Notes

Chapter 1

1. Remarks of Rafael Khakimov, an adviser to President Shaimiev, reported in Rutland 1996.
2. Russia in the mid-1990s was divided administratively into 21 ethnically defined republics (20 if one does not include Chechnya), 10 ethnically defined autonomous okrugs, one ethnically defined autonomous oblast, and 57 non–ethnically defined units—oblasts, krais, and the two capital cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg (see chap. 2).
4. See, for example, Sachs (1995), who argued in 1994 that the kind of competitive tax withholding that had undermined the Yugoslav federal government in 1989 and that of the Soviet Union in 1991 “could still threaten the Russian Federation.”
7. Integration is a term used by different writers in different ways. I use it in a relatively narrow sense synonymous with state survival, and as an antonym for disintegration. In what follows, integration refers to the absence of secession by a territorial unit within the state, or of violent conflict involving a significant proportion of the population over the issue of secession. Thus, the United States in the 1860s, Spain since 1975, and Russia in the mid-1990s faced problems of integration of differing degrees of severity (Spain with regard to ETA, Russia with regard to Chechnya). Nevertheless, none of them disintegrated.
8. For instance, Birch 1989, 8.
9. Polanyi 1957a, 1957b, chap. 4. Polanyi also discusses another mode of integration that does not require central organization—reciprocity (1957b, chap. 4). But this mode of integration requires a high degree of symmetry in the structure of society, less likely to be found in modern, complex systems.
10. For a useful review, see Bolton, Roland, and Spolaore 1996.
11. See, for instance, Oates 1972.
14. As Washbrook writes of South Asia: “Communities form and unform, define and redefine themselves, in relation to this struggle. They exist, essentially, for the purpose of opposing and demanding a share of the privileges seen to be enjoyed by ‘others’ and
dissolve or reconstitute themselves as the context changes and throws up new ‘others’ for them to oppose. . . . In Tamil society, then, all categories of community and identity and, related to them, all evaluations of culture and history are permeated by politics and exist in flux” (Washbrook 1989, 230–31, quoted in Mitra 1992, 145.) For an interesting exploration of how different Russian diaspora communities in several former Soviet republics make such identity choices, see Laitin 1996.

16. It is possible that respondents felt such an answer more prudent, but it is highly unlikely that at this point, after several years of glasnost they felt any fear of reprisals should they have said they thought of themselves as “Russian.”
17. The Russian saying “Scratch a Russian and you find a Tatar” long ago became a cliché.
18. White Southerners were not ethnically distinct from white Northerners.
19. The exact vote was 138,653 to 70,706. See Birch 1989, 187.
20. Carrère d’Encausse 1981; Donald Horowitz (1992) also anticipated particularly severe separatist pressures in Central Asia, though for somewhat different reasons.
21. Figures are reported in Pravda, Mar. 27, 1991, 1–2. The vote may certainly have been less free in the Southern republics than in the more developed ones, so this may indicate the preferences of the political leadership to a greater extent than the population.
22. Ordeshock 1996; also see Riker 1987, chap. 11, for a slightly different view of the importance of party structure in federations.
23. Tarrow draws a similar distinction between administrative, growth-oriented integration through the state bureaucracy in France and clientelistic integration through parties in Italy (Tarrow 1977).
27. Author’s interview with Ramazan Abdulatipov, Moscow, July 8, 1996.
28. Average of imports and exports of goods between constituent units, from IMF 1992b, table 1, 37.
31. Interestingly, the Soviet Union’s political institutions have been considered by some to have been consociational, rendering its disintegration even more surprising.
32. See, for instance, Yeltsin’s own account in Yeltsin 1994.
33. Was this a deliberate, consciously adopted strategy or one that evolved out of a series of improvisations? There were elements of both, but I would emphasize the latter. Analyzing Yeltsin’s thinking at any given time is a challenging task, and on this point he was particularly ambivalent in public statements. On the one hand, he did grasp intuitively (where Gorbachev had not) that accommodating most of the demands of regions and ethnic republics would alleviate tensions far more effectively than attempting to intimidate them. There was definitely an element of political strategy and quite acute judgment in his courting of the more mobilized regions and in his assessment of regional politicians’ credibility. He was skilled at combining “carrots” with the threat of a “stick,” and at judg-
ing just how large the carrots had to be. On the other hand, while most of the time playing this game skillfully, he seems at times to have felt personally embarrassed by it. He expressed something close to shame at his own acts of monetary largesse and seemed to accept the arguments that such a strategy was economically inefficient. He described his regional policy as "papering over the cracks" and flirted with ideas of a more drastic consolidation of regions. In Chechnya in 1994, he blundered so dramatically, completely reversing his previously successful strategy, that one cannot help wondering how much he understood about the successes he had earlier achieved by instinct. In Yeltsin's entourage, there were deep disagreements over regional strategy. Some would probably recognize the logic of the argument I present. Others would be exasperated by the suggestion that the apparent chaos concealed a functional logic. Similar disagreements could be found in the parliament and in most of the inner circles of Moscow officialdom.

34. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral power-sharing agreement with Moscow in February 1994. It was soon followed by North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Sakha, Buryatia, and Bashkortostan. By early 1996, the center had also signed pacts demarcating divisions of jurisdiction and powers with several oblasts (Kaliningrad, Sverdlovsk, Orenburg, and Krasnodar Krai). See Orlov 1996 and *OMRI Daily Digest*, Jan. 30, 1996.

35. The chairman of Tyva's parliament was also a leader of a Tyvan nationalist organization, but not the republic's president.


37. Interfax, Kazan, Feb. 2, 1996, published in FBIS-SOV-96-024, Feb. 5, 1996, 47. At rallies in Tatarstan in May, Shaimiev reportedly observed numerous communist flags with the hammer and sickle, but no exemplars of the green, white, and red flag of Tatarstan (Gershaft 1996).


39. RIA, June 5, 1996.


41. Two caveats are important. While the study examines empirically the goals and strategies of regional and central leaders, it treats regional populations nonstrategically. I do not explicitly examine the rationality of individuals' voting or protest actions, nor do I consider how individuals reach decisions about political participation. A second omission concerns the structure of the central and regional state. The book's analysis of conflict and cooperation between the executive and legislative branches at both the central and regional levels is limited. While I believe that competition between the two branches—empirically, a very important aspect of Russia's political history in the early 1990s—increased the incentives for their leaders to act in the ways I describe, I do not demonstrate this. A more comprehensive—and much longer—study would also incorporate this part of the political process.

