

CHAPTER 10

The Conflict Management of Enduring Rivalries

In this chapter we pursue two agenda items: (1) our continuing evaluation of the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalry and (2) the use of the rivalry approach in the analysis of conflict management in enduring rivalries. Our analysis of the punctuated equilibrium model in the previous chapter focused on escalatory processes, whereas here we look at de-escalatory—conflict management—aspects of enduring rivalries. More generally, we have argued that the rivalry approach provides a natural framework for the study of conflict management. It is virtually impossible to think about medium- to long-term conflict management without some sort of rivalry in mind.

The punctuated equilibrium model does not prove optimistic in its predictions for conflict management in enduring rivalries. Just as it does not expect gradual escalatory processes, it does not predict gradual de-escalatory ones. The findings of the previous chapter indicate that long-term conflict management success is not common in enduring rivalries. Yet it is worth pursuing a closer examination of patterns in enduring rivalry from the conflict management perspective. Thus, this chapter builds and expands on the analysis begun in the previous chapter.

Several aspects of the relationship between the punctuated equilibrium model and conflict management merit further examination. First, we need to conceptualize more clearly conflict management success within the punctuated equilibrium context. We argue that long-term successful conflict management can take various forms, some of which contradict the punctuated equilibrium model, but others are consistent with that framework. For example, one key aspect of enduring rivalries is their volatility. One form of successful conflict management involves reducing volatility, hence the likelihood of war. This can occur without a change in the basic rivalry level, and therefore it is consistent with the punctuated equilibrium model.

The same applies to short-term conflict management success. At first blush, the punctuated equilibrium model would seem to imply that conflict management does not significantly affect the severity of the next dispute in the rivalry. Given the stability predicted by the punctuated equilibrium model, this seems natural. Nevertheless, we argue that the variation from the basic rivalry level depends on crisis-specific factors, among which we can include conflict management efforts. The punctuated equilibrium model clearly implies no medium- to long-term conflict management success, but is not inconsistent with short-term impacts.

Our examination of the punctuated equilibrium model in the context of conflict management parallels in many ways that of the escalatory hypotheses in the last chapter. We discuss the long-term de-escalatory hypotheses in contrast with—although sometimes consistently with—the punctuated equilibrium framework. Also, we examine the conflict management parallel to the rapid lock-in of the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalry. We examine whether enduring rivalries end quickly in accordance with the punctuated equilibrium model or slowly, which corresponds to a gradual conflict termination model. By the end of this chapter, we will have subjected the punctuated equilibrium model to an evaluation from both the volcano and conflict management sides. We think this is appropriate within the rivalry approach, which focuses on rivalries in terms of both war and peace.

Our second agenda item involves illustrating the usefulness and importance of the rivalry approach to the study of conflict management in general, although with particular emphasis on enduring rivalries. Enduring rivalries are the context for much war, but also much conflict management activity. We have already used the rivalry approach to examine the democratic peace, and we now continue in this vein by looking at conflict management issues through rivalry glasses.

Broadly speaking, there are a number of ways of dealing with conflicts, ranging from noncoercive to coercive strategies (e.g., avoidance, negotiation, referral to an international organization, adjudication, mediation, and feuding). The conflict management strategy that relies on third parties to resolve a conflict is, on the face of it, particularly apposite in the context of international relations. It is after all a voluntary, consensual, ad hoc, and nonbinding method of conflict management that can work best in a system of states, each of which will only too jealously guard its autonomy and sovereignty. States abide by tacit “rules of the game” only insofar as such rules serve their national interests. In what is traditionally described as an anarchic system, conflict management by third-party peacemakers of any sort seems to offer a promising solution to the problem of conflict. Here we first discuss what it means for conflict in an enduring rivalry to be managed. We then examine just how effective the most prominent form of third-party conflict management, mediation, really is in abating or managing enduring rivalries.

Although conflict management can be successful in resolving all manner of conflicts, internal as well as external, the most difficult context for successful mediation and third-party intervention is that of an enduring rivalry. As we noted in chapter 3, enduring rivalries represent the most dangerous conflicts in the international system. Can international efforts at conflict management break the stability of rivalries and mitigate the dangerous conflict patterns contained therein? There are both theoretical and policy implications that follow from this question.

Our concern with the conflict management of enduring rivalries is also motivated by more than theoretical concerns. From a policy perspective, we are concerned that the stability of conflict patterns within rivalries suggests that states or third parties may be able to do little about mitigating or stopping these most serious conflicts. Our emphasis on political shocks, largely out of the control of the rivals or other actors, further heightens our interest in identifying factors directly manipulable by decision makers that can make a positive difference in moderating or ending enduring rivalries. For us, an obvious place to start is with international mediation attempts, the efforts of third parties to manage external conflict. The existence of an enduring rivalry inherently implies that the rivals themselves have to a substantial degree already failed to manage some aspects of their own competition.

We begin with a general discussion of what conflict management connotes in the context of enduring rivalries. This includes past conceptions as well as our own specification of different ways that conflict management might be conceived and measured with respect to enduring rivalries. We then move to an empirical analysis of a certain form of conflict management, mediation, considering its frequency, timing, and impact on enduring rivalry dynamics. There are several specific issues of concern here. We wish to explore how often mediation actually occurs in the context of enduring rivalries and understand at what phase mediation efforts are undertaken (if indeed they are made at all). Are mediation efforts only made in the most severe rivalries, or are they attempted in rivalries before they become enduring? At what stage in the rivalry is mediation attempted, and how does this fit in with the prescriptions derived from the extensive literature on timing and mediation success? Beyond a description of mediation in the context of rivalries, we wish to assess its impact on the medium-term dynamics of rivalries. Do mediation efforts make a difference? Do they help to postpone the onset of violence, lessen conflict severity, or prevent a war?

Conflict Management and Enduring Rivalries: A Conceptual Overview

To say that governments “manage” their conflicts does not, strictly speaking, refer to conflict reduction. The more intuitive use of the term suggests that a resort to violence is the antithesis of conflict management.¹ As we use the term, conflict management refers to behavior taken by states to reduce conflict levels or to avoid certain kinds of conflict, such as war. We believe this interpretation conforms to common usage. Unfortunately, the discipline lacks a widely shared concept of what constitutes conflict management as a dependent variable. As a result we also lack systematic, comparable, and accepted indicators of conflict management. As we gain a clearer idea of the concept of successful conflict management, we should also have a clearer idea about what indicators are appropriate. Conversely, the development of indicators forces us to confront theoretical ambiguities.

Beyond the implication of reduced hostility levels, conflict management often seems to refer to *both* the efforts to control the relationship and the success of such efforts. What does it mean when someone says, “The United States and the USSR managed their conflict”? Is conflict management a dependent or independent variable? We take conflict management, as an independent variable, to be actions such as mediation, negotiation, or security regime formation that have generally been the core of the literature on conflict management and resolution. What has been much less clear in this literature is the identity of the conflict management dependent variable, what we will frequently call successful conflict management. For example, Kriesberg (1992) in his study of “conflict resolution” in the United States–USSR and Middle East enduring rivalries provided a number of tables of negotiation attempts and agreements, but nowhere did he present tables of the *effect* of these management activities. In essence, he suggested that sometimes the management efforts were effective, without giving a clear explanation of the observed changes in behavior.

In the causes-of-war literature, the use of wars, militarized interstate disputes, or crises as dependent variables is so routinized and accepted that it is no longer justified, but merely announced. The literature on deterrence success illustrates the other end of the spectrum, where a lively debate continues about the character and coding of the dependent variable. We argue that an essential first step lies in conceptualizing and developing measures of conflict management dependent variables. We can speculate ad nauseam on the impact of efforts to manage conflicts, but until we have a clear idea of what behavior is affected, we are spinning our wheels for little forward movement.

¹Deterrence illustrates the ambiguity about what it means to manage a conflict. Deterrence is a hostile, military threat, and nations are encouraged to show strength militarily to increase the credibility of that threat. Such actions may not fall under what most people mean by conflict management.

Our approach starts by inquiring about the kinds of behavioral change that we would expect to see if states in fact were able to manage conflict successfully. Of course, to detect behavior that counts as successful conflict management does not mean that mediation, security regimes, and other conflict management independent variables are necessarily the explanation. Such behavior may result from exogenous factors that one would not label as foreign policy efforts to manage conflict. The end of the Cold War provides part of the explanation for the end of some Third World rivalries. A realistlike explanation of reduced conflict levels would probably start by looking for long-term changes in basic power relationships. Yet until we have a dependent variable with which to work, such speculation remains just that.

One can perhaps divide conflict management dependent variables into three kinds: (1) short-term effects, (2) medium-term effects, and (3) conflict termination. For example, *détente* refers to the kind of short- or medium-term phenomena that interest us. *Détente* is more than one successful treaty and lasts more than a few years. We sharply distinguish conflict management from conflict resolution. Conflict resolution implies a fundamental change in dyadic relationships whereby the resort to militarized actions is no longer likely (Miall 1992). We consider successful conflict management to refer to the reduction *within an ongoing* rivalry of conflict levels without eliminating hostility altogether.

The punctuated equilibrium model has different implications for shorter- and longer-term conflict management as well as conflict termination. In order to evaluate the punctuated equilibrium model in terms of de-escalatory or conflict management patterns, however, we need to know what conflict management—as a dependent variable—means in an enduring rivalry context. Therefore, our principal goal in this section is to develop the concept and measures of successful conflict management. Most of our analysis will address issues of theoretical description and measurement. At the same time, by embedding this analysis in a rivalry framework, we hope to shed some light on rivalry relationships and their evolution, as well as to evaluate the merits of the punctuated equilibrium model.

