Chapter 2
Beyond the Border: Strategic Assets

Envoys (Presbeis, Presbeutai)

Presbeis and presbeutai are translated “ambassadors” by Liddell and Scott, but I have used the translation “envoy” to avoid confusion with the twentieth-century conception of ambassadors, who are professionals and normally take up residence in a foreign nation. Most presbeis in the Greek poleis, by contrast, held their office for the duration of a specified mission and traveled from their own city to a foreign land to accomplish their assignments.1

Xenophon mentioned that custom accorded envoys some protection, based on morality and the more practical necessity of keeping lines of communication open.2 Unlike heralds, however, they did not normally enjoy a right to immunity (adeia), and they were therefore subject to arrest and even execution.3 Immunity could be obtained for them through treaties and specific agreements negotiated by heralds.4 Other-

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1. LSJ s.v. πρεσβευτής I, πρεσβύς II.
2. This generalization is more true of democracies and oligarchies than autocracies and of the classical period than the Hellenistic. We find, for example, Megasthenes (the ethnographer) in residence at Chandragupta’s capital in India while acting as Seleucus Nicator’s diplomatic agent (ca. 300–290, cf. Cary 66–67). For specialization in Antigonus the One-Eyed’s court, see Billows 252–54.
3. Xen. Anab. 5.7.27ff.
4. Some examples: Hdt. 7.137; Thuc. 2.67ff., 3.72.1, 8.86.9; Xen. Hell. 5.4.22; Xen. Anab. 5.7.19; Epist. Phil. (in Demosthenes’ corpus) 3; Diod. Sic. 19.79.1; Arrian Anab. 2.15.2, 3.24.4–5; Plut. Ages. 16.3; Photius Biblio. 44b; Harpocratin s.v. Hagnias. Even so, maltreatment of envoys was an offense against the state that they represented—in a later context (179), we find it listed among the (alleged) reasons for war between the Romans and Perseus.
5. The truce between the Athenians and Peloponnesians near the close of the Archidamian War, for example, contained provisions for safe conduct for kerukes, presbeiai, and akolouthoi engaged in negotiating peace terms (Thuc. 4.118.6). It is odd that special provision was made here for heralds, who would normally have already possessed adeia—perhaps the outrages of the war had rendered even these “untouchables” touchable. See also Thuc. 8.70.2. States sometimes sent kerukes ahead to arrange safe conduct for other
wise, open (and even imminent) hostilities could and did interrupt the
flow of envoys to and from states and hence limited their use.⁶ Even in
such times, however, envoys might conduct sub rosa negotiations
between disaffected subjects and their prospective allies.⁷ Given their
sphere of operation and their curtailed use during conflicts, it comes as
no surprise that the information they provided related almost exclusively
to diplomacy and contained little military content.⁸

The criteria for the appointment of envoys varied according to state,
period, and circumstance, and a full treatment of these factors is a study
in itself. For our purposes, it suffices to note a few aspects that have a
bearing on their function as agents or sources.

First, during crises, when another state was hostile and needed to be
placated, men were sometimes selected as envoys on the basis of their
good personal relationships with the foreign state’s leaders. Such was the
situation when the Athenians sent the pro-Spartan Callias to Sparta to
secure peace (in 371) and when they chose men congenial to Alexander
after he had crushed the Theban revolt (in 335) and was looking south
with a suspicious eye.⁹ One would expect that reports sent by such men
could be colored by their sympathy. Conversely, in situations in which a
state’s fate did not rely so heavily on another’s goodwill, the selection of
people hostile to a foreign government was thought to ensure that the
envoys would be critical of appearances and announce what was true
rather than what was pleasant. Demosthenes alleged that Aeschines was

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⁶ E.g., Thuc. 1.139.1, 5.80.1.
⁷ E.g., Thuc. 1.67.2, 8.7.1. Cf. Aratus’ secret negotiations with Antigonus, at the time
his enemy in policy, if not in spirit (Polyb. 2.47.4).
⁸ Except insofar as foreign relations and military operations on the strategic level were
always intertwined. However, in the Hellenistic period there are references to quite detailed
descriptions of military forces given by envoys: Polyb. 21.26.1–4; Plut. Flam. 17.4.
⁹ Xen. Hell. 6.3.2; Arrian Anab. 1.10.3. See also Thuc. 5.40.2, 5.44. Cf. Homer Iliad
9.197–98; Xen. Cyr. 5.1.3; Plut. Nic. 9.3–5. It is possible that when Alexander chose a man
from his ranks who happened to be of the same ethnicity as the recipients of his embassy,
he did so for convenience of translation as much as congeniality (Q. Curtius 8.2.25). See
also Thuc. 8.5.4, 8.85.2, for Persian employment of Greeks and Carians.
sent as an envoy to Philip because of his initial hostility to the Macedonian, since other envoys had given misleading reports about the prospects of peace. One might, however, expect that interpretations of events presented by these men would be influenced by their ill will. An embassy comprising both types might provide a balance, and the Greeks may well have realized this. In any event, the custom of sending three or more envoys on a given mission afforded recipients of information access to different perspectives and also made it difficult for any one envoy to manipulate messages based on his own personal agenda.

Second, while envoys did not normally hold a professional office, they were often drawn from small groups of people considered appropriate for particular tasks, based on their status in their own community and their connections to men of influence abroad. This characterization has some validity even in democratic states but is particularly true of the Lacedaemonians (who might have been inclined to restrict the number of individuals exposed to foreign corruption). Antalcidas, for example, is thought to have handled all embassies to Persia in the early fourth century. Autocrats might go so far as to appoint specialists, as the Thracian Seuthes appointed Medosades. Hence there was a possibility for individuals to develop expertise in policy with a given state and be recognized as an authority on it.

Third, the application of minimum age requirements could also have an impact on the credibility of envoys as sources, if older men were perceived (as Lysias indicated) as knowledgeable and wise.

State control of presbeiai was strict. People were not permitted to speak on behalf of their states unless so appointed; otherwise they faced fines or death. In Athens, envoys returning from service abroad were subject to a scrutiny of their actions and reports. They were accountable for the accuracy of their reports as well as for the general conduct of their missions, and they could be liable to measures taken by a state exas-

11. Nearly all references to diplomatic activity refer to more than one envoy. See Adcock and Mosley 155 for numbers commonly sent by various states.
12. Adcock and Mosley 156.
14. Lysias XXIII (Against Panceleon) 5. Cf. Iliad 1.250–74; Isoc. VI (Archidamus) 4. I know of no upper limit on the age of envoys—a Rhodian envoy, Theaedetus, was over eighty years old when he appeared before the Roman senate. The poor man died of natural causes before the senate made an official reply (Polyb. 30.21.1–2).
15. Xen. Hell. 5.3.11; cf. 2.3.40.
16. Demosth. IX (On the embassy) 211; the scrutiny was conducted by the logistai.
perated with failure. Andocides mentioned that envoys must be guided by written instructions when negotiating for peace, although it is not clear whether his statement is a recommendation or a reflection of practice. If the latter, envoys would be precluded from taking advantage of information garnered by themselves in the course of an embassy. Such a practice would also provide a target for the information-gathering services of another state, which would no doubt find these instructions highly interesting and valuable for conducting negotiations. In any case, envoys were rarely authorized to make decisions on the spot but were compelled to refer developments back to their states and await instructions. Consequently, negotiations were often protracted.

Before examining the role of envoys as information sources and agents, it would be profitable to look at one of the circumstances surrounding their employment. Lee has illustrated a logical dependence of particular diplomatic activities on intelligence and thereby has shown that diplomatic activity can provide evidence for a reception of information not mentioned in our sources. His theory has application to the ancient Greeks.

There are examples of embassies sent in reaction to received information: the Syracusans, on receiving from various sources news of an imminent Athenian invasion, sent out envoys to the cities of the Sicels as part of their preparations. The link between embassy and intelligence source is here explicit; in many instances it is not. How, at a later date, did the Syracusans know that the Athenians were sending home for aid and so know to send envoys to Corinth and Sparta? One might reasonably conjecture that they discovered this through deserters or captives, but clarification is lacking in the text. All too often, historians not only fail to specify a source but do not even report that information was received. But how else could the Lacedaemonians have decided to send envoys to Corinth to attempt to forestall secret negotiations between Corinth and Argos in 421? In such instances, the fact that the embassy was sent provides the only testimony to an unmentioned, but essential, flow of infor-

17. Andocides On the Peace 35.
18. E.g., see Xen. Hell. 2.2.17, 5.3.26.
20. Thuc. 6.45.
21. See Thuc. 7.7.3. Nicias somehow knew of these embassies at 7.12.1. A few other examples: Thuc. 5.4.1; Xen. Hell. 1.5.8–9, 3.5.7, 4.7.1.
22. Thuc. 5.27–30.
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We also find envoys sent to counter embassies sent by rival states, resulting in the dramatic rhetorical agons so loved by ancient historians, but also logically demanding expeditious information-gathering and decision-making processes.

Aside from this implicit link to intelligence, envoys served both to communicate information to foreign states and to collect it for the benefit of their own.

Collection of Information

The collection of information is and was implicit to diplomacy and no doubt was carried on casually as often as formally. At times it was officially mandated, as in the case of the Athenians who were commissioned by their city as envoys to investigate whether the Egestaeans had the money they said they did and to ascertain the situation pertinent to a war in Sicily. Lycon proposed to the Ten Thousand that they choose envoys and send them to Heraclea and on the basis of their reports take counsel as to whether or not to engage in extortion. In such cases as these, the primary role of the *presbeutes* was that of information gatherer. In others, he acted more as a conduit than a collector, as when in 387 the Persian satrap Tiribazus summoned envoys from the Greek states to read them the king’s terms, which they in turn reported to their respective states.

Demosthenes would have us believe that Phocian envoys were sent to Athens in 346 in the capacity of political observers: “The news [of Philocrates’ decree] would have reached Phocis on the fourth day, since there were Phocian envoys in Athens, and they were interested in knowing what report these men would submit and what decree you would

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23. This information flow suggests that some source available to the Lacedaemonians was privy to confidential information. For other examples of an embassy implying intelligence not otherwise indicated, see Thuc. 4.122.4, 5.37; Arrian *Anab.* 1.4.6, 1.10.2, 1.24.5, 3.24.3.

24. An example well dramatized by Thucydides was the Corinthian embassy sent to Athens to counter the claims of the Corcyran envoys (Thuc. 1.31ff.). Cf. Thuc. 6.75.3; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12–13; Plut. *Pelopidas* 30.1.


26. Thuc. 6.6ff.; see 6.46ff. for the story of the trick to which they fell victim. Phaeax’s mission sometime earlier might have had similar, if less blatant, functions (Thuc. 5.4.1).

27. Xen. *Anab.* 6.2.5.

adopt.” Similarly the Athenian ambassadors in Thebes were in communication with Athens regarding the situation there, and while there is no evidence that such information was demanded of them, it is probable that it was desired. Moreover, the practice does not appear to be in any way out of the ordinary. Indeed, when Demosthenes defined the duties of envoys, he noted first their responsibility to submit reports. They were accountable for the veracity of these, since false information precluded good judgment—and the punishment for falsehood in Athens was, apparently, death.

