

## Chapter 1

# Narrative and Metanarrative

The aim of this chapter is to identify different levels of narrative in Herodotus' text. I first define narrative in the strict sense, as opposed to metanarrative, and then distinguish self-referential from referential metanarrative. My discussion is especially indebted to three sets of works: narratological studies outside the field of classics,<sup>1</sup> studies that apply narratological principles to Herodotus,<sup>2</sup> and the work of other scholars who have devoted special attention to the formal aspects of Herodotus' narrative.<sup>3</sup> The definitions I present here are largely my own and formulated strictly as a function of my overall interpretive task. I keep unfamiliar terms to a minimum and avoid making theoretical points for their own sake. Hurried readers more interested in substantive issues of interpretation than in the approach offered here have the option of skipping this chapter and referring back to it later if needed.

### What Is Metanarrative?

The *Histories* contain a multiplicity of stories shaped and held together by discourse and transformed by it into a single story with a logical, if rambling and open-ended, plot.<sup>4</sup> Transitions between stories may be deter-

1. Genette 1980; Bal 1985; Chatman 1978; Labov and Waletzky 1966; Labov 1972. See especially Prince 1977, 1982, 1987; Barthes 1986.

2. Dewald 1987, 1999, forthcoming a; Fowler 1996; de Jong 1987, 1998; Richardson 1990; Hornblower 1994a; Rood 1998.

3. Especially Immerwahr 1966; Beck 1971; Wood 1972; Müller 1980; Pearce 1981; Munson 1983; Hartog 1988; Marincola 1987.

4. These narratives more or less correspond to the units Immerwahr (1966, 14) calls *logoi*. See also especially Immerwahr 1966, 46–48, 329–62. On the distinction between story and discourse, see Chatman 1978, 19: “the story is the *what* in a narrative that is depicted, discourse the *how*.” Other narratologists make more refined distinctions and use different terminologies. For example, Bal (1985, 1–10) adds a useful definition of text as an upper layer of the communication: “a text is a finite, structured whole composed of language signs.” In other words (those of de Jong 1987, 31), “that which the hearer/reader

mined by historical landmarks along a chronological sequence, by changes of time, or by changes of place and subject matter, but always on the basis of some factual connection. On the whole, the narrative proceeds chronologically, but the discourse interrupts the story sequence by constantly introducing explanations and expansions of this or that story element.<sup>5</sup> In most cases, these formally subordinated narratives recount events belonging to a specific previous or later story time (flashbacks or follow-ups) or are descriptions in the present tense.<sup>6</sup>

In my definition, “narrative” includes both the recounting of events in the past and description.<sup>7</sup> Description, in whatever tense, displays objects, beings, situations, and actions “in their spatial, rather than temporal existence, their topological rather than chronological functioning, their simultaneity, rather than succession.”<sup>8</sup> In Herodotus’ ethnographic descriptions, the present tense describes circumstances that may also obtain at the time reached by the historical narrative to which the description is attached. Whether it does or not, the ethnographic present is at any rate a real present, referring to the time of narration.<sup>9</sup> Just as he instructs the audience about what happened in the past, so Herodotus teaches them about the contemporary world.

Whereas narrative represents the story as it is manipulated by the discourse, metanarrative speaks about the narrative and exists as a function of the discourse. Minimally narrated narrative consists of passages that approximate the concept of pure narrative, or objective mimesis, of

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hears/reads is a text.” When I say “Herodotus,” unless the context makes clear I am indicating either the historical author or the narrator, I am referring to the “text” in this sense.

5. The discourse devices used in archaic and early classical Greek literature for connecting semiautonomous items of a chain are discussed by Fränkel (1924, especially 62–67) and Van Groningen (1958, 36–50).

6. See Pearce 1981. Genette (1980, 35–85) calls narratives involving a change of time “anachronic” (either “analeptic” or “proleptic”). In a few cases, Herodotus’ inserted narratives are chronologically parallel (see, e.g., 3.39–60) or indeterminate (see 1.23–24).

7. This definition, functional to my analysis, differs from that of most literary theorists, for whom narrative only concerns specific events in a temporal sequence of two or more. See, e.g., Labov and Waletzky 1966, 20–32; Labov 1972, 359–62; Bal 1985, 1–10; Prince 1982, 1–4; Prince 1987, s.v. “narrative.”

8. Prince 1987, s.v. “description.”

9. Hartog (1988, 254–55) inexplicably denies this. Even if we wished to attribute a certain timelessness to the “gnomic” present, that would not apply to the ethnographic present. See, e.g., the timing of the Persian ethnography discussed in chap. 3, “Persian Ideology.”

external facts.<sup>10</sup> Certain propositions, however, fall partially or entirely outside of the narrative and are equivalent to or contain titles, proems, repetitions, postscripts, or explanations that fulfill the role of glosses to the narrative itself. These metanarrative sentences especially appear as a sort of “padding” between adjacent or concentric narratives.<sup>11</sup> At 7.57.1, for example, the minimally narrated narrative sentence “a mare gave birth to a hare” represents the core of a larger story sequence:

- \* s-i Xerxes’ army crossed the Hellespont.
- s-ii A mare gave birth to a hare.
- s-iii They saw it.
- s-iv They proceeded on their way.

In Herodotus’ discourse, however, event s-ii stands out by itself. What precedes and follows is predominantly metanarrative, containing event s-i in a subordinated clause and incorporating event s-iii:

- 1a. *I* When all [the Persian troops] had crossed, while they were moving on their way, a great prodigy [τέρας μέγα] appeared to them of which Xerxes took no account, though it was easy to interpret [εὐσύμβλητον]:
- n* for [γάρι] a mare gave birth to a hare.
- G* This was easy to interpret because Xerxes was about to lead an army against Greece with the greatest pomp and magnificence but would come back to the same place running for his life.

10. See my introduction, n. 44 and corresponding text. All narratives are of course “narrated” to different degrees, and we could discuss the internal signs of narration in each case. Here I am concerned with making a basic distinction.

11. For the combination of an introductory and a concluding statement framing a narrative in Herodotus, see especially Immerwahr 1966, 12, 52–58. Cf. Pohlenz 1937, 72, 208–10; Beck 1971, 11–17, 57–59; Müller 1980, 79–80. On the concept of metanarrative, I am applying very broadly the definition by Prince (1977, 1–2): “Chaque fois que le discours narratif (au sens large) renvoie au code qui le sous-tend ou, plus spécifiquement chaque fois qu’il accomplit (paraît accomplir) une fonction de glose par rapport à l’un de ses propres éléments, nous avons affaire à des signes métanarratifs.” See also Prince 1980; 1982, 115–28. The “shifters” discussed by Barthes (1986, 128–30) and Fowler’s “markers of the historian’s voice” (1996, 69–76), including, among others, all statements in the narrator’s first person (for which see Dewald 1987), are all part of the metanarrative as I define it.

It will become clear later why I identify statement *I* as an introduction and statement *G* as a concluding gloss rather than as a conclusion. What matters now is that both statements *I* and *G* are predominantly at a different level of discourse with respect to the central narrative sentence. Their main function is to “read,” summarize, or explain. They perform, in other words, some of the operations a reader/listener might perform, and they do so from a perspective that, like that of the recipient, is not an integral part of the action narrated. This commentary, moreover, leads the narrator to postpone *s-iv* after he has attached to this story the narrative of a chronologically anterior omen, similar to the one just narrated. The result is a narrative preceded by its own summarizing introduction (7.57.2), which in the present context represents a gloss to the preceding narrative of the mare/hare omen. This is followed by a sentence (*CC*) that both concludes preceding narratives and narrates story function *s-iv*.