Conflict Management Dependent Variables: A Brief Survey

Before turning to our own proposals for conflict management dependent variables, it is useful to briefly survey the explicit or implicit dependent variables used by prominent researchers in this literature. It is important to review the common short-term dependent variables because one plausible strategy is to extend these variables to the medium-term range. Another important issue relates to whether one should include cooperative actions as part of the dependent variable or focus only on the conflictual end of the scale. In this regard, one must be clearly distinguish between the independent and dependent variables. The act of negotiation might itself be an indicator of improved conflict management,

but at the same time a negotiation may be considered the independent variable explaining reduced conflict levels.

Cooperation-Conflict Scales in Events Data

Many of those who employ events data use as their dependent variable some form of “conflict minus cooperation” (Goldstein and Freeman 1990; Kegley, Richardson, and Richter 1978; Lebovic 1985). Our conception of conflict management focuses explicitly on the hostile range of relations, which we suggest is more appropriate. The basic logic behind the use of the entire spectrum of the conflict-cooperation continuum is that the results represent a history of a relationship “expressed as fluctuations over time along a scale of net cooperation” (Goldstein and Freeman 1990). When aggregating cooperative and conflictual events, however, we obscure that some of what constitutes cooperative events is precisely what we envisage being causally related to changes in the character of conflictual relationships. For instance, in the coding of the more recent version of the WEIS data (Goldstein 1992), making substantive agreements with an adversary is considered a highly cooperative event, as are other events that might result from mediated or negotiated disputes. By creating an aggregated index, one virtually eliminates the possibility of using such cooperative events as potential explanations for successful conflict management. Making all events part of the dependent variable inhibits our ability to understand the influence of cooperation on conflict more fully.

Short-Term Dependent Variables

One of the characteristics of most research into the success of efforts to manage international conflict—be it through third-party diplomatic initiatives or military and economic interventions—is that the effectiveness of the effort is largely operationalized in terms of short-term outcomes. Bercovitch (1991) has systematically coded the outcome of conflict mediation efforts using four categories that reflect the degree of success of the specific mediation effort. These categories are (1) the partial or (2) full settlement of the issues, (3) the establishment of a cease-fire, and (4) unsuccessful outcomes. Each of these focuses on the mediation attempt itself, not the overall relationship between antagonists. Others also have a short time horizon, paying particular attention to the outcome of the specific mediation effort (Kramer, Pommerenke, and Newton 1993; Curry and Pecorino 1993). This type of short-term outcome is illustrated most clearly by focusing on a specific case, for example the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. There have been numerous cease-fires and partial resolutions negotiated and signed by the warring parties, only to have the killing start again after a brief respite. Many individual management efforts were clearly successful at achieving the short-term goal of bringing a halt to the fighting, opening up transport lanes, or giving passage and safe havens to civilians. Yet despite many short-term successes in conflict management, the medium-term character

of the conflict may have changed very little. The key issue here is the specificity of the dependent variable. Using a different example, the United States and the USSR negotiated an agreement after the Cuban missile crisis guaranteeing Cuban security and a commitment to a nuclear-free Cuba. This agreement can be considered successful because it has been honored by both sides (with occasional minor controversies), but the Cuban agreement did not automatically alter the longer-term U.S.-Soviet rivalry.

Taking a broader view of conflict management does little to relax the emphasis on short-term outcomes. For example, Licklider (1993) considers civil wars to have ended when the military aspects of the conflict have been terminated for at least five years. Although five years may seem like a long time by some operational criteria, it is quite conceivable—even likely—that most enduring rivalries go through multiple phases without engaging in military hostilities for periods of up to five years. By our standards, and in the logic of international rivalries, five years is still a relatively short time horizon.

Those who examine the role of military or economic interventions as a form of conflict management also generally adopt a short-term outcome framework. Regan (1996), for example, focuses on the role played by third-party military or economic interventions in controlling the violence between parties in civil disputes. By his operational criteria, a successful intervention is one that contributes to the cessation of hostilities for a period of at least six months. This short time frame is justified on the grounds that six months gives political decision makers reason to claim success, but also adequate time for diplomatic initiatives to be organized and implemented.

In studies of the effectiveness of intervention by international organizations, the predominant focus has been on short-term impact (e.g., Butterworth 1978; Haas 1986). Most prominent has been the ability of international organizations to achieve cease-fires or otherwise prevent escalation of ongoing conflicts. Even studies of peacekeeping that include broader concerns than conflict abatement, nevertheless tend to define success in terms of short-term achievements such as feeding refugees or conducting a democratic election (Druckman and Stern 1997). The only exceptions may be Diehl (1994a) and Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel (1996), which consider the ability of international organizations to discourage a renewal of armed conflict in the future and thereby promote true conflict resolution.

Virtually wherever one looks in the literature on conflict management, the outcome of the management efforts adopted by researchers relies predominantly on short-term consequences. Although there may be good reasons to believe that this is the time frame of importance to political decision makers, a short time horizon constrains our ability to draw logically elegant and empirically sound generalizations about the ability of states to manage conflict over the long haul. This is particularly important when we seek to understand conflict management within enduring rivalries. We suggest that this overarching

consensus on a limited horizon can obscure the longer-term, and interactive, effects of conflict management initiatives.

Medium- and Long-Term Conflict Management Dependent Variables

We suggest that posing the question of medium-term conflict management in terms of the outcome variable can provide payoffs for our understanding of how enduring rivalries are managed. A key facet of conflict management consists of reductions in the overall level of hostility in the conflict. This is particularly relevant when the conflict involves long-standing rivals. In this context, conflict management efforts (i.e., independent variables) are effective if they help to reduce the long-term intensity of the rivalry. For example, a series of efforts to manage a conflict actively could result in a gradual decline in the number, intensity, and duration of militarized disputes between rivals, to a level that minimizes the short-term probability of the outbreak of a war.

A mechanism that might account for the discrepancy between the observed success rates in earlier studies (Bercovitch 1989; Bercovitch and Langely 1993; Bercovitch and Regan 1997) and the potential for conflict management efforts to achieve longer-term success can be found in the role played by mediation attempts. Earlier studies have focused on the attributes of the mediator, characteristics of the international system, or the specific conflict context as predictors of the success of the mediation effort. It is hypothesized that the context in which these efforts are undertaken affects the ability of the mediator to bring about some resolution. What we suggest, however, is that the process of bringing conflicting parties to a bargaining table can have a longer-term impact on the progression of the rivalry relationship. For example, a single mediation effort, whether successful or not, may have only a marginal effect on the overall rivalry relationship. But the strategy and density of efforts to manage the conflict may display considerable medium-term effects, even though many of the specific attempts at management have failed. The act of participating in a negotiating or mediating forum appears to convey, at minimum, an acknowledgment that trade-offs are possible, maybe even desirable. The short-term attempts at finding the appropriate mix of trade-offs may not bear fruit, but the more, and the more regularly, conflicting parties come to the table, the greater the likelihood that we would see medium-term results. This longer-term perspective can only be observed if one adopts a view of conflict management (dependent variable) commensurate with what we propose here.

Conflict Management as Declining Basic Hostility Levels

As suggested above, conflict management success can be evaluated on two dimensions. On the one hand, a particular mediation effort may result in a cease-fire, bilateral negotiations can end with a truce, or a multilateral conference may lead to a partitioning of disputed territory. In each such instance, success

would be evaluated in terms of the outcome of the specific diplomatic effort. On the other hand, conflict management success can be judged in terms of reductions in the overall level of hostility in the conflict. This would be particularly relevant when the conflict involves long-standing rivals. In this sense, conflict management efforts (i.e., independent variables) would be effective if they helped to reduce the overall trend in the intensity of the rivalry. For example, a series of efforts to manage a conflict actively could result in the number, intensity, and duration of militarized disputes between rivals gradually declining to a level that minimizes the short-term probability of the outbreak of a war. In the first instance, the success of conflict management is conceived in terms of nearly dichotomous outcomes, either successful or not. In the latter view of conflict management—the one we adopt—the outcome is considered to be a continuous variable, with variation in a long-term trend being an observable indicator of the effectiveness of management efforts. Given this framing of the problem, rivalries provide a natural theoretical framework within which to explore the role and effectiveness of management efforts. By definition, enduring rivalries are hostile, militarized relationships that can play out over decades; similar to marriages, they offer many opportunities for interventions in an effort to manage the conflict.

This general conceptualization seems relatively unproblematic. The heart of the matter is how can we tell if relationships are improving in a rivalry, and therefore determine the relative effectiveness of conflict management efforts. We have used the phrase “level of hostility,” but we need to be more precise and provide some explicit behavioral criteria.

Conceptually, one form of conflict management success occurs when the BRL decreases. A declining BRL indicates that, for whatever reasons, relations between rivals are improving. Candidates for successful conflict management are thus those rivalries that have periods of a declining BRL. One might suggest that including only *declining* BRL levels is too strict a criterion for successful conflict management: a flat, unchanging BRL means that the rivals “manage” to keep the rivalry from getting worse. This remark raises several concerns. First, in chapter 9, we presented a flat BRL as the dominant mode of rivalry severity over time. Implicitly, this suggests that various efforts to influence hostility levels have no long-term impact. Second, empirically, if it were common that rivalries showed increasing BRLs, then a constant BRL would appear in that context to be successful conflict management. Nevertheless, such does not appear to be the case, as increasing patterns of severity were relatively rare among enduring rivalries. Third, a flat BRL would signify successful conflict management if it occurred after a period of a steadily increasing BRL (such as the plateau case in the previous chapter). Fourth, common usage implies that conflict management means improved relations. “*Détente*” meant a change in relations. The persistent hostility of the United States and USSR throughout the 1950s does not fall under most people’s definition of conflict management.

