New York: The Clustered Masses

New York, unlike California, has an immigrant-friendly reputation. In the 1840s and 1850s, when Irish immigrants were being persecuted for their Catholicism in the New England states, they often found a much less hostile reception in New York (Billington 1961; Glazer and Moynihan 1963). Although New York state lacks constitutional provisions for direct legislation, there was no serious consideration of Proposition 187-style bills in the state legislature as there was in other states. New York City’s Republican mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, actively opposed GOP plans in Congress to place new restrictions on legal immigration in 1995 and 1996. When Congress gave states the option of ending or continuing certain welfare benefits for legal immigrants in 1996, Republican Governor George Pataki quickly acted to continue these programs at state expense while lobbying Congress to reconsider the decision to cut federal aid. Republican leaders in New York were hardly on the restrictionist bandwagon like the California GOP. Nor has there been much grassroots protest of immigrants.

New York receives fewer immigrants than California but its immigrant population is far from inconsequential. In 1990, the state was home to nearly 2.9 million immigrants—second only to the Golden State. These immigrants are clustered primarily in the state’s largest cities, and, of these, the five New York City boroughs stand out. Only 3 percent of immigrants resided in New York’s rural areas, compared with 18 percent of the native born in 1990.

The state’s growth has been much slower than California, and this is an important difference that may explain the two states’ differing reactions to immigrant influx. A large, but relatively slow-growing, foreign born population has been a steady feature of New York politics for the last 150 years. The ethnic composition of this population has changed with immigration law, but native New Yorkers rarely complain about their state being “overrun” as they frequently do in California.
Most of the state’s growth has occurred in the counties containing the New York City suburbs (Suffolk, Nassau, Rockland, Westchester, and Orange Counties; see map 8.1). The lightly shaded counties upstate show that the population outside the New York City metropolitan area has been far more stable, with the exception, perhaps, of a few counties around Rochester (Monroe County) and Albany (Albany County) and scattered others (map 8.1). Between 1980 and 1992, the average county grew by about 5.3 percent with population decline occurring in Western New York, and particularly Erie (Buffalo) and Chautauqua (Jamestown) Counties.

As in Pennsylvania, the cultural and economic divide between New York City and the urban and rural areas upstate has repeatedly asserted itself in the state’s politics. The cleavage between loyal Republican voters upstate and the Democratic boroughs of the city has been one of the most enduring divisions in American state politics (Gimpel 1996). While the lack of heavy industry on the Pittsburgh scale has made western New York less vulnerable to recession than it might otherwise be, economic decline has changed the occupational mix in Rust Belt cities such as Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse (Corrigan 1985; Wu and Korman 1987; Koritz 1991). Better educated workers and the wealthier among the elderly have moved out, leaving behind a less skilled and less mobile population forced into lower paying jobs and bearing up under a declining standard of living. Out-migration is also the product of the few new white collar jobs that have been created in areas upstate. Afflicted with one of the worst climates for new business creation during the 1970s and 1980s, college-educated, younger New Yorkers discovered that there were no opportunities for them once they entered the labor force (Alba and Trent 1986; Fitchen 1992). Population losses and economic decline in upstate New York have gradually eroded the registration edge the GOP has traditionally enjoyed, bolstering third-party and Democratic registration. The regional acculturation of the upstate voters to the Republicans is still strong, however, and the area is far less likely to vote Democratic in statewide races than New York City and its suburbs are.

The New York City boroughs have also lost population to the suburbs since the 1950s, with Queens and Manhattan (New York County) losing one-quarter of their population from 1950 to the mid-1990s. Only Staten Island (Richmond County) has grown, more than doubling in size over the same period. While the city has experienced a net loss in population, the housing stock remains inadequate in both supply and quality.
“There are no true slum neighborhoods in New York,” insisted one city planner in a 1996 interview. “Housing is in too short a supply for there to be slums.” The population dynamics in the borough neighborhoods are extremely complex, with one demographic group moving out of an area only to be replaced by another (Denowitz 1980; Alba, Denton, Leung, and Logan 1993; Rosenbaum 1992). This phenomenon of population replacement, often termed “residential succession” by housing specialists, has been fueled by both out-migration to the suburbs and the arrival of immigrants (Denowitz 1980). In the early 1960s, it was possible to write about a city where most of the immigrants were still white and European (Glazar and Moynihan 1963; Moynihan 1979). By the 1990s, New York City was full of minorities of diverse origin, but this diversity was accompanied by racial segregation and economic polarization. Many neighborhoods that were racially mixed in the 1970s had become all-black by the 1990s (Alba, Denton, Leung, and Logan 1993). White and Asian immigrants have been among the first to move to the suburbs, leaving black and Hispanic residents to the older borough neighborhoods. New York City’s increasing racial diversity has sustained and exacerbated the historical pattern of spatially isolating new groups in homogeneous pockets.

Contributing to this spatial segregation is the growing income inequality in New York City, characterized by opportunities for the well educated and skilled but not for the unskilled (Mollenkopf and Castells 1991; Waldinger 1996). Most of the city’s manufacturing jobs had been lost by the early 1980s. The emergence of a postindustrial economy provided some well-paying white collar jobs but many more low-paying service sector positions (Bailey and Waldinger 1991). For low-income households that have missed out on the economic growth in the private sector, survival in New York has been aided only by public sector employment and services coupled with the high volume of out-migration (Waldinger 1996). Mollenkopf and Castells (1991) argue that it is an oversimplification to say that New York has been balkanized into two classes of people. The reason why the “dual city” metaphor does not seem to apply is that immigrants do better in the New York economy than many native minorities do. Foreign workers have substituted for natives in the manual labor market, taking many of the remaining manufacturing jobs (Marshall 1987). The labor market patterns of ethnic groups are often sector specific, reflecting the occupational paths that were established by their coethnic predecessors (Waldinger 1996; Foner 1987). Immigrants are also able to take advantage of the informal economy in enclave communities popu-
lated by coethnics, which helps to compensate for the discrimination they encounter (Waldinger 1996, 23; Kwong 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Zhou 1992). Reliance on ethnic enclaves and niches in the New York economy has paid off, as immigrants have proven better able to exit the city for the suburbs than native blacks and Hispanics.

While three of the five boroughs have minority white populations, the older suburbs in Nassau and Westchester Counties are also becoming more racially and economically diverse and gradually more Democratic in spite of the presence of strong Republican political machines. There are more all-black neighborhoods in Nassau than ever before—testimony to residential succession rather than spatial assimilation as the mechanism of neighborhood transition. Blacks may achieve a socioeconomic status close to that of whites, but the reluctance of whites to live near blacks has prevented the latter from translating socioeconomic achievement into improved living standards (Alba and Logan 1993; Rosenbaum 1992, 469; Wirt, Walter, Rabinovitz, and Hensler 1972). Further outside of New York City, the suburbs of Suffolk, Rockland, and Westchester Counties are home to the highly affluent residential development one can find in Chester County, Pennsylvania, and other commuter-shed areas. Like wealthy suburbs elsewhere, local control of public schools is a major issue. Several of the towns in this region have fought protracted battles against the development of low-income housing for minorities, including Yonkers and White Plains in Westchester County (Metzger 1995; Skinner 1995; Galster and Keeney 1993). Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians have found their way into older suburban neighborhoods, but the towns further out remain racially homogeneous, primarily residential, and white.

New York’s uniqueness lies in the fact that the vast majority of suburban residents are not from out of state. Population growth in the New York suburbs has been the product of out-migration from the city rather than cross-state migration. Map 8.2 shows that the New York City area experienced overall decline in the proportion of internal migrants during the 1980s. By 1990, 87.3 percent of Suffolk County’s population had been born in New York, far higher than the percentage for similar suburban counties in Kentucky, Florida, Kansas, Colorado, or California. Having a suburban population from elsewhere in New York, as opposed to elsewhere in the country, makes a difference for an area’s politics. New Yorkers who move from one part of the state to another are more likely to have developed some knowledge of and interest in state and local politics than those who move from a different state. The likelihood that they will exer-
cise this political capital by participating in state and local elections after they move is higher than for those who come from a greater distance.

