As the shield is a practical response to the spear, so counterintelligence is to intelligence. Just as it is in the interest of a state to enhance its ability to influence events through the use of intelligence, it is in its interest to deny a similar ability to its opponents. The measures taken to accomplish this end fall within the nebulous boundaries of the discipline now known as counterintelligence.¹

Was such a shield employed by the ancients? In general, yes—although, as with intelligence, this response must be qualified in degree according to state, circumstance, and era. Assessments are, however, somewhat complicated by the use of stereotypes and propaganda by the ancients. Members of democratic states (i.e., the Athenians, who have left us a lion’s share of evidence) tended then—and still tend—to wish to conceive of their societies as open and free and of subjects of other forms of government as liable to scrutiny and censorship. In his funeral oration, Pericles declared that the Athenians “hold our city open to all and never withhold, by the use of expulsion decrees, any fact or sight that might be exposed to the sight and profit of an enemy. For on the whole we trust in our own courage and readiness to the task, rather than in contrivance and deception.”² Demosthenes similarly characterized the Athenians: “You think that freedom of speech, in every other case, ought to be shared by everyone in the polis, to such an extent that you grant it even to foreigners and slaves, and one might see many servants among us able to say whatever they wish with more freedom than citizens in some other

¹. Some definitions of counterintelligence follow. R. Godson (1): “At a minimum, however, CI can be defined as the identification and neutralization of the threat posed by foreign intelligence services, and the manipulation of these services for the manipulator’s benefit.” Dulles (123): “The classical aims of counterespionage are ‘to locate, identify and neutralize’ the opposition.” U.S. Marine Corps art. 104c: “Counterintelligence is that aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or materiel against sabotage.”

². Thuc. 2.39.
states.” Other comments by Nicias, Demosthenes, and Demades have characterized the Athenian democracy as less adept than other forms of government in detecting traitors and spies.

Adcock and Mosley thought it unlikely that the democracies of the ancient Greeks were able to deliberate in secret, because of the nature of their decision-making process. Their observation has merit (and may be applicable to oligarchies as well), and there is no doubt that democracies were not able to keep secret all things that they might wish. Faction and accident, if nothing else, were sufficient to ensure that matters raised in the boulé, much less the ekklesia, would not be discussed only within the borders of Attica. But attempts were made to circumvent this problem, some of which were successful. The real problem here is that the values inherent to democracies and the premises on which rest a determination of policy by a vote of informed citizens demand an idealized society that keeps no secrets. Such societies did not and do not exist on any large scale, however democratic the societies may aspire to be. A parallel might be found in the United States, which tries to balance personal freedom against national security, while upholding the image of a free and open society. Although there are striking examples of display and ingenuousness on the part of individuals and states, such claims to a society untainted by the shadow of Big Brother rest more on political machina-

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3. Demosth. IX (3 Phil.) 3.
4. Thuc. 6.11.7; Demosth. XVIII (On the crown) 149; Demades On the twelve years frag. 46.
5. Adcock and Mosley 170. Cf. Dulles 8. It appears, e.g., that no attempt was made to keep metics or strangers from witnessing the departure of the Athenian expeditionary force when it set out for Sicily (Thuc. 6.30.2). One might conjecture that the Athenians saw the futility of trying to keep quiet an expedition of this magnitude, especially since it required calling up men from the katalogos—a lengthy process in fifth-century Athens (see Ober 96)—and the concentration of many ships and much material in areas that could not be conveniently shut off from the eyes of merchants coming into the city. However, the Athenians may have wanted the Syracusans to know too well the magnitude of the force being brought to bear on them. Similar motives may apply to the congress of Peloponnesian allies at Lacedaemon, if indeed Thucydides’ account bears resemblance to reality and is not a piece of drama (Thuc. 1.72; but cf. 1.79). It is possible that the Lacedaemonians wanted the Athenians to learn that many of the Peloponnesians desired war and so realize that the Lacedaemonians were also willing to contest the Athenian bid for supremacy with force of arms. In a related passage, Archidamus voiced his hopes that when the Athenians learned of the Peloponnesian preparations, they might be more willing to back down (Thuc. 1.82.3; possibly also at Xen. Hell. 5.1.33). Cf. Isoc. VI (Archidamus) 77. Wright (108) alleged that a similar game was played by the Russians with the British during the Suez crisis.
tions and idealized self-perceptions than on the realities indicated by example, as will be seen in this chapter.

Subjects

The following does not purport to be a comprehensive list of types of information that were concealed in classical Greece, as it neglects private matters for the sake of public and does not treat such secrets as those associated with religious ritual or mystery cults. The three subjects described here are those best attested in the sources. The first two, incidentally, correspond to the types of information most frequently sought.

Military Plans and Movements

Xenophon included in topics for consideration by a military commander “how you might learn your enemy’s affairs and how he might least be able to learn yours.” Examples of counterintelligence in military operations are numerous, and it was widely if tacitly acknowledged that counterintelligence was an integral part of military practice, even though some paid more heed to its importance than others.

Recorded efforts to protect information are most commonly associated with military movements (and hence intentions to make movements), especially those of a tactical nature aimed at achieving advantage through surprise. Most examples come from the fifth century and later, although the use of ambushes and surprise attacks in archaic and earlier times necessitates at least some measures to conceal the presence of troops. The practice of protecting information about military dispositions and numbers is widely attested among the Greek peoples.

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6. Xen. Cyr. 1.6.43.
7. See, e.g., Iliad 1.227, 13.277; Odyssey 14.217; Polyaeus 1.15; Paus. 4.5.8. Cf. Pritchett 2:161, 164–69, 180–83 (tables 3–5, 7). Ambushes depended either on a lack of enemy information-gathering efforts or on counterintelligence efforts, in the form of concealment or other devices or both. Pritchett (2:188) has argued that the first option is to be preferred. He is quite right in some particular examples, but see the discussion of reconnaissance in chap. 1.
8. The following are a small sample. Athenians: e.g., Alcibiades (Xen. Hell. 1.1.15), Iphicrates (Polyaeus 3.9.8, 3.9.19), Phocion (Plut. Phoc. 15.1ff.), and Thrasyllus (Polyaeus 1.47.1). Corinthians: see, e.g., Thuc. 4.8. Lacedaemonians: e.g., Agesilaus (Xen. Ages. 6.6), Alcotas (Xen. Hell. 5.4.56), Chalcideus (Thuc. 8.14.1), Mindarus (Thuc. 8.99.1). Macedonians: e.g., Alexander (Arrian Anab. 2.9.1, 6.6.4; Q. Curtius 3.10.3). Syracusans: e.g., Dionysius (Polyaeus 5.2.12; Leo Byz. 7.1); cf. Hermocrates (Thuc. 6.72.5). Thebans: e.g.,
Preparations for large-scale expeditions, which employed allied contingents, were most difficult to conceal and did not normally go unnoticed, since a summons would have to be sent to the allied states, and since the time elapsed for muster and travel would be adequate for news to arrive well before the troops. The invasions of Sicily by the Athenians, of Attica by the Peloponnesians, of Boeotia by the Lacedaemonians, and of Laconia by the Boeotians (in all examples accompanied by allies) did not achieve complete surprise, and it does not appear that any measures were taken to conceal report of their advent—quite the contrary, in some instances. The objectives of the expeditions might be obscured through disinformation (e.g., by Agesilaus in Asia Minor), but in most instances deception on this scale was simply not feasible.

Expeditions undertaken by a single state, independent of its allies, are another matter. Since no publication beyond the borders of the state was required, and since the time needed for muster was considerably less, a state could hope to achieve surprise and therefore might make efforts to realize its hope. The Athenians, for example, tried to launch a surprise attack on the rebellious Mytilene and, to prevent news of their intent preceding them, incarcerated the crews of Mytilenaean ships in the Piraeus. Their hopes were disappointed, however, when a sailor escaped and hastened home to tell of their plans. A more successful outcome may be found in Phocion’s march on Megara.

Sparta, in this field at least, proved more adept than its contemporaries. Not for naught did Thucydides complain that he was unable to learn the numbers of Lacedaemonian troops at the (first) battle of Mantinea because of the secrecy inherent to their constitution. Information concerning military plans, losses, and numbers was handled carefully. Thucydides mentioned that when the Lacedaemonians sent an army afield under Agis in 419, their allies, although they supplied substantial contingents, were not aware of their destination. Indeed, even Thucydides was unable to discover what Agis’ intent was, since the king turned

Neocles (Paus. 9.1.6); cf. Epaminondas (Xen. Hell. 7.5.8) and the decree concerning the Athenian exiles under arms (Xen. Hell. 2.4.2; Dinarchus Against Demosthenes 25; Plut. Pelopidas 6.4), Thracians: e.g., Seuthes (Xen. Anab. 7.3.36).

9. Thuc. 5.68.2. Thucydides’ observation is more or less applicable to Spartan policy in the era under study and perhaps derives from the character instilled in their youths. From childhood, Spartans heard such sayings as “Out through these doors no word travels” at their sussitia (Plut. Lyc. 12.5; Mor. 236f) and such anecdotes as that of a boy who allowed a fox to rip open his stomach rather than reveal its presence (Plut. Mor. 234a–b). They spent time in the krupteia, the secrets of which are still preserved.
back at the Laconian frontier when the omens were not favorable. According to Pausanias, the Spartans habitually concealed the numbers of their dead by collecting them together with those of their allies. Epaminondas compelled them to gather their fallen separately after the battle of Leuctra, so that the magnitude of their loss would be apparent to all. The fate of two thousand helots who were allegedly killed by the Spartans is still not known.