This is the first of many times in which we will argue that conflict management implies behavioral change. After all, the purpose of such management is to alter the course of the conflict. If the initial course of the rivalry is escalatory, a *change* to a flat line may be attributable to successful conflict management, but if the trend of the BRL of the rivalry appears basically flat from the start, then a continuation of that stable trend is not an example of success. One important caveat is in order. The absence of behavioral change should not necessarily be counted as a failure in conflict management. Some enduring rivalries (for example, USSR–Norway and United States–Peru) persist at very low levels of severity, and there is little that mediation and other conflict management efforts can do to ameliorate the rivalries further, short of facilitating their termination.

Enduring rivalry patterns with periods of declining basic rivalry levels constitute one important type of successful conflict management. These are the flip side of the volcano hypothesis discussed in the last chapter. Similar to escalatory patterns, such conflict management patterns would throw into doubt the punctuated equilibrium model, typified by the flat, unchanging BRL pattern. Returning to table 9.1 in the previous chapter, we note that there are several patterns that might be indicative of conflict management. Five cases involved flat distributions that shifted from a higher plateau to a lower one. This behavioral shift may be indicative of successful intervention by a third party or the rivals themselves managing their competition at lower levels. Similarly, decreasing or convex patterns of severity also are potentially identifiable as those in which conflict management occurred. Collectively, however, these constitute only 13 cases, or approximately 21 percent of all enduring rivalries.

About a quarter of all enduring rivalries contain periods of successful conflict management. We thus have the problem of whether this glass is three-quarters empty or one-quarter full. Clearly, the dominant pattern remains the flat punctuated equilibrium one. Nevertheless, conflict management is not rare. One can compare this to wars as a percentage of all militarized disputes, only about 4 percent. Also, worthy of note are the plateau cases that *both* indicate conflict management success and fit the punctuated equilibrium model. Clearly there is sufficient material to investigate what distinguishes the modal punctuated equilibrium pattern from the somewhat rare cases of conflict management success.

Conflict Management as Avoidance of Extreme Forms of Conflict

Trends in the BRL constitute but one possible form of conflict management. Most general concepts are multifaceted, and conflict management is no exception. The basic rivalry level refers to the *average* level of hostility. Some disputes are more severe, some are less so, and the BRL focuses on the center of gravity of rivalry hostility. Recall that we do not include rivalry termination in our analysis; hence the rivalry is always ongoing in this study. We examine conflict management *within* rivalries. Militarized disputes thus form a part of

TABLE 10.1: High BRL Enduring Rivalries and War Avoidance

Rivalry	BRL	Number of Wars
Jordan–Israel	142	3
N. Korea–S. Korea	125	1
Somalia–Ethiopia	123	1
Iran–Iraq	112	1
USA–North Korea	109	1
Syria–Israel	107	4
Honduras–Nicaragua	106	1
Yugoslavia–Bulgaria	105	2
India–Pakistan	105	3
China–South Korea	104	1

an expected rivalry future. In this context, conflict management can refer to the *avoidance* of the most severe conflicts in an ongoing rivalry relationship. Hence, our second conception of successful conflict management uses the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the most severe conflicts and wars in an enduring rivalry.

Conflict management defined as war avoidance does not contradict the punctuated equilibrium framework. War results from a combination of the basic rivalry level and crisis-specific factors—volatility. The punctuated equilibrium model makes clear claims about the evolution of the BRL, but says little or nothing about volatility or extreme values.

Of course, it may be the case that the enduring rivalry was not serious (i.e., a low BRL) and hence war was very unlikely: it is not difficult to avoid something that is not likely to occur anyway. Of course, for war to become probable, a low BRL must have a large volatility. Enduring rivalries without war *and* a high BRL or frequent disputes would be good places to look for successful conflict management. It is not easy to maintain a high level of conflict intensity without something going wrong in one dispute or another. If war is avoided, then management efforts may be the explanation.

A rough indication of successful conflict management in this regard can be defined by looking at the rivalries with the highest BRLs and those with the largest number of disputes. Here we again roughly define the basic rivalry level as the mean severity of all the disputes in the enduring rivalry. We list the top 10—roughly the top 15 percent—by these criteria and look for states that were successful in war avoidance. Table 10.1 gives the results for the high BRL group and table 10.2 for high dispute frequency category. It should be noted that the calculation of the mean basic rivalry levels *includes* all wars, so the existence of a high BRL without war is a particularly strong test.

TABLE 10.2: High Dispute Enduring Rivalries and War Avoidance

Rivalry	Number of Disputes	Number of Wars
US–USSR	53	0
USSR–China	50	3
Syria–Israel	45	4
USSR–Japan	43	4
India–Pakistan	40	3
Egypt–Israel	36	5
China–Japan	34	5
US–China	24	1
China–India	22	1

In general, we note that high frequency and high BRL rivalries do not avoid war. There is no high BRL rivalry that did not experience war at least once. The rivalry with the highest BRL not to experience war is between Morocco and Algeria (BRL = 103). A severity score of 100 is just the dividing line at which disputes begin to involve battlefield fatalities. If this is the average for a rivalry, it is perhaps not too surprising that things eventually get out of hand. Quite famously, the United States and USSR operated under a tacit norm to avoid direct and official contact between their armed forces. Generally rivals that operate at a very high level of hostility must make only a slight escalatory leap to war, and it is evident from our results that they are not successful all the time in controlling that escalation. Another indicator of rivalry severity is the number of disputes it generates. Again, we suspect a rivalry that generates many crises is a severe one, and war is likely to occur eventually. Among high dispute frequency enduring rivalries, only the United States–USSR rivalry managed to avoid war. More commonly, frequent dispute rivalries go to war several times, something that might be predicted just given the large number of conflictual interactions. War avoidance must be an important part of the concept of successful conflict management; if war occurs, then in an important sense conflict management efforts have failed. Not surprisingly, virtually all severe enduring rivalries failed on this count.

More nuanced than the complete absence of war in a rivalry would be trends in the incidence of severe disputes and war. For example, if there were several wars in the first half of the rivalry and none in the second half, then that would suggest that the rivals have done something to manage their rivalry. Thus, one variation on this second conflict management indicator is a decreasing trend in extreme severity values over the course of the rivalry. This mimics the analysis of the BRL using the highest dispute level reached by the rivalry instead of all dispute values.

TABLE 10.3: Patterns in Extreme Values

Pattern	Number of Cases (%)
Flat	25 (40)
Increasing	16 (25)
Decreasing	6 (10)
Convex	2 (3)
Concave	9 (14)
Wavy	5 (8)
Total	63 (100)

We examined trends in extreme values by plotting the “moving maximum.” The moving maximum is a variation on the moving average, where the maximum statistic replaces the mean. At any given time, the value equals the most severe of the previous five disputes (including the current dispute if one is under way).² For this moving maximum to go down requires an extended period of less severe disputes. The occasional, odd or sporadic low-level dispute does not indicate successful conflict management, but a long string of such disputes does. The moving maximum methodology, like the moving average, is a data-smoothing technique, and it eliminates much of the variation between observations. Hence clear patterns are more likely to emerge. The impact of a war is limited in the BRL analysis, to just one point, often among dozens. With the moving maximum, a war usually continues to determine the value of the maximum for the next four disputes (because wars receive very high severity values), hence accentuating high points in a rivalry. This may be appropriate because one might want to weight wars more heavily than other disputes. For example, if there is only one war in the rivalry and it occurs at the beginning, then the pattern is likely to be decreasing (e.g., China–South Korea). If the war occurs in the middle, then the pattern is likely to be convex.

Of course, trends in the extreme values are related to the BRL. If we think of the BRL as a something akin to an arithmetic mean, then it will clearly be influenced by the presence or absence of extreme values. Nevertheless, the mean does include low-severity as well as high-severity disputes, and a large number of low-severity disputes will dilute the effects of a war on the BRL.

Table 10.3 provides a summary of the different patterns we coded in the evolution of extreme disputes and wars. Contrasting this table with BRL patterns in table 9.1, we find that there are significantly more nonflat patterns; flat is still the modal pattern, but now it constitutes significantly less than 50 percent of the cases. From a conflict management standpoint, the decreasing and convex patterns (collectively about 13 percent of the sample) are interesting

²For the initial disputes in a rivalry, we coded the first two disputes as missing on the moving five-dispute maximum statistic; for the third and fourth disputes we used the maximum of all previous disputes in the rivalry.

in that rivals have managed to deescalate their hostile interactions even while continuing their competition. Notably, all three rivalries involving the Korean peninsula exhibit this pattern. Somewhat discouraging is the frequency of patterns that suggest rising hostility over the life of a rivalry, at least with respect to extreme incidents. One-quarter of the cases exhibit increasing extreme values, and another 14 percent show a concave pattern. These cases suggest that rivals are increasingly facing more severe confrontations and perhaps war as the rivalry matures. It is perhaps these cases that account for Hensel's (1996) moderately strong findings among rivalries as a whole that severity increases with the length of rivalries. Even though the most severe rivalries rarely avoid war, we see a variety of different patterns in the evolution of the most severe conflicts and wars. We often tend to think about war as the result of some process, but some of the patterns we detect start with a war. War may not as much occur *in* an enduring rivalry as be the *cause* of the enduring rivalry. Effective conflict management in these instances is as much the attempt by states to deal with the sequels of war as they are attempts to prevent the next one.