- 1b. = *G* *I* **Also another prodigy** [ἔτερον . . . τέρας]  
 occurred for him when he was still in Sardis:  
*n* for a mule gave birth to another mule with a  
 double set of genitals, male and female, the  
 male on top.  
*CC* **Taking neither of these two into account,**  
*n* Xerxes moved forward. (7.57.2–7.58.1).

A contrasting example to this set of metanarrative interferences is provided, for example, by a minimally narrated narrative reporting what Astyages learned about the meaning of his daughter’s two successive dreams and how he reacted to the information (1.107–108.3). Astyages is the embedded focalizer of the events; whoever is telling this story (Herodotus or one of the sources mentioned at 1.95.1) is almost invisible.<sup>12</sup> In the case of the hare giving birth to the mare, in contrast, while

12. On focalization, see Genette 1980, 185–210; Bal 1985, 100–118; de Jong 1987, 29–36 (in the *Iliad*); Hornblower 1994a (in Thucydides); Dewald 1999 (in Herodotus and Thucydides). The narrator is first and foremost the one “who speaks”; the focalizer, the one “who sees.” While narrating always entails focalizing (so that the narrator is by definition the primary focalizer), the narrator may report the focalization of someone else (the embedded focalizer); or he may report the character’s act of seeing as a pure event, as Herodotus does when he says that the hare omen “appeared to them.” The distinction between narrative and metanarrative in the history can be described in terms of different focalization when the illusion that there is no narrator is achieved not by means of objective recording of

the agent in the narrative marches on, the narrator, Herodotus (and this time we are sure it is he), comes forward to communicate his perception. He and his audience come to share an understanding about the discrepancies between the clearness of divine communication (εὐσύμβλητον) and men's failure to respond appropriately and between the initial magnificence of Xerxes' expedition and its anticipated outcome.

The stories of Astyages and Mandane, on the one hand, and that of the omens during Xerxes' march, on the other, illustrate different discourse possibilities in the *Histories*. Metanarrative introductions or conclusions may subdivide the narrative at any point; the resulting narrative sections may be theoretically as extensive as the entire work, as small as the smallest segment, or of any extent in between. Introductions (most frequently with continuative δέ) give a preliminary summary that identifies a section of the following narrative as a unit. Conclusions summarize in some way what has been narrated, identifying it as a unit that has ended. Rather than being connected with δέ to what precedes, most of these conclusions have anticipatory μέν (or καί . . . μέν, μέν νυν, μέν δή), to enhance the mechanical connection of the passage that has just ended with what follows.<sup>13</sup>

Introductions and conclusions contribute to clarifying the subdivisions of a complex work, but their purely organizational function is secondary to my analysis. Especially interesting, however, is how their form, force, and interpretive potential indicate a more self-consciously didactic undertaking than that performed, for example, by Homeric poetry. Just as the *histor* is personally involved in investigating his subject in a way that the Muse-inspired bard is not, so he is also in close contact with his public. The way in which he speaks to them and guides their listening, however, is often ambiguous and reflects the complexity of his message.

### Types of Introductions and Conclusions

I begin this discussion of metanarrative by treating introductory and concluding statements because in Herodotus, they are particularly numerous, discrete, and visible. They represent in themselves glosses to the text and thereby attract the presence of other glosses of various types, which can be

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external events but by means of a narrative focalized through a character. In metanarrative statements, by contrast, we always perceive the presence of the narrator-focalizer. See Marincola 1997b, 9.

13. See Fränkel 1924, 83; Müller 1980, 77–78; Immerwahr 1966, 46–58.

found scattered along the narrative (e.g., in parenthetical statements or at the end of a sequence) or within it (in qualifiers). Introductions and conclusions are, in other words, privileged pockets of metanarrative communication. I will briefly survey their basic forms before discussing their general effect on the recipient of the narrative.

All introductions and conclusions contain a summary of the narrative they identify, but what I call a *summary conclusion* is just that—an autonomous plain restatement of the whole or of parts of the preceding account, with no other fixed characteristics.<sup>14</sup> For example, the sentence

2. Λυδοὶ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ Πέρσῃσι ἐδεδούλωντο  
 [The Lydians, then, were definitively enslaved by the Persians]  
 (1.94.7)

does not mention a new event in the narrative sequence but rather recaps the earlier account of Croesus' war against Cyrus by rephrasing its result, which has already been recorded (though in different words) along with all the other stages of the action. The particles μὲν δὴ anticipate a continuative δέ in the introduction to the narrative that follows (1.95.1). The pluperfect tense of the summarizing verb marks the point at which the narrative had arrived before the intervening Lydian ethnography (1.92–94)—Where were we? Ah, yes: the Lydians had lost their freedom.

When an element of summarization on which the emphasis of the sentence lies is either replaced or accompanied by a backward-looking demonstrative—a form of οὗτος, τοιοῦτος, τοσοῦτος, or, less often, ὅδε—the conclusion is no longer a plain summary. I call it a *retrospective sentence*. An example is

3. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν τούτῳ τῷ μῶρῳ διεφθάρησαν.  
 [and these, then, were killed in this way.] or  
 [and this is how these were killed.] (5.21.1)

Here the demonstrative refers back to the unfolding of the action itself in the preceding narrative. “In this way” means “as it has been narrated.”<sup>15</sup>

14. On the terminology I use here to distinguish different types of introductory and concluding statements, see Munson 1983, 28.

15. I use the terms *retrospective* and *prospective* in a more restricted way than does Van Groningen (1958, 42–43; see also Beck 1971, 7–10). All else being equal, conclusions in which the demonstrative is adverbial, especially οὗτω(ς), tend to lean back less heavily than those where the demonstrative is subject or object. Elements of summarization that do not

Like retrospectives, the third and last type of conclusions in Herodotus consists of a nonautonomous, backward-looking sentence whose meta-narrative status is formally identifiable. I call it the *programmatic conclusion* because it makes reference to the narrator's compositional plan by expressing the idea that the preceding narrative has been narrated and ends at this point. It may or may not include the appearance of the grammatical first person referring to the narrator. Examples follow.

4. ῥοδώπιος μὲν νῦν πέρι πέπαυμαι.  
[I am through [talking] about Rhodopis] (2.135.6)
5. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀναθημάτων τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω  
[And about offerings let this much be said] (1.92.4)

Among opening statements, *programmatic introductions* incorporate a reference to an act of narration that is about to occur. Herodotus' introduction to his description of Assyrian boats (1.194.1, discussed in the introduction) belongs to this type,

6. But the greatest wonder of all for me . . . I am going to describe  
[ἔρχομαι φράσων].

The introductory counterpart of retrospective conclusions are *prospective sentences*, where the primary element of summarization is similarly represented or accompanied by a deictic that points to the narrative or narrative segment that the statement identifies as a unit. In a prospective sentence, the deictic is a forward-looking demonstrative implicitly signifying “as it will be narrated” (it is usually a form of ὅδε or τοῖόςδε, but οὗτος is also found).<sup>16</sup> An example is

7. νόμοι δὲ αὐτοῖσι οἶδε κατεστάσει.  
[Their customs are the following.] (1.196.1)

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bear the main emphasis of the sentence can at any rate be replaced or accompanied by a backward-looking demonstrative pronoun without the conclusion being necessarily “retrospective” according to my definition. E.g., at 5.72.4, οὗτοι μὲν νῦν δεδεμένοι ἐτελεύτησαν, translated “these [i.e., the Cilonians, just mentioned, then, died in chains” (not “these then were the men who died in chains,” and unlike “these were the only peoples in the cavalry”), is a plain summary conclusion.

