CHAPTER 1

1. The term unrestricted globalism is attributed to Walter Lippmann, known for his early criticism of the globalist aspect in U.S. containment policy (see Steele 1980).

2. Since deterrence policy is designed to prevent an opponent from initiating or escalating a conflict, issues of deterrence are an intrinsic part of theory of international conflict and thus relevant to both strategic studies and general international relations research.

3. For a distinction between general and immediate deterrence, and other conceptual issues related to the study of deterrence, see chapter 3.

4. A widely used classification, relevant especially for major power relations, makes the distinction between direct and extended deterrence. Basic or direct deterrence refers to the prevention of attack on the deterrer’s home territory. In extended deterrence, a state attempts to deter an attack on a third party.

5. The term rational, as used here, is identical to the notion of instrumental rationality, which postulates that, if all other conditions permit, actors are expected to act according to their preferences (Zagare 1990). An irrational actor, therefore, is one that deliberately chooses a course of action that is inconsistent with its preferences. In the situation of nuclear balance, the second-strike capabilities of both sides would assure that any nuclear attack would also be suicidal for the attacker. It would thus be irrational for a deterrer to carry out its nuclear threat.

6. See George and Smoke 1974 for an early warning about the errors and dangers of policy prescriptions resulting from a narrow focus on the “art of manipulation” as a major source of deterrence success.

7. For an extensive treatment of these requirements, see Kaufmann 1956, Schelling 1960, Zagare 1987.

8. Commitment theory, as defined here, is also partly analogous to Huth’s notion of “qualified-interdependence-of-commitments.” For the purpose of this study, I do not separate this literature from the research on interdependent commitments, either cross-sectional or temporal, because both approaches find their original source in the research tradition of solving the credibility
problem of “irrational” threats (Schelling 1960, 1966). However, a detailed survey of the literature with a different theoretical aim than here, such as that done by Huth (1997), could indeed validly point to many fine differences between them.

9. A few game-theoretic analyses also question the logical validity of this argument. Carlson (1995), for instance, finds an inverse relationship between cost tolerance and escalatory behavior. As the disparity between the players’ cost tolerances increases, the less cost-tolerant actor is more likely to escalate the conflict.

10. There are a number of studies about the effects of bargaining strategies on deterrence outcomes, but most of the examined strategies (tit-for-tat, firm-but-flexible bargaining, etc.) are not specifically intended to change the adversary’s perception about the deterrer’s rationality or, alternatively, to deliberately increase the deterrer’s costs for not honoring its commitments. Research on these strategies (e.g., Leng 1993) is, therefore, distinct from commitment theory as defined here.

11. The quote comes from the address of Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor at the time, delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations on September 12, 1994 (cited in McManus 1994, A1).

12. Quoted from President Harry S. Truman’s briefing of the members of Congress on June 27, 1950 (see Jervis 1991, 20–21).

13. In their comprehensive survey of theories of international relations, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1997, 376) classified Jervis together with Schelling and Brodie as “more interested in achieving deterrence through manipulating the level of risk.” This characterization was made in the context of the debate between those proposing risk manipulation strategies to maintain the credibility of MAD (including strategic thinkers such as Thomas Schelling and Robert Jervis) and others advocating against MAD as a single strategy that, in this second view, needed to be supplemented with the capability to fight a nuclear war (e.g., Paul Nitze or Colin Gray).

14. As discussed previously, the approach to deterrence credibility as a function of domestic audience costs reflects the argument about the effects of “tie-hand” strategy, which should not be confused with the “sink-cost” strategy (Fearon 1997). The latter reflects the logic of what I termed as a “commitment” theory of credibility (see the discussion in the preceding section on credibility and resolve).

CHAPTER 2

1. This passage is also interesting for its concise notion of the Concert of Europe, whose designs are also largely attributed to Castlereagh.

2. For conceptual and operational issues related to each of these three qualifying requirements for a major power, see appendix B, which also provides a survey of previous attempts to use one or more of these requirements
for identifying major powers. Additionally, it compares several previous classifications of major powers for the last two centuries to each other and to the one used in this book.

3. For further details see appendix B, which also reviews a few previous studies that acknowledge an extraregional aspect as one of key requirements for a major power.


5. See Taylor 1948, 265. Some provinces had a negligible number of Germans or Magyars such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, acquired in 1878 and officially annexed in 1908 (the 1910 census recorded 43 percent Serbs, 34 percent Moslems, and 21 percent Croats in the province, leaving only 2 percent to other nationalities). For more details, see Tapie 1969, 407.

