Notes

Introduction


Chapter 1

5. Welch, Civilian Control of the Military, 1.
7. Ibid., 80–83.
8. Ibid., 83–85.
9. Ibid., 85.
10. Ibid.
11. W. H. Morris Jones pointed out the unlikelihood of the military officer cohort


30. Ibid., 51.


33. Ibid., 7–8.
37. Ibid., 367–69.
40. Gitz, Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe, 3.
41. Ibid., 6–10.
42. Jones, Red Army and Society, 150.
43. Gitz, Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe, 89–94.
54. Perlmutter and Bennett, eds., The Political Influence of the Military, 205.
57. Jones, Red Army and Society, 89.


68. For a description of such behavior see Victor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 222–23.


71. The general emphasis that all professions place on professional ethics is described in Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power, 63.


75. Ibid., 204.


77. For a full account of the political indoctrination program that was conducted from nursery school through the beginning of military service see E. S. Williams, “Political Education and Training,” in The Soviet Military: Political Education, Training and Morale, ed. E. S. Williams (London: Macmillan, 1987), 11–38. See also Jones, Red Army and Society, 151–53.


79. Jones, Red Army and Society, 156.


83. Gitz, Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe, 91.

84. Ibid., 92.
86. Idea offered by Edward A. Kolodziej, Research Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois.
87. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-902. This is the U.S. Air Force regulation that details permissible and prohibited political activities of USAF personnel.
96. Ibid.
102. Ibid., 9.
107. Ibid., 173.

Chapter 2

released in February 1995 and February 1996 without significant changes to the original concept. Beginning in 1997, the document was retitled *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*. The promotion of democracy remains a core national security objective justified by the arguments of Democratic Peace Theory.


5. Most recently, the 1998 *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* argues that the promotion of democracy is a key objective of the Clinton administration and that “we recognize that the spread of democracy supports American values and enhances both our security and prosperity . . . our strategy must focus on strengthening the commitment and institutional capacity [of states in transition] to implement democratic reforms.” The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1998), 5, 34; available from http://www.jya.com/nssr98.htm; Internet.


14. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 16.


40. Mil-To-Mil Contact Programs for FSU/Central Europe. USAF briefing obtained at the Pentagon in May 1995. 4.

41. Bruce Messelt, OSD Point of Contact for Military to Military Programs in East and Central Europe, interview by author, the Pentagon, May 1995.


46. Mil-To-Mil Contact Programs for FSU/Central Europe, 13.


50. Charles Helms, Captain, USAF, former Executive Officer to General Lennon, interview by author, 2 June 1994, HQ EUCOM, Stuttgart, Germany.

51. McCarthy, interview.


53. These are discretionary funds available to all of the theater CINCs (i.e., EUCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM . . .).

54. JCTP briefing papers acquired June 1994 at HQ EUCOM, Stuttgart.

55. JCTP Briefing obtained from HQ EUCOM, November 1997.

56. Ibid.

57. Stirling, interview.


59. JCTP policy paper obtained from HQ USEUCOM, November 1997. This statement is not significantly different from one stated in a July 1994 JCTP policy paper.

60. JCTP mission statement from briefing slide in HQ USAFE Military to Military briefing obtained at the Pentagon in May 1995.

61. The most recent mission statement is “to deploy teams to selected countries of
Central Europe to assist their militaries in the transition to democracies with free market economies.” JCTP Briefing obtained from HQ EUCOM, November 1997. It should be noted that in JCTP parlance Central Europe includes the same countries included in the previous mission statement with a few others. The complete list was noted in this chapter under the heading “The Joint Contact Team Program.”

62. Joint Contact Team Briefing obtained from HQ USEUCOM, November 1997.

63. A more complete analysis of democratic military professionalism is the subject of chapter 4. I will argue that there is a unique brand of democratic military professionalism that military members from transitioning states should learn that adapts habits acquired under authoritarian systems to practices that reflect the democratic values of the state. I will further suggest that U.S. military assistance programs focus on developing these practices within the military institutions of transitioning states.


65. Interviews with various representatives from the IWG verify this conclusion.

66. Statement from briefing slide in HQ USAFE Military to Military briefing obtained at the Pentagon in May 1995.

67. Dirk P. Deverill, Commander, USN, Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, European Division, interview by author, the Pentagon, May 1995.


69. JCTP Briefing obtained from HQ EUCOM, November 1997.

70. The argument is more fully developed in chapter 5.


72. Ibid.

73. JCTP briefing papers acquired in June 1994, HQ EUCOM, Stuttgart, 1.

74. Only the State Department’s IMET program is allowed to train foreign military officers.

75. Ron Maxwell, Major, USAF Point of Contact for Military to Military Programs in Eurasia, Central and Eastern Europe, interview by author, the Pentagon, May 1995.


81. Margaret West, Major, USAF National Guard, Point of Contact for Guard and Reserve involvement in Military to Military Programs, interview by author, Arlington, VA, National Guard Bureau HQ, May 1995.
82. This is up from 30 percent in 1995. Joulwan, “Statement before the House National Security Committee,” 2 March 1995; JCTP Briefing obtained from HQ EUCOM, November 1997.

83. Gosnell, Concept Paper, 5.


86. For instance, MLT members reported that some personnel had been sent back to the United States as a result of criminal or inappropriate behavior in-country. These activities ranged from improper promoting of personal business interests to charges of the rape of a foreign national.

87. MLT members in the Czech Republic reported that their state partner, Texas, had inappropriately tried to arrange a military exercise with the Czech Army without coordinating with EUCOM or DOD.


94. Keith Webster, DSAA Coordinator for Central and Eastern Europe and the FSU, interview by author, November 1997.


96. Ibid., 4.


98. Warren Christopher and William J. Perry, letter to the Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chairman of Senate Committee on Armed Forces, 7 April 1995, 1.


100. For instance, the Security Assistance Officer (SAO) in the Czech Republic was directed to target 20 percent of the total Czech IMET grant for EIMET courses.

101. Hammersen, interview.


104. Charles Squires, Major, Executive Officer to the Director, Marshall Center, interview by author, Marshall Center, June 1994.


107. Hammersen, interview.


Chapter 3


18. Rubus, interview.


27. Interviews by author with cadets and junior officers at the Brno Military Academy and the Namest and Pardubice air bases, March 1997.


29. Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, an information briefing provided by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, 3.


40. R. C. Longworth, “Time for NATO to Admit Trio from Europe,” Chicago Tribune, 16 October 1994, 1. This article also discusses the desire for EU membership.


42. Interviews by author with personnel assigned to the Brno Military Academy and with officers stationed at the Namest and Pardubice air bases, March 1997.


45. Pezl, 35.


52. Remington, *Politics in Russia*, 53.

53. Zhelezov, interview.


55. Stephen J. Blank, *Russian Defense Legislation and Russian Democracy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 1995). This document contains a thorough analysis of both draft versions of these laws and their implications for democratic political control of the military.


60. Ibid.

61. Political briefing delivered by Brno Military Academy Social Science faculty, March 1997, Brno.


64. Interviews by author with Czech liaison officers to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium, June 1998.

72. Felgengauer, “Uncontrolled Generals.”
76. A 1994 survey of Russian military elites indicated that less than one in five expressed trust in Grachev with over half expressing mistrust in him. Military Elites in Russia 1994, 4.
83. Kenneth L. Kladiva, Faculty Member, Defense Systems Management College and PPBS adviser to the Czech MOD, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.
84. Milan Rezac, Professor and Head, Air Force Department, Brno Military Academy. Interview by author, Brno, March 1997.
85. Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion, 118.
86. Jiri Pehe, Director of the Open Media Research Institute (OMRI), interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

89. Ibid., 124.


93. Additional problems with the lustration process are discussed in chapter 4.

94. Pehe, interview.

95. Pehe and Sternod, interviews.


101. As of this writing, the proposed concept was being re-drafted by the Zeman government.


112. Kwiecien, interview.

113. Howcroft, interview.


117. Felgengauer, “Uncontrolled Generals.”

118. Interviews by author with Brno Military Academy faculty, March 1997.


120. Statement made in MOD briefing on Czech military reform presented to visiting American Colonels from the U.S. Air War College, March 1995.


125. Lambeth, 93.


127. Justice, interview.


132. Pirumov, interview.

133. Brusstar, interview.

134. Pirumov, interview.


136. Ibid.


139. Ibid., 13.

140. George D. Dunkelberg, U.S. Defense Attaché to the Czech Republic, interview by author, March 1995, Prague. The U.S. Defense attaché in Prague MOD observed that “there are lots of people in positions who don’t know what they’re doing.”

141. Ibid.


148. PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) is a budgeting system that forces policymakers to determine national defense priorities before funds are allocated for defense. This computer planning system allocates funds according to these priorities and can determine how much any component of the ACR is spending. Its implementation requires specialized financial expertise, which presently only civilian bureaucrats in the MOD possess.


154. Skorobogatko, “‘Wartime Budget’ or ‘Survival Budget.’”

155. Ibid.

156. Zhelezov, interview.


162. Ibid.
164. Ibid.
165. Brett, interview.
166. Ibid.
167. Dunkelberg, interview.
168. Olga Kashina, Humphrey Fellow, University of Maryland, former staff member of the Duma Defense Committee, interview by author, May 1995, Washington, DC.
169. Brett, interview.
170. Brett, interview.
172. Ibid.
173. Brett, interview.
174. Kashina, interview.
175. Ibid.
177. Dunkelberg, interview.
178. Ibid.
179. Jehlik, interview.
180. Howcroft, interview.
181. Brusstar, interview.
182. Williams, interview.
183. Kwiecien, interview.
185. Dunkelberg, interview.
187. Up to this point all references to Parliament have referred to the only chamber of Parliament that existed until November 1996, the Chamber of Deputies. Referring to the lower chamber as the Chamber of Deputies has only become prevalent since the installation of the Senate.
190. Interviews by author of officers, academics, and defense analysts at the Brno Military Academy, Namest and Pardubice air bases, March 1997.
191. Milan Rezac, Professor and Head, Air Force Department, Brno Military Academy. Interview by author, March 1997, Brno.
194. Szemerkenyi, 64–73.
196. Golz, interview.
197. Kwiecien, interview.
199. Kwiecien, interview.
200. Pirumov, interview.
203. Kwiecien, interview.
206. Zhelezov, interview.
211. Ibid.
214. Zhelezov, interview.
216. Golz, interview.
222. Ibid., 34–37.
223. Ibid., 38.
224. Ibid., 45–46.
225. Ibid., 39.
228. Ibid., 129.
229. Ibid., 140.
230. Prokesova, interview.
233. Wielkoszewski, interview.
235. Szemerkenyi, 49.
236. Pehe, “Czech Republic and NATO.”
241. USIA, Office of Research and Media Reaction, “Majorities in the Czech Republic Favor PFP, NATO Membership,” *USIA Opinion Analysis*, 27 December 1994, 2–3. The other eleven states in order of descending military confidence levels were: Croatia, Britain, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, France, Germany, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Albania, and Estonia.
244. Tomas Horejši, “Training a Horse Not to Eat; The Air Force is Still Looking for a Way Out of Crisis.”
245. Wielkoszewski, interview.
246. Miroslav Krcmar, Major, Member Czech liaison team to the U.S. MLT (Military Liaison Team), interview by author, March 1995, Prague.
251. Christopher Donnelly, “Armies and Society in the New Democracies,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review* 7, no. 1: 3. Donnelly outlines in this article the specific structural elements needed to establish effective civil-military relations according to Western democratic standards.

**Chapter 4**

3. Huntington, *Soldier and the State*.
4. This is the argument laid out in chapter 2.


15. Tsygichko, interview.


19. The Soviet Army had 5.6 million troops. According to General Staff statistics, the Russian Army was cut from 2.8 to 1.7 million troops between 1992 and 1996. The 1997 reform proposals set 1.2 million as the targeted reduction level.

20. Pirumov, interview.


23. Ibid., 14.


25. Justice, interview.

26. Tsygichko, interview.


28. Funding to pay the transition costs and retirement benefits of 50,000 officers was set aside in a special fund. Mann, “Russians Sound Alarm Over Stalled Reforms.”

