Orange County, California, was once the most predictable Republican stronghold in the nation. Democrats could field only sacrificial lambs in hopeless challenges to GOP incumbents at all levels of elective office. By the mid-1990s, Republicans still held a registration edge that had slipped only slightly since 1970, but many other aspects of the county had changed. About one-quarter of the county’s population was of Hispanic origin, and 10 percent were Asian. Twenty-four percent were foreign born.

In 1996, a thirty-six-year-old Hispanic woman, Loretta Sanchez, entered the contest for the 46th Congressional District seat, then occupied by Bob Dornan, a fire-breathing conservative who was finishing his twentieth year in Congress while running a hopeless campaign to become the Republican presidential nominee. Sanchez had no previous political experience and was well aware of Orange County’s Republican inclination, but she had taken careful note of the large Hispanic population in the segment of Orange County that is encompassed by the 46th District’s boundaries, an area where 50 percent of the population was Latino. She was convinced that Latinos would vote for her because she was one of them, and she won by a narrow 984 vote margin. Dornan immediately made charges of voter fraud, claiming that noncitizens had been improperly registered to vote, but in the end insufficient evidence was found to overturn the result. Dornan had become another political victim of population mobility. His loss was not simply the result of redistricting or the manipulation of district boundaries, although such factors certainly contributed. It was real demographic change in Orange County that led to Dornan’s political demise.

In the opening chapter, I offered some good reasons for suspecting that contemporary trends in internal migration and immigration are changing the electoral politics of states and regions. Specifically, internal migration has become the privilege of upwardly mobile, white, well-educated, mostly Republican-leaning natives. This is particularly true of
migration across state lines, where the costs imposed by moving are far higher than most moves occurring locally or within a state. A major component of current immigration, on the other hand, involves the movement into the United States of non-Caucasian peoples with few skills, low educational attainment, and little English. These characteristics inhibit the assimilation and integration of immigrants into the social, economic, and political mainstream. Lacking skills, education, and English, the newer immigrants cluster in enclaves, where ethnic distinction is reinforced, rather than dispersing to meld with other elements of the population, including other immigrant groups. Because immigrants are admitted under U.S. law based mainly on family ties, regardless of their skills and education, they naturally form concentrated ethnic pockets in the areas where they settle. Nowhere is this more evident than in California’s Santa Clara County (San Jose), where the Asian population increased from 99,000 to 261,000 between 1980 and 1990, or Orange County (Anaheim), where the Asian population increased from 57,000 to 250,000 during the same period. Drawing upon the work of Frey (1996, 1995a, 1995b) and others (Filer 1992; Barff and Walker 1992), I am arguing that the distinct characteristics of foreign- and native-born movers lead to their residential segregation and ultimately to important political changes as substate regions develop monolithic racial and economic interests that eventually translate into political identities. In this manner, population change will catch up to alter the politics of places, as it did in Orange County in 1996.

California’s experience of population change is unique in American history and perhaps even in the world. No state has been the destination of such a large volume of both internal migrants and immigrants. In turn, California is an excellent (and relatively easy) case with which to begin an assessment of the political impact of rapid population growth. If population changes have had some impact on turnout, partisanship, and other aspects of electoral politics, that impact should be observable in the Golden State. Map 2.1 shows the areas of highest growth in California from 1950 to 1992. Darker shades indicate counties with the most explosive growth. The map shows that growth has occurred all over the state but especially in the south (Orange, San Diego) and north-central counties (Yolo, Sacramento, Placer, Amador). Several coastal counties south of the Bay Area also rank high, including Santa Cruz, San Mateo, and Monterey. The counties of slower growth are those in the rural north, but even they have grown relative to their 1950 populations.
Outside of the northern counties and a few mountain regions along the Nevada border, the growth has been enough to radically realign certain regions of the state. Areas along the coast from Santa Barbara to the Oregon border that voted comfortably for Richard Nixon in the 1960s were voting solidly Democratic by the 1990s (Gimpel 1996). Party registration figures suggest that the electorate is evenly distributed between the two major parties across much of the state, making nearly every area a political battleground. By 1990, only about 15 percent of Republicans (or Democrats) would have had to move for partisan voters to be evenly distributed across the state’s fifty-eight counties—a far lower percentage than in the other states discussed in this book. In the Central Valley, once strong Democratic bastions such as Tulare, Fresno, Kings, and Kern Counties became some of the most predictable Republican areas in the state in presidential and gubernatorial races while electing conservative Democrats locally. In Southern California, the increasing racial and economic diversity of Riverside and Los Angeles Counties plunged GOP registration to its post–World War II low point in the mid-1990s. Republicans have remained stronger in Southern California than in the north, and the greater numbers there have helped Republicans control the state’s governorship through the 1980s and 1990s, but California’s politics is in an evolving, highly unsettled state.

Trends in the growth of the foreign-born population and the change in the percentage of the foreign-born population that is Caucasian provide solid evidence for the rapid changes that have reshaped California’s character. The foreign-born population now constitutes about one-quarter of the state’s population and a majority of those immigrants are nonwhite. The steep drop in the percentage of foreign-born white residents is particularly worth noting. In 1960, over 90 percent of the foreign-born population in California was white. By 1990, this figure had dropped to about 40 percent. This trend corresponds to both the changes in national immigration

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1. This figure is based on the calculation of a dissimilarity index for counties that will be used throughout this book to indicate the concentration and spatial segregation of groups across both counties and census tracts. The index of dissimilarity is given by

\[ D_{xy} = 0.5 \sum |(x_i/Y) - (y_i/X)| \]

where

- \( x_i \) and \( y_i \) are the number of \( X \) and \( Y \) members in census tract or county \( i \).
- \( X \) and \( Y \) are the total number of \( X \) and \( Y \) members for the entire county (in the case of tracts) or state (in the case of counties) (Massey and Denton 1987, 805–6).
policy that shifted immigration preferences toward less developed nations and the failure to control illegal immigration across the nation’s southern border (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). By the early 1990s, 85 percent of California’s foreign-born population had entered the country after 1965.

For 1990, the composition of the foreign-born population in California is illustrated by the pie chart in figure 2.1. Of the nearly 6.5 million immigrants in the state in 1990, 31 percent, or just over 2 million, were Asian, with Filipinos, Koreans, Chinese, and Vietnamese the largest groups. Another 2.5 million (38 percent) were Mexican, and this population was seriously undercounted. The remaining immigrants in 1990 included 595,000 Europeans, 706,000 Central and South Americans, and about 66,000 Africans. Continued immigration in the face of a five-year recession during the early 1990s helped fuel much of the nativist resentment that culminated in the Proposition 187 movement to limit public services to legal and illegal residents (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).

The research on migration and internal migration discussed in chapter 1 indicates that there are important demographic distinctions among cross-state migrants, immigrants, and nonmigrants. But many of these research studies have been conducted using national data and surveys rather than data from particular states. In response, one might raise the reasonable objection that what is true for national surveys may not hold for individual states. Could it be the case that migrants, long-term residents, and immigrants are not that distinct in California? To evaluate the differences, I looked at the 1990 Census Public Use Microdata 1 Percent Sample (PUMS) for California. I selected only those Californians over the age of eighteen. Comparisons of the mean age, education level, and income of 213,688 cross-state migrants, immigrants, and native Californians are presented in appendix A (table A2.1). These data show that internal migrants residing in California earn more money, are considerably older, and are more likely to be on Social Security than either native Californians or immigrants. In addition, 80 percent of internal migrants are white, compared to 71 percent of natives and 20 percent of immigrants, indicating that the racial composition of internal migrants and immigrants in California is highly distinct. The age distribution, though, is different from many national studies, as it shows California’s newer residents to be older than natives or immigrants. California, like Florida, draws from a migration stream that selects out a disproportionate number of elderly retirees from the national pool of migrants.

What relevance do the 1990 PUMS data have for predicting patterns
of spatial balkanization in California? The answer lies primarily in the income, educational, and racial differences between immigrants, internal migrants, and California natives. Nearly $8,000 separated the average income of migrants from that of immigrants in 1990. Immigrants, on average, had 2.2 years less education than did internal migrants and natives. Slightly more than one-fifth of immigrants in California are non-Hispanic white compared to the vast majority of interstate migrants and 71 percent of native Californians. These differences easily predict that immigrants, natives, and internal migrants will not make the same locational decisions about where to live and work. To evaluate whether settlement patterns are different for the migrant and immigrant populations, I will return to the aggregate data.