Secret Negotiations, Plots, and Betrayals

Plots and betrayals demand secrecy by their very nature—the punishment for treason among the Greeks was death, and hence conspirators staked all on secrecy. At times individual traitors or a fifth column within a city sought to enter into negotiations with another polis hostile to their government, since outside aid was often required to accomplish a coup d'etat. The invoked polis often (but not always) perceived that it was to its own interest to keep negotiations secret, since their revelation risked the failure of the plot, possible loss of face, and at times the danger of open war. States also tried to conceal the existence or the content of diplomatic activity from other states when acting contrary to existing agreements.

Information Affecting Morale

It seems to have been accepted practice, extending back at least as far as the Odyssey, for a commander to withhold from his men foreshadowings of danger when he feared the knowledge would turn them from his will. Andocides expressed the sentiment thus: “to lead most men into dangers,
[a general] must keep them in the dark or deceive them.”16 Eteonicus and Agesilaus withheld news of the defeats at Ariginusae and Cnidus from their troops lest they be disheartened, and they claimed victory instead. Nicias wanted neither his own men nor the enemy to learn that he contemplated retreat after the final disastrous harbor battle.17 Such policies naturally extended to a concern lest the enemy be enheartened: Pericles advised the Athenians, who were suffering plague and confinement as a result of his policies, to conceal their troubles from the Lacedaemonians. At a later date, the Spartans did not want the Athenians to learn the extent of their unease after their men were captured at Pylos.18

Methods

Information was protected in a number of ways: by limiting the number of people handling matters best kept secret; by acting on decisions before report of them could reach an opponent; by maintaining some control over the movement of citizens, metics, and foreigners; by instituting measures and legislation to monitor suspect elements of one’s own populace, while discouraging and frustrating efforts of enemy agents and sources through counterintelligence agents; by disrupting enemy communication; and by disseminating false information.

Limiting Access to Information

Macchiavelli once commented that “when the number of accomplices in a conspiracy exceeds three or four, it is almost impossible for it not to be discovered, either through treason, imprudence, or carelessness.”19 In the Greek world, in which the fidelity of an ally or compatriot was all too often ephemeral, there was a realization that the greater the number of people who knew any given piece of information was, the more likely it was that an enemy would know of it also. This problem was especially prevalent in democracies and oligarchies, since many people participated

17. Xen. Hell. 1.6.36, 4.3.14; Thuc. 7.48.1. Cf. Alexander’s suppression of reports of the ambush and slaughter of Menedemus’ force (including threats directed against any survivor who spoke of the defeat); see Q. Curtius 7.7.39. Word of the death of Cimon seems also to have been suppressed (Plut. Cimon 19.1).
18. Thuc. 2.64.6, 4.41.3.
in the decisions of such governments. A solution was to select a few individuals who would have full authority to act on behalf of the state without the need to refer matters to the demos or to other oligarchs. As obvious as this solution appears, it was not one that sat comfortably among peoples who lived in fear of tyrants and who attempted to prevent any one individual from obtaining too much power. Nevertheless, it was enacted at times. When Corinthian envoys, dissatisfied with the state of affairs following the Peace of Nicias, went behind the backs of the Lacedaemonians to Argos, they advised the Argives to select a few men with whom other states might negotiate alliances. The purpose of this selection was to enable matters to be considered without the people’s cognizance, lest the Lacedaemonians learn of the dealings from an individual who did not favor the alliances.\textsuperscript{20} The Argives took the Corinthians’ advice and appointed twelve men with whom a state might make a treaty. This measure did not entirely conceal their machinations from the Lacedaemonians, since it was necessary to generally publish the measure to the Greek states who might wish alliance.\textsuperscript{21} But their arrangement apparently succeeded in keeping under wraps specific details of, for example, the Argive treaty with the Mantineans.\textsuperscript{22}

In Athens sensitive matters might be handled by the \textit{boulé} rather than the \textit{ekklesia} to enhance the security of information by restricting dissemination. Although there is some evidence for this practice, there are not sufficient grounds to argue that it was general policy.\textsuperscript{23} Examples pertinent to the problem are limited to the fifth and fourth centuries.

Diodorus spoke of secret meetings of the \textit{boulé} to hear Themistocles’ schemes to rebuild Athens’ walls and, on a later occasion, to consider the disposition of Sicily should it be conquered. His accounts are not elsewhere confirmed.\textsuperscript{24} Andocides told the Athenians that his efforts on their

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{20} Thuc. 5.27.2.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Thuc. 5.28.1; at 5.30.1 the Spartans were also aware that the Corinthians had been the instigators of the device.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Thuc. 5.29.1–2: its efficacy is suggested by Thucydides’ characterization of other Peloponnesian states, who seem to have felt incompletely informed and to have thought that the Mantineans knew something they did not.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Wallace (109) proposed that the knowledge of the location of secret tombs (one might recall that of Oedipus mentioned in Sophocles’ \textit{Oedipus at Colonnus}) was confined to the Areopagites; this body did not, however, determine policy in the manner of the \textit{boulé} and \textit{ekklesia}.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Diod. Sic. 11.39.4–5, 13.2.6. Such meetings are not mentioned in Thuc. 1.90ff. or 6.8ff. (although it might be argued that Nicias’ wish to deliberate matters privately reflected a concern for security, it is more likely that he was equivocating). Cf. Plut. \textit{Arist.} 22.2; \textit{Them.} 20.1–2.
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behalf were not to be discussed openly in the *ekklesia*, but he assured them that his measures were approved of by the *boulé*.25 In another speech, he refers to the *boulé*’s secret decision to make arrests in the witch-hunt of 415.26 Demaenetus made a secret agreement with the Athenian *boulé* to take a trireme and visit Conon at the time when Conon was fighting for the king of Persia against the Lacedaemonians, to whom Athens owed obligations under their treaty. The populace soon learned of this arrangement, no doubt through a leak from the *boulé*. The *bouletai* feigned ignorance in the face of outrage, while the people, fearing the risk of war with Sparta, sent word of the affair to Milon, the Lacedaemonian harmost on Aegina.27 The Athenians attempted to limit to the *boulé* and ambassadors knowledge of their negotiations with Philip II regarding Amphipolis and Pydna. As Demosthenes noted, their efforts were unsuccessful.28

The last two examples illustrate that the security derived from limiting the number of parties to confidential information to five hundred would be minimal, since among such a large number of individuals (chosen by lot, at that) would be at least one who would let slip the secret. As Aristophanes joked about his fellow Athenians: “And he said that the women don’t reveal the least of the secrets of the Thesmophoria, but you and I always do this when we sit in council.”29

Commanders serving most Greek states did not normally feel an obligation to give advance notice of their plans to their men. Indeed, the contrary seems likely to have been general practice.30 An open vote on whether to retreat was apparently a real possibility for the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily, but this was exceptional, even among the Athenians.31 Alexander habitually restricted to trusted commanders those admitted to his councils—only in exceptional cases were matters

25. Andocides *On His Return* 21; see also 3, 19, 20.
30. Cf. Onas. 10.22: if a general has secret plans, he must not tell anyone, only a few high commanders if necessary, before he is on the scene of action. Cf. also Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.6. 21.
31. The general meeting of the Ten Thousand after the murder of their commanders is another exception, hardly to be taken as typical (Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.15ff.).
handled openly before his men. Not only were the ranks kept in the dark, but the number of officers cognizant of future operations could be limited for security. Among the reasons given by Hermocrates to the Syracusans for entrusting the command of their troops to fewer generals was that whatever ought to be kept secret would be better concealed by a few than by fifteen. Miltiades asked the Athenians for resources to carry out a military expedition without telling them his intent, and at the time the request was not seen as unreasonable. The most sensible explanation for such a reaction was a recognition of a need for information security.

Anticipating Reports

In some circumstances the ancients realized that an information leak was bound to occur despite attempts to prevent it. The assemblies of the democracies and oligarchies, in particular, were vulnerable in this way, as I mentioned earlier. In such cases, a state could try to deny its opponent time to respond effectively to the news they would certainly receive. When the Megarians made a secret appeal to Athens for help against a faction that would betray them to Philip II, Phocion feared that the Boeotians would anticipate the Athenians in sending aid if they knew the circumstances in time. He therefore called the ekklesia early in the morning, announced the message, and led the Athenians to Megara immediately after a decree was passed. The Boeotians were not always on the receiving end of other peoples’ devices: the Theban Neocles acted similarly. He knew that the Plataeans watched for general assemblies of the Boeotians, since they were familiar with the Boeotian habit of doing business in long meetings of the whole people. Wishing to take Plataea by surprise, he called the Thebans to come to assembly in arms and marched out at once.

32. See, e.g., Q. Curtius 6.8.1. Cf. Q. Curtius 4.13.3; Arrian Anab. 2.6.1, 3.9.3; Plut. Alex. 39 (= Plut. Mor. 180d, 332f, 340a).
33. Thuc. 6.72.5. The Syracusans approved his proposal. Polyaenus (1.42.1) gave an analogous story of Gylippus, who arranged to have his plans leaked to the enemy so that he could pretend outrage and demand sole command on the grounds that more than one general made security untenable. Cf. also Xen. Anab. 6.1.18; Thuc. 8.9.2.
34. Hdt. 6.132. Another alternative, practiced by the Argives when they wished to support the Messenians without arousing Lacedaemonian ire, was to avoid a public decision and leave a course of action available to private citizens (Paus. 4.10.1).
36. Paus. 9.1.6.
This measure of going immediately from decision to action, while successful in both of the preceding examples, has a defect: if anyone saw the citizens of a city going to assembly armed, he would realize something was afoot, even if he lacked details. Perhaps it was effective in the first case since Boeotian intelligence agents or sources would have been likely to await the results of an assembly to learn these details, as they would be at a loss as to why the Athenians were preparing a military force (had they not waited, they might have drawn the erroneous conclusion that the Athenians were intending to march north against Boeotia). In the second case, it was combined with a successful attempt to circumvent Plataean lookouts. In any event, rapid movement of military forces, as was typical of great commanders such as Jason of Pherae and Alexander, served a similar purpose, in that an army might be on hand before news of its advent.