29. Skorobogatko, “‘Wartime Budget’ or ‘Survival Budget’.”

31. Mann, “Pessimism Deepens Over Russia’s Fate,” 23.
32. Justice, interview.
34. Adam R. Wasserman, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State, interview
by author, May 1995, Washington, DC.
38. Bruce Messelt, OSD Point of Contact for Military to Military Programs in East and Central Europe, interview by author, May 1995, Washington, DC; Kenneth L. Kladiva, Faculty Member, Defense Systems Management College and PPBS adviser to the Czech MOD, interview by author, March 1995, Prague; Leininger, interview.
40. General Staff of the Czech Republic, The Army of the Czech Republic, 1.
42. Messelt, interview.
44. Giesl, interview.


57. Garrels, “Russia Military: Part I.”

58. Barber, “Reform Rattles Through the Ranks.”

59. Interviews with Czech officers during March 1997 base visits to Namest and Pardubice.


62. Lt. Vohralik was one of only two Czech officers to graduate from U.S. service academies. The other, Lt. Petr Miller, is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He has also publicly stated his dissatisfaction with conditions in the ACR, but has indicated that he will give the government more time. See *Czech News Service* (CTK), 7 November 1997; *FBIS-EEU-97-311*, 7 November 1997; CTK, 12 November 1997; *FBIS-EEU-97-317*; CTK, 13 November 1997; *FBIS-EEU-97-317*, 13 November 1997.


64. Christopher Lord, Professor, Institute of International Politics, Charles University, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.


68. Ibid.

69. Interviews with Czech officers during March 1997 base visits to Namest and Pardubice.

70. A U.S. Marine attaché related a meeting he had with an officer in March 1995 who was working at a nuclear sub repair facility and had not been paid since the previous November. The Russian officer remarked, “We’re not making macaroni here. We’re doing serious work.” James Howcroft, Major, Assistant Marine Attaché, U.S. Embassy Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

71. Koltsov, “Divisions of Deserters Wandering Around Russia.”

72. Odnokolenko, “It Will Be Entirely Old Men on Parade.”

73. Koltsov, “Divisions of Deserters Wandering Around Russia.”

74. Odnokolenko, “It Will Be Entirely Old Men on Parade.”
76. Rezac, interview, and interview with Barry Midkiff, Capt., U.S. Army, Exchange Student at the Czech Command and General Staff College, Brno Military Academy, March 1997. Indeed, interviews with the social science faculty indicated that the quality of military cadet vs. university student was quite low. One faculty member remarked that the military academies are “the rubbish bin of the educational system.”
79. Correspondence with Colonel Yuri Runaev, Head Social Sciences Department, Kachinsky Air Force Academy, June 1997.
83. Boris Zhelezov, Research Fellow, Center for International Security, USA-Canada Institute, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.
84. Howcroft, interview.
85. One Czech Major, who has attended a yearlong course in the United States through IMET, served on the Czech liaison team to the U.S. MLT enabling him to make many trips abroad and served in UN peacekeeping units explained his departure plan. He related that one more tour with the Czech peacekeepers in Yugoslavia would give him enough of a nest egg to leave the service and move his family to a small Czech city where he has been offered the job of director of marketing for a small firm. Peacekeepers receive a per diem paid by the UN that far exceeds the basic pay of troops serving within the Czech Republic. Despite his excellent service record and selection for many opportunities in the West, he sees no future in the ACR officer corps or at least not an opportunity comparable to what he can arrange for himself in the Czech economy. Krcmar, interview. Defense Security Assistance Administration (DSAA) officials admit that the same phenomenon is occurring within the Russian IMET program. DSAA, interview, December 1997.


93. In January 1998 a Military Education Team from the Naval Postgraduate School was scheduled to conduct in Moscow, at the MOD’s request, a workshop on transitioning from a conscript to a professional NCO force. Keith Webster, DSAA Russian Desk Officer, interview by author, December 1997.


95. See chapter 3 for a summary of this argument.

96. Zhelezov, interview.


98. According to an April 1995 interview with the author, Colonel William Thurston, U.S. Air Attaché to Moscow said that there is evidence that some among the Russian military leadership may be exploring ways to increase the importance of merit in the system. When General Colonel Sergeyev, Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, and Admiral Chiles, Vice Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met in a high level visit in 1994 the United States provided the Russians information on how the U.S. officer evaluation system works, at the request of the Russians. The specific request for information concerned how the United States assesses the degree to which an officer’s performance contributes to the mission of the unit.


100. Peter R. O’Connor, U.S. MLT Team Chief, Czech Republic December 1994–May 1995, interview by author, March 1995, Prague. In this interview, Colonel O’Connor related his own interview with an especially promising Czech junior officer who had attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, and who had worked closely with the U.S. MLT.


106. Chart provided by officers of the ACR General Staff, Prague, March 1995.


111. O'Connor, interview.

112. Jehlik, interview.

113. By 1997 most of the officers recalled from the Prague Spring had retired (again).

114. Jehlik, interview.


116. Chicago Tribune, “Editorial,” 27 November 1995, section 1, p. 14. This editorial in endorsing the firing of an American Navy admiral dismissed for making inappropriate comments regarding the behavior of sailors in Okinawa argued that “Democracies can and should demand principled behavior from those who fight. . . . America’s flag and star officers must represent American values.”

117. For a review of the differences in officership and leadership in democratic and Soviet era military institutions, see chapters 2 and 3.

118. Wielkoszewski, interview. The “good soldier” Schwejk is a character from Czech literary fame who embodies the Czech perception of the bungling soldier.

119. Anna Bukharova, Major, Scientific Associate (faculty member), Higher Military Humanities College on Scientific and Research Work, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.