**Settlement Patterns of Migrants and Immigrants**

Where are the new population groups settling? The spatial isolation of immigrants from the native born may have an impact on the naturalization rates of the former and the political participation rates of both groups. One version of the contact hypothesis predicts that intergroup interaction will increase political mobilization (Hood and Morris 1997; Stein, Post, and Rinden 1997; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glaser 1994; Key 1949). If groups are clustered in distinct geographical pockets so as to minimize intergroup contact, there will be less of a perception of threat or competition from rival groups and political involvement will be slack (Olzak 1992). The first question to answer, then, is whether migrant and immigrant population groups have become more isolated. One way of
evaluating this is to model the locational choices of migrant and immigrant groups. The dominant theories suggest that migrant and immigrant populations are persuaded to settle in certain areas by either the promise of jobs or the presence of family and friends (or at least coethnics). In the absence of comparable state-level survey data on destination choice, I use county-level data throughout this and the next six chapters to evaluate whether those arriving between 1980 and 1990 were drawn by employment prospects, the presence of a community of coethnic prior arrivals, or some combination of both.

The dependent variable is the change in the size of the particular population group as a percentage of the total population from 1980 to 1990. In other words, I am interested in explaining changes in group size relative to the rest of the population of the county. If a county begins the decade with 13 percent of its population of Mexican origin and finishes the decade with 14.5 percent, the change in the size of the Mexican population relative to the rest of the population is equal to +1.5. Constructed in this manner, the dependent variable allows the measurement of whether a group is an increasing or decreasing proportion of the county’s population. Time-series data would be best for this purpose, but annual or other appropriate periodic observations for these groups are not available. Realizing that mine is a second-best strategy for modeling population change, I hope to determine whether particular groups became more or less noticeable across the decennial interval between 1980 and 1990.

To reduce the leverage of counties with small populations, I have weighted the model for population. The model also includes a spatially lagged dependent variable to account for spatial dependence among the observations. Spatial dependence is a condition affecting data that are spatially arranged such that the values at one point in space are related to the values at nearby points (Anselin 1988, 11; Haining 1990, chap. 8; see also Appendix B). Since county boundaries are drawn arbitrarily, it is highly likely that one county’s values for a variable are related to the values of neighboring counties for that same variable. It would be a mistake to simply assume that the observations are totally independent. By incorporating a spatially lagged dependent variable into a regression model as an explanatory or “right-hand side” variable, one can account for spatial dependence and eliminate autocorrelation in the error term, thereby bringing the model into line with classical regression assumptions. I address the topic of spatial autocorrelation and the strategy I use to correct the problem more completely in appendix B. The variable capturing spatial depen-
dence also serves a useful descriptive function in this particular context because it provides some indication of whether each migrant group is clustering in geographic pockets of California—in counties that are proximate to each other—as opposed to dispersing more evenly or randomly throughout the state.

Among the other explanatory variables, I have included a variable for net change in the population during the decade to account for the possibility that increases (decreases) in a group’s share of the county population are controlled by overall population trends. Population density is included to determine whether immigrants are attracted to urban or rural areas of the state, with the expectation that immigrants usually move to cities (Lieberson 1963). Also included in the model is a control for the percentage of college students in a county to account for the possibility that some of the new arrivals are simply university students. A variable for the change in real median family income between 1980 and 1990 is included to capture the changing economic condition of alternative locations within the state during the decade.

The results for this model are presented in table 2.1 for immigrants from several continents as well as for those specifically from Canada and Mexico. A model for the locational concentration of internal U.S. migrants is presented for the sake of comparison. Several interesting patterns emerge from the results. First, compared to 1980 figures, Asians, Mexicans, Central (including Caribbean) Americans, and South Americans are significantly increasing their visibility relative to California natives and other immigrant groups.

The immigrant groups most responsible for reshaping California politics are Asians and Mexicans. Mexicans are becoming a more noticeable presence in the areas where they had established themselves by 1980. For every 1 percent increase in the proportion of Mexicans living in a county in 1980, there is a considerable .21 percent increase in the growth of that population (as a percentage of the total population) by 1990. This finding reflects the fact that newer Mexican arrivals are dependent upon the social networks provided by friends and family members who arrived previously (Portes and Rumbaut 1990). But Mexicans are also likely to avoid areas that began the decade with high unemployment. The Mexican population, then, is growing most noticeably in areas of both previous ethnic settlement and economic opportunity.

Map 2.2 illustrates the concentration of the immigrant population in California counties in 1990. The most noticeable pocket of Latino immi-
TABLE 2.1. Influences on Population Concentration in California Counties, 1980–90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>U.S. Migrants</th>
<th>African Immigrants</th>
<th>Asian Immigrants</th>
<th>European Immigrants</th>
<th>Canadian Immigrants</th>
<th>Mexican Immigrants</th>
<th>Central American Immigrants</th>
<th>South American Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% 1980 group population</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.37*</td>
<td>-.30*</td>
<td>-.49**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>1.45**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% unemployment, 1980</td>
<td>2.25**</td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.48**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in real median family income, 1980–90</td>
<td>2.00**</td>
<td>.009**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>-.10*</td>
<td>-.02*</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% net population change</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.001**</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.0007*</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.000004</td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td>-.00001</td>
<td>-.00006</td>
<td>-.00006</td>
<td>-.0002**</td>
<td>.000001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% college students</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>-.04**</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial lag</td>
<td>.81**</td>
<td>-.42*</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>-.29**</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-44.10</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                                  | 58            | 58                 | 58               | 58                  | 58                  | 58                 | 58                          | 58                        |
| $R^2$                              | .62           | .52                | .51              | .83                 | .76                 | .57                | .98                         | .65                       |

Note: Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; income coefficients expressed in thousands of 1992 dollars; dependent variable = change in population group as a percentage of total population. See appendix A for a full description of variables.

*p < .10.  **p < .05.
Map 2.2. Change in the proportion of immigrants in California counties, 1980–90. (Mean = -12.5, Moran's I = .46)
grant presence is in the Central Valley (Fresno, Madera, Merced) where the promise of farm labor continues to attract Mexican migrants (Taylor, Martin, and Fix 1997). There are also significant Mexican immigrant concentrations in the Los Angeles area, including Los Angeles and Orange Counties. Asians are drawn to coethnic enclaves in California much as Mexicans are. But the Asian concentrations are in the darkly shaded Bay Area counties (San Francisco, San Mateo, Alameda, Santa Clara). The regression analysis in table 2.1 shows that for every 1 percent change in a county’s 1980 Asian population, there is a .37 percent gain in that group’s growth relative to the non-Asian population. The influx of Asian immigrants, coupled with their concentrated settlement patterns, has made this community more visible and politically powerful than ever before.

The proportion of internal migrants constituting the state’s population shrunk an average of 12.5 percent from 1980 to 1990 across counties, and the instrument of this decline was the incredible influx of immigrants. The growth in the percentage of internal migrants is occurring not in areas where similar migrants from earlier periods settled but in areas that showed income growth between 1980 and 1990 (table 2.1). They are also an increasing proportion of the population in areas that began the decade with high unemployment. One thing is certain, however: internal migrants have not increased their presence in the areas that are most popular with immigrants. Evidence for this is presented in map 2.3. Note that in the very counties where the foreign-born presence is highest (map 2.2) the presence of out-of-state migrants is lowest. It is certainly possible that areas could attract greater concentrations of the foreign born and a larger proportion of interstate migrants at the same time. This could happen, for instance, in places where the proportion of native Californians shrinks, as seems to have been the case in Modoc County on the state’s northern border. But this was a rare occurrence in California during the 1980s. Out-of-state migrants grew numerically in many places but not proportionally anywhere but in a few rural and mountain counties, which immigrants avoided.

The spatially lagged dependent variable provides some indication of whether there are concentrated growth patterns in California in particular subregions of the state. Positive values indicate patterns of positive spatial dependency—places where the growth of a particular population is occurring not just within a county but across a group of adjacent counties (appendix B). Negative values indicate the rarer condition of negative spatial dependency—places where growth in a particular population is occurring even as that population is diminishing in nearby counties. The
Map 2.3. Change in the proportion of internal migrants in California counties, 1980–90. (Mean = 3.18, Moran's I = .42)
coefficients in table 2.1 indicate positive spatial dependency for the growth patterns of U.S. internal migrants. In other words, the number of these migrants is growing fastest (or declining more slowly) in counties that are in close proximity—shown as the dark northern counties on map 2.3. Positive spatial dependency is also found in the growth patterns of Central American immigrants, who are clustering in greater concentrations in the state’s southern and central counties. Negative spatial dependency can be found in the models for African American and European immigrant growth. These groups are becoming more noticeable in isolated counties but not across entire subregions or “county clusters” in the state.

The models in table 2.1 best predict changes in the growth of Central American, European, Canadian, and U.S. internal migrants. For Canadians and Europeans, there is a strong inverse relationship between their numbers in 1980 and their growth relative to that of other groups. This is not surprising since these movers are highly skilled, well educated, and mobile. They have no need for the social support networks that less skilled immigrants seek. Nor are Europeans and Canadians likely to face the discrimination in the labor market that makes social networks necessary for survival. Canadians and Europeans also show some capacity to move to areas where real income is rising. Central Americans, on the other hand, show a strong propensity to cluster in areas where previous arrivals have established a presence—perhaps suggesting a reliance on social networks.