**Chapter 2**

1. This reflected the situation as of late 1998 (Chechnya is counted as one of the ethnic republics, though its status was actually unresolved). For useful discussions of the
administrative status of the various regions, see Slider 1994; Wallich 1994, 23. In what follows, I use the word regions to refer to republics, oblasts, krais, autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, and the two federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. In this, I depart from common usage, which more often classifies the oblasts and krais as “regions” and contrasts them with the “republics,” other ethnically defined units, and the two cities. Where I wish to draw narrower distinctions, I use the specific units’ names (e.g., oblast, krai).

2. This is based on details provided in McFaul and Petrov 1995. For one example, see Fainsod’s account of administrative reform in Smolensk and surrounding regions (1958, 52, 61). Some additional details are in Ushkalov and Khorev 1989.

3. These were called “autonomous republics” to distinguish them from the 15 “union republics” (Kozlov 1988, 32–35).

4. According to the RSFSR Constitution, state and administrative bodies of the autonomous oblasts had the right to communicate with corresponding bodies of the RSFSR either through the superior krai bodies or directly. In the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the central parliament’s upper house, each union republic received 32 deputies, each autonomous republic 11, each autonomous oblast 5, and each autonomous okrug 1 (The Soviet Constitution: A Dictionary, 1986, 20, 274.)

5. See, for instance, Remnick 1994, chap. 10. On more criminal aspects of these local cartels, see Vaksberg 1991.

6. For a good discussion, see Paretkskaya 1996.

7. Author’s interview with Yuri Blokhin, deputy governor of Tambov Oblast, June 26, 1996.


9. Teague 1994a, 31; Sakwa 1993, 127. Similar ideas periodically re-emerge. The proposals of the extreme nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky to eliminate ethnic republics are widely reported. However, he is not alone in advocating such reforms. Anatoli Sobchak, then mayor of St. Petersburg, proposed in February 1995 reorganizing the administration of Russia to re-create the gubernii of imperial Russia (Tolz 1996, 44). Presidential adviser Sergei Shakhrai suggested (also in February 1995) “merging the 89 currently existing republics and regions into a dozen larger administrative formations, each combining prosperous as well as poor federation members” (Tolz 1996, 44).

10. Author’s interview with Ramazan Abdulatipov, Moscow, July 8, 1996.

11. Interview with Leonid Smirnyagin, July 9, 1996, Moscow. Smirnyagin said he had opposed the selective granting of special benefits associated with such an approach, but had become reconciled to it as the lengthening list of regions thus favored eroded the particular advantages.

12. Interview with Anatoly Moiseev, adviser to the chairman of the government of Karelia, Petrozavodsk, July 2, 1996.

13. Interview with Yuri Blokhin, first deputy head of administration, Tambov Oblast, June 26, 1996, Tambov.


15. By late October 1991, practically all the Soviet republics had accumulated large arrears in remittances to the Union budget: Russia owed 29 billion rubles, Ukraine 8 billion, Kazakhstan 1.5 billion, Uzbekistan 985 million, and Lithuania 720 million. The
same month, the Russian Finance Ministry froze the bank accounts of several central ministries, and in November President Yeltsin announced that Russia would stop funding the operations of more than 70 Union ministries. See Diuk and Karatnycky 1993, 37.

17. Author’s interview with Ramazan Abdulatipov, July 8, 1996, Moscow.
18. Laba 1996, 5. Or, as Ruslan Aushev, the president of Ingushetia put it in the context of Russia’s internal order: “We are a little republic which would of course be easily conquered by Russia. But I do not think that the Russian Army has the power to put down all the other republics if they rise up” (FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, Jan. 23, 1995).
19. An example of the mixed interests and shifting positions of the Siberian leaders was presented by the remarks of Krasnoyarsk governor Valerii Zubov when deputy premier Anatoli Chubais visited in 1997. First, Zubov reportedly “warned that if the federal government did not stop giving preferences to such regions as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sakha, Moscow, and Ingushetia, it could not count on the support of the Siberian governors.” Later, he found time to attack the privileges received by some of these same Siberian governors, complaining “that Tyva and Altai [also members of Siberian Agreement] received the most generous subsidies from Moscow, while his Krasnoyarsk Krai was a donor—giving more than it received in return.” Institute for East-West Studies, Russian Regional Report, May 15, 1997.
20. Personal pique may also have played a role, though it is hard to evaluate its significance. President Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan met with Yeltsin in early 1994 and discussed Chechnya. In Shaimiev’s account: “It was as if he was asking himself the question, as we were talking. He said to me: ‘What do you think? Probably I should negotiate with Dudaev.’ Then Boris Nikolaevich said: ‘I want to meet with Dudaev. But not all in the Security Council share my inclination.’ Two or three weeks passed. There were sharp attacks on Yeltsin from Dudaev’s side. At the end of May Yeltsin came to Tatarstan, and I asked him: ‘You wanted to meet, but the situation is getting worse. What happened?’ ‘You can see,’ he replied. ‘It’s not possible to meet. It has come to insults toward the President of Russia’” (interview with Shaimiev, Russian television, “Moment Istiny,” Aug. 2, 1997).
21. The Yeltsin regime in Moscow reportedly also hoped that because of his weak links to local power structures Dudaev would prove more clubbable than his predecessor, Doku Zavgayev, who had played the nomenklatura nationalist strategy quite ably until the August 1991 coup attempt (Shoumikhin 1996, 8). See also Khazanov 1995, 216.
23. Author’s interview with Ramazan Abdulatipov, July 8, 1996, Moscow. Dudaev may, of course, have been putting a brave face on a situation of obvious weakness. In President Shaimiev’s interesting formulation, Dudaev found himself by this point “a general in whose hands remained nothing but weapons” (interview with Shaimiev, Russian television, “Moment Istiny,” Aug. 2, 1997).
Chapter 3

