

CHAPTER 6

The Rivalry Approach to the Democratic Peace

We have emphasized that the rivalry approach applies to issues of both war and peace. In the last two chapters, we have focused on the conflictual side in our use of deterrence theory as a continuing example. Here we redress the balance by addressing the issue of the democratic peace through the rivalry lens. More specifically, we consider how the rivalry approach poses new questions in a heavily researched area, but also how it helps address key questions that have proven problematic with traditional cross-sectional methodologies.

We chose the democratic peace because it is perhaps the most interesting and important body of international conflict research in the last decade. The democratic peace centers on the proposition that democracies rarely fight each other. Although democracies may be no more or less conflict-prone overall than authoritarian regimes (for different levels of analysis in the democratic peace, see Gleditsch and Hegre 1997), two democracies have almost never fought against each other in the modern era (Small and Singer 1976; Russett 1993; Ray 1995).

Although there has been an abundance of work on this subject over the past several years and a seeming exhaustion of interesting lines of research, we propose that new insights can be gained into the democratic peace by looking at the phenomena through the lenses of the rivalry framework. Chan (1993) has noted that the analyses of the democratic peace (and indeed international conflict in general) have been static and cross-sectional comparisons of democratic and nondemocratic dyads, with little concern for the processes that generate interstate conflict or peace. We believe that the rivalry approach addresses that concern and provides new ways of looking at the democratic peace. In this way, studying the democratic peace offers an illustrative example of many of the themes, characteristics, principles, and methodologies outlined in the last two chapters.

This study reformulates the democratic peace debate using the rivalry framework. First, it allows us to extend the democratic peace argument to phenomena beyond war. According to Doyle (1996), this is essential to test both the validity and elasticity of the democratic peace argument. Instead of asking whether or how often democratic states fight wars, the rivalry framework allows us to focus on how often and in what kinds of rivalries democratic states become involved. This permits us to test whether the democratic peace applies to repeated conflict; that is, whether joint democracy not only inhibits war or initial militarized conflict, but whether given conflict it stifles repeated confrontations between the same pair of states.

Second, the rivalry framework provides for a more dynamic, longitudinal research design that permits scholars to study the conflict behavior of each dyad over its entire history, including both democratic and nondemocratic periods. Most existing research on the democratic peace has compared the conflict behavior of democratic dyads with that of nondemocratic dyads at some arbitrary point in time. The rivalry approach is consistent with Spiro's (1994) call to explore a dyad over its history in evaluating the democratic peace rather than just at one point in time. If dyads avoided militarized conflict while democratic and were also peaceful while one or both states were nondemocratic, questions could be raised about the importance of joint democracy in maintaining the observed peace. Yet if many democratic dyads engaged in frequent militarized confrontations in nondemocratic periods, but stopped doing so once both states in the dyad became democratic, our confidence in the democratic peace as a pacifying influence would be strengthened. A longitudinal analysis meets the concerns of Russett (1995), who suggests that studying conflict over the lifetime of each dyad can greatly extend our understanding of the democratic peace beyond the year-to-year cross-sectional comparisons that have dominated previous research.

Specifically, the longitudinal character of the rivalry approach can also help uncover changing conflict behavior over time in response to democratization. With the rivalry approach, we can hold most aspects of a given competition constant by looking at changes within individual rivalries, which allows us to study the impact of changes in one factor—democracy—on conflict. Most other analyses of the democratic peace are unable to “equalize” the comparison of disparate dyads, being at best forced to institute as many controls as possible (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1992) in order to account for national differences that might be responsible for the observed relationships. In our analyses, different phases of the rivalry itself effectively offer us a control group for comparison with each other, allowing us to study the effect of changing democracy levels on the occurrence and severity of militarized conflicts. A similar approach was taken by Chan (1984), who supplemented an aggregated analysis of all “relatively free” and “relatively unfree” states with a more fine-grained analysis of individual states that experienced periods of both free and unfree rule. Thus, the

second contribution of the rivalry approach is to provide an analysis of rivalries in which the states underwent a regime change such that a democratic dyad resulted (or vice versa). We then assess whether joint democracy had any impact on rivalry dynamics.

A third contribution of the rivalry approach to the study of the democratic peace is an extension of the previous one. How strong is the impact of democracy on rivalry dynamics? Above, we considered whether new joint democracy affected a rivalry. We can also assess whether democracy can completely arrest a rivalry, thereby precipitating its end. Thus, the rivalry approach can extend the democratic peace argument to new venues, help assess its impact by studying the impact of regime change on rivalry competition, and determine whether democracy has a strong enough effect to end ongoing militarized competitions. Rasler and Thompson's (1998b) findings suggest that effects from ongoing rivalries may outweigh any pacifying impact from democracy.

Finally, the rivalry framework facilitates the use of democracy as a dependent variable as well as an independent one. Previous analyses of the democratic peace looked only at how democracy inhibited conflict. In our analysis, we also explore how rivalries (specifically their onset and their termination) affect democratization within the rival states. In this way, we explore whether democracy is a consequence, as well as a facilitator, of peace. Thus, the rivalry approach permits us to examine the possibility of reverse or recursive causality cited by Thompson (1996), Gates, Knutsen, and Moses (1996), and others.

We begin with the simplest application of the rivalry approach, changing the focus of analysis from war to rivalry. This is an incremental step away from traditional studies of the democratic, but one that still yields new insights. We then exploit the potential of the rivalry approach more fully by looking at rivalries over time, with special attention to changes in regimes of the rivals over time. Because the democratic peace debate is so well known, we dispense with the usual literature review (see Russett 1993; Ray 1995; Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller 1996) and discuss only those elements directly relevant to our argument. The final part of our analysis explores the causal direction of the rivalry-democracy relationship. As this has not been explored extensively, we devote significantly more attention to previous studies on related topics that offer us some guidance in formulating our expectations.