This overview of migrant and immigrant settlement patterns obviously overlooks important distinctions within these groups. Some Asians are less dependent upon social networks than others. Undoubtedly some interstate U.S. migrants do find themselves in areas of low income growth. But the general picture is clear. Asians, Mexicans, and Central and South Americans, the bulk of the immigrants arriving since changes in the 1965 immigration law took effect in 1968, are drawn to areas in California where their fellow émigrés are concentrating and becoming more noticeable. In 1992, a typical year, four out of ten immigrants settled in Los Angeles County and 75 percent settled in just six counties: Los Angeles, Orange, Santa Clara, San Diego, San Francisco, and Alameda (Bizjak 1993). While Hispanic émigrés show some capacity to avoid concentrating in areas of high unemployment, they are also less likely than U.S. internal migrants to move to areas that are experiencing income growth. These sustained settlement patterns are contributing to the class and ethnic balkanization of the state.
Balkanization within Counties and Naturalization Rates in California

Naturalization is the legal aspect of assimilation (Liang 1994, 407). Obtaining citizenship is important because naturalization entitles an immigrant to vote. Immigrants who naturalize, then, have a measure of political capital that nonnaturalized immigrants lack (Portes and Curtis 1987; Pachon 1987; Garcia 1981). Naturalization is also a “measure of the degree to which immigrants are integrated or assimilated into American life and society” (Liang 1994, 407). Those who naturalize are willing to be identified as citizens and presumably willing to assume the responsibilities that go along with full membership in their new communities.

Several scholars have indicated that the spatial isolation of a group influences the propensity of that group to naturalize (Liang 1994; Portes 1984). Residential segregation increases within-group rather than inter-group interactions (Liang 1994; Blau 1977; Gordon 1964; Allport 1954). Within-group interactions, so the theory goes, reinforce ethnic identity and make immigrants less likely to naturalize than if they had contact with other groups. We can directly assess the impact of ethnic balkanization on naturalization rates with data from California. Of course, counties are geographically large units of analysis, particularly in Southern California. Much of the ethnic balkanization of the state is obscured at this level and can be better captured by data at the neighborhood, census tract, or block group level. Using the index of concentration described in footnote 1 and widely employed by sociologists and demographers for the last forty years (Duncan and Duncan 1955; Lieberson 1963; Taeuber and Taeuber 1969; Jiobu 1988; Massey and Denton 1987, 1993), I computed values indicating the segregation of the Asian and Hispanic populations from the white population across census tracts within each of the state’s fifty-eight counties. The result was two indicators of spatial balkanization: one for the

2. The dissimilarity index obviously cannot be calculated across census tracts for counties where there is only a single census tract. Ordinarily this means that the most rural counties in many states would have to be excluded from analysis. In some states analyzed in this book there would be so much missing data that I would only be capable of offering a truncated analysis of the most urban areas of the state. To avoid this I decided to code the most rural counties where there was only a single census tract as 0 on the dissimilarity index. Of course, this assumes that ethnic minority populations in the nation’s smallest counties are well-integrated, or at least far better integrated than in urban counties. And certainly at the broad level of census tracts, they probably are well-integrated because in the most rural
segregation of the Asian and white populations and a second for the segregation of the Hispanic and white populations. Using these segregation indices as independent variables in two regression models for 1980 and 1990, I evaluated the extent to which ethnic isolation within counties was related to naturalization rates for immigrants residing in those counties. If spatial isolation makes immigrants less likely to naturalize than integration does, a regression analysis should show that the segregation of white from minority groups both within and across counties reduces naturalization rates, thereby retarding the civic engagement of new populations. To control for other influences on naturalization rates, I included variables for population density and the percentage of residents in a county who are college educated.

The results reported in table A2.2 (appendix A) show the expected result that naturalization rates are inversely related to the size of the foreign-born population in a county. In other words, the more populated the immigrant enclave is, the lower naturalization rates will be—although this is less true in 1990 than in 1980. That foreign-born concentrations would be related to a lack of civic engagement conjures up the idea that the visibility of an immigrant population in an area may be positively related to immigrant-native inequality in that area. Blalock (1956) advanced a related idea by suggesting that when a minority population is large the white population will be more likely to discriminate against that population, increasing inequality between the two groups (Beggs, Villemez, and Arnold 1997; Jiobu 1988). Here we have some indication that political inequality across immigrant communities in California—differences in the propensity to civically engage through naturalization—may be related to the size and concentration of the immigrant population. Immigrants who settle in areas populated predominantly by the native born naturalize at higher rates than immigrants who settle primarily among other immigrants.

46 Separate Destinations

counties outside the Deep South, ethnic minority populations are usually very small. A much less desirable alternative, in my judgment, was to code these counties as 100 on the dissimilarity index—assuming that rural minority populations were much more highly segregated than their urban counterparts. Readers should note that all regression models presented in this book that contain the dissimilarity index as an independent variable are weighted for population so that the influence of the most rural counties, and therefore the influence of these “0-coded” observations on the regression plane, is reduced. There is no doubt that rural minority populations are often very isolated and perhaps the dissimilarity index could be constructed from data at the block-group or even the city block level of aggregation for such places. But in the most rural counties it is often the case that all populations are relatively dispersed and so terms such as segregation and spatial isolation take on a different meaning than in more urban and suburban settings.
Table A2.2 also indicates that Hispanic segregation from whites within counties has the effect of depressing naturalization in both 1980 and 1990, although less so in the latter year. Interestingly, though, Asian segregation from whites is associated with increased naturalization in 1980 but bears no relationship to naturalization in 1990. The results, then, for the effect of ethnic segregation on turnout are mixed in precisely the way that Liang (1994, 429) discovered. On the one hand, consistent with a variation of the “visibility-discrimination” hypothesis advanced by Blalock (1956) and others, high concentrations of the foreign born within counties are surely not conducive to putting immigrants on a political par with their counterparts who have mixed with the native population. As Liang (1994) found, however, the rate of Hispanic naturalization is more likely to be adversely affected by residential segregation from whites than the rate of Asian naturalization is. This difference in the effect of Asian-white and Hispanic-white segregation can be accounted for by the fact that Asian segregation from whites is not always a sign of poverty, poor education, and lack of English in that community. There are long-standing residential enclaves of established Asian wealth where rates of citizenship and political participation are as high as in any white community. Hispanic segregation, though, is more likely to be the result of characteristics that inhibit Latino mobility such as lack of English, low literacy rates, and poverty.

Migrants, Immigrants, and Turnout in California Elections

What is the effect of the presence of migrants and immigrants on turnout rates across California’s counties? Most of the recent research in political science suggests that internal mobility reduces turnout due to the presence of restrictive registration laws. Movers are hindered in their efforts to reregister by closing dates, inconvenient hours at registration offices, and “procedures shrouded in obscurity” (Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass 1987, 45). With the “motor voter” law, passed by Congress and signed by President Clinton in 1993, many of these barriers were removed (at least in theory) since voter registration is now accessible through state motor vehicle licensing offices. But for most of the period of study here the motor voter legislation had not passed into law, and even after it had passed the California state government delayed implementation while pursuing legal action to enjoin its enforcement.

Many new immigrants also face barriers to conventional political par-
ticipation. Acquisition of citizenship is a major step, and some immigrant
groups show a greater propensity to naturalize than others. Asians gener-
ally obtain citizenship rather quickly compared to Mexicans and Central
Americans (Portes and Rumbaut 1990, 117). Some researchers have made
the very plausible case that noncitizenship is the single greatest obstacle to
the political empowerment of Hispanic communities (Pachon 1991; Gar-
cia 1987, 1981). But even when they are naturalized many recent immi-
grants are not well educated and therefore not inclined to vote (White and
Kaufman 1997). In a study of political participation in the 1984 election in
California, Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet found that only 60 percent of
Latino citizens and 69 percent of Asians voted, compared to 81 percent of
blacks and 80 percent of whites (1989). The ability to speak English and
longer residence in the United States do increase participation rates
among Asians and Hispanic immigrants (210). It is not surprising that
established immigrants would be more likely to participate than new
arrivals. Older immigrants are more likely to be naturalized and more
likely to have acquired a stake in their new country’s political future. They
may also be inspired to vote by experiences of discrimination that trigger
ethnic consciousness. The general expectation, then, is that in areas with
recent immigrants, participation will be particularly low. Similarly, places
with large migrant populations are expected to have lower rates of politi-
cal participation after controlling for other variables likely to have an
impact on turnout such as education; the residential segregation of whites
from Asians, Hispanics, and blacks within counties; the percentage of the
population that is African American; and population density.

Average turnout rates for counties across two California gubernator-
ial elections are depicted on map 2.4. It appears from a simple inspection
of this map that turnout rates are inversely related to the concentration of
immigrant populations. The lightly shaded counties are those with both
low turnout and a strong immigrant presence.

Results of a multivariate analysis of turnout rates in two recent presi-
dential and three gubernatorial contests in California are presented in
table 2.2. In the last column of this table, I have also pooled the results
from the 1990, 1992, and 1994 elections to facilitate generalization. As one
would expect based on well-understood individual-level relationships,
education is positively related to turnout across four of the five elections
and in the pooled model.