16. The prospective value of the adverb οὕτω(ς) is sometimes weaker than that of deictic pronouns used as subject or object, in which case the introduction is almost the equivalent of a summary (see, e.g., 1.7.1). A prospective, however, is never as weak as the weakest retrospectives. See n. 15 in the present chapter.

Finally, unlike prospective sentences and programmatic introductions, the plain *summary introduction* does not formally look forward to anything. It consists of a statement grammatically and logically autonomous from the report that follows. If taken out of context, it gives no indication of its introductory function. For example, the sentence

8. There are many other offerings of Croesus in Greece beside those mentioned (1.92.1)

happens to represent the heading for a subsequent discussion of specific items. However, the very similar sentence at 1.183.3 (“there are also many private offerings”) does not. Plain summary introductions to narratives may be, in other words, formally identical to *summary narratives*.<sup>17</sup> In fact, another way to analyze summary introductions, especially when the narrative segment they identify is short and connected with γὰρ, is to regard the summary introductions as being the narrative and take the following segment as an explanatory gloss that provides further details.<sup>18</sup> What identifies a sentence as a summary introduction is the fact that it is more abstract and “processed” than what follows; for example, it may contain broad categorizations or other interpretive elements (see the word *prodigy* in statement 1 of passages 1a and 1b quoted earlier). In undecidable cases, the only principle that matters is that when the text contains more than one statement of the type “X happened” in reference to something that happens once in the story, the excess of discourse constitutes a metanarrative phenomenon.

### The Rhetorical Value of Introductions and Conclusions

All introductory and concluding statements in the *Histories* either can be assigned to one of the three basic types I have described for each or consist of a mixture or series of these. They provide “reading” directions at least by virtue of the fact that they intervene at a certain point to summarize the narrative in a certain way. Statement 2 quoted earlier,

17. With the term *summary narrative*, I am adapting the concept of summary that Genette (1980, 35–85, especially 40) develops in reference to novelistic narrative and that Richardson (1990, 35, especially 31–35) applies to Homeric narrative. My metanarrative summary statements (introductions and conclusions) have much in common with Richardson’s “appositive summaries,” forward- or backward-looking.

18. See, e.g., the narrative at 7.125, analyzed in chapter 4, “Wondering Why.” On explanatory glosses, see “Referential Glosses” later in the present chapter.

“The Lydians, then, were definitively enslaved by the Persians,” contains no additional glosses but fulfills a function of gloss by bringing out the meaning of the narrative according to the monarchical code. The verb δουλόω, “enslave” (used metaphorically) is a particularly strong term in this code. It has appeared only once so far in the *Histories* (1.27.4) but becomes more frequent in subsequent narratives of conquest, especially Persian.<sup>19</sup> If we think in terms of “performance,” the sentence seems to require a moment of silence as it underlines a milestone in the story and a major break in the narrative. Following upon the Lydian ethnography and at some distance from the preceding historical account, it concludes the entire Lydian narrative by reminding the audience that the actions of rulers affect communities. Croesus’ defeat by the Persians has caused the “enslavement” of an *ethnos* whose contributions to culture and initial resourcefulness have just been described (1.94.1–7). If narrative always entails interpretation, a preliminary summary or a restatement of part of the narrative represents an additional opportunity to interpret, whether by attributing the narrated event to a general class, by privileging a single moment or feature, or by referring to one or more of the cultural codes according to which the narrative can be read.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, introductions and conclusions, including those that seem expendable from the point of view of what they actually say, scan and pause the narrative, endow it with a certain rhythm and tone, and perform a “phatic” function vis-à-vis the audience.<sup>21</sup> Some retrospectives, for example, are equivalent to mere verbalized punctuation marks that leave the listener time to react. This is especially true when both the primary and the secondary elements of summarization are replaced with

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19. Similarly, the word δοῦλος appears in the sense of “subject” beginning with the rule of Cyrus (1.89.1). For cultural codes and the monarchical code in particular, see my introduction, text and n. 28.

20. Cf. Prince’s definition of metanarrative quoted in n. 11 in this chapter. The introduction (1.7.1) and conclusion (1.14.1) framing the Gyges-Candaules episode, e.g., bring out the political code in a story of love, betrayal, and revenge by emphasizing the resulting change of dynasty. They therefore draw attention to the interface between the public and the private spheres in the actions of individuals in power, a major tenet of Herodotean thought.

21. Of six constitutive functions of language that Jakobson (1960, 353–56) distinguishes in any speech event, the “phatic” focuses on the contact between speaker and addressee through messages “primarily serving to establish, to prolong, or to discontinue the communication, to check whether the channel works (‘Hello, do you hear me?’), to attract the attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention (‘Are you listening?’ or in Shakespearean diction, ‘Lend me your ears! . . .’).”

backward-looking demonstratives. At the end of a riveting narrative of how Alexander of Macedon had an entire Persian delegation killed over dinner and managed to cover up the murder, we find,

9. ταῦτα μὲν νυν οὕτω κη ἐγένετο.  
 [these things, then, happened approximately in this way.]  
 (5.22.2)

So, this is it. Period, end of story. What do you know?

Prospective sentences, which constitute an implicit promise of something to come, may be almost as inexpressive in their substance as the retrospective sentence I have quoted. When a prospective sentence mentions a set of facts, it serves as the chapter heading for the narrative of those facts (as in “Their [i.e., the Babylonians’] customs are the following” in statement 7). Prospective sentences, however, also point at short range to an individual element about which they anticipate very little information. Thus, forward pointers of the type “he did/devised the following thing” frequently appear to create a tiny moment of suspense before the narrative of clever, unexpected, or outrageous actions. No matter how colorless, a prospective sentence stimulates the recipient to formulate a question (“The following thing happened.” What happened? “He saw the following dream.” What dream? “They sacrifice in the following way.” What way?), and marking a pause before the beginning of the narrative, it signals, “Listen! and you will know.”<sup>22</sup> The narrative has then the chance for a new start.<sup>23</sup>

While the deictic allows the prospective to withhold information momentarily at the same time as it announces a topic, summary introductions must anticipate a complete thought about a topic before the narrative

22. Each logical pause in a narrative implies a question about what will come next, and forward-looking introductions provide the terms in which the narrator wants the recipient to ask the question. In one case (3.6.2), an introductory open-ended question encoding the recipient explicitly formulates a riddle that the recipient may not have thought about and is in turn followed by a programmatic introduction: “Where on earth, one might ask, are the empty jars used? I will explain this too.” All questions in the text that are not in speeches belong to the metanarrative and encode the addressee, but different types fulfill different roles: celebratory (7.21.1), interpretive (1.75.6), or introductory, as here (cf. *Iliad* 1.8 and 5.703; see Richardson 1990, 179; de Jong 1987, 49). See Lang 1984, 38–41; Lateiner 1989, 72–73. For a more detailed discussion of Herodotus’ use of prospectives, see Munson 1993a.

23. Examples are “Regarding Croesus himself, this is what happened. He had a son” (1.85.1), and “Smerdis was unmasked in the following way. Otanes was the son of Prexaspes . . .” (3.68.1).

begins, often with γάρ, to substantiate and expand on the summary. For this reason, summary introductions tend to be a more suitable tool for interpretation and evaluation than are “strong” prospectives (i.e., prospectives that lean heavily forward because the deictic fulfills most of the summarizing function). See, for example, the introduction to the narrative of the death of Croesus’ son.

10. After Solon left, a great nemesis from god overtook Croesus, one can imagine, because he thought he was the happiest of all men. (1.34.1)

To call what happened to Croesus a “great nemesis” and to make a statement on the causality of the event on that basis is a striking interpretive maneuver, and the self-referential “one can imagine” [ὡς εἰκάζουσι] identifies it as such.