Conflict Management as Reduced Volatility of Rivalries

Related to the incidence of extreme disputes and wars as a measure of conflict management is what we have termed the "volatility" of rivalries. If the BRL is similar to a regression curve or mean, then volatility is approximately the variance around that curve. The basic idea behind the BRL is that the level of each dispute is an identically distributed, independent random variable centered on the BRL, and therefore volatility is the variance of those dispute levels around the BRL. The statistical analogy emphasizes that conceptually the BRL and volatility constitute separate—and possibly independent—facets of conflict management. In practice, they are weakly correlated ($r = .30$; statistically this means heteroskedasticity).

Normally, the variance of the residuals in a regression model is of no real substantive importance. Reducing this variance is important only because this increases the accuracy (hence significance) of parameter estimates. In our situation, the size of the residuals reflects the volatility of the rivalry. A rivalry with a lower baseline, but higher volatility, may produce more wars than a rivalry with a high baseline with little variation. Whether or not a dispute in an enduring rivalry escalates to war is a function of both the BRL (mean) and the volatility (variance) of the rivalry. One possible indicator of effective conflict management is when the baseline of a rivalry does not change, but the variance is reduced. This is epitomized by the Cold War, in which the United States and the USSR developed a few rules for keeping the competition under control, even though intense competition remained the norm. Lower volatility in a rivalry should mean greater predictability for the rivals and therefore less misperception that could lead to war.

The volatility of a rivalry is linked to the occurrence of extreme values. This connection is generally much more important than the link between extreme values and the mean. Extreme values by themselves indicate a larger variance, and therefore greater volatility. Yet the logic of the argument for the use of extreme value analysis as a way of understanding conflict management carries over to volatility. Limited volatility or decreasing trends in volatility each permit the inference that states may be doing something to keep their conflicts under control. We have already discussed the problem regarding the relevance of cooperation in the analysis of conflict management. A similar issue arises with volatility. The elimination of lower-level disputes, while keeping those at a high level, also reduces the variance. Yet we would not regard this as effective conflict management, as we are interested in the reduction of the most serious disputes between rivals, not necessarily those conflicts that have little or no chance to escalate to war. One possible solution is to define volatility as the variation above the BRL, excluding the effect of variation in low-level disputes. Just as we do not include cooperative events in our measure of the BRL, we can exclude changes in volatility that result from changes in low-level dispute activity. This parallels the extreme value argument as well; we are not really concerned with the evolution of the lowest-level conflicts, but rather the highest ones.

We measure volatility in a manner analogous to the moving maximum method outlined above. Instead of a moving maximum, however, we can calculate a “moving variance.” Unlike the maximum, we need a sample mean to calculate a sample variance. This is not as easy as it might appear. One of our criteria for coding patterns is that one or two disputes should not affect the final coding decision, but by constructing the BRL using regression-like techniques, *all* observations enter the calculations. Of course, we could remove outliers, using smoothing techniques, but this means that each BRL must be individually crafted. Getting a computer to recognize patterns that seem obvious to the human eye is a nontrivial matter; one need but briefly examine the artificial intelligence literature on pattern matching to be convinced of this. The cases that we coded as flat in chapter 9 seem less problematic in this regard. In this particular case, the mean dispute level for the whole rivalry seems like a good first-cut approach. Of course, even here extreme values have an impact, but much less than they can have on a regression curve. Therefore, in this analysis we limit ourselves to the rivalries that we have coded as flat (chapter 9, appendix).³ In addition to the cases we had to eliminate because we had no numeric estimate of the BRL (i.e., all nonflat rivalries), insufficient data eliminated a further group of rivalries, giving us only a final total of only 12 rivalries. Our method of constructing the moving variance only uses above average disputes; hence we lose

³We also did not consider so-called plateau case variations of the flat distribution. From a conflict management perspective, these are variations of the increasing and decreasing patterns and therefore not appropriate for consideration of volatility.

a substantial number of data points for each rivalry. Our final sample thus effectively includes only flat BRL rivalries with frequent disputes.

With only a limited number of cases, distinct patterns across cases are hard to discern. Nevertheless, cases of declining volatility, such as that in the United Kingdom–USSR rivalry, might be considered evidence of successful conflict management. Convex patterns suggest a midcourse adjustment in rivalry hostility and the establishment of norms or procedures for controlling the competition. The India–Pakistan rivalry is an example of this pattern. With only 12 rivalries as a sample we cannot draw any definitive conclusions, but nevertheless we note that there were three flat, four increasing, two convex, one decreasing, and two wavy patterns. These results fit generally with those of the moving maximum analyses, a decrease in the number of flat cases with more “increasing” cases. In contrast with the theme of this chapter, it is the punctuated equilibrium and volcano patterns that dominate our analyses. In the case of volatility, we see only one decreasing and two convex patterns, which show conflict management success. As we move from the basic rivalry level to the extreme value and volatility analyses, we roughly see an increase in the proportion of escalatory patterns.

In many ways, it is unfortunate that data and methodological difficulties prevented us from carrying out an analysis of all rivalries. Conceptually, we find volatility (variance) superior to the moving maximum as a measure. Instead of using only maximum values and suppressing all other information, the moving variance gives extra weight to extreme values (because distances to the BRL are squared) but also includes information from all above-average disputes. The funnel-like effect of decreasing variance seems to capture an important aspect of what conflict management is about, particularly in ongoing rivalries. Because rivalries are ongoing and many rivalries show no change in the basic rivalry level, reducing volatility may constitute their only means of conflict management.

Summary

In summary, we have examined several forms of conflict management as a dependent variable: (1) the evolution of the basic rivalry level, (2) the evolution of extreme values and the absence of war, and (3) the evolution of volatility. In all cases, conflict management is operationalized as a *change* in the rivalry relationship in the direction of less conflict. These three facets of conflict management all invoke change, but change of different kinds. We proposed that changes in basic rivalry levels and volatility constitute relatively uncorrelated dimensions of conflict management. Students of war tend to think of conflict in terms of unidimensional scales, be it the cooperation-to-conflict of events data or the level-of-force scale used in COW data.⁴ We suggest here that conflict

⁴The duration of a dispute seems quite independent from its severity, but duration is rarely used as a dependent variable in conflict studies.

management may be multidimensional, and that any attempt to collapse it into one dimension will be problematic, and possibly unwise. Each of these facets of conflict management is worthy of study in its own right.

Our results on medium to long-term conflict management have implications for the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalry. Because this model most directly refers to the basic rivalry level, its implications for volatility and extreme conflict are less clear. We found that a significant minority of enduring rivalries had successful conflict management periods, but the dominant pattern was the flat one predicted by the punctuated equilibrium model. This parallels the results on the volcano hypothesis in the previous chapter where we found only a limited number of rivalries with escalatory phases.

Extreme conflict and volatility patterns all focus in various ways on deviations from the BRL. In one way or another they center on the most severe disputes in an enduring rivalry. Here the punctuated equilibrium model does not make clear predictions. Changes in volatility or extreme conflict patterns may both be consistent with an unchanging basic rivalry level.

Although we stress conflict management in this chapter, some of our analyses of extreme conflict within enduring rivalries support the volcano model of enduring rivalry. In our various analyses of extreme conflict patterns and volatility, we found a larger percentage of escalatory patterns than we did in our focus on the basic rivalry level. If we change the meaning of *escalatory* from the basic rivalry level to the extremes of rivalry, then we find somewhat stronger support for the volcano hypothesis than in the previous chapter.

This has ambiguous implications for the punctuated equilibrium model. On the one hand, to focus *only* on the most extreme conflicts of a rivalry certainly is biased. Yet, on the other hand, if there is a clear trend whereby the most severe disputes are getting more severe, then one can argue that the rivalry in some sense is escalating. In summary, the relationship between the basic rivalry level, volatility, and extreme conflict remains an important item for future research.

Mediation in International Rivalry

The focus of the last part of this chapter is directed toward assessing the impact or success of mediation on rivalry conflict. There are several implications and caveats associated with this focus. First, we note that we are analyzing the conflict *management* of rivalries, especially enduring ones, and not necessarily conflict *resolution*. Conflict management is a lower threshold standard to meet than conflict resolution. For mediation to be effective in our study, it must lead only to creating stability in the rivalry and facilitating circumstances that allow the rivals to avoid the most severe manifestations of militarized conflict. If mediation does indeed produce conflict resolution or termination of the rivalry, then clearly it has also managed the rivalry positively and more. Nevertheless, we save the issues of conflict resolution and termination of rivalries for the next chapter and concentrate instead on conflict management.

Consistent with the conflict management focus, we also concentrate on the medium-term impact of mediation attempts. That is, we are concerned with how mediation attempts affect the behavior of rivals in the aftermath of those efforts. Accordingly, this section is not concerned with whether mediation efforts have a cumulative effect over time in a rivalry or whether conflict patterns in rivalries are altered permanently or in the aggregate, but only with whether rivalry behavior is changed (if at all) in the approximately 5–10 years on average following third-party intervention. This is not to say that such long-term concerns are unimportant; indeed, they were the topic of the first part of this chapter. We now concentrate on the more immediate effects of mediation, which is consistent with the goals of most mediation attempts and may be easier to discern than long-term impacts, in which time and many intervening factors may make an assessment of earlier mediation efforts quite difficult.

Finally, we should clarify what we mean by the success or positive impact from mediation on rivalries. We regard mediation as having an impact if it changes the subsequent conflict behavior of the rivals. The standard for this judgment is a comparison of state behavior in segments of the rivalry with and without mediation attempts (this is the interrupted time-series design noted in chapter 5). Any beneficial impact from mediation, and this is considered along several dimensions (avoiding war, delaying conflict, lessening its severity), can be said to represent success, although clearly we are interested in the magnitude of beneficial impacts, not merely their existence.