Communication of Information

Official communication by envoys was fundamentally dictated by the interests of the state imparting it. A goal or object was intrinsic to the message. When, for instance, the oligarchs usurped power in Corcyra in 427, they at once sent envoys to Athens to explain their version of recent events. Their aim was to persuade the Athenians to keep aloof from their affairs. They were unsuccessful: the Athenians arrested them as revolutionaries and deposited them on Aegina. Hardly less subtle are the recurring tidings of danger borne by envoys, which were delivered in conjunction with appeals for help. Hermocrates proposed sending out envoys to inform the other cities of Sicily and southern Italy that the Athenians were a danger to them all—Thucydides need not add that Her-

29. Demosth. XIX (On the embassy) 59, which continued, “When the Phocians learned your policy from the proceedings of the ekklesia, received the decree of Philocrates, and were informed of the report and promises of Aeschines, their ruin was complete” (both translations are from Loeb); cf. 53. Examples of presbeis happening to be on hand in foreign states when important matters were debated include Thuc. 1.72.1ff., 5.30.5, 5.50.5, 6.5.33.

30. So Demosth. XVIII (On the Crown) 211: Demosthenes had the dispatches of Athenian presbeis active in Thebes read out. These, describing the Boeotian political situation, had been written in 338, while Demosthenes’ speech is dated to 330, signifying that such documents were preserved. Cf. ibid. 31.

31. Demosth. XIX (On the embassy) 4: they were responsible for reports they had made, advice they offered, observance of their instructions, and acting with integrity.

32. For the sentiment about judgment, see Demosth. XIX (On the embassy) 183; for allegations of false reports, 12, 174; for the death penalty, 279, in which Demosthenes recalls an old decree against Epicrates and others, who were convicted and executed for not reporting the truth in the boule.

33. Thuc. 3.71–72. Similar intentions were attributed to envoys at Thuc. 5.82.4 and Xen. Hell. 7.4.39–40.
mocrates was thereby requesting aid against Athens. Demosthenes time and again badgered the ekklesia to send presbeiai to tell of Athenian resolve and incite action against Philip. Conversely, appeals for aid and alliance almost certainly (even when not explicitly) contained some sort of information about the situation that necessitated the request.

On occasion envoys were sent in response to specific inquiries. An Athenian decree from the fourth century preserves a record of three envoys selected to go to Hebryzemnes, the king of the Odrysians, to respond to questions concerning their political and military disposition. One wonders just how forthright the envoys would be. While information furnished by envoys as representatives of their states was valuable, it was liable to manipulation. The Corinthians charged the Lacedaemonians with ignorance of affairs beyond the Peloponnese and, more to the point, with suspecting the party bringing information (here, the Corinthians) as much as the party accused (the Athenians). But were not the Spartans quite right to do so? When Cleomenes I rejected the overtures of Aristagoras, who was trying to involve the Spartans in the Ionian revolt, he realized that the interests of Aristagoras did not coincide with those of his people. The Lacedaemonians of the early fourth century were perhaps less prudent or more ambitious than the mad Cleomenes of the early fifth, when envoys from Ionian cities told them that Tissaphernes would make the Greek cities independent if he was forced to deal with an army in Asia. In the event, it proved not so simple.

The communication of information by envoys was nearly always verbal. There are a few instances in which they acted much like couriers, bearing messages in the form of letters rather than delivering them.

34. Thuc. 6.34.2.

35. E.g., Demosth. II (2 Olynth.) 11, VIII (On the Chersonese) 34–35, XIV (On the navy boards) 12.

36. Requests for aid: e.g., Thuc. 1.24.6, 3.4.5, 3.5.4, 3.92, 3.100.1, 6.73.2, 8.5.1, 8.32.1; Xen. Hell. 2.4.28, 3.1.3, 3.5.4, 4.6.1, 5.2.11, 6.1.1. Requests for alliance: Thuc. 2.7.1–3, 5.80.2, 8.5.4, 8.6.1; Xen. Hell. 3.2.24. Cf. Thuc. 7.2.2–3, 25.1; Xen. Hell. 4.8.12–13.

37. IG II² 31 (Harding no. 29; dated to 386/5).

38. Thuc. 1.69.2. This passage has been brought forward to support notions that the Lacedaemonians were ignorant of the world beyond southern Greece (see, e.g., D. Lewis 29–30; Starr 3 [but cf. 44]). It is far more likely that it is a rhetorical ploy.

39. Hdt. 5.49–51; the Athenians were more ambitious or more gullible, or perhaps Aristagoras was more wily in his presentation after his experience in Sparta.

40. Xen. Hell. 3.2.12.
It is possible that they differed from *angeloi* in such cases only in that they were perceived as official representatives of their states. It should be noted that the terms *presbeutes* and *angelos* can, at various times, be applied to the same individuals and that the verb ἀγγέλλω is not infrequently used in connection with envoys. The distinction, then, is by no means absolute.

While the examples of communication of information by envoys on the whole reflect action in an official capacity, it is probable, indeed almost inevitable, that they imparted information informally—perhaps in casual conversation with officials while receiving hospitality at such institutions as the *prutaneion* or perhaps with *proxenoi* or *xenoi*. A fair proportion of envoys can be recognized as individuals of some stature, and these enjoyed connections of *xenia* or *philia* with citizens of other states, which have been known to transcend civic ties of fealty. Indeed, Aeneas Tacticus recommended that contact with envoys be limited to curb opportunities for treachery and gathering information.

**Heralds (Kerukes)**

*Kerukes* held a socially recognized office, which is attested as early as the Mycenaean era, certainly well defined by the time of Homer, and more or less consistent throughout the classical era. The office underwent some modifications during this time, among them the adoption of the task of securing the bodies of the fallen when the battlefield was in hostile hands; this first appears in Thucydides. The possession of *adeia* afforded her-
alds freedom to operate during time of war. It was considered an act of impiety to harm a herald, and this religious protection was augmented by a general recognition that some lines of communication must be kept open even in war. A staff, called a kerukeion, was the sign of their office and was a tangible reminder that they were under the care and auspices of Hermes.

47 An anecdote in Herodotus (7.133ff.) vividly illustrates the powerful impact the killing of kerukes had, whether in fact or propaganda: heralds were sent by Darius I to the Greek states to collect earth and water; in Sparta, they were thrown down a well. After that, the Lacedaemonians were unable to find good omens in their sacrifices and attributed this to the wrath of Talthybius, who was the herald to Agamemnon and patron hero of heralds at Sparta. The Lacedaemonians called for volunteers to go to Persia and be killed to appease Talthybius: both Sperthias son of Aneristus and Bulis son of Nicolaus volunteered. Xerxes, upon their arrival, is said to have spared them, saying that he would not himself transgress the laws of all men as the Lacedaemonians had done.

The sons of Sperthias and Bulis were slain by the Athenians when arrested on a diplomatic mission in the Peloponnesian War. Herodotus was careful to call the sons angeloi, to absolve the Athenians (who also killed the Persian heralds but offered no restitution) from the shame of impiety; I argue that he deliberately misrepresented the situation to cast a better light on Athens, since he elsewhere (Hdt. 6.60; cf. 7.134) noted that the office of herald was hereditary at Sparta and that the fathers of these men were acknowledged by Xerxes to be at least de facto heralds (Hdt. 7.137). In comparison, the Athenians down to the time of Pausanias held the Megarians culpable for the execution of their herald Anthemocritus in the fifth century B.C. (Plut. Per. 30.2–3; Paus. 1.36.3); as Strepsiades said in the Clouds (484–85), ἰν μὲν γ’ ὀφείλητοι τι μοι, μνήμων πάνυ, ἕαν δ’ ὀφείλω σχέλτος, ἐπιλήσμων πάνυ.

Other violations of adeia are found in Tod no. 137 (arrest), Epist. Phil. 2 (kidnapping and imprisonment), and Q. Curtius 4.2.15 (death); cf. Hdt. 3.13 (death). Cf. Xen. Anab. 5.7.3ff. for pragmatic reasons for preserving heralds inviolate.

48 See, e.g., Dinarchus Against Demosthenes 18; cf. Hdt. 9.100.

49 See, e.g., Tod nos. 66 (= IG I2 71; Meiggs and Lewis 69; Fornara 136), 67. Taktai wrote down their routes; the demos and prytanes determined what they would say. Their
Herodotus) both spheres were elemental to the inherited office. This suggests a potential for the existence of men experienced in diplomacy and hence able to recognize more subtle forms of information pertinent to the conduct of foreign policy. Heralds operating in military contexts seem to have been closely attached to the commander, most likely for convenience in passing on orders. More generally, however, it seems that any individual with a makeshift herald’s wand could suffice in a pinch for secular functions. A ready example is the Argive selected for his swiftness to serve as a herald to Mardonius, to warn him that a Lacedaemonian army was heading north and that the Argives would not be able to stop it. Here celerity rather than family or professionalism was the determining criterion, and the Argive was appointed herald for the sake of adeia, since he had to travel through hostile (Corinthian and Megarian) territory to reach the Persians. Even more interesting, for the purposes of this study, is the account in Xenophon of a visit to the Ten Thousand by emissaries of the Persian king and Tissaphernes. The members of the embassy were all referred to as kerukes and included a single Greek among the barbarians. This Greek was a certain Phalinus, who was honored by Tissaphernes and professed to be an expert in tactics. The reason for his presence undoubtedly lay in these qualifications: his expertise would enable him to evaluate the fighting potential of the Greek mercenaries. Given the situation, it is perhaps a measure of Clearchus’ desperation that he asked Phalinus for advice on the grounds that he was a fellow Hellene.

Like envoys, kerukes most often served in an official capacity to convey information and, occasionally, to collect it.

50. Hdt. 7.134.
51. Hdt. 9.12.
52. In another instance when a herald was used as a courier, however, the route was entirely through friendly territory (Xen. Hell. 7.1.32). Dromokerukes (“runner-heralds”) were found in situations in which speed was of the essence, including an example in which they are described as couriers between skopoi and commanders. See Shepherd 216n on Polyaenus 5.26.1, who added, without providing corroboration, “The Δρομοκέρυκες were not always employed: but only when the urgency of affairs required the continued attention of the σκοποί.”
53. Xen. Anab. 2.1.7.
Collection of Information

Greek heralds do not appear to have been bound by a code of silence regarding what they had seen while performing their duties, unlike their counterparts of the medieval era. Rather, from the first they were at least ancillary to collection. When Odysseus beached his ship on the shores of yet another land, Homer twice sang the following lines:

then I sent forth companions to go and inquire
what men, eaters of bread, might live in this land,
choosing two men, and sent with them a third, a herald.

The inclusion of a herald in a miniature “type-scene” of a reconnaissance of unknown territory suggests that this might have been thought sensible and normal practice during the eighth century. Later works contain vestiges of an association of heralds and scouts: the horseman who was sent by the Athenians to have a look at what their Lacedaemonian allies were up to at Plataea was called a kerux, and the use of herald’s boats (kerkouroi) by Alexander’s scouts is attested in Arrian.

Due to their particular office, heralds had opportunities to collect

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54. For medieval heralds, see Allmand (in Neilson and McKercher) 34, 40, and 44 n. 9.
55. Od. 9.88–90, 10.100–102. Eustathius (1.171) reasoned that the heralds were present because of the immunity (διὰ ἀκυλοῦ) that they conferred on the mission.
56. Hdt. 9.54; ἵππεα ὅγγεμον = 55: ὁ κήρυξ; Arrian Anab. 6.19.3, 6.20.3. Cf. Thuc. 6.50.4–5: men sent on triremes to scout out (κατασκέψαθαι) the harbor of Syracuse also made a proclamation (κήρος) to the Leontines in that city. There is a mythical account of a herald named Leos, of Agnus, who betrayed to Theseus the plans of the Pallantidae. Theseus believed his story, contrived an ambush, and slaughtered them (Plut. Theseus 13.2–3).