1. Interview with Leonid Smirnyagin, July 1993, Moscow.
2. This was claimed by a Finance Ministry report, cited in Hanson 1994, 19.
3. This chapter draws upon work reported in Treisman 1996b and 1998c. I am grateful to the British Journal of Political Science and Cambridge University Press for permission to excerpt from these.
4. While the State Tax Service was nominally under complete federal control from 1991 and local branches were in theory subordinate to the headquarters in Moscow, in practice local tax officers retained loyalties to and dependence on the oblast administrations (Wallich 1994, 27; author’s interviews).
5. This may merely have accelerated a process of decentralization of fiscal authority noted since Stalin’s death (Bahry 1987a, chap. 1).
6. From World Bank operational data; see table 3.1. These figures do not include transfers between the federal and regional/local budgets.
7. The Finance Ministry discontinued using expenditure norms in 1988, according to Martinez-Vazquez 1994, 111; however, oblast and rayon governments continue to use them to make a case for greater tax retention or transfers. In any case, the norms traditionally employed were only for recurrent—not capital—expenditures and represented estimated operating costs of running existing facilities. They, thus, reinforced whatever pattern of distribution had resulted from past capital investment.
9. Calculated from Freinkman and Titov 1994 and Le Houerou 1995, table A4. In 1992, total transfers are estimated by Freinkman and Titov at 19.44 percent of GDP. However, this only includes a Central Bank credit total of 1.98 trillion rubles. The IMF estimates total Central Bank credits for the year at 2.8 trillion rubles (Le Houerou 1995, table A1). When its credit figures are used, the transfer total rises to 23.98 percent of GDP. Federal off-budget fund spending is estimated at 9.56 percent of GDP (territorial off-budget fund spending has been subtracted from the totals in Le Houerou 1995, table A4. Unlike the figures in table 3.1, this does not include import subsidies). Federal tax revenues remitted by regions were estimated at 13.48 percent and federal off-budget fund revenues at 12.27 percent. (Unlike the revenue figures in table 3.1, these estimates of federal tax and off-budget fund revenues do not contain tax revenues of foreign trade, not remitted by the regions, or nontax revenues.) The 13.48 percent figure is calculated from Le Houerou 1995, table A1, as total tax revenues plus intergovernmental transfers minus taxes on foreign economic activities.
10. Center-region transfers estimated at 7.8 percent of GDP. Federal off-budget fund spending is estimated at 7.92 percent.
11. Calculated from Le Houerou 1995, tables A3–4, and World Bank operational
data. Federal tax revenues remitted by regions in 1994 are estimated at 9.4 percent of GDP (from World Bank operational data); intergovernmental transfers to federal budget and federal off-budget fund revenues are estimated at 9.3 percent. (Unlike the revenue figures in table 3.1, these estimates of federal tax revenues do not contain revenues from foreign trade taxes, which are not remitted by the regions, or nontax revenues.)

12. If additional tax breaks to specific regions extended by the Ministry of Finance after the budget had been enacted are included among center-region budget flows, the 1994 total comes to 3.9 percent of GDP. The total budget transfers dropped somewhat in 1995 and 1996.


14. According to the Russian Agricultural Bank, of 120 billion rubles provided in soft credits for the spring 1992 sowing season, only 71 billion rubles were returned (Yasin 1993a, 29–30). In the run up to the 1996 presidential election, Yeltsin wrote off the entire debt of the agroindustrial complex on all kinds of centralized credits extended since 1992—a sum assessed at about 21 trillion rubles (Bekker 1996).

15. Yasin et al. put the total value of export-import benefits for regions and enterprises for the year at 700 billion rubles, or 3.9 percent of GDP (1993a, 29).

16. In discussing “winners” and “losers” from central fiscal transfers, an important complication is the impact that regional transfers (and spending) may have outside the recipient region. Public finance specialists note that spillovers often lead to patterns of “benefit incidence” that differ from the actual pattern of transfers (see, for instance, Bennett 1980, chap. 9). This is probably also the case in Russia. This study, however, focuses on the observable relationships between the parts of transfers that do not “spill over,” rates of regional spending, regional voting, and political strategies. The significance of transfers might be even greater were there no spillovers. Yet, even with them, relationships between transfers and other variables can be observed.

17. This equaled about $220 per capita at the average exchange rate for the year.

18. The coefficient of variation, a measure of dispersion, is the standard deviation divided by the mean.

19. If Alaska is excluded, the coefficient of variation is only .19. Russian figures from Le Houerou 1995.

20. For example, Johnston 1978; Gottschalk 1981; Friedland and Wong 1983; and the other studies cited in Rich 1989.

21. Liebowitz found that while there was some redistribution of investment funding to less developed parts of the USSR in the 1950s through mid-1970s, after that investment priorities focused on more resource-rich and industrially developed regions (1996, 159–84). Of course, there is considerable evidence that, both in socialist and market systems, much redistribution that is publicly justified in terms of alleviating need in fact favors less needy groups (see Szelenyi 1978, 1983; Kornai 1992, chap. 13; Tullock 1983).

22. On tax collection effort, see, for instance, works of Roy Bahl (1994) and James Tong (1994).

23. For one example of such claims, see an interview with the finance minister, Boris Fyodorov, in mid-1993 (Bekker 1993b). Fyodorov accuses the agrarian lobby of pressing for credits and subsidies with “hysterical speeches” and “picket lines of people with pitchforks.”

24. In the rueful account of one Economics Ministry department head, “what gener-
ates the most force is not logical arguments but lobbying—who phoned whom, who put pressure on whom” (Yanovsky 1993). According to former Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov: “our budgets are always made by lobbies” (Ostankino television, Apr. 10, 1994, quoted in Hanson 1994, 19).

25. See, for example, Bekker 1993a. A considerable lore has developed around the logistics of such visits in Russia. Indeed, one political geographer says special teams of handlers accompanied Yeltsin on visits to the regions in the early 1990s, with instructions never to leave him alone with local officials. Yeltsin himself has regrettably acknowledged his role as an “ambulance,” flying to troubled regions with shipments of cash (Trud 1994). Southern regions such as Krasnodar, where government leaders like to vacation, are rumored to do particularly well. During a vacation in Sochi, Yeltsin reportedly agreed to a series of measures proposed to him by the region’s governor, ranging from financial aid to a bid to host the 2002 Winter Olympics. “If the state’s top men continue to take regular vacations on our coast,” one local journalist gleefully observed, “the Kuban will soon become the most prosperous region in Russia” (Alekseyeva 1994). Southern regions such as Krasnodar, where government leaders like to vacation, are rumored to do particularly well. During a vacation in Sochi, Yeltsin reportedly agreed to a series of measures proposed to him by the region’s governor, ranging from financial aid to a bid to host the 2002 Winter Olympics. “If the state’s top men continue to take regular vacations on our coast,” one local journalist gleefully observed, “the Kuban will soon become the most prosperous region in Russia” (Alekseyeva 1994).