Rivalry as the Focus of Analysis

Our hypotheses begin with the first concern, testing the democratic peace argument on new phenomena. Our expectation is that democratic dyads will become involved in militarized rivalries of any form less frequently than other dyad types. This expectation is a logical extension of previous research on

democracy and conflict, which has repeatedly found that democracies less frequently engage in militarized conflict and only rarely, if ever, in full-scale interstate wars. Because militarized rivalry involves protracted adversarial relationships with multiple confrontations between the rivals, the previously observed rarity of militarized conflict between democracies suggests that democracies should also become involved in very few rivalries. Yet, we also expect that this relationship will be even stronger for more severe forms of rivalry. That is, joint democratic dyads should be somewhat less likely than other types of dyads to engage in isolated conflict, which is a type of adversarial relationship involving one or two militarized confrontations. But democracies should be even less likely than other pairs of states to engage in proto-rivalries or enduring rivalries.

Democracy and Peace Within Rivalries

The next two expectations concern a specific subset of all interstate rivalries: those rivalries that experience at least one change in dyadic democracy status during the course of the rivalry. Such regime-change rivalries offer a useful opportunity to reconsider the relationship between democracy and peace, because they allow us to study the effects of changing democracy levels within the same dyads while holding almost all other factors constant. Maoz (1997) looks at a series of dyads and compares their militarized dispute proclivity during periods of joint democracy and other regime configurations; he finds that joint democratic periods are much less dispute prone than others. Nevertheless, his comparisons are made across a broad sweep of dyad-years over two centuries, and it is not clear how comparable the two time frames really are. For example, are the historical contexts and all other relevant variables comparable in dyad relations in the early nineteenth and later twentieth centuries? The focus on rivalries, which range from a few years to an average of 30 to 40 years for enduring rivalries, is less subject to this limitation and provides a better basis for comparison (as we are comparing periods in close proximity to one another in the same ongoing competition).

When a regime transition during an ongoing rivalry leads to the creation of a joint-democratic dyad (or to the reversal of joint-democratic status), we expect the transition to have an important impact on rivalry behavior. If the pacifying effect of democracy is to be considered meaningful, then we should expect to observe a rapid reduction in the frequency or severity of militarized conflict within rivalries that undergo a transition to joint-democratic status. Similarly, we should expect a noticeable increase in the frequency or severity of conflict in rivalries following a transition away from joint democracy.

We recognize that the pacifying effect of joint democracy may not be immediate and may vary depending on the history of conflict between the adversaries during their rivalry before the regime transition (Hensel 1995). Similarly, Mansfield and Snyder (1995b) suggest that the process of democratization may actually increase the short-term likelihood of militarized conflict, due

to the risks of a volatile rise in mass politics in a setting with relatively new and unstable democratic political institutions. It should be noted, however, that Entlerline (1996) identifies numerous problems in Mansfield and Snyder's research design and evidence, and that his reanalyses find an immediate pacifying effect of democratization. We will test for the possibility of a lagged effect.

A final dimension of the democracy-rivalry linkage that bears consideration is the impact of democracy on the termination of rivalry. Bennett (1997a) finds a significant relationship between polity change and rivalry termination, especially when that change leads to joint democracy among the rivals. The effect of introducing democratic changes into a rivalry may be the equivalent of an endogenous shock (see chapter 11) that disrupts rivalry patterns and provides the conditions under which that rivalry can end. Thus, consistent with the logic of the democratic peace, we expect joint democracy to have a powerful effect on rivalry behavior, strong enough to end an ongoing rivalry.

Rivalry and Democracy

We now consider the impact that rivalry can have on democracy levels. In previous empirical research on the democratic peace, democracy has functioned as the independent variable, which has been hypothesized to affect conflict propensity or conflict escalation. Looking at the democratic peace through the lenses of the rivalry approach, however, we have reason to expect that the causal direction might also run in the opposite direction. Our final two hypotheses consider the impact of rivalry on democracy, focusing on whether involvement in a militarized rivalry leads to decreases in democracy levels and on whether the end of militarized competition in turn promotes greater democratization.

If these final two hypotheses receive empirical support, then at the very least we could conclude that the relationship between democracy and peace is recursive. It may even be the case that the democratic peace literature has the wrong causal direction, namely that periods of conflict and rivalry typically reduce democracy levels and that the end of serious military conflict may be a prerequisite for the establishment of stable democratic processes. Gates, Knutsen, and Moses (1996), for example, suggest that greater levels of international peace and stability may contribute to the growth of democracy, while less peace internationally may lead to restrictions on democracy.

Our first expectation on the rivalry-democracy linkage concerns the effects of an ongoing rivalry on political democracy. The extant empirical evidence for this proposition is thus far mixed. Modern warfare, with its reliance on mass-mobilized armies, requires the support—or at least acquiescence—of the masses both in the military and on the home front. As a result, states may extend citizenship rights during wartime, in order to mobilize the population and to ensure their support in the war effort (Therborn 1977). Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) and Howard (1991) note that working-class organizations

must often be included in the ruling coalition to a much greater extent than in peacetime, and that war can generate mounting pressures to extend the vote to women and excluded racial groups. More generally, Tilly (1985) and Howard (1983, 1991) argue that war making and state making were closely related in the development of European states. Such states developed out of leaders' quest for power within a secure or expanding territory, which involved conflict with internal and external enemies. To succeed in this conflict, the state needed to build up a strong military, which required the extraction of substantial resources and the formation of alliances with selected social classes within the state. In return for their participation, the state rewarded these classes with "protection" from their enemies in ways that often constrained the state's rulers themselves, such as courts, assemblies, or reliance on credit and technical expertise. Thompson (1996) argues similarly that in many cases, the scope of franchise extensions expanded with the increasing number of people regarded as important to war-making efforts as soldiers, workers, and taxpayers.