Immigration has had an undeniably strong impact on the state’s economy and politics (Torres 1995; Foner 1987; Glazer and Moynihan 1963). As in South Florida, immigrants socially and culturally demarcate New York City from the rest of the state (see map 8.3). The existence of immigrant enclaves has been well documented in New York City, and ethnic balkanization is nothing new (Ernst 1949; Glazer and Moynihan 1963). The racial diversity of immigrants who have arrived since 1970 is new. The bulk of the new immigration is from Asian, Latin American, and Caribbean countries. The racial composition of this new wave has served to harden divisions between upstate New York and the city by adding a component of racial balkanization to the more fundamental urban-rural differences that have existed for decades. The composition of the foreign-born population in 1990 reveals that European émigrés made up only 26 percent of the immigrant population in the state (see fig. 8.1). Forty-one percent come from Latin America and the Caribbean, and 20 percent are from Asian countries.

New York’s racial heterogeneity is also the product of a large black population, numbering nearly three million in 1990. The black proportion of the population has increased in every borough since the 1960s and was well over one-third of the population in Brooklyn (Kings County) and the Bronx (Bronx County). Blacks comprise more than 10 percent of the population in only three counties outside the city: Erie (Buffalo), Monroe (Rochester), and Westchester (White Plains). This means that the black population is overwhelmingly concentrated in a small area of the state, although not quite so concentrated as in Pennsylvania. When a dissimilarity index is calculated for the state’s sixty-two counties, it shows that nearly 50 percent of blacks would have to move for them to be evenly distributed, compared to two-thirds in Pennsylvania (see chap. 7). Unlike Pennsylvania, however, Asians and Hispanics are as concentrated in New York state (at the county level of aggregation) as blacks are. Nearly half of each group would be required to move for them to reside in balanced proportions across the state. Corresponding to this racial balkanization is political balkanization caused by the one-sidedness of party registration in many cities and counties. In terms of party registration, New York is less politically balanced than either Florida or Pennsylvania. A dissimilarity measure calculated for party registrants shows that about 40 percent of Republicans (or Democrats) would have to move for the parties to be equally proportioned across the state’s counties.
Map 8.2. Change in the proportion of internal migrants in New York counties, 1980–90. (Mean = 4.4, Moran’s I = .62)
PUMS data for 1990 show that we have very little reason to expect that natives, migrants, and immigrants will be settling in next to each other anytime soon (see appendix A, table A8.1). Migrants from other states earned, on average, $17,118 annually, compared to $15,934 for native New Yorkers and just $12,946 for immigrants. The $4,200 gap in average earnings between immigrants and internal migrants is among the widest in the nation. The figures for median income indicate that immigrants earned only 66 percent of what internal migrants earned in 1990. The reasons why immigrants did not fare as well as other groups are straightforward. First, only 37 percent of foreign-born New Yorkers were non-Hispanic white, compared to 74 percent of internal migrants and 88 percent of natives (table A8.1). Immigrants also lag behind migrants and natives in terms of their educational attainment. On other measures of income and well-being, immigrants in New York lag well behind natives according to the PUMS data. They receive more in public assistance (but not Social Security) than either natives or internal migrants, and the average immigrant pays only about half of what the average native New Yorker pays in personal property taxes.

Settlement Patterns of Migrants and Immigrants in New York

Map 8.3 shows that growth in the concentration of immigrants has occurred in the New York City boroughs and the suburban counties along with Tompkins (Ithaca) County upstate. Internal migrants (map 8.2) were a decreasing presence in these locations and many others. The most notable growth in the concentration of interstate migrants has been in rural north-
Map 8.3. Change in the proportion of immigrants in New York counties, 1980–90. (Mean = .05, Moran's I = .64)
ern New York along I–87 above Albany and west along the Canadian border (map 8.2). Few counties have been strong magnets for both internal migrants and immigrants, and western New York, like western Pennsylvania to the south, is home mainly to native New Yorkers.

The analysis of settlement patterns in previous chapters has shown that Latin American and Asian immigrants are the most likely groups to be a growing presence in the areas where they have previously settled. This is also the case in New York, as table 8.1 shows. For Mexicans, a one-point increase in the Mexican-born population across counties in 1980 contributed to a nearly three-point increase in the Mexican proportion of the population by 1990. For South Americans, the results are similar, and for Asians the relationship is positive but not statistically significant. The more recent waves of immigrants are attracted to the destinations already settled by previous coethnic arrivals, particularly if they are of color. For Europeans, Africans, Canadians, and Central Americans, though, there is an inverse relationship between their growth throughout the 1990s and the size of their communities in 1980. This is no great surprise for the Caucasian groups, as these are the least likely to chain migrate or depend upon ethnic enclaves for employment at their destinations. The results for Central Americans and Africans are a bit more puzzling. They were a smaller proportion of the population in 1990 than in 1980 according to the coefficients in table 8.1. This result reflects the fact that, although their numbers have increased, their growth has been outstripped by the growth in other population groups settling in the same areas.

To what extent is the population mobility of these groups determined by employment prospects? Of all eight groups described in table 8.1, Europeans and Canadians appear to be best able to avoid increasing their relative presence in areas of New York that began the decade with high unemployment, while Asians, U.S. internal migrants, and Central and South Americans are an increasing proportion of the population precisely in those places that had the weakest job prospects in the early 1980s. As for increasing income, the proportion of the populations comprised of Asians, Central Americans, and internal migrants did increase with income growth, suggesting some sensitivity to economic conditions. Why don't internal migrants run from places with high unemployment rates, leaving only native New Yorkers behind? Perhaps it is because many of these migrants did not move to New York for economic reasons. New York's stagnant economy has not attracted people across state lines. The few recent migrants from elsewhere are retirees not in the labor force who have
TABLE 8.1. Influences on Population Concentration in New York Counties, 1980–90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>U.S. Migrants</th>
<th>African Immigrants</th>
<th>Asian Immigrants</th>
<th>European Immigrants</th>
<th>Canadian Immigrants</th>
<th>Mexican Immigrants</th>
<th>Central American Immigrants</th>
<th>South American Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% 1980 group population</td>
<td>.42*</td>
<td>-.48*</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.43**</td>
<td>-.38**</td>
<td>2.73**</td>
<td>-.44**</td>
<td>-.90**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment, 1980</td>
<td>1.86**</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.01*</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in real median income, 1980–90</td>
<td>.81**</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>-.02*</td>
<td>-.0002</td>
<td>-.004**</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% net population change</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.0004</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>.00008</td>
<td>.000035**</td>
<td>-.00002**</td>
<td>.000003</td>
<td>.000002**</td>
<td>-.00007**</td>
<td>.0001**</td>
<td>-.00003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% college students</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial lag</td>
<td>1.62**</td>
<td>1.17**</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.328**</td>
<td>-.65**</td>
<td>1.04**</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.47**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-25.77</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-1.35</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>-2.15</td>
<td>-.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2_a$</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; income coefficients expressed in thousands of 1992 dollars; dependent variable = change in population group as a percentage of total population. For a full description of variables, see appendix A.

*p < .10  **p < .05.
moved to resort locations in northern New York near the Canadian border (Jefferson County on Lake Ontario and Essex County on Lake Champlain). U.S. internal migrants are gaining a larger share of the population in the areas where cross-state migration has been high in the past, mostly in upstate counties (see table 8.1 and map 8.2). Internal migrants are not dependent on ethnic enclaves, but the same amenities that attracted migrants to upstate locations in previous decades were also operating in the 1980s and 1990s.

Judging from the coefficients for population density, several groups increased their visibility in the state’s most urban areas: Canadians, Africans, and Central Americans, for example, while Asians and South Americans were a growing presence in areas of lower density development. This is an important indication that the recent wave of immigrants is not entirely confined to big cities. Asians have been particularly successful in dispersing into the New York City suburbs in Nassau and Rockland Counties.