Hence military commanders delayed transmission of orders until the last minute, as Onasander suggested: “[the general] must tell no one beforehand against what place or for what purpose he is leading his army, unless he considers it necessary to warn some of the higher officers in advance.”37 Mindarus, a half millennium earlier, was following the same tenets when he waited until the last minute before giving his men orders to put to sea, so that his move would not be known to the Athenians on Samos.38

Conversely, a delay between decision and action, even in clandestine arrangements, increased the chances of word reaching the wrong ears. The protracted nature of the secret negotiations between the Chians and the Lacedaemonians, for example, allowed the Athenians ample opportunity to become aware of them. Although the Athenians were unable to forestall the Chian revolt, they were at least able to harass and delay Peloponnesian naval forces that were to be sent east.39

Controls on Contact with Foreigners

States attempted to regulate foreigners and travel to a degree varying according to polity and circumstance. Generally speaking, the less secure a state felt, because of external or internal threats, the more it tended to be strict in applying controls. It is not always easy, however, to discern to

37. Onas. 10.22, Loeb (Illinois Greek Club) translation and text.
what extent this security was for the sake of moral or constitutional health and to what extent it was for the sake of protecting information.

Restrictions on Travel
During time of peace there was relatively free intercourse between states. People traveled freely, even for extended periods of time. The four great Hellenic festivals saw visitors from all over the Greek world. Although wars could and did upset their attendance and performance, the truces that attended them normally held good. Aeneas Tacticus wrote that citizens should not be allowed to leave without official permission (in the form of a token), but it is probable that such strictures were applied only during times of tension, if not open war—his work, after all, concerns a city under siege.

The apparent exception, of course, was Sparta. In the truce between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians in 424, Athenian garrisons on the perimeter of Peloponnesian-controlled territory were expressly forbidden to mix with the population outside their walls. But the primary purpose of this provision was not to dam information flow but to confine Athenian actions and to prevent them from inciting helots to revolt. According to Plutarch, Lycuragus did not allow Spartans themselves to travel lest they be corrupted and destabilize their state. It cannot be said with certainty that travel was altogether forbidden but it is entirely possible that it was regulated. There is a note in Isocrates that Lacedaemonian citizens fit for military service could not leave the country without the consent of those in office. The motive is not entirely clear in the last case but may be associated with the Lacedaemonian practice of sending its men abroad as mercenaries in the fourth century. In any event,
Lacedaemonians were present at the Olympic Games as spectators as well as competitors, and a variety of remarks in Plutarch mention Spartans abroad.\textsuperscript{47}

All Hellenic states restricted travel at the outbreak of war.\textsuperscript{48} Hyperides recalled a law against metics leaving Athens in wartime; similar controls would have been placed on citizens.\textsuperscript{49} Some states, such as Cius and Erythrae, granted freedom of movement to honored foreigners in both peace and war. It is not clear whether they were being accorded the rights of citizens or given privileges beyond that status. Since one of the honorees, Athenodoros, was also granted exemption from taxation, and since another, Mausolus of Mylasa, satrap of Caria, was a man of considerable note, the latter alternative is preferable.\textsuperscript{50} In time of war, even movement within a state could be restricted by the enactment of curfewlike measures. According to the Suda, the seer Diopithes introduced a law forbidding anyone from the city to remain in the Piraeus beyond a certain time of night, under penalty of death.\textsuperscript{51}

\textit{Restrictions on Foreigners}

In the small poleis so characteristic of Hellenic life, the presence of strangers would be readily noted. Even large cities, such as Athens, were a conglomerate of smaller subcommunities, whose members could identify those who did not belong.\textsuperscript{52} In military units, commanders could catch spies by calling a drill and arresting anyone who lacked an assigned place in the ranks.\textsuperscript{53} Covert intelligence operations were correspondingly

\textsuperscript{47} Anecdotes place Spartan spectators at the Olympic and even the Panathenaic festivals. See, e.g., Plut. Mor. 235cd; cf. Plut. Lyc. 16.3, 24.3. Herodotus (5.63) mentioned Spartans coming to Delphi both on public and private journeys.

\textsuperscript{48} Cf. Hdt. 1.67.

\textsuperscript{49} Hyperides Against Athenogenes 29; cf. 33. Athenogenes left Athens during the war with Philip, just before Chaeronea, and moved to Troezen, and therefore was tried under a law that stated that a man who moved in wartime should be indicted and summarily arrested if he returned.

\textsuperscript{50} Tod no. 149 (post-360): Athenodoros, an Athenian mercenary, and his descendants were honored by Cius with \textit{atelia} (as opposed to \textit{isotelia}) and the right of “sailing in and out [without harm and] without treaty, both in peace and in war” (lines 7–8). Mausolus and his descendants were awarded \textit{proxenia} in addition by Erythrae (Tod no. 155, ca. 357–355). Cf. Tod no. 186 (Antigonus by Priene); Harding no. 28B (Idrieus by Erythrae); more generally Harding no. 117 (=SIG 273, between the peoples of Miletus and Sardis).

\textsuperscript{51} Connor 116–17, citing Suda s.v. \textit{Diopithēs}, \textit{ἐπιτῆδευμα}. Diopithes was himself caught doing so unintentionally and dragged off to court.

\textsuperscript{52} Aristoph. \textit{Thesm.} 596ff.

\textsuperscript{53} Polyaeus 3.13.1 (of Chares), 5.28.2 (of Theognis).
difficult, and some types of counterintelligence were relatively simple. Strangers passing themselves off as citizens or members of a military force could be detected simply by not being known. They might more easily assume the role of newly established metics, but this population was often regulated.\textsuperscript{54} Foreigners often faced some degree of limitation on their freedom, the extent of the limits naturally varying according to the internal and international atmospheres. Athens, for example, has been characterized as rather open to visitors in times of peace, at least according to Thucydides’ Pericles and the evidence implicit in such examples as the presence of a Syracusean troop-master in the city in 421.\textsuperscript{55} But as tension increased, the city’s policy grew more strict: for instance, when suspicious of Potidaean fidelity, the Athenians forbade their Potidaean “allies” to admit Corinthian magistrates.\textsuperscript{56} In time of war, extreme measures were taken: at the opening of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians arrested all Boeotians in Attica, and they later cast the Aeginetans from their island.\textsuperscript{57} An inscription from the Attic town of Eleusis, dated to the opening of the Peloponnesian War, mandates that no foreigners—not even deserters—could be received.\textsuperscript{58}

The last mentioned incidents give rise to the question of expulsions of foreigners (\textit{xenelasiai}) and their application to counterintelligence. The Lacedaemonians have often been charged with recourse to such practices, but the extent and purpose of their use of expulsion acts was respectively exaggerated and misrepresented by Athenian propaganda. \textit{Xenelasia} was directed against corruption rather than intelligence, although it could have had a collateral effect in disrupting information flow.\textsuperscript{59} It could also have made the relationship between a domestic fifth column and a sympathetic foreign power more difficult, and hence it could have reduced the efficacy of traitors as informants. Failing this, it would have forced traitors to use covert means of communication. Expulsion acts could be instituted to preserve physical as well as moral

\textsuperscript{54} Tod p. 119.
\textsuperscript{55} Thuc. 2.39.1; Xen. \textit{Symp.} 2.1. Some religious secrets were vigorously kept, and foreigners were excluded from some rites (see, e.g., [Demosth.] LIX \textit{[Against Neaera]} 79–83; Wallace 108–9 ad loc.).
\textsuperscript{56} Thuc. 1.56.2.
\textsuperscript{57} Thuc. 2.6.2, 2.27.1.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{IG I} \textsuperscript{1} 58.
\textsuperscript{59} Cf. Allmand (in Neilson and McKercher, 40 and n. 35): during the Hundred Years’ War, the English parliament on more than one occasion demanded that Bretons be expelled to preserve secrecy.
security and can be associated with fear of sabotage: in the case of the Boeotians just mentioned, there are allusions in Aristophanes to apprehensions lest they burn the facilities in the Piraeus.\textsuperscript{60} Expulsions of foreigners, by individual or type, were not unknown in other states. Aristotle’s flights from Athens in 348 and 323 no doubt owe something to his Macedonian background.\textsuperscript{61} Further, there is a general feeling in the comments of Aeneas Tacticus that periodic expulsions of foreigners are a hygienic practice, undertaken out of prudence, to enhance security.\textsuperscript{62}

Other measures could be instituted by a state to control the admittance of foreigners and to monitor them during their stay. Aristophanes spoke of a token (alternately called a \emph{sphagis} and a \emph{sumbolon}) that was obtained at the gates to the city from the commander of the guard. This could be demanded of foreigners to verify their right to be present.\textsuperscript{63} Aeneas Tacticus accorded public officials the duty of registering the names and lodgings of visitors. Mention of the use of tokens in his preceding sentence may apply here also.\textsuperscript{64} Envoys of hostile or potentially hostile states, although admitted for the sake of maintaining diplomatic channels, might be kept apart from the general populace during their stay, to prevent communication.\textsuperscript{65} Aeneas further advocated a general policy whereby trusted citizens were assigned to ambassadors and whereby ambassadors would be limited to discourse with these alone.\textsuperscript{66} His advice might be limited in application to his context (a city under siege), but it seems to rest on the more sociable practice of envoys and notable visitors being entertained by prominent members of a community.\textsuperscript{67} Even when formal controls were not in place, there

\textsuperscript{60} Connor 117, citing Aristoph. \emph{Knights} 475ff. and adding: “The same fear is mentioned in \emph{Frogs} 359ff. In \emph{Acharnians} 715ff. Aristophanes jokes about Boeotian plots to set the naval yard afire. All these passages are jesting treatments of a very real anxiety.” See also Dinarchus \emph{Against Philocles} 1–2; Hyperides \emph{For Lyc. frag. Illa (IV)}.

