CHAPTER 13

Future Research

In conclusion, we take the occasion of this chapter, not so much to look backward and summarize the previous 12 chapters of the book, but rather to direct our attention forward to areas of future research. We have stressed that the rivalry approach has implications for data, testing, and theory. We use these three broad categories to examine the general rivalry research agenda. The second part of this volume focuses on enduring rivalries, and we therefore also survey new possibilities for enduring rivalry research broadly and the punctuated equilibrium model in particular.

Extending the Rivalry Approach

Many of the ideas for using the rivalry approach to study international conflict are inherent in chapters 4 and 5. Furthermore, the illustrations used in those chapters, drawn from a wide range of topics and theoretical concerns, might easily be translated to items for a future research agenda. We will not repeat those arguments and suggestions here. Nevertheless, there are several other directions for future research involving the rivalry approach that are not developed above. We begin with data concerns, although we recognize that such considerations are not necessarily the highest priority and should in any case be subordinate to, or driven by, specific theoretical interests.

Data

The rivalry data that we described in chapter 2 were created from existing sources, which were gathered for purposes other than our own. The COW dispute data reflect a cross-sectional approach to war with an atomistic view of individual disputes. In contrast, the rivalry approach centers on interdispute connections over the long or short term. As a result, we believe our rivalry data represent only a first stage in the development of rivalry data sets.

Thompson’s (1995) research agenda on principal rivalries reflects what we would call the second generation of rivalry data collection. Instead of using cross-sectional data to construct rivalries—as we do—he starts with a rivalry
concept and is collecting data on that set of principal rivalries (some preliminary results are evident in Rasler and Thompson 1998a, 1998b). In a similar vein, Cioffi-Revilla is using the rivalry idea in his project on ancient war, which focuses on rivalries as well as individual wars (see Cioffi-Revilla 1996 for an overview of the project). The rivalry idea helps him better understand changes in conflict relations over time than does merely collecting data on individual wars.

Bennett’s work on rivalry termination (1993, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998) illustrates that this focus can be a significant contribution to rivalry research. He has taken the dispute-generated rivalries and enriched them with rivalry termination dates. In contrast, we have used only existing rivalry data and adopted much more tentative and approximate end dates. We infer that a rivalry has ended “sometime” in the 10 years following the end of the last dispute. Bennett hence takes an intermediary position. He uses existing data on rivalries based on dispute data and then extends them with rivalry-specific, historical information.

This volume has used a wide cross-sectional set of rivalries, 1,166 in total. One of the costs is to have relatively little data on each rivalry. Another data strategy is to gather much more information about a few rivalries. Maoz and Mor (1996, 1998) have adopted this approach. Many dynamic hypotheses, in particular, require more detailed information for their testing, which only the approach of Maoz and Mor can provide. Similarly, Leng’s (1993) in-depth analysis of crisis behavior required him to look at a sample of crises (N = 40), rather than all militarized disputes between states in the period studied.

Each of these three approaches to data represents an effort to move beyond the focus on independent disputes and wars to concentrate on rivalries. In the long run, extant data sets will be limited in how well they can address the theoretical demands of the rivalry approach. Thus, data collections directly driven by rivalry concerns, as illustrated above, will be essential. Although we make a general call for data sets on rivalries, there are a number of specific data priorities embedded within that broader plea.

Rivalry termination is a key issue and has attracted significant theoretical work and some data collection, but no less important is rivalry initiation. As of this writing we know of no efforts to pinpoint when rivalries—short or enduring—actually start. Our own beginning dates for rivalries mimic the termination scheme in that the rivalry begins “sometime” in the 10 years prior to the beginning of the first dispute. We (as well as other scholars who work on rivalries) pick up the first militarized manifestations of rivalry behavior, but we thus far lack the precision necessary to understand when the competition actually begins, short of military threats and actions. Data sets that identify more precise beginning dates would be useful in answering some key questions about rivalry initiation, including, for example, how commercial rivalries evolve (or

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1 See chapters 2 and 11 for details.
not) into militarized ones, as is discussed below. As we argued in chapter 2, however, it may be difficult (even impossible) and inappropriate to assign exact dates for rivalry initiation and termination, given that these are processes and not fixed points. Nevertheless, the data and accompanying research could benefit from greater precision than we have thus far provided.