121. Bukharova, interview.

122. Wasserman, interview.


125. Chapter 2 fully develops this point in the presentation of the model of democratic military professionalism.

126. David A. Wagle, Colonel, Professor, USAFA, James H. Head, Colonel, Vice Dean, USAFA, and Gerrold G. Heikkinen, Captain, USAFA faculty member, interviews by author, May 1995, USAFA.
127. Wielkoszewski, interview.
128. Ibid.
129. Martinek, interview.
130. Krcmar, interview.
132. Krcmar, interview.
133. Wielkoszewski, interview.
134. O’Connor, interview.
135. Ibid.
136. Martinek, interview.
137. Dunkelberg, interview.
138. O’Connor, interview.
140. Wielkoszewski and Midkiff, interviews.
141. Midkiff, interview. In addition, the U.S. Army Captain has focused many of his assignments on pointing out the gap that he perceives in Czech leader development. For instance, he has written papers for the Czech faculty on such topics as leadership and professional ethics.
142. Tsygichko, interview.
143. Govan, interview.
144. Howcroft, interview.
145. According to Ministry of Defense statistics, in the first 8 months of 1993, 1,222 servicemen died. Twenty-five percent of these deaths were attributed to suicide. Ministry of Defense officials reported that 518 deaths, including 74 officers, occurred in the first 6 months of 1994. MOD statistics for 1995 are 392 deaths, one-third of them suicide. In 1996 the number of suicides went up to 123. The Mothers’ Rights Foundation estimated that in 1996 thousands of soldiers died as a result of criminal acts by fellow soldiers or officers, by committing suicide, or by not receiving sufficient medical attention. See U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports, 1994, 1995, 1996, which report on human rights practices for individual countries. See also Koltsov.
146. Garrels, “Russia’s Military: Part I.”
147. Justice, interview.
148. Lieven, 22.
151. Lieven, 22–23.
152. Lieven, 22.
154. Hazing and hunger are cited as the reasons more than 7,000 deserters roamed Russia in 1997. Koltsov, “Divisions of Deserters Wandering Around Russia.”
155. Nelson, interview.
156. Rokke, interview.
158. Kwicien, interview.
159. Ibid. See also *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, March 1995.
160. Kwicien, interview.
161. Zhelezov, interview.
165. Ibid.
166. Spurny.
169. Sternod, interview.
170. O’Connor, interview.
172. The issue of corruption in postcommunist military institutions and in society at large is dealt with more thoroughly in chapter 5.
173. U.S. officers reported that the Russian cadets were interested in what the consequences of violations were and were amazed that disenrollment may be the designated punishment. The Commandant at the Russian academy asked the student body if they would like such a system implemented at Kachinsky and the cadets laughed as if such a concept was an impossibility. Head, interview.
175. Howcroft, interview.
176. Tsygichko, interview. Dzokhar Dudayev was the Chechen rebel leader.

180. Members of a U.S. Air Force Academy delegation who visited a Russian military college in April 1995 reported that their hosts showed them yellowed lesson plans indicating that change had not occurred in those particular courses for some time. The overall message received by the American officers was that the administration of the college was overwhelmed by budgetary problems that had left the institution in disrepair and that the lack of available funds was the institutional excuse for lack of change. Wagie, Head, and Heikkinen, interviews.


183. Brno Military Academy Senior Staff, interviews by author, March 1997, Brno.

184. Brno Military Academy Junior Civilian Faculty Members, interviews by author, March 1997, Brno.

185. Yuri Runaev, Lt. Colonel, Head, Social Science Department, Kachinsky Higher Military Aviation College, Volgograd, Russia. Correspondence received by the author in August 1995.

186. By the way, I explained all this in my reply to Lt. Col. Runaev. Perhaps the contacts made in the writing of this dissertation will actually help change for the better the course of democratic military professionalization in Russia.


189. Golz, interview.

190. Lord, interview.

191. Nikita Chaldimov, General, Chief Deputy of the Commandant of the Higher Military Humanities College, the former Lenin Military Political Academy, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.


193. Pirumov, interview.

194. Bukharova, interview.

196. Bukharova, interview.
200. Indeed, one proposal for the reform of servicemen’s ideological education suggests that soldiers should be taught that the near-abroad is a sphere of the Russian Federation’s most immediate and vitally important political and military-strategic interests. See Aleksandr Kokorin and Viktor Samoylov, “A Position: Fruitless Years of Talking Shop: A Realistic Approach to Military Reform in Russia Is Still a Problem,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 8–14 February 1997, 1, 4; FBIS-UMA-97-057-S, 14 February 1997.
201. Bukharova, interview.
203. Ibid.
204. Kokorin and Samoylov.
207. USAFA cadets visiting the Czech military academy at Brno noted that the cadets they came in contact with did not cite service to country as a primary motivator for enrollment at the military academy. No prime ideological reasons were cited. Stuart, interview.
208. Sternod, interview.
211. Giesl, interview.
212. Statement made in MOD briefing by Deputy Director of Education and Head of University Level Education on Czech military reform presented to visiting American Colonels from the U.S. Air War College, March 1995.
214. Dunkelberg, interview.
215. Reynolds, interview.
217. Reynolds, interview.
220. A Russian journalist who accompanied a group of visitors from London to a Russian military college reported that the British delegation was shocked when the chief of the college told them that no version of political science was taught there. The chief justified this curriculum decision by saying, “The Army is not involved in politics.” Golz, interview.
221. The Chairman of the All-Russian Officers’ Assembly defended his movement by saying, “The army is an instrument of politics, so it should take part in the fate of our country.” Deborah Seward, “Former Soviet Generals Vow to Oppose Yeltsin in Parliamentary Vote,” AP Worldstream, 17 August 1995.
226. Ibid.
228. This estimate includes the military-industrial complex, pensioners, and relatives of active duty forces. Carey Scott, “Russian Army Drafted for Vote Rigging Duty,” Sunday Times, 1 October 1995.
230. A Russian newspaper reported that in the district where Gromov is running the commander of the local military school was ordered to nominate himself to run against Gromov. The commander complied. Yulia Kalinina, “Khaki-Colored Duma,” Moskovsky Komsomolets, 1–4, 11 October 1995. Obtained through the Russian Press Digest.
236. Katrina vanden Heuvel and Stephen F. Cohen, “The Other Russia: Moscow Glitters, the Economy Collapses, the Army Rumbles,” The Nation 265, no. 5. (11 August 1997), 24.
239. Runaev correspondence.
240. Golz, interview.
241. Wielkoszewski, interview.
244. Military Elites in Russia 1994, 4.
245. Ibid.
246. Howcroft, interview.
248. Govan, interview.
249. Ibid.
251. Dunkelberg, interview.
252. Holecek, interview.
253. Govan, interview.
255. For instance, Defense Minister Grachev protested the decline of military-patriotic education in schools and the demilitarization of such texts as alphabet primers. Such practices, he argued will lead to the demise of the military ideals of the state. Aleksandr Kovalev, “Educating a Patriot, Serviceman, and Citizen Is Today the Main Task for a School,” Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 October 1994, 1, 3. JPRS-UMA-94-044, 2 November 1994, 7–10. See also Igor Rodionov, Colonel-General, “We Do Not Want to Militarize Society Again: On Military Reform and Reform of the Armed Forces,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 December 1994, 1, 3. JPRS-UMA-95-003, 31 January 1995, 22. The author argues, “Let them not reproach us for attempts to militarize society again, for a systemic approach to safeguarding the country’s military security is characteristic of any democratic ‘civilized’ state of the West.”
257. Wasserman, interview.
259. Garrels, “Russia: Draft Dodgers.”
261. Golz, interview.
Chapter 5