Medon, who was a herald in the house of Odysseus, served as an agent of sorts: he overheard the suitors plotting against Telemachus and communicated their intent to Penelope (Od. 4.675–714). He was not, so far as the text conveys, assumed to be a covert agent by virtue of his office, but rather his office seems to have been accidental to these actions. In fact, his allegiance was also somewhat ambivalent—when Penelope received him, she thought him sent by the suitors (Od. 4.694), with whom he was on friendly terms (Od. 17.172–73). The ambivalence is preserved through to the end of the epic, when he spoke in an assembly, telling the suitors’ families that Odysseus and Telemachus killed their relatives with the aid of a god (Od. 24.442–49), at which point some armed for war. Telemachus numbered him among the suitors, along with the minstrel (Phemius) and two squires, when relating the inhabitants of his household to Odysseus (Od. 16.252). In the end he was spared at Telemachus’ request (Od. 22.355–72). It is perhaps worthy of note that he and the spy Dolon appealed for their lives in similar words (Od. 22.371 = Il. 10.400); in Medon’s case the supplication was honored.
information when arranging for the return of the dead. There is a curious account in Thucydides of an Ambraciot *kerux* who came to request the bodies of those who had perished during a disastrous retreat two days earlier. Some Acarnanian thought he had come for those who had perished at Idomene the preceding day and gave over far more arms than the herald expected. In the ensuing dialogue, worthy of a tragedy, misapprehension gave way to realization, and the herald learned that his people had suffered two disasters rather than one. Such was his distress and urgency to report back that he left before concluding arrangements for the dead.\(^{57}\) Not all news was so bad: the morning after a night escape attempt from besieged Plataea, a herald was sent out by the remaining Plataeans, who thought that those trying to escape had failed and been killed; he returned to tell them that there were no dead to be recovered: the attempt had succeeded.\(^{58}\)

Aside from the preceding examples, the role of heralds in gathering information is not well attested. Further evidence is inferential: when the Spartiate herald Melesippus was refused admittance by Athenians, he was escorted back on his route to prevent him from contacting anybody.\(^{59}\) This provision might have been calculated to insult or perhaps to prevent the populace from learning anything that Melesippus had to say. A further possibility, in no way precluding the other two, is that the purpose of isolating Melesippus was to prevent him from learning anything of Athens’ preparations for war.\(^{60}\) It may be presumed that *kerukes*, like envoys, had the opportunity to learn information from observation and conversation. Clearchus was aware that Persian heralds would form impressions of his men when they were admitted into his camp, so he kept the heralds out until his troops were drawn up in an ordered parade.\(^{61}\) It is not impossible that he had been reading Herodotus, who

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57. Thuc. 3.113. Cf. the ignorance of the Athenian *kerux* of the fall of Delium (Thuc. 4.97ff.).
58. Thuc. 3.24.
59. Thuc. 2.12.1–2.
60. *Kerukes* and envoys were at times refused admission by warring cities (Thuc. 5.80, 8.75.2; cf. Thuc. 4.38.3; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.21; Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.5; Polyaenus 2.18.1); this refusal was probably more a form of protest or insult than a security measure (although one must admit that, should the Peloponnesian army be in Attica, *kerukes* and envoys going to and from Athens would have kept the Peloponnesians informed of the result of their actions on morale and about any possible Athenian countermeasures).
61. Xen. *Anab.* 2.3.1ff.
told of preparations by the besieged and starving Milesians to make their city appear well stocked when a Lydian herald entered.62 Exceptionally, there is a story that a herald sent by Alexander to those besieged in the citadel of Celaenae was taken to the top of a tower and told to report to his commander the strength of their fortifications that lay exposed to his eyes.63

Communication of Information

Heralds conveyed information far more often than they gathered it. Within an army or city, they did so in official announcements, these being for the most part orders to troops or formal notifications to citizens and metics.64 They served also to publish policy, demands, and decrees abroad.65 To hostile cities or armies they announced warnings, demands, or offers, and in a few instances they made proclamations containing overtures to potential sympathizers among the enemy. Declarations of war were also among their duties.66

All messages and announcements were delivered verbally. Sometimes (e.g., for the proclamation made from Athenian ships off the Syracusan harbor to people no doubt out of range of a bow-shot) their voices had to carry over noise and distance. For this reason heralds were chosen from

63. Q. Curtius 3.1.6–7.
64. Orders to troops: e.g., Hdt. 6.77–78; Xen. Hell. 3.4.19, 4.5.7, 5.1.11, 7.2.22; Xen. Anab. 2.2.20, 3.1.36, 4.1.13, 5.2.18, 5.7.3, 6.4.14–15, 6.4.23, 6.5.3, 7.1.36; Xen. Lac. Pol. 12.6; cf. Xen. Cav. Com. 4.9. Anderson (79) noted that when the army was in bivouac, heralds with specially trained voices were used to summon the senior officers or make announcements at moments of emergency; only exceptionally were their voices used to transmit orders on the field of battle. Notifications to citizens and metics: e.g., Tod no. 24; Thuc. 1.27.1, 3.101.1, 5.115.2; Xen. Hell. 1.7.9, 7.4.4; Arrian Anab. 5.19.6. See also S. Lewis 52ff.
65. See, e.g., Tod nos. 66, 67, 74; Hdt. 1.153, 5.70, 6.105, 8.27, 8.114; Thuc. 2.6; Xen. Hell. 6.4.20; Xen. Anab. 6.6.9; Arrian Anab. 4.22.6; cf. Hdt. 1.77. At Athens, two heralds were often sent to each of five (after 438, four) fixed regions (Thrace, Ionia, Caria, the Islands, and the Hellespont).
66. Warnings: e.g., Hdt. 6.123, 9.87; Thuc. 1.29.2, 2.5.5, 3.52.2, 4.30.4, 4.114, 7.3.1, 7.8.3.2; Xen. Hell. 1.1.15, 2.1.7, 3.1.18; Arrian Anab. 4.19.3, 4.21.6, 4.27.2, 4.30.2. Overtures: e.g., Thuc. 2.2.4, 6.48.1, 6.50.4–5, 6.52.1, 7.82.1; Xen. Hell. 2.4.20; Diod. Sic. 17.9.5; cf. Hdt. 1.76. Overtures as a stratagem to cause dissent: Thuc. 4.68.3; Polyaeus 2.10.1. Declaration of war: e.g., Polyaenus 5.6.1. In exceptional cases, hostilities were opened without a declaration of war, to achieve surprise (e.g., Hdt. 3.8.1; Paus. 4.5.8).
those possessing clear, loud voices. It seems a natural (if curious) consequence that heralds were rarely used for secret communication. Art may imitate reality in the contrast between a herald, who openly announced to Penelope before her handmaids (not all of whom were trustworthy) that Telemachus had returned, and Eumaeus, who did so softly. There are only a few incidents in which heralds were employed for clandestine missions. One is an unlikely tale of a secret request made by Polycrates of Cambyses through a herald, another a mention of appeals made to Nicias through heralds sent by Athenian sympathizers in Syracuse. The third is an account of Athenian subject cities sending heralds in secret to Brasidas, in hope of securing his aid in a revolt against Athens. In the last two cases, the employment of heralds was a reasonable measure, since the communication was between people who were technically enemies.

**Proxenoi**

Proxenoi were men chosen by a polis to represent its interests in another state. They were selected not from the population of the state they represented (i.e., the one that conferred the honor) but rather from that of the state in which they lived (and performed their office). The practice is best illustrated by example: in a decree dated to 411, Hegelochus, a citizen of Taras, was appointed Eretrian proxenos at Taras by the people of Eretria. The award was given in recognition of his services to the Eretrians and was extended to his descendants. Hegelochus would henceforth have represented Eretrian interests in his native city.

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67. Epithets in the *Iliad* relating to heralds’ voices include ἡπότα, 7.384; καλήτορα, 24.577; ἀττυβοώτην, 24.701; θεό ἐναλίγκος αὐθη, 19.250; λιγυφόγγοι, 2.50, 2.442, 23.39. Other epithets allude to wisdom (πεπυμένο μήδε εἰδως, 7.278; πεπυμένο δήρω, 7.276; δαιφρων, 24.325) and age (γεραίτερος, 24.149, 24.178; τό γαρ γέρος ἑστι γερόντων, 9.422; cf. Periphas 17.324–25); swiftness is also implied in some of their names, when they act as messengers or dromokeruces (Θωώτης, “the swift,” 12.342–43; Εὐρυβάτης, “wide-walking,” 1.320, 2.184, etc.).

Demosthenes (XIX [On the embassy] 338) noted that if it was necessary to have a dokimasia for a herald, one must ensure that he had a good voice. S. Lattimore has brought to my attention the inclusion of contests for heralds in the Olympic games, beginning in 396.

68. Od. 16.333–41.

69. Hdt. 3.44; Thuc. 6.48.2.

70. Thuc. 4.108.3; cf. Thuc. 8.44.1, 8.70.2.

71. Tod no. 82. Inheritance or beneﬁcence was the normal way one gained this ofﬁce. Sparta was, as usual, the exception. Herodotus (6.57) said that the Spartan kings appointed proxenoi (presumably at the time he was writing) from those of the citizens willing to serve as such. How and Wells (86 ad loc.) thought that the kings appointed these only for those countries without ordinary representatives at Sparta to fulﬁll honorary functions.
Proxenia accorded a certain status to its recipients (many of whom had positions of influence already). It appears that this status may have declined—coincidentally with the role of proxenoi in intelligence—by the late fourth century, although a wider sample of evidence from earlier periods is needed to establish this more firmly.\textsuperscript{72} The office was not limited to Hellenes, as is indicated by a fourth-century Boeotian decree conferring proxenia on a Carthaginian, Naba son of Axioubo.\textsuperscript{73}

Proxenoi seem to have operated fairly independently, but there were some controls. A provision of the treaty between Oeanthea and Chaleum reads, “regarding the proxenos—if he should act as a proxenos falsely, let him pay a double fine.”\textsuperscript{74} It is by no means clear what type of malfeasance is referred to here. Espionage in some states constituted prodosia, or betrayal, and hence called for the death penalty rather than a fine. It is possible that misrepresentation of information could fall under the charge of serving falsely—especially given the choice of the word \textsuperscript{74}ψ\varepsilon\upsilon\delta\varepsilon\alpha, which denotes deceit—and one could argue that such a misdemeanor would call for a fine rather than death, since it is so close to misinterpretation, which can be quite unintentional. Such musings are, of course, speculation; but the inscription indicates that the activities of proxenoi could be monitored.

Although the institution of proxenia dates back to the seventh century, explicit examples of their participation in intelligence begin in the fifth and end in the mid-fourth century.\textsuperscript{75} The first involves Alexander son of Amyntas, king of Macedon, who served under Mardonius in the Persian expeditionary force of 480–79. At the same time, according to Herodotus, Alexander held the titles of benefactor and proxenos of the Athenians, who were among the most bitter foes of his Persian over-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[72] For the enhanced status conferred by the office, see Adcock and Mosley 161; Meiggs, \textit{Athenian Empire}, 216 (although the latter’s notion that proxenoi were motivated to give information for the sake of commemoration on a stele in Athens has no foundation in any source to which I have had access). Gerolymatos (7–8, 10–11, 97–98) testified to a decline in status in the fourth century (and, interestingly, a shift in loyalty from state to individual patron). Passages in Dinarchus (\textit{Against Demosthenes} 45) and Hyperides (\textit{Against Demades} 76)—who charged that base individuals were being appointed proxenoi as a result of political machinations—can be read to bolster or to weaken his argument. They may indicate that such a practice was becoming widespread, but equally they illustrate a concern lest an office—one presumably still valued—be given to someone unworthy of it.
\item[73] Harding 48 (\textit{IG VII.2407}).
\item[74] Tod no. 34 (which he dates to ca. 450), lines 8–9.
\item[75] The earliest attestation is found in a cenotaph, dated to ca. 625–600, of a Corcyran proxenos at Oianthea in Ozolian Locris (Meiggs and Lewis no. 4; cf. Meiggs, \textit{Athenian Empire}, 215).
\end{footnotes}
lords. Herodotus narrated a story in which Mardonius sought to exploit Alexander’s position by employing him as an emissary (angelos) to the Athenians, hoping that the Macedonian could convince them to defect to the Persian side. His hopes were unfulfilled, and Alexander returned with rebukes of faithlessness stinging his ears. Later, at Plataea, he rode out from the Persian camp to the Athenian lines without the knowledge or consent of Mardonius and hailed the Athenian sentries, asking for strategoi by name. Some of the pickets went back to fetch their commanders, while most stayed with Alexander. When the strategoi arrived, Alexander first appealed for secrecy from all save Pausanias and then described his motive (philhellenism) for trying to help the Greek cause. He went on to warn the strategoi that the Persians would attack at dawn, and he outlined Mardonius’ logistic situation. He finally asked them to remember his service after the war and only then gave them his name.