\textsuperscript{61} Cf. McKechnie 152, with nn. 124 and 125. See also Demosth. XIX (\emph{On the False Embassy}) 331.

\textsuperscript{62} Aen. Tact. 10.10.

\textsuperscript{63} Aristoph. \emph{Birds} 1213 (\emph{sphagis}), 1214 (\emph{sumbolon}).

\textsuperscript{64} Aen. Tact. 10.9. On the basis of this passage, Whitehead ("Lakonian Key," 268) suggested that the “Laconian key” (mentioned in Aristoph. \emph{Thesm.} 423 and schol. \emph{ad loc.}), which locked a door from without, rendering it impossible to open from within, alluded to a form of house arrest of foreigners practiced in Sparta.

\textsuperscript{65} Aen. Tact. 10.11; cf. Thuc. 2.12.1–2. Cf. Thuc. 5.84.3 and, for late antique examples, Lee, \emph{Information and Frontiers}, 167–68.

\textsuperscript{66} Aen. Tact. 10.11.

\textsuperscript{67} See, e.g., Xen. \emph{Oecon.} 2.5; Xen. \emph{Mem.} 1.2.61.
seemed to be a general interest in keeping tabs on anyone socializing with foreigners.68

Provision was apparently made for attendance of religious festivals and access to the oracle of Apollo at Delphi even in time of war. Aristophanes mentioned that Athenians wishing to go to Delphi during the Peloponnesian War had to ask for passage from the Boeotians, through whose territory their route lay.69 The mechanics of this application could be a problem: how would an Athenian obtain permission from the Boeotians without being admitted into Boeotia, yet how could he be admitted into Boeotia without first gaining permission? Some arrangement with a third party might have solved this dilemma, or perhaps application was made via a herald, who possessed immunity.

The religious festivals, which provided an excellent opportunity for information gathering, must have made counterintelligence correspondingly difficult, and there is no evidence for monitoring of contact between individuals of mutually hostile states. Even regional festivals allowed admittance to a state during a war (without provisions for a truce). There is mention of visitors to the Gymnopaedia while most of the Spartan men were abroad at Leuctra, although it is hardly likely that Theban tourists were admitted into the city at that time.70

Attempts to control the contact between citizens and foreigners could impede the mobility of agents and reduce the availability of sources in time of war. Consequently, states would be relatively ignorant of their opponents’ affairs or would be compelled to compensate by using available means more extensively (e.g., heralds), by using different types of informants (e.g., captives), or by relying on covert collection (e.g., spies).

Counterintelligence Agents

The term counterintelligence agent is here used to denote those who disrupted the activity of intelligence agents or sources. In a few cases individuals were assigned the task of capturing or killing enemy intelligence agents. Patrols were sent to capture enemy scouts, and guards were posted to prevent deserters. Pompiscus, an Arcadian, was said to have made access to his camp difficult for enemy kataskopoi by fortifying the main roads and denuding them of cover, while patrolling the byways to

68. Hyperides For Euxenippus 22.
69. Aristoph. Birds 188–89.
70. Plut. Ages. 29.2.
capture those avoiding the roads.\textsuperscript{71} When important decisions were being made, Alexander posted mounted guards at the entrance to the camp and had nearby roads patrolled by cavalry to prevent messages being sent.\textsuperscript{72} Practical precautions were also suggested by Aeneas Tacticus. These included posting dogs outside the city walls and controlling passage out of the gates.\textsuperscript{73} Sentries may have acted as an obstacle to desertion or betrayal, although Xenophon’s description of small groups of men scattered through the dark to ambush would-be deserters probably reflects theory more than practice.\textsuperscript{74} Men or ships posted as watchers were vulnerable in turn, and Xenophon advocated setting ambushes for these as well.\textsuperscript{75}

The bulk of counterintelligence activity, however, was a by-product of a need for security against treachery. To this end informers were encouraged in many states. The employment of these individuals is relevant to the conduct of both intelligence and counterintelligence, insofar as they provided information to the government by revealing traitors and, in doing so, put an end to the activity of those who often provided information to hostile foreign powers.

Losada has commented on the success of security measures against fifth columns in the Peloponnesian War but has also noted that of five plots discovered by their prospective victims, four were revealed by individuals who were party to the plot, rather than by people outside the plot discovering it through vigilance or accident.\textsuperscript{76} As I mentioned earlier, it was (and remains) very difficult to keep secrets when the number of individuals privy to the secret exceeded three or four. Hence it is no surprise that conspirators were the most common informers. These were further able to provide a degree of detail unavailable from other sources.\textsuperscript{77}

Losada’s small sample is indicative of the larger context, and it is fair to say that democracies and oligarchies relied most heavily on volunteered information rather than on agents commissioned to monitor the
Provacateurs were not altogether absent but were more characteristic of tyrannies. All polities encouraged contributions from informers. Encouragement took the forms of promises of rewards, on the one hand, and the exacting of oaths and inculcation of the concept of duty, on the other. It might have also manifested itself in penalties for not informing, should people fail to report their knowledge of a plot.79

At least some of the peoples subject to Athens in the fifth century were bound by oath to denounce any revolutionary activity.80 Their adherence to these oaths was reinforced by the more tangible presence of episkopoi, proxenoi, phrourarkhoi, and the like. There may have been a similar arrangement during the Lacedaemonian hegemony, since the Athenians were quick to inform the Spartan harmost on Aegina of Demaenetus’ machinations lest they be considered implicated by their silence. Other authorities sometimes sought to instill a similar sense of obligation; hence sycophants often tried to give to their prosecutions the aura of public duty.81

Rewards included money for free people, freedom, and sometimes money for slaves. The amount of the reward could be fixed (and published), or it might be a percentage of the property of the accused.82 In either case, the rewards could amount to substantial sums of money. It was not uncommon for immunity (adeia) to be accorded to an informant who was himself involved in a conspiracy, in return for comprehensive information about a plot’s purpose and membership. Immunity could be extended to a participant in a plot but not to the instigator, and was provisional based on the veracity of the information. Those who provided information judged to be false, whether on the basis of other evidence or political expediency, did not meet happy ends.83

Informers were common in the fifth and fourth centuries and probably earlier as well, since informers and sycophants are mentioned (at least in...
Athens) from the time of Solon.\textsuperscript{84} They laid charges before magistrates (kings, tyrants, and fairly high-level officials, like strategoi and archons) or engaged in prosecution themselves. Intermediaries appear in the sources only when their behavior affected the information flow, although in less open societies their presence can be taken for granted. It is improbable that a cobbler, for instance, would be able to get an immediate interview with a tyrant without some sort of screening process. The channels through which an informant’s report flowed could be rather circuitous: the plot to deliver Boeotian cities into the hands of the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes was reported by Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, to the Lacedaemonians, who in turn communicated the information to the Boeotians in time for the latter to intervene and prevent the uprising.\textsuperscript{85}

In addition to informers, tyrants recruited and maintained provocateurs, such as those working for Hieron and the Dionysii in Syracuse. Ad hoc measures to test erstwhile friends on their fidelity were undertaken by people under other constitutions as well: Iphicrates, for instance, was said to have sent men disguised as Lacedaemonians into Chios to discover those who welcomed them. He arrested and sent to Athens those who received the imposters.\textsuperscript{86} Agents could be recruited for specific tasks involving clandestine investigation of suspect elements. The leader of the popular party in Argos, learning from an unspecified source of an imminent oligarchic coup, won over two men of the opposite party to work for him covertly while he openly treated them as enemies. In secret he learned the oligarchs’ plans from them and, on the night of the attempt, he called the ekklesia to stand in arms by tribe and so prevented the oligarchs from carrying out their coup.\textsuperscript{87} I have given other examples of such agents in chapter 3.

Finally, there were men like Demosthenes—there is no fitting category for their role, save perhaps the notions associated with the term loose cannon—who fostered a certain paranoia over the presence of foreign spies and domestic traitors. Their efforts were not a function of the offices they held but were guided by private concerns and ambitions.

\textsuperscript{84} Losada 113 and n. 349.
\textsuperscript{85} Thuc. 4.89.1–2. Cf. Thuc. 8.73.4; Plut. Pelopidas 9.3, 10.3–4.
\textsuperscript{86} Polyaeus 3.9.58; Front. Strat. 4.7.23. On the private level, but perhaps of equal pertinence to counterintelligence in its specific sense, is the advice of Isocrates (I [to Demonicus] 24–25), who advocated testing friends by confiding harmless information as if it were secret.
\textsuperscript{87} Aen. Tact. 11.7.
Demosthenes in particular was a self-appointed spy catcher and was censured, even mocked, by his political opponents for what they characterized as frenzied witch-hunts. Aeschines, his bitter enemy, declaimed, “I say nothing of his deceitful [perhaps “forged”] letters and arrests of spies and torture sessions on fictitious charges—as if I, and some others wanted to bring about revolution in the city.” Aeschines’ mockery does not lack backing in the speeches of other orators and in the words of Demosthenes himself. Dinarchus attacked Demosthenes on the grounds that he “brought into the assembly held just the other day an informer whom he had prepared with false statements to say that people were plotting to damage the docks.” The incident, if indeed it is the same one, appeared to Demosthenes in a different light.