In programmatic introductions and conclusions, the summary that announces the topic of the following narrative or restates some aspect of the preceding narrative is by definition joined to a self-referential *gloss of narration*, by which Herodotus comes into the open as the one who is ultimately verbalizing the story and putting it together. The narrator displays his control over his material simply by announcing what he is going to say, by cutting a story short, by explaining his reasons for narrating or not narrating something, or by expressing which criteria govern his whole work. Not all programmatic statements are show-stoppers. Nevertheless, the introductions or conclusions that bear the greatest rhetorical force and are most expressive about the substance and point of the narrative tend to include a programmatic element. Thus, Herodotus’ first sentence is a mixed summary-prospective-programmatic introduction; it identifies the entire work as a single, though diversified, narrative. This statement signals at the outset the tensions and complications of the *Histories* themselves, torn between unity and dispersion, fact and meaning, diachrony and synchrony, syntaxis and parataxis.

Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνησέος ἱστορίας ἀπόδεξις ἦδε, ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεῖα γένηται, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δι’ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι.

[This is the demonstration of the research of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, lest the events of men may become evanescent with time, or great and wonderful actions, some performed by Greeks, some by non-Greeks, may become inglorious, both the other things and also for what cause they came to war with one another.]

The words summarizing the narrative generically and at long range are represented by the subjects of the double purpose clause that gives the reason for narrating. “Great and wonderful actions, some performed by Greeks, some by non-Greeks” [ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα] are the terms of the narrator’s code of celebration, here advertising the narratability of all the “events of men” [τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων] treated in the *Histories*, be they historical or ethnographic. A more specific summary is provided by the final colon of ambiguous grammatical status, where anticipatory ἄλλος in τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ [both the other things and also] serves as a bridge between the broader subject matter and the narrower topic δι’ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι [for what cause they came to war with one another].<sup>24</sup> The word αἰτία means “cause,” “grievance” (of an offended party), or “responsibility” (of an offender). As a historical, juridical, and ethical term, it anticipates the combination of these three codes in the immediately following narratives about the remote origin of the East-West conflict and, at long range, in the narratives of many other wars both between Greeks and non-Greeks and between members of each group.<sup>25</sup>

The first sentence also notably names the real author, Herodotus. This person will henceforth become the “I” of the text, the *histor*. He will appear again in his historical dimension, as he does here, in a particular type of metanarrative statement that I call glosses of *historie*, that is,

24. The best analysis of the first sentence is by Erbse (1956, especially 217–19 for this point). Cf. also Krischer 1965; Drexler 1972, 6–9; Moles 1993, 92–94. Initial sentences of other fifth-century prose works are discussed by Fowler (1996, 69–70). Anticipatory ἄλλος (as opposed to “additional” as in statement 8 earlier in the present chapter) has the function of narrowing the focus of the narrative that follows by postponing (or excluding) certain aspects of the topic being treated. Wood (1972, 14) rightly regards it as one of the signs of “a perspective . . . which views discrete events as parts of a whole, which sees always the meaning of events.”

25. See αἰτίους at 1.1, where it means “those at fault,” “those responsible,” and therefore also the “causes” and is eventually picked up by τόν . . . ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἔργων [the one who initiated unjust actions] at 1.5.3. See Pagel 1927, 8; Immerwahr 1956, 245. As Payen argues (1997, 88–91), the narrative of the *Histories* imposes a broad interpretation of the phrase “they came to war with one another.”

references to Herodotus' fact-finding process.<sup>26</sup> The gloss of *historie* in this sentence is in the expression ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις. The word ἀπόδειξις constitutes the programmatic element (or gloss of narration) of the sentence. It means “performance” in the sense that the product of *historie* becomes a display of narrative; but it also points to the disclosure of the preliminary discovery process, in a sort of contrapuntal narrative of the actions and reasonings of the *histor* as researcher—where he went, where he learned things, how he put together what he saw and heard, and so on.<sup>27</sup> But another type of gloss is embedded here: since the root ἀποδεικ- in this same sentence also advertises the narrated (“great and wonderful deeds *performed*” [ἀποδεχθέντα]), the term ἀπόδειξις is attracted into the celebratory code as well. The narrator, Herodotus, in other words, presents his own speech act as a performance in some way comparable to the great and wonderful performances of the characters of his narrative.<sup>28</sup>

### Self-Referential Glosses

As my preceding analysis of the first sentence of Herodotus' *Histories* shows, an introductory or concluding statement is a gloss for the way in which it summarizes the narrative, but at the same time, it may also contain a number of other glosses. There are two major categories of glosses, self-referential and referential. A self-referential gloss belongs to the level of metanarrative that is most distant from the story level, because it defines and qualifies—“talks about”—another piece of the text (i.e., a narrative, part of it, or another gloss) as a verbal product, rather than focalizing through the narrator a referent in the world of the narrated.

*Glosses of narration.* We have already encountered glosses of narration: they identify a narrative, a portion of a narrative, or another metanarrative statement as something that the narrator, Herodotus, has said or will say, or they postpone or recall narratives (“as I will narrate later,” “as has been said before”). In the negative form, glosses of narration describe the text by default; they state that it lacks certain features by decision of the narrator.

26. See Dewald 1999, 232, 236.

27. See Dewald 1987, 167; Marincola 1987, 127.

28. See Erbse 1956, 209–11; Nagy 1990, 218–21 with nn. 24 and 35. Ἀπόδειξις is also a part of a semic code and connotes wisdom because another use of ἀποδείκνυμαι has to do with the display of advice, opinion, or *sophie* (cf., e.g., 2.146.1, 7.139.1, 8.8.3: γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι, applied to the narrator).

Herodotus identifies the unfinished product of his narration as his λόγος. He also applies this word to some of his individual narratives or parts of the whole.<sup>29</sup> Herodotus denotes his act of narration by both verbs of speaking and verbs of writing; he thereby shows his adherence to the two modes and his double intention to communicate in the present and to create a lasting record.<sup>30</sup> Several of Herodotus' terms for narrating participate in the metaphor of a journey to the places that will become part of the narrated.<sup>31</sup> The narrator as such is a traveler who may or may not decide to embark on the roads of other people's *logoi*.<sup>32</sup> The itinerary is his work in progress, his *logos*, which "seeks" or "wants" (verb ἐπιδίξομαι or δίξομαι) more or less predictable destinations or topics.<sup>33</sup> This metaphor of the journey creates the illusion of an overlap between the code of narration and the code of *historie* (where verbs of motion are in most cases used literally). Thus it reinforces our sense of the identity between the narrator and the researcher.<sup>34</sup>

29. See, e.g., 1.5.3, 1.140.3, 1.184. See also Payen 1997, 63–66.

30. Nagy (1990, 219) writes, "Saying something is in the case of Herodotus the equivalent of writing something because it is ultimately being written down in the *Histories*." Cf. Hartog 1988, 276–89. According to Immerwahr (1966, 15), γράφω emphasizes exactitude (1.95.1, 2.70.1, 2.123.1) or the notoriety of a person or event (2.123.3, 7.214.3). Cf. Hartog 1988, 285. Herodotus' vocabulary of narration is vast. Verbs with the root μνη- (ἐπιμνησθῆω, 2.3.2; etc.) may suggest the idea of memorializing through words (cf. the memorial of words at 7.226.2; see Immerwahr 1960, 267). Applicable to both oral or written speech are verbs of mentioning, indicating, explaining, or displaying, including the particularly fluid σημαίνω (on which see Hartog 1988, 366; Nagy 1990, 165). Other performative verbs of narrating include "go on at length" (μηκύνω, 2.35.1, 3.60.1), "use" in the sense of mentioning information he knows (χρῶμαι, 8.85.2), "refrain from saying" (ἐπέχω, 7.139.1), "stop" (παύομαι, 2.135.6), "revert" (ἀνέρχομαι, 1.140.3, 7.239.1), "omit" (ἀπίημι, 3.95.2), "forget about" (ἐπιλανθάνομαι, 4.43.7).