26. According to Jon Elster, bargaining power is the capacity “to harm the other party without conferring excessive harm on oneself.” See Elster 1992, 175.

27. On strikes, Vladimir Mau, then economics adviser to acting prime minister Gaidar, explained in July 1992 how regional leaders bargained using their leverage over local enterprises as a weapon. “The head of local administration demands this and this and this, and . . . threatens to bring his enterprises out on strike” (Mau 1992).

28. Boris Fyodorov, the former finance minister, in 1996 described the government as caving in abjectly to the demands of striking coal miners. “These guys are so afraid of the miners, the moment somebody announces a strike they promise to pay. Of course, they do not pay on time. Then in the next six months a new wave starts” (Gordon 1996b). He suggested recruiting Margaret Thatcher to overhaul the Russian coal industry.

29. The data on transfers and tax payments were obtained from Leonid Smirnyagin and Aleksei Lavrov of the President’s Analytical Apparatus, who obtained them from the Russian Ministry of Finance and the State Tax Service. For full details, see appendix B.

30. For details of their construction, see appendix B. In various cases, I tried several specifications of the variable in order to reduce the chance of rejecting a hypothesis because the indicator I chose was faulty (see notes to table 3.3). It might seem strange to include such a comprehensive set of explanatory variables in the long regressions. Some early readers of the manuscript expressed surprise at the number of predictors. In fact, this is preferable on statistical grounds. To omit any variable that theoretically might explain the pattern of transfers is to risk “omitted variable bias”—i.e., biased estimates of the coefficients on independent variables that are included. On the other hand, including additional explanatory variables merely reduces the efficiency of the estimates—i.e., it makes it less likely that any estimates will be found to be significant. In this sense, by including more variables, I am in fact stacking the deck against my main hypothe-
ses. It may make sense to adopt a slightly higher criterion for significance when more independent variables are included to compensate for the increased chance of uncovering a spurious correlation. Most of the major results presented below are so extremely significant that they would still be significant given a much stricter criterion.

31. The individual transfer streams for which data were available in 1992 were: subventions, budget investments, payments from the government’s and parliament’s reserve funds, special benefits (for the first nine months of 1992), and some credits. Together, for all regions, these came to 1.45 trillion rubles, or about 41 percent of the total fiscal transfers estimated by Freinkman and Titov (1994, 15). The included transfers for 1994 were: subventions, first quarter subsidies, direct payments from the Regional Support Fund, indirect payments from the Regional Support Fund (made by subsequent increases in regions’ permitted share of VAT retained), net mutual payments, short-term budget loans, and payments to closed cities made by the Defense and Atomic Energy Ministries. The transfers for both years were predominantly allocated by the central government and parliament rather than the Central Bank.

32. In fact, the volume of central credits was sharply reduced from late 1993. Descriptive statistics for the variables are provided in appendix B.

33. However, the voting variable is significant at the .03 level in 1996 if one controls in model 2 for the region’s northerly location, itself positively, though not significantly, related to net transfers. Where not otherwise indicated, I refer to significance levels in the model 2 regressions.

34. I also tried substituting a variable measuring Yeltsin’s 1991 margin of victory for the pro-Yeltsin vote in the 1992 regression. If central allocators concentrated resources on marginal constituencies, one would expect this factor to be significant. In fact, it was far less significant than the Yeltsin vote variable (coefficient of \(-0.17\), significant at \(p = .10\), in model 1) and the regression had a lower adjusted \(R^2\)-value. There was no discernible policy—either by supporters or opponents of Yeltsin—of concentrating resources on marginal constituencies.

The association between anti-Yeltsin or antireform voting and higher transfers might have two explanations: (1) Yeltsin and the reformers might be trying to shore up support in hostile regions, or (2) the opposition parliamentary leadership might be trying to reward its supporters. In 1992, the fact that anti-Yeltsin voting was most significantly related to “special benefits,” a category of transfers most controlled by the president and government, suggests the first interpretation (see table 3.4). There was not a significant relationship between voting and payments from the Supreme Soviet Reserve Fund. In 1994, a lower vote the previous year for Russia’s Choice was followed by higher payments from the Regional Support Fund. Since allocations under this fund were first calculated and adjusted by the Ministry of Finance and then voted on by the parliament, it is harder to disentangle the effect of pressures in the different institutions.

35. A nonlog formulation of the strike variable is even more significant if one extreme outlier, Kemerovo, is excluded from the data. In 1991, the coal-mining region of Kemerovo lost about eight times more man-days to strikes than the next most strike-prone region. Not surprisingly, it did not receive eight times more in net transfers.

36. Regression analysis is, of course, insufficient to prove a causal relationship. But it suggests a strong hypothesis, especially when other theoretically plausible causes are
controlled for and previous-year values of independent variables are used where possible and appropriate to reduce problems of endogeneity.

37. Variables were constructed to measure the relevant population proportions in the ethnic republics and autonomous okrugs and coded zero in the nonethnic oblasts and krais.

38. Details of the dates of sovereignty declarations are provided in appendix B.

39. Under the regulations, regions qualified for aid from the Regional Support Fund if they met one of two criteria. “Needy” regions were those that had per capita budget revenues the previous year lower than 95 percent of the country’s average. “Especially needy” regions were those whose expenditures the previous year exceeded the budget revenues of the average region (see Le Houerou 1995, 20; Lavrov 1995b; Treisman 1998c).

40. This is taken from the model 2 estimate for total RSF transfers in appendix B, table B1. Since the criterion for classification as “especially needy” was simply to have spent a lot in the base year, fiscal transfers under the Fund actually favored big spending regions.

41. Transfers under the Fund may also have responded to strikes or governor opposition to Yeltsin, though these results are only marginally significant.