You all remember Antiphon, the man who was struck from the register, and came back to Athens after promising Philip that he would set fire to the dockyard. When I had caught him hiding at Piraeus, and brought him before the assembly, this malignant fellow [Aeschines] raised a huge outcry about my scandalous and undemocratic conduct in distress and breaking into houses without a warrant and so procured his acquittal. Had not the Council of the Areopagus learned of the matter, and seeing that you had made an inopportune blunder, conducted an investigation of the man, arrested him and brought him to court a second time, the vile traitor would have slipped out of your hands and eluded justice, being smuggled out of the city by our bombastic phrase-monger. As it was, you put him on the rack and then executed him.

In the life of Demosthenes, once ascribed to Plutarch, there is further mention that he arrested Anaxilas of Oreus, who had been his guest-friend, and had him tortured as spy. Although Anaxilas, under torture, did not admit to espionage, Demosthenes proposed a decree that he be handed over to the Eleven for execution. Interpretation of Demosthenes’ action is rather difficult—he may have been attempting political
housecleaning under the guise of his concern for the security of the state, yet Aeschines (and later Dinarchus) had every motive for wishing Demostenes’ actions to appear in the worst light possible. In any event, these fourth-century free-for-alls show that counterespionage was a lively issue.

Finally, it is curious to note that the appearance of an ability to detect traitors could itself be a deterrent to treachery, as evidenced by a story in Polyaeus, in which a man announced publicly that he knew an infallible way to discover plots. He was summoned by Dionysius, who bade him reveal his method. The man insisted on telling him in private. Upon the dismissal of all others, he advised Dionysius to pretend that he indeed had a sure way of apprehending traitors, so that all would shrink from treachery out of fear.93 Nicocles appears to have aimed at provoking a similar response in his subjects when warning them, “Let none of you imagine that even what he secretly thinks in his own heart will be hidden from me.”94 But, more practically, Thucydides cynically observed that while much credit was given to those who had the intellectual prowess and, presumably, the sources that enabled them to detect plots, when the intelligent passively relied on their ability to anticipate unrest, they were destroyed by those of meaner wit but greater activity.95

Disruption or Interception of Communication

While Plutarch wanted to believe that the Athenians would not open Philip II’s private correspondence to his wife, he had to admit that such restraint could not be expected of all.96 If, indeed, the Athenians refrained from breaking open that letter, they had no compunctions about reading others. Even Philip had cause to complain that they waylaid his herald and read out the captured letters in the ekklesia.97 In fact, such evidence as exists implies that the Athenians were fairly adept at get-

93. Polyaeus 5.2.3; cf. Plut. Mor. 175f (Sayings of kings, Dionys. 8); Stob. 3.42.
94. Isoc. III (To Nicocles) 51, Loeb translation.
95. Thuc. 3.82.5, 83.2, 83.4, 87.3; cf. 6.38.2.
96. Plut. Mor. 799e, Loeb translation: “And I do not believe that the Thebans either, if they had obtained control of their enemies’ letters, would have refrained from reading them, as the Athenians, when they captured Philip’s mail-carriers with a letter addressed to Olympias, refrained from breaking the seal and making known an affectionate private message of an absent husband to his wife.”
97. Philip Epist. 2 (in Demosthenes’ corpus).
ting their hands on other people’s messages and messengers, perhaps because of their control of the sea for much of the fifth and fourth centuries.

These incidents are by no means isolated, nor can all be attributed solely to the chances of war. Reconnaissance forces are sometimes mentioned as responsible for the capture of documents, which is probably due to their role in seeking captives for interrogation. A number of messages fell into unintended hands because their bearers held allegiance to a third party above loyalty to the correspondents, sought personal gain by turning over the documents, or both. Such was the case with the courier of the treacherous regent Pausanias. Third parties, perhaps having learned how easy it would be to frame somebody by simulated correspondence, seem to have been cautious in receiving defecting couriers and sought independent confirmation. A return to the story of Pausanias illustrates this: the ephors arranged to overhear Pausanias acknowledge his guilt in a conversation contrived by the courier. In other circumstances, couriers were ordered to deliver the message as directed by its sender and then return with a reply that would confirm the correspondent’s complicity.

Many citations are vague on details of the capture. Xenophon recorded the celebrated letter of Hippocrates, that was sent to inform his Lacedaemonian compatriots, “Our ships are lost. Mindarus is dead. Our men starve. We don’t know what to do,” but was intercepted by the Athenians. However, Xenophon left us to speculate exactly how and

98. Some examples: Thuc. 2.67ff., 3.35.1, 4.50.1–3. Besides these, there is indirect testimony to the existence of measures taken to intercept messages in countermeasures used, by inference, to circumvent them—that is, devices invented to convey information without detection.

99. Some examples: (1) Plut. Lys. 28.2; (2) the capture of tablets bearing the Syracusan catalogue by Athenian triremes sent ahead to scout Syracuse’s harbor (Plut. Nicias 14.5); and (3) the capture of a Mardian messenger sent by the satrap of Damascus to Alexander (with secret overtures) by Parmenio’s scouts (Q. Curtius 3.13.2). In some cases, the attribution to scouts is implicit: it is entirely possible that the cavalry who captured a courier conveying an appeal from Selinus to Hamilcar and brought him to Gelon were scouts, since cavalry often fulfilled this role (Diod. Sic. 11.21.4–5).

100. Thuc. 1.132.5; Diod. Sic. 11.45.2ff. (cf. Hdt. 5.32). Cf. Hdt. 6.4; Xen. Anab. 1.6.3.

101. Aen. Tact. 31.9: During a siege a man was sent into the city with a message for a traitor, but instead he went to the archon of the city, to whom he gave the letters; the archon told him to deliver the letters and bring back a reply. Upon receiving the reply, the archon summoned the traitor and convicted him with his own seal.
where the Athenians got their hands on it. One must also rely on conjecture with regard to Parmenio’s letter to his sons, the letters of Darius intended for distribution among Alexander’s troops, and those of Demades urging action against Antipater.

Private correspondence could also be subjected to interception and scrutiny. Aeneas Tacticus called for an episkopesis (perhaps best translated “censorship” here) of outgoing and incoming letters. The context suggests that this practice would be continuous in peace and war; hence the creation of a new office or an alteration of an existing one might be desirable. There is no other evidence for such an office, and it may be that his theory did not become practice, but it is possible that a state would not wish to advertise its use of censorship on inscriptions for reasons of image or efficacy or both. Ad hoc measures to monitor communication were instituted by Alexander, who arranged for letters written by his troops to be opened and read to discern their sentiments. The Sicilian and Cyriote tyrants surely did likewise. The sources are silent concerning regulation of private correspondence of soldiers, but some effort may have been taken to oversee this channel of communication, which could compromise security.

The interception of messages represented not only a facet of counterintelligence (in that intelligence flow was subject to interruption) but also one of intelligence, since the information contained in dispatches could prove of great value to their captors. In the case of Theban scouts who intercepted a dispatch from Lysander to King Pausanias, the Boeotians were able to act quickly enough to prepare a strong force at Haliartus, where Lysander met his death fighting. Captured documents could be exploited in other ways to strengthen one’s own position or damage another’s. The letters of Darius and Parmenio mentioned earlier might be examples of such a practice. The framing of Dion with a letter allegedly sent to the Carthaginians, captured, and presented to Dionysius is prob-

102. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.23. This was an official dispatch, presumably on a skutale.
104. Aen. Tact. 10.6. Aeneas intended thereby to prevent contact between citizens and exiles, but such controls would have also affected other channels of communication of information.
ably an example as well. Conversely, disinformation could be effected by arranging for specially contrived documents to fall into enemy hands. Attempts were also made to disrupt other modes of communication, either by forestalling or by “jamming” their transmission. Interdiction seems to have been a matter of general policy (at least by the fourth century), at times carried out by night watchmen and enforced by stiff penalties. A notable instance of “jamming” was the Plataean confutation of signal fires lit by their Peloponnesian besiegers. The Plataeans had planned an escape attempt but realized that should they break through their besiegers, they would still have to deal with enemy reinforcements sent for from Thebes. Therefore they prepared beacons in advance, so that when the Peloponnesians tried to signal for aid, the Plataeans were able to light the beacons and thus confuse transmission of any messages.