5. Talking Points on Defense and Military Contacts with the FSU, 1993.
6. JCTP mission statement from briefing slide in HQ USAFE Military to Military briefing obtained at the Pentagon in May 1995.
9. JCTP Briefing, obtained from HQ USEUCOM, November 1997.
12. Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Faculty Member, interview by author, May 1995, Washington, DC.
13. See chapter 2.
17. Reppert, interview.
18. Interview by author with officer assigned to the Joint Staff, November 1997.
20. The exercises with Russia include: Peacekeeper 95 (took place in the US), Cooperation from the Sea 95 and 96 (took place in Hawaii and Vladivostok), and Arctic Search and Rescue 96 and 97. The exercises with Ukraine include: Peaceshield 95 (Lviv, Ukraine), Autumn Allies 95 (Camp Lejeune, NC), Amphibex 95 (Odessa, Ukraine), Peaceshield II (Ft. Leavenworth, KS), Peaceshield 96 (Lviv, Ukraine—Russia, and 9 other PfP states took part), Autumn Allies II (Virginia), Cooperative Neighbor 97 (Lviv, Ukraine—9 PfP states besides Russia took part), Sea Breeze 96 (Odessa, Shirokiy Lan, and Donuzlave, Crimea), and Peaceshield 97 (Camp San Luis Obispo, CA); interview by author with Joint Staff Officer, November 1997.
21. O’Connor, interview.
25. Harris, interview.
26. When I asked the Czech Defense Attaché to the United States this question he was careful to preface his remark with, “This is not meant to be a negative comment, but rotating the teams every six months is too much. The deployments should be at least one year long.” Jiri Giesl, Major General, Military and Air Attaché, Embassy of the Czech Republic, interview by author, May 1995, Washington, DC.
27. O’Connor, interview.
29. Dirk P. Deverill, Commander, Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, European Division, interview by author, May 1995, the Pentagon.
30. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 6–7.
33. The key result areas of the Czech Republic’s Country Work Plan, supporting objectives, metrics, and events are provided in appendix C of the Work Plan.
35. Justice, interview.
36. Interview by author of Joint Staff Officer in the Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia division, November 1997.
37. Harris, interview.
38. Freeman, interview.
39. Interview by author of Joint Staff Officer in the Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia division, November 1997.
41. Howcroft, interview.
43. Govan, interview.
45. Weiss, interview.
46. Freeman, interview.
47. Weiss, interview.

48. Interview by author of Joint Staff Officer in the Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia division, November 1997.

49. O’Connor, interview.

50. Justice, interview.


52. Report prepared in December 1993 by officers in the defense attaché office in Moscow for inputs to a report to Congress on the effectiveness of the U.S. military to military contact program in Russia.

53. Webster, interview.

54. Ibid.

55. Richmond, interview.

56. Webster, interview.

57. Report prepared in December 1993 by officers in the defense attaché office in Moscow for inputs to a report to Congress on the effectiveness of the U.S. military to military contact program in Russia.

58. Howcroft, interview.


60. Webster, interview.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

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Index

Afghanistan, Soviet War in, 99
Akhromeyev, General Sergei, 52, 155
Albania, military to military contacts with U.S., 51, 54
All-Russian Officers’ Assembly, 143, 144
American foreign policy. See Foreign Policy, U.S.
Andréjčak, Lt. General Imrich, 85
attachés, military intelligence collection role, 154, 161
regional expertise, 161