Alexander’s information was taken seriously by the strategoi and was passed on to Pausanias, who proceeded to alter his dispositions; but the last-minute shuffling of ranks resulting from his warnings does not appear to have put the Greeks in a better situation when battle was joined. Mardonius did not attack in full force at dawn, as Alexander had said, but it must be acknowledged that Alexander allowed for a delay when describing Mardonius’ situation, and the information seems to have been more or less accurate.

The story of Alexander has a Themistoclean feel to it (the necessity of forcing an engagement, the secret communication by night with the enemy, the desire on the part of the communicant to assure a reward or refuge with the enemy, etc.), and one hesitates to put a great deal of confidence in it. However, it seems to be, if not real, realistic and thereby instructive. Implicit in it are some questions: was there an arrangement between Alexander and the Athenians for providing information, and was the provision of information intrinsic to his role as proxenos? An analysis of the events suggests that this was not the case.

Alexander’s arrival at the portion of the line held by the Athenians can, it must be acknowledged, be better ascribed to intent than accident.

76. Hdt. 8.136, 143. Some modern scholars have argued that Alexander did not receive the proxenia until after the battle of Plataea.
77. In Plutarch’s account (Arist. 15), he asked for Aristides.
78. Hdt. 9.44ff.
since, as proxenos, he had a degree of relationship with them and might expect more serious consideration than he might have gained had he rode up to the Lacedaemonian contingent. To argue that his knowledge of the names of the strategoi necessitated a prior arrangement would be reasonable but hardly conclusive, since he might have learned them on his first embassy or perhaps from captives, deserters, or other sources. Also, he was apparently not recognized by the strategoi, and indeed he withheld his name until he was ready to depart. It is further interesting to note that the Athenian pickets received Alexander in a manner similar to the way they handled deserters or defectors—with caution, as befitted the situation. It appears that no special arrangements—such as devices or passwords—had been made for his admittance, which again suggests that Alexander’s actions were not based on a prior arrangement. Moreover, the necessity of explaining his motives to the strategoi, as was typical with deserters and traitors, suggests that during this time period proxenoi were not expected to act as information-gathering agents. Finally, Herodotus felt a need to explain Alexander’s motives, which suggests that a connection between proxenoi and intelligence was not widely known before the Peloponnesian War. Thus it is probable that Alexander’s proxenia was incidental, rather than essential, to his intelligence role, and it does not serve as an explanation for his actions or lead one to consider him an Athenian agent by virtue of being a proxenos.

A half century after Plataea, it begins to be possible to argue that gathering information was an intrinsic function of proxenoi. When Mytilene prepared to revolt against Athens in 428, the Athenian proxenoi in Mytilene, some Mytilenaeans motivated by political dissatisfaction, and some citizens of hostile poleis brought news to Athens of Mytilene’s

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79. Alcibiades’ circumstances offer a good parallel (Thuc. 6.89.2; cf. Thuc. 5.43.2 and Gomme 4:49–50 ad loc.; Plut. Alc. 14.1). It would be most difficult to argue that he was passing on information to the Lacedaemonians as an aspiring (or better, lapsed) proxenos before he jumped ship in Sicily and sought refuge at Sparta. Once there he took pains to validate his actions, including a neat rhetorical dance about the issue of his ancestral proxenia. Surely Alcibiades was looking out for Alcibiades at all times, and the proxenia provided an entrée, rather than a motive, for giving information and advice to the Lacedaemonians.

80. There are no explicit examples of intelligence activity in the interval. Meiggs (Athenian Empire, 216), however, suggested a possibility that Sophocles derived information on the Samian revolt through an Athenian proxenos on Lesbos. He cited (216 n. 3) Ion of Chios (FGrHist 392F6 in Athen. 13.603f., Meiggs’ translation): “When Sophocles during the Samian revolt was dispatched from the main fleet to bring reinforcements from Lesbos he dined with Hermesilaus, a proxenos of Athens.”
intentions. The Athenians did not at first lend credence to their reports, wishing to believe what was pleasant rather than what was true. But they eventually took them seriously enough to send envoys, who tried unsuccessfully to curb the revolt.

In this instance, *proxenoi* imparted information of serious consequence to the integrity of the Athenian Empire. Thucydides did not feel the need to explain their motives, as he did for the other citizens of Mytilene and its enemies; this suggests that the explanation is implicit in their role as *proxenos*. Within an empire, and to some extent in other contexts, *proxenoi* tended to have a coincidence of interest between self-preservation and the authority and power of their patron state, which could therefore expect to be informed by the *proxenoi*, as in the case of Athens and Mytilene, of potential threats or revolts. Should a faction or power hostile to their patron city gain control, the *proxenoi* faced a real danger from their fellow citizens. The would-be Athenian *proxenos* on Corcyra met a bloody end, after protracted infighting among rival factions. A decree mentions the slaying of the Athenian *proxenos* on Iulis by a rebelling faction, “contrary to the decrees of the Athenian *demos* and in transgression of oaths and agreement.” This last example shows that patron states attempted to protect *proxenoi* operating on their behalf, and it hence further complicates the question of allegiance.

*Proxenoi* looked for political and military assistance as well as protec-

81. Thuc. 3.2.3. Thucydides noted that the *proxenos* later repented of his action and embarked on an unsuccessful embassy on behalf of the Mytileneans. At 3.4.4 the repentant informer is referred to as διαβαλλόντων ἔνα; at 3.5.1 he is specified as a *proxenos*.

82. Aristotle (*Politics* 1304a9), linking great consequences to minor causes, mentioned only one informer, Dexandrus, the *proxenos* of the Athenians who was piqued at not getting the desired brides for his sons. Gomme (2:252–53 on Thuc. 3.2.3) argued convincingly that Aristotle’s account is not entirely reliable. Perhaps Aristotle’s point of view was influenced by the decline of the role of *proxenoi* in intelligence in the mid–fourth century, so that he found it necessary to seek a motive elsewhere.

83. Thuc. 3.70.3ff. Peithias, an *etheloproxenos* of Athens and a leader of the *demos*, was brought to trial on the grounds that he was serving Athenian interests at the expense of his native Corcyra. Upon his acquittal, he brought counter-charges against his prosecutors, who grew desperate and killed him. Gomme (2:360 ad loc.) defined the term *etheloproxenos* as “presumably a *proxenos* not recognized officially by the state (here Athens) for whom he worked: *self-appointed*; or perhaps, as the scholiast says, not confirmed by his own city.” Cf. Thuc. 6.89.2.


85. Adcock and Mosley 162, citing *IG* II2 33, 111. Cf. also *IG* I3 19; Arrian *Anab.* 1.9.10. Meiggs (“Athenian Imperialism,” passim, citing *IG* I2 27.13–17 and 28.11–13) argued that protection may have been granted in special cases, but it was not the general rule.
tion, as seems to be the case of Polydamas, a prominent man in Pharsalus, who came to Sparta to brief the Lacedaemonians on the rise and imminent threat of Jason of Pherae in Thessaly. His speech is prefaced with a reminder of his office and is laced with terms of obligation, and Xenophon may be correct to ascribe his motive to honor, but a cynic would argue that he was only appealing for military backing. Proxenoi were also vulnerable to spillover in conflicts between their patron state and its rivals, or so it seems in Demosthenes’ accusation that Philip killed the Athenian proxenos of Carystus and refused to hand over his corpse for burial to the envoys sent by Athens to recover it.

It has been noted that the flow of information from the proxenoi to their patron cities was, whether formally or not, one of their duties. Intrinsic to the role of the proxenos was contact with diplomats and officials from his patron state. This could entail an informal briefing on how matters stood in his native city, as we see the episkopos in the Birds apparently wishing to check in with the local proxenos before carrying out his duties. But a gap remains between this practice and Gerolymatos’ theory that “the title of proxenos was at times given to certain individuals in exchange for the past, present, or future conduct of intelligence work.” This gap is to some extent bridged by an inscription that reads as follows:

Cephalus proposed: let the other matters be as was decided by the boulé, but also record Phanocritus the Parian as proxenos and benefactor, him and his descendants, on a stone stele, and let the secretary of the boulé place it on the acropolis, since Phanocritus gave information to the strategoi about a naval expedition; if the strategoi had believed him, the enemy triremes would have been

86. Xen. Hell. 6.1.2ff. Westlake (Thessaly, 76–81, esp. 78) suggested that Polydamas’ actions were influenced more by a dependency on Sparta for his position than by the proxenia. He further referred (77 n. 3) to Tropea’s notion (Giasone il tago della Tessaglia [Messina, 1898] n.p.) that Polydamas was in fact a secret agent. Westlake did not seem to take Tropea’s idea seriously; neither can I, since such an interpretation, while not demonstrably false, is unnecessary given the relationship as described by Xenophon, or conjectured by Westlake.

87. Demosth. VII (On Halonnesus) 38.

88. Aristoph. Birds 1021ff. Cf. Xen. Hell. 4.5.6, 5.4.22. Alcibiades’ trick on Lacedaemonian ambassadors during the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.45.2) seems to have been loosely based on such a practice.

89. Gerolymatos, Espionage, 5.
taken. For these deeds accord him proxenia and the status of benefactor and invite him to hospitality at the prutaneion tomorrow.\textsuperscript{90}

That this award of proxenia was based on the giving of information is quite clear; it is less clear whether the information given was merely one of the many types of benefaction or whether it was a qualification pertinent to the role to be assumed.\textsuperscript{91} Given the lack of solid evidence for the latter possibility, the former seems preferable.

Information did not always flow in one direction. Because of their continued and intimate contacts with their patron state, proxenoi were perceived to be experts on the affairs of that state. Their expertise was called on when formulating policy, as is illustrated by the role of Demosthenes with Thebes and Nicias with Syracuse. It should also be noted that proxenoi did not always act in the interests of their patron state. Timesitheus, proxenos of the Molossians at Trapezuntum, used his knowledge of Molossian affairs to the advantage of the Ten Thousand. When the Ten Thousand reached the Molossian border, they sent Timesitheus ahead to ask whether they should pass as friend or foe. The Molossians replied, “Neither.” Timesitheus thereupon informed the Ten Thousand that the Molossians were divided into factions and that they would be well advised to exploit the division by allying with another faction against

\textsuperscript{82} Information Gathering in Classical Greece

\textsuperscript{90} Tod no. 116 (which he dates to ca. 386), lines 6ff.

\textsuperscript{91} Other examples of benefaction leading to an award of proxenia include the provision of wood and timber (Tod no. 91: Athens, to Archelaus, king of Macedon, 407–406); hospitality given to envoys (Tod no. 139: Athens, to Strato, king of Sidon, ca. 367); intercession and negotiation on the polis’ behalf (Tod no. 148: Ilium, to (ironically) Menelaus, an Athenian envoy, ca. 359); an interest-free loan, the ransom of prisoners, and general good rule (Tod no. 152: Arcesine, to Androtion, its Athenian governor, 357–356); the ransom of citizens captured by pirates (Tod no. 170: Athens, to Cleomis, tyrant of Methymna).