**Ethnic Balkanization and Naturalization in New York**

The spatial settlement patterns of migrants and immigrants illustrate some familiar patterns. Some populations are more dependent upon the presence of their coethnic predecessors than others. Nonwhite immigrants are less easily assimilated because they are more distinguishable from the white majority. Within cities, counties, and metropolitan areas, the size of the foreign-born population is highly related to its segregation from natives. But even at the state level, across geographic units as large as counties, differences among the settlement patterns of internal migrants, European and Canadian immigrants, and immigrants of color are of some consequence for predicting future patterns of economic, social, and political balkanization. Immigrant groups are not randomly mixed into the population. Instead they are “sorted by place according to their relative standing in society,” and for this reason “group membership must be taken into account in analyzing locational processes” (Alba and Logan 1993, 1391). The stratification of groups by place of settlement would not be especially troubling if it did not also perpetuate economic, social, and political inequality. But some places have advantages that others do not (Logan 1978). That some immigrants are constrained to settle only in certain areas means that they will be confined to what those communities have to offer in terms of education, employment, community involvement,
and attitudes toward government and political participation. In the final analysis, then, balkanization of ethnic and racial groups results in unhealthy political variations across communities that threaten the practice of pluralist democracy.

In previous chapters, we have seen that the spatial concentration of immigrant groups is often inversely associated with naturalization within the immigrant community. In New York, this is clearly the case, as table A8.2 (appendix A) shows. In 1980, a 10 point increase in the proportion of the population of foreign birth across the state’s counties is associated with a 5.3 point drop in the percentage naturalized. In 1990, the effect is smaller but still highly significant. Moreover, the results also show that isolation of minorities from whites within counties is associated with diminished naturalization. Finally, the naturalization rates across the state display a pattern of positive spatial dependency in both 1980 and 1990, indicating that low naturalization counties are clustered together (in the areas of high immigrant concentration), while high naturalization counties are also found adjacent to one another upstate.

**Migrants, Immigrants, and Voter Turnout in New York**

In previous chapters, we have seen that it is quite common for turnout levels to be influenced by the composition of the electorate. The ecological data analysis suggests that places inundated with migrants from other states often have lower participation rates, particularly in nonpresidential election years. Average turnout rates for gubernatorial elections in 1990 and 1994 are shown on map 8.4 by quartile. Among the counties with the lowest turnout are the New York City boroughs, Suffolk County on Long Island, and scattered counties upstate, including Albany. High-turnout locations include the darkly shaded cluster of counties in central New York, including Onondaga (Syracuse), Tompkins (Ithaca), and Oneida (Oneida-Utica-Rome).

The results of a regression analysis of county-level demographic characteristics on turnout in recent presidential and gubernatorial races shows that the percentage of the population from out of state is often positively related to participation when other variables are taken into account (see table 8.2). Why is turnout slightly higher in places where large proportions of non–New Yorkers reside? One possible explanation is that many native New Yorkers are sufficiently disinterested in politics that by comparison the out-of-state population is relatively more active. New York’s native
Map 8.4. Average turnout in New York gubernatorial elections, 1990–94. (Mean = 51.3, Moran's I = .42)
black population, for example, is known for its low participation. In table 8.2, the percentage of black residents in a county, for example, is associated with lower turnout for 1994 and in the pooled model. The low turnout of native populations, then, may account for the generally positive relationship between out-of-state residency and participation rates. Another explanation is that New York’s out-of-state residents comprise an older, more established population, which, through longevity, has overcome the barriers to participation that newer migrants face. The 1990 PUMS data do reveal that the mean age of migrants over the age of eighteen was forty-seven, several years older than the average age for native New Yorkers (see table A8.1). Migrants in New York also earned more Social Security income than natives to the state.

The population of recent immigrants (those arriving after 1970) bolsters turnout in all of the elections except 1980. This is also contrary to the pattern in other states. The positive association between turnout and counties with a high percentage of recent immigrants reflects the influence of cases such as Tompkins (Ithaca) County, where recent waves of immigrants have included students and better educated residents associated with the universities and high-technology industries there. Note that the percentage of residents with college degrees is positively associated with turnout in all but one of the elections, as the individual-level relationship would predict (table 8.2). Population density is associated with lower turnout in all recent elections. It is not surprising that the densely populated urban counties have low participation. These are also the areas with the highest concentration of poor and uneducated residents (both natives and immigrants). Finally, the spatially lagged dependent variable shows that patterns of turnout in New York are highly regional in off-year elections such as 1982 and 1990. In these years, participation rates are similar across entire substate sections that cut across county boundaries.

Inequalities in turnout and participation across a state matter because they inevitably undermine the one person, one vote principle, effectively giving some people and places more control over government than their numbers merit. These results clearly show that many of New York state’s elections are spatially balkanized by race, education, population growth or decline, and population density. The most urban areas, in particular, are underrepresented in all recent elections, giving city dwellers much less influence than they should have in statewide contests based on their numbers.

That demographic characteristics of areas explain turnout levels only reinforces the impression that the state is sectionally split. Like Pennsylvania-
### TABLE 8.2. Impact of Population Mobility on Voter Turnout in New York Counties, 1980–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% college educated</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>–.23</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation of minorities from</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>–.03</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
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<td>whites (within counties)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% post-1970 immigrants</td>
<td>–.65**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.12a</td>
<td>.18a</td>
<td>.27a</td>
<td>.27</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% born out of state</td>
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<td>.20**</td>
<td>.09a</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.09a</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>% black</td>
<td>–.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03a</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>–.37**</td>
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<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spatial lag</td>
<td>–.06</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.98**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.84**</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
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<td>(.03)</td>
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<td>Presidential race</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4.08**</td>
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<td>61.43</td>
<td>46.53</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>186</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2_a$</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; dependent variable = percentage turnout by county. See appendix A for a full description of variables.*

*aVariables with low tolerances and high standard errors due to multicollinearity.*

*$p < .10. \quad **p < .05.$*
nia, the competitiveness of elections makes some difference. In the highly
competitive 1982 gubernatorial contest and again in 1994, New York’s
turnout levels were highly stratified by the racial composition of counties.
The 1990 contest, however, was far less competitive, and race played a
very small role, as turnout levels sagged in many of the white (and Repub-
lican) areas upstate because the GOP candidate was dismissed early in the
contest as a hopeless loser. That it takes a one-sided contest in which the
outcome is known well in advance for the racial stratification in participa-
tion to subside reveals how competitive elections alone will not erase such
inequalities. Indeed, the most highly competitive elections increase
inequalities across these aggregate units, putting racially and economically
heterogeneous places at a heightened disadvantage relative to their pre-
dominantly white and homogeneous counterparts.

Migration, Immigration, and Party Regularity in
New York

Often turnout levels and patterns of party regularity are studied while their
broader implications for democratic governance and representation are
forgotten. Here I have tried to frequently remind the reader of the theoretical
context that makes these analyses relevant. Party regularity refers to
the extent to which party registration matches the balance of party voting.
Differences between registration and voting in a neighborhood, city, or
county can be the result of the level of turnout, the degree of independent
and split-ticket voting, or some combination of the two. Following the
theories offered at the individual level for the rise of independent political
behavior in American politics, I have hypothesized that party regularity is
that have not undergone much population change are likely to have
entrenched or institutionalized patterns of political behavior that the
rapidly growing areas will lack.

For New York, table 8.3 provides a glimpse of the demographic char-
acteristics of counties that are associated with differences between voting
and registration. Positive coefficients indicate those variables that increase
irregularity. The findings for various population characteristics are some-
what consistent with theoretical expectations. Party irregularity increases
with the proportion of newly arrived immigrants in four of the five elec-
tions, particularly in the early 1980s. The population from out of state is
associated with irregularity in 1994, where a 10 point increase in the pro-

<table>
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<td>.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>% turnout</td>
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<td>.55</td>
<td>.37</td>
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<td>.65</td>
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</table>

Note: Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; dependent variable = Abs (% Republican vote – % Republican registration); high positive values indicate counties where voting differed from registration. See appendix A for a full description of variables.

*Variables with low tolerances and high standard errors due to multicollinearity.