The evidence from individual cases, however, seems to suggest quite the opposite relationship more recently, which is consistent with our expectation. For example, Thompson (1996) notes that participation in warfare—particularly frequent or intensive warfare—typically encourages and rewards more authoritarian approaches to decision making and resource mobilization. Gates, Knutsen, and Moses (1996) note that governments in wartime have often restricted their citizens' rights and freedoms, and that even democratic governments in wartime have declared martial laws or postponed elections in the name of security. Similarly, Tilly (1985) notes that the European model does not apply very well to many states that have developed recently. Many newly independent states have been able to meet their military needs through external sources of equipment and expertise in return for commodities or military alliance. As a result, they have not needed to build the same domestic alliances in the course of war making and state making, and therefore have not been subjected to the same constraints as their European predecessors. In such cases, Tilly (1985, 186) notes, the new states often develop "powerful, unconstrained organizations that easily overshadow all other organizations within their territories," with little incentive to grant civil liberties or broad political participation.

Most of the literature cited above deals with periods of active warfare, rather than the typically less severe concept of rivalry (although many rivalries are characterized by periods of warfare at least once in their duration). Yet similar arguments can be made for the effects of a situation of protracted external security threat. As Thompson (1996, 144) notes, "even the threat of impending war" can make more democratic power-sharing arrangements relatively inefficient or undesirable, and "political systems are quite likely to become more authoritarian as they become engaged in crises of national security." Layne (1994, 45) also argues that "The greater the external threat a state faces (or believes it does), the more 'autocratic' its foreign policymaking process will be, and the

more centralized its political structures will be.” That is, states in high-threat international environments tend to adopt more autocratic governmental structures to enhance their strategic posture and allow them to deal with the threatening situation more efficiently.

Regarding the positive effects of external conflict on political mobilization, Howard (1991) and Kaufman (1993) note that Israel’s environment of continual external threat has been an important integrative force for social mobilization, consensus, and conciliation in Israeli society, “shaping Israel’s civil society in to a highly participatory community” (Kaufman 1993, 115). Nonetheless, Howard (1991, 47) suggests, it has also created a beleaguered garrison state “where the distinction between the armed forces and the civilian population is one simply of function.” Along these lines, Pinkas (1993, 62) suggests that the Israeli occupation of Arab territories captured in the 1967 war “has exacted a heavy price from Israeli democracy, impairing its development.” According to Pinkas (1993, 62), the occupation has negatively influenced public perceptions of democracy (“corrupting the soul of Israeli society”), as well as negatively influencing the institutions of democracy itself by blurring the line between democracy and nondemocratic military government. He further argues that the Israeli public is willing to accept the suspension of certain democratic rights or infringement of certain civil rights in the name of security. Examples cited by Pinkas include censorship of the press, reliance on emergency security legislation passed and enforced with little parliamentary supervision, and restrictions on the rule of law in the occupied territories. Kaufman (1993) further notes that while Israelis overwhelmingly support abstract democratic principles, they also prefer strong leadership, restrictions on minority rights, and the general subordination of political rights to security considerations.

Beyond the case of Israel, Nincic (1989, 3–4; see also Vasquez 1993) argues that the Cold War had “permanent and pernicious”—although rarely recognized—domestic consequences in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Defense and intelligence agencies achieved privileged positions of power within the U.S. government, giving them a preeminent role in shaping national priorities (particularly regarding U.S.-Soviet relations) with less possibility of oversight by nonmilitaristic elements of government or society. Society itself was also influenced by the rivalry, with opposition to the government’s policies being seen as reflecting a communist or left-wing (and certainly unpatriotic) position. Nincic identified similar trends in the Soviet Union, with the dominance of the national security bureaucracy and the narrowing of permitted political discourse. The protracted rivalry thus corrupted the practice of democratic principles in the United States (even if the actual institutions were not altered substantially) and solidified or exacerbated the repressive tendencies of the Soviet leadership.

Scholars have argued, then, that the impact of war or rivalry on democracy can take several forms, ranging from increased political inclusion to reduced

civil and political liberties. We suggest that a similar relationship should hold with respect to interstate rivalries—which typically last much longer than wars, and thus present greater opportunities for the external security threat to lead to restrictions or limitations on political democracy. Thus, we expect that periods of rivalry should lead to regime change away from dyadic democracy relative to the rivals' regime type before the onset of rivalry.

As discussed above, several scholars have noted a tendency for civil liberties and political rights to be extended to previously excluded groups during wartime or rivalry; we now consider the impact of the termination of rivalry on democracy. The more peaceful international environment resulting from the end of rivalry may be conducive to the expansion of democratic rights and liberties in the former rivals. Indeed, some scholars might argue (Gates, Knutsen, and Moses 1996; Thompson 1996) that peace creates the possibility of democracy, particularly when the peaceful period follows a history of warfare.

In many cases, governments that extended additional rights or liberties during war or rivalry may attempt to reverse these changes after the conclusion of the war, only to find that liberties and rights can be difficult to take away once they have been granted. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992, 70) illustrate this point with a 1946 quote from U.S. Senator Barkley of Kentucky, who noted that he could not refuse to vote for the peacetime extension of democratic rights to all races, colors, creeds, religions, ancestries, and origins after having voted to subject men from all of these backgrounds to compulsory military service during the war. In cases in which rights and freedoms have been granted for the first time during war—or rivalry—we thus expect that many of these rights and freedoms will continue to be granted after the end of the conflict in question.