Another data priority is developing a finer-grained picture of rivalries than can be obtained with COW dispute and other existing data. Events data provide an obvious choice (Hensel 1997). Dispute data give only a very coarse and intermittent picture of rivalries. The latter is true because we know only about what is happening in the rivalry at the time of militarized conflict, but not at other junctures. Events data provide a more precise picture of rivalry behavior in that they include both conflictual behavior short of the militarized threshold and cooperative behavior between rivals. For example, many of the hypotheses generated from the punctuated equilibrium model focus on the speed of change within an enduring rivalry. These hypotheses are better examined with finer-grained data than those provided by looking at militarized disputes alone.

Related to a concern with events data, and therefore more attention to possible cooperative actions in rivalries, is the necessity of studying conflict management and conflict termination that comes with the rivalry approach. Rivalry research began with (and remains largely so today) an overwhelming emphasis on the conflictual side of rivalries. For empirical progress, we need to have data sets that include conflict management efforts as well as militarized disputes and wars. We made a first cut at this by merging Bercovitch’s (1993) mediation data with our data on rivalries. We think that this is an important first step, but problems emerge because neither Bercovitch’s nor COW data were conceived, designed, or coded from a rivalry perspective. Bercovitch has recently extended the range of his data from mediation attempts to third-party interventions of all sorts. Within rivalries, we would like to know about all significant conflict management efforts, not just those of a particular type. The rivalry approach also focuses attention on periods beyond those that just precede and closely follow major crises and wars, which are the focal points of most analyses of conflict management. The same principle applies to deterrence research. The overwhelming emphasis has been on deterrence encounters, but we need to put deterrence in the context of compellence. With cross-sectional approaches, one can ignore alternative conflict management or compellence attempts, but once the focus is placed on rivalries we need to consider all other relevant actions.

One of the key elements of our punctuated equilibrium model is the basic rivalry level and its purported stability over time. As illustrated in chapter 9, we estimated this using the severity level of disputes in the rivalry. It would be desirable to have a continuous measure of the BRL (for an attempt at something like this, see Crescenzi and Enterline 1998), rather than one that is observable only at dispute times. This would permit a better test of the punctuated equilibrium model’s expectations and help us perhaps understand better when and
how normal fluctuations and dramatic changes occur. It might also allow scholars to assess whether the BRL is subject at all to decay and reinforcement processes, which may not be consistent with punctuated equilibrium formulations, but which are certainly part of many psychological and physical science models. An estimate of the BRL might also be improved by consideration of more than just the severity of conflicts. One needs to understand and relate other characteristics of the competition, including the duration of conflicts, interactions (or lack thereof) on nonrivalry issues, and acts of cooperation, to the punctuated equilibrium framework. This would provide a subtler picture of the BRL as well as test for the robustness of our findings.

In short, much remains to be done on the data front. Unfortunately, many important theories and hypotheses do not get developed if suitable data sets do not exist. We suggest that as more rivalry-specific data become available, not only will we learn more about rivalries, but that the existence of such data will incite further theory development. Data generation at the same time is driven by conceptual and theoretical development, and we believe that our rivalry approach and the extant research on rivalries have produced sufficient theoretical motivation for data collection on rivalries to develop along new lines.

Testing

In the 1980s, hypothesis-testing demands drove the creation of the enduring rivalry concept and its various operational measures. Rivalries were used to select a sample of cases, which was their sole testing function in those early studies. In chapter 5, we called this the first-generation testing use of rivalries, but we also argued that the rivalry approach provided many other means for examining hypotheses, some of which we illustrated in chapter 6 on the democratic peace.

When we speak of testing in this section, we refer to using rivalries to test nonrivalry hypotheses, such as the democratic peace, power transition, and the like. The second generation of rivalry testing maintains this focus, but exploits more fully the testing possibilities of the rivalry approach. As with second-generation data gathering, we are only now beginning to see studies that utilize the wide range of rivalry methods.