*p < .10.  **p < .05.
portion of interstate migrants increases the difference between party registration and voting by about 2.5 points. But in other races, such as that of 1990, the impact is the reverse. The results are variable enough to suggest that much depends upon the idiosyncrasies of the election in question. New York is well known for having strong third parties, which frequently field candidates in gubernatorial races that draw strength away from the major party contenders (Gimpel 1996).

The 1990 contest is an anomaly in some noteworthy respects. In this lopsided election, Mario Cuomo coasted to an easy reelection victory. College education is positively associated with irregularity and the proportion of out-of-state migrants and foreign-born residents is associated with regularity. What is it about noncompetitive elections that makes them different from competitive contests? In the 1990 race, several of the most Republican areas upstate wound up splitting their votes between Herbert London (Conservative Party) and Pierre Rinfret (Republican Party), neither of whom stood much chance of unseating the popular Cuomo. These were areas such as Fulton, Saratoga, and Warren Counties (north of Albany; see map 8.1) that have few out-of-state residents and almost no immigrants. Second, Cuomo had considerable appeal in several areas with well-educated populations, including Tompkins (Ithaca) and Westchester (White Plains). Perhaps some of these voters could also sense that Cuomo’s victory over two weak opponents was a sure bet and hence voted for the Democrat while others may have stayed home entirely. In more competitive contests, these areas are far less likely to depart from their basic party inclinations.

In highly competitive elections we can see that some patterns of spatial balkanization are consistent with patterns observed in other states, separating one area from another based on demographic composition. The more independent minded or irregular electorates in 1994, for instance, were less educated and comprised of both migrants from out of state and higher proportions of recent immigrants. In the less competitive contests, such as the 1990 gubernatorial election, these patterns almost totally reverse themselves.

New York’s patterns of party irregularity are odd in one other respect. High turnout is associated with departures from party registration in the 1990 and 1994 gubernatorial races. Usually, when turnout matters at all, it reduces the difference between party registration and voting. In this state, however, there are some places where Republicans and Democrats are disloyal to their parties. These areas are often in high-turnout neighborhoods...
where swing voters are the focus of highly competitive party efforts and where third parties may garner strong support.

It is no trivial matter that some parts of New York state are less predictable in their behavior than others in competitive election contests. Political party organizations and candidates are charged with the complex and costly task of organizing and mobilizing support to win elections. The burden of carrying out this exercise is much heavier in the areas where voters have minds of their own (Gimpel 1996; Sorauf 1984). It is little wonder that political party organizations have endured far longer in densely populated urban areas where low-cost mobilization efforts translate directly and easily into votes for the dominant party. These spatial patterns of party regularity help to predict where political party organizations and candidates will be most effective in deploying a conventional mobilization strategy.

Changes in Party Registration in New York

The long-term dynamics of partisan change are perhaps best reflected in the changing balance of party registrants within a state. Changes in the vote, by contrast, are far more volatile, reflecting short-term forces, including the state of the economy, the popularity of incumbents, and the strategies of candidates and their campaigns. Party registration is more immutable to temporary forces, and this is the reason I have emphasized fluctuations in registration rather than votes throughout this book. From 1980 to 1990, Republicans did well in a number of unusual places in New York, including New York City, as the dark shading on map 8.5 plainly shows. Democrats countered by gaining party registrants in upstate New York in rural areas where they had not been much of a presence in times past. These gains upstate probably came more as the result of Republican out-migration than the conversion or realignment of long-time residents. Among the first to leave depressed cities such as Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse are the employable, the well educated, and upper income professionals who constitute the rank and file of the New York Republican Party. Others who may leave during economic hard times include New York’s farmers, or their children, who by deserting the distressed farm economy reduce the balance of Republican Party registrants upstate.

Results from models that predict changes in the Republican share of party registrants from 1970 to 1980 and from 1980 to 1990 appear in table 8.4. The coefficients immediately indicate that New York is different from
Map 8.5. Change in the proportion of Republican registrants in New York counties, 1980–90. (Mean = −3.1, Moran’s I = .20)
the states examined in earlier chapters. First, the proportion of the popu-
lation from outside New York at the beginning of each decade does not
necessarily strengthen Republican prospects like it does in some other
states. A 1 point increase in the proportion of the population from outside
New York in 1970 is associated with a .21 drop in GOP registration ten
years later. These results are similar to those for Colorado, where the
strong GOP inclinations of many of that state’s counties in the early 1970s
meant that almost any population influx from elsewhere would blunt the
Republican edge (see table 3.4).

An examination of several cases explains why cross-state migration is
not associated with Republican growth. Many out-of-state migrants have
settled in New York City, including New York (Manhattan), Bronx, and
Kings (Brooklyn) Counties. While the rate of out-of-state migration to
New York City dropped drastically from the first to the second half of the
twentieth century, a high proportion of the population in the Democratic

<table>
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<tr>
<td>% born out of state, 1970 (1980)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in % born out of state</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>% foreign born, 1970 (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in % foreign born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Republican registrants, 1970 (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
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<td>Spatial lag</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2_a \]

\[ 62 \]

\[ .57 \]

\[ .50 \]

Note: Spatial autoregressive model, weighted for population; dependent variable = change in Republican Party registration. See appendix A for a full description of variables.

*Variables with low tolerances and high standard errors due to multicollinearity.

*p < .10. **p < .05.
boroughs does come from elsewhere. A second area where growth from out of state has been associated with diminishing Republican prospects is northern New York, where the arrival of migrants from Connecticut and Massachusetts has politically diversified traditionally Republican communities. Albany and Schenectady are interesting cases in which the proportion of internal migrants dropped from 1980 to 1990 (map 8.2) while Republican registration growth was in the highest quartile (map 8.5). In these places, GOP growth has coincided with increases in the proportion of native New Yorkers due to natural increase (fertility) and migration from nearby locations.

Places with large immigrant settlements at the beginning of each decade became more Democratic through the 1970s and 1980s. But, on the other hand, counties where immigrants were a growing proportion of the population saw Republican prospects improve markedly in the 1970s. This is because established, upwardly mobile immigrants found their way to the Republican suburbs. The ecological results provide no evidence that immigrants are registering as Republicans, but growth in the immigrant population is an indicator of the pro-growth orientation of suburban areas, where Republican gains have been strongest. Many of the older immigrants, in particular, are more likely to be white and are better able to assimilate into the American economic mainstream. As their social and economic standing improves, they are just as likely to move to the suburbs as any native in the same situation. There is little individual evidence to suggest that immigrants are naturalizing and registering to vote in vast numbers, but their relocation to areas of Republican strength remind us that population growth in the United States is stimulated by strong and growing economies rather than impoverished and declining ones.

The coefficient for GOP registration at the beginning of each decade in table 8.4 also indicates that there may be an equilibration process occurring over time that is responsible for altering the balance of party registrants. Counties that began each decade with higher shares of Republican registrants, including those shaded in white in map 8.5, experienced slower Republican growth than those with low Republican registration. In a fiercely competitive two-party state like New York, these results come as no surprise. While regions of the state do have enduring traditions that align them with one party or the other, the Democratic and Republican Parties compete side by side in most areas. With time, even the strongest Republican counties will lose ground to Democrats and third parties. Sim-
ilarly, the lopsided Democratic counties will become less Democratic as
the two parties move back into competitive balance. More densely popu-
lated counties also saw high Republican growth rates during both decades,
with several suburban counties (Nassau, Rockland, Putnam) picking up
Republican registrants in spite of the increasingly high density of their
development.

New York’s patterns of partisan change provide some justification for
doing state-by-state studies of the impact of migration and immigration
on politics. States do differ, and New York’s population trends are unique
from those studied in the previous chapters. Out-of-state migration is a
relatively inconsequential political phenomenon in New York compared
to the significant impact of immigration and migration within the state
from the boroughs to the suburbs.