42. Politicians were quite blunt in suggesting that arbitrary political adjustments were frequently made, concealed by the technical complexity of the formula calculations. Oleg Morozov, head of the Russian Regions faction in the State Duma, complained, “People from the Ministry of Finance have explained many times how the calculations are made, and even with a Ph.D. in political science I did not understand anything” (author’s interview, State Duma, Moscow, July 7, 1997). Mikhail Motorin, head of staff of the Duma Budget Committee, was quite categorical: “There isn’t any formula—just a certain balancing of interests, first in the Ministry of Finance and then here [in the Duma]” (author’s interview with Mikhail Motorin, State Duma, Moscow, Aug. 14, 1997).

43. The apparently lower 1992 transfers to agricultural regions may have been compensated by targeted agricultural subsidies and credits, for which regional breakdowns were not available.

44. The lack of clear signs of the influence of access recalls Bahry’s pre-perestroika conclusion that fragmented institutions of government provide a range of alternative niches for would-be lobbyists. Rivalry between central ministries and departments, and the increasing complexity of national leaders’ goals, created a “multitude of windows— and the ‘art of being a successful advocate in Soviet politics is to find them’” (Bahry 1987a, 159; her quotation is from Gustafson 1981). This reflected “not the uselessness of connections but the fact that there are so many connections that can be of use.” Such an interpretation would echo the prevailing view of pork-barrel allocation in the United States—that it results in a universalistic spread of benefits. (For a recent discussion of this literature, see Stein and Bickers 1994 and Weingast 1994.)

45. See Treisman 1996c for more details on the campaign. The disaggregated regressions do suggest one other possible confirmation of the image of a largesse-dispensing president, traveling with pen and checkbook at the ready. Those regions visited by President Yeltsin in 1994 did get significantly larger investment grants that year. These benefits, however, were canceled out by the larger share of tax revenue that these regions tended to remit to Moscow.
46. The regions varied quite widely in the scale of their representation. While the average region got one single-member electoral district per 324,000 inhabitants, the Republic of Sakha’s 1.1 million residents had only one representative between them. Their neighbors in the Evenkiisky Autonomous Okrug were rather more fortunate, with one representative for 23,000.

47. As one would expect, parliamentary overrepresentation did not cut much ice with the government. While having more Supreme Soviet representatives per capita was associated with larger transfers under the Supreme Soviet’s reserve fund, it was actually correlated with lower transfers from the government’s reserve fund.

48. Examining tables 3.4 and B1 suggests a trade-off: more populous regions tended to retain larger shares of tax revenue (at least in 1992), but to receive smaller transfers. The net impact was negative.

49. Author’s interview, Moscow, July 8, 1996.

50. One alternative view might nevertheless explain such allocative policy as a means by which Yeltsin repaid his supporters; in 1990–91, Yeltsin in fact encouraged both strikes and autonomy movements within Russia as a way of putting pressure on President Gorbachev and the Union level of power. Such explanations would not, however, account for the greater allocations to regions that voted against Yeltsin.

51. Rankings are shown in appendix B.

Chapter 4

1. The results of the other candidates also show no very clear pattern.

2. For more on the context of this election, see, for instance, Colton and Hough 1998; Treisman 1998b. In all regions where the election occurred, voters were presented with at least four ballots: a proportional representation national party-list ballot; a single-member-district ballot for their local constituency; a two-vote ballot for the upper house of parliament, the Council of the Federation; and a referendum ballot on Yeltsin’s proposed constitution. Some regions supplemented these four with additional regional ballots.

3. For previous, useful studies of Russian electoral geography, see Clem and Craumer 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Slider, Gimpelson, and Chugrov 1994.

4. The voting data analyzed in this chapter are those published by the Central Electoral Commission. Some analysts have expressed doubt about the veracity of official figures as reported for at least one of the elections in question (Sobyanin and Sukhovolsky 1995). Most notably, Sobyanin and Sukhovolsky claimed that up to nine million votes were added in December 1993, mainly in favor of the LDP and the proposed constitution. These allegations were based on a statistical analysis of the official results rather than direct evidence of falsification. However, two political scientists who examined the statistical arguments on which Sobyanin’s claims were based were not able to substantiate them (Filippov and Ordeshook 1996). The notion that local officials—who tended to be associated with either Russia’s Choice or the Communists—would inflate the vote of the LDP as was claimed seems somewhat implausible (White, Rose, and McAllister 1996, 127–29). A nationally representative opinion survey taken around the time of this election found support levels for the national party lists similar to the official vote tallies (Colton and Hough 1998). Whether the turnout on the constitutional referendum
reached the required 50 percent is far less clear, and I do not include analysis of that vote. In general, however, I share the opinion of various scholars that while substantial falsification cannot be ruled out, the minor falsification or errors that undoubtedly did occur would probably balance each other in the aggregate (White, Rose, and McAllister 1996; Colton 1997; Filippov and Ordeshook 1996). The likelihood of falsification would seem greatest where the interests of local officials were involved—e.g., in the 1993 Council of Federation election and the single-member district races—and then in matters of central presidential concern such as the constitutional referendum. Organizing a systematic, nationwide falsification of the results in favor of one party or presidential candidate in the other votes, however, would have been extremely difficult, given the large number of monitors—50,000 representatives of different parties and thousands of candidates in the 1993 poll (see White, Rose, and McAllister 1996, 129). In 1996, not even the defeated candidates publicly questioned the Central Electoral Commission's figures. Finally, the analyses presented in this chapter examine voting behavior in a given election controlling for voting in the previous one. If the degree and political objectives of any falsification in a given region did not change between elections, it should not affect the results.

5. In brief, fuel and raw materials industries won lucrative export opportunities, while a shift in relative prices severely worsened profitability in agriculture. During 1992, while the prices of basic industrial inputs used by farms rose by 26 times, procurement prices for agricultural goods increased by only 10 times (Wegren 1994, fn. 70).

6. Alternatively, privatization might spark antipathies toward reform if the change results in less security for workers, harder working conditions, or downward pressure on wages, and it is perceived as enriching an unmeritorious minority.


8. The agricultural concentration of a region may thus affect political attitudes in two ways: by altering prospective evaluations of the region's economic well-being in conditions of market reform, and through the distinct cultural traditions and social organization of rural life. For discussions of rural conservatism, see Lipset 1963; Wegren 1994.


10. Thirteen blocs ran in this election, representing all parts of the ideological spectrum.

11. Again, including explanatory variables to capture all theoretically plausible determinants of regional voting behavior is statistically preferable and stacks the deck against the key hypotheses being confirmed. See chap. 3, note 30.