We begin our investigation with a review of the relevant literature on mediation and relate this to enduring rivalries, recognizing that there currently is little scholarly research that addresses questions similar to those posed here.

Insights from Mediation Research

International conflicts can be managed by the parties themselves (through coercion or some form of negotiation), or more often by some exogenous actors (e.g., the UN, a regional organization, a state, etc.). Mediation is widely regarded as the most common form of exogenous intervention in international disputes (Bercovitch 1984; Butterworth 1976; Holsti 1987), and not surprisingly the focus of most extant research on conflict management. Indeed, over 70 percent of the conflict management efforts in rivalries are mediation attempts.

Although seeking a mutually agreeable solution through mediation is becoming increasingly popular in all areas of social life, there is much about its performance and effectiveness that we do not understand. Clearly, mediation cannot be effective or successful in each and every dispute (for a review, see Wall and Lynn 1993). Some disputes may be amenable to mediation; in others, the parties may have to rely on different means. There is considerable agreement among many scholars and practitioners that mediation is more suitable than law or force in dealing with international conflicts, but there is also some disagreement on what precisely constitutes international mediation. However

we view it, and whether we study mediation from a historical, normative, or prescriptive perspective, mediation makes sense only if it is placed in the overall context of conflict management and its special features are recognized within this context.

Mediation is an aspect of conflict management without a universally accepted definition. Some studies (e.g., Northedge and Donelan 1971; Moore 1986) purport to describe mediators' stances or what mediators do. These are narrow definitions. Such definitions of mediation are consistent with the attempt to capture the "essence" of mediation and to draw boundaries between mediation, conciliation, facilitation, good offices, shuttle diplomacy, fact-finding, and other related activities. This seems to be a futile exercise. When entering a dispute, a mediator may change his or her stance and exhibit all, or any combination, of these behaviors. This is why we prefer to shape the analysis by adopting a definition that will remove unnecessary quibbling over the boundaries between conciliation, facilitation, good offices, and so forth, and will focus on behavior rather than on motives and intentions of actors in conflict. We define mediation as "a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law" (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991, 8). This is a broad definition, but one that places mediation in the overall context of conflict management, draws attention to the basic components of mediation (namely, disputing parties, a mediator, and a specific conflict management context), and permits comparisons across levels and types of conflicts.

Does mediation actually work? Does it have any impact on international conflicts and if so, how to assess it? These issues are clearly at the heart of this section. In most contexts, it is possible to ascertain that a particular strategy works by assessing (through personal interviews with those directly involved) the degree of satisfaction the parties have had with a mediated outcome. One may also study the rate of compliance with any outcome, its speed, efficiency, or capacity for implementation. Dealing with the kind of conflicts we do, all we can do is examine how mediation attempts work by noting their impact on the parties' subsequent conflict behavior. When parties cease or limit violent interactions, or experience greater time lags between such interactions, mediation may be said to have been successful. If the parties carry on fighting with roughly the same frequency and levels of hostility, then clearly mediation has had little or no impact. The basic proposition we wish to test here is that mediation, because of its character, informality, and flexibility, is an effective conflict management approach in moderating enduring conflict.

We are mindful that assessing conflict outcomes, or the impact of mediation, is conspicuously tricky. Often there are as many evaluation criteria as there are scholars. Notwithstanding these difficulties, we are convinced that it

would be valuable to examine, in a systematic fashion, the influence that mediation may have on the different types of conflict. How will the type of dispute, as our main independent, contextual variable, affect the frequency, timing, and effectiveness of mediation?

Type of Dispute

We approach our study by assuming that any mediation strategy must, first and foremost, be adaptive and contingent. Different mediators do different things in different situations, and the particular form of any mediation behavior depends on who the parties are, what the dispute is all about, and who the exogenous managers are. Intense and protracted disputes, evidenced here by enduring rivalries, may call forth different forms of mediation than disputes over relatively insignificant issues.

It seems a truism to suggest that the kind of dispute will have a significant impact on the success or failure of any mediation attempt. Kressel and Pruitt (1989) conclude that unfavorable dispute characteristics are likely to defeat even the most adroit mediators. Similarly, Ott (1972) argues that the success or failure of mediation is largely determined by the character of the dispute, with the characteristics and behavior of the mediator marginally influential at best. We intend to go beyond such statements and actually unravel some dimensions of conflict, code their presence and impact systematically, and analyze how mediators actually perform in different kinds of rivalries. We begin by reviewing the theoretical consequences of one of the defining aspects of enduring rivalries, that of intensity.

When we consider dispute intensity, we are immediately confronted with two fundamental difficulties: definition and operationalization. Although intensity is often regarded as an important dispute characteristic, what precisely does it signify? A number of scholars (e.g., Burton 1968; Young 1972; Jackson 1952) claim that intense disputes (however measured) are particularly suitable for mediation, as they usually offer a conspicuous solution, and the parties, having exhausted themselves, are ready to countenance any way out of their predicament. Others (e.g., Frei 1976; Kressel and Pruitt 1989) conclude that parties in high-intensity disputes will show a greater inclination to reject mediation efforts. Under the rubric of intensity, all sorts of diverse factors such as the severity of prior conflict, the level of hostility, levels of anger and intensity of feeling, as well as the strength of negative perceptions (most enduring rivalries would score high on each of these dimensions) are included. There is no suggestion how these can be operationalized. In their discussion of public sector mediation, Kochan and Jick argue that the intensity of a dispute will be negatively related to the effectiveness of the mediation process (1978, 213). Yet, here again, what they mean by intensity is not made explicit.

To avoid this confusion, we will use one relatively simple indicator to test the hypothesis that mediation is less likely to be offered or to succeed in intense disputes. The most accessible surrogate measure of conflict intensity, and the one relevant to our concerns, is rivalry type (isolated, proto, and enduring categories, which on average represent increasing degrees of length, severity, and conflict frequency). Enduring rivalries, on average, can be considered the most intense conflicts given their relatively long duration, higher levels and frequency of violence, and large number of wars and fatalities that occur in that context. Thus, enduring rivalries might be expected to have more mediation attempts, although the impact of individual mediation attempts may be less in this context.

Previous studies (e.g., Bercovitch and Langley 1993) have shown a very clear pattern of the inverse relationship between intensity as measured by fatalities and successful mediation. Only 39 percent of all mediation attempts in the 1945 era had *any* degree of short-term success in mediating disputes where fatality levels exceeded 10 thousand, compared to 64 percent success rate in disputes where fatality levels were lower than five hundred.

In discussing enduring conflicts, we have to be aware that the number of fatalities may give us a rather misleading picture. Some high-fatality disputes can last years or even decades, while in others a considerable number of casualties may be experienced in a relatively short time. The “age” of a dispute, as Frei (1976) notes, has to be taken into account as well as the level of fatalities. This is where the concept of enduring rivalries, with its emphasis on the long-term dynamics of a relationship, comes in so usefully.

Timing of Conflict Management and Mediation

One of the most intriguing issues in the study of mediation relates to the issue of timing of third-party initiatives. When is the best time, if such a time does exist, to initiate mediation? And how can this “right moment” be identified conceptually and defined empirically? The discussion in this section will be devoted to addressing these questions.

Scholars agree that conflict management in general, and mediation in particular, can function best if the moment of entry is just right. The importance of proper timing has been highlighted by a number of scholars, though often in a tautological fashion. Conflicts, like any other social process, go through various points or distinguishable phases. Certain mediation attempts can be successful if made at the right point or phase. Mediation timing, and its relation to the “life cycle” of a rivalry, can be posited as another independent variable.

Northedge and Donelan note that mediation attempts can be successful “when there exists a concatenation of circumstances already tending toward an improvement of the situation” (1971, 308). Zartman (1985) has suggested that the parties’ assessment of the dynamics of the conflict, its combination of plateaus, precipices, deadlocks, and deadlines, will produce a distinct moment

of “ripeness.” The assumption here is that in the waxing and waning of the complex social forces that make up an international conflict, there are moments (e.g., a change in power relations) that may affect the perceptions and attitudes of the disputants and thus the likelihood of mediation success.

When we examine the scholarly literature on mediation, we find broad agreement with Touval that “mediation should take place at a propitious moment” (1982, 8), but that is where the agreement ends. Some theorists, such as Claude (1971) and Edmead (1971), have suggested that mediation efforts should be initiated as early as possible in a dispute, certainly long before positions become fixed, attitudes harden, and an escalating cycle becomes entrenched. From an ethical perspective, this is an attractive proposition. It is better to initiate mediation early to avoid further suffering. But are the parties ready to accept and partake in mediation in earnest? Can “windows of opportunity” be detected so early in rivalries?

Others (e.g., Kriesberg and Thorson 1991) believe that conflicts have to go through some phases, as well as moves and countermoves before a serious attempt to mediate it should be made. Mediation is clearly more likely to be successful when disputants think that they can gain a better settlement through mediation than through unilateral action. This normally occurs when a conflict has gone through a few phases and crises, and a workable alternative to combat appears feasible (Zartman 1985). This juncture, usually described as a “ripe moment,” occurs when (1) the parties perceive a hurting stalemate, or an impending catastrophe, or all unilateral actions are blocked, and (2) when a powerful mediator can, through the use of leverage, create a perception that mediation timing is right. Either way, there is agreement that ill-timed mediations are bound to fail, but some disagreement over the specifics of mediation timing.