6. Other indicators also confirm a severe gap among regions. By 1910, only 18 percent of the labor force in the Alpine Provinces worked in agriculture compared to over 80 percent in Dalmatia and Croatia. The regional share of national income ranged from a high 34 percent (Alpine Provinces) or 43 percent (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia) to a low 3 percent (Slovenia and Dalmatia) and 1.6 percent (Bukovina). For more details, see Milward and Saul 1977, 326–27.

7. Ironically, the assassinated Archduke Francis Ferdinand was a chief advocate of the tripartite state and generally sympathetic to the Slavic population. This view often put him at odds with his foreign ministers, many of whom were recruited from Hungarian political circles or presented views sympathetic to the Hungarian concern of having their position weakened by a Triple Monarchy (Albertini 1952, 2, 90, 190–92; Taylor 1954, 450–56, 494).

8. In the Near East, France secured control over Lebanon and Syria, and in Africa, it acquired large portions of the Cameroons and Togoland as “mandate territories” (Schuman 1931, 256).

9. Despite its name, Prussian “militarism” originated as a defensive program to ward off losses such as those the Germans endured in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48).

10. Historical data for military expenditures are often unreliable for a number of reasons. Wright’s estimates for German defense appropriations fall between the amounts estimated by Hillman (1952) and the more recent Correlates of War project. The difference among these three major data sources for the interwar defense expenditures is substantial for a number of powers with the exception of France, United States, and Great Britain (see table).

### Military Expenditures, 1937 (in millions of current dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hillman (1952, 454, table VI)²</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>3,298</td>
<td>3,446</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>1,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright (1942, 670–71, table 58)</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>1,263</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,026</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlates of War (COW) data</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>1,283</td>
<td>4,769</td>
<td>3,430</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>1,621</td>
<td>1,015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²Hillman presented the figures in British sterling pounds. The dollar figures are calculated at the exchange rates given in the footnote to his table.
11. The year 862 is generally accepted to mark the beginning of the Russian state (Florinsky 1953). The view that its great power status originated during the reign of Peter the Great is also widely held in the literature (e.g., Florinsky 1953, 307; Seton-Watson 1967, 41; Ulam 1974, 4).


13. The 1898 war resulted in establishing naval bases in Cuba and Puerto Rico, which consolidated U.S. power in the Caribbean.

14. Kennedy’s well-publicized argument about the “imperial overstretch” that has doomed the United States as much as any previous global power to its ultimate decline (Kennedy 1987) was first criticized most prominently by Nye (1990). The controversy later found advocates on both sides of this ongoing debate.

15. This agreement was never ratified by Congress as it was too politically sensitive to be presented in the Senate. It was rather a “gentlemanly agreement” by which Taft, with Theodore Roosevelt’s approval, assured Japanese Premier Katsura that the U.S. government would support the Japanese role in the Far East, while Katsura in return promised not to interfere with the Philippines (Kajima 1967, 331–33).

16. Some figures are illustrative: in 1929 China, excluding Manchuria, furnished approximately 18 percent of the Japan’s coal, 45 percent of its iron ore, and 10 percent of its pig iron. Manchuria provided 60 percent of Japan’s coal and 23 percent of its pig iron (Beasley 1987, 129–30). Korean mineral wealth provided also a steady flow of coal and iron to Japan’s industry (Beasley 1987, 154).

17. Perceptions by other powers are also important as they indicate to what degree a great power status is recognized by contemporaries. In a number of official or less formal statements since the early 1970s, Japan has been routinely mentioned as a power. For instance, in his oft-quoted interview in Time magazine in 1972, Nixon enumerated United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, and Japan as major powers of his times (Kissinger 1994, 705).

CHAPTER 3

1. Notwithstanding these problems in establishing deterrence success empirically, see Harvey 1998 for a comprehensive and useful theoretical discussion of the necessary and sufficient conditions for deterrence success and failure.

2. This was one of the core issues in the debate between two groups of deterrence scholars, one using a quantitative analysis of deterrence (Russett 1963; Huth 1988; Huth and Russett 1984, 1988, 1990) and the other advocating comparative case studies (Lebow 1981; Lebow and Stein 1987, 1990). Though both sides acknowledged the difficulties in establishing intentions, the debate did not lead either side to question the definition of deterrence based on intentions. Rather, the difference remained, in that Lebow and Stein
attempted to document historically whether such intentions existed at all, whereas Huth and Russett inferred them from behavior. The resulting “alarmingly low levels of cross-study reliability” (Lebow and Stein 1990, 340) between these two groups of studies should not then come as a surprise.

3. Perhaps for this reason compromise as an outcome was completely bypassed in many previous studies, with the exception of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992 and Dixon 1994.