Other Devices and Legislation

Legislation
Most legislation pertinent to counterintelligence was enacted to thwart treachery (prodosia). Prodosia encompassed espionage along with other forms of treason and fifth-column activity. Those found guilty under these laws were executed; spies of foreign states were subject to the same penalty as domestic traitors. A clause prohibiting the reception of deserters was incorporated among the terms of the truce between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians in 423. It would be interesting to know whether the two parties abided by their agreement. If nothing else, the treaty would make desertion a yet riskier undertaking in the mind of a soldier, since he could not have confidence that he would not be returned by his new patrons, particularly if his presence brought them no particular advantage. There are no indications, however, that deserters who claimed to have information were ever turned away unheeded by the

107. Aen. Tact. 10.26; Lysias Against Agorat.
108. Thuc. 3.22.7. Cf. Polyaenus 6.19.2. Naturally, the troops in Thebes were aware that something was up, but their response was less well directed than it might otherwise have been. Cf. Riepl 73 for an analysis of how this might have worked.
109. As recorded in Thuc. 4.118.7 (“neither you nor we are to receive deserters during this time, neither free nor slave”). Cf. IG3 58 (Attic, ca. 430): “it is forbidden [to receive any] xenos [into one’s house, not even a suppliant or an autolomolos.”
people whom they approached. Those who suffered their desertion established severe punishments. An Athenian decree concerning those who fled to Deceleia mandates that should they be caught returning, they could be taken by any Athenian to the Thesmothetae, who would in turn hand them over to be executed.\textsuperscript{110}

In an exceptional case, the communication of a specific item of intelligence was prohibited by law. A decree passed by the Thebans, often lauded by Athenian orators of the fourth century, mandated that the Thebans were to ignore anyone (i.e., any Athenian rebel) passing through their country under arms. This decree was enacted to prevent information concerning the muster in Boeotia (of the Athenians opposed to the Thirty) from reaching the Thirty or the Lacedaemonians.\textsuperscript{111} One wonders how effective such a decree could be, since the mere fact that it was enacted would be an indication that some game was afoot and would hardly prevent a Laconophile from tipping off the Spartans. It must be noted, however, that the Thirty did not lead out their troops until too late, after Phyle was seized—perhaps they had not taken the threat seriously.

**Internment**

During time of war, a commander had license to arrest and detain anyone who might conceivably be able to pass on information of his movements or plans. Such was the intent of the Athenians when they interned the crews of the ships of their Lesbian allies while preparing a surprise attack on Mytilene.\textsuperscript{112} Alexander proved more successful when he sent troops against a Mallian town with orders not to engage but to prevent anyone from escaping lest they tell their compatriots that the Macedonians were at hand.\textsuperscript{113} Armies on the march made no effort to distinguish between likely and unlikely security risks—instead, those who fell in with them were seized indiscriminately, as when Alcibiades and Chalcideus sailed to Chios.\textsuperscript{114} Likewise Seuthes led his force with cavalry that


\textsuperscript{112} Thuc. 3.3.4.

\textsuperscript{113} Arrian *Anab.* 6.6.4.

\textsuperscript{114} Thuc. 8.14.1. At a later date Alcibiades, upon arrival at Proconnesus, took into custody all the vessels in the harbor, even small ones, so that nobody could reveal the size of his own force to the enemy; he had a proclamation made to the effect that anyone caught sailing across the strait would be killed (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.15). Cf. Amm. Marc. 29.4.4.
detained everyone it met lest someone escape to warn his foes. Xenophon was particularly impressed with this precaution and improved on it in his *Education of Cyrus*, in which Cyrus, attempting to surprise the Armenians, sent men ahead in the guise of brigands to capture any Armenians on the army’s route, to prevent them from spreading news of his advent.

Concealment and Distraction

Concealment is attested most often in the military sphere, especially on tactical levels. It frequently manifested itself in ambushes over the entire range of the period under discussion, but it was also useful in achieving tactical advantage through unexpected movement. Agesilaus was praised by Xenophon for habitually concealing his army’s movements, so that his enemy often did not know where he was or whither he went. Movements by night or behind a screening body of troops or terrain and even smoke screens were used by Greek commanders and their opposite numbers among the Carthaginians. Troop numbers were also concealed or misrepresented. By the fourth century, all such measures were advocated as basic security and affected campaigning. Xenophon commended Epaminondas, for instance, for pitching camp within the walls of Tegea, since his actions would be less visible to his enemies, while it was possible for Epaminondas to observe them, since they were camped in the open.

While concealment of information is an impediment to an opponent’s ability to make intelligent decisions, its employment is liable to arouse suspicions. Although it is not always easy to detect a lack of information and understand its significance, it is certainly possible for an astute observer to be prompted to ask questions such as “Why am I not able to learn the whereabouts of the Athenian fleet?” and “Where did his light-armed troops go to?” or even “Why do the Spartans wish to conceal this?” Such thoughts lead naturally to further inquiry and speculation, which might compromise the counterintelligence effort. Indeed, Timoc-

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115. Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.36. Onasander (39.4) suggested this as standard operating procedure.
118. Xen. *Ages.* 6.6; Arrian *Anab.* 2.9.1, 2.9.3; Polyaeus 2.3.13, 3.3.13, 3.3.14, 3.9.8, 5.10.5. Cf. Thuc. 5.8; Q. Curtius 4.9.15. Cf. also Anderson 217–18 and n. 84.
119. Polyaeus 1.47.1, 3.9.19.
120. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.8.
rates aroused suspicions of treachery because he would not share common quarters with his compatriots when participating in an embassy to the Thebans, and he was executed on the belief that he did this to conceal secret negotiations and corruption. Thus although concealment in itself can be effective, its utility could be enhanced by complementary devices, such as misinformation and distraction. These devices, by concealing actual plans and actions beneath apparent explanations or demonstrations (particularly those appealing to an opponent’s expectations and prejudices), could deter hostile parties from properly considering the implications of whatever preparations they might detect.

Distraction entails the provision of an opportunity for an opponent to divert his attention and resources to an activity other than the one concealed. The Corinthians, for example, demonstrated with warships stationed opposite the Athenian fleet at Naupactus, while secretly preparing to send troop carriers to Sicily. The Corinthians knew that Naupactus was of considerable importance to the Athenians, who used it as a base to observe and hinder Peloponnesian movements west through the gulf. The Corinthians reasoned, soundly as events proved, that the potential threat of their fleet would divert Athenian attention from their other preparations.

Other Comments on Methods

Information on an opponent’s intelligence efforts facilitated a counterintelligence response, both in general strategy and in particulars. In the former case, it was essential to know what an enemy was actively seeking to learn and what types of agents he was employing, so that counterintelligence resources could be allocated where they were most needed, and so that measures taken to conceal, distract, or misinform the foe would be as effective as possible. A fitting example, if one of somewhat tenuous historicity, is the story of the Persians sent by Darius at the instigation of Democedes to reconnoiter the Greek coasts. Upon reaching Taras, Democedes jumped ship and persuaded Aristophilides, the Tarantine king, to arrest the Persians as *kataskopoi*. While the whole affair is described as a collusion between Democedes and Aristophilides to enable the former to escape back to his native Croton, nevertheless the Persians

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122. Thuc. 7.19.5.
were in fact *kataskopoi*, and their reconnaissance was compromised and only partially successful.\(^\text{123}\) Other measures included sealed orders and spot security checks on these.\(^\text{124}\) There are also a fair number of examples of efforts to withhold information that lack clarification as to the method used. Xenophon mentioned, for instance, that Alcotas, a Lacedaemonian guarding Oreus, took care lest the Thebans learn that he had manned ships for an ambush. No indication was made of how Alcotas achieved this.\(^\text{125}\)

### Disinformation

Disinformation complements concealment by providing one’s opponent with a false perception of one’s intentions. It further hinders the efforts of agents seeking reliable information, both by the immediate consequences of providing false information to decision makers and by the long-term demands it exacts due to the necessity to verify information.

Disinformation entails both outright falsehood and the presentation of the truth in a way that compels the listener to draw an erroneous conclusion or encourages an action beneficial to the deceiver.\(^\text{126}\) It was employed against enemies to gain advantage, especially in military contexts to lull their awareness and so heighten surprise, to lower their morale, to detach their allies, and to prevent or provoke movements.\(^\text{127}\)

The deception of an enemy did not seem to pose ethical dilemmas for

\(^\text{123}\) Hdt. 3.136.
\(^\text{125}\) Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56.
\(^\text{126}\) To denizens of the twentieth century the distinction between these two forms of deceit is perhaps arbitrary. There is, however, an interest in Greek literature in how far one can bend the truth until it breaks, which reflects a distinction in their society. In the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* (274–77, 368–86), e.g., the god Hermes seems to swear an oath denying that he stole Apollo’s cattle, but he is only describing an oath he might swear, and he presents his case to Zeus in words that are technically true but meant to mislead. His efforts, though detected, afford amusement and admiration rather than censure.
\(^\text{127}\) To heighten surprise: e.g., Aen. Tact. 23.3. To affect morale: e.g., Xen. *Cav. Com.* 5.8: “To instill fear in one’s enemies, one does such things as fake ambushes, fake reinforcements, and false information. Enemies are especially confident when they learn of difficulties and bother among the other side.” Cf. similar sentiments attributed to Iphicrates by Polyaenus (3.9.32). To detach allies: e.g., Plut. *Dion* 27.2. To affect movements: e.g., Aen. Tact. 23.7–11. Cf. also Dulles 145: “Its [deception’s] best known use is in wartime or just prior to the outbreak of war, when its main purpose is to draw enemy defenses away from a planned attack, or to give the impression that there will be no attack at all, or simply to confuse the opponent about one’s plans and purposes.” Collateral effects on evaluation will be discussed shortly.
the Greeks, particularly in military operations. They were hardly more hesitant to deceive their own soldiers than they were to mislead their enemies. Andocides accepted this practice as standard operating procedure, and even the moralizing Xenophon sanctioned its use when aimed at the general good. It might be argued that concealment of danger was more common than outright fabrications, but the former does imply the latter.