Most scholars who accord considerable importance to timing (e.g., Ott 1972; Pruitt 1981; Rubin 1981; and Moore 1986) suggest that mediation will be more successful if it is initiated well into a conflict, when costs have become intolerable and both parties accept that they may lose too much by continuing their dispute. This notion also receives some empirical support in one of the few studies to actually assess the impact of timing (Bercovitch and Langley 1993). Here we wish to pursue this question further and test for mediation timing in different rivalry types. What happens if a conflict is of long-standing duration with repeated resorts to militarized conflicts? Is mediation timing different in enduring rivalries than in proto- or isolated rivalries? And what if there are a few mediation attempts, as is the case in most conflicts? Do they occur at the beginning, middle, or final phases of a militarized competition? How, in short, is mediation embedded in an enduring rivalry?

The essence of mediation timing is the creation of a right atmosphere of political willingness and dyadic impasse. Exploiting the right moment or initiating mediation at just the right time can usually only be ascertained a posteriori, but here we want to postulate that enduring conflicts will attract more mediation efforts, and that most of these efforts might take place later rather than earlier in the life cycle of an enduring rivalry. Parties in such a conflict are willing to tolerate repeated cycles of conflict, and to run greater risks than other parties. Enduring rivals are in it for the long haul. We anticipate that they will neither expect, nor welcome, early mediation.

How does the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalries fit into the analysis of mediation effectiveness? In many ways, it is a continuation of the hypothesis that the more intense the conflict, the lower the success rate. The punctuated equilibrium model suggests that conflict management has little long-term impact on enduring rivalries. In this section, however, we focus principally on medium-term impacts of mediation on the next dispute in the rivalry (although not immediate changes in behavior such as a cease-fire). Short-term mediation success does not necessarily contradict the punctuated equilibrium model. Many factors influence the volatility of a given crisis, and one factor could well be mediation efforts. At the same time, the punctuated equilibrium model implies that this does not happen frequently and that in general mediation is likely to have little effect on the course of the enduring rivalry.

In summary, we might expect that mediation attempts in rivalries will be more common in the most severe rivalries (enduring ones), but perhaps not be as successful in that context given the difficulty of resolving long-standing grievances and the history of violent relations between the two sides. With very little prior research to rely upon, these expectations must be regarded as tentative, and our study is largely exploratory. With this in mind, we move to an empirical description and assessment of mediation attempts in rivalries.

Research Design

Unlike other empirical analyses, we are limited in the scope of our analyses by the character of the mediation data available to test our propositions. First, we can only look at mediation attempts in the context of rivalries since 1946. Although this is in one sense greatly limiting, international mediation efforts were considerably less frequent prior to this time period, and international organizations (frequently the principal agents of mediation attempts) are rare in the nineteenth century and only fully developed and numerous after World War II. We are also confined to rivalries that have at least one dispute with 10 or more fatalities according to Bercovitch (1993). His mediation data cover only conflict management attempts in rivalries that meet or exceed this threshold and therefore we are unable to assess the full population of rivalries, some of which

have no fatalities.⁵ Nevertheless, even with these restrictions, we are able to analyze 555 rivalries of all varieties over the period 1946–92: 35 are enduring rivalries, 112 are proto-rivalries, with the remaining 408 rivalries being in the isolated category.⁶ As we indicated in the first part of the book, although we are interested in enduring rivalries, we use the isolated and proto varieties as control groups for comparison, and indeed they facilitate the test of several of our expectations that propose differences in mediation attempts and success across the rivalry continuum.

Wars and the severity of conflict are identified and measured as in previous chapters. To assess less dramatic impacts of conflict management, we are also interested in whether militarized disputes are less frequent or delayed in rivalries as a result of a mediation effort. Thus, we look at the mean time (measured in years) or “waiting time” from the time of one dispute to the next dispute, comparing those waiting times that include mediation to those that do not.

Beyond these basic measures of conflict level and waiting times, we “contextualize” the measures by looking at their relationship to the mean value of the rivalry. This is consistent with the notion of the basic rivalry level, that rivalries have a relatively stable pattern of conflict over their lifetimes. Thus, we can assess whether mediation attempts result in a lower than average conflict level or a longer waiting time than is typical in the rivalry. Purely cross-sectional analyses may not be able to identify this effect, especially if there is a bias toward mediation attempts occurring in more severe disputes or rivalries. Some comparisons will be made between rivalries with and without conflict management. In addition, however, we will compare the relative effectiveness of mediation efforts on disputes within the same rivalry. In this way, we can hold constant many of the idiosyncratic elements of a rivalry and understand whether mediation affects the conduct of the rivalry (by comparing the evolution following a mediation attempt with postdispute periods that have no mediations).

Identifying instances and characteristics of rivalries is only half of the equation. We now turn to international mediation efforts and their components. We use the term *mediation* to refer to the wide range of third-party activities that are acceptable to the adversaries and are designed to manage or resolve a dispute without resort to force or invoking authoritative rules (Bercovitch 1991). For an operational listing of these attempts, we turn to Bercovitch’s (1993) International Conflict Management (ICM) data set that covers all international conflict management attempts in rivalries with 10 or more fatalities over the period

⁵There is some difference in the recording of fatality levels between the Bercovitch and the COW data sets. In those instances, we necessarily relied on the Bercovitch codings, as they were the basis for selecting cases in the identification of mediation attempts.

⁶Only rivalries beginning in 1946 and afterward are included. Rivalries that began prior to 1946 and continued after that (and hence are left-censored) are dropped from consideration.

1946–92 (summary descriptions of this data are given in Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991). For our purposes, we focus only on those mediation efforts in disputes between two recognized states (according to Small and Singer 1982), the population from which rivalries are drawn.

We merged the data set on rivalries with that on mediation and determined whether or not a given rivalry included any attempts at international conflict management. A mediation attempt occurs in a rivalry if it involved a third party trying to manage a conflict between the same two states that constituted the rivalry. The mediation attempt had to take place within five years of the first militarized dispute in the rivalry or 10 years after the last dispute in the rivalry. In the rivalries identified, there were 618 different instances of mediation attempts.

Beyond the presence or absence of mediation attempts, we are also interested in their timing. For the descriptive analysis of timing, we divided rivalries into three equal segments from the time of the first militarized dispute to the last dispute: early, middle, and late. We also considered whether conflict management attempts occurred in the five years prior to the first dispute or 10 years after the last dispute, thereby creating two more phases: before and after. For our analysis of the impact of mediation timing on conflict in the rivalry, the measure used was the elapsed time (measured in years) from the onset of the rivalry (defined as the beginning of the first dispute) to the dispute on which the mediation effect was supposed to exercise an impact. The immediate, short-term outcome of a mediation attempt was coded as successful if there was a partial or full settlement between the protagonists at the time, and unsuccessful in all other cases, taken from the categories in the ICM data. We expect that favorable outcomes of mediation attempts in the immediate aftermath might make conflict less severe or likely in the medium term.

The likelihood and severity of future conflict in rivalries are also influenced by factors other than the existence and timing of mediation attempts. Thus, we include two other factors that have been found to have an important impact on recurring conflict in another study (Hensel 1994): issues and previous dispute outcomes. Some conflict issues are more prone to recurring conflict, and states may be more willing to risk violence in pursuit of certain issues; this is consistent with our earlier notion that some dispute characteristics are less amenable to mediation and conflict resolution. In particular, territorial issues could be the most dangerous (Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1994). Accordingly, in looking at the possibility of future conflict, its severity, and its timing, we code whether the last dispute in the rivalry involved territorial issues or not for either rival, relying on the information reported in the Correlates of War data set on militarized disputes (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). We anticipate that a territorial dispute is more likely to produce a war or serious conflict in the future and in a shorter interval of time than conflicts over other issues. We also include a control variable for whether the previous dispute ended in a compromise or not.

TABLE 10.4: Mediation Attempts in Rivalries, 1946–1992

Rivalry Type	Management (%)	<i>N</i>	Without (%)	<i>N</i>	Number of Attempts
Isolated	35	144	65	264	233
Proto	45	50	55	62	142
Enduring	66	23	34	12	243
Total	39	217	61	338	618

Note: Unit of analysis is rivalry.
 $\chi^2 = 14.33$, significant at .01.

Compromise outcomes may improve relations between protagonists and make them less likely to fight in the future or limit the violence or delay its onset between them when there is a confrontation. This is consistent with the earlier discussion that noted mediation efforts must correspond to positive or ripe environments, which recent compromises between rivals might represent. Thus, we also include a dichotomous variable for compromise outcomes (yes/no) in our multivariate analyses.

Empirical Results

In the first set of analyses, presented in table 10.4, we look to the frequency of conflict management attempts in the three types of rivalries. Our concern is both with the likelihood that a given rivalry will involve conflict management and with the number of attempts in each rivalry type (as a rivalry may experience multiple conflict management attempts). Our expectation is that enduring rivalries, the most intense of conflict types, will draw a disproportionate number of conflict management efforts. In general, less than 39 percent of rivalries of all varieties experience any international conflict management. Some 66 percent of all enduring rivalries, however, involve at least one attempt. Enduring rivalries are almost twice as likely as isolated rivalries to attract external conflict management, and almost 50 percent more likely to have mediation than proto-rivalries. In some sense, this is both comforting and logical in that the international community directs its attention to the most serious problems and the ones that reappear on the international security agenda.