The ecological results correspond to individual-level findings in other
ways as well. For instance, turnout is negatively related to the percentage
Map 2.4. Average turnout rates in California gubernatorial races, 1990–94. (Mean = 59.8, Moran’s I = .33)
TABLE 2.2. Impact of Population Mobility on Voter Turnout in California Counties, 1980–90

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% college educated</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.11)</td>
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<td>.70</td>
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Note: Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; dependent variable = percentage turnout by county. See appendix A for a full description of variable.

*aVariables with low tolerances and high standard errors due to multicollinearity.

*p < .10.  **p < .05.
of migrants from out of state in three of the five contests, particularly in 1992. In the pooled model, the coefficient for the internal migrant population indicates that a 10 point increase in the percentage of the native born population from outside California drops turnout by about 1.2 points—a substantive difference that could easily determine an election’s outcome. Political participation is also lower in areas where there are significant numbers of African American residents. The percentage of the immigrant population arriving after 1970 is associated with lower turnout in the 1990s but not in the 1980s. Of course, by the 1990s the population of immigrants that had entered after 1970 was considerably larger than it was in the early 1980s, indicating that the lack of significance of the immigration variable in 1980 and 1982 was probably due to the smaller proportion of newly arriving immigrants at the time.

The variable for the segregation of minorities from whites within counties in table 2.2 shows a generally negative sign in the 1990s and also for the pooled model. In other words, the more highly segregated whites are from minorities across census tracts within an area, the lower the turnout is likely to be for the entire area. The pooled model indicates that a ten point increase in segregation drops political participation by about .4 percent. This finding is certainly consistent with the contact hypothesis. Interracial contact and proximity generates a concern for the maintenance of political power by whites and a concern for obtaining political power among minorities. This kind of competition produces high participation rates by both minorities and whites. Low turnout, on the other hand, is found in areas where immigrant populations are so distant from native ones that they pose no threat to the values and interests of the majority.

The most consequential finding from the ecological analysis presented in table 2.2 is that places with large populations of both out-of-state and international migrants have lower participation rates than places where natives predominate. Eventually out-of-state migrants may reregister, and they certainly do not face the obstacle of a cumbersome naturalization process. But long after domestic migrants settle down, noncitizens remain politically handicapped. Immigrants are underrepresented in the political system not just because only citizens can vote, but because the foreign born settle in low-income areas where even the native population is poor, uneducated, and nonparticipatory. As more of the recent immigrants naturalize, perhaps the differences in participation between areas with many immigrants and those with few will disappear. Even immigrants who have been slower to naturalize have felt the heat of nativist sentiment expressed
in movements such as Proposition 187, which threatened to deny public benefits to illegal aliens. There are doubts about whether even legal residency is enough to protect access to government services. Both the Republican Contract with America and President Clinton’s own welfare reform legislation (signed into law in August 1996) sought to deny most public benefits to noncitizens even if they were legal residents. In California, the 1994 elections were also followed by Governor Pete Wilson’s efforts to roll back affirmative action programs in higher education that were designed to help minority groups. Political mobilization is greatly enhanced by the perception of threat, and these initiatives made it clear that legal residency was not enough. The late-1990s have witnessed a surge in petitions to naturalize.

Migrants, Immigrants, and Partisan Voting

What about the contention that population mobility unravels the party system? Migrants bring political identities and attitudes from elsewhere. Local indigenous political cues have little influence in the short term. The juxtaposition of the imported identities in the new and alien political setting may lead to the weakening of political party identification (Brown 1988). By examining the relationship between party registration and party voting, it is possible to determine whether there is a larger difference between the two in some areas of California than in others. For areas populated with immigrants, many of whom are not naturalized, the expectation is less clear. New immigrants from Mexico and Asia usually identify with the Democratic Party in California once they become citizens. In addition, the lower-class standing of most unskilled immigrants of color strongly suggests that they will locate in urban and suburban neighborhoods where Democrats may be so well entrenched that other parties are not an option. At the county level of aggregation, I suspect there may be significant differences between registration and voting in areas where there has been strong receptivity on the part of white voters to the conservative positions taken by Republican candidates against the use of public services by newer immigrants. In other words, I hypothesize that Republicans will do better than their registration predicts in counties with more immigrants who have arrived since 1970. Control variables have been added for participation rates, percentage African American, education, and population density.

Map 2.5 shows the spatial patterns of party irregularity that must be
Map 2.5. Average party irregularity in California gubernatorial races, 1990–94. (Mean = 17.5, Moran’s I = .39)
explained by the multivariate regression model. The light streak of coastal counties from Santa Barbara to Sonoma stand out as locations where party registration and party voting match especially well. Areas of party irregularity include Kern, Tulare, and Kings Counties, where many registered Democrats often vote Republican. The northern counties, populated with large proportions of internal migrants, were also highly irregular in their behavior in these elections.

The results of the regression analysis of party irregularity are presented in table 2.3 for five individual election years and a pooled data set that includes 1990, 1992, and 1994. The effect of these demographic attributes on the difference between party voting and registration are evidently dependent upon the election in question. For presidential races (1980, 1992), the percentage of residents born out of state increases the difference between party registration and voting, as Thad Brown’s groundbreaking work would predict for individuals. The pooled model also suggests that out-of-state origin is associated with independence of party. Kern and Imperial Counties are good examples of places with high party irregularity coupled with a large nonnative population. In off-year elections, though, there is no statistically significant difference between those places with large migrant populations and those without. In these elections, new arrivals may not have turned out to vote at all. Mobility inhibits the development of political capital. The turnout of migrant groups is likely to be lower in nonpresidential years. When new arrivals, with their weakened party attachments, do not turn out to vote, the difference between party and candidate voting diminishes, thus explaining the change in significance levels between presidential and nonpresidential election years. Low turnout of certain subgroups, such as blacks, also accounts for the difference in signs between the on-year presidential elections and off-year gubernatorial races in table 2.3.

As for new arrivals from abroad, the results show that places with large populations of recent immigrants were productive of highly partisan voting in the early 1980s but not during the 1990s. This change suggests that counties where recent immigrants are concentrated have undergone a political transformation from predictable bastions of party support to volatile and unpredictable places. In the 1992 presidential contest, a 1 percent increase in the percentage of recent (post-1970) immigrants contributed to a .36 increase in the difference between party registration and party voting. Survey data show that many of the recent Asian immigrants are registered as independents. H. Ross Perot’s candidacy in the 1992 pres-
### TABLE 2.3. Similarity of Party Registration to Party Voting in California Counties, 1980–94

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<td>.09a</td>
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<td>.11*</td>
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<td>.71</td>
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*Note:* Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; dependent variable = Abs (% Republican vote – % Republican registration); high positive values indicate counties where voting differed from registration. See appendix A for a full description of variables.

*Variables with low tolerances and high standard errors due to multicollinearity.

*p < .10. **p < .05.
idential election probably best accounts for the unusually large discrepancy between registration and voting in that year.

Education behaves predictably across the entire series of elections, and its effect is to decrease the difference between party registration and voting except in 1992 when support for Perot altered the tendency in the opposite direction. The results for education correspond to the individual-level finding that better educated and informed voters are stronger and more consistent partisans (see, e.g., Zaller 1992). In the California context, the areas with the highest percentages of the college educated residents are located on the coast, where better educated residents are committed ideologues, and therefore straight ticket Democratic voting is the norm.

The spatially lagged dependent variable in table 2.3 shows that party irregularity in California follows a pattern of positive spatial dependency. Places that depart from their basic political inclinations are clustered in the north and central regions of the state. Those counties where voting best matches party registration are in the San Francisco Bay area and along the coast, as seen in map 2.5.

To summarize, we have learned that party regularity is a function of internal population mobility, the proportion of recent immigrants in a place, the educational attainment of the population, and idiosyncrasies of individual election years. Patterns of party regularity are important because it is predictably partisan areas that candidates and party organizations can most easily ignore in highly competitive races. California’s ideologically liberal and affluent Democrats in Bay Area neighborhoods, for example, need not be the focus of much campaign effort. They are not likely to change. Similarly, those neighborhoods where older waves of immigrants have settled, the large urban counties, are thoroughly socialized and highly predictable. The less predictable places, in presidential election years at least, include those with both a large proportion of out-of-state residents and recent immigrants, many of whom are not politically active. These are the locations where political traditions have been shaken by population growth and where swing voters may determine the outcome of a close contest. Note that the ecological data do not show that migrants and immigrants are directly responsible for independence of party voting. Only surveys of individual behavior could determine this with certainty. It is also possible that waves of migrant and immigrant settlement have stimulated California natives to depart from their party affiliations when casting votes. In either scenario, however, both parties in California would be wise to pay close attention to the
places where these new arrivals settle, as they are politically erratic if not highly volatile.