Disinformation has some important implications for a study of intelligence. First, the instigator of a leak had to be able to count on his foe’s willingness and ability to collect information, since for his plan to succeed, some effort on the enemy’s part was necessary. It would be futile—and perhaps bad for morale—to circulate disinformation at home and abroad if it could not provoke a desired response in a victim who was unable to discover it. The instigator had to have some knowledge of which channels of information were flowing at a given time, so as to ensure that the disinformation effort was placed appropriately. Additionally, anyone conveying disinformation by leak or agent must have sufficient knowledge about his foes to anticipate their response to the news. An example from Polyaenus may illustrate this: Iphicrates, while still in Mytilene, was said to have circulated that his men were to collect shields to send to Chian slaves. This move was calculated to pressure the Chians into supporting him, and indeed it succeeded in doing so. Had Iphicrates not known that the Chians lived in constant dread of a slave revolt, it is hardly probable that this idea would have occurred to him. While such knowledge hardly required elaborate information gathering, his assessment also relied on information about relative strengths and capabilities (what if the Chians had been strong enough to exact retribution?) and on an awareness that Chian agents or sympathizers would be present on Lesbos to report his rumor. Alternatively, if the means for such an operation had not been obviously at his disposal, the disinformation would not have been credible. Therefore it can be expected that

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128. Xen. Mem. 4.2.15, 16. Cf. Thuc. 4.86.6; Xen. Ages. 11.4. The Greeks were not the only ones to use misinformation: see, e.g., Hdt. 9.89; Xen. Anab. 2.4.14–25 (of Persians; cf. Polyaenus 2.2.4); Plut. Timoleon 19.4–6; Polyaenus 5.10.3 (of Carthaginians).


130. See Xen. Hell. 1.6.36 (Polyaenus 1.44.1), 4.3.14 (Plut. Ages. 17.2–3); Plut. Pelop. 10.2.


132. Polyaenus 3.9.23 (ca. 391); cf. Athen. 265d–266e for corroboration of Chian fears of slave revolts.
commanders had need of good intelligence on their opponents, supplemented by adequate knowledge of their opponent’s information-gathering practices.\textsuperscript{133}

Effective disinformation also demanded an ability to withhold true information that could expose the lie. There was a greater degree of confidentiality possible when information was communicated to a single person—had not Eteonicus been privately informed of the Lacedaemonian defeat at Arginusae, he would not have been able to suppress this report and bid the messengers to deliver false news of victory to his men.\textsuperscript{134} Such confidentiality was much more difficult to maintain in collective bodies because of varied individual interest, carelessness, or faction on the part of their members (even smaller bodies, such as the five ephors at Sparta, were not always in agreement, and security was less than airtight).\textsuperscript{135} There was correspondingly less ability to manipulate the populace by withholding or publishing news.\textsuperscript{136}

Having introduced the prerequisites of misinformation, it remains to turn to the subject itself. Disinformation took a variety of forms, but these can be generally placed into categories based on the manner of delivery: the leak and the agent.

**Leaks**

While the Greeks may not have known a word corresponding to our twentieth-century conception of a leak, they were familiar enough with the idea.\textsuperscript{137} Most leaks seemed to have been arranged by the instigator discussing his (false) plans openly or perhaps employing men to spread the word throughout his camp, in the expectation that someone would

\textsuperscript{133} Cf. Dulles 145–46: “As a strategic maneuver, deception generally requires lengthy and careful preparation. Intelligence must first ascertain what the enemy thinks and what he expects, because the misleading information which is going to be put into his hands must be plausible and not outside the practical range of plans that the enemy knows are capable of being put into operation. Intelligence must then devise a way of getting the deception to the enemy.”

\textsuperscript{134} Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.36; for a similar story of Agesilaus, see 4.3.14.

\textsuperscript{135} See, e.g., Thuc. 1.134.2.

\textsuperscript{136} So Adcock and Mosley (181), whose reasoning is good as far as it goes (“News was not carried exclusively or most quickly along official channels. Therefore there was no opportunity for it to be digested by an official body which could prepare its release and manipulate public opinion”) but incomplete in that it does not consider security measures.

\textsuperscript{137} Υευδογελλά, in Xen. *Cav. Com.* 5.8, almost attains this meaning, but the word is elsewhere used in its literal sense.
desert to the enemy or that a spy would be present. Since deserters were endemic to Greek warfare, the expectation was a real one. Such was probably the course of events when Alcibiades, Antalcidas, and Alexander deceived their respective foes. Making an announcement to a popular assembly also worked well—which is, to be sure, a measure of the difficulty of keeping real information from the enemy in democratic forms of government. Aeneas Tacticus suggested using this method for leaking fabricated plans for night attacks to the enemy to divert them from their own intended actions. He might have been alluding to the example of Iphicrates, who used this tactic against the Thebans. A rather crude alternative was to speak so loudly that a nearby enemy would overhear—such was the ploy ascribed to Pelopidas, who arranged for a horseman to ride up to him near the walls of a town, announcing loudly that the town’s ally had fallen. Hardly more sophisticated were Alexander’s measures to deceive Porus’ watchers: he had a small contingent pretend to be his whole army by making a lot of noise and commotion, while he moved his main force to attack elsewhere, thereby gaining tactical surprise—herein the kinship between concealment and demonstration is quite close. Stock stratagems included such devices as lighting more or less fires to deceive the enemy as to one’s numbers and making withdrawals while leaving fires lit behind. Signals observed by an enemy could also be used to denote the opposite of what the foe expected through prior experience, as in the cases of Cleomenes and Pompiscus. Occasionally appearances were manipulated when contact with representatives of other states was expected, as when the Egestaeans gave visiting Athenian envoys an impression of great wealth by gathering all their tableware of precious metals together and transferring the lot to each house that hosted them as if it was the property of each rather than all. Letters containing false information were allowed to fall into enemy hands on occasion.

138. Cf. Polyaenus 1.17, 1.42.1; see also Onas. 10.22–24, and chap. 1.
141. Polyaenus 2.4.1: Pelopidas also arranged for smoke to billow up in the direction of the allied town, as confirmation of the report; cf. Front. Strat. 3.8.2, in which the deception was further supported by prisoners dressed in the manner of the townspeople.
142. Q. Curtius 8.13.18ff.
143. Hdt. 6.78; Polyaenus 1.14.1, 5.33.2.
144. Thuc. 6.46; Polyaenus 6.21.1.
Agesilaus was a master of subtle and elaborate deception. Not only did he employ the tried-and-true method of deliberately circulating false information within his camp, but he made preparations consistent with this, so that his opponents would receive varied and independent evidence all pointing to the same erroneous conclusion. When campaigning against Tissaphernes in Asia Minor, he mustered men and sent word to those cities en route to Caria to stock markets. In doing so, he manipulated the expected indications of an attack and its directions, which large armies must make due to logistic necessity, and relied on Tissaphernes’ spies or on deserters and captives from his own army to convey information that would logically be sought by his foe. When Tissaphernes moved to defend Caria, Agesilaus invaded Phrygia. Agesilaus used the same method against the Thebans, when he wished to lure them from their defense of the pass at Scolus. He again gave orders for markets to be prepared, this time in Thespiae, and further indicated that all embassies should await him there; the Thebans moved to guard the pass to Thespiae, while he marched unhindered through Scolus.

There are only two examples of this type of disinformation before the second half of the Peloponnesian War. This could indicate (1) that the Greeks were not so efficient at gathering information that an attempt to circulate false information in the hope of it being reported back to an opponent was feasible, and/or (2) that the possibility of such a subtle form of deception was not yet realized, or (3) that examples occurring before the birth of historical writing were lost due to secrecy or neglect. The second possibility seems to be the most likely, since the Greeks perceived an active effort, via an agent, as normal operating procedure; the story of besieged Miletus (if true) seems more of an ad hoc response to an unforeseen opportunity.

145. Xen. *Hell* 3.4.11–12; Xen. *Ages.* 1.14–16; Plut. *Ages.* 9.2, 10.1; Polyaenus 2.1.9. For other examples of the collection of foodstuffs as an indication of an army’s muster or route, see Hdt. 7.25; Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.11. Cf. Frederick the Great 126 (“look for the enemy’s supply depots”), 347–48; Maurice de Saxe (291): “They [spies] should be placed everywhere, among the officers, the generals, the sutlers, and especially among purveyors of provisions, because their stores, magazines, and other preparations furnish the best intelligence concerning the real designs of the enemy.”

146. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.48; Polyaenus 2.1.11.

147. Hdt. 1.20, 23 (ca. 611): When the besieged Milesians learned from Periander of a future embassy from Alyattes, they arranged a show of conspicuous consumption for his herald to witness. On learning of the apparent prosperity of the Milesians, Alyattes despaired of his siege. Cf. Polyaenus 6.47.1; Front. *Strat.* 3.15.6.
Agents

If a leader could not count on an enemy intelligence agent being on hand to report disinformation back to his employer, he could send one of his own men to accomplish the task. Particularly reliable men were sought for such a role, and one can imagine that the risks they faced were considerable should their reports be revealed as lies. The agent’s first problem was to get access to the foe, then win acceptance and trust. As Dulles put it, “He cannot simply turn up with dramatic military information and expect to be believed unless he can explain his motive and how he got his information.” The most common cover employed by such agents, as with spies, was that of a deserter: it provided a familiar context for gaining admittance, it eliminated the need to fabricate another identity, and it lent itself well to a cover story built around a motive.

The first (more or less) historical use of this manner of disinformation by a Greek is credited to Solon, who sent a fake deserter to Salamis with the story that the Athenian women were celebrating a festival on a given night apart from the city. He thus lured his foes into an ambush, when beardless youths disguised as women turned on their Megarian assailants. Numerous other examples occur in Polyaein.