31. The act of narrating is often expressed with verbs of going: e.g., ἔρχομαι ἐρέων (1.5.3, 2.99.1), ἦμα λέξων (4.82). At 1.5.3, the narrator will proceed forward in the *logos* (προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου), going through (ἐπεξιόν) cities great and small. Bidding goodbye to a subject is equivalent to leaving a place (see 2.117, 4.96.2).

32. At 2.20.1 (where metaphorical and literal terms of the code of narration mix in a striking way), the narrator states that some Greeks wanting to be distinguished (or perhaps "visible": ἐπίσημοι) for their cleverness, "said three roads [όδούς]" (cf. 2.22.1), two of which he does not deem worth mentioning, except that he wants only to point to them (σημῆνα). At 1.95.1, he knows three other "roads of *logoi*" [λόγων ὁδούς] about Cyrus besides the *logos* according to which he will write. For the journey metaphor applied in the narrative to the speeches of characters, see 1.117.2, 2.115.3.

33. See 1.95.1, 4.30.1. The verb δίξομαι is often found in the narrative in conjunction with verbs of motion, as when Heracles goes all over Scythia looking for his mares (see 4.9.1).

34. On Herodotus as alter ego of the Homeric Odysseus, see Nagy 1990; Marincola 1997, 1–3.

Narrating is only one of the activities the text attributes to the authorial first person, but one in which Herodotus displays unparalleled self-assurance.<sup>35</sup> Occasional apologies compensate for his expressions of control over what he narrates,<sup>36</sup> and these phrases sometimes take the form of an appeal to the narrator's obligation or lack of obligation to mention something or to include certain types of material. The verb δεῖ appears frequently in this context and bears little emphasis ("And yes, I must still explain . . . where was the dirt from the ditch utilized," 1.179.1). It suggests "a sense of strain inherent in the problem of composition,"<sup>37</sup> the need to be detailed and exact, perhaps the fear to go on for too long and appear trivial. Other times, we find stronger phrases expressing a graver commitment to the integrity of his *logos*. The *logos* that seeks/wants (his *logos*, always with a dative of possession) is his narrative agenda. This is never sharply defined for the recipient, but it imposes on the narrator a duty that overrides personal inclinations, other moral issues, or external pressures.<sup>38</sup>

*Glosses of source.* Complementary to glosses of narration are glosses of source, which identify a narrative or statement as originating from other narrators outside the narrative ("so and so say" or "it is said").<sup>39</sup> The *logoi* of others have the important function of giving a voice to the other, who challenges the subjectivity of the audience.<sup>40</sup> At the same time,

35. See Dewald 1987, 164. The problems connected with the first-person plural are discussed by Chamberlain, forthcoming.

36. At 2.45.3, the narrator exceptionally apologizes to the gods and heroes, as if they were a special part of his audience.

37. Dewald 1987, 165.

38. On the narrator's obligation with ἀναγκ-, see 7.139.1, 2.3.2, 2.65.2, 7.99.1. Cf. 2.123.1 (ἐμοὶ . . . ὑπόκειται), 7.152.3 (ὀφείλω, οὐ . . . ὀφείλω). The idea of obligation is discussed further in chap. 4.

39. See Dewald 1987, 153; Jacoby 1913, 398–99; Darbo-Peschanski 1987, 91–97. Sometimes sources do more than "say": they demonstrate (see, e.g., 5.45.1, 5.45.2), know exactly, calculate (see 2.145.3), agree or disagree with one another (see, e.g., 1.23.1), swear (see 4.105.2), accuse (see 6.14.1), have nothing to say (see 3.111.1), and so on. Though Herodotus refers to the provenance of his evidence throughout his work, he does so irregularly, and many evidently received narratives are not marked by "they say" or any such gloss or slide from the second to the first narrative level of the narrator's own voice. See Darbo-Peschanski 1987, 113–18, 124–25; Hartog 1988, 291–94. Dewald (1999) discusses the problems of the focalization, and therefore the status, of unattributed narratives.

40. Glosses of sources identifying foreign *logoi* resemble cognitive statements of the type "the Persians say." These, however, record a people's cultural beliefs in an ethnographic context and are therefore just as much a part of the narrative as are statements of the type "the Persians do." An example is "The Taurians say that the divinity to whom they sacrifice is Iphigeneia, the daughter of Agamemnon" (4.103.2).

the *logoi* reported in the *Histories* also expose the self-interest or subjectivity of the speakers themselves.<sup>41</sup> More often than not, they provide unreliable evidence, contradict one another, and lead to contention. If Herodotus' first sentence puts the narrator in charge, his second sentence ("The Persian *logioi* say that the Phoenicians were the ones responsible for the conflict," 1.1.1) introduces a verbal quarrel that remains unresolved.<sup>42</sup> This is only the first of many quarrels in the metanarrative of the text that echo, reflect, and metaphorically represent the disputes and struggles among the characters in the narrative and in the real world.

*Glosses of historie.* When a source "says" something in the past tense and directly to the researcher, the gloss of source is colliminal with a gloss of *historie*, which identifies a part of the text as containing the results of Herodotus' inquiry.<sup>43</sup> No longer a passive recipient of information, the *histor* travels, "wants to know," participates in interviews, collects hearsay, verifies by autopsy. The more extended passages that place him at the scene are small narratives in their own right, though at a different level, and represent the closest thing in Herodotus to what modern ethnographers call "personal narrative."<sup>44</sup> To put it in literary terms, the outside narrator enters the narrative and almost becomes a character.<sup>45</sup>

*Evaluations of accuracy, glosses of evidence, knowledge, and ignorance.* Other than underlining the provenance of a statement or a narrative in the text, self-referential signs give indications about their reliability. In a text mostly composed of the received *logoi* of others, these are important directions. Evaluations of accuracy<sup>46</sup> corroborate or decline to

41. See Dewald 1987, 168.

42. See Dewald 1999, especially 236. For an inventory of Herodotean alternative versions, see Lateiner 1989, 104–8. The interface between metanarrative and narrative quarrels is discussed in chap. 3, "Disputes, Arbitration, and the Subjectivity of Opinions."

43. Jacoby 1913, 247–76, 395–400; Macan 1895, 1:lxxxii–lxxxiii; How and Wells 1928, 1:16–20; Marincola 1987; Dewald 1987, 155–59; Hartog 1988, 261–73; Darbo-Peschanski 1987, 84–87.

44. Pratt 1986; Geertz 1988.

45. See Marincola 1987, especially 127–28. Marincola gives a complete survey of Herodotus' statements of inquiry and shows that the extended type only occurs in book 2, where the statements represent implicit polemics against previous accounts. In these passages, we find verbs of setting forth, traveling, going, arriving, sailing (see ἔπλευσα at 2.44.1), being in someone's company (συνεγερόμην, 3.55.2), and so on. Occasionally the *histor*'s sources become part of the narrative as well, as do the Egyptian priests in the famous *piromis* scene (2.143) and the disingenuous scribe of the temple of Athena on Sais (2.28.2).