**Migrants, Immigrants, and Changes in Partisan Registration**

We have so far observed that the impact of migration and immigration on voter turnout at the aggregate level is consistent with commonplace findings from surveys of voters but occasionally depends upon election-specific factors. Areas where minorities are isolated from whites have consistently lower turnout rates, especially in the 1990s, than those areas where there is residential integration. Places with more residents from outside California report lower participation rates than counties populated mostly with native Californians, particularly in off-year elections.

The influence of these indicators of population settlement have a mixed impact on party regularity. Migration across states increases differences between party registration and voting in presidential election years, but party irregularity is not consistently influenced by out-of-state migration in gubernatorial years. By the 1990s, areas with large populations of new immigrants (those arriving after 1970) are less consistent in their political behavior than those with either older waves of immigrants or no immigrants at all. Apparently, the effects of these demographic characteristics of places are mediated through California’s candidate-centered elections.

In light of these results, the effect of migration and immigration on changes in the balance of party registration in California counties is worth careful consideration. The independent variables used to predict changes in party registration have been selected based on their theoretical relevance. The dependent variable is the increase in the share of Republican registrants (by county) for the decades 1970–80 and 1980–90. In other words, I seek to explain the variation in Republican registration relative to other parties. This is not the same thing as measuring the change in the number of Republican party registrants for each county, since growth in the number of Republican registrants could easily occur alongside growth in party registrants for other parties. Rather, I mean to explain the difference in the percentage of registrants across these ten-year periods. For example, if a county began 1980 with 35 percent registered Republicans and finished the decade (in 1990) with 31 percent, the change (growth/decline) in the share of Republican registrants would be –4.

Put in its simplest and most general form, my main hypothesis is that
population growth from sources internal to the United States enhances Republican registration. Areas of population growth are generally associated with expanding economic opportunity and wealth creation. These are middle- and upper-income areas, including suburbs and medium-sized cities where Republicans are already well established and represented. By contrast, older urban areas are associated with brighter prospects for Democrats given their traditional association with population groups that were least mobile during either decade. Areas of population decline, then, are hypothesized to be areas where Republicans took the greatest losses relative to other parties.

The change in Republican registration is thought to be a function of the density of the county population—urban and densely populated areas less likely to see gains in Republican registration. The percentage of the population born outside the state at the beginning of each decade captures the relative balance of natives and transplants. A variable capturing the change in the percentage of the population born out of state will serve in the evaluation of whether the increasing or decreasing balance of non-Californians has influenced Republican registration. Included in the model are variables for the foreign-born population at the beginning of each decade on the supposition that areas with large foreign-born populations are likely to be large cities and Democratic strongholds. The growth of the foreign-born population, on the other hand, is likely to be associated with Republican growth, as mobile, better educated immigrants flow to areas of expanding economic opportunity and wealth creation in suburbs and prosperous cities and are less drawn to areas where their ethnic group is spatially concentrated (Nogle 1996; Bartel 1989).

Table 2.4 reports the results of the hypothesis tests on the growth or decline in Republican registration. GOP registration has increased in areas of higher population density across both decades, suggesting that Republicans have done well in certain urban and suburban counties. The population of out-of-state residents in a county at the beginning of the 1980s is associated with strong positive gains in Republican registration in the ensuing ten years. Increases in the proportion of interstate migrants from 1980 to 1990 also contribute to GOP growth rates. In other words, the forces of internal migration are clearly bolstering Republican registration growth. For the foreign-born population, the evidence is different. Areas with large foreign-born populations at the beginning of each decade saw sizable GOP losses, particularly in the 1970s. A one point increase in the proportion of foreign-born residents in a county in 1970 led to a 1.4 per-
cent decline in the percentage of Republicans between 1970 and 1980. These results make sense given that California’s most Democratic areas had the largest immigrant populations. In Los Angeles, Alameda, and San Francisco Counties, all with large foreign-born populations, the GOP continues to grow weaker. Places where the foreign-born population increased as a proportion of the total population, however, show marked Republican gains in both decades. This is no indication that immigrants are themselves registering as Republicans in the places where they are becoming a larger segment of the population. Without individual-level data, we cannot determine the exact source of the gain in GOP strength—it could also have been produced by the native backlash against the influx of immigrants. But whatever the individual-level process entails, it is noteworthy that places do not necessarily go Democratic in California simply because immigrants become a larger proportion of an area’s population.

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\( N \) = 58, \( R^2_a \) = .76, .84

Note: Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; dependent variable = change in the percentage of Republican Party registrants. See appendix A for a full description of variables.

*aVariables with low tolerances and high standard errors due to multicollinearity.

*p < .10. **p < .05.
Finally, the lagged variable for change in Republican registration shows that a different spatial dynamic is at work across California counties in the 1970s than occurred in the 1980s. In the 1970s, GOP growth in a county is negatively related to the growth of Republican registration in neighboring counties. This may indicate that the source of GOP growth during the 1970s was suburbanization, which led to population redistribution within the state. In other words, negative spatial dependency suggests that Republican gains in outlying counties are offset by Republican losses in adjacent core counties. For the 1980s, however, the sign on the spatially lagged variable is positive, suggesting that Republican registration growth is occurring across clusters of adjacent counties. This pattern would reflect GOP gains not from suburbanization but from migration from other states.

Ethnicity and Political Behavior at the Individual Level

The aggregate data examined thus far are informative not for what they suggest about individuals but for what they say about differences among places where individuals reside. Migrant and immigrant groups are drawn to different locations in California. Some groups cluster in the same geographic locations, increasing their visibility relative to other groups, while others disperse. The results describe a state in which turnout is high in areas where there are few blacks and new residents. They show increasing Republican strength in areas where the population from out of state is high in the early 1980s and the foreign born population has increased as a proportion of the total population. Frey (1995) is not only right about California’s socioethnic balkanization, but we can go further and conclude that this balkanization has political consequences—it spatially separates people from different parties and with different propensities to participate. Of course, the usual ambiguities of ecological data analysis persist. I have shown that these trends in population mobility and politics are associated but not necessarily traceable to voters. We do not know, for example, whether Asians and Mexicans naturalize, register, and vote Democratic or whether the Republican losses associated with their presence are instead the consequence of white out-migration or nonparticipation. The number of Republicans could be growing more slowly or declining relative to other parties as the result of attrition or generational replacement, not due to real Democratic gains from the addition of new voters.
Studying the political behavior and attitudes of migrants and immigrants at the individual level for specific states is difficult due to the lack of appropriate data. For internal migrants, questions about residential mobility and political attitudes are rarely covered in the same polls. For immigrants, it is similarly difficult to find comprehensive background information together with queries about politics. Immigrants from very different backgrounds are often grouped into broad categories such as Asian and Hispanic. This raises questions about the extent to which most polls and surveys overgeneralize about groups that are internally highly variable. Wendy Tam (1995) has pointed out that the Asian community is highly diverse and the usual polls fail to capture its nuances. In one recent study of the Los Angeles area community of Monterey Park, Chinese Americans were found to be far more Republican than Japanese Americans (Horton 1995). But few polls distinguish the myriad Asian groups. Another drawback of surveys is that they rarely distinguish between resident aliens, naturalized citizens, and undocumented workers. Nor do questions commonly appear about whether a particular ethnic person is native or foreign born. Obviously, most politically oriented surveys are focused on citizens (those eligible to vote). Exit polls only survey those who show up at the polls and therefore capture only ethnic persons who are either naturalized or native born. So in the typical poll there is often no way of knowing whether an ethnic voter is a native-born or naturalized citizen. Of course, birthplace may not matter. Many foreign-born Mexicans are less educated than Mexican American natives. But when they obtain education and find long-term employment many of the differences between the two groups disappear. Differences may also disappear with length of residence in the United States (Cain, Kieweit, and Uhlaner 1991). If so, then education, income, age, and length of residence may be the critical variables distinguishing the political fortunes of foreign- and native-born residents. Education, age, and income are variables that are readily available in most surveys.

One survey that does record birthplace information is the American National Election Study (ANES). While it is impossible to use this survey to generalize about electorates in individual states, it can be used to evaluate more generally whether it makes much difference if an ethnic voter was born in the United States. Pooling the ANES surveys from recent years (1980–94) provides enough cases to obtain a general impression of the influence of a person’s country of birth on his or her political attitudes and voting habits. In appendix A (table A2.3), I present a model of the impact
of birthplace on vote choice in presidential elections. I have added control variables for education, income, age, party identification, and length of residence in the country. The results are presented for Hispanic and Asian respondents as well as those with European and Canadian backgrounds. The results show that place of birth makes no difference at all for Hispanics once party identification and the other variables are included in the model. The strength of party identification is extraordinary. Even income is only marginally significant. For Asians, too, party identification is the overriding influence on vote choice.