Baku, 99
Baltic states
   Baltic fleet, 113
   U.S. National Guard role in, 61
Baudys, Antonín, 85
Belarus, military to military contacts with U.S., 53, 54
Brno Military Academy, 86, 136, 140, 145
Brussels Summit (1994), 52
budgetary control, 13, 18
Bulgaria
   armed forces, 36
   military to military contacts with U.S., 54
Bush Administration, 46
Carlucci, Frank, 52
case-study method, selection of Czech and Russian cases using, 3–4
Chechnya
   Duma role in war, 98
   as impetus to military reform, 178
   relations with Russia, 77
role of Russian press, 100
Russian military readiness, lack of, 113
Russian use of contract servicemen in war, 135
use of Russian conscripts in war, 100, 150
war with Russia as a case study for Russian civil-military relations, 99–102, 178
Christian Democratic Union-Czecho- slovak People’s Party (KDU-CSL), 86
Chubais, Anatoly, 48
Civic Democratic Party (ODS), 86
civilian control of the military
   civilian expertise, 91, 174–75
   considered as a set of relationships, 6
   in the Czech Republic, 83–107
democratic models of, 109–10
   objective, 7–9
   parliamentary control, 91–98
   patterns of, 2
   in Russia, 83–107
   in the Soviet model, 110
   subjective, 7–9
   in transitioning states, 42
civil-military relations
   in democratic states, 6, 8–10, 11–21, 37–41
   in Eastern Europe, 19–20, 36, 37–38, 40
   functional imperative, 6
   party control in Communist systems, 11
   societal imperative, 6
   in the Soviet Bloc, 12, 19–20, 22–43, 37–41
civil-military relations (continued)
theory for postcommunist states, 5–43, 185–87
traditional approaches to, 6–10, 108, 182
twin imperatives of, 5–6
Clinton Administration, 45
Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, 96, 100, 101, 102
opposition to hazing, 133
Communist Party
control of the military in Eastern Bloc, 15–16, 36
control of the military in the Soviet Union, 15–16, 35–36
in East European states, 36
of the Soviet Union, 32, 36
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 51
conscripts, 121
constitutional provisions for democratic political control, 12, 13–14, 41, 80–83
in the Czech Republic, 82
in Russia, 82–83
contract service. See professionalization, of conscript militaries
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, 46, 52
Croatia, military to military contacts with U.S., 54
Crowe, Admiral William, 52, 155
Czechoslovakia
armed forces, 36, 75
Battle for Dukla Pass, 102
Czechoslovak Legion, 103
military to military contacts with U.S., 51, 155, 180
struggle for democratization in, 102–3
in World War II, 102
elections, 1992, 72
1948 Coup, 103
Support for East European Democracy program, 47
Velvet Divorce, 72
Velvet Revolution, 72
Civic Forum, 72
Public Against Violence, 72
Czechoslovak People’s Army (CSPA), 75, 84
motivation for service in, 127–28
support for Communist regime in 1989, 85
Czech Republic
armed forces
Air Force, 90
budget, defense, 91–92
civilian expertise, 93, 97–98
civilian oversight, 76, 84–85, 88
conscripts, 121
defense acquisitions process, 96
democratic transition, components of, 80, 184
down-sizing of, 86, 115
force structure, 116
housing, 118
legacy of Soviet era, 74
lustration process, 85, 115
military academies, 120, 129, 142, 145
military education reform, 97
military to military contacts with U.S., 54
motivation for service in, 140–41
NATO membership goals, 79
NATO’s role in military reform, 77, 126
personnel management reform, 87–88, 97, 123–27, 162, 168–69
personnel structure, 123–25
prestige, legacy of low, 79–80
public relations function, 148–49
Rapid Deployment Brigade, 173
relationship with society, 147–49
role in society, 78–79, 98
scandals in, 104
split with Slovakia, 115
strategic concept, 76–78
transparency of, 87–88
birth of, 72
Civic Democratic Party (ODS), 93, 97
Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security, 93
constitution, 97
Defense and Security Committee, 90, 93, 94
democratic history, 73
economic situation, 71–72
geostrategic location, 76
National Defense Strategy, 82
National Security Strategy, 77
Parliament
   Chamber of Deputies, 97
   quality of civilian control, 91–98
   relationship with General Staff, 95–96
   Senate, 97
public opinion support for NATO membership, 104
Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), 86
dedovshchina, 30, 132–34
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 154
delegative democracy. See O’Donnell, Guillermo, concept of delegative democracy
democratic military professionalism. See military professionalism, democratic
democratic peace, 45, 182
democratic political control. See political control, democratic
democratic transition of postcommunist states, 7, 108–9, 186
democratic values, 9, 20, 26, 106, 131, 138
   infusion of, in authoritarian society, 71, 109, 110, 152, 184
   role in democratic civil-military relations, 110, 128–29, 141, 149–51, 184
democratization
   military. See military democratization
   winners and losers in process of, 71
discipline, military
   in Soviet bloc, 30
in transitioning states, 110, 128, 132, 141–42
Dobrovsky, Lubros, 85
Dudayev, Dzokhar, 135
East, Colonel Paul, 161
edinonachilie, 29
education and training, military system of
   in the Czech Republic, 136–43
   curriculum, 131, 136–37, 140–41
   legislation governing, 136
   in democratic states, 31–34, 136
   role in democratic socialization, 137
   differences between U.S. and Russian systems, 172
NCO Corps, role in, 142, 169
Professional Military Education System
   in the Czech Republic, 165
   in postcommunist states, democratic
deficits of, 142
   in Russia, 136–43
   in the Soviet bloc, 31–34, 136
Estonia
   military to military contacts with U.S., 54
Support for East European Democracy program, 47
ethics, professional
   in postcommunist states, 135
   role in military professionalism, 135
European Union, 46
   Czech membership goals, 79
Founding Act, 168, 178
Foreign policy, U.S.
   Joint Contact Team Program, 52, 53, 54–62
   bureaucratic limitations of program, 160–65, 182
   facilitation of NATO interoperability goals, 56
   familiarization tours, 59
   focus areas, 57
   funding, 54
Foreign policy, U.S. (continued)
how it works, 59
legal basis, 55
mission statement, 156
Military Liaison Teams, 54, 59, 67–68, 155, 161–63
National Guard and Reserve forces, involvement of, 60–62, 162
objectives, 55
“post-reform” era, 156, 157, 164–65, 181
“pre-reform” era, 156, 157, 165
Traveling Contact Teams, 59
Russia, U.S. relationship with in post-communist era
military democratization programs, 44, 50–62
achievement of programs’ objectives, 66–69, 156–81, 169–70, 179–80, 182, 183
Country Work Plan, 165
Defense and Military Contacts Program for the Former Soviet Union, 52–54, 155, 156, 165–66
future of, 178–80
impact on host countries, overall, 166–70, 185–87
IMET, effectiveness of, 170–75
oversight of, 56–59, 158–60, 163–66, 181, 183, 185
reform of assessment procedures, 58–59, 180, 181
Freedom Support Act, 46

Galvin, General John, 51
Germany, denazification, 50
Good Soldier Schwejk, The, 104
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 27, 30, 40
beliefs on reforming communism, 72
Govan, General Gregory, 131, 167
Government Accounting Office, 47
governmental control of the military, 2, 6
Grachev, Pavel, 82, 84, 112, 144
loyalty to Yeltsin, 96
relationship with Lebed, 88
Gromov, General Boris, 144
Group of Seven (G-7), 48

Harvard, Institute of International Development, 47
Havel, Vaclav, 85, 90, 97, 105, 149
hazing
in Czech Republic, 134
in Russia (see dedovshchina)
Holan, Wilem, 80, 85, 93, 124
human rights
abuses in Chechen War, 100
democratic expectations of, 31, 135
toleration of abuses within the military, 9

Hungary
invitation to NATO, 177, 179
military to military contacts with U.S., 54
Support for East European Democracy program, 47
Huntington, Samuel, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 34, 109, 145, 182
characterization of civil-military relations, 2
International Military Education and Training (IMET). See United States, Security Assistance Program
International Monetary Fund, 48

Jandacek, General Pavel, 176–77
Japan, democratization of, 50
Jelik, Colonel Josef, 125–26
Johnson, Ralph, 46
Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP). See United States, military democratization programs
Joulwan, General George, 62
Justice, Lt. Commander Charles, 111