First-generation testing was characterized by the use of rivalries to select disputes and wars, which were then analyzed in cross-sectional or cross-sectional time-series fashion. Huth and Russett’s (1993) work on deterrence illustrates this first-generational procedure. Second-generation rivalry testing exploits first, and above all, the temporal dimension of rivalries. It uses before-and-after comparisons within rivalries. Gibler (1997) demonstrates this with his analysis of territorial settlement alliance treaties. He evaluated the impact of such treaties by comparing rivalries before and after these critical events.
There are numerous potential applications of this testing approach, and several of these were discussed in the first part of the book. Here, let us highlight just two of those possibilities. First, one might gain insights into the power transition by comparing power transition periods within nontransition periods in rivalries. As the contributors to the Kugler and Lemke collection (1996) have noted, war may be evident during the times of transition. Yet by comparing the frequency of conflict during the transition periods with that in other parts of the rivalry, scholars may be able to detect whether the incidence of war during transitions is spurious. It may be the case that the rivalry experiences war at several junctures, whether or not a power transition is occurring or not. Even if power transition periods are found to be more dangerous, the longitudinal perspective of the rivalry approach may be able to uncover alternative explanations for the pattern of increased conflict and facilitate a critical test between competing explanations.

A second testing possibility concerns the alleged relationship between arms races and war. Among the most controversial findings in the international conflict literature is that arms races are associated with dispute escalation. Yet, one of the most obvious specifications of a spurious relationship involves rivalries. Arms races are more likely in the context of enduring rivalries (Goertz and Diehl 1993). And we know from chapter 3 that both war in general and the likelihood of escalation in individual disputes are greater during enduring rivalries than in other conflict contexts. One hypothesis that emerges from this premise is that arms races and violent conflict are both manifestations of the enduring rivalries and thus not directly related to each other. This proposition is consistent with Sample’s (1997) discovery of a large number of “no arms race, no war” cases and with Horn’s (1987) reporting that longer arms races are associated with war. Enduring rivalry disputes may be inherently more prone to escalate than those earlier in the rivalry sequence (Hensel 1996). Indeed, Sample (1997) reports that “early” disputes between a given pair of states are unlikely to escalate even in the presence of arms races.

Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) reexamined Sample’s (1997) data and found that evidence for a modest, positive, and statistically significant relationship between arms races and wars is largely confined to the enduring rivalry cases. That work could be extended by comparing different segments of the rivalry in which arms races were present to those in which they were absent in order to detect differences in escalatory tendencies, much as was suggested above for power transitions. The longitudinal perspective of the rivalry approach would also permit one to uncover the occurrence of arms races as consequences of rivalry escalation or war rather than only as causal agents. This distinction will not be apparent in static analyses and may suggest misleading conclusions about the place of arms races in the conflict escalation process.

Another characteristic of second-generation testing will be the inclusion of analyses using the rivalry as the unit of analysis. Those who use cross-sectional
time-series must examine not only how a given model works for militarized disputes, but also for rivalries. For example, it is not very likely that Huth and Russett’s deterrence model works equally well for all their enduring rivalries. By analyzing the poor fit and anomalous rivalries—not disputes—theory development can be facilitated. Thus, one might suggest the use of rivalry as the unit of analysis in all standard analyses of international conflict, if only as a supplement to test the robustness of the findings using conventional approaches.

A third characteristic of second-generation testing will be the inclusion of shorter-term, nonenduring rivalries. This plays an absolutely essential role in the study of conflict management hypotheses. For example, our analysis of the democratic peace would not have gotten off the ground without our use of proto-rivalries. The same holds true for Gibler’s (1997) study; if the territorial settlement treaty ends a rivalry, this may well occur before it becomes an enduring rivalry. Thus, even to the extent that scholars adopt enduring rivalries as case selection devices, they must also appropriately include proto- and sometimes isolated rivalries as well, especially when theoretical formulations do not specify ongoing conflicts of a certain duration.

In summary, the future agenda of rivalries in testing involves developing procedures and methods that take into account and exploit (1) the temporal duration of rivalries, (2) the rivalry as the focus of analysis, and (3) the whole temporal gamut of rivalries from isolated to enduring. Our analysis of the democratic peace illustrates how the rivalry approach can provide new means to examine an already widely tested hypothesis. Other than Gibler’s (1997) excellent study, the population of the second generation of rivalry testing remains very small. It should be a priority on a future rivalry agenda. We believe that our study and Gibler’s only scratch the surface. As researchers begin to explore and exploit the rivalry approach in testing, new and rich techniques for testing will emerge.

Theory Development: Conflict Management

We have underlined throughout this volume that the rivalry approach applies to issues of both war and peace. Nevertheless, we have focused primarily on the war side of the coin. In the second part of the book, we presented a punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalries, and indeed much of our research agenda below is dedicated to further testing and extensions of that model. At the top of the future research agenda—at least our own agenda—lies a concentrated focus on conflict management and conflict termination in rivalries. Hence, for us, the second generation of rivalry work revolves around the conflict management side of (enduring) rivalries.