12. Despite the variation, some continuity did remain between elections. In three out of the four cases, the level of a region's pro-Yeltsin or pro-reform vote in the previous election was significantly related to the vote the next time around. Controlling for all the other factors, for every 10 percentage points of a region's vote that supported Yeltsin in the April 1993 referendum, the president could expect 6 or 7 percent of the vote in the first round of 1996.

13. This might mean that ethnic minority and non-Christian voters were more likely to vote for the party of power—or it might mean that ethnic Russians and Christians in
ethnic minority or non-Christian regions were more likely to do so. No direct inference can be drawn.

14. It might seem that a more direct way to demonstrate this relationship would be to regress the voting variables on net central transfers rather than on regional spending. I use spending variables in the regressions because on theoretical grounds it is the spending that is expected to affect voting, not transfers per se. If part of the transfer ends up in the governor’s pocket rather than financing government programs, this would reduce the correlation between transfers and voting. In fact, however, the significant results in table 4.1 suggest that such leakages were quite limited. And a similar positive relationship can be identified statistically between central transfers and voting for central incumbents. When the spending variables in the short models of tables 4.2 and 4.3 are replaced by a variable measuring the level of center-region transfers per capita in the previous year, along with a control variable for the region’s domestic tax revenues, transfers are significant at $p < .03$ in the 1995 and both 1996 regressions, and at $p < .14$ in the 1993 regression (using the level of subventions—i.e., direct central aid to finance regional budget deficits). Controlling for the level of regional tax revenue is necessary since if transfers go disproportionately to fiscally poorer regions, the positive impact of the transfers might be obscured by the negative impact of relative fiscal poverty.

15. These estimates are calculated from the coefficients in table 4.2, models 1 and 2.

16. Oddly enough, both also polled particularly highly in regions with high levels of exports. Perhaps high levels of exports polarize political attitudes, creating a sharper division between those who benefit from them (who become more pro-reform) and those who feel excluded from the benefits derived from their region’s industrial or resource wealth (who vote more for the opposition).

17. The result is only marginally significant (at $p < .07$) for the elderly population variable in the Communist Party regression (model 1).

18. The Communists also received a lower vote in regions where inflation was high. However, this may actually reflect the fact that in regions where both voters and political leaders were more Communist, regional administrations were more likely to impose regional price limits, which did initially slow the jump in prices (for instance in Ulyanovsk). This would explain an association between low inflation and high Communist support.

19. On the other hand, the same survey found that pension-age respondents were less likely to say they had voted for Yeltsin.

20. Survey results provided to author by Timothy Colton.


22. Author’s interview with Valery Koval, mayor of Tambov city, June 26, 1996, Tambov.

23. I also tried including a variable reflecting the month in which the gubernatorial election had taken place, on the assumption that either anti-incumbent or pro-incumbent sentiment might have been growing over time. This dummy variable was not significant and lowered the significance of the equation’s chi-square. Including it increased the estimate of the coefficient on the regional budget spending variable slightly (to .12), but reduced its significance to $p = .076$. The other coefficient estimates were not much changed.
24. Again, the number of variables included was limited on both theoretical and practical grounds. But as a check, I tried adding each of the excluded economic performance or quality of life variables to the final regression. None of these was significant, and none caused a major change in the main results.

25. In fact, if agricultural employment, agricultural output, or rural share of the population is added to the regression, each has a negative, though insignificant coefficient.

26. In elections in which members of the regional executive branch were running, there is particularly strong reason to be concerned about possible falsification. This could invalidate the results of the analysis if the degree of falsification was correlated with the factors found to be significant. It seems unlikely, however, that governors of more developed, higher output regions would have a greater ability or propensity to falsify; the conventional wisdom is that such problems are far more prevalent in less developed, more easily controlled regions. Similarly, there is no obvious reason to believe that falsification of results in gubernatorial elections or the Council of Federation vote would be greater in regions where budget expenditures recently increased relatively more.

27. The mean regional spending that year was 925,000 rubles per inhabitant.

28. Author’s interview with Yuri Blokhin, first deputy head of administration, Tambov Oblast, June 26, 1996, Tambov.

29. Author’s interview with Viktor Stepanov, chairman of the government of Karelia, Petrozavodsk, July 2, 1996.

Chapter 5


2. Reports of this come mainly from Barsenkov 1993.

3. Tallies were compiled from reports in Teague 1993 and the Federal Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports.

4. It may be assuming too much to view these two soundings of regional leaders’ positions as indicators of the trend in regional leaders’ behavior between December 1992 and September 1993. However, it is interesting to note which coefficients are similar in the two regressions. This might be because the same leaders tended either to support or oppose Yeltsin on both occasions, rather than revealing any deeper underlying common causes. However, there was some variation in leader response in the two cases. Of the 70 regional governors for whom data is available on both occasions, 47 adopted the same course in the two crises, either supporting or opposing Yeltsin in both. However, 21 of those who failed to support Yeltsin in December supported him in September; and two who had supported him in 1992 opposed him the next year.

5. This is based on the antilog of the coefficient, \( e^{-2.43} \). Another way of making this point is that, even without controlling for the other determinants of regional leader strategy, 30 percent of leaders in regions where the vote for Yeltsin had fallen chose to oppose him overtly during the crisis, compared to 11 percent of leaders in regions where the vote for Yeltsin had risen.

6. Of course, it is also possible that causality runs in the reverse direction: governors influence the change in vote totals in their region rather than opinion constraining gov-
ernors. Claims are frequently made that regional administrations falsify election results or pressure voters to support their favored candidates. There is no clear-cut way, with data available, to test for the direction of causation. However, if causation runs from regional leadership preferences to votes rather than the reverse, one might expect earlier indicators of regional leadership preferences to help predict subsequent changes in reported voting behavior. In particular, the governors’ positions in December 1992 might affect how regional electorates were reported to have voted in the April 1993 referendum. To test this, I tried including the December 1992 governor strategy dummy variable in the short regression of April 1993 referendum voting from table 4.2, second column from the left, in chapter 4. It proved to be highly insignificant. Whether or not a region’s governor opposed Yeltsin in December 1992 bore no relation to the level of voter support for Yeltsin in April 1993, controlling for the Yeltsin vote in 1991 and other factors. However, the direction of change in voting between 1991 and April 1993 was significantly related to whether or not the region’s governor supported Yeltsin in September 1993. So the evidence suggests that causality ran from voting to leadership action.