Even so, some patterns of political stratification and change are simi-
lar to those observable in other states. Growth in the foreign-born popu-
lation is occurring alongside Republican growth in suburbs and in the
more prosperous counties upstate. The broader significance of the parti-
san changes occurring in New York is seen in how uneven the political and
demographic development of the state continues to be. Migrants and
immigrants have never dispersed randomly into New York’s sixty-two
counties. They select certain areas and avoid others. Hispanics and Asians,
for example, go to areas in New York City where there are ethnic enclaves,
and once established they move to Nassau, Westchester, and Rockland
Counties. That these mobility patterns unevenly affect cities and towns
invariably means that the political fallout from demographic change is not
a random process either. Interestingly, several suburban areas that began
the second half of the twentieth century with homogeneous white popula-
tions became more ethnically diverse during the 1970s and 1980s and have
become more Republican. Whether this upward trend in GOP registration
is a reaction against increasing ethnic diversity by native whites or a direct
result of the foreign born registering as Republicans can only be deter-
mined through an examination of microlevel data. The aggregate varia-
tions detailed here raise enough questions to demand further exploration.

Migration, Ethnicity, and Political Behavior at the
Individual Level

The aggregate data have shown that New York is a state where partisans-
ship, ethnicity, race, and political participation are not evenly distributed.
As elsewhere, this unevenness is the result of the linkage of race, ethnicity, and education to partisanship and participation. Since racial and ethnic groups tend to cluster, especially if those populations are recently arrived, geographic patterns of clustered political participation and partisanship inevitably follow. Entire communities may go unrepresented due to massive nonparticipation. Other communities may become cohesively one-party Democratic (or Republican) because key members of that ethnic group find a reception in one party or the other.

Inferring individual level behavior from county level observations is difficult and potentially misleading. Using the standard model developed by King (1997, chap. 6), I evaluated party registration by ethnicity in New York based on the county level observations for 1990, 1992, and 1994. Using this method, I obtained reasonably precise estimates of the party registration of white voters—about 40 to 41 percent of this population is registered Republican. The proportion of blacks registered with the GOP was predictably low, ranging from 8 percent in 1990 to 6 percent in 1994. Estimates for the Hispanic population indicated far lower support for Republicans than in Pennsylvania, California, or many other states—only in the 5 to 6 percent range—but with a sizable margin of error. Estimates for the Asian population were not highly reliable due to the tiny fraction of Asians in most of the state’s counties, and given the absence of additional information that would help to sharpen our image of this heterogeneous group’s political leanings.

Limited individual-level data are available to determine the partisan orientation of New York voters by race and ethnicity (see table 8.5). While white voters are split between Republicans and Democrats, blacks are overwhelmingly Democratic. From 1990 to 1994, Hispanics were not as heavily Democratic as blacks but were solidly in the Democratic column nevertheless. Asians were more evenly divided between the parties than either Hispanics or blacks, and far more Asians were reported to be independents than in the other two minority groups. Still New York’s Asians are far less likely to be Republican identifiers than those in California (see table 2.5 for comparison). That minority groups would identify so monolithically with a single party provides evidence of how ethnic and political identities go hand in hand, not only for black Americans but for other minorities as well. When controls for education and income are added, blacks and Hispanics are still highly likely to report Democratic affiliation, although Asians become far less Democratic (table not reported). Further analysis of polling data confirmed the
tendency for voters upstate to be more irregular in their political behavior (e.g., they are more likely to disregard their partisanship when voting) than those in New York City or its suburbs in the three elections evaluated in table 8.5. African Americans are the most highly regular voters across all three regions.

Given that the majority of Asian, Hispanic, and black voters do identify with the Democratic Party in New York, it seems likely that the addition of immigrants from nations where these groups are the predominant population will only bolster Democratic registration. This means that the ecological regression analysis in table 8.4 does not point to a direct individual-level relationship when it shows growth in the Hispanic and Asian populations leading to Republican registration gains in New York’s suburban counties.

While we have no way of verifying from the VRS exit polls which respondents are foreign born and which are not, these polls do suggest that some of the patterns in the ecological data are traceable to the individual level. Patterns of political party identification, for example, do hinge on ethnicity and whether respondents live in New York City, its suburbs, or the cities and towns upstate. Voters are spatially separated by party identification and propensity to participate in elections. The uneven distribution of ethnic groups and partisans in New York creates the kind of sin-

<table>
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<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Independent</th>
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<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>15.9</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>16.5</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
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ingle-party election districts that elect officeholders who are not as accountable as they could or should be. Party responsibility and cohesion is eroded in communities where the only meaningful competition occurs within the primary of one party or the other. Finally, one-sided electioneering erodes the value of political participation by marginalizing the value of voting in general elections, thereby discouraging turnout and political activism.

**Political Change and the Internal Composition of New York Counties**

Describing political development and change across states utilizing county-level data is convenient because comprehensive data exist that are not available for smaller aggregate units or even individuals. It is highly likely, though, that the mechanisms that create the interesting partisan and political variations I have discussed are more clearly revealed by examining forces operating within counties at the neighborhood and tract levels. Some counties are so large and heavily populated that figures aggregated at the county level obscure crucial internal nuances and variations. I have argued that GOP registration growth has often been assisted by the small size and spatial isolation of ethnic groups within counties. Spatial isolation may also inhibit overall turnout or the turnout of specific groups within an area. In table 8.2 there was little relationship between minority isolation from whites and overall participation because minority-white segregation is so closely related to other variables I included in the model, including the size of the black population and urbanization. A bivariate regression model (not reported) revealed that a ten-point increase in the degree of segregation within counties, as measured by the dissimilarity index, drops overall turnout by 1.5 percent. In table A8.1, there is more convincing evidence that the spatial concentration of the foreign born inhibits assimilation by reducing the propensity of the immigrant population to naturalize. Segregation within counties is also politically relevant because in places where minorities are isolated, the politics that minorities practice is a racially monolithic one. When those minorities are of a sufficiently small number, a race-based politics contributes to their marginalization usually within the politics of a minority party.

Examining the internal population dynamics of each of New York’s sixty-two counties is too big a task for a single chapter and would overwhelm both the author and reader with data. Instead I have chosen to investigate four counties that represent various electoral settings in the
state: Bronx (the Bronx), Chemung (Elmira), Nassau (Hempstead), and Onondaga (Syracuse). From 1980 to the mid-1990s, the populations of these four counties were stable, with Chemung and Nassau losing less than 3 percent of their population and Bronx and Onondaga increasing by about the same percentage. Bronx County has the highest proportion of immigrants of the four, followed by Nassau, Onondaga, and Chemung. Bronx also has the most internal (U.S.) migrants, although many of these are long-term residents. Chemung and Onondaga received a higher proportion of recent internal migrants (from 1980 to 1990) than the two counties downstate. GOP registration declined most precipitously in Onondaga County, where Republicans dropped from 59 percent of registered voters in 1970 to only 44 percent by the early 1990s. Chemung has also experienced decline in GOP registration, which was reported to be less than 50 percent for the first time in 1990. Nassau County’s registration remained almost the same from the 1970s to the 1990s, hovering steadily at 48 to 49 percent. Bronx is the most Democratic county in the state, and Republicans have lost ground there. There is no hope for a restoration of two-party competition in this area, as GOP registration stood at a puny 10 percent in 1990.

The index of racial isolation is presented in table 8.6 for all census tracts in New York state as well as the four counties just mentioned. As in other places, blacks are the most spatially isolated minority group, followed by Hispanics and Asians. This has been an almost universal finding in this study and confirms the pattern found by Massey and Denton (1993) in their evaluation of metropolitan areas. Blacks are most isolated in Nassau and Onondaga Counties, and far less so in the Bronx, where they are a much larger share of the population, and Chemung, where they are much smaller. Hispanics are less segregated from whites in Nassau and Onondaga than in the more urban or rural counties but have grown more isolated from whites in all but the Bronx. Asians, too, seem to reside closer to whites in these four counties than in the state, but they grew more isolated from whites in 1980 to 1990 in all four areas. Judging from the results in table A8.1, these patterns of minority concentration within counties appear to have some relation to both population loss and internal migration. For blacks in 1980, for example, a 10 percent loss in population in the previous ten years contributed to a nine-point increase in the isolation of blacks from whites. Population losses similarly impact the Hispanic and Asian populations. Gains from internal cross-state migration are related to the increasing segregation of Hispanics and Asians but have not affected
### TABLE 8.6. Index of Dissimilarity for the Black, Asian, and Hispanic Populations Relative to Whites in Four New York Counties, 1980 and 1990, by Census Tract

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Chemung</th>
<th>Nassau</th>
<th>Onondaga</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.30</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
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<td>.78</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.59</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanics</td>
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<th>270</th>
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</table>

Source: U.S. Census 1990, and author’s calculations.