We have already briefly mentioned that the focus on conflict management has data-gathering and testing implications. On the data front, we need systematic data on conflict management variables for rivalries. In particular, we need
data on efforts at mediation, arms control treaties, and proposed but failed negotiations. All these constitute activities on the conflict management side of the ledger. In terms of testing, we need to start evaluating conflict management theories in the rivalry context. There is an extensive literature on bargaining, negotiation, and mediation, largely from the fields of social psychology and labor-industrial relations. Yet this has been largely ignored (except by practitioners) with respect to international conflict. We know little about how applicable these social and psychological theories are to international relations.

A key part of this future research lies in developing conflict management dependent variables. We argued in chapter 10 that there exists no consensus of what medium- to long-term conflict management means in terms of behavior, not to mention at the conceptual level. We believe that our various proposals, developed in chapter 10, capture many commonly held ideas. Conceptualizing and measuring conflict management dependent variables forms the foundation of the policy implications of the rivalry approach for conflict management. To evaluate a policy, in the most concrete sense of the word, one needs criteria of success and failure. For example, there is only limited consensus on what constitutes success in the context of UN peacekeeping (Druckman and Stern 1997).

With data and measures of conflict management success in hand, we can begin to evaluate hypotheses and theories of conflict management. Of particular interest, in light of our work here, is the conjunction of our hypotheses about political shocks as necessary conditions, Kingdon’s (1984) work on agenda setting, and Zartman’s (1985) metaphor of ripeness.

The notion of the conjunction of factors lies at the heart of Kingdon’s model and Zartman’s metaphor. More precisely, it is only when there is a favorable confluence of factors that something makes it onto the political agenda or a conflict ripe is for resolution. Goertz (2000) has formally modeled Kingdon’s ideas using necessary conditions. He argues that Kingdon makes a necessary condition claim as well as a sufficiency one. Kingdon argues an item will make it onto the agenda (1) only if the political context is favorable, (2) only if actors see a problem that needs attention, and (3) only if some political entrepreneurs provide some solution. Each of these “only if” requirements is a necessary condition for agenda success. Kingdon then argues that when these three necessary conditions happen to coincide or occur at the same time, the item actually makes it onto the agenda. More formally, the three necessary conditions are jointly sufficient (see Goertz 2000 for details).

Joint sufficiency, or as Kingdon would say, very high probability, taps Zartman’s (1985) notion of ripeness. Only when a number of key factors coincide is a conflict ripe for resolution. Although much of the scholarly literature on ripeness is post hoc or tautological, the essential point is that conflict management efforts are only effective when launched in conjunction with some other favorable conditions. One such condition cited is the presence of a “hurting
stalemate” between the parties, although the scholarly literature is not very specific about what other conditions might be relevant. Jointly, these conditions and a conflict management attempt are said to be sufficient for success.

Clearly our findings about political shocks as necessary conditions for rivalry termination fit naturally with ideas such as those of Zartman and Kingdon. Similar to Kingdon, we argue that shocks are necessary, but not sufficient, for rivalry initiation and termination. Also, what we count as a political shock enters into Kingdon’s substantive factors either in creating a favorable context (international shocks) or political entrepreneurs (regime change variables). Our empirical analyses indicated that, on average, mediation attempts rarely succeeded in moderating rivalry dynamics. Kingdon finds the same thing for political entrepreneurs at the domestic level. But he finds also that successes are usually big ones, and that the best way to succeed is to keep pushing ideas until a ripe moment arrives.

Kingdon’s model also explains the stability of rivalries. If change occurs only during a favorable confluence of factors, this itself is unlikely to happen very often. A simple numerical example illustrates this: if there are three factors, each of which is favorable 50 percent of the time, then we have a confluence of the three only 1/8 of the time (the probability of getting three heads when flipping three fair coins.)