46. *Accuracy* is not a very satisfactory term here, but I am reluctant to use *truth*, a word that Herodotus himself avoids in most contexts. See chap. 3, "Specific Glosses of Interpretation."

corroborate, refute or reject tout court.<sup>47</sup> Herodotus guarantees his own statements with glosses of evidence (“it is evident that such and such is the case”)<sup>48</sup> or of knowledge.<sup>49</sup> When he says he does not know (or he “cannot tell exactly”), he is either unable to corroborate someone else’s *logos* or acknowledging the incompleteness of his own.<sup>50</sup>

*Glosses of opinion.* Among the most pervasive self-referential meta-narrative signs are those that identify a referential gloss or a statement of fact (e.g., the number of troops at 7.184.1) as representing the result of Herodotus’ mental activity—estimate, reasoning, conjecture, judgment, and so on. To these I apply the blanket term *opinion*.<sup>51</sup> Glosses of opinion both weaken and enhance the authority of the text. When they accompany a referential gloss that proclaims how great the significance of a fact is (celebration), discloses what its significance is (interpretation), or evaluates its worth, they underline Herodotus’ own subjectivity, separate from that of other voices in and outside the text.<sup>52</sup> They constitute the most forceful markers of Herodotus’ own ideological and philosophical position. For example,

47. Rejections qualify received information as not trustworthy. A refutation is an explanatory gloss attached to a rejection (called an ἔλεγχος at 2.23; cf. 2.22.4). See, e.g., 3.45.3.

48. When Herodotus is confronted with controversial issues, the gloss of evidence often introduces a referential gloss that explains the evidentiary basis for something (see, e.g., 5.22) See Darbo-Peschanski 1987, 131–47; Thomas 1997 and 2000, 168–200.

49. With such generalized expressions as “I learn” [πυνθάνομαι] (e.g., 7.114.2), the category of glosses of *historie* overlaps with that of glosses of knowledge, which emphasize the results rather than the process of the research. An example occurs at 1.20: “I know, having learned it from the Delphians.” See Lang 1984, 11–17. Glosses of knowledge include the limitative phrase “the first [or greatest, etc.] we know about” (πρώτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, etc.). See Shimron 1973; Darbo-Peschanski 1987, 113; Hartog 1988, 289–90.

50. See, e.g., 4.25.1 (no one knows), 4.180.4, 6.14.1. See the lists “Ignorance Universal” and “Certainty Impossible” in Lateiner 1989, 69–71. See also Flory 1987, 49.

51. In the programmatic statement with gloss of *historie* at 2.99.1, Herodotus mentions the role of his own γνώμη, “judgment,” in processing the data of eyewitness and oral report. Besides verbs of seeming, thinking, and conjecturing, Herodotus’ vocabulary of opinion also includes expressions with οἶα and οἶαώς (3.111.1, 3.38.2, 4.195.4, 5.97.2, 7.167.1, 7.239.2), the dative of reference μοι (see passage 17 later in the present chapter), and certain first-person verbs in self-referential or referential glosses (e.g., πείθομαι, “I am persuaded”; γελῶ, “I laugh”; αἰνέω, “I praise”: see passage 15 in the present chapter). See Beck 1971, 70–72; Dewald 1987, 162; Lateiner 1989, 98; Hohti 1977; Darbo-Peschanski 1987, 164–89, especially 184.

52. Darbo-Peschanski (1987, 186) writes ‘Lorsque l’enquêteur consent à évaluer ses propres discours comme ceux de ses informateurs . . . il donne . . . à son jugement le caractère relatif d’un avis susceptible d’être discuté.’ See also Dewald forthcoming a.

11. **In my judgment** [κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἡμετέραν] the following is the wisest custom, which I learn that the Illyrian Eneti also have. (1.196.1)
12. . . . **since I believe** [νομίζων] that all men know equally about the gods . . . (2.3.2)

To the extent, however, that opinion identifies information that may not be accurate, it is a compromise that replaces the vacuum of “being unable to tell” but falls short of “knowing.”<sup>53</sup>

*Various glosses encoding the addressee.* What the narrator Herodotus knows, corroborates, and believes (in the sense of *nomizein*) provides reference points for the understanding of the world he wants to communicate. Glosses that express his ignorance or uncertainty are the explicit marks of an interrogative text. They put the recipient of the narrative in charge. We perceive the presence of the recipient in the text especially through the mediation of self-referential metanarrative. He is the anonymous ὄστις who is asked by a gloss of noncorroboration at 2.123.1 to “use” the reported *logoi* if he finds them credible, and he is the τις who is invited to choose between different versions at 5.45.2. This “whoever” or “someone” is also enlisted in glosses of *historie* as a potential *histor*, traveler, observer, or eyewitness (“it is evident even for one who has not heard about this but just sees, at least if he has some intelligence . . .,” 2.5.1).<sup>54</sup> Direct addresses in the second-person singular coopt the listener to the inquiry.<sup>55</sup> Yet the narrator also expresses some doubt that his audience will be up to the task with which he entrusts them. When glosses of narration explicitly refer to their likely reaction to what is or could be narrated, they

53. I am paraphrasing Romm (1989, 100 n. 12). The nonauthoritative aspect of Herodotus’ opinion is emphasized by Darbo-Peschanski (1987, 146–47, 184–89).

54. The attributive participle also encodes the recipient in this capacity, e.g., at 2.135.3: “anyone who wants [τῷ βουλομένῳ] can see . . .”; cf. 1.105.4, 2.31. In some cases, mostly in referential metanarrative (2.154.4, 3.116.3, etc), the first-person plural encodes the audience because it means “we the Greeks.” On the role of the narratee, see Prince 1973; 1982, 16–24; 1987, s.v. “narratee.”

55. An example occurs at 1.139: “if you look into this, you will find . . .” [ἔξ τούτου διζήμενος εὐρήσεις . . .]; see also 3.6.2 (the recipient as interviewer); 1.199.4, 4.28.1, 3.12.1 (the recipient as prospective or hypothetical experimenter); 2.5.2, 2.29.5, 2.30.1, 2.97.2 (the recipient as prospective traveler). See Dewald 1987, 155; 1990, 220. De Jong (1998) notices the similarity with the use of the second person in the Hippocratics (e.g., *Airs, Waters, Places* 8.10).

especially mention disbelief.<sup>56</sup> One famous passage (7.139.1), which I examine later (chapter 3.2), attributes to them hostility.

### Referential Glosses

A referential gloss provides directions on how to receive the narrative by commenting not on the narrative itself but on the narrated. Such glosses often represent the propositional content of glosses of the self-referential group—in other words, they correspond to item Y in a statement of the type “X is evident because Y” or “it is my opinion that Y.” But referential metanarrative can stand on its own.

Referential glosses constitute the level of metanarrative that is closest to the narrative. For this reason, they fulfill their function indirectly and often in a subtler way than statements that identify a piece of text as coming from a certain source, as being Herodotus’ opinion, or as representing—or not—an accurate report. Consider, for example, what I call *glosses of testimony*. These consist of references to poetic and other written testimony of narrated events or to tangible vestiges of the past that are generally well known, verifiable by Herodotus’ contemporary audience, or allegedly verified by the narrator/researcher. Glosses of testimony sometimes appear to be the referential content of an implicit gloss of corroboration or evidence. An example is the item y in “X is evident/proven/accurate because Y,” whatever X in the narrative may be in the particular case. Thus, the Spartans were defeated by the Arcadians (X), and their chains were visible “still in my time” in the temple of Tegea (Y): here Y memorializes event x and confirms its gravity (1.66.4).<sup>57</sup> In many cases, however, what notations of this sort contribute to Herodotus’ account, what they confirm or go to prove, is not entirely transparent. At 5.77.3, for example, we encounter another mention of chains: the chains of Chalcidians and Boeotians, crushingly defeated by the Athenians in

56. Glosses of narration automatically encode a recipient of the narrative—“I say/narrate/write (for the benefit of someone)” —but they are also a type of gloss where the recipient is likely to be explicitly mentioned. At 1.193.4, the disbelief of the audience motivates the narrator’s negative program. Disbelief is attributed to “some Greeks” (i.e., some of the audience) in a gloss of narration at 6.43.3 and in an implicit gloss of corroboration at 3.80.1. See Hartog 1988, 289–90; Packman 1991, especially 406. Other glosses of narration refer to the audience’s cultural knowledge as the basis for narrating or explaining something: see 3.37.2, 3.103, 4.81.4, 4.99.5.