Given the importance of party identification, one may well want to ask about the acquisition of partisanship, as Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlner do (1991). What role does nativity play in the development of party identification? The answer is that nativity does make an important difference to the acquisition of partisanship. First-generation citizens, those who immigrated directly from abroad, are less likely to have experienced discrimination than those of the second or third generation (394–95). Since the 1930s, Democrats have always done well among disadvantaged minority populations. Hence, it is to be expected that the longer an immigrant has been in the United States the more likely he or she is to be a Democrat. This is exactly what we find in examining the ANES data, especially for Hispanics: only 17 percent of the native born identify with the Republican Party, compared to 39 percent of the foreign born ($\chi^2 = 39.2; p \leq .0001$). For Asians, the differences are less dramatic: about 38 percent of the native born Asians identify with the Republican party, compared to 51 percent for the foreign born ($\chi^2 = 4.83; p \leq .09$). These differences persist even after controlling for income and education.

So what does this do to our ability to use the majority of state-representing polls that fail to differentiate on the basis of nativity and length of residence? Second-best strategies are common in the social sciences, and one such option is to use the available data and describe differences across states, keeping in mind the distinct characteristics of the immigrant populations in those areas. The data presented in the pie chart in figure 2.1 serve as important contextual information. One source of state-level data that is comparable across all of the states studied in this book is the 1990, 1992, and 1994 Voter Research and Surveys Exit Polls (VRS). These polls do not contain the level of detail found in national polls but do contain questions on basic political attitudes and behavior as well as questions on race, education, and other background characteristics relevant to the political
socialization process. Table 2.5 presents the breakdown of party identification by race/ethnic group for the three elections in California. Unsurprisingly, white Californians are divided between the two major parties about equally, blacks are solidly in the Democratic column, and two-thirds of Hispanics vote Democratic. Asians, though, are only slightly more Democratic than Anglo voters. These figures contrast with what Tam (1995) found for Asians in the San Francisco Bay area, where clear minorities of each of the three major Asian groups—Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese—were registered as GOP identifiers. Given the finding that Asians who are foreign born are more likely to be Republican, perhaps the high percentage of recent Asian immigrants in California is responsible for their Republican orientation. Higher income and better education appear to be responsible for the Republican leaning of wealthier Asians, but many are also foreign born, with a shorter length of residence in the United States, and therefore less likely to have experienced the kind of discrimination that leads many native-born Asians to identify with Democrats (Uhlaner 1991). Other explanations for the strong Republican inclination of Asians in California include the socialization of many new Asian immigrants into a party system dominated by highly visible Republican presidents who took strong stands against communism. Finally, these exit polls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Republican</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>43.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>40.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
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<td>17.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Source: Voter Research and Surveys, General Election Exit Polls, 1990–94 (weighted data).*
are capturing only Asian participants in the elections. As Tam (1995) has pointed out, turnout rates for Asians range from 53 to about 56 percent in off-year elections (237). Hence, the Republican inclination of the Asian electorate may be overestimated by the exclusion of those choosing not to vote. Keeping in mind the surge and decline in participation from presidential to nonpresidential years, it is not surprising that the percentage of Asian Republicans is higher in 1990 and 1994 than it is in 1992 (see table 2.5).

These survey data on the party identification of the Asian and Hispanic electorates in California suggest that the growth of the Asian population may do little to harm Republican prospects. The effects of Asian immigration may well be a wash when considered at a statewide level— with some Asians moving into the Democratic Party and others identifying with Republicans. Attempts to use Gary King’s (1997) ecological inference maximum likelihood technique to determine the statewide proportion of Asians who register Republican, based on county level observations, produced estimates that may not be far off. Reflecting the surge and decline of participation across presidential and gubernatorial election years, 27 percent of Asians were estimated to be registered Republicans in 1990, 20 percent in 1992 and 28 percent in 1994. These figures reflect estimates of those Asians who are registered to vote, not of those who actually went to the polls. Asian participants, as the polling data suggest, are more Republican than the total Asian population of registered voters. From this evidence, it seems particularly problematic to suggest that the Asian influx is responsible for any sudden drop in Republican registration across the state. Where the GOP is losing strength in areas of high Asian concentration, it is because Asians are replacing white Republicans who move out of the area. This interpretation is consistent with William Frey’s recent studies of the interaction of immigrant and migrant populations (1995). Specifically, Frey has documented the association of immigration and internal out-migration from metropolitan areas across the nation. In California, there is a major out-migration stream induced by immigration, and these out-migrants are less educated, elderly, and white. Asians and high-income white households seem to be staying put (361).

Among Hispanics, though, the VRS polls show a strong Democratic preference that is tempered only slightly by higher income. It is safe to infer that an increased number of Hispanics has led to a direct increase in Democratic registration and a drop in Republican growth, although there may be some population replacement of whites with Hispanics that is also contributing to low Republican growth or even decline.
Political Change and the Internal Composition of California Counties

Since county boundaries are arbitrarily drawn and often encompass large and diverse populations, county-level data can obscure internal variations important to an area’s political identity. To bring additional light to bear on the possible mechanisms of political change, it will be useful to examine census tract data for several exemplary counties that both have and have not experienced Republican Party growth between 1980 and 1990. During this period, GOP registration growth was on an upward curve throughout the state. In the 1970s, Republicans had taken a beating, losing an average of five points to Democrats and third parties across California’s fifty-eight counties. The 1980s, on the other hand, reversed this trend, and the average county saw Republicans gain about four points relative to other parties. Los Angeles and Alameda Counties have shown slow to no growth. As new immigrants have moved in, Los Angeles County’s share of Republican registrants has moved up three points—slightly below the state average. Alameda County’s proportion of Republican registrants dropped about a tenth of a percentage point from 1980 to 1990. In Kern County (Bakersfield), just north of Los Angeles, Republican growth has been brisk, with the proportion of Republican registrants jumping seven points from 1980 to 1990 in spite of growth in the Mexican and Asian populations. In Placer County, in northern California just outside of Sacramento, the proportion of Republican registrants jumped nearly eleven points over the ten-year period. Might the internal population dynamics of these counties explain why Los Angeles and Alameda have seen little Republican growth while more rural counties have seen steady to dramatic improvement in GOP registration?

One possibility is that the counties where Republican growth has been strongest are those that exhibit the least ethnic diversity. Perhaps Placer County has seen strong Republican growth precisely because it has not experienced the kind of demographic change that the more urban areas of the state have undergone. Placer’s population has increased rapidly over the last fifteen years, but the new residents are the spillover from Sacramento or have migrated from the Bay Area to take advantage of a lower cost of living and doing business. There are few minorities. The 1980 census reported only 1 percent Mexicans and only .5 percent Asians. These populations have seen little growth. Local residents report that Hispanics have had a historical foothold on certain areas of the county, but there are
no Asian enclaves. Thirty years ago, a small Japanese population was involved in the fruit-ranching business, but this group has since dispersed into other walks of life. So it may well be that without the moderating trends of ethnic population change elsewhere, counties like Placer have naturally drifted in a Republican direction in a period that favored Republican growth overall.

What is especially interesting about Placer County is that its small Hispanic population is geographically isolated. The one Hispanic enclave in the county is in the city of Roseville, and there is a small Hispanic population in Lincoln. While the pockets of ethnicity are distinct, these communities have a long history and contain few new arrivals. Ethnic conflict is a relative nonissue in suburban fringe areas like Placer County precisely because of the high degree of spatial separation between groups coupled with the small size of the minority population. When two potentially rival groups do not have much contact, they are less inclined to engage in political combat. This is not a new finding. V. O. Key suggested that black-belt whites in the old South were particularly active in the struggle to maintain Jim Crow, while up-country whites were not (1949). Key’s explanation was that black-belt whites had the most contact with blacks and were therefore most likely to be threatened by the empowerment of black voters. Similarly, one early study found that black participation was highest in areas where blacks came into frequent conflict with whites, that is, where the two populations mixed, and lower in areas where blacks constituted the overwhelming majority of the population (Matthews and Prothro 1963a; 1963b). Racial interaction is likely to lead to the experience of discrimination, and therefore ethnicity becomes a salient political cue in more integrated areas (Giles and Hertz 1994; Antunes and Gaitz 1975; Olsen 1970). In a study of turnout in 282 U.S. cities, Robert Alford and Eugene Lee found that political participation was higher in cities with explicit ethnic and class cleavages (1968, 809). If the idea that interethnic proximity leads to political activism applies to race and ethnic relations outside the South, and for intergroup relations other than African American and white, then perhaps the spatial separation between Hispanic and white groups in places like Kern and Placer Counties has resulted in low participation levels among Hispanics and natural, unabated, Republican growth in the rest of the community.

The important methodological question at this point is what constitutes “spatial concentration” and “spatial dispersion”? As with all measures, a certain amount of arbitrariness is involved in the determination of
some threshold level or cutpoint. If the cutpoint is set too high, so as to require a neighborhood to contain a majority of an ethnic group for that group to be considered spatially concentrated, then surely few neighborhoods will pass that test outside of the very largest metropolitan areas. Such a stringent measure would understate the degree of spatial concentration of many groups since few neighborhoods contain such high proportions of any minority group. On the other hand, if the standard is set too low, so that a very small percentage of people of color living in an area comprised mostly of whites indicates spatial concentration, then the degree of spatial concentration would be overstated. Every county would contain spatially segregated minority populations. One index that has been derived and widely utilized in discussions of residential segregation is the index of dissimilarity or $D$ (see footnote 1) (Massey and Denton 1987; Jiobu 1988). This measure evaluates the evenness of a group’s population across tracts. If a group is unevenly distributed, or segregated, the index values will be high and that group can be described as spatially concentrated. It is spread in even proportions if in each tract it comprises the same percentage of the population that it does in the county as a whole.