There are close links between the ripeness metaphor and the stability emphasized by the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalries. Zartman’s metaphor and Kingdon’s model both serve to explain why change is rare. The punctuated equilibrium policy model of Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and their empirical analyses have demonstrated the stability of most U.S. domestic policies. They have also implicitly used confluence models—to give them a name—to describe certain periods of rapid policy shift:

One cannot understand the rise and decline of the national urban initiative without appreciating the particular confluence of factors that occurred during the 1960s. An unprecedented window of opportunity opened during that time, in which three major social trends came into juxtaposition: America’s postwar prosperity; social attitudes that, for brief moment in history, turned from economics to social issues; and the high watermark of the Democratic Rooseveltian coalition, led by an activist president with an ambitious domestic agenda. (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 144)

Thus, we see developing a theory of conflict management in rivalries as beginning with many extant ideas in various scholarly literatures and being informed by many of the findings that we report in this book. Certainly, this does not exhaust the theoretical options and issues that need attention. For example, a key conflict management issue revolves around why some rivalries become

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2For the same argument applied to the infrequency of war see Most and Starr 1989.
enduring. To explain why some rivalries become healthy and long-lived implies knowing why some rivalries are resolved at the proto-rivalry stage. Conflict management issues also arise at the beginning of rivalries: why do states move from the zone of peace to a state of militarized rivalry status? Throughout the rivalry life cycle, conflict management questions arise.

With the notable exception of the democratic peace, the study of war and conflict management have evolved along separate paths. As Ross (1996, 472) says:

A paradox worth considering is how little attention the development of the field of conflict resolution has attracted from scholars of international war and peace. To be sure there are some significant exceptions, such as recent interest in the specific phenomenon of war termination, but a central reason for the absence of a broader discussion is that the core assumptions of theories of conflict resolution make little sense to the dominant theoretical approaches in international relations.

For us, perhaps the most attractive facet of the rivalry approach remains its possibilities to synthesize and embrace issues of war and peace.

Exploring Enduring Rivalries

Many issues of data gathering, testing, and conflict management apply to enduring rivalries as a special subset of rivalries. We need not repeat ourselves here, and hence we now limit ourselves to considerations directly related to enduring rivalries.

We have proposed the punctuated equilibrium model as the principle framework for understanding enduring rivalries, including their development, initiation, and termination. Obviously, our future agenda involves an examination, extension, and refinement of the punctuated equilibrium model. Before we go too far in the direction of the punctuated equilibrium model of rivalries, we think it prudent to assess its utility more carefully, especially vis-à-vis its competitors. One direction should be to explore the controversy occasioned by the punctuated equilibrium versus evolutionary (Hensel 1996) models debate on rivalry dynamics. As we noted in chapter 8, the evolutionary approach emphasized gradual development of rivalries, with an emphasis on the interactions and outcomes of the first few militarized confrontations in the rivalry sequence. There is no quick lock-in effect postulated, and indeed the dynamics of the first few confrontations in an enduring rivalry are thought to be different (generally less severe) than later disputes.

One test to distinguish between the punctuated equilibrium and evolutionary models would be to analyze conflict patterns within the population of enduring rivalries. The hypothesis to be tested could be that conflict in early stages of enduring rivalries is less severe than in later stages. A corollary proposition is
that there is no significant difference in conflict severity in enduring rivalries’ early stages and comparable phases in lesser rivalries. The evolutionary model is consistent with each of these hypotheses, whereas the punctuated equilibrium model would predict the opposite: more severe conflict, on the average, early in enduring rivalries and relatively consistent severity over the life of rivalries.

Hensel’s (1996) aggregate analyses could not effectively test these hypotheses since the early phases of enduring rivalries are lumped together with the early parts of lesser and more numerous rivalries; therefore, enduring rivalry patterns are likely to get lost in the aggregate. His disaggregated analyses offer some insights into these hypotheses, although few direct tests. There is no statistically significant difference in severity and hostility levels in disputes that occur within different phases of enduring rivalries, although there is a slight tendency for stalemate outcomes to become more likely as the rivalry proceeds. The corollary hypothesis is not tested directly, although a cursory glance at some of Hensel’s data shows mixed support for his evolutionary model. Of particular note, it is evident that decisive outcomes are much more difficult to achieve at all phases of enduring rivalries, suggesting structural factors are responsible. More direct and precise tests of the two models would help sort out which is more accurate and whether a hybrid model might best be constructed.

The priority of other items for the research agenda depends, in part, in resolving the punctuated equilibrium versus evolutionary debate. If the punctuated equilibrium model is more accurate, greater attention might be devoted to identifying further the structural factors that account for higher BRLs and therefore the greater likelihood of war in some rivalries. A research agenda occasioned by the evolutionary model would necessarily focus more on the maturation process of rivalries and on the thus far disappointing results with respect to learning. Greater attention would need to be paid to how some rivalries apparently are able to manage their conflicts (even as they endure) without war, whereas others repeatedly escalate to war.