The attention given to enduring rivalries is also reflected in the number of mediation attempts. Although enduring rivalries constitute only about 6 percent of all rivalries in this sample, they attract almost 40 percent of all conflict management efforts; the average enduring rivalry with conflict management has over 6.9 individual conflict management attempts, whereas the typical proto-rivalry has only 1.3 on average. For any given rivalry, the expected number of mediation attempts for enduring rivalries is almost 10 times greater than for isolated rivalries. Thus, we conclude that enduring rivalries have a higher

TABLE 10.5: The Timing of Mediation in Rivalries

Rivalry Type	Before % (N)	Early % (N)	Middle % (N)	Late % (N)	After % (N)
Isolated	38 (89)	4 (10)	4 (9)	1 (11)	54 (114)
Proto	19 (27)	13 (18)	6 (8)	6 (9)	27 (80)
Enduring	1 (3)	29 (70)	30 (73)	37 (89)	3 (8)
Uncensored Cases					
Isolated	15 (16)	6 (6)	1 (1)	5 (5)	68 (79)
Proto	11 (9)	9 (7)	5 (4)	7 (6)	37 (55)
Enduring	0 (0)	55 (6)	27 (3)	0 (0)	18 (2)

Note: Unit of analysis is mediation attempt.

probability of attracting an effort at conflict management, and among those rivalries that do involve third-party conflict management, enduring rivalries will experience more numerous mediation attempts.

We noted in the theoretical section that conflict management attempts are most effective when a conflict is ripe for settlement, generally after states have locked in to their hostility patterns and have reached an impasse in the settlement of their competition (direct diplomatic and military initiatives have not resolved the dispute). Table 10.5 provides an analysis of when various mediation attempts have been launched vis-à-vis the different stages of a rivalry: before the onset, in the early phase, middle phase, latter stages, or after the final dispute. Because many of the rivalries in our sample had not ended as of 1992 (and therefore we are technically uncertain of which phase they actually are in), we include analyses for all cases as well as only for those that had ended by 1992 (uncensored cases).

It is evident that few conflict management efforts (with the exception of isolated rivalries) occur prior to the onset of the first militarized dispute in enduring rivalries. The international political (and scholarly) community is not very skilled at anticipating serious conflict and is often reluctant to take action even when the storm clouds appear. These findings illustrate that recent calls for effective early warning systems and preventive diplomacy have a basis in the empirical reality in that the international community tends not to respond to conflict prior to the first threat or actual use of force. This late effort is evident in isolated and proto-rivalries in that a majority of conflict management efforts take place following the last dispute. At this stage, there are two possible interpretations to this pattern of late intervention. On the one hand, it may be that in these cases the international community does not react until the threat of future conflict is past. In contrast, it may be that the mediations appear to be late in the

TABLE 10.6: The Impact of Mediation on the Likelihood of War—Logit

Variable	Estimate	S.E.	Significance
Intercept	4.47	0.86	0.0001
Mediation success	1.39	1.43	0.3306
Compromise	-1.96	0.89	0.0281
Territorial	-3.24	0.91	0.0004
Timing	-0.06	0.03	0.0131
Rivalry type	3.07	0.95	0.0013
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses			
Concordant = 88%		Somers' D = 0.77	
Discordant = 11%		Gamma = 0.78	
Tied = 2%			

game because they are effective in preventing future conflict and thereby facilitate the end of the rivalry. The empirical evidence below, however, is more consistent with the first interpretation. The conflict management efforts in enduring rivalries are spread throughout the life of the rivalries, but this may be misleading in that many enduring rivalries are ongoing. From this analysis, there is the suggestion that conflict management efforts are not always timed so as to ensure maximum effectiveness; such efforts are distributed broadly over the life of rivalries (although rarely early in the life of rivalries, and commonly after conflict has subsided in brief, less intense competitions).

We now turn our attention to the impact that conflict management efforts have on the behavior of rivals in conflict. The first concern is with the ability of conflict management efforts to lessen the likelihood of war. We conducted a logit analysis (as the dependent variable is dichotomous) that considered the impact of mediation, its timing, and other control variables on the likelihood that the next dispute in the rivalry would result in war. We analyzed only those rivalries that had at least one mediation attempt, so as to compare periods with and without mediation efforts while holding most other contextual factors constant.

With respect to mediation, the results are somewhat disappointing. Initial analyses looking at the presence or absence of mediation attempts did not affect the future likelihood of war between rivals. The most coherent set of results is that given in table 10.6. There, the key mediation variable was short-term mediation success. The effect of mediation success on future war was not statistically significant, and the sign of the coefficient is actually *positive*, suggesting that such mediation had the effect of increasing the probability of future war, rather than decreasing it. The positive sign of the coefficient is probably not a function of any negative results of short-term successful mediation, but rather a

TABLE 10.7: The Impact of Mediation on Conflict Levels in Rivalries

Variable	Estimate	S.E.	Significance
Intercept	-2.10	2.07	.31
Mediation	-8.49	4.45	.06
Compromise	-8.55	7.20	.24
Territorial	15.57	3.15	.0001
Timing	-0.17	0.10	.10
Number of mediations	0.18	1.22	.88

Note: $R^2 = .03$, $F = 6.79$, $p < .0001$.

selection effect. That is, mediation attempts occur primarily in the more severe rivalries, and take place at critical times in those rivalries, when the danger of war is the greatest. Thus, mediation attempts, and even short-term successes, may correspond to violent phases of rivalries.⁷

All of the other variables predicting war propensity were significant and generally in the expected direction. Not surprisingly, rivalry context (here relative severity along the rivalry continuum) affected the propensity of future war, with enduring rivalries most likely to experience war (this mirrors the results in chapter 3). Also as expected, mediation in the latter part of the rivalry seems more conducive to settlement as subsequent escalation to war is reduced. Among the control variables, compromise outcomes and territorial issues (surprisingly) had the effect of lessening the future chances for war. Overall, however, mediation appeared to have little role in reducing the prospects for war in the short to medium term.

Beyond looking at the effect of mediation attempts on subsequent war outbreaks, a more sensitive analysis considers their impact on conflict severity, including those confrontations that do not cross the threshold of war. If conflict management cannot always inhibit war, perhaps it might lessen the severity of future conflict. In general, there was little effect from mediation on conflict levels across the three rivalry types, although the sign of the coefficient was in the postulated direction (negative, indicating lower conflict levels). There was also little difference across different rivalry types.

Table 10.7 shows the impact of conflict management on the severity of disputes following those efforts; we use regression analysis on rivalries that had at least one mediation attempt. Here we define "conflict level" not in an absolute sense, e.g., number of fatalities, but with regard to what is normal for the rivalry in question. The dependent variable is thus the difference between the conflict severity of the dispute and the average conflict level (BRL) for the

⁷The results were not significantly altered by considering the number of mediations (i.e., there was no additive value to multiple mediation efforts.)

TABLE 10.8: The Impact of Mediation on Dispute “Waiting Times”

Variable	Estimate	S.E.	Significance
Intercept	3.73	0.29	.0001
Mediation	6.51	0.57	.0001
Compromise	0.53	0.86	.53
Territorial	-1.60	0.40	.0001
Timing	-0.05	0.02	.001
Number of mediations	-0.54	0.15	.0002

Note: $R^2 = .17$, $F = 33.17$, $p < .0001$.

rivalry; hence, a negative value means that the dispute was less severe than normal for that rivalry (the logic is similar to the indicator constructed in our analysis of military allocation measures—see Goertz and Diehl 1986). That is, we explored whether mediation efforts were conducive to lower-than-average conflict levels in the next dispute in the rivalry. An intercept of zero (our results are not significantly different from zero) means the average dispute severity for a given rivalry. The effects of the various independent variables are from this rivalry-specific value (this is the contextualizing idea: success/severity is relative to what is normal for the rivalry in question). Mediation here does have a slight effect in lessening the relative severity of future conflict, as does intervention later in the rivalry. Again, the total number of mediations has little effect. There remains the suggestion that the most serious and likely severe conflict will attract a larger number of mediation attempts. In this context, more mediation attempts are likely a symptom of problems rather than a desirable circumstance. Overall, the fit of the model is poor, and mediation attempts do not have a dramatic effect in any event. When one shifts to stratified analyses according to rivalry type, the mediation variable is not significant suggesting that the significant effect in table 10.7 is largely the product of sample size rather than substantively important.

If mediation has little impact in stopping or mitigating war and other violent conflict, perhaps it might be able to delay the onset of that conflict. In a final analysis of the impact of mediation, we look at the “waiting times” (the time from the conflict management effort to the next dispute between the rivals)⁸ for disputes that were preceded immediately by a conflict management attempt and those that were not. The results are reported in table 10.8. Mediation attempts do have the effect of delaying the onset of new conflict by approximately six years on average, a modest achievement. Yet territorial issues tend to prompt more frequent conflict. The later the time in the rivalry and the more mediation attempts, the quicker the onset of new conflict, again suggesting selection

⁸In some cases, this waiting time is actually negative, indicating that in some cases a second dispute starts up before the first one has ended.

effects rather than a causal impact. The effects of mediation were generally stronger in shorter rivalries, as enduring rivalries proved to be more resistant to the effects of all the variables. This is probably the result of firm BRLs that tend to be hard to displace once established early in the rivalries.

The largely insignificant results vis-à-vis mediation in this section are concordant with the spirit of the punctuated equilibrium model. Although we analyzed mediation in all types of rivalries, the results apply with even more force to enduring ones. The one clear-cut impact of mediation success we discovered involved the increased waiting times between disputes. Successful mediation appears to delay the onset of the next dispute, but does not affect how severe that conflict will be.