The results for the index calculated for the entire state and the four counties discussed are presented in table 2.6. Without question, blacks are the most spatially concentrated group, certainly in California as a whole but even in counties with smaller cities like Kern. This concentration appears to have dropped in all of the counties from 1980 to 1990 but remains highest in Los Angeles (.69). Interestingly, Kern County’s Asian and Hispanic populations are at least as spatially concentrated as in Los Angeles and considerably more so than in Alameda.

Placer County
Located to the north and east of the city of Sacramento, Placer County consists of rapidly growing suburban towns and bedroom communities straddling Interstate 80 (see map 2.6). The median home price in the mid-1990s hovered around $150,000, far lower than in the Bay Area or Southern California. The affordable housing and location midway between the mountains and the coast has attracted both younger residents and retirees escaping the high costs, traffic, congestion, and crime of the state’s coastal cities. The suburbs of Roseville and Rocklin have been inundated with development spilling over from Sacramento. Light industries, including NEC Electronics and Hewlett-Packard, have been transplanted from Silicon Valley and other parts of the state to Placer’s growing number of
TABLE 2.6. Index of Dissimilarity for the Black, Asian, and Hispanic Populations Relative to Whites in Four California Counties, 1980 and 1990, by Census Tract

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanics</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census 1990, and author’s calculations.

Note: Figures represent the percentage of each group that would have to move in order for the group to be evenly distributed across census tracts in the county.
Map 2.6. Migrant and immigrant magnet areas in Placer County, California, 1990
industrial parks. Growth control is a major issue. “No sooner do they settle down than they seek to slam the door on additional newcomers,” remarked one local reporter. Local officials are fond of saying to developers proposing multifamily dwellings that “if we wanted to live in Sacramento, we would have moved there.” One local initiative in the town of Roseville caps the city’s population growth at 96,000 people by the year 2010 partly by cutting down on the density of new housing development.

The cost of living in a place determines, of course, who lives there and what shape politics will take. The strong push for growth control has kept low-cost housing to a minimum, which has isolated the small black and Hispanic populations in older neighborhoods in suburbs lying on the Sacramento County border. Commuting costs to and from Sacramento have also kept low-income minorities close to the city’s borders. Placer County’s tiny minority population might appear highly dispersed compared to those of the three other counties reported in table 2.6, but the figures are reflective of the small number of minorities in the county rather than the tolerance of the white population. Hispanics settled in Roseville beginning in the late nineteenth century to be near their historical base of employment on the Southern Pacific Railroad. Now many of the former railroad employees are retired, and they remain clustered in the older parts of the town. Outside of a few Roseville neighborhoods, the county is overwhelmingly “white bread.” Indeed, one local observer bluntly admitted that people migrate to Placer County to get away from the minorities they feel have taken over other parts of the state. The picture is clear for small monoethnic counties like Placer. This locale has experienced strong Republican growth because few of the demographic forces that temper that growth are operating.

Kern County
“Kern County is a transplanted piece of Oklahoma,” said one local reporter. Even though the massive southwestern migration dissipated in the 1950s, many residents still have relatives in Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. They shuttle back and forth on Bakersfield’s only wide-bodied jet service to Dallas, Texas. Even the economy is similar. Kern is one of the largest oil-producing areas in the United States. When oil prices dropped in the 1970s, and again in the early 1990s, many of the small towns were devastated. While some residents left the state, many remained behind, driving the local unemployment rate into double digits. Racial tension and segregation are also the results of a transplanted southern culture. The
town of Oildale is a haven for white supremacists and hate groups. The
black community is clustered in southeastern Bakersfield in the poorest
and most blighted neighborhoods. Blacks have taken little interest in local
politics, although the Bakersfield City Council did have one black repre-
sentative as of the mid-1990s.

Aside from oil production, the Kern County economy is based mainly
on agriculture and therefore is highly dependent upon immigrant labor.
The Hispanic immigrant population is a mix of old and new arrivals. It is
concentrated in East Bakersfield and in the rural “ag towns”—small town
settlements adjacent to farms at the southern end of the Central Valley (see
map 2.7). Second- and third-generation Hispanics are well integrated in
the local economy but not in local politics. In spite of its large Hispanic
population, Bakersfield has never elected a Hispanic city councilman. Still,
Kern County has seen slightly less Republican growth than Placer because
the Hispanic population has grown and, while concentrated, it has a his-
tory of labor activism. The United Farm Workers organized in this area
throughout the 1970s to extract better wages and working conditions from
big California growers. Delano, a city of twenty-five thousand on the bor-
der of Kern and Tulare Counties (see map 2.7), was the headquarters of
labor organizer Cesar Chavez.

Farmers have greeted the political activity of Hispanics with consider-
able hostility and suspicion. Latino political activity has found its expres-
sion overwhelmingly within the Democratic Party. Local polls suggest
that as many as 68 percent of the Hispanic voters are Democrats. If ethnics
expand their influence over the local Democratic Party apparatus, Repub-
licans are only likely to gain more support among the Central Valley’s
farmers, generating class cleavages on top of the existing ethnic ones in the
local party system.

Los Angeles County
As in many other parts of the nation, California’s most urban counties dif-
fer from the state’s rural counties primarily with respect to their ethnic
composition. Unlike Placer and Kern, Los Angeles County has high pro-
portions of all three major ethnic groups: Asians, Hispanics, and blacks,
along with an Anglo population that is a steadily declining majority. By
tract, the Asian and black populations are highly concentrated in Los
Angeles County. The Hispanic population was more concentrated in Los
Angeles \( (D = .46) \) in 1990 than in Alameda \( (D = .36) \). Whites are more
likely to avoid settling in neighborhoods where minorities reside if the
Map 2.7. Migrant and immigrant magnets in Kern County, California, 1990
population of the minority in question reaches a certain threshold. Similarly, white flight accelerates once neighborhoods undergoing integration reach a certain “tipping point.” In many Los Angeles County tracts, these thresholds were reached in the 1950s.

Since the ethnic and white populations in these urban areas are spatially isolated from one another, racial tensions frequently surface in politics. Spatial isolation in the context of densely populated urban settings with district-based elections generates a politics where racial and ethnic advocacy is required for reelection (Clark and Morrison 1995; Skerry 1993). At first this seems to be a contradiction, since I have just argued that the geographic separation of ethnic groups is conducive to low consciousness of ethnicity. Within a neighborhood containing only one’s coethnics, a person is less likely to encounter prejudice from outsiders and ethnicity may not become a salient political trait. But California’s urban areas contain not only spatially concentrated populations, but also highly dense neighborhoods with extensive transportation links that promote exposure to a variety of nearby places. Citizens rarely stay only within their own neighborhoods. The large populations in these tracts and the casual traffic of people throughout areas of differing social and economic character suggest that the degree of spatial isolation can be easily overstated by looking at residential concentrations in the absence of population density. In highly urban areas, residential segregation and ethnic consciousness can go hand-in-hand because density mitigates the impact of geographic insularity.

The internal composition of California counties, the heterogeneity and density of their populations and their political traditions, help us to understand patterns of partisan change during the 1980s and 1990s. Democratic registration growth in Southern California has been hindered by the low rate of naturalization among Hispanic immigrants. Many Mexicans and Central Americans harbor very little confidence in the political system, perhaps reflecting their experience with government in their home countries. In addition, the Hispanic population is highly mobile and preoccupied with economic necessities (Pachon, Arguelles, and Gonzalez 1994). With no attachment to a particular place, and concerned primarily with the search for work and the payment of rent, political roots never take hold. The result is that predominantly white communities in Los Angeles County have far higher participation rates than recent immigrant communities. Cities where Republicans are registered have much higher turnout than where Democrats are strongest, exaggerating the Republican leaning of Southern California.
Nevertheless, Democrats have remained a competitive force because a small percentage of new immigrants have joined together with white liberals and more established immigrants in Democratic party building efforts. In Los Angeles, the sheer concentration of minorities ensures a strong Democratic political base on the south and east sides of the city even when turnout is low. Although the high level of segregation creates local political districts that are politically safe and encourage an ethnically based politics, liberals in the city’s westside neighborhoods supported Mayor Tom Bradley’s repeated reelection through the 1980s. Of course, Bradley became mayor of Los Angeles only by shedding a racial orientation and adopting a more pluralist, pro-business approach to city government (Sonenshein 1993). His white support waned as voters in the city’s better neighborhoods began to take a dim view of his emphasis on continued commercial development. At that point his support came to rely more narrowly on the minority community. Like many other cities, then, Los Angeles County is far less Democratic than its ethnic and racial composition should dictate. Because so many low income minority voters take no interest in politics, white areas of Los Angeles are disproportionately represented. The ethnic balkanization of neighborhoods helps to create local legislative districts that encompass racially homogeneous areas. The politics following from quite natural and undistorted apportionment schemes ensures that group identities are transferred into politics. The unfortunate result has been that whites remain the controlling force in elections in the face of a growing minority population. Because minorities see a disproportionate number of white faces in state and local office, they assume they have been cheated of representation.