Even if we find that the punctuated equilibrium model is superior (as we expect and our preliminary findings here indicate), our empirical findings in this book revealed that the punctuated equilibrium did not fit all enduring rivalries well. A key general item for future research thus lies in trying to understand why some rivalries deviate from the dominant punctuated equilibrium pattern. This involved analyses both in the area of conflict escalation as well as successful conflict management patterns. We have found evidence that rivalries do differ in their evolution, but we have provided no explanation for this fact.

Beyond the general elements of a research agenda on enduring rivalries, there are series of promising avenues that relate to specific elements of the rivalry life cycle.
Origins

Beyond our work on political shocks as necessary conditions for enduring rivalry initiation, no theoretical explanation exists for the origins of enduring rivalries. Within the context of the punctuated equilibrium model, it becomes even more important to study the initial period because this is when the long-term relationship gets established. Here we need to understand the escalatory process by which relationships deteriorate and hostile policies then get established between states.

A useful place to begin may be in studying how competitive relationships become militarized. One approach could be an investigation of commercial rivalries and their propensity to become militarized. There are a number of policy and theoretical imperatives that drive this focus. Levy and Ali (1998) indicate that such rivalries are an interesting point of analysis, and we need to probe the limits of generalization possible about this phenomenon, something that is not possible in a case study of one rivalry several hundred years ago. More importantly, however, understanding commercial rivalries will be an essential part of clarifying the relationship between interdependence and conflict.

There has been a trend in the academic literature toward a more skeptical view of the economic interdependence-conflict relationship between states. Early work (Keohane and Nye 1977) touted the benefits of close and symmetrical ties between states and argued that war and other serious conflict was less likely between such states. In contrast, (Barbieri 1996) found that trade interdependence is positively associated with states becoming involved in militarized disputes, even controlling for a range of other influences. Studying commercial rivalries can help us understand how some competitions become militarized as well as provide further evidence on the interdependence-conflict debate.

The study of commercial rivalries has more than a theoretical rationale behind it. Academic study is often driven by contemporary policy concerns (note that the timing of the renewed interest in the democratic peace coincides with the third wave of global democratization) as much as by abstract theoretical concerns. With the rise of the “trading state” (Rosecrance 1986) and the end of the Cold War, economic rivalries are likely to be the most common form of competition between states in the world, especially among the major powers. Rather than making the analysis of militarized conflict passé, these rivalries suggest a closer examination of how competition evolves over time and when trade, resource, and other disputes are translated into more dangerous forms of confrontation. Generally, there is precious little (an exception may be Conybeare 1987 or perhaps, to some extent, Choucri and North 1975) on this subject.

Beyond the focus on commercial rivalries, there are many other traditional approaches to understanding conflict initiation, including power distributions and the like, and these are summarized elsewhere (Maoz 1982). Nevertheless, the core theoretical and empirical work that needs to be done to develop the
punctuated equilibrium model revolves around the policy processes by which
governments lock into rivalries, that is, when they reach the militarized stage.
Our brief discussions of foreign policy decision making have relied heavily on
the domestic politics literature that supports the punctuated equilibrium model.
For a period in the 1970s the organizational model of Allison (1971) received
a great deal of attention in international relations, but then it rapidly faded in
prominence. The general sort of organizational model we propose obviously
has links with the international relations literature generated in the 1970s. Yet
we think that much more can be gained by thinking in the terms of Jones, Baum-
gartner, and Kingdon than in those of Allison. Nevertheless, foreign policy is
not domestic policy, and work is required to modify and adjust an organiza-
tional politics model so that it fits international relations.

The Allison approach and the organizational model were problematic in
that the latter provided no theory of significant organizational change. While
the punctuated equilibrium model argues that stability is the norm, the model
must also explain why and when change takes place. If we go back to the bio-
logical origins of the punctuated equilibrium theory, it would have been ridicu-
lous for Gould and Eldredge to argue that there was no evolution. Rather, they
said that evolution occurred in fits and starts. In particular, they pinpointed pe-
riods of mass extinction, which then provided the opportunity for rapid evolu-
tion (Raup 1992). Hence we need a foreign policy decision-making model that
takes into account that policies do change, sometimes dramatically.