Note: Figures represent the percentage of each group that would have to move in order for the group to be evenly distributed across census tracts in the county.
blacks who were already highly segregated. Internal migrants have contributed to the ethnic balkanization of the state based on their residential location choices.

The Bronx

The dynamics of partisan change suggested in table 8.4 indicated that Republican registration growth was associated with a high proportion of residents born in New York but few internal migrants. These figures predicted rapid GOP growth in the suburbs, on Staten Island, and in some upstate rural areas but Republican decline in the boroughs. Bronx County represents those cases that have a significant population of foreign-born residents but also many internal migrants. Some of these internal migrants are blacks who have migrated from Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina but not from the Deep South. The majority of internal migrants, however, were born in Puerto Rico and have since settled in the Bronx, many in public housing projects. Immigrants, in general, are not as attracted to the Bronx as to other boroughs. The Asian population comprised a mere 2.6 percent of the total in 1990. This is understandable given the high crime rates and lack of job opportunities and housing. “High crime drives out anybody who can move,” said one local planner. “The South Bronx has a higher crime rate than any other neighborhood. Immigrants don’t come here to get robbed and killed.” Aside from high crime, the Bronx is also the poorest of the New York boroughs. Immigrants who arrive to seek economic opportunity are least likely to find it here. Millions of dollars have been poured into the South Bronx in an effort to revitalize it but to little avail. During the early 1990s, the new trend was to encourage home ownership and private redevelopment. These efforts have displaced the established residents.

Residential mobility in the Bronx, as elsewhere in New York City, moves along the transit lines. This means that population groups that once settled in the south have since moved north to be replaced with others leaving Manhattan. The South Bronx was once the home of Polish, Italian, Irish, and Jewish immigrants. These residents have long since moved to the far north end of the county and into Westchester County to be replaced with blacks and Hispanics. The fastest growing foreign-born group in the Bronx is the Dominican population, which has spilled over from Washington Heights and nearby neighborhoods in Manhattan (Torres and Bonilla 1993). The black population constituted about one-third of the total in 1990, and it is highly clustered in two regions: poor blacks in
the South Bronx housed mainly in public housing projects and a middle-
class black population in the north-central Bronx in the Wakefield and
Williams Bridge neighborhoods. The middle-income black population
is primarily employed in government, and the northern Bronx neighbor-
hoods are especially attractive to black workers employed in the New
York City transit system because major transit yards are located nearby.
The other major employer for middle-income blacks is the large number of
public and private hospitals that offer a variety of steady semiskilled and
skilled jobs.

The Bronx is not as segregated as other places in New York, perhaps
because there are relatively few non-Hispanic whites there (21 percent in
1990). As in other large cities, the high population density mitigates
the degree of spatial isolation among competing groups, and some studies
have shown the black population to be politically well organized com-
pared to other minorities (Torres 1995; Wilson 1960). The small and
decreasing number of whites in the borough and the high proportion of
minorities in an area where Democrats have firm control of all local offices
have not made for a setting conducive to Republican Party growth.
Throughout the 1990s, black and Hispanic animosity toward the Republi-
can Giuliani administration has fueled a backlash in the activist nonwhite
community. Giuliani’s campaign against high crime was especially notice-
able in lower-income black and Hispanic neighborhoods, where police
brutality was commonly alleged. Giuliani’s promises to reduce the size of
municipal government also posed a significant threat to the Latino and
black populations employed in the social services, transportation, and
housing agencies. The majority of native blacks in New York, however,
are convinced that the political system does not work for them, and this is
particularly true for the citizens of the Bronx’s poor neighborhoods.
Blacks are sufficiently concentrated in the Bronx that they are assured of
political representation by black city council members and state legisla-
tors, but the easily won election victories of black leaders have done little
to improve turnout and participation rates.

Only 36 percent of adult Hispanics are registered to vote citywide. In
the Bronx, Hispanic political participation rates are low because their incli-
nation to naturalize is weak. Mexicans and Dominicans are the least likely
of any group to change flags because they maintain closer ties to their home
countries than other immigrants (Grasmuck 1984; Torres and Bonilla
1993). The Dominican population is also very young, and this youth trans-
lates into less interest in politics. Finally, the newer Hispanics who cluster
in the Bronx are not inclined to get involved in politics because many cannot speak English. While these characteristics of the population make for easy Democratic victories, the long-term future for GOP candidates may not be entirely grim. Latinos are not wedded to the Democratic Party and seem to be more capable of playing off one party against the other than blacks. Citywide about 38 percent of Latinos supported Giuliani’s first election and show themselves increasingly willing to vote against Latino candidates. Hispanics are more likely to vote for non-Hispanic candidates in neighborhoods where there is more integration with the white population, and this usually means that class is playing a role in preference formation.

Nassau County
Nassau County, lying just to the east of Queens and extending out onto Long Island, can be best described as a weakening Republican stronghold. Nassau’s Republican tradition began with its establishment as a separate county in 1899. It had originally been a part of Queens. Democrats opposed the separation, but Republicans supported it, not wanting to be part of the Tammany Hall machine. The Republican inclination of the county was solidified early in the twentieth century when Irish immigrants who had settled the area from Queens took a strong dislike to President Wilson’s warm relations with the British after World War I. As a result of the county’s adversarial stance toward the city and the Democratic Party, many residents of Nassau County switched parties. By the 1990s, these historical events had faded from the collective memory, but the Republican tradition of the county was well entrenched. Republicans have maintained firm control over county government and public employment.

Just as the population migration in the Bronx flowed from north to south along the transit lines, population mobility in Nassau proceeded from Queens and Brooklyn eastward in two streams along the north and south shores. The north shore has typically been populated with wealthy residents from neighborhoods on the north end of Queens. Wealthy WASP communities such as Oyster Bay and Glen Cove (map 8.2) are home to the stately mansions of New York’s old mainline Republicans. The southern part of the county drew migrants from the less affluent neighborhoods in the south end of Queens and Brooklyn. There are exceptions to these general patterns. The “five towns” along the south shore close to Queens are home to affluent, Democratic, Jewish residents. The north shore is drawing in a more diverse population, including wealthy Asian residents who have migrated out of the city.
Between the shores, Nassau is massively overdeveloped, with overpriced single-family housing in small crowded tracts, strip malls, shopping centers, and office buildings. Most Nassau County residents are commuters. The white population in the county has declined with the loss of high-paying manufacturing jobs. The major local employer, Grumman Aircraft (with large plants in Bethpage and Calverton), employed nearly thirty thousand workers at its peak. By the early 1990s, employment at Grumman was less than two thousand. In the 1960s and 1970s, migrants went to Long Island because there was job growth. Now the only draw is the desire to get out of the city. Families from the boroughs move there to raise their children in a more peaceful setting with safer neighborhoods and better public school systems.

The population is increasingly heterogeneous, reflecting the outward flow of the changing population of Queens. While limited facility in English and noncitizenship are barriers to assimilation for some groups, Asians and Hispanics are more dispersed and less segregated from whites than blacks are (see table 8.6 and map 8.6). Map 8.6 shows patterns of interstate and immigrant settlement in Nassau County. Wealthy internal migrants have been drawn to the far south shore and the far north. Lower-income black internal migrants have settled in Hempstead and Freeport alongside immigrants. Poorer, more recent immigrants are predominantly clustered on the western side of the county, with wealthier immigrants in the north. The patch of white tracts at the east end of the county (Levittown, Massapequa) is worth noting. These areas have been the least attractive to both immigrants and internal migrants and are occupied predominantly by native New Yorkers.