7. The antilog of the estimated coefficient from model 2, 3.17, is about 24.
8. This might merely reflect coincidence: that more conservative regions held elections. But the result already controls for the region’s vote for Yeltsin in 1991 and for whether the governor is a former apparatchik. More elections for regional executive were held in the republics than in the oblasts and krais, but the regression results control for republic status, so this too cannot explain the outcome.
9. He added, however, that Yeltsin had asserted by decree the authority to fire any governor, regardless of whether he or she was elected or appointed, which in practice reduced the difference.
10. Nine of the 15 oppositionist regional leaders were from ethnic republics, while six were from oblasts or krais.
11. In appendix D, I present evidence that regional delegations to the national parliament were swayed in their voting choices by many of the same factors as determined the strategies of regional governors. Where the pro-Yeltsin vote rose within the region, its parliamentary delegation tended to vote more often on Yeltsin’s side.
12. In another analysis I did find that among Russia’s ethnic republics and districts, more fiscally dependent regions were less likely to demonstrate high levels of separatist activism. See Treisman 1997.
13. To be more sure of all the causal links in the argument would require comparable data covering several years, and some form of causal modeling. But these results, which do isolate relationships from many possible confounding factors and which find relationships that are significant using timed data that fits the hypothesized intertemporal causal links but not significant if the timing is reversed, suggest some quite powerful evidence for the hypothesized links. In addition, the interpretation presented is supported by various other types of empirical evidence: see the discussion of specific cases below.
14. The real spending drop appears to have continued the following year, though a change in the budget classification system used makes it difficult to compare 1994 and 1995 levels.
Chapter 6

1. For instance, Milanovic 1994; Lynch and Lukic 1996.


3. It is also possible that such policies were not tried because leaders knew that their political systems currently lay outside the boundary conditions in which they could be effective.

4. Important differences between Russia and the other three include the larger number of subunits (89 compared to 15, 8, and 2), the far longer history of Russian statehood, and the higher proportion of the largest nationality (Russians constituted 81.5 percent, compared to 63 percent Czechs in Czechoslovakia, 51 percent Russians in the USSR, and 36 percent Serbs in Yugoslavia).

5. The 12.5 percent figure is from World Bank operational data. Russian Economic Trends 5 (2) (1996): 11, gives an estimate of 12.4 percent for the first half of 1996. The figure with foreign exchange sales excluded is from this source.


7. At the same time, republic and local revenues and expenditures also increased as a share of GSP; so the change represented not so much recentralization as an increase in tax collection at all levels.

8. Calculated from Aleksashenko 1992, 446.

9. Revenues of the “available” general government (including the federation, republic, local governments, extrabudgetary funds, and operations of the State Financial Assets and Liabilities account) dropped from 62.2 percent of GDP in 1989 to 47.2 percent in 1992.

10. For a discussion of fiscal developments in Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s, see Prust 1993.

11. Of course, Czech and Slovak republic expenditures may not all have been made in the same republics, but it seems safe to assume the majority would have been. Per capita republic expenditures still remained slightly higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic, though the gap narrowed.

12. After Slovakia’s secession, Klaus “remarked that an optical illusion had disappeared from the map” (Rév 1994, 167).

13. While Slovenia’s share of Yugoslav exports and imports and retail sales were above average (2.5 times and 2.1 times the national average, respectively), so was its share of Yugoslav GDP (1.7 times the national average) and manufacturing income (2.6 times the national average), other bases on which tax could have been assessed.

14. Latvia and Lithuania seem to have been paying (increasing) positive net transfers to the center, while Estonia received a (decreasing) net transfer from the center.

16. For another estimate of these implicit subsidies, calculated for 1987 (and expressed in rubles rather than share of GDP), see Austin 1996, table 2.

17. The account of negotiations in 1989–90 between the Baltic republics and the center given in Bahry 1991 suggests a central strategy of insincere concessions, manipulation, and stalling, explained in part by divisions and disorganization of the central bureaucracy.


19. As noted, it is not certain whether this was the case for the USSR.

Chapter 7

1. Zaslavsky notes the greater incentive for mobilization provided by central redistribution in ethnically divided states: “In multiethnic countries in which territorially based nationalities exhibit profound differences in economic and cultural development, the redistribution of resources by the state creates the conditions for the rise of nationalist or separatist movements” (1992b, 114).

2. In a similar vein, Przeworski argues that the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe was caused by an ideological crisis combined with a failure of repression. “The reasons the system collapsed so rapidly and so quietly are to be found both in the realm of ideology and in the realm of physical force. . . . By 1989, party bureaucrats did not believe in their speech. And to shoot, one must believe in something. When those who hold the trigger have absolutely nothing to say, they have no force to pull it. . . . Moreover, they did not have the guns. In no country did the army, as distinct from the police forces, come to the rescue” (1991, 5–6).

3. According to Rokkan and Urwin: “The dilemma for centres is that even the slightest concession might be taken to be, and might become, the thin end of a wedge that might ultimately threaten these regime imperatives, for at the furthest edge peripheral demands challenge the unity of the state” (1983, 166).

4. This is one view of the Roman leadership’s strategy to preserve its empire. As Mellor describes it: “They gambled on trouble always being limited to a few spots in the Empire rather than any general insurrection, for they had inadequate resources to maintain a proper strategic reserve. By tolerance and fairness, but a fierce and ruthless response to any troublemakers, they maintained a level of peace not previously experienced” (1989, 162).

5. Axelrod also extends the logic to empires trying to deter revolts by their provinces or by external aggressors and notes that Britain’s ability to deter aggression against Gibraltar and Hong Kong was enhanced by Whitehall’s decision to respond with force to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands (1984, 150–51).

6. In a discussion of individual tax evasion, Margaret Levi also suggests that “side payments are most effective for appeasing those with significant bargaining resources—especially those constituents from whom it is better to get some tax than no tax. Relative bargaining power can determine the kinds of tax reductions, cutbacks, extra services, or other concessions a constituent receives” (Levi 1988, 64). However, unlike the argument of this book, her account of “quasi-voluntary compliance” assumes that the free-rider problem is overcome in part by a normative motivation of individuals to pay tax as long as they believe others will do the same.
7. The emphasis here is on questions. I do not pretend to offer answers or make broader claims based on one case study. It does, however, suggest hypotheses that might be worth examining more thoroughly in other contexts.