Gerolymatos’ argument for the recruitment of proxenoi for future intelligence activity rests in part on circumstances that might be favorable to intelligence activity and in part on the examples of Alexander son of Amyntas and Nymphodorus son of Pythes. Nymphodorus was the brother-in-law of Sitalces, king of Thrace. The Athenians made him their proxenos in Abdera even though he had been their enemy in the past. They summoned him to Athens and asked him to win over Sitalces as an ally, which he did (Thuc. 2.29). At a later date, he betrayed Spartan envoys passing through Thrace and handed them over to the Athenians (Hdt. 7.137). Nymphodorus was not necessarily acting in an intelligence capacity here, except insofar as the Spartans he seized might have been questioned at Athens. In any case, he was recruited to act on Athens’ behalf with regards to diplomacy rather than information gathering.
those who had refused them passage. The Greeks did so, and were able to continue their trek homeward.92

In general, the Greeks were alive to the need to suspect the allegiance of proxenoi. When the Ten Thousand were debating their course homeward along the coast, Hecatonymus, the Cotyoran proxenos at Sinope, gave the Greeks information tailored to dissuade them from a land march to Sinope. The Ten Thousand suspected him of having his own motives for keeping them out of Cotyoran territory, on the grounds of his allegiance. They did, however, follow his advice and went by sea.93

Meiggs, Starr, and Gerolymatos have all recognized the intelligence potential of proxenoi; Gerolymatos has gone so far as to propose that they functioned as a comprehensive organization for espionage and fifth-column activities. While the evidence cannot support Gerolymatos’ suspicions of espionage networks, it can fairly be claimed that this institution did afford states with agents who had a vested interest in providing timely and reliable information.

Allies, Sympathizers, and Foreign Clients

Allies most frequently provided information unbidden, motivated by goodwill or advantage, but there are a number of examples in which their advice was sought. In some cases the duty of an ally to communicate

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92. Xen. Anab. 5.4.2. A similar story was told of Arthmius son of Pithonax, of Zelea, who was an Athenian proxenos. He was believed to have been sent by Artaxerxes to Greece with the intent of conveying gold to the Peloponnese; the gold was to instigate a war against Athens to distract the Athenians from their intervention in Egypt. A stele was erected on the acropolis condemning him and his descendants (Dinarchus Against Aristogeiton 24–25; Demosth. IX [3 Phil.] 42, XIX [On the embassy] 271; Plut. Them. 6.3; cf. Thuc. 1.109; Diod. Sic. 11.74–75; Aeschines III [Against Ctes.] 258; Aristides 2.287 and scholion). This example indicates intelligence activity indirectly—how did the Athenians know of his mission? As an aside, despite the orators’ protestations that the Athenians performed a general service to all Greeks by condemning Arthmius, they were only too glad to have the Rhodian Timocrates try to stir up war against the Lacedaemonians on Tithraustes’ behalf (Paus. 3.9.8).

Yet another, if less glamorous, example is Nicias, a Cretan from Gortys and an Athenian proxenos, who persuaded the Athenians to sail against Cydonia in Crete, promising to bring Cydonia over to their side, but in fact acting on behalf of another people, the Polichnitans, who were hostile to Cydonia. Nicias thereby wasted Athenian time and resources on a fruitless endeavor and prevented a timely reinforcement of Phormio (Thuc. 2.85).

93. Xen. Anab. 5.6.7ff.
information was written in stone. A fair number of fourth-century alliance treaties contained clauses that required one party to notify the other when assistance was needed. Other treaties included provisions for informing one party of economic activity, as did that between Amyntas of Macedon and the Chalcidians, which mandated that the Chalcidians notify Amyntas before exporting timber. At least some of the subject “allies” of the Athenian empire were required to report signs of insurrection. Those soliciting alliance on some occasions provided information as a gesture of goodwill or to incite action on their behalf.

More typically, however, allies furnished information on their own initiative. A passage in Arrian tells of Langarus, king of the Agrianians, who accompanied Alexander the Great when the Macedonian was campaigning in his vicinity. When Alexander learned from messengers that the Autariates planned to attack him as he marched, he made inquiries about the nature and numbers of these people. Langarus learned of Alexander’s efforts, approached him, and gave him the information he wanted, adding that the Autariates were unwarlike. He further promised the Macedonian that he would keep them busy so that Alexander could turn his attention to the problems posed by the rebels Clitus and Glauclus. Alexander rewarded him with honor and gifts and promised a marriage alliance, but Langarus died soon after. There are some noteworthy points here. First, Alexander knew nothing of a people who inhabited an area bordering his line of march, who apparently lived near the Maedi (against whom he had earlier campaigned) and the Agrianians (who had served in his forces). Second, the Autariates apparently knew of Alexander’s movements, perhaps as a result of survivors from his battles to the north, deserters traveling south toward Pella, or captives taken in skirmishes. Third, Alexander’s immediate reaction to the threat was to seek to learn more about it. Fourth, Alexander’s efforts to get information did not go unnoticed by his ally. While it is possible, it is not probable that Alexander would let news of the threat spread unchecked about the camp, and a public appeal to his soldiers for information on the

95. Tod no. 111 (ca. 393).
96. Fornara nos. 102 (Eretria) and 103 (Chalcis).
97. Arrian Anab. 1.5.2ff. For other examples of subjects or allies providing information on local conditions, see Xen. Hell. 4.1.2–28; Xen. Cyr. 5.2.23; Q. Curtius 9.2.5–6.
98. In Bosworth, Commentary, cf. the map facing 52, and see 66 ad loc.
Autariates would have sparked uneasy rumors. It is more probable that Langarus came in response to an appeal circulated among the commanders of northern contingents. In some cases, a person would have to know enough about his ally to know what sort of information he needed—Periander, for instance, had to know that Miletus was besieged by Alyattes to have any inclination to send news of the Lydian’s consultation of Delphi to the Milesians.\(^99\) Fifth and finally, Langarus offered the information freely, and he was rewarded. One could argue that the reward was more for his promise than for his information, but a gift of information was often reciprocated by other gifts.

Private individuals were occasionally motivated by sympathy or xenia to provide information to foreign states—these might be distinguished from traitors in that they were working not necessarily to subvert their own state but to advance the interests of a personal ally. Such was the motive of Archias (hierophant of Athens) when he sent a letter to another Archias (the Spartan-backed ruler of Thebes), his xenos and philos, describing in detail the plot of Pelopidas.\(^100\)

In general foreign clients depended for their livelihood on remaining in the good graces of their patrons. One way to achieve this standing was to provide information. All could offer at least a rudimentary outline of the political and social structure of their native lands. Those who possessed extensive social connections, elevated status, or acute intellect and perception could also provide valuable information pertaining to policies,

\(^99\) Hdt. 1.20.

\(^100\) Plut. Pelopidas 10.3–4. The Theban Archias (ἐξένυν ὅντο καὶ διειλόων) received the courier bearing the letter but postponed opening it to continue with his party, and so he soon perished. It is possible that the Athenian Archias was also responsible for the earlier, more vague warnings of conspiracy (Plut. Pelopidas 9.3). Cf. Thuc. 4.89.1–2: Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, betrayed an Athenian plot to take Boeotia, informing the Lacedaemonians, who in turn told the Boeotians, who forestalled it.

In a few instances it is unclear whether personal or state alliances are behind the provision of information. During the Archidamian War, the Corinthians got word through Argos of an imminent Athenian offensive and so were able to bring up all their troops to the Isthmus in its defense (Thuc. 4.42.3). Thucydides’ use of the phrase ἔκκεισιν Ἀργεῖον here is rather odd with προπολέμοιοι— the verb normally takes a genitive for the agent or source (LSJ s.v. προπολέμοιοι I.1, 4). One would expect τῶν Ἀργείων to be used if the information was passed on officially, so this passage might indicate individual Argives or even Corinthianmetics, but such is the ambiguity of the Greek that official action cannot be precluded. Gomme presumably assumed the information derived from the government, when he noted (3:490 ad loc.) that “Argos had a foot in each camp,” citing Aristoph. Peace 475–77.
individuals, sentiments, political factions, military arrangements, and the like.101 As Machiavelli once observed, however, the problem with exiles (and the same may apply to hostages) was that their stories were colored by their situations and that their aspirations might not coincide with what would be expedient for their patrons.102 A rather blatant example can be found in Leandrias, a Spartan exile at Thebes, who told of an old story bandied about in Laconia that one day the Spartans would be defeated at Leuctra.103 If Diodorus was not exercising his talents in creative writing here, Leandrias must have been exercising his own poetic license. Would not every other Spartan also have heard the tale? Surely Leandrias contrived such a story to encourage the Thebans to continue the fight. For if the Thebans were victorious, he would be reinstated with their backing; if not, he was no worse off than before. This is not to say that all information available from exiles was calculated to mislead, simply that cautious use by its recipients was warranted.

Like exiles, hostages could serve as sources of information on their native land. But while Polybius learned to be a great admirer of the Romans, many hostages would have feared and resented their masters and, perhaps, their own compatriots who had evaded their unhappy fate. Their cooperation could not be taken for granted and any information they provided would have to be weighed carefully. It is also quite possible that hostages could gather information during their involuntary sojourn and use it against their patrons at a later date—as the Thebans rued the day when Philip II acquainted himself with the tactics of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. While exiles might have a similar capacity, they would not have opportunity to act on it, unless upheavals in their native state first brought them home, then pitched them against their former patrons.

101. See, e.g., [Lysias] XIV (Against Alcibiades I) 35; Xen. Cyr. 5.2.23ff. For a rather specialized service, see Thuc. 4.75 (of Samian exiles providing Peloponnesian ships with pilots). Information might go two ways if the exiles were reconciled to their former compatriots: Artabazus, a satrap of the Hellespont region, had fled to Philip II after a failed revolt (Diod. Sic. 16.52.3) and might have been of considerable use to Philip, with whom he resided, by providing information for Philip’s planned campaign into Asia Minor. Eventually, however, he was pardoned by the Persian king and returned—by that time, perhaps, with much to say about Philip’s plans.

102. Macchiavelli Discorsi 2.31.
103. Diod. Sic. 15.54.1.
Official Investigations

There was a wide range of resources available to a state to conduct investigations of private and public nature. Officials and military commanders were frequently subject to supervision or investigation by individuals or committees appointed by the state (whether constitutionally, by custom, or on an ad hoc basis). In fourth-century Athens, for example, strategoi were accompanied by paymasters (tamiai) and auditors (exetastai), who oversaw expenditures and verified the strategoi’s reports on recruitment.\(^{104}\) The strategoi would undergo reviews of their performance on their return; similar procedures were established for envoys, and officials leaving office had to render accounts to appropriate bodies.\(^{105}\) Citizens aspiring to public office were subject to preliminary reviews (dokimasiai) as to their fitness. Investigations (zeteseis) of various types (including inquiries into treachery, and hence espionage) were undertaken by such bodies as the Areopagus.\(^{106}\)

In brief, even in relatively open states such as Athens, there were institutions established to enable governments to gather information on their subjects. These might also be set up on an ad hoc basis. Examples include the obsessive inquisition into the mutilation of the herms and the parody of the Mysteries in Athens in 415, and the commission established by the people of Mylasa (in Caria) to investigate whether Manitas son of Pactyes had accomplices in his attempt to assassinate Mausolus.\(^{107}\) Decrees might also be passed soliciting information from citizens.\(^{108}\)

Assessments of situations abroad might be undertaken by specially appointed officials, such as the Athenian kataskopoi sent to Pylos to establish how matters stood there in 425 or the three men sent by the Lacedaemonians to Asia Minor to check on Dercylidas and to confirm him as commander for another year.\(^{109}\) Balcer has convincingly detailed

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\(^{104}\) See Pritchett 2:38–39, 41.


