the East on the other. It is still the old way of thinking.”

General Jandacek said that he thought his Russian classmates did learn a lot in the course, saying, “The discussions with them at the end of the course were quite different than the ones in the beginning. But they’ll revert back to the norms of the home environment when they return. No one at home will believe what they learned.” The Czechs complained, too, that the students were from states with such different levels of understanding about democratic principles that the pace of the program was too quick for those with very limited experience and too slow for those with more. However, the Marshall Center is reluctant to track students according to their states’ levels of democratization due to political sensitivities. The absence of officers from the West in significant numbers also took away from the program, leading the officers from the East to feel that they were inferior and that the West did not think that any lessons could be learned from them.

In response to a question about whether or not he thought a program that reached so few officers could ever make a significant impact, General Jandacek shared his “sand particle theory.” He said that the Marshall Center graduates will each go back as individual sand particles in their militaries that are a minute speck on the giant sand hill that comprises the whole military. But eventually there will be more and more sand particles that have had the experience and some may eventually attain the very top positions on the hill. Then these particles will be in a position to dominate the entire hill and communicate with others at the top of other hills. He added that already in the few months since graduation, he has had the opportunity to deal with the Defense Minister in Latvia who was his classmate at Garmisch.

Though the individuals affected thus far in the ACR have been few, it seems that the Marshall Center’s classroom and picturesque mountainous environment have had a positive impact on those Czech officers who were the first to enter its doors. Since the receipt of their NATO invitations, however, students from the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have also questioned whether or not they should still attend courses aimed at helping them adapt to a democratic political system. In their view, the task is complete, and they should now be attending NATO schools, such as the NATO Defense College.

The effectiveness of the course within each postcommunist state depends on the willingness of each participating country to send quality students and to draw on their expertise when they return home. This is a major problem in the
Russian case, because the MOD has refused to send uniformed Army, Navy, or Air Force personnel. Only officers from the border troops and civilians from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have had the green light to attend.98 The staff of the Marshall Center has had its sights set on Russia as the most important target due to its military primacy in the region, but has been continually frustrated in its attempts to solicit quality Russian participation. The current overall state of the Russian military, which is plagued by corruption, declining morale exacerbated by the war in Chechnya, widespread public disobedience of orders, ties with organized crime, and inappropriate participation in politics, indicates that civilian control of the military is tenuous. Unfortunately, it seems that Russia’s Marshall Center graduates have only had individual encounters with the nature of liberal democracy and the role of the military within it. These graduates’ opportunities to bring these lessons to the Russian defense establishment at large, which is in dire need of learning them, have been scant.

The potential exists for the Marshall Center to be a meeting place and democratic training ground of import for senior defense officials and officers across the postcommunist region. The challenges facing the Marshall Center include rethinking the approach developed in 1993 to meet the current needs of postcommunist states now years into their democratic transitions, determining how to come up with a diplomatic solution to the question of different categories of states needing instruction at different levels in the democratization process, and revising the curriculum to target officers at all levels with courses of appropriate focus and length.99

The Future of U.S. Military Assistance Programs in Russia and the Czech Republic

The Russian MOD’s strict control of defense and military contacts with the United States means that the future of the program depends on the attitudes of the senior military leadership in the MOD. Attitudes within the MOD range from those of people who are somewhat positive about military to military contacts to the opinions of “Cold War dinosaurs not interested in contacts.”100 U.S. officers contend that most of the senior Russian generals give lip service to the effort in an attempt to be politically correct, but do not really support it. Meanwhile, the nearly frozen military to military relationship exhibited throughout the beginning of the program and continued with the hostile response to proposals to expand NATO has thawed a bit with the signing of the Founding Act in 1997.

Chechnya has driven home the limited degree to which the Russian military has internalized reforms. The military leadership has also been able to successfully resist post-Chechnya efforts at military reform. Some U.S. officers
think that this reality should make the United States reevaluate its approach of reaching out to the Russians. “A shotgun approach is not good enough. Any contact may not be good. We should be concerned if we are dealing with the right individual who is serious about absorbing what we have to offer.”101 Meanwhile, the Russians have come to the conclusion that the political value of hobnobbing with us is declining. Both sides, then, are withdrawing in the relationship.

The part of the relationship that is considered most secure is the continuation of practical programs like Nunn-Lugar that are perceived as serving mutual interests. Additionally, program managers think the United States should be persistent in its efforts to include younger officers in contacts in order to give them direct exposure to many of these ideas. Such an engagement may pay off in the long run when the Soviet era military leadership finally fades into retirement.

In the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, April 1999 has been set as the end of the Joint Contact Team Program. Originally envisioned as a short-term program, the JCTP has already survived beyond its initial projected life of two years, and there are no immediate plans to shut down operations in participating states still working toward their NATO invitations. Policymakers have said, though, that when the program is slated to end, it will be phased out according to the progress made within each country. This chapter has documented how untenable that objective will be since criteria for victory in the realm of military democratization were developed so late in the life of the program. Additionally, the conceptualization of these goals continues to be poor, and they have been insufficiently assessed. The conceptualization and assessment of NATO interoperability goals have been much more successful. IMET and the Marshall Center are envisioned as long term programs that will continue indefinitely with the goal of achieving gradual impact in all of the postcommunist states.