57. On these glosses providing evidence for the “greatness” of an event, see Immerwahr 1966, 269.

their first battle after the liberation of Athens from the tyrannical regime, still hang at the Athenian Acropolis on the wall “half-burned by the Medes.” This notice juxtaposes the distant past, the more recent past, and the present of narration in an allusive way that requires decoding. It goes beyond a testimonial function in the most obvious sense.<sup>58</sup>

*Explanatory glosses.* Questions about the function of metanarrative intrusions sometimes emerge within the broad referential category of explanatory glosses (to which glosses of testimony also sometimes belong). These provide new factual information apparently designed to clarify some element of the context in which they occur, but their explanatory value is not always clear. At the end of the narrative of the murder of the Persian ambassadors at the hands of Alexander of Macedonia during a banquet, for example, we find a gloss (itself emphasized by self-referential glosses of knowledge and source and generating a gloss of evidence with its explanation) stating that the kings of Macedonia are Greek (5.22). Is this information designed for the sake of apologia or irony? Or has the narrator simply taken the opportunity to insert information that will be useful later on?<sup>59</sup>

Explanatory glosses in general occupy an intermediate position between the metanarrative and the narrative, because along the main narrative line that proceeds in chronological order from Croesus to Xerxes, insertions marking a change of time always more or less begin as explanatory glosses. Thus, the long flashback on Cyrus’ antecedents is introduced by the summarizing statement “who was this Cyrus who conquered Croesus” (1.95.1). It interrupts the chronological narrative, in other words, like the delayed and much expanded *gloss of identification* that typically accompanies the entrance of a character in the history to give a few facts about his family, his position, and his accomplishments.<sup>60</sup> Similarly, even the most structurally autonomous ethnographic description can be regarded as a gloss explaining the background of a people that has played a role in the narrative or is about to do so. In comparison with inserted semiautonomous narratives, the metanarrative status of an

58. For other glosses of testimony, see, e.g., 1.12.2, 1.24.8, 2.123.3, 2.131.3, 4.11.4, 4.12.1, 4.166.2, 5.58.3, 6.14.3, 7.167.2, 7.178.2. At 3.38.4, the Pindaric quotation is used somewhat differently, to corroborate a gloss of interpretation.

59. See Badian 1994, especially 121, on the ambivalence of Herodotus’ whole Macedonian narrative.

60. See, e.g., 1.6, 1.23, 5.32, 6.35.1, 6.131, 8.79.1 (cited as passage 16 in the present chapter). Cf. the discussion of Homeric character introductions in Richardson 1990, 36–51.

explanatory gloss is based on its brevity. Consequently, it is, or we expect it to be, immediately functional as a short-range explanation and not autonomous from the narrative to which it is attached. An isolated *ethnographic gloss* within the Gyges-Candaules episode, for example, is clearly designed to help a Greek audience to evaluate Candaules' behavior in displaying his wife naked.

13. Among the Lydians, as also among almost all other non-Greeks, to be seen naked even for a man brings great shame. (1.10.3)

While historical glosses bring out the historical code in an ethnographic description (e.g., by explaining the origin of certain customs or monuments), ethnographic glosses underline the "code of customs" in the history. Both testify to the mutual interdependence of the two genres in Herodotus' work. Sometimes, we need to know about culture to understand history, or we need to know about historical occurrences to understand culture. But again, specific cases raise different issues: not only whether and how an ethnographic gloss actually contributes to the context where it appears, but also whether it is complementary or contradictory in relation to the ethnographic information about the same people given elsewhere, especially in autonomous ethnographic narratives; or how these isolated bits of ethnographic knowledge work as a group when they can be classified cross-culturally, according to the areas of culture they discuss.<sup>61</sup>

*Glosses of comparison.* An explanatory intrusion in the text also occurs every time the narrator brings into the narrative an extraneous referent for the purpose of affirming its resemblance to or difference from something in the story. The resulting gloss of comparison often explains an unfamiliar phenomenon through one that is, from the point of view of the audience, more familiar. But this is clearly not the case, for example, with the numerous comparisons proclaiming the similarity or equivalence among customs and beliefs of different peoples (see the earlier examples 11 and 13). The function that these and many other comparative glosses perform individually and the cumulative effect of

61. See, e.g., the collections of ethnographic glosses concerning oath taking or purification rituals around the world (1.74.1, 3.8.1) and the *metalinguistic glosses* (translations of terms) scattered along the narrative. On the latter group, see Hartog 1988, 237–48; Harrison 1998; Chamberlain 1999.

explicit comparison in the text are, as I shall show in the next chapter, more profoundly interpretive.

*Glosses of interpretation.* Interpretation is explanation at a higher conceptual level. Interpretive glosses occur when the voice of the narrator comments on some of the more covert or questionable aspects of the narrated. Herodotus' decoding of dreams, omens, symbolic objects, oracles, *logoi*, and other utterances belongs at the more explicit end of the explanatory/interpretive spectrum. At the other end, interpretation is communicated by the summarizing elements of introductory and concluding statements and, closer still to the edge of "pure narrative," even by the words and codes with which the text verbalizes the story in the narrative itself. Between these two poles, we find a number of statements that discuss, more or less conspicuously or problematically, why an event is important; its value, meaning, or origin; and its less obvious motive or result.

In most cases, interpretive glosses do not add new facts, as pure and simple explanations tend to do, but rather process those given in the narrative. The operation is often made more visible by a gloss of opinion or by some other self-referential gloss—for example, one of knowledge or evidence. An example is

14. And it is clear to me [δηλοῖ τέ μοι] that the whole situation on the barbarian side depended on the Persians, since also these fled even before they engaged with the enemy, just because they saw the Persians flee. (9.68)

Other metanarrative signs that alert us to the presence of an interpretive gloss are a generalized form of discourse (e.g., "all men know equally about the gods" in example 12), certain types of negations and questions, hypothetical constructions, particles signifying "perhaps" or "somehow" (especially *κως*), or a listing of alternative choices about what may have happened or why.<sup>62</sup>

62. For multiple choices, see, e.g., 1.86.2 (motives of Cyrus), 7.54.3 (motives of Xerxes), 7.239.2 (motives of Demaratus), 8.87.3 (motives of Artemisia). For an interpretive negation, see, e.g., 6.61.1. Negative statements are always a part of the metanarrative, because what we call the story does not include nonevents. See Prince 1982, 18–19; de Jong 1987, 61–68, especially 67; Hornblower 1994a, 152–53. The same is true for hypothetical constructions (see, e.g., 7.139.2–4). Important interpretive glosses with *κως* and *κου* appear at, e.g., 3.108.2, 7.191.2, and 6.98.1. Cf. Lateiner 1989, 31–32. Interpretive glosses in the form of a question (often in combination with a hypothetical construction) appear at