The decision-making model that we have loosely referred to as organiza-
tional is also one that focuses on domestic politics. Policies do not change, in
part, because players in government have no reason to change them. Traditionally,
the source of this is thought to come from the international realm, yet we
suspect that domestic factors play at least as important a role. Very few elected
officials in the United States had any electoral reason to be associated with con-
ciliatory moves to the USSR, and the same is likely true (perhaps even more so)
in closed systems such as the USSR. One can apply Waltz’s (1979) natural se-
lection argument using domestic instead of international politics. The 1950s
saw the elimination of many bureaucrats and elected officials favorable to rec-
 onciliation with the USSR. In Waltzian fashion, the nature of U.S. policy was
influenced because some policies were successful in domestic terms, while oth-
ers failed. Even the massive shock of the Vietnam War did little to affect this
basic state of affairs.

The field of international conflict has one well-developed decision-making
model—the rational actor one—which has many opponents, but no well-
developed alternatives. The punctuated equilibrium model relies on a different
view of governmental decision making. It does not assume that governments,
organizations, and leaders are “irrational,” but rather that the “national interest”
is up for grabs, as well as the best policies for pursuing that “national interest.”
If we take the case of Israel, is it in Israeli national interest to put settlers in occupied territories? Should annexation be a goal of Israeli policy? Clearly both the means and the ends are up for debate. From the punctuated equilibrium point of view, those who propose the dismantling of Jewish settlements have the cards stacked against them. Colonization has marched forward under both Labor and Likud governments. As Braybrooke and Lindbolm (1963, 93) say:

> Although there is a fundamental sense in which ends govern means, there is an equally fundamental sense in which the proximate ends of public policy are governed by means. . . . Clearly what we establish as policy objectives we derive in large part by our inspection of means.

This organizational sort of decision-making model appears to underlie the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalries. We have furnished no evidence, however, that such is actually the case. If we examine the histories and analyses of some enduring rivalries, we find much to support such a view. But we need more than intuitively plausible readings of particular rivalries; rather, we require systematic analysis and confirmation.

**Dynamics**

Based on the findings in this study, there seem to be at least three other critical areas of research concerning the dynamics of enduring rivalries: their maintenance, variation in the basic rivalry levels across rivalries, and the volatility of conflict within rivalries (including most significantly the outbreak of war). The first concern is with the maintenance of rivalries. Cioffi-Revilla (1998) and Bennett (1998) indicate that rivalries are unstable in their later phases, suggesting that some process sets into reverse the effects of rivalry maintenance factors. Yet according to conventional definitions of enduring rivalries, they can last more than 40 years. Factors are at work that seem to mitigate the unstable tendencies of rivalries, or there may be "stress" that appears only later, allowing some rivalries to persist well into the future. A valuable line of research would be to identify the conditions that make rivalries persist and conflict to recur repeatedly in the rivalry.

The studies here and elsewhere provide some clues to the conditions for rivalry maintenance. One possibility is the kind of issues or stakes under dispute. Vasquez (1998) suggests that territorial disputes are most prone to recurring conflict, given that they relate closely to concerns about national identity and can become linked to other intangible and indivisible stakes; Huth (1996b) makes similar claims in his study of territorial disputes. Hensel (1996) confirms the importance of territorial disputes in prompting future conflict and doing so more rapidly than other issues. Nevertheless, not all territorial disputes are subject to recurrence; much depends on the way that those disputes are resolved. Thus, another consideration is to go beyond the structural aspects of the rivalry.
relationships and concentrate on the interactions between the rival states. In effect, the past and present dynamics of a rivalry will influence its future dynamics. Maoz and Mor (1998) indicated that only when there is some dissatisfaction among at least one of the rivals does a rivalry continue. Some game structures make this all but inevitable (e.g., Bully games will leave the losing side unhappy with the inferior payoff). Yet it also suggests that certain outcomes of disputes are more likely to prompt future conflict. Those outcomes that do not resolve issues in disputes (stalemates) may lead to a return to militarized confrontation. Vasquez (1998) refers not only to territorial issues, but unresolved ones as instigators of recurring militarized conflict. Similarly, Hensel (1996) finds compromise dispute outcomes dampen the prospects for future conflict. That particular power distributions are associated with rivalry onset (see Levy and Ali 1998; and Vasquez 1998) and stability indicates that changes in them may influence which rivalries die out and which persist. One might suggest that rivalries in which there is a widening disparity in capability between the rivals are more prone to end quickly.