The Withering Away of Rivalries

In our final analysis of de-escalatory patterns, we look at the end period of enduring rivalries. Here we focus on the contrast between a gradual withering away of enduring rivalries versus the sudden death postulated by the punctuated equilibrium model.⁹

We have suggested in our presentation of the punctuated equilibrium model, and we confirm this in a subsequent chapter, that some sort of shock was a necessary condition for the termination of rivalry. Behind that hypothesis was the implicit belief that rivalry termination was not the result of a gradual improvement of relations, but rather a result of dramatic change. In terms of conflict termination, the decreasing trends and the convex trends both indicate gradually improving relations between rivals. If we assume that the flat, wavy, increasing, and concave patterns are evidence against an evolutionary view of rivalry termination, only about 12.6 percent of rivalries show evidence of a fade-out effect, and even fewer among the uncensored cases (approximately 11.5 percent).

Just as we examined the lock-in effect for rivalries as a whole by examining negative residuals at the beginning of rivalries, we also can examine the fade-out effect by looking for negative residuals at the end of rivalries (see table 9.2 again). There is no systemic trend toward gradual improvement in rivalry relationship. The evidence for the absence of a fade-out is perhaps stronger than in the case of lock-in (mean = 1.42 for completed rivalries and 1.45 for all rivalries). The sign test for the number of negative residuals for severity is also not significant ($p < .52$). This confirmation is perhaps not surprising given our results about trends in the BRL in which less than 13 percent of rivalries showed some kind of declining trend over the last part of the rivalry. Yet if we examine those rivalries with two or three negative residuals at the end, we discover few

⁹We recognize that some lingering hostility may persist between rivals, years after the end of the rivalry (e.g., Japanese feelings toward China). Nevertheless, the punctuated equilibrium model posits that the militarized component of the rivalry abruptly ends.

that are declining or convex cases. Just as we examined the volcano hypothesis before wars, we can translate the fade-out hypothesis into a “war-weariness” one after wars. Yet if we define fade-out after war as declining levels (symmetrically to the volcano hypothesis before) we find that the difference between the immediate postwar dispute and the following one is barely positive (mean = 0.30) and not significantly different from zero ($p < .98$).

In short, both our analysis of fade-out after wars as well as at the end of rivalries confirms the punctuated equilibrium perspective. In neither case do we see a gradual winding down of severity levels. These results parallel those for the lock-in hypothesis; there, we found no indication of any gradual increase in severity levels in the early stages of rivalry. In summary, at both ends of enduring rivalries we find no indication of gradual change; when change occurs—birth or death—it appears to happen quickly.

Conclusion

This chapter had two central topics, the investigation of conflict management within interstate rivalries in general and enduring rivalries in particular, and our ongoing evaluation of the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalry.

Although this is largely an exploratory analysis of de-escalatory patterns, conflict management, and mediation in rivalries (it is one of the very first systematic and empirical studies of mediation and enduring rivalries), we did discover a number of significant patterns and were able to verify or disconfirm some of our hypotheses. It was most evident that enduring rivalries experience more mediation efforts than other conflicts. Compared to other less intense rivalries, enduring ones were up to twice as likely to involve a third party (almost two-thirds of enduring rivalries actually had at least one mediation effort), and the average number of mediation attempts was significantly greater in the enduring rivalry context. Thus, as we anticipated, the most serious forms of international conflict draw the greatest attention of third-party efforts.

Few of the other patterns of mediation in rivalries were as strong. Contrary to some prescriptions, we did not find mediation efforts to occur later in enduring rivalries. Mediations generally occurred at various stages of the rivalry process, although a significant number of mediations occur very late in isolated and proto-rivalries. Given our other results, this indicates the international community was late in dealing with the conflict, and not necessarily successful in preventing future conflict.

Consistent with this was the finding that few mediation efforts occurred in enduring rivalries prior to the onset of militarized conflict, suggesting the inadequacy of early warning capacities or the failure of political will on the part of the significant actors in the international system. Mediation did not necessarily take place in the latter stages of enduring rivalries either, although this conclusion is tentative given the large number of ongoing enduring rivalries in the study.

Overall, we found mediation attempts to have relatively little impact on the behavior of states in rivalries, but we did not test for cognitive or perceptual impact. They did not apparently influence the likelihood of subsequent war between rivals. If anything, mediation attempts were associated with a greater likelihood of war between rivals. Yet this was probably a result of the selection effect that mediation is more likely when conflict is most serious or dangerous, and mediation may be the last-ditch effort before rivals resort to war in order to resolve their disputes. This is certainly true across rivalry types, and we suspect a similar effect is present even within rivalries.

The rivalry approach allowed us to focus on the impact of mediation beyond its capacity (of lack thereof) to prevent war, considering the impact on rivalry dynamics such as conflict severity and occurrence short of war. The most notable effects of mediation were found in their relationship to dispute “waiting times” or the interval from one dispute to the next. We found that positive mediation outcomes could, in some rivalries, lead to a delay in the onset of new militarized conflict.

These tentative analyses support the punctuated equilibrium model rivalry dynamics. The basic rivalry levels appear largely unchanged by mediation efforts (except a modest effect on waiting times), at least in the short and medium term. Furthermore, the presence or absence of those efforts does not appear to have any impact on significant deviations from those levels, namely the occurrence of war. Finally, our somewhat unsystematic assessment suggests that a political shock approach, outlined in the next chapter, to the end of rivalries appears more valid than one based on incremental change or on the effects of international conflict management. Our results may also call into question some of the broad applicability claimed for conflict management and mediation research. Enduring rivalries may represent a special class of conflict in which standard methods or strategies of diplomatic intervention may be different or largely ineffective.

In terms of gradual versus rapid fade-out of enduring rivalries, we found no evidence of gradual patterns of declining severity at the end of enduring rivalries, which is exactly what the punctuated equilibrium model would predict. It may well be that with finer-grained data, such as events data, one could detect the gradual improvement of relations, but within our data limitations we can find no such effect.

We have stressed the link between an organizational, decision-making model and the punctuated equilibrium approach to rivalries. In Kingdon’s (1984) influential policy model, political entrepreneurs play a key role in putting items on the agenda. International mediation can play a similar role in international relations. One of the things that Kingdon emphasizes is that these political entrepreneurs are around for a long time and experience repeated failures before they succeed—if they do at all. In statistical terms, the political entrepreneur variable is likely to be insignificant. Kingdon argues that they are

important and succeed only when the time is ripe—to use the mediation literature’s term.

Part of Kingdon’s definition of ripeness is a favorable “political context.” In the next chapter, we examine one way favorable political contexts arise, which is through political shocks of various types. We argue that political shocks form a *necessary* condition for the formation and demise of enduring rivalries, just as Kingdon argues that a favorable political context is a necessary condition for an item to make it onto the agenda. Nevertheless, other factors need to arise to constitute *sufficient* conditions for rivalry initiation and termination. The actions of international political entrepreneurs such as conflict mediators can serve to create such sufficient conditions. If Kingdon’s model applies to international conflict, then it is important for mediators to hang around because it is very hard to predict when the political context will be ripe for mediation to have an impact.

TABLE 10.9: Conflict Management Patterns

Rivalry	Extreme Values	Volatility
USA–Cuba	concave	low n
USA–Mexico	convex	low n
USA–Ecuador	flat	low n
USA–Peru	flat	low n
USA–UK	flat	low n
USA–Spain	decreasing	n.a.
USA–USSR	flat	convex
USA–China	concave	n.a.
USA–North Korea	flat	n.a.
Honduras–Nicaragua	flat	n.a.
Ecuador–Peru	flat	increasing
Brazil–UK	increasing	low n
Chile–Argentina (I)	flat	low n
Chile–Argentina (II)	increasing	n.a.
UK–Germany	increasing	low n
UK–USSR	increasing	n.a.
UK–USSR	decreasing	decreasing
UK–Ottoman Empire	increasing	low n
UK–Iraq	concave	n.a.
Belgium–Germany	flat	n.a.
France–Germany	flat	n.a.
France–Prussia/Germany	increasing	n.a.
France–Ottoman Empire	flat	low n
France–China	increasing	low n
Spain–Morocco	decreasing	n.a.
Germany–Italy	flat	n.a.
Italy–Yugoslavia	flat	low n
Italy–Ethiopia	increasing	low n
Italy–Ottoman Empire	increasing	n.a.
Yugoslavia–Bulgaria	flat	low n
Greece–Bulgaria	flat	low n
Greece–Turkey (I)	increasing	increasing
Greece–Turkey (II)	concave	n.a.
Cyprus–Turkey	increasing	low n
USSR–Norway	concave	low n
USSR–Iran	flat	flat
Russia–Ottoman Empire	concave	low n
USSR–China	wavy	wavy

Continued on next page

TABLE 10.9—*continued*

Rivalry	Extreme Values	Volatility
USSR–Japan	wavy	n.a.
Congo–Zaire	increasing	low n
Uganda–Kenya	increasing	low n
Somalia–Ethiopia	flat	increasing
Ethiopia–Sudan	concave	low n
Morocco–Algeria	flat	low n
Iran–Iraq	increasing	increasing
Iraq–Israel	flat	low n
Iraq–Kuwait	increasing	low n
Egypt–Israel	wavy	n.a.
Syria–Jordan	flat	n.a.
Syria–Israel	flat	flat
Jordan–Israel	concave	low n
Israel–Saudi Arabia	flat	n.a.
Saudi Arabia–Yemen	flat	n.a.
Afghanistan–Pakistan	flat	low n
China–South Korea	decreasing	n.a.
China–Japan	wavy	wavy
China–India	convex	flat
N. Korea–S. Korea	decreasing	flat
South Korea–Japan	decreasing	n.a.
India–Pakistan	wavy	convex
Thailand–Kampuchea	flat	low n
Thailand–Laos	concave	n.a.
Thailand–N. Vietnam	increasing	low n