In 1990, Hispanics did not constitute a majority of the population in any of the county’s census tracts. A relatively higher degree of residential integration does not always indicate political involvement, of course. Among Asian groups, only around 20 percent of the thirty thousand ethnic Koreans are citizens (Moritsugu and Guzman 1996). And many issues that are of interest to immigrants are handled at the national rather than the local level. With no possibility of electing members of their ethnic group to local office, Asians and Hispanics continue to work through the back channels of the party system. These groups, while smaller in number than blacks, are not nearly as tied to Democratic Party politics and are therefore in a stronger position of influence within Republican ranks.

The black population of Long Island increased by 10.6 percent between 1980 and 1990, with most of the growth occurring in Nassau.
Map 8.6. Internal migrant and immigrant magnets in Nassau County, New York, 1990
Hempstead, Roosevelt, Wyandanch, and Freeport have large black populations. The black population is highly segregated from the white, reflecting the cost of housing. Segregation and Republican domination have undoubtedly reinforced habits of nonvoting among blacks whose political home is far more likely to be in the Democratic Party. In this respect, the black community in Nassau shares something in common with the black community in Dade County, Florida (see chap. 6). The village of Hempstead has more registered Democrats than Republicans, but Republicans have maintained a firm grip on local offices. The Republicans appear to be struggling to maintain this grip in the face of increasing diversity. Incidents of racial and ethnic violence and intimidation are more common, and this has brought pressure on the Republican leadership to open county government to the voices of the minority community. Lacking the numbers to directly elect minority legislators, minority groups have traditionally had to work behind the scenes in the political party organizations and make contributions to party coffers to gain access (Moritsugu and Guzman 1996). By the mid-1990s, blacks were sufficiently concentrated to have elected two black representatives to the county legislature with the help of specially drawn districts. If the white population continues to decline, as it did during the 1980s, and the black population remains politically cohesive, the emergence of a consistent black Democratic vote will help Democrats move into a competitive position vis-à-vis the Republicans.

Elmira and Chemung County
Chemung is typical of many counties in upstate New York with small cities that have struggled with the transition to the postindustrial economy. Population and economic losses have not been as catastrophic as in western Pennsylvania, but Republican Party registration has slowly eroded from 57 percent of all registered voters in 1970 to 47 percent in 1994, with independent and Democratic registration on the rise. Some of this erosion in GOP support has resulted from the deterioration of high-paying jobs accompanying industrial decline. Elmira was the site of the famous voting study conducted by Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee during the 1948 election campaign (1954). At that time, the authors described it as an “ordinary bustling industrial community,” with nonmilitant unions and a predominantly white ethnic population, where the Democratic Party ran surprisingly well for upstate New York. In the 1990s, it could be described as an ordinary postindustrial northeast-
ern city with a stable population and a lower standard of living than in the past. The city has declined relative to Chemung County, and all of the new housing development has occurred in outlying towns. Locals express the usual litany of complaints that are voiced about central cities everywhere: worsening schools, higher crime, and more illicit drug activity.

In the 1990s, Chemung County experienced a slight economic rebound, leading the state’s counties in job growth. Some of the jobs were in manufacturing, such as in the Toshiba-Westinghouse color picture tube plant and Anchor Glass (as well as Corning Glass in nearby Corning, New York). But much of the job growth came in the low-paying retail trade sector and government employment. The county has two large state prisons. Local observers report that the area’s bouts with unemployment have not resulted in population exodus because more households are relying on multiple wage earners and extra jobs than in the past, while others have turned to public assistance. Job growth in the health services sector has accompanied the aging of the population. As migration theory would predict, talented young people generally leave the area for greener pastures and few return. This leaves an older and poorer population behind.

There are few Asians or Hispanics in Chemung County. Map 8.7 shows patterns of immigrant and internal migrant settlement. Unlike areas with more noticeable immigrant populations, there is little spatial clustering of the tracts where immigrants reside. Like western Pennsylvania, its remoteness and its weak economy have not been attractive to many immigrants. “The Hispanic population works very hard at being invisible,” said one local reporter. Constituting only 1.5 percent of the population in 1990, most of the Hispanics are immigrants from Central America or Puerto Ricans who have migrated from New York City. Reflecting the political turmoil in the countries from which they fled, the Central Americans are reluctant to involve themselves in civic affairs. According to the reporter, “They are hard working and willingly accept low-paying jobs on night shifts, so the natives don’t notice them. The Puerto Ricans receive the brunt of the discrimination because they are accustomed to American life and more visible than the immigrant Hispanics.” For Asians, who numbered just seven hundred in 1990, assimilation comes much easier, as the figures in table 8.6 suggest. Of those seven hundred Asians, less than two hundred lived in the city of Elmira in 1990. Some of the Asian families in suburbia are Japanese managers at the Toshiba plant, but they, too, remain politically indistinct.

The black community in Chemung County stood at 5,300 in 1990,
Map 8.7. Internal migrant and immigrant magnets in Chemung County, New York, 1990
about 5.5 percent of the population. Of those, 4,100 lived in the city of Elmira in black neighborhoods on the east side of town and mixed neighborhoods south of the Chemung River. According to locals, the occasional racial tension in the city may be the result of the proximity of the white and black populations rather than their separation. Certainly blacks and whites are more integrated in Chemung than in Nassau, Onondaga, or the state as a whole (see table 8.6). The black community is active enough to help make the city politically competitive in local races, usually coalescing with labor union votes to support Democratic candidates. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, control of city government moved back and forth between the parties. “When you anger Elmira voters, you can be sure they will respond,” said Steve Hughes, a Democratic city councilman. Democrats have a slight registration edge of about two thousand voters in Elmira, but that does not keep them from being tossed out of office for electorally unresponsive behavior. While the majority of blacks are Democrats, one black city councilman, a popular socially conservative minister of a mostly white suburban church, has won repeated reelection as a Republican. With such a small black population and elections that are so competitive, it is difficult and counterproductive to play a race-based politics in Elmira. Racial grievances, such as the lack of black employees in city government and incidents of police brutality, must be addressed gradually in coalition with other forces at the local level. The county government, on the other hand, is firmly in Republican hands, and so are the local governments of the smaller towns. Democrats have difficulty recruiting candidates outside of Elmira. Republican registration strength has eroded, but not necessarily to the benefit of Democrats. Independent registrants (those outside the two major parties) rose from 13.7 percent of the electorate in 1980 to 19.3 percent by 1994.

Syracuse and Onondaga County

“The last ten years has been a story about the destruction of the local economy,” said one county planner about the economic decline of Syracuse. Although its population has been stable since the 1970s, Onondaga County has struggled with the transition to the postindustrial economy. Surprisingly, unemployment has not gone up—people who don’t leave can find work—but, as in Elmira, the standard of living for blue collar families has diminished. Economic losses in chemical and automotive parts manufacturing and corporate consolidation at the area’s major defense contractor, General Electric, have contributed to the disappearance of high-pay-
ing jobs in blue collar occupations. The response of the less mobile blue collar labor force was often to take lower-paying service sector jobs while putting a spouse to work to maintain the same standard of living. In many cases, household income still declined, but where it did not it was often because more people in the family were working, sometimes in multiple jobs. Politically many of these workers have found themselves part of the burgeoning class of independent voters. Convinced that the Democratic Party and their old labor unions have let them down, but still associating Republicans with wealth and privilege, the struggling service sector household has dealigned. Registration outside the major parties rose from 23 to 29 percent between 1980 and 1994.

Even the city’s largest employer, Syracuse University, has downsized, cutting six hundred nonacademic positions in the early 1990s and restructuring its major programs. Of the local corporations that have survived, many have been bought by national corporations. With the disappearance of local corporate wealth goes the benevolent association of companies with the local community. The decline of local ownership and management of remaining manufacturing facilities has resulted in the export of many high-paying management jobs. Carrier Corporation, the local air conditioning manufacturer, is a good example. When its plant was bought in the late 1980s, the local management jobs were eliminated or transferred to a new headquarters in Connecticut. In the 1970s, Syracuse was home to several locally owned and managed banks. By the mid 1990s, only one was locally owned, and the others were branches whose headquarters were located elsewhere. Since skilled professionals are among the most highly mobile workers in the labor force, they are the first to leave an economically depressed area. Republican Party registration has suffered from this kind of attrition as professional positions have dried up.