Kachinsky Higher Military Aviation College, 135, 137
Kazakhstan, 77
military to military contacts with U.S., 53
Kert, Johannes, 60
Kholodov, Dmitriy, 87
Klaus, Vaclav, 86, 105
priorities of government, 97
resignation of, 73
Kokoshin, Andrei, 83
Kovalyov, Sergei, 101
Krasnaya Zvezda, 101
Kulakov, Lt. General Vladimir, 139
Kuznetzov Academy, 111
Latvia
military to military contacts with U.S., 54, 60
participation in Marshall Center, 177
Support for East European Democracy program, 47
leadership, military
in democratic states, 28–31, 127–29
NCOs, role in, 134, 169
officer evaluations, role of, 31, 130
in Russia, 131
in the Soviet bloc, 28–31, 127–29
Lebed, Alexander, 84, 89
disobedience of, 88
Lenin Military Political Academy, 138
Lennon, Brigadier General Thomas, 54
Lithuania, military to military contacts with U.S., 54
Lobkowicz, Michal, 125, 142
Luzny, Colonel Peter, 172–73
Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic
of, military to military contacts with U.S., 54
Main Political Administration, 15
Mansfield, Edward D., 107
Marshall, George C., European Center
for Security Studies, 49, 52, 64–65, 130, 155, 175–78
Czech participation in, 175–77
Russian participation in, 175–78
Martinek, General Jiri, 130
Marxist-Leninism, 32, 111, 131, 133, 137, 138, 141
McCarthy, General James P., 51
Meyer, General Edward C., 29
military democratization, 4
dimensions of problem, 2, 4, 182, 183
military discipline. See discipline, military
military institution
political environment of, 6
political role of, 7–8, 34–37, 146
relationship with, in democratic states, 20–21, 98
relationship with society in postcommunist states, 98–105, 111
relationship with society in Soviet Bloc, 21–22
resistance to change, 8, 71, 112
transparency of, 31, 38–39, 86–88
Military Liaison Teams (MLTs). See
United States, military democratization programs
military professionalism, 7, 39, 184
characteristics across political systems, 23, 24–25, 151–53, 183
democratic, 2, 9, 10–11, 41, 108, 116–53, 154, 180, 182, 183, 184
how to achieve, 3
norms of, 22–43
role of NCOs, 31
elements of, 3
patterns of, 3
redefining in the postcommunist era, 109–11
Soviet norms of, 4, 22–43, 109–10, 127, 182, 184
in transitioning political systems, 41–43, 108–11, 151–53
military reform
postcommunist, in the Czech Republic, 115–16
postcommunist, in Russia, 112–15
military to military concept, 109
arms control contacts, 157
Military University, 138–39
Ministry of Defense
civilian experts in, 17
effectiveness of day-to-day oversight, 16–18
Ministry of Defense (continued)
  Soviet militarization of, 14
  transparency of, 17
Moiseev, General Mikhail, 155
Movement in Support of the Army, the
  Defense Industry, and Military
  Science, 144

Nagorno-Karabakh, 99
National Defense University, 175
National Security Council, importance of
  in democratic states, 17
National Security Strategy, 45
  of Engagement and Enlargement, 45
NATO, 9, 46, 66
  Defense College, 177
  enlargement of, 177, 181, 183
  Czech participation in, 82
  partner states, 44
  Russian reaction to enlargement,
    167–68
Necas, Petr, 93
Nekvasil, General Jiri, 95, 126
New Socialist Man, 21, 33, 40
Non-commissioned Officer Corps
  German, 29
  role in facilitating democratic military
    professionalism, 31, 167
Nunn-Lugar program, 46, 49, 52–53, 179

O’Connor, Colonel Peter R., 161, 162,
  168–69
O’Donnell, Guillermo, concept of
delegative democracy, 106
officer corps, East European
demographic background, 26
  pay and benefits, 26
  self-image of, 39
Owens, Admiral William, 95

parliamentary control
  elements of, 18–19
  range of legislative authority, 18
  role of staff, 19
Partnership for Peace, 52, 66, 97, 179,
  183

JCTP support of, 56, 179–80
Warsaw Initiative, 66
perestroika, 40, 155, 180
Pezl, General Karel, 76, 80, 85
Poland
  armed forces, 36
  invitation to NATO, 177, 179
  military to military contacts with the
    U.S., 51, 54
  Support for East European Democracy
    program, 47
political control
  democratic, 2, 13, 41, 70–107, 154,
    180, 182, 183
    in the Czech Republic, 82–107,
      180
    in Eastern Europe, 19–20
    how to achieve, 3, 183
    the imperative of, 6–7
    norms of, 11–21
    in parliamentary systems, 16
    in presidential systems, 16
    in Russia, 82–107, 180
    in East European states, 15–16
    nondemocratic patterns of, 9
    patterns of, 2, 3
Soviet era, 11–22, 41
  role of Communist Party, 14–16
political influence of military, norms of
  in the Czech Republic, 143–47
  in democratic states, 34–37, 144–46
  in Russia, 143–47
  in the Soviet bloc, 34–37
political officer role in military-political
  indoctrination, 33, 138–40
  in the Czech Republic, 138
  in Russia, 138–40
  education officers, 138–40
political systems
  adopting new sets of societal values in,
    8, 41
  transition to new political systems, 6,
    41, 45
  types that the military serves, 6, 108
postcommunist militaries
  challenges faced, 71
democratic adjustment of, 8
legacy of Soviet era norms, 9
postcommunist states, authoritarian heritage of, 9
Powell, General Colin, 51, 54, 155, 159
Prague Spring, 103
press
role in democratic civil-military relations, 20, 39
Russian military, coverage of, 148
prestige, military, 23, 25, 38–39
in Czechoslovakia, 102–5
in Czech Republic, 143, 147–49
norms of
in democratic states, 37–39
in Soviet bloc, 37–39
in Russia, 147–49
professional ethics. See ethics, professional
professionalism
definition of, 10
military (see military professionalism)
strategic, 44
professionalization of conscript militaries
in the Czech Republic, 122, 141, 142
in Russia, 114, 121–22
professional military as essential element of military reform, 114
promotion systems, military corruption in, 27–28
in Czech Republic, 122–27
“career concept,” 123
as an obstacle to NATO accession, 123
in democratic states, 26–28
role of officer evaluations in, 27
in Russia, 122–27
in Soviet bloc, 26–28, 122–23
reasonable sufficiency, 40
recruitment and retention, norms of
in the Czech Republic, 117–22
in democratic states, 23–26
in Russia, 117–22
in the Soviet bloc, 23–26
Reppert, Brigadier General John, 134, 248n. 164.
Rodionov, General Igor, 84
Rogov, Sergey, 91, 95, 113
Rokhlin, Colonel General Lev, 144
Rokke, Lt. General Ervin J., 167
Romania
armed forces, 36
military to military contacts with U.S., 54
participation in Partnership for Peace program, 179
Rubus, Brigadier General Gary, 74, 119
Runaev, Lt. Colonel Yuri, 137
Russia
attitudes of citizens toward democracy, 73–74
crime, 74
Defense Council, 88–89
Democratic transition, overall progress, 184–85
Duma role in military reform, 113
Duma Defense Committee, 94, 95, 144
economic situation, 74
judicial branch, weakness of, 80–81
Law on Realization and Utilization of Military Production, 95
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 171
national security interests, 78
Russian General Staff Foreign Liaison Office, 159
Security Council, 83, 87, 89
comparison with U.S. National Security Council, 89
Western aid to, 48
Russian armed forces
adaptation to democratic political system, 114
attitude toward democracy, 74, 78–79, 91, 181
budget, defense, 92–93, 113–14
civilian oversight
civilian expertise, 93–95, 166
executive/MOD control, quality of, 83–91
Russian armed forces (continued)
parliamentary control, quality of, 91–98
conscripts, 121
public attitude toward conscript system, 150
corruption of, 88–89
draft evasion, 121
housing, 117, 119
military academies, 120, 129
military doctrine, 77
role of nuclear weapons, 78
motivation for service in, 139–40
parliamentary control, quality of, 91–98
pay, 117, 119
peacekeeping, role in, 77
politics, role in, 115
public relations function, 148
receptiveness toward Western assistance, 74, 178–79
relationship with society, 78–79, 98–102, 147–49
social conditions 119
Strategic Purpose Forces, 113
Suicide rate, 132
transparency of, 86–87
Russkiy Island, 132

