

Bound by Struggle

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The Strategic Evolution of
Enduring International Rivalries

Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor

Ann Arbor

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS

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Published in the United States of America by
The University of Michigan Press
Manufactured in the United States of America
Ⓢ Printed on acid-free paper

2005 2004 2003 2002 4 3 2 1

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A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Maoz, Zeev.

Bound by struggle : the strategic evolution of enduring
international rivalries / Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-472-11274-0 (cloth : alk. paper)

1. International relations—History. 2. Israel-Arab Border
Conflicts, 1949—Egypt. 3. Peace. I. Mor, Ben D. II. Title.

JZ5595 .M366 2002

327.1'6—dc21

2002000563

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Preface

This book represents a culmination of a six-year research project supported by the Fund of Basic Research of the Israeli National Academy of Sciences. Zeev Maoz's research was also supported by the Ford Foundation through the Israeli Foundation trustees and the United States Institute of Peace. Ben D. Mor's research was funded by the Bertha von Suttner Foundation, through the Jewish-Arab Center at the University of Haifa. Major portions of this study were written when Zeev Maoz was a Visiting Scholar at the Baker Institute for Public Policy and a Visiting Professor at the Department of Political Science at Rice University, and when Ben D. Mor was a Visiting Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University. The generous support of all of these institutions is gratefully acknowledged, but none is responsible for the views, analyses, or interpretations contained in this book.

The project involved a great deal of data collection on national decisions. We were fortunate to have an outstanding group of coders. We are especially grateful to Anat Segal, our data manager in this project. Our graduate assistants included Viviana Benzaquen, Anat David-Forrer, Gabi Dagan, Moshe Levi, Eli Raz, Chaim Sadeh, Rachel Swissa, Lesley Terris, Avishag Uzan-Malkhi, and Yehuda Zimmerman. We thank them for their diligent work. Finally, we are indebted to Steven J. Brams and the anonymous readers at the University of Michigan Press for useful comments on earlier drafts.

Finally, this book is based on extensive research, only portions of which made it into the book's pages. Readers who are interested in learning more on how this research was conducted by examining some of the data that did not make it into the book are invited to visit the book's website at <http://spirit.tau.ac.il/poli/faculty/maoz/iha.html>.