Where political rights and freedoms have not been enjoyed during wartime or rivalry, we also expect that pressures may build for their extension afterward. Most dramatically, previous research has shown that the end of war—particularly an unsuccessful or costly war—can lead to regime change in the involved states (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992). Authoritarian regimes have been replaced with political democracy in cases ranging from the Axis powers after World War II to Argentina after the Falklands War. Our current emphasis on rivalry rather than war, though, involves a much broader effect. With the end of serious conflict, we see governments willing to relinquish powers to the citizenry that they heretofore guarded jealously to meet the demands of external threats. Similarly, popular demands may increase for more active participation in government, as opposition to the government is no longer considered traitorous and the justifications for restraints on popular rule are no longer as compelling.

Certainly the movement toward democracy by many states in Eastern Europe and elsewhere after the Cold War is suggestive of this effect. Once the political and military competition comprising the Cold War decreased to a level

that was not as threatening to national security, many of the formerly authoritarian states in Eastern Europe (and, indeed, many of the formerly authoritarian republics that had made up the Soviet Union itself) began to democratize. Thus, we anticipate that the end of militarized conflict in rivalries should be followed by regime change toward democracy in one or both rival states, relative to the rivals' regime type during the militarized period of rivalry.

The causal direction of the relationship between rivalry and democracy is a potentially complex one. We acknowledge that our tests below are of the most preliminary character and do not necessarily capture the full range of this complexity. Nevertheless, we include this aspect of the rivalry approach to the democratic peace as an illustration of the kinds of questions and analyses that are suggested by that approach.

Research Design

We explore the democratic peace for *all* rivalries during the 1816–1992 period. Classifications of regime type and democracy level follow Dixon (1994), and are based on Polity III data (Jagers and Gurr 1996). The Polity III data set includes indices of institutionalized democracy and autocracy that each range in value from 0 to 10, based on five specific polity characteristics: competitiveness and regulation of political participation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. For analyses requiring a dichotomous measure of democracy, we use Dixon's (1994, 22) classification of democracies as states scoring at least a 6 on the 0 to 10 Polity III index of institutionalized democracy. For analyses involving a continuous measure of democracy, we use Jagers and Gurr's (1996) "Democ – Autoc" measure that subtracts each state's autocracy score from its democracy score. The dyadic measure is taken as the score of the *least* democratic state in the dyad, which can range from positive 10 (highly democratic, no authoritarian characteristics) to negative 10 (highly authoritarian, no democratic characteristics). This use of the minimum score in the dyad rather than the average of two states' democracy scores allows us to capture effects that depend on both sides being democratic, thereby avoiding the risk of coding a dyad as more democratic when one state in the dyad is highly democratic and the other is mildly democratic or even slightly authoritarian in nature. This "Democ – Autoc" measure has been argued to be superior to either the democracy or autocracy index alone, and has been found to be highly correlated with numerous alternative measures of democracy (Jagers and Gurr 1996). In general, we find that our results are quite robust, with little substantive difference when using these different measures of dyadic democracy. This robustness greatly increases our confidence in the results as not deriving solely from a quirk of data operationalization.¹

¹In earlier analyses, we found similar results using the dichotomous and continuous joint-democracy indicators presented by Russett (1993), as well as the continuous democracy indicators

Empirical Results

Rivalry as the Focus of Analysis

Our first hypothesis suggested that democratic dyads should become involved in fewer rivalries than other dyads. The evidence, depicted in tables 6.1 and 6.2, supports this expectation. Table 6.1 lists the number of rivalries begun while both states were democratic, while one state was democratic, and while neither state was democratic. Additionally, this table lists the number of dyad-years in the interstate system since 1816 in which both, one, and neither members of a given dyad were democratic. These dyad-year totals are used to determine the unconditional probability of a rivalry breaking for each rivalry type during a given year (e.g., .00173 for isolated conflicts). This probability is then used to calculate the expected number of rivalries that should have been observed for each dyad type based on the number of eligible dyad-years, if dyadic democracy has no impact on the probability of rivalry.

Table 6.1 indicates that 66 rivalry relationships began while both states were democratic, which is significantly less than the 107 that should be expected based on the number of joint-democratic dyad-years in the interstate system ($Z = -3.93, p < .001$). Additionally, almost all rivalries that began while both states were democratic remained confined to low levels of rivalry, with only 11 proto-rivalries and two enduring rivalries (as noted below, however, only one is a democratic dyad throughout its lifetime) emerging from the 66 total rivalries. All three types of conflict are significantly less likely to begin between two democratic adversaries. Table 6.1 also reveals that rivalries are less likely than expected to begin between one democracy and one nondemocratic state across all three types of rivalry. All three types of rivalry relationship are significantly more likely than expected for dyads in which neither side is democratic.

Another illuminating point in table 6.1 concerns the probability of rivalry breaking out. Although the probability of any type of rivalry beginning in any type of dyad is low overall (the probabilities in the table range from .00004 to .00224), it is instructive to compare these probabilities across dyad types. Joint democratic dyads have a .00142 probability of beginning any type of rivalry in a given year, while the probability is 1.36 times greater (.00193) for mixed dyads with only one democracy, and over twice as great (.00294) for dyads containing no democracies. The probability of enduring rivalry is almost three times greater for dyads with only one democracy and four times greater for dyads with no democracies than for joint democratic dyads. Overall, there is a consistent pattern of increasing rivalry formation as one moves from democratic dyad to neither democratic. Furthermore, although the differences are apparent for all

employed by Dixon (1993, 1994). The observed similarity in results under different democracy indicators increases our confidence in the robustness of our findings.