8. Another scholar has described the treaty of peace Theodosius made with the Visigoths in 382 and other subsequent treaties with Germanic and Hun war bands as “no more than legal affirmations of the status quo and Roman self-deceptions” (Christ 1984, 231). Nevertheless, the same writer acknowledges that the “long duration of the agony and the complexity of its development are to be explained by the fact that the Germans in question were not always destructive in their effects but for a long time exerted their military strength on behalf of Roman interests” (232).

9. See Kann 1979, 100–101: “As the Austrian prime minister, Count Eduard Taaffe (1879–93) put it, the best way to govern was to keep all Austrian national groups in a moderate state of dissatisfaction. . . .”

10. According to Barkey:

   Traditional historians who do not see the calculated aspect of state policies at this time argue that the Ottoman state was weak. Accordingly, the deals the Ottoman state made with bandit leaders are described as originating from a position of weakness rather than of strength. Ottoman rulers had no other choice, say historians, because they had to fight their foreign enemies. The position I take differs. . . . The Ottoman policies of incorporation of bandits were policies of strength. They originated from a need to incorporate more armies into the war effort against the Habsburgs or the Persians, as well as from the need to undermine the regional strength these bandits could acquire if left to their own devices. The state in the Ottoman Empire was strong since it was able to preempt potentially disruptive action by the bandits as well as exploit it when it became important. (Barkey 1994, 239–40)


12. In an interesting article, Lijphart has argued that Indian political institutions actually constitute a variant of “consociational” democracy (1996).

13. For another interesting discussion of how central fiscal policies have helped to moderate conflict within divided federations, see Bird 1986.

14. See Hirschman 1995 for an elegant review of this tradition. He traces the idea that conflict can play a constructive role in social relationships to, among others, Heraclitus, Machiavelli, Georg Simmel, Lewis Coser, Ralph Dahrendorf, Max Gluckman, Michel Crozier, Marcel Gauchet, and Helmut Dubiel.

15. For a formal demonstration of this point, see Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981.

16. The British electorate was about 250,000 (Root 1994), which was probably between 2 and 5 percent of the total population (based on population estimates in Plumb 1950). The Chinese party nomenklatura in 1982 has been estimated at a little less than 1 percent of the population (Greer 1989, 50).

17. Of course, there is no reason to assume that central governments would prioritize efficiency. However, the public good characteristics of financial restraint and other efficiency-enhancing policies suggest that the center’s encompassing interest will give it greater incentives than the regions.
18. Haggard and Webb consider a number of institutional factors that may influence how economic and political reforms interact—the party system, timing of elections, organization of bureaucracies, strength of interest groups, program design, and international involvement (1994). Geddes considers how the number of political parties, their internal discipline, and the balance of power between them affect the likelihood of reforms to increase state capacity—an often crucial aspect of economic reform (1994).


20. While some economists have certainly noted the important political dimension of economic policy in federal states (e.g., Bird 1986), the usual economic reform advice has been to liberalize more or less indiscriminately.


22. Nikolai Sevryugin, the governor of Tula Oblast, issued such a challenge to the center, threatening to cut off tax remittances, during his unsuccessful bid for reelection in early 1997.

Appendix A

1. For other recent formal analyses that explore aspects of the same problem, see Kuran 1991; DeNardo 1985; Lohmann 1994.

2. In order to focus on the interactions between the levels, I make the large assumption that each of these is unitary; in reality, many important complications arise from the interaction between different actors within a given level of government.

3. It would be possible to make this a function not just of the number choosing $R$, but a function that weights different defectors differently (perhaps larger regions that defect absorb more of the center’s punishment resources, lowering the risk more for others). For simplicity, I assume that all are equally effective at reducing the risk for others of defying the center.

4. Obviously, another way for a central government to avoid such a fate is to increase its enforcement capacity. But at times the center may not be able to do this or may prefer not to. Indeed, the threshold function may also shift downward because of a fall in enforcement capacity, as the result of decay in the state apparatus, the decline of national parties, or democratization of vertical relations. These changes may be difficult or undesirable to reverse. In such situations, changes in tax policy may be able to make full compliance once more an equilibrium.

Appendix B

1. The terms were combined in an index to economize on degrees of freedom. For a similar approach to index construction, see Putnam 1993.

2. This was a discontinuous variable, based on the classification provided in Yasin 1993b, 24. This study divided Russia’s regions into three groups on the basis of the degree of price regulation in the period March 1992–June 1993: those with active price regulation (more than 9 of 19 food products surveyed subject to price controls); those with a “mixed strategy” (3–8 of the 19 products subject to price controls); and those
with little or no price regulation (controls on 2 or fewer of the 19 products). For much of the period, the price of bread remained regulated at the federal level.

3. They were combined in an index to economize on degrees of freedom. Including discontinuous variables, such as that measuring the extent of price regulation, in a factor analysis is often viewed as problematic. However, when the correlations between the underlying variables are believed to be moderate (no greater than .6 or .7), the technique can still be expected to perform well (see Kim and Mueller 1978, 75). Given the generally moderate observed correlations between different measures of commitment to economic reform, it is likely that this condition is met in this case.

Appendix D

1. The index is calculated for each roll-call vote as the percentage of the deputies in the delegation voting with the president’s side minus the percentage voting against it. Thus, if they are split 50-50, the rating is zero. The authors say the temperatures are calculated from several dozen key roll-call votes in the 3d Congress (1991) and 9th Congress (1993).

2. It is conceivable that the opinions of the parliamentary delegation influenced voters, rather than the opinions of voters influencing the parliamentary delegation. However, some evidence suggests otherwise. The roll-call voting temperature of a region’s delegation in 1991 was not a significant predictor of regional public voting in the April referendum (the 1991 temperature is insignificant when included in the regression in table 4.2, second column from left, in chap. 4). But public voting in the April referendum (whether included in absolute terms, or broken down into the 1991 level of support for Yeltsin and the 1991–93 change) was a highly significant determinant of the parliamentary delegation’s 1993 temperature (even controlling for the 1991 temperature).
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