Alameda County
Like Los Angeles, Alameda County contains a heterogeneous population. The western and northern reaches of the county are the most densely populated and racially diverse areas. Large tracts of empty land on the east end of the county in or near the cities of Livermore, Dublin, and Pleasanton are rapidly filling up with single family dwellings that have attracted internal migrants but few immigrants (see map 2.8). In 1990, less than 9 percent of the population in the easternmost tracts was nonwhite. In the most urban settings, including Oakland, the level of interracial contact is high and the black, Asian, and Hispanic communities are large. Immigrants are not confined to inner city areas in northern Alameda. More than one million Bay Area minorities live outside traditional urban enclaves (Viviano 1991).
Some of these are refugees from Southeast Asian countries; others are professionals drawn by northern California’s educational institutions and high-tech employment. Because of the high caliber of the immigrant stock, many of the new Asian immigrant communities in Alameda grew wealthier rather than poorer during the 1980s and 1990s, although the number of families per household has often grown as well. Map 2.8 shows that significant immigrant communities can be found in the southern and central tracts in or near the cities of Hayward, Fremont, and San Leandro. Notably, these towns have not been as attractive to interstate migrants. The only tracts that have attracted equal internal migrant and immigrant populations are clustered in the north around Berkeley and the University of California (see dark shaded area in map 2.8).

The black community in Alameda has lost ground economically even as it has gained political power in Oakland and neighboring communities. Isolation in the northern end of Alameda County has conveyed some political representation. Residential segregation, particularly between black and white areas, ensures that race is translated into the politics of state and local legislative bodies—blacks occupied nearly 40 percent of the jobs in Oakland city government by the early-1990s and routinely elected City Council members—but integration and economic progress have been slower. The Latino community is both spatially more dispersed and economically better off than the black population. Because of its dispersion, however, it has not had the same success in electing Latino representatives. Hispanic politicians elected in Alameda are required to draw upon cross-racial coalitions to an extent that blacks are not. As one Latina assemblywoman from Alameda County remarked, “We have to be careful when people wear their ethnicity on their sleeve all the time. People get uncomfortable, and they don’t want to work with you” (Hull 1994).

The racial consciousness generated by a segregated but densely settled ethnic population has not resulted in much support for Republican candidates in Alameda County. Republican registration declined nine points relative to that of Democrats (and other parties) from 1970 to the 1990s, standing at a mere 24 percent by 1994. Republican support for Proposition 187 and the California Civil Rights Initiative, which sought the repeal of affirmative action programs in the state, has done nothing to endear the GOP to lower income blacks and Latinos in Alameda’s larger cities. Due in part to the flight of wealthy white residents, the black population of Alameda grew at eight times the rate of the white population from 1980 to 1990.
Map 2.8. Internal Migrant and Immigrant Magnets in Alameda County, California, 1990
Rural versus Urban Isolation

Ethnic heterogeneity and interracial conflict in the East Bay and Los Angeles areas has generated the kind of ethnic consciousness that finds its expression in politics. The segregation of neighborhoods, something that would ordinarily reduce interethnic contact and ethnic consciousness, has been mitigated by the density of settlement. In turn, legislators from the larger minority enclaves practice a racially oriented politics. The rural counties, while generally not as heterogeneous, show how spatial isolation can have a detrimental impact on political participation of any kind, whether politics is racially centered or not (Lamare 1977; Miller 1975; Garcia 1973). In Kern County, Hispanics and new immigrants are located in neighborhoods in the eastern section of Bakersfield and in remote towns in the rural northwestern part of the county (see map 2.7). With a lower degree of interaction with whites than that found in more urban counties, Hispanics are not as likely to be mobilized to naturalize, register, and vote. In this sense, rural isolation is more problematic for democratic politics than urban isolation is (Lamare 1977). Chicano children in rural areas have a stronger Mexican identity than those in urban areas and feel less attachment to the United States and its political institutions (Garcia 1973, 48). Early in life, most Mexican American children have feelings of affection for state and national government, but these feelings erode most rapidly among those living in rural areas. Garcia suggests that this erosion is due to the negative socialization experiences of the rural youth as compared to their urban counterparts (187–88). Rural Hispanics are usually of lower class standing and experience more discrimination from whites than those in urban and suburban settings. An alternative explanation is also consistent with Garcia’s evidence, however. Rural Hispanics experience less contact with white political institutions and do not learn that these institutions can possibly work to benefit them. Given their lack of contact with non-Latinos relative to youth in more populated areas, it is difficult to comprehend how rural Mexicans could experience more discrimination. Geographic isolation provides some modicum of protection from discrimination by other groups. In fact, it may be that the lack of interaction with other groups as well as isolation from “Anglicizing” institutions in rural areas that depresses political unrest and involvement among rural Latino populations.

The balkanization of urban neighborhoods in Los Angeles and Alameda Counties occurs within a densely populated setting where other
parts of town are accessible, albeit with some effort. Some interracial contact will take place, and much of it will not be negative. The black youth’s employment in a supermarket in a predominantly white neighborhood two miles from home is the kind of interracial interaction that provides concrete economic benefits. Rural isolation, on the other hand, is far more difficult to surmount. Rural monoethnic communities may experience little racial tension, but they will also find it more difficult to come by the social and economic opportunities that might be available in a different kind of neighborhood. The middle-class white community where there is job growth may be twenty miles away rather than two.

In places like Kern County, with its history of conservative politics and lack of participation by many Hispanics, and at a time when much of the state was leaning toward the Republicans anyway, the GOP has done well. In Placer County, there are too few minorities for them to have been an effective counterweight to the rising Republican tide during the 1980s. The county remains 94 percent white. The few minorities there are dispersed, and, while the number of Asians and Hispanics has increased slightly, there are not enough of them to be consequential to the area’s political development.

Peaceful race relations coupled with minority nonparticipation are found in areas where racial and ethnic groups are spatially isolated, where they are scattered over a large, sparsely populated territory, and particularly where the population of nonwhite residents remains small and non-threatening. The latter description fits Placer County especially well. Placer’s population grew by nearly 60 percent from 1980 to 1992, but most of this growth was the result of whites moving in from outside or within the state. Their settlement patterns are shown in map 2.6. The tracts that drew internal migrants are in the northern parts of the county and in the more expensive neighborhoods. Those that were magnets for immigrants are in the older towns near Sacramento. Even in a place like Placer County, the sorting process resulting from population mobility is evident, as it stratifies these small towns. Placer County has become yet another example of a white suburban county filling with residents fleeing large multiethnic central cities. But the ethnics who do make it to Placer still find their mobility restricted.

To say that racial conflict is not likely to break out where there are no minority groups is, of course, as trivial as saying that where there is ethnic heterogeneity conflict is more probable. Diversity is divisive; there is nothing new about that. What is less obvious, though, is the effect of ethnic set-
tlement patterns on the electoral politics of places. Spatially interactive, integrated ethnic minority populations are more likely to get involved in the community. Whether their involvement takes on a racial or nonracial tone depends upon the isolation of the diverse communities. Spatially segregated populations in densely populated areas are particularly productive of a race-based politics since racially homogeneous neighborhoods become the basis of legislative representation. Racial polarization is common in places like Alameda and Los Angeles Counties, where ethnic populations are highly concentrated at the neighborhood level but highly interactive within and across municipalities. Spatially integrated populations, on the other hand, whether in rural or urban areas, may generate political cleavages of some type, but they are not likely to be race based. In racially heterogeneous communities, politicians cannot easily get elected serving an ethnically pure constituency.

While the residential segregation of California’s large urban counties has exacerbated the political stratification of the state, the utter hopelessness of ethnopolitical conflict in California has also been overblown. Metropolitan areas may be the places where the most intense racial battles are fought, but they are also the areas where those battles are ultimately to be won. The demobilizing influence of residential segregation in urban communities is easier to overcome than it is in rural areas where distances between homogeneous enclaves can be far greater. The mechanism for integration of ethnic communities in urban areas is the spatial mobility that comes from education and economic advancement. For immigrants, that means overcoming the obstacle of learning to speak English. For native blacks and Hispanics, it means overcoming the considerable disadvantages of low-income neighborhoods through self-effort and government enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. Political winds currently blowing in California threaten to slow progress toward integration. The tone of California politics is one of ethnopolitical separation coupled with trends in party support that increasingly distinguish areas of the state by their ethnic composition.