TABLE 6.1: Dyadic Regime Type and Probability of Rivalry Onset

Rivalry Type	Dyad-Years ^a	Rivalries Begun	Rivalries Expected	Probability of Rivalry
Isolated conflict	509,122	880		.00173
Both democratic	46,519	53	80	.00114
One democratic	255,588	364	442	.00142
Neither democratic	207,015	463	358	.00224
	$\chi^2 = 54.05, d.f. = 2, p < .001$			
Proto-rivalry	509,122	223		.00044
Both democratic	46,519	11	20	.00024
One democratic	255,588	101	112	.00040
Neither democratic	207,015	111	91	.00054
	$\chi^2 = 9.95, d.f. = 2, p < .01$			
Enduring rivalry	509,122	63		.00012
Both democratic	46,519	2	6	.00004
One democratic	255,588	27	32	.00011
Neither democratic	207,015	34	26	.00016
	$\chi^2 = 5.87, d.f. = 2, p < .055$			
Total	509,122	1,166		.00229
Both democratic	46,519	66	107	.00142
One democratic	255,588	492	585	.00193
Neither democratic	207,015	608	474	.00294
	$\chi^2 = 58.28, d.f. = 2, p < .001$			

^aExcludes the following dyad-years in which a rivalry of any type was ongoing: 317 in which both states were democratic, 3,041 in which one side was democratic, and 3,317 in which neither side was democratic.

categories of rivalry, the disparities become greater with the increasing severity of the rivalry (that is, the findings are most stark with respect to enduring rivalries).²

These results strongly support the first hypothesis, because joint democratic dyads are much less likely than other types of dyads to become involved in rivalries of any type. Pairs of democratic adversaries account for a small absolute number of all rivalry relationships—only 66 rivalries of any type, and

²We acknowledge that some of the democratic dyads in the last few decades have not had the requisite period in which to become enduring rivalries. Yet those democratic dyads have had the opportunity to have isolated and proto-rivalries and are less likely than other dyads to have those types of rivalries; this suggests that the results on enduring rivalries, which are the strongest, will not likely disappear with the passage of time. These findings are also consistent with Maoz (1997), which looks at dispute behavior among all dyads, all politically relevant dyads, and enduring rivalry dyads.

TABLE 6.2: Dyadic Regime Type During Rivalries, by Type of Rivalry

Dyadic Regime Type	Type of Rivalry			Total
	Isolated (%)	Proto (%)	Enduring (%)	
Always joint democratic	53 (85)	8 (13)	1 (2)	62
Sometimes joint democratic	4 (17)	9 (39)	10 (43)	23
Never joint democratic	823 (76)	206 (19)	52 (5)	1,081
Total	880 (75)	223 (19)	63 (5)	1,166

only two enduring rivalries—but a skeptic might suggest that this is only because the small number of joint democratic dyads in recent history offer few opportunities for rivalry. As table 6.1 reveals, when the opportunity for rivalry is considered, the few observed cases of joint-democratic rivalry are significantly fewer than might be expected if democracy has no impact on the likelihood of rivalry.

Democracy and Peace within Rivalries

It is also important to consider the democratic status of rival adversaries during the course of their rivalry. Although table 6.1 categorizes rivalries based on the democratic status of their participants at the outbreak of rivalry, the regime type of one or both rivals may change during the course of the rivalry. A rivalry that begins with one or no democratic adversaries may later see both become democratic, and a rivalry that begins between two democracies may see the end of democratic rule in one or both states. Table 6.2 thus expands on table 6.1 by considering the regime type of rival adversaries over the entire duration of their period of rivalry, classifying each rivalry as always joint democratic, never joint democratic, or mixed (including both joint democratic and nondemocratic periods).

A total of 62 rivalries remain joint democratic for their entire duration between 1816 and 1992, including only eight proto-rivalries and one enduring rivalry.³ Most conflictual relationships between two democracies thus remain confined to relatively low conflict levels, with 85 percent of such relationships remaining limited to the level of isolated conflict and only one reaching full-fledged enduring rivalry. Twenty-three more rivalries, including four that began under conditions of joint democracy, change regime type during the duration of the rivalry, meaning that they experienced both joint democratic and

³The enduring rivalry between two democracies is the nineteenth-century rivalry between the United States and Great Britain, which involved eight low-level militarized disputes.

nondemocratic periods, including nine proto-rivalries and 10 enduring rivalries.⁴ The vast majority of all rivalries, though, never experience any periods of joint democracy. Over 80 percent of the cases in each type of rivalry remain non-democratic over their entire duration, totaling 1,081 of the 1,166 rivalries in table 6.2 (93 percent). Although the number of cases is small, it is nonetheless startling that 43 percent of the mixed cases (those that have joint democracy at some point in the rivalry, but not for the whole period) are enduring rivalries—this is at least eight times the rate for rivalries with consistent regime types for the rivals. This suggests the proposition, not fully explored here, that regime instability or change in general may prolong rivalries.

Given that rivalries are constructed with militarized dispute data, it is not surprising that we confirm for rivalries what has been found previously for wars and disputes, that democratic states are less likely to confront each other with the threat or use of military force. The rivalry approach allows us to extend this finding, however, demonstrating that not only are militarized disputes relatively rare among democracies, but they are also not generally repeated between the same states.

The second and third hypotheses focus on “regime change rivalries,” or those rivalries in which the rivals become jointly democratic or move away from that status during the course of an ongoing rivalry. As table 6.2 reveals, there are 23 such regime change rivalries in our data set: four cases of isolated conflict, nine proto-rivalries, and 10 enduring rivalries. It should be noted that our empirical analyses of regime change rivalries focus on the 19 cases of proto- or enduring rivalry that change democracy status during the rivalry. Cases of isolated conflict last for such short periods of time (often only two or three years) and include only one or two militarized disputes, which does not give us a satisfactory basis for comparison across democratic and nondemocratic periods.