The city of Syracuse has steadily lost population since the 1950s, and this has left the population poorer, older, and more racially diverse. Ethnic minority populations are far less likely to migrate during hard times, so the Asian, Hispanic, and black populations have increased. About one-fourth of Syracuse’s population was nonwhite by 1990, and this population was highly segregated. Contributing to this segregation are the patterns of immigrant and internal migrant settlement pictured on map 8.8. Internal migrants are concentrated on the east and southeast sides of the city and in the suburb of Manlius. Natives, including many native blacks, are clustered in the eastern and southern tracts shown in white. More recent immigrants have been drawn to neighborhoods at the north and
Map 8.8. Internal migrant and immigrant magnets in Onondaga County, New York, 1990
west ends of Syracuse. Older and more established immigrants reside alongside internal migrants and natives on the south and east sides of city.

According to the dissimilarity index reported in table 8.6, 71 percent of the black population would have to move for it to be equally distributed across the county’s 143 census tracts, indicating a high level of residential segregation. The population losses in Syracuse created a major housing glut in the 1980s and 1990s. The lower-cost housing has slowly helped the black and Hispanic communities spread out of their traditional enclaves on the south, east, and southwest sides of the city into the older suburbs. Like other urban counties in upstate New York, Onondaga is highly balkanized internally in racial, economic, and political terms. The segregation that has accompanied white flight and black immobility has helped consolidate the Democrats’ control of the city while making the suburbs nearly as homogeneously Republican. The county is governed by Republicans and the city by Democrats. Syracuse elected a Republican mayor in 1995 for the first time since 1970 as the result of fierce Democratic infighting, but the city council was still in Democratic hands. The city is perpetually broke. For a string of twelve years in the 1980s and 1990s, the Syracuse municipal government outspent its revenues. This had some politicians considering city-county consolidation by the mid 1990s.

The minority black population of Syracuse has forced black politicians to use nonracial appeals to get elected to city and county office, but primaries are the only locus of political competition. In the predominantly black areas of town, Republicans are hard pressed to slate a candidate. Racial tension between blacks and whites has sometimes flared in the administration of law enforcement and a major federal investigation in the early 1990s found the county jail to be a racially hostile environment for both black employees of the sheriff’s department and prisoners. The suburban communities have the typical attitudes toward the central city that one finds in suburbia nationwide. People view Syracuse as crime ridden and a place to be escaped. The retail sector in the city has collapsed, so it is not even viewed as a place to shop. There are some commuters, but many new industrial parks and white collar jobs are located in the suburbs. “You could shoot a cannon ball down main street at 5:30 P.M. and not hit anybody,” said one local reporter.

Hispanics and Asians are not a political force in either the county or Syracuse. The Hispanic population is predominantly of Puerto Rican and Mexican ancestry. In the 1980s and 1990s, this population was joined by Dominican immigrants, many of whom were suspected to be involved in
the illicit drug trade. Whites made no distinctions between Dominicans and Puerto Ricans, and the negative stereotypes created a rift between the Puerto Rican community and the newer Hispanic arrivals. Asians are a small and growing population, including three hundred families of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian boat people relocated with the help of local churches. Language barriers have prevented them from developing an interest in politics. In the mid 1990s, they were still struggling to integrate into the local economy, trying to overcome language and skill deficits. Immigration is not an issue in Syracuse because it has been small in its overall volume. The absence of foreign and domestic in-migration has kept the supply of labor remarkably consistent, with stable demand even in the face of economic restructuring. Since the foreign born do not pose a threat to native workers, the immigrant influx has not resulted in a backlash, which in so many other places has benefited Republican Party registration.

Two States, Even More Separate Than Before

New York is a diverse and complicated state, differing significantly from all the other states studied in this book. In the last twenty years, it has experienced the waves of immigration that are typical of New York City but very little internal migration anywhere. Among the nonimmigrant population, the proportion of locally born persons is extraordinarily high: 89 percent in Nassau and 82 percent in Onondaga in the 1990s. With its terrible business climate, few persons have entered New York from outside the state to take advantage of economic gains. Consequently, few areas have experienced the kind of political change, evidenced in northern Kentucky, Florida, and California, that has been so kind to Republicans. As the results in table 8.4 showed, growth in the population from out of state seems to depress Republican prospects.

Ethnic balkanization is occurring across as well as within counties. Immigration to New York City and its suburbs will further isolate this part of the state from the upstate cities and towns. Once a massive collection of white ethnic enclaves, the new wave of immigration since 1968 has transformed New York into a city of mixed race enclaves. While the city’s boroughs are internally varied, their heterogeneity separates their politics even more from that of the rest of New York than in 1960. Given the prevailing patterns of party support among racial and ethnic groups, it is unsurprising that boroughs like the Bronx and Brooklyn are becoming
even more Democratic than in the past. Reflecting established migration patterns along transit lines from city to suburbs, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are finding their way out of the boroughs and into the New York City suburbs. The monolithic identification of blacks with the Democratic Party has put increasingly competitive pressures on the GOP machines in Nassau and Westchester Counties. Republicans must find a way to either incorporate the black population in these areas and win black party converts or eventually cede power. In Nassau, the black population is more highly segregated than in any other part of the state (table 8.6). Republicans finally responded to the pressure of black leaders in the early 1990s by carving out two county council districts with majority black populations. Asians and Hispanics who migrate to the suburbs are not nearly as likely as African Americans to vote Democratic. They have shown only limited interest in political involvement, preferring to focus on activities that will further their economic integration.

Republicans are losing ground upstate and in New York’s suburban counties as the result of attrition due to deindustrialization. As companies left New York during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, those who could afford to move did so. These were often the skilled and well-educated white collar employees whose management jobs had disappeared. The blue collar workers were not nearly so mobile. They were left behind to scrounge for new jobs in low-paying service sector employment, often putting their spouses to work to maintain their standards of living. The demise of Republican registration and the rise of third-party and Democratic registration can be linked to deindustrialization through the mechanisms of out-migration and declining living standards that have led to a large class of economic and political malcontents.

Throughout this book, I have underlined the importance of consistent two-party competition as an instrument for obtaining full representation and good government. Forces restoring and promoting two-party competition to states and localities are good. Forces that promote and extend one-party politics are bad. Current economic forces appear to be restoring a two-party balance of power in New York’s upstate counties. While a large number of entrenched Republican machines still exist and may hang on for some time, the long-term trends are favoring Democrats and third parties. Some of the suburbs are standing on a similar threshold. Ethnic and racial diversity may finally bring needed representation to residents who heretofore have had no voice in the politics of Long Island and Westchester Counties. New York City is a more troubling case. Mayor
Giuliani’s election and reelection in the 1990s is a function of his strong and forceful personality rather than a resurgence of Republican Party strength. Giuliani’s claim to represent the Republican alternative to the governance of New York City can legitimately be called into question given his endorsement of statewide and national Democratic candidates. There is no true Republican Party in New York City in the sense in which the party label finds its expression in national terms.

While a glance across counties reveals that population diversity has stimulated a movement toward two-party politics in many one-party areas, within counties the mechanism of spatial balkanization by race and ethnicity continues to create many single-party-dominated cities, townships, and neighborhoods. Chemung and Onondaga Counties are good examples of this common pattern: one-party municipalities, with occasionally competitive general elections, surrounded by overwhelmingly Republican suburbs. This gives the politics internal to counties an areal foundation that erodes accountability and cheapens the value of votes in local elections. City council members from Syracuse have safe seats. One party usually controls the mayoralty. Suburban council members in the county legislature have equally safe seats. With a politics that is so closely tied to the segregated residential settlement patterns of contemporary metropolitan areas, it is little wonder that turnout and participation in local elections is so low, that urban leadership has been at such a loss when confronting long-standing urban problems, and that suburban leadership turns its back on urban problems entirely.