The infusion of Partnership for Peace funds and goals into the region has begun to overshadow the JCTP and has led to its de facto shift away from military democratization goals. Beginning in March 1995 EUCOM headquarters issued a memo to its MLTs directing those operating within Partnership for Peace states to earmark 75 percent of all contacts to support the host nation’s Partnership for Peace Individual Partnership Plan objective.102 Between 1995 and 1997, 92 percent of the 1,532 JCTP-facilitated events aimed at the six top candidates for NATO membership (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) were related to NATO PfP areas of cooperation. These events focused primarily on standardization, communications, exercises, logistics, and training.103 This represents a substantial shift from democratization objectives to goals centered on making postcommunist militaries better
fighting forces prepared to contribute to NATO. Focusing on the latter objectives without ensuring that the former have been accomplished is a dangerous prospect in the long term.

It seems, then, that in order to survive, the JCTP is internally shifting its focus from its original abstract, “never able to operationalize” goals of facilitating democratization to an emphasis on NATO interoperability issues. The JCTP simultaneously got into the assessment game with its new self-assigned, more easily quantifiable mission. To the extent a democratization component of the de facto mission has survived, it continues to be poorly operationalized, leaving significant military democratization problems still unaddressed. While such a switch may be a shrewd adaptation to the winds of congressional funding, it can also be seen as an abandonment of the JCTP’s original mission. The question is, has anybody noticed?

**Conclusion**

Perestroika and glasnost afforded the United States an opportunity to engage the Soviet Union in democratization issues, and the effort has continued in the post-Soviet era. Meanwhile, November 1989 marked the opening of the window of opportunity for the United States to influence the process of democratic transition in Czechoslovakia and, later, the Czech Republic. Within these overall efforts, the U.S. military accepted its delegated role to influence the transition of the postcommunist militaries. The goal was to facilitate the development of military institutions that are democratically accountable and that act as positive factors in the overall progress of the democratic transitions.

Chapters 3 and 4 illustrated that democratization deficits still exist in both militaries studied in the areas of democratic political control and democratic military professionalism. The United States should continue to monitor these deficits and exploit opportunities to positively influence them. However, an objective analysis of the U.S. effort to assist in the democratization needs of Russia and the Czech Republic concludes that the U.S. attempt has fallen short of its potential. The ACR continues its struggle to become more proficient as a democratically accountable military institution and to achieve the standards of democratic military professionalism prevalent in the West. The Russian military, meanwhile, seems to be disinterested in making any progress in alleviating its democratic deficits.

The United States’ inability to overcome its own Cold War legacy as evidenced in the persistence of Cold War bureaucratic inertia accounts for much of the lack of success. The United States was unable to release adequate resources from its defense arsenal (which is still poised to counter the massive Soviet threat) to fund and staff sufficiently efforts to help postcommunist militaries make the ideological and organizational shifts necessary to consolidate
democracy in the region. Additionally, the insufficient aid to the states at large at the beginning of the transitions contributed to the dire economic conditions of many postcommunist states and to the development of negative views about democracy. This is particularly true in the case of the Russian military. The focus on NATO expansion issues has only shifted emphasis away from improving the early deficiencies in programs aimed at facilitating military democratization in the region.

Both the Russian and Czech cases illustrated the deficiencies of the uncoordinated and poorly conceptualized democratic military assistance programs that resulted. Particular attention was given, in the Czech case, to the U.S. European Command’s Joint Contact Team Program because it was the centerpiece of the effort to have a mass impact in Central and Eastern Europe. The JCTP’s shortcomings, and those described in the program of Defense and Military Contacts with the FSU, indicate a lack of learning from previous military assistance efforts in the U.S. military’s history and the inability of the U.S. military to exploit its political-military expertise to provide the theoretical underpinnings necessary for the programs’ success. In the Czech case, reforms in the administration of the JCTP have resulted in first steps to focus and assess program activity, but not in ways that are effectively maximizing the opportunity to lend military democratization assistance. In the Russian case, no significant changes have occurred in the oversight and administration of the military to military contact program.

This chapter has presented two contrasting examples of recipients of U.S. assistance and of the variations in assistance that exist in programs aimed at Central and Eastern Europe and the FSU. The Czech Republic was presented as a postcommunist state enthusiastically accepting Western and in particular U.S. attempts to assist it. The main characteristic of the Russian case was its unwillingness to be assisted in a similar way. The inability and increasing unwillingness of the Russian military leadership to discard Cold War thinking and practices has certainly impeded the development of the Russian military as a democratic institution. However, opportunities have been lost in both cases due to a failure to maximize all tools available to positively influence postcommunist regimes at this critical transitional moment in history. The United States should remain steadfast in its effort to influence the process of democratization across the region and within military institutions in particular. The prize of stable democracies as the successor states of the former Soviet bloc is too great a windfall for the international community not to pursue at every opportunity.