Our second hypothesis suggests that regime change rivalries should be less conflict-prone while both rivals are democratic than when one or both of the rivals is not democratic. Table 6.3 addresses our second hypothesis by examining the probability of militarized conflict occurring during rivalry, based on the rivals’ democratic status in each year of their rivalry.⁵ The results in table 6.3

⁴The 10 enduring rivalries that experience limited periods of joint democracy include rivalries involving the United States against Ecuador and Peru in the mid to late twentieth century, Great Britain, France, and Belgium against Germany in the early twentieth century, Israel against Syria due to a brief period of Syrian democracy according to the Polity III data, Turkey against Greece and Cyprus in the late twentieth century, Japan against South Korea, and India against Pakistan. Of these 10 regime-change enduring rivalries, only the Cyprus–Turkey case experiences enough democracy to average joint democratic status over the period of rivalry using our measure of democracy. The other nine cases remain nondemocratic on the average, reflecting protracted periods of nondemocratic rule in one or both states and only limited periods in which both states could be considered political democracies.

⁵This table includes the active militarized portion of each rivalry, or the period between the outbreak of the first dispute in the rivalry and the conclusion of the final dispute. Additionally, it

TABLE 6.3: Militarized Dispute Propensity in Regime-Change Rivalries

Dyadic Regime Type	Militarized Dispute Years (%)	Nondispute Years	Total
Proto-Rivalry			
Both democratic	18 (22)	64	82
One democratic	15 (22)	54	69
Neither democratic	6 (33)	12	18
Total	39 (23)	130	169
$\chi^2 = 1.20, p < .55$			
Enduring Rivalry			
Both democratic	29 (22)	103	132
One democratic	89 (38)	145	234
Neither democratic	4 (31)	9	13
Total	122 (32)	257	379
$\chi^2 = 9.90, p < .01$			
Total			
Both democratic	47 (22)	167	214
One democratic	104 (34)	199	303
Neither democratic	10 (33)	21	31
Total	161 (30)	387	548
$\chi^2 = 9.37, p < .01$			

generally support our expectations. Militarized conflict in regime change rivalries is generally less likely when both rivals are democratic than when at least one rival is nondemocratic. Militarized disputes break out in 22 percent of all the years in which both are democratic, compared with 34 percent of the years in which only one state is democratic and 32 percent of the years in which neither is democratic. This result is statistically significant for enduring rivalries ($\chi^2 = 9.90, p < .01$) and overall ($\chi^2 = 9.37, p < .01$), although the effect is weaker in proto-rivalries because there is virtually no difference between dyads including one or two democracies.⁶

includes a 10-year period after the end of the final militarized dispute in the rivalry, because a new dispute in this period would have had the effect of extending the rivalry. This approach allows us to capture a possible effect of extending the rivalry. This approach allows us to capture a possible effect of democratization on the avoidance of future conflict that would extend a rivalry, which might have been missed by stopping the analysis with the conclusion of the final dispute in each rivalry.

⁶There is no relationship between the severity of disputes and whether the rivalry is in a joint democratic or other period.

TABLE 6.4: Democracy and Conflict in Regime-Change Rivalries

Regime Type	Disputes	Years	Percent
Proto-Rivalry	43	173	0.25
Two democracies	13	69	0.19
One democracy	16	64	0.25
No democracies	6	17	0.35
Transition to dem.	7	16	0.44
Transition to auth.	1	7	0.14
Enduring Rivalry	159	379	0.42
Both democracies	16	99	0.16
One democracy	100	211	0.47
No democracies	5	13	0.38
Transition to dem.	23	33	0.70
Transition to auth.	15	23	0.65
Total	202	552	0.37
Both democracies	29	168	0.17
One democracy	116	275	0.42
No democracies	11	30	0.37
Transition to dem.	30	49	0.61
Transition to auth.	16	30	0.53

On the one hand, there does appear to be some pacifying effect on dispute occurrence when joint democracy is present. On the other hand, this effect is apparent only for enduring rivalries, with proto-rivalries showing no difference in patterns of dispute occurrence during joint democracy expectations. It is evident that rivalries have a certain kind of stability that is not easily dislodged (something postulated by the punctuated equilibrium model in the second part of this book), and even changes in the regimes of the two rivals may not be enough to change the rivalry patterns. That militarized disputes still persist in some of these rivalries suggest that the dynamics driving the rivalries may be stronger than any pacifying effects of joint democracy, a concern that we address below.

Table 6.4 compares the frequency of disputes in regime change rivalries according to the different regime configurations at the time. We also consider dispute frequency during regime transition periods (defined as the year the transition occurred and the one immediately following it) in order to investigate claims that democratizing periods are especially dangerous ones (Mansfield and Snyder 1995a, 1995b). The table reports the number of militarized disputes that occurred, the number of years included, and the mean number of disputes per year; as many as four disputes occur in several individual years in the data set.