\(^{106}\) Wallace 113.

\(^{107}\) Andoc. On the Mysteries passim; Tod no. 138 (dated to 355/4). Another man, Thyssus, was found to be involved. Quintus Curtius (9.10.21) related that when Astasps was suspected of plotting against Alexander, Alexander continued to treat him well pending investigation. Astasps was subsequently executed (9.10.29).

\(^{108}\) E.g., Meiggs and Lewis 85, lines 44–47.

\(^{109}\) Thuc. 4.27.3–4; Xen. Hell. 3.2.6 (Aracus, Naubates, and Antisthenes). Cf. Hdt. 3.123ff., 4.151 (also called kataskopoi), 7.163–64; Thuc. 1.91.2–3 (cf. Demosth. XX [Against Leptines] 73.8), 4.15.1, 6.6.3; Xen. Hell. 5.2.8.
a relationship between episkopoi and proxenoi (both appointed by the Athenian boulê), which produced a network conducive to collecting information, monitoring the “allies,” and bringing word back to Athens.  

Oracles

Fontenrose, in assessing the characteristics of recorded oracles given at Delphi, noted that almost a quarter of extant historical responses concerned res publicae—questions of rulership, legislation, city foundations, interstate relations, and war. How illuminating were the insights of Apollo? The extant oracles cannot answer this question, since apologists have synthesized prophesies and outcomes, not a few pronouncements were composed post eventum, and discredited responses are more likely to have become lost. As I cannot capably address issues of supernatural or preternatural communication, I can only endeavor to address this problem with a few observations.

Presuming that oracles were limited to temporal sources for information, their attendants would have had every incentive to have an excellent grasp of current events and issues, since their own status and livelihood depended on the oracle’s prestige. Lucian, in his story of Alexander of Abonotichus, painted a delightful portrait of what might happen when an unscrupulous con man took up the lucrative business of running an oracle. This worthy had a large staff of employees, including “investigators [peuthenai], oracle makers, oracle keepers, copying clerks, seal experts, and interpreters.” He fielded a large number of agents in Rome to report what his clients were like, what questions they were going to ask, and what they particularly wanted, so that he could work out his answers in advance. He also questioned couriers about the contents of sealed messages.

While Alexander’s story is somewhat anachronistic and is subjected to a satirical pen, it is suggestive. On a somewhat higher plane, Parke and

110. Balcer passim. See also Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 215; Gerolymatos, Espionage, 93–95; Losada 112. Cf. Meiggs and Lewis no. 40 (= IG I 14; Fornara no. 71), 46 (= IG I 34; Fornara no. 98).
111. Fontenrose 50, table VII–A. The proportions are somewhat higher for legendary (28.4 percent) and “quasi–historical” (43.4 percent) responses.
112. Lucian Alexander 23.
113. Lucian Alexander 37, 53ff.
Starr have noted that the temple personnel at Delphi must have had frequent contact with representatives and private individuals from many states and would thereby have insight into current events. People came from all over the Greek world not only to consult the oracle but also to attend the Pythian Games. Like the other great panhellenic festivals, the games at Delphi were protected by a divinely sanctioned truce. During the intervening years, Delphi remained open to all comers, even in time of war. One might expect intelligence activity to be intense in this milieu, in a manner analogous to Switzerland during World War II. Such a characterization can be indirectly supported by Thucydides, who mentioned that the Athenians obtained clear information on the secret negotiations between the Chians and Lacedaemonians while participating in the Isthmian games. More to the point, Herodotus reports that Periander’s knowledge of the plight of the Lydian King Alyattes came about because Periander was present at Delphi when Lydian ambassadors consulted the oracle. Lycurgus’ rendition of the story of Codrus is yet more suggestive: he related that when in the distant past the Peloponnesians had inquired at Delphi whether they should take Athens, they were told they would succeed if they did not kill the Athenian king, Codrus. Cleomantis, a Delphian, learning of this, secretly informed the Athenians, and Codrus devised a ruse to sacrifice his life. Pausanias related that a Delphian tipped off the Lacedaemonians about an oracle received by their Messenian foes, which dictated that the first nation to dedicate a hundred tripods on Ithome would be victorious. The Spartan sent an obscure fellow, by the name of Oebalus, in the guise of a huntsman to sneak into the Messenian camp on Ithome with a hundred miniature cauldrons.

While hardly historical, these stories admirably illustrate that the Greeks conceived of Delphi as a place to acquire information that was otherwise difficult to access. Why would the Delphians (or the caretakers of other oracles, such as Dodona) not take advantage of their position?

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114. Starr 28; Parke and Wormell 50. The latter observe that the extensive knowledge of geography implicit in oracles concerning colonization was probably derived from the inquirers themselves or was a result of oracles composed after the settlement had been made, in order to lend divine legitimacy to the foundation.

115. Thuc. 8.10.1.


117. Lycurgus Against Leocrates 84ff. This story was told to mark the goodwill of foreigners toward Athens. Cleomantis and his descendants were duly rewarded.

118. Paus. 4.12.8–9.
And why would states not wish to find out what questions their rivals were putting to the gods?

Conjecture aside, it is evident that oracles, such as Delphi, had a place in a state’s decision-making process. Hyperides, in defending Euxenippus, spoke of Delphi as the ultimate authority in matters beyond the sphere of reason. In some states individuals were commissioned to consult oracles (or other religious sources of knowledge) and accorded an official status. The office could be quite temporary and relatively informal, as with the theopropoi habitually sent by Athens. In Sparta, by way of contrast, specially appointed puteioi carried on official correspondence with Delphi; two of these were permanently attached to each king’s entourage.

Collections of Delphic responses were kept by the Spartan kings and may have been entrusted to the care of the puteioi. Besides those of Delphic origin, there were a fair number of oracles derived from other sources in general circulation or collections. In Sparta oracles originating from places other than Delphi were kept in the city archives, while the Athenian archives preserved both Delphic and non-Delphic responses. There is some evidence—although there are few details—for other collections, public and private, among the states and individuals of the Greek world. Parke and Wormell suggested that records were also kept at Delphi, although these have not come to light (perhaps being written on perishable material). It seems implausible, however, that the Delphians would not be motivated, by reverence or expediency, to chronicle their god’s words.

119. Hyperides For Euxenippus 14: Euxenippus and two others were ordered by the demos to sleep in a temple and report their dreams. A while after, in the course of a trial in which Euxenippus was the defendant, the prosecution charged that he had reported his dream falsely. Hyperides answered the charge by claiming that it was the responsibility of the state to verify the dream at Delphi had they thought it or him unreliable. Cf. Xen. Hell. 4.7.3 (Olympia and Delphi).


121. Hdt. 6.57; Fontenrose 164 and n. 31.

122. Fontenrose 164. He further described consultations carried out through the use of tablets or couriers at various shrines (217–18 n. 27, 219); these would leave material available for records. Herodotus (7.142) mentioned that the Athenians who received the oracle about the wooden walls immediately wrote it down; it is likely that such documents were preserved.

123. For which see Fontenrose 158–65.

124. Parke and Wormell 2:xiii. Fontenrose (165) noted this lack, together with a paucity of references to oracles in Delphic inscriptions.
Chresmologoi ("oracle tellers," or "oracle gatherers") collected (and sometimes forged) oracular pronouncements of various derivations.\textsuperscript{125} They enjoyed considerable prestige in the archaic and classical periods and are thought to have retained general favor, although they earned the scorn of the likes of Aristophanes and Thucydides in the fifth century.\textsuperscript{126} They did not function as state officials, although they could exert influence on state policy both through judicious presentation, manipulation, and suppression of oracles in their private collections and through interpretation of oracular responses and oracles in general circulation. The use and abuse of oracles was by no means limited to chresmologoi, and there were enough examples of corruption and partisanship to make it possible for statesmen such as Demosthenes to cast doubts on the reliability of oracles that did not favor their position.\textsuperscript{127} It was more common, however, to put forth interpretations that coincided with one's ambitions. The impact of exegesis on the discussion of policy is visible in such events as the contested succession of Agesilaus and the more famous debate over the significance of "wooden walls" for the course of action Athens should take in view of the Persian menace.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{125} Fontenrose 154ff. Unlike manteis, they did not engage in the divination of dreams or omens.

\textsuperscript{126} See, e.g., Thuc. 2.54, 8.1.1 (cf. 5.26.3); Aristoph. Birds 959–91; Aristoph. Peace 1043–1126.

\textsuperscript{127} Plut. Demosth. 20.1: Demosthenes did not heed oracles about Chaeronea, because he suspected the Pythia of being in sympathy with Philip. There is also a story of Lysander's failed attempt to bribe the priests at Delphi, Dodona, and Ammon; his attempts were duly communicated by the priests to the Spartan authorities (Plut. Lys. 25.3 [and see 26.1ff.], giving Ephorus as his source; Diod. Sic. 14.13.3–7). Cf. Hdt. 5.63; Thuc. 5.16.2; [Aristotle] Ath. Pol. 19.4; Paus. 3.4.3; Plut. On the malignity of Herodotus 23.

It is odd that the only attempt to verify the authority of oracles is probably fictional (the tests of Croesus recounted by Hdt. 1.47ff.; cf. 2.174). It is not impossible that tests were made but were not publicized, for fear of charges of impiety (which could carry the death sentence in, e.g., Athens). Lucian gave a detailed account of the tests and tricks to which he subjected Alexander of Abonotichus, but this story is set after the period under discussion in this book.

\textsuperscript{128} (1) Diopithes, who supported Leotychidas, informed the Spartans of an oracle warning them against a lame kingship (Agesilaus was lame), but Lysander was able to convince them that "lame" was to be taken metaphorically (Leotychidas was reputedly a bastard, hence Lysander argued that Sparta would be "lame" if one of its two kings were unsound). Cf. Fontenrose Q163; he further noted the story's sources. He also suggested (165) that the oracle was drawn from a Lacedaemonian collection, perhaps the state's. (2) Hdt. 7.142.3–143.1; see Fontenrose Q147 for the text of the oracle and further sources.
Merchants

Merchants were ubiquitous and welcome in most of the Greek world. They themselves had need of information on routes, markets, prices, and the like, and hence they had a vested interest in keeping tab on the political climates and activity at home and abroad. Xenophon compared the skills of merchants and generals, and he noted that a wary eye for potential disaster was common to both. Lysias further remarked—a bit cynically—that merchants either received news of disasters in advance of everyone else or fabricated rumors themselves, since news of disasters entailed higher prices, which in turn yielded larger profits.

There are examples of important military information (usually concerning naval matters) imparted by merchants who picked up information on their travels. Herodas, a Syracusan, happened to be in Phoenicia with a shipowner at an opportune place and time. Herodas was not specifically called a merchant, but he was at least accompanying one, and it is probable that trade of some sort was the reason he found himself in

129. Xenophon recommended that spies be disguised as merchants for this very reason (Xen. Cav. Com. 4.7). The freedom of merchants was limited, however, especially during conflicts. Knorringa (128) maintained that Athens restricted trade during war; although he did not provide evidence for this assertion, I have no reason to doubt him, given the way they treated the Megarians. The Athenians did not appreciate Perdiccas’ ban on Methonian merchants operating in his territory, and they insisted he lift it (Meiggs and Lewis no. 65; cf. Fornara no. 128, IG I3 61; ca. 430 or later). They further justified their killing of Spartan ambassadors by alleging that the Spartans killed Athenian traders when they came on them off the Laconian coasts (Thuc. 2.67ff.).