In the absence of any marker of interpretation whatsoever, statements that attribute undisclosed motives to characters can present special problems.<sup>63</sup> In other cases, the perception that we are in the presence of a gloss depends first and foremost on the level at which the text processes the raw external data. No self-referential sign of interpretation marks the statement that the Athenian war against Aegina, by forcing the Athenians to build ships, proved to be the salvation of Greece at the time of the Persian invasion (7.144.2). Yet the causal connection it establishes a posteriori between two otherwise unrelated occurrences clearly reveals the mental process and deliberate intervention of the narrator. By creating a thought-provoking paradox, he goads the reader to search for further meaning.<sup>64</sup>

*Evaluations of worth.* Embedded in many narratives is a judgment that some of the actions narrated are “Bad” or “Good” on either moral or intellectual/strategic grounds or by both standards at once.<sup>65</sup> In other cases, the narrator himself, explicitly and in his own voice, makes evaluations of worth either by using evaluative words in the course of the narrative (e.g., 9.78.1: “he uttered a most impious speech”) or by using glosses of praise or blame.<sup>66</sup> In the following retrospective/prospective that marks the transition between two items of the Persian ethnography, the evaluative verb incorporates a self-referential gloss. “I praise” is more or less equivalent to “I record/believe that [gloss of narration and opinion] it is good [evaluation].”

15. αἰνέω μὲν νυν τόνδε τὸν νόμον, αἰνέω δὲ καὶ τόνδε  
 [I praise that custom [reported earlier], and I also praise the  
 following one.] (1.137.1)

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2.11.4 (twice), 2.125.7, 4.46.3, 1.75.6, 2.15.2, 2.22.2, 2.45.2, 2.45.3, 2.57.2 (the last six occur in refutations). Generalizations are discussed in chap. 3.

63. This is also due to the fact that the narrator of the *Histories* swings back and forth between the positions of omniscient narrator—that is, with “the privilege . . . of obtaining an inside view of another character” (Booth 1983, 160; cf. Chatman 1978, 212, 215–16)—and researcher. In the latter stance, he distinguishes seen from unseen and marks attributions of motives by a self-referential gloss. Dewald (1987, 161 n. 161) counts twenty-two cases in which δοκέω and δοκέειν ἔμοι have this function.

64. Interpretive glosses also include *glosses of anticipation of doom*, which underline the decisive role of a functional event in the plot in triggering an overdetermined negative outcome. An example occurs at 1.8.2: “After not much time, since Candaules was bound to end up badly, he said to Gyges the following.” See also 2.161.3, 5.92δ1, 6.135.3, 9.109.2, 4.79.1. For discussion of these passages, see Hohti 1975; Gould 1989, 72–78; Munson forthcoming.

65. I borrow these deliberately vague expressions from Asad 1986.

66. See Prince 1982, 11.

Praise (reinforced by glosses of opinion and *historie* and by a pun with the proper name) is the most emphatic component in the identification of Aristides (8.79.1). The gloss is designed to underline the element of ἀρετή (moral excellence) in the narrative of Salamis, otherwise dominated by an ethically more ambiguous σοφία (cleverness) of Themistoclean stamp.<sup>67</sup>

16. When the generals were gathered together, there crossed over from Aegina Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, an Athenian who had been ostracized by the people and about whom I have come to believe, when I was inquiring about his character, that he was the best man in Athens and the most just [τὸν ἐγὼ νενόμικα, πυνθανόμενος αὐτοῦ τὸν τρόπον, ἄριστον ἄνδρα γενέσθαι ἐν Ἀθήνησι καὶ δικαιοτάτον].

*Advertisements of narratability.* In Herodotus, evaluation is intimately joined with explanation and interpretation because bad or good behavior and foolish or wise actions determine the course of history. At the same time, Herodotus' positive evaluation of a fact in the world of the narrated sometimes also coincides with a different metanarrative function: the celebration of his subject as such. Thus, a conclusion/introduction system within the narrative about Sperthias and Boulis at the Persian court represents both an evaluation of worth and what I call an advertisement of narratability (or *celebratory gloss*). It is phrased in terms designed to recall the text's initial advertisement in the promise to preserve the renown of "great and wonderful deeds."

17. αὕτη τε ἡ τόλμα τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν θώματος ἀξίη καὶ τάδε πρὸς τούτοισι τὰ ἔπεα.  
[This boldness [i.e., that reported earlier] from the part of these men is worthy of wonder, and in addition also the words they said, as follows.] (7.135.1)

Here and in other cases where the narrative is about brave deeds, "goodness" of conduct and what is deserving of mention are one and the same. This attitude conforms to the Homeric tradition, later pursued by

67. Cf., e.g., 8.124.2. In Herodotus, when the moral and the strategic standards of evaluation are separate—which is by no means always the case—the split between the two centers especially around the fluid term σοφία, which can be used to mean "intelligence" in a narrower sense and does not necessarily convey moral approval.

the praise poetry of Pindar.<sup>68</sup> In Herodotus, however, what I have called evaluation of worth is more specifically moralistic than is praise of greatness of the Homeric type; and conversely, his field of celebration (“great and wonderful deeds”) is both different and broader than the range of what Homer, Pindar, or (in his own way) Thucydides claim is worth preserving.<sup>69</sup> Perhaps because Herodotus’ concept of narratability is so unpredictable, the advertisement we find in the first sentence needs continuous tending along the *logos*. Terms of the celebratory code in fact recur throughout the *Histories*, often joined to programmatic statements and glosses of opinion. These express the narrator’s authority in determining what he will tell for no other reason than that it is, or he considers it to be, worthy of being told.<sup>70</sup> Phenomena of very different types and magnitude, historical or ethnographic, are emphasized in this manner. Explanation in a broad sense, including interpretation and evaluation, purports to indicate why something in the world of the narrated occurs and what constitutes its importance, meaning, or worth. Celebration, in contrast, is simply designed to signal that a feature in the world of the narrated possesses some sort of importance, meaning, or worth.

Earlier in this chapter, I showed that in many cases, self-referential glosses put the reader in charge of filling in the blanks left in the text and of interpreting the reality the text represents. So far as referential glosses have an unstable or multiple role, they achieve a similar effect, albeit even more implicitly. Referential metanarrative represents the main focus of my analysis. In the next two chapters, I examine how Herodotus explains through explanation. In chapter 4, I explore, albeit through the study of a single term, how he directs us to explain (if that is what he does), or what else he does, through celebration.

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68. On Pindar’s praise poetry in relation to the Homeric tradition, see Nagy 1990, 150–207. For Homeric praise of ἀρετή in Herodotus, see my chap. 3, “Interpretation in the History.”

69. Thucydides magnifies his subject as the greatest war and the most worthy of report (1.1–19, especially 1–2; cf. 7.87). Cf. Herodotus at 7.20.2. The tradition of ancient historians’ magnification of their subject is broadly surveyed by Marincola (1997a, 34–43). On praise and Homeric glory in Thucydides, see Immerwahr 1966, 177–279.

70. These celebratory terms include words of the θῶμα family; the phrases “great deed” or “great work,” “display of deeds” (ἔργων ἀπόδειξις, 2.101.1), “deeds greater than human” (2.148.6); the noun λαμπρότης (“brilliance” (2.101.1)); the adjective μέγας, μέγιστος, as well as other superlatives; words and expressions indicating fame (verb εὐδοκιμέω), originality (“the first we know about” to do something), primacy (“the first in his time”), or uniqueness; various expressions equivalent to “worthy of being told” (ἀξιόλογος) or “greater than words” (λόγου μέζω, 2.148.1).