TABLE 6.5: Democracy and Conflict in Post-Transition Periods

Rivalry Type	Disputes	Years	Percent
Transitions to nondemocratic dyad status			
Proto-Rivalry	5	45	0.11
1–5 years	1	13	0.08
6–10 years	3	13	0.23
11–15 years	1	10	0.10
> 15 years	0	9	0.00
Enduring Rivalry	62	122	0.51
1–5 years	27	39	0.69
6–10 years	14	26	0.54
11–15 years	5	17	0.29
> 15 years	16	40	0.40
Total	67	167	0.40
1–5 years	28	52	0.54
6–10 years	17	39	0.44
11–15 years	6	27	0.22
> 15 years	16	49	0.33
Transitions to democratic dyad status			
Proto-Rivalry	2	55	0.04
1–5 years	1	26	0.04
6–10 years	1	18	0.06
11–15 years	0	10	0.00
> 15 years	0	1	0.00
Enduring Rivalry	15	97	0.15
1–5 years	15	59	0.25
6–10 years	0	30	0.00
11–15 years	0	8	0.00
> 15 years	0	0	0.00
Total	17	152	0.11
1–5 years	16	85	0.19
6–10 years	1	48	0.02
11–15 years	0	18	0.00
> 15 years	0	1	0.00

There are several consistent and notable patterns. First, the years of joint democracy are those with the lowest frequency of dispute formation in rivalries. Overall, periods of joint democracy are more than twice less likely to have a dispute in a given year than when one or both of the rivals is not a democracy. Second, it is quite apparent that the transition periods are the most dangerous for rivalries. The transition to democracy period has the highest rate of dispute formation of any condition. Nevertheless, it may be the transition process itself and not necessarily the direction of the regime that is responsible for this conflict proclivity. In enduring rivalries, the transition phase is very conflict prone whether the move is toward greater democracy in the rivalry or toward more authoritarian governments.

The third hypothesis suggests that regime change rivalries should be likely to end shortly after the change to joint democracy. Consistent with earlier findings, we find strong confirmation for our proposition that rivalries are more likely to end when both rivals are democratic than when at least one of the rivals is nondemocratic. The evidence in table 6.5 shows that disputes, which perpetuate rivalries, dissipate quickly in enduring rivalries after a transition to a democratic dyad. Significantly, transition away from joint democratic status did not produce a similar effect. Although dispute frequency tails off somewhat over time, the rate of dispute formation is still high and such rivalries, especially enduring ones, continue well into the future. Further examination of the regime change rivalries in our data set indicates a general tendency for these rivalries to end while both states are democratic. Over half of the regime change rivalries (11 of 19, or 58 percent) end while both sides are democratic, including seven of nine proto-rivalries and four of 10 enduring rivalries. Of course, seven of the nine proto-rivalries and seven of the 10 enduring rivalries are considered censored because their militarized period of rivalry has ended less than a decade before the end of the militarized dispute data. Even removing these censored cases, though, both proto-rivalries (United Kingdom–Netherlands and United Kingdom–Sweden, both of which ended in 1917) ended while joint democratic, as did the United Kingdom–Germany enduring rivalry in 1921. The other two uncensored enduring rivalries are Belgium–Germany and France–Germany, both of which ended at the close of World War II without joint democratic status—but which would be transformed into joint democratic relationships shortly thereafter.⁷

⁷ We also ran an event history analysis of joint democracy and rivalry termination. The presence of joint democracy significantly increases the likelihood of rivalry termination ($\chi^2 = 6.79, p < .01$); rivalry termination is three times as likely under joint democracy than under other conditions. The analysis includes only the militarized portion of the rivalry, up to the conclusion of the final MID in the rivalry.

TABLE 6.6: Democracy Levels before and during Rivalry

Time Period ^a	Mean (SD)	<i>N</i>
Proto-Rivalry		
Before rivalry	-5.61 (3.90)	44
1st rivalry decade	-6.00 (3.89)	44
Later in rivalry	-5.95 (3.80)	44
$F = 0.13, p < .88$		
Enduring Rivalry		
Before rivalry	-5.02 (4.01)	24
1st rivalry decade	-5.15 (4.74)	24
Later in rivalry	-4.82 (3.47)	24
$F = 0.04, p < .96$		
All Rivalries		
Before rivalry	-5.40 (3.92)	68
1st rivalry decade	-5.70 (4.19)	68
Later in rivalry	-5.55 (3.70)	68
$F = 0.10, p < .91$		

^aRefers to the average dyadic democracy level in the 10 years before the rivalry began, in the first ten years of the rivalry, and in the remainder of the rivalry. This table includes only dyads for which complete data are available (i.e., dyads for which the Polity III data set includes democracy data for both the prerivalry period and portions of two separate decades within the rivalry), and excludes rivalries that can be considered “censored” because a new dispute toward the end of the time period studied (1978–92) would have prolonged the period of rivalry.

Rivalry and Democracy

The previous analyses used democracy as an independent variable to predict changes in rivalry behavior. In this section, we reverse the causal arrow and explore the impact of rivalry on democracy levels. Our fourth expectation suggested that the occurrence of rivalry should lead to a general decrease in democracy levels within the rivals, relative to their democracy levels before the rivalry began. Table 6.6 presents difference of means tests for democracy levels (again, the range is from -10 for complete autocracy to +10 for complete democracy) before and during the rivalry, comparing the entire duration of the rivalry with the decade before that rivalry.⁸ The results reveal that dyadic democracy levels do, on average, decrease during the course of rivalries, most notably during

⁸It should be noted that this table excludes cases for which democracy data are not available both before and during rivalry, which generally affects rivalries that begin with the entry of one or both rivals into the interstate system. This table also excludes rivalries that are censored, in the sense that another dispute at the end of the time period studied (1816–1992) would prolong the rivalry, to ensure that such rivalries do not distort the results. Table 6.7 is subject to a similar set of exclusions with respect to data after the end of rivalry.