130. Some of the information collected to this end—particularly that concerning navigation and geography—was recorded and preserved in written form. Starr (22) noted that by the sixth century a survey of the Spanish coast existed and that the Periegesis of Hecataeus contained much geographical information of the Mediterranean coasts. McKechnie (200 n. 104) commented that Scylax’s Periplous (the basis for which goes back at least to the fourth century) represented “a tradition of know-how [that] was probably built up in the context of communities of professional seafarers and traders.”

131. Xen. Mem. 3.4.11.

132. Lysias XXII (Against the grain-sellers). The examples to which Lysias referred were the losses or capture of ships, blockades, and impending ruptures of truces. Knorringa (35–36) had a fair bit to say in this regard. Besides the preceding Lysias passage, he noted (36 n. 2) Isaeus frag. 15 (ed. Thalheim) and Xen. Oec. 20.27, and he added: “it appears that they [merchants] always found the means to get such information as they thought necessary, either by means of agents or in another way.” The agents to whom he referred were fielded by Cleomenes (Berve no. 431), who was appointed governor of Egypt by Alexander the Great in 331. Cleomenes developed an organization with a field headquarters in Athens that was “continually sending quotations of prices to the branches in other places” (Knorringa 126; cf. 99, 100, 125).
Phoenicia. At any rate, he saw large numbers of Phoenician warships gathering and being readied. Having learned that there were to be three hundred, he departed on the first boat sailing to Greece to report this to the Lacedaemonians. His news prompted them to send an expeditionary force to Asia under King Agesilaus.

Less momentous examples include an anonymous trader who tipped off the Peloponnesians on Abydus that the Athenians planned to slip by them and Sinopean merchants who reported Xenophon’s intent to found a colony if provisions were not provided for his men. The value of merchants as sources of information can also be seen from characterizations in speeches and literature and from measures taken against them. An example of the former can be found in Lycurgus’ case against Leocrates: he attacked the defendant for fleeing Athens after the defeat at Chaeronea and spreading word of their misfortune in Rhodes, on the grounds that the merchants who frequented that island passed on the ill news about Athens as they sailed about the known world. Evidence for measures taken to suppress the spread of news by merchants can be seen in the seizure of their boats by Alcibiades to prevent his various enemies from getting wind of his approach.

**Official Documents (Both Published and Archived)**

Since the political and military leaders of the Greeks used written records (e.g., rosters of men and equipment) for their own purposes, it is unlikely that they would overlook other people’s records as potential sources of information. A look at what sort of information was preserved, together with some notes on its availability to foreigners, would therefore be of potential benefit.

A visitor strolling through the Athenian agora and acropolis in the fifth or fourth centuries would come on a large number of freestanding

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133. See D. Lewis 60, for evidence for Greek trade with Phoenicia; S. Lewis 1–2, 75–77, 94–95, on this incident.

134. Xen. *Hell*. 3.4.1. According to the story, Herodas did not know what plans Tissaphernes and the king had in mind for this fleet and was honest enough to admit his ignorance.

135. Thuc. 8.102.2; Xen. *Anab*. 5.6.19. One wonders whether the latter example was a deliberate leak on the part of Xenophon and Timation.


stone documents, or stelai. One could peruse decrees and announcements written on whitened boards affixed to the base supporting the eponymous heroes or displayed at the royal stoa. Here those who were not or could not be present at meetings of the deliberative bodies could learn of their enactments.

Much of the information published was of obvious value to a foreign state.138 Extant inscriptions include casualty lists, catalogues of military expenses, and a resolution to launch a major expedition.139 Catalogues of military resources available on land and sea were commonly inscribed from the mid–fourth century; catalogues of individuals called up for service were posted on whitewashed boards called leukomata.140 The state of Athens’ foreign policy could be determined from treaties and records of embassies sent and received; one might also deduce who was or was not paying tribute to the Athenians at a given time and thereby draw conclusions about the cohesion and resources of Athens’ empire (even as scholars do today). Further information on economic capabilities could be had from yearly publications of the accounts of officials and treasuries.141 While the Athenians were especially prolific in publishing doc-

138. The interval of time between decision and publication was probably short. Some time would be necessary for cutting the letters into the stone, but for most documents this would entail hours or days rather than weeks; in any case, the original document, written in ink on a whitened board, would not take long to prepare and post. Some indication of the brevity of time can be seen from a stele giving parameters for the expedition to Sicily, which was inscribed according to the will of the ekklesia before changes made a few days later; a second inscription was then needed to record the new information. Whether or not the first was actually displayed in the interval is not certain. Cf. Tod no. 78 A and B; Gomme 4:223–29 on Thuc. 6.8.1–2.

Adcock and Mosley (179) noted that inscriptions were reexamined on occasion, since inscriptions bearing treaties have been found to be supplemented and updated with marginal notations.

139. Casualty lists: e.g., Tod nos. 26 (459/8), 28 (457), 48 (= Meiggs and Lewis no. 48, ca. 447); cf. Meiggs and Lewis no. 35. Expenses: e.g., Tod nos. 55 (433), 75 (418–414), 83. Expedition: e.g., Tod no. 78 (to Sicily). The extant Themistocles decree (Meiggs and Lewis 23), a detailed plan of the Athenian evacuation and strategy established just prior to the Persian sack of Athens in 480, has not—to my mind—been adequately demonstrated to be anything but a later fabrication.

140. Adcock and Mosley 179.

141. Adcock and Mosley 179. This proposition may seem rather fanciful and anachronistic until one asks how the Peloponnesians knew that Athens had better financial resources than they did; concerns for economic information can be found, e.g., in Hdt. 3.122–23; Thuc. 6.6.2–3, 6.8.1–2, 6.22, 6.46.1–5, 7.49.1.
uments, a wide range of inscriptions from a wide range of states show that the custom was hardly unique to them.142

Our same visitor might amble over to the nearby Metron (formerly the Old Bouleuterion) and arrange for access to documents kept in the state archives.143 Official correspondence was kept there, such as a letter from Philip II of Macedon to the Athenians and documents pertaining to the conduct of embassies.144 It is possible that copies of publication of correspondence between other states were somehow obtained and preserved, for in his speech On the Crown, Demosthenes is found reading aloud a letter from Philip to the Peloponnesians.145 How had he obtained the letter, and how was it preserved? Given his questionable scruples, it is quite possible that he made it up. Yet if he had, one would have expected a few choice remarks from Aeschines about his practice of forging documents; these are lacking. Such an argument from silence is weak but ought to be considered. Perhaps Demosthenes acquired the letter—or

142. Cf. also inscriptions set up by non-Greek peoples, such as the Behistun Inscription, and the pillars raised by Ramses II in conquered lands (cf. Hdt. 2.102, 103, 106).

143. Aristotle may have used these. Access was apparently readily available. Posner observed (113–14) that “the very combination of archives and sanctuary in a ‘multi-functional’ building may have caused problems of control and safety, for Apellikon of Teos, a collector of books, was able to appropriate some old decrees of the Metroon and would have been brought to trial had he not fled the city.”

144. Philip’s letter: Demosth. VII (On Halonnesus) 33. Conduct of embassies: Demosth. XIX (On the embassy) 129. Cf. Demosth. XVIII (On the crown) 211, 218. Cf. also Starr (38), who plays down the importance of written records to information gathering. His arguments are based on flawed readings of the evidence. E.g., he dismissed (41) the capture of the Syracusan documents containing a catalogue of their citizens by misinterpreting Plutarch (Nicias 14.5: οὖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔλοιποι πρὸς τοὺς Ἐλευθερούς κυριεύοντας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἡρθεὶ τῶν ἄνδρων τῶν ἑλληνίδων καταλόγους, τῇ δὲ πόλει ἔχουσιν καὶ καταλόγους τῶν ἐν ἡλίκια μετεπερώτησαν. οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀλλοίων πρὸς τοὺς ἐλευθερούς κυριεύοντας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐρχομοί τῶν ἄνδρων τῶν ἑλληνίδων εἰρήνη γενέσθαι ἐπιτελέσσει, ἔχοντας καὶ τὸν πολέμον ἐφετεῖν ἄλλως τοὺς Ἑλλήνας. Οὔτε δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλήνασιν ἐμπόδισεν ἡ Κάλλιππας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἐκεῖ οὓς ἠλλοίως ἐπεμένει (MSS, Επεμένις [Coraës and Bekker] οὖν ἐρχομοί τοῖς Ἑλλήνασιν γενέσθαι ἐπιτελέσσει, καθ’ ἐν ἡλίκια ἀποκτείνας Δίωνα Κάλλιππας ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἔχει Ναυακοῦσα). Starr read Plutarch as saying that the capture of the ship happened much later: “the report itself may be doubted in view of his own [Plutarck’s] remark that scholars [nowhere mentioned in Plutarch] dated this event to a much later occasion.” The “event” whose date was in question was not the capture of the ship but the fulfillment of an oracle predicting that the Athenians would master the Syracusans; Plutarch said that this prophecy was fulfilled later when Callipus the Athenian murdered Dion and set himself up as tyrant over Syracuse.

145. Demosth. XVIII (On the crown) 218.
a copy of it—through Peloponnesian friends who had access to it, and then kept it himself.\textsuperscript{146} Although such a theory is compatible with the concept of personal networks, it is open to the same objection as above: Aeschines’ silence. An alternative is that by the late fourth century Athens preserved in its archives documents of particular import gathered by its agents and sources. If this was indeed the case, these archives in turn should have been made accessible so that actors on the political stage, such as Demosthenes, could make use of them to supplement their own information.\textsuperscript{147} Oracular pronouncements, in any event, were preserved for current and future reference. State archives were more generally administered by secretaries (grammateis), whose offices were specialized and (at least in Macedonia) subject to a hierarchy of authority.\textsuperscript{148} The \emph{strategoi} and the cavalry commanders (in Athens, at any rate) were served by specially appointed secretaries; these men would almost certainly possess a fair bit of valuable information at their fingertips and might conceivably have functioned as advisors or intelligence officers to their military commanders. Such a position would be perfect for a spy, and it is little wonder that Phillidas sought it when the Thebans were plotting to throw off their Spartan-backed government.

It is hopefully self-evident that Greek states of the sixth through fourth centuries would have had much to gain from their neighbors’ documents, if they could but have contrived to get possession of them. Persian archives have been found and excavated in the palace at Persepolis—these, the “fortification” and “treasury” tablets, are primarily concerned with payments in food (510–494) and species (492–459), respectively. The recovered tablets do not contain data of immediate political or military value but it is possible that yet unexcavated records contain such information. Herodotus mentioned that catalogues were taken of the forces that marched with Xerxes on his ill-fated expedition in 480, and

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  \item [146.] Lysander was supposed to have preserved his correspondence with states in his private dwelling, rather than in a state archive (Plut. \textit{Lys.} 30.3). A state archive existed in Sparta in Plutarch’s day, and in it the biographer found the names of Agesilaus’ daughter and wife. Such records were therefore kept as early as the late fifth or early fourth century (Plut. \textit{Ages.} 19.6), unless they were contrived later.
  \item [147.] Polyaeenus (4.6.2) mentioned the uses put to the record system of an Antigonus, perhaps Antigonus Doson (ruled 229–221). Implicitly, these were exceptional enough to be included in a collection of stratagems.
  \item [148.] For more complete descriptions of these offices, see Posner 111–12 on the Athenians; Berve 54–58 on the Macedonians.
\end{itemize}
these have not come to light.\textsuperscript{149} Yet undiscovered royal archives are attested in Babylon and Ecbatana. Records may also have been kept by satraps in provincial capitals, since Plutarch mentioned an archive at Sardis.\textsuperscript{150}

Could the Persian archives be a viable information source for the Greeks? The information they contained could be valuable, particularly to the Ionians. The problem was access. There is no evidence (save a boast of Ctesias) that the archives were open to Greek inquiry before Alexander captured Persepolis,\textsuperscript{151} but the Persians frequently made use of scribes and records clerks of various nationalities—among these were Greeks. One of the aides mentioned in the fortification tablets was called “Yaïna,” which is the ethnic name for a Greek.\textsuperscript{152} Among the tablets found was one written in the Greek language, implying that another Greek (or an individual to whom it would be natural to write in Greek) served in another archive center.\textsuperscript{153} There were likely others, as D. Lewis pointed out.\textsuperscript{154} It is not improbable that these Greeks retained some contact with their communities of origin and could have passed on pertinent

\textsuperscript{149} Hdt. 7.100: Xerxes’ scribes (grammatistai) recorded the numbers of Xerxes’ forces and the questions he made of their captains. How and Wells (ad loc.) maintained that these lists existed but that they were not made at Doriscus; the commentators did not, unfortunately, indicate how they knew this.