Our analyses indicate that even though conflict levels in most rivalries are consistent across time, some rivalries have higher basic rivalry levels than others and some exhibit more variation (volatility) than others. Another area of fruitful research would be to understand why some rivalries are far more hostile than others. This goes beyond concerns of duration and stability noted above to those of conflict intensity. Clues to the puzzle above might be found in other traditional correlates of war. One possibility suggested by Geller (1998) is that instability in the power distribution prompts greater uncertainty and threat for the rivals. One might also return to the issues in dispute noted above as an explanation; territorial and other disputes may present higher stakes that lead rivals to adopt more coercive bargaining strategies and respond to challenges with a higher level of force. Of course, certain game structures, suggested by Maoz and Mor (1998), tend to produce more conflictual outcomes (whereas some offer greater incentives for cooperation). It may be useful to compare the game structures across different rivalries to explain the higher levels of conflict in some rivalries. A focus on the game transformation process would not only help us with rivalry dynamics, but in devising strategies to “downshift” especially dangerous rivalries (assuming that game transformation conditions are manipulable by rivals or by external intervention).

Finally, the volatility of rivalries is a prime item for an enduring rivalries research agenda, not least because we share a strong concern for the most dangerous of deviations in the rivalry relationship—war. Understanding volatility and war in enduring rivalries is partly related to understanding differences across rivalries in the basic rivalry level. Those rivalries that regularly operate at a high conflict level need less of a push to cross the war threshold than those rivalries that do not move much beyond the mere threat to use military
force. Yet, beyond this there still lies the concern with what factors make a rivalry more or less hostile at various points. Unstable capability distributions may ratchet a rivalry up the escalation ladder and explain why Geller (1998) found that type of instability so important in the outbreak of war among major-power rivals. By studying linked conflict, we found that conflict levels can be influenced by the dynamics in other rivalries. For example, the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union may have influenced the course of the rivalries between Israel and its neighbors; Kinsella (1994a, 1994b) shows that the conflict levels in some Middle East rivalries were influenced by the arms transfer policies of the superpowers. Changes in rivalry conflict levels may also be affected by other challenges or disputes that a given rival may face, beyond those in the immediate rivalry; there even may be a dampening effect on outside conflict and rivalry conflict when the attention and resources of rival states are stretched. These are provocative ideas that enduring rivalry research has barely considered.

Termination

In contrast to other parts of rivalry research, there has been comparatively more done on the termination of rivalries than other subjects. Stemming largely from the work of Bennett (1993, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998), a number of interesting ideas on the conditions associated with rivalry termination, including domestic political considerations, changing security configurations, and the like, have been advanced. Yet Bennett (1998) has treated those as potentially competing propositions and attempted to test each one’s relative explanatory capability against one another. Perhaps a better way, suggested by the punctuated equilibrium model, is to understand how various factors work together to end rivalries. If political shocks are only necessary conditions for rivalry termination, then one must look for other factors that are coterminal with political shocks in order to produce the end of rivalries. This cannot be achieved when different factors are juxtaposed against one another and tested in a fashion that assumes that they are additive, and not necessary and conjunctural. Not surprisingly, the results will be mixed (see Bennett 1998) and will miss the impact that the confluence of these different factors might have in ending rivalries. Although theorizing on rivalry termination is better developed than on origins or dynamics, current work is still trapped in the conventional linear and additive thinking that is characteristic of traditional war studies.

Rivalry termination work will also be largely informed by the progress made on conflict management and resolution, as detailed above. The ways that rivals manage the competition themselves or the impact of third-party interventions may give us insights into how states successfully end a competition. Whatever the direction of future research on rivalry termination, a key priority is that greater attention be paid to rivalries that are not enduring. That is, many of the clues on how long-standing competitions end are likely to be found by examining rivalries that do not mature, that die out or are resolved before they
become enduring rivalries. This ties back to our concern with understanding the factors that maintain rivalries. At the same time a focus on proto- and isolated rivalries may also reveal what structural or behavioral conditions make it easier for rivalries to be resolved and thereby allow the analyst to detect the absence of those conditions or trace the movement toward those conditions in enduring rivalries.

At the outset of this book, we sought to redefine the ways that scholars look at issues of war and peace. We do not believe that the rivalry approach is the only fruitful one or that a punctuated equilibrium model can account for all rivalry behavior. We are convinced, however, that they allow us to break out of the stifling norms of traditional studies of war and peace, with the results being new data, insights, hypotheses, and ultimately theories.