TABLE 6.7: Democracy Levels during and after Interstate Rivalry

Time Period ^a	Mean (SD)	<i>N</i>
Proto-Rivalry		
During rivalry	-4.74 (4.45)	116
1st decade after	-4.56 (5.40)	116
2nd decade after	-4.30 (5.56)	116
$F = 0.22, p < .81$		
Enduring Rivalry		
During rivalry	-4.92 (3.10)	21
1st decade after	-4.25 (4.74)	21
2nd decade after	-3.60 (5.77)	21
$F = 0.42, p < .67$		
All Rivalries		
During rivalry	-4.77 (4.26)	137
1st decade after	-4.51 (5.29)	137
2nd decade after	-4.19 (5.58)	137
$F = 0.45, p < .64$		

Note: This table includes only dyads for which complete data are available (i.e., dyads for which the Polity III data set includes democracy data for both the rivalry period and portions of two separate decades after the rivalry) and excludes rivalries that can be considered “censored” because a new dispute toward the end of the time period studied (1978–92) would have prolonged the period of rivalry.

^aRefers to the average dyadic democracy level during the entire militarized period of rivalry, in the first 10 years after the final dispute in the rivalry, and in the next 10 years (up to the twentieth year after the rivalry or the end of period of study in 1992, whichever comes first).

the first decade of the rivalry. They do not, on average, decrease thereafter and indeed increase ever so slightly. Yet there is considerable variation across individual cases, and the overall results are not statistically significant.

The overall effect of the onset of rivalries on democracy levels is rather small and not very consistent across rivalries. It is likely that the shifts in democracy levels are attributable to other factors. It is also apparent that except for abrupt regime changes, democracy levels do not vary substantially over time. Indeed, our earlier results suggest that most rivalries’ dyadic regime types remain fairly stable using this continuous indicator of democracy, which is consistent with the earlier finding that only 23 of 1,166 rivalries include both joint democratic and nondemocratic periods. Dramatic changes in regime are relatively rare, and changes in democratization are not always in the same direction among pairs of states.

There does not appear to be a clear or substantial effect on democracy levels from rivalry onset, and we turn our attention to the effects of rivalry termination on democracy. Our final hypothesis suggested that the end of rivalry should lead to be followed by a general increase in democracy levels within the rival states, relative to their democracy levels during the rivalry. Table 6.7 presents difference-of-means tests for democracy levels during and after rivalry, comparing the entire duration of rivalry with the decade after the last dispute in the rivalry and the decade following thereafter. We look at the second decade after the last dispute as we are certain that the rivalry has ended by that time and to insure that states have had sufficient time to implement democratic reforms and have them take effect. The results indicate a general positive effect, with the end of rivalry leading, on average, to an increase in dyadic democracy levels.

Although there is a general trend toward greater democratization in the aftermath of a rivalry, the magnitude of the effect is relatively small and does not reach conventional standards of statistical significance. There are a number of instances of states that become democratic after the last dispute in the rivalry, particularly following the end of World War II. A case-by-case analysis clearly shows that the end of the rivalries is associated with the establishment of democratic rule in these countries (e.g., numerous rivalries involving Japan, Italy, and Germany). Nevertheless, there appears to be no strong and systematic trend toward the spread of democracy emanating from the end of militarized conflict in rivalries. Therefore, we must reject the notion that a decline in conflict necessarily leads to an increase in democratization.

There is an important caveat with respect to interpretation of these results and indeed those regarding democracy and rivalry termination. Our results have suggested that democratization leads to rivalry termination, but not necessarily the reverse. In fact, it is quite difficult to sort out the causal direction of rivalry termination and democratization. As we noted in chapter 2, there is considerable debate over pinpointing the end of rivalries, and differing definitions of rivalry termination might produce varying results (Bennett 1997b). We conceive of rivalry termination as a process that occurs over a period of time, rather than a fixed event in space and time. Similarly, democratization is a process as well, with a democratic transition coded as occurring only after some threshold has been crossed. From these vantage points, democratization and rivalry termination might very well be interactive processes, and this should be the subject of future research. It is clear, however, the intersection is relevant only when there is abrupt change in the direction of greater democratization in a rivalry. We found very little impact from incremental changes in democracy levels on rivalry behavior and vice-versa.⁹

⁹This will be an important issue in the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalries in the second part of the book.

Conclusion

This chapter reexamined the democratic peace in a longitudinal fashion, through the lenses of the rivalry approach. We utilized the rivalry approach to achieve four new and specific purposes with respect to the democratic peace. The first was to extend the democratic peace argument to phenomena beside war—rivalries. We found that rivalries have been rare among democratic dyads; there is only one case of enduring rivalry between consistently democratic states. A second purpose was to assess the effect of regime change when such a change precipitated a democratic dyad (or ended a joint democratic period). For the 23 rivalries that include both joint democratic and nondemocratic periods, lower dispute occurrence in democratic periods is confirmed only for enduring rivalries, but importantly there appears to be a lagged effect, with dispute formation dissipating over time. The latter is consistent with the onset and deepening of democratic norms. Third, we sought to determine whether a change to joint democracy was strong enough to terminate an ongoing rivalry. Empirical results indicate strong confirmation that rivalries are more likely to end when both states become democratic.

A fourth purpose of this chapter was to use the rivalry approach to answer questions about whether the causal arrow of the democratic peace might be reversed; that is, the beginning and end of rivalries promote less and more democratization respectively. Our findings, however, provide little evidence that the relationship between democracy and conflict is recursive. The onset of rivalry does not appear to decrease democracy levels substantially, and states do not appear to move rapidly toward democracy after the termination of rivalry. Although there are some difficulties sorting out the exact endings of rivalries and the beginnings of the democratization process, the very preliminary evidence is most suggestive of dramatic shifts to democracy being associated with the end of rivalries, and not the reverse.

The democratic peace has inspired numerous studies and great debate in the academic community in recent years. Our contribution to this research is to demonstrate the utility of moving away from pure cross-sectional analyses of democracy and war to dynamic and longitudinal assessments of the relationship between joint democracy and interstate conflict. Our results generally confirm the robust effects of the democratic peace, but also caution that democracy's relationship with conflict is a threshold one and one that is not likely to be recursive.