\textsuperscript{150} Plut. Demosth. 20.4–5: “Alexander . . . discovered at Sardis certain letters of Demosthenes and documents of the king’s generals, which revealed the amount of money given to him.” To be sure, Alexander had a motive for framing Demosthenes. D. Lewis (25, citing Ezra 5.17–6.2) has pointed out that this diffused system of archives led to retrieval problems: a search for a twenty-year-old document began in Babylon and ended in Ecbatana.

\textsuperscript{151} Cf. Diod. Sic. 2.32, where they were called diphtherai basilikai.

\textsuperscript{152} D. Lewis 5–6. Yaïna appears frequently on the tablets, and from December 499 to September 498 he is the only visible aide of Pharnaka, the Persian overseer (D. Lewis 12).

\textsuperscript{153} D. Lewis 12–13. Before the mid–fifth century, when the use of Aramaic on documents became general, it was necessary to write in the language used by the recipient (Posner 119 and n. 4; cf. Meiggs and Lewis no. 12 [= Tod no. 10, ca. 522–486 b.c.], a letter ostensibly from Darius to Gadatas in Greek, which Meiggs and Lewis thought to be authentic). The tablets at Persepolis were, for the most part, written in Elamite (Posner 123).

\textsuperscript{154} D. Lewis 14: “If we find Greeks in a secretarial capacity as early as this [ca. 499] and as far east as this [Persepolis], there is no reason to doubt their availability to the King or to other satraps, particularly in the west, in all relevant periods. The line between a secretary or aide and an exiled Greek maintained at the court of the King or of a satrap for his possible usefulness will not be an easy one to draw.” He mentioned Calligeitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus with Pharabazus (Thuc. 8.6.1), the bilingual Carian Gaulites (Thuc. 8.85.2), and Praxinus of Zacynthus (Xen. Anab. 2.1.7ff., Plut. Art. 14.5; Diod. Sic. 14.25.1) with Tissaphernes.
information, however informally. One might speculate on the opportunity such employment would have presented to a spy.

Miscellaneous

Itinerants and Philosophers

There were a variety of people who traveled or held itinerant professions and thus had the opportunity to gather and communicate information in an informal fashion. In surveying the types and natures of outsiders in Greek city-states in the fourth century, McKechnie included specialized builders and craftsmen, doctors, entertainers, actors, musicians, orators, soothsayers, and cooks.\(^\text{155}\) While there is no evidence that most of these groups of people consciously collected information for city-states, it is inevitable that the experiences they gained on their travels would influence their indigenous communities. A few examples of specific information are available; among them is the news obtained in Sparta of the Athenian effort to rebuild their walls immediately after the Persian Wars, which was provided by travelers.\(^\text{156}\)

Philosophers were likewise known to travel and to obtain posts as teachers or advisors of the ruling classes. Aristotle collected a fair amount of information of a political (and hence military) nature by sending his students out to learn about the history and constitutions of a large number of Greek poleis. While one might argue that his interest was purely academic, one might also note that he was directing such research at a time when Philip II was trying to work out a political arrangement in Greece with himself as hegemon, and such information would have been of great value to the Macedonians.\(^\text{157}\)

By the early fourth century there were men who marketed themselves as teachers of strategy and tactics. While the impression of these obtained from Xenophon’s Memorabilia does not inspire confidence in their capabilities, they could have been good sources of information on how various peoples trained and prepared for war.\(^\text{158}\)

\(^{155}\) McKechnie 143–57.

\(^{156}\) Thuc. 1.91; cf. Hdt. 1.27 (Diod. Sic. 9.25.1–2).

\(^{157}\) It is also worth noting that Aristotle had close connections with Philip and Alexander and further that he thought it expedient to flee Athens on at least two occasions (cf. McKechnie 150–52).

\(^{158}\) Xen. Mem. 3.1.1; cf. 3.5.21–22.
highly enough of a Greek military expert, Phalinus by name, to retain him as an advisor in military matters. This was only sensible, considering that he, as satrap, was faced with continual battles with the Greeks in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Plato stated, with some irony, that drillmasters seemed to have regarded Sparta as a place too holy to enter and did not practice there—it is highly unlikely that the Lacedaemonians would have suffered their presence.

Geographers

It would have been possible for interested parties to obtain geographic or ethnographic information from historians and geographers. Strabo mentioned the existence of a number of geographical works by the first century, including Limenai, Periploi, Periodoi, and the like. Xenophon’s Hellenica and Anabasis might have been of some service to Alexander, though there is no mention of Alexander’s having read them. It has been noted that Alexander’s entourage included geographers and scholars and further that Alexander maintained a group of men, called bematistai, whose duty was to survey the country through which he was passing.

Hired Agents, Sycophants

Sycophants had the reputation for an overindulged ability to discover or fabricate misdeeds of the wealthy. They profited materially from this skill, and in Athens they were perceived as a plague that was endured but never cured. In the Memorabilia, Xenophon portrayed a treatment for this ailment: an agent hired by a wealthy man to investigate sycophants persecuting him. The agent, Archidamus, uncovered their dirty secrets and sought out their enemies to help him in his counterattack.

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159. Xen. Anab. 2.1.7—Xenophon called Phalinus a man who represented himself as one learned in matters concerning both tactical formations and hoplite warfare.

160. Plato Laches 183a–b.

161. D. Lewis (144 nn. 56–57) remarked that when Pharnabazus captured and garrisoned Cythera in the spring of 393 (Xen. Hell. 4.8.8; Diod. Sic. 14.84.5), he might have been acting on “good sense,” or under the influence of a passage in Herodotus (Hdt. 7.235) that calls attention to the vulnerability of Laconia to such a move.

162. Tod no. 188 (SIG 303; Harding no. 110; post-334) recorded a dedication of a Cretan, Philonides son of Zoites, at Olympia, which refers to the dedicatee as both bematistes and hemerodromesios, suggesting a link between surveying and communication. For a more detailed description, see Berve 51–52.
patron, Criton, paid him in goods and honor and retained him in his service, occasionally lending his talents out to friends who had need of them.\footnote{163}

In his life of Demosthenes, Plutarch mentioned a bounty hunter by the name of Archias. This man was engaged by Antipater to discover the whereabouts of the Macedonian’s enemies and arrest them. To this end Archias directed a group of men known as “fugitive hunters” (phugotheres). Archias was apparently quite successful at his job, which no doubt involved investigation in the course of his pursuits. Among his victims was Demosthenes, who escaped him only by committing suicide in 322.\footnote{164}

Aside from these two men, the evidence is scanty; there is some suggestion that information pertaining to legal cases might be purchased from sycophants, and an allusion to an overseer engaged by merchants.\footnote{165}

Survivors and Escapees

News of disasters was at times brought back by those who had survived them, as when the Arcadian Nicarchus stumbled wounded into the camp of the Ten Thousand to tell of the treachery of Tissaphernes.\footnote{166} In a number of instances their news was so shocking as to strain their credibility (the Athenian reaction to the survivors of the Sicilian disaster is a case in point),\footnote{167} but when measures could yet be taken to avert peril, these were generally done.\footnote{168}

Servants and Slaves

Servants and slaves might have made inquiries or communicated information on their masters’ behalf, but most references to them in the context of information portray them giving information against their current or former masters. The reliability of slaves as informants was open to some question (this problem is treated in chapter 4 in the context of tor-
ture). Aristotle remarked that tyrants looked to slaves as allies in informing against their masters; the same might be said of leaders in other forms of government.\textsuperscript{169}

Others

There are a large number of informants of types so varied and singular as to defy meaningful categorization. Many of these obtained or imparted information through a fortuitous combination of chance and the knowledge that a prospective recipient of a piece of news would be interested to learn of it. Although it would be tedious to enumerate the plethora of examples available, I cannot resist an anecdote illustrating the preceding statement. Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, had delusions of grandeur as a poet and in 368/7 was fortunate enough to win a victory for one of his pieces that had been performed at the Lenaea in Athens. A member of the chorus hastened to Corinth as soon as the victory was announced and thence took the first boat to Syracuse, in hopes of being the first to inform Dionysius. He succeeded and obtained the expected reward for his good news.\textsuperscript{170}

Sources and Agents of Unspecified Nature and Provenance

Our sources are often negligent or vague when it comes to providing details of how information was obtained before actions were taken. Reference to agents and sources might be relegated to an indefinite pronoun (e.g., Alcibiades learned of secret arrangements between the Lacedaemonians and Cyrus \(\delta \iota \alpha \tau \iota \nu \omega \nu \)) or to a relative pronoun in conjunction with a participle (e.g., \(\delta \iota \alpha \sigma \alpha \gamma \gamma \epsilon \eta \alpha \lambda \omicron \nu \\tau \varepsilon \) the defeat at Leuctra who came to Sparta with the names of the dead).\textsuperscript{171} Quite often verbs of learning in participial form or in subordinate clauses governed by \(\hat{o} \kappa \) or \(\hat{e} \pi \epsilon \delta \eta \) are the only record that intelligence was involved. Passive forms of the verb \(\alpha \gamma \gamma \epsilon \lambda \lambda \omega \) are frequently used, and occasionally we find the use of \(\lambda \alpha \nu \theta \alpha \nu \omega \) with a negative. In many other cases, even such rudimentary

\textsuperscript{169} Aristotle \textit{Politics} 1313b; one might recall, e.g., the information given by slaves on the parodies of the mysteries. Cf. Lysias V (\textit{For Callias}) 5, who warns that the precedent given by trusting slaves will encourage others to obtain freedom by falsely informing against their masters.

\textsuperscript{170} Diod. Sic. 15.74.1–2.

\textsuperscript{171} Diod. Sic. 14.11.2ff.; Plut. \textit{Ages.} 29.2.
notations are lacking, although the receipt of information must have, or probably did, precede an action. Again, it would be tedious to go through even a fraction of such examples, but a single incident might demonstrate how even important information, obtained in advance of an event, might rate no more than a passing mention. Thucydides reported that Demosthenes (the *strategos*, not the orator) was preparing a force to invade the Aetolians in 426; this did not escape their notice from the time he first formed the plan.¹⁷² It is apparent that some form of information gathering went on; perhaps one of the Acarnanians to whom Demosthenes communicated his intent passed news of it on to the Aetolians out of bitterness, when Demosthenes failed to support an Acarnanian plan to invest Leucas.¹⁷³ It is possible that the Aetolians learned of it still earlier through an anonymous traitor, deserter, or spy.

¹⁷². Thuc. 3.96.3.
¹⁷³. Cf. Thuc. 3.95.2.