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148. He could also undertake it himself, but this was not so common (delegation being the better part of valor, no doubt). Themistocles took the Spartans for a ride with his denials that the walls of Athens were being rebuilt, but he was practicing his deceits amidst friends (if heavy–handed ones) rather than enemies (Thuc. 1.91.3–7; Diod. Sic. 11.39ff.; Plut. Them. 19.1–2). Cf. Alcibiades at Thuc. 8.81.3. Aristarchus apparently did not seek to delegate the task when he tricked the Athenian garrison at Oenae into relinquishing their camp (Thuc. 8.98.1); this is no doubt due to his reliance on his office of strategos to lend authority to his words.

149. Individuals so employed are called “trusted” (περιτεχνικοί) at Thuc. 6.64.2 and Plut. Solon 8.4. They had better be, since they were quite likely to be caught. Sun Tzu classified such men as “death agents”—i.e., serving with the expectation of eventual execution by the enemy.

150. Dulles (146–48) described such agents, including, among more modern examples, the man from Catana sent by the Athenians to deceive the Syracusans (Thuc. 6.64).

151. Plut. Solon 8.4; cf. Polyaein 1.20.2, 1.48.1, 2.12.1. Earlier examples (Polyaein 1.9, 1.15) are mythical.

152. In our period: Polyaein 4.2.21 (Philip II; cf. Front. Strat. 1.4.13), 5.33.4 (Pompeiscus), 5.44.2 (Memnon). Unfortunately these cannot be confirmed by other sources (except the story of the Persian Zopyrus [Polyaein 7.13.1; cf. 7.12.1 of Sitalces], which is attested in Hdt. 3.153ff.; Diod. Sic. 10.19.2–4; Just. 1.10.15; Front. Strat. 3.34; Plut. Sayings of Kings, Darius 4; Leo Byz. 2.3), but they are worthy of mention on the grounds that they may be derived from sources lost to us. Cf. Vergil Aeneid 2.57–198.
these is of special interest in that there was an attempt to corroborate the report of the fake deserter: when the Lacedaemonians were short of provisions, Agis sent fake deserters to tell the (unspecified) enemy that a large army was on its way to reinforce his troops. Not only did Agis back up their story by having his men make noises consistent with the report, but he thought to have a number of (ostensibly) independent sources all bearing the same tidings.¹⁵³

The Athenians, while in Sicily, sent to Syracuse a Catanaean whom the Syracusans thought sympathetic to them. He told them that the Athenians spent the nights in the city away from their arms and that if the Syracusans came, there were many in Catana who would join them. The Syracusan generals were careless, failed to check into the man’s story, and eagerly took the bait. While their forces were marching to Catana, the Athenians sailed by night, landed at the Olympium near Syracuse, and consolidated their position as their foes began the weary trek back.¹⁵⁴ By the end of the struggle in Sicily, the Syracusans were able to even the score. After they had inflicted a crushing blow on the Athenians at sea, the Athenians prepared to move their land forces to safety. The Syracusans were not about to interrupt their victory celebrations to prevent them. But their general, Hermocrates, was aware that Nicias had agents in Syracuse, so he sent some of his companions to the Athenian camp. These men called out names of Athenian officers as if they had been sent from Nicias’ agents, bidding them to tell their general that the roads were guarded. Nicias failed to verify the report, since he thought it came from a reliable source. The delay ended in disaster.¹⁵⁵

In addition to the use of fake deserters and impersonation, a commander might allow an enemy to capture some of his men who were primed with incorrect information. Xenophon portrayed Cyrus devising such a scheme in the theoretical context of the Education of Cyrus. The context was as follows: Cyrus had won the allegiance of Gadatas, an Assyrian officer still among his people. He planned to have Gadatas and his com...

¹⁵³. Polyaenus 1.46.1.
¹⁵⁴. Thuc. 6.64–66. Plutarch (Nicias 16.2) credited Nicias with the scheme, while Thucydides made a vague reference to the Athenian stratēgoi. One wonders whether Lamachus, who was characterized as brave but not overly imaginative, would have had the idea; Alcibiades had already fled (although Polyaenus 1.40.5 attributed the ruse to him). Cf. Diod. Sic. 13.6.2–3; Front. Strat. 3.6.6. Both Dulles (145) and Plutarch (loc. cit.) commended the maneuver.
¹⁵⁵. Thuc. 7.73; Plut. Nicias 26.1–2; Diod. Sic. 13.18.3–5; Front. Strat. 2.9.7; Polyaenus 1.43.2.
mand admitted into a stronghold that Cyrus wanted to possess, so that the traitor could overcome the garrison and deliver the stronghold to the Persians. Cyrus devised thus: he gave some of his men word that he planned to attack the stronghold, and he arranged for them to be captured by Gadatas. Gadatas then had the captives interrogated in front of witnesses, and on the basis of their information, he was sent to reinforce the stronghold; he thereafter betrayed it as planned. There are mercifully few examples of such callousness toward one’s own men, and one presumes that the practice was rare, although couriers were now and again deliberately allowed to fall into enemy hands: Philip II, when the Athenians and Thebans held a pass against him, sent a contrived letter to Macedon, as if he had learned of a Thracian revolt and intended to march on Thrace. He sent the courier through the narrows, where the strategoi Chares and Proxenus captured both man and letter; the strategoi thought the letter genuine and moved their force, thereby freeing the pass. It is further conceivable that soldiers were told what they might tell the enemy if captured, yet this was probably avoided for the sake of morale and security.

Other Forms of Disinformation

To this point the focus has been on disinformation in military contexts, since it is easier to perceive its presence and study its effect. In the political realm things become nebulous, due in part to the clash of personalities and ideals rather than arms. Rhetoric pervades politics, and it manip-
ulates information by its very nature. Are those who employ it engaged in disinformation? Did Pericles (or Thucydides) intend to deceive his listeners when he distorted truth in the funeral oration, or did Isocrates in his Panathenaicus? Were the Athenians who spoke against aggressive action against the Macedonians really Philip’s agents or victims of mud slung all too vigorously by Demosthenes? It is difficult to distinguish sincerity of belief from fabrication, and in any case this is not a treatise on psychology or rhetoric. Suffice it to say that disinformation was and is subtle and pervasive, in the sense that information is manipulated or suppressed according to the goals of the individuals who present it.

Besides deliberate disinformation, there are many examples of reports or rumors that proved to be unfounded. These might be due to wishful thinking, fear, partisanship, prejudice, misunderstanding, or any combination of the many factors that influence people to accept information that is not true. Furthermore, the dictates of chance could be such that even the data before one’s eyes cannot always be trusted: at one point in the Corinthian War a group of Lacedaemonian cavalry dismounted and took up shields left by routed Sicyonians. They fell on the Argives, who saw the sigmas on the shields and did not realize their danger until it was too late.

The Greeks manipulated their opponents (and allies also, for that matter) by means of true information as well as false. A case in point is the scheme of Themistocles to force the Greeks to fight at Salamis. Themistocles felt it was in the Athenians’ best interest, and incidentally that of the other Greeks as well, to fight the Persians in the narrows, while the other Greeks preferred not to risk a battle from which there could be no viable retreat should they be defeated. Unable to win over his compatriots with arguments, Themistocles sent an agent (various accounts give various details) to Xerxes with the (quite true) news that the Greeks were divided among themselves and planned to slip away. This information, as Themistocles had anticipated, encouraged Xerxes to surround the Greeks and plan an attack for the following morning to put an end to their naval strength once and for all. Thus the Greeks soon discovered that they were unable to flee and were faced with no alternative.

158. See, e.g., Thuc. 6.52.1–2, 6.104, 8.66.3.
159. Xen. Hell. 4.4.10.
160. Aeschylus Persians 355; Hdt. 8.75, 87; Diod. Sic. 11.17.1; Plut. Them. 12.3; Plut. Arist. 9.4; Plut. Mor. 185bc; Polyaenus 1.30.3; Front. Strat. 2.2.14; etc. Cf. Hdt. 8.110; Plut. Them. 16.4.
but to fight. Had Salamis ended with a Persian victory, Themistocles’
name would have been a byword for treachery among the Greek peoples.
As it was, he emerged covered with glory.161

The effect of disinformation extends beyond the immediate success or
failure of a particular application. Its memory endures in its victims’
(and, to some extent, the perpetrators’) minds, so that when they later
receive other items of information, their ability to judge and evaluate
data will be at once enhanced and hindered by their experience.162 It will
be enhanced in that they will be more likely to question appearances and
less prone to fall for subsequent misinformation. It will be hindered in
that they will hesitate to act on real and valuable information and so lose
opportunities or even—as in the case of Tissaphernes mentioned ear-
lier—be so suspicious of information that they will err by acting on the
assumption that it was intended to deceive.

Broadly speaking, the Greeks’ characterization of the prevalence and
efficacy of counterintelligence was influenced by their perception of
power structure. In military contexts, it was assumed that secrecy was a
necessary ingredient for surprise and that counterintelligence measures
were a prerequisite for secrecy. In a democracy, counterintelligence was
seen as antithetical to individual freedom. Governments in which power
was held by few or one were thought to rely for stability on an ability to
detect secrets and conspiracies among the populace while withholding
their own secrets from foreigners.

161. Cf. the manner in which the Athenian Phrynichus handled a tricky situation result-
ing from his correspondence with Astyochus, the Spartan navarch, during the Pelopon-
nesian War (Thuc. 8.50–51).
162. Cf. Dulles 151–52; Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations, 41 (giving as an
example Wavell’s hesitation in crediting the fact that Crete was in fact the target of immi-
nent German airborne attack, rather than a diversion or ruse).