Schwartzkopf, General Norman, 130
“Schwejkism,” 128
Sedivy, Major General Jiri, 173
Sergeyev, General Igor, 84, 112, 113, 114
Shalikashvili, General John, 54
Shaposhnikov, Marshal Evgenii, 112
Simons, Thomas, 46
Slovakia
military to military contacts with U.S., 54
participation in Partnership for Peace program, 179
rebirth of, 72
Slovenia
military to military contacts with U.S., 54
participation in Partnership for Peace program, 179

Snyder, Jack, 107
socialization, democratic, 8, 28, 131–32
in commissioning sources, 32
in Eastern Europe, 20
ideological, 8, 32–34
role of military education system, 138–43
and militarism, 40
of military personnel, 7–9, 32–34
conscript system, role of, 150
in East European states, 21–22, 33
in postcommunist Russia, 79
in Soviet Union, 21
Soldatenkov, Lt. Colonel Sergei, 176
South Korea, 9
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act. See Nunn-Lugar program
Soviet Union
armed forces
interference in East European militaries, 36
motivation for service in, 127–28
military to military contacts with the U.S., 51–54, 180
patterns of civil-military relations in, 11
role of military in society, 12, 21–22, 75
dissolution of, 44
foreign policy, “New Political Thinking,” 75
invasion of Czechoslovakia, 103
liberalization within, 72
national security interests, 75
Suman, Vladimir, 95
Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act, 46, 47
Taiwan, 9
Tajikistan, 77
Toqueville, Alexis de, 23
Tosovsky, Josef, 86
transparency. See military institution, transparency of

290 Index
Ukraine
military to military contacts with U.S., 53, 160, 166
security assistance from the U.S., 170

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 30

United Nations
Czech support for peacekeeping operations, 79
UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force), 121, 129

United States
Agency for International Development, 47–49
assistance to postcommunist states, 44–52, 155, 181
Department of Agriculture, 47
Economic Support Fund, 47
European Command
deployment of MLTIs, 155
role in military to military contacts programs, 53
Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness, 49
Theater Security Planning System, 58

Export-Import Bank, 47

Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), U.S. Air Force, 161

Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), U.S. Army, 161
foreign policy (see foreign policy, U.S.)

National Military Strategy, 49
National Security Strategy, 44, 49
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 160

Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 47

Security Assistance Program, 49–50
Defense Security Assistance Agency, 50

Direct Commercial Sales, 50
Foreign Military Sales, 50, 63
International Military Education and Training (IMET), 50, 52, 62–64, 131, 155
in the Czech Republic, 172–75
expanded IMET, 64, 171, 174–75
funding, 63, 64, 170–71, 172
philosophy of, 63
postcommunist states, inclusion of, 63
in Russia, 170–72
in Ukraine, 170
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, 63
Peacekeeping Operations, 63
State Department, 50
role in JCTP, 54–55, 60

United States Air Force Academy, 141

United States Army Command and General Staff College, 155, 172

United States Army War College, 162, 172, 173

United States Military Academy, 141, 174

United States Naval Postgraduate School, 175

Ustinov, Dmitrii, 14

Vacek, General Miroslav, 85
Vaclavik, Milan, 103
Values, compatibility of military and societal
in the Czech Republic, 149–51
in democratic states, 39–41, 149
in East European states, 40
in Russia, 149–51
in the Soviet Union, 39–41

Vetchy, Vladimir, 86, 97, 116, 125, 142

Democratic (see democratic values)

Vilnius, 99

Vohralik, Lt. Petr 118

Vyborny, Miloslav, 86, 97, 118, 125

Warsaw Initiative. See Partnership for Peace

Warsaw Pact, 44

Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), 11, 15

Washington Summit, 1987, 52
Yeltsin, Boris  
- failure to halt Grozny bombing, 87  
- management of defense ministry, 84  
- role in 1991 coup, 72

Yugoslavia, former, U.S. assistance to, 47

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zaitsev, Grigory</th>
<th>176</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zantovsky, Michael</td>
<td>93, 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaoralek, Lubomir</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zdorikov, Lt. General Sergey</td>
<td>139, 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeman, Milos</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhirinovsky, Vladimir</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>