4. This typology of military acts is based on the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Disputes Project (see Gochman and Maoz 1984). The typology is consistent with the conceptual definition of deterrence in behavioral terms as formulated here. Most other deterrence studies have used the COW operational classification similarly to capture diverse forms of deterrence manifestation (e.g., Huth 1988; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993), even though their conceptual premise of deterrence was formulated in terms of the actors’ intentions.

5. It is also important to identify the types of actions that are excluded from this analysis. They include the following actions: (1) joint military actions by several major powers against another state, while no other major power seriously objects to this collective action (e.g., the joint intervention against Greece in the Cretan insurrection of 1897, or the 1900–1901 joint intervention against the Boxer Rebellion in China); (2) accidental and relatively quickly clarified incidents (e.g., the 1904 Dogger Bank episode, the 1937 Panay incident, a number of such incidents during the Cold War such as the 1969 EC-121 spy plane incident); (3) a major power’s action within its own territory (e.g., its own civil war, such as the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia) or that of its colony; (4) a covert involvement that was not officially endorsed by the major power’s government (e.g., the 1984 mining of Nicaraguan ports with the help of the CIA); and (5) increased military assistance during the time of conflict (this was a frequent resort of superpowers during the Cold War period—unless accompanied by a military act as identified above, it cannot be considered a deterrent case, but rather should be classified as a case of intensified arms transfer).

6. For the sake of the parsimony often required for larger data sets, the operational rules do not include a stalemate. Like compromise, stalemate has often been neglected in empirical analyses, and its inclusion needs to be part of the agenda for future research. Empirically, however, the inclusion of stalemate would not significantly alter the data set used in this analysis. There were only a few cases that might be considered as stalemates, including the 1901–3 Manchurian Evacuation, 1920–23 Anglo-Russian frictions in Central Asia, and 1939 Nomonhan. Furthermore, since the coded outcomes of these crises are not uniform (respectively, Defender’s acquiescence, compromise, and war), it can be safely concluded that stalemate is not merged with any particular outcome category under the current coding.

7. A slightly modified version of this list of cases of extended-immediate deterrence was also reprinted in Zagare and Kilgour 2000.
8. Conventional historical names should facilitate the identification of each case for readers.

9. Whenever general historical surveys lacked sufficiently detailed information on particular crises, I consulted a number of historical monographs about these cases. The full list of consulted historical sources and references is provided in the second part of the reference section.

CHAPTER 4

1. For a fuller treatment of the balance-of-power approach, see Sheehan 1996. Vasquez’s (1997) recent critique of the entire school negatively evaluated its development as a “degenerative” research program according to the Lakatosian criteria of theoretical progress. For rebuttals to Vasquez’s argument, see especially Waltz 1997, Walt 1997, and a few additional responses in the same issue of the *American Political Science Review*.

2. For an extensive survey of structural realism, see James 1995.

3. Geller and Singer (1998, 70) separate power shifts as “capability convergence or divergence” from power transitions as “a reversal of relative capability position.” Such a conceptual distinction is not made here as both terms are generally defined as interchangeable.

4. Typically, the COW National Capability index is calculated as each nation’s percentage share of the world total. When estimating a major power’s strength, there is a compelling reason to opt for the major power total rather than the world total. While the number of observed major powers is roughly the same for each subperiod (i.e., 1895–1914, 1920–41, 1945–85), the number of states in the world system varied over time. That is, an increase in the world total was due, understandably, to the power growth of states, but it was also often due to the growing number of independent states. Consequently, each nation’s percentage share would marginally decrease with each new state joining the system. An index would thus distort the nation’s real growth over time. To avoid this distortion, the number of states that compose the system’s total must be kept constant. Since the major powers subsystem (as delineated here) is constant in terms of its numerical size across each subperiod, it is a more convenient choice.

5. As already discussed in chapter 3, there were 44 cases of extended-immediate deterrence between major powers. Some of these cases had more than one Challenger, Defender, or Protégé, which resulted in a total of 70 cases of deterrence dyads as the unit of analysis for the empirical test.

CHAPTER 5

1. The term *geopolitics* was coined much later by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén in his *Staten som Lifsform* (The State as an Organism) of


3. For the distinction, see Diehl 1991.

4. Keal (1983) distinguished five terms: spheres of action, influence, preponderance, responsibility, or interest. These notions are not exactly interchangeable as they reflect different patterns of sphere politics (for others, see Keal 1983, 19–26).

5. The term is attributed to Walter Lippmann, known for his advocacy of regionally “discriminate” containment policy. Ironically, George Kennan, considered an intellectual creator of the global containment policy, also reflected on this globalist approach with a grain of skepticism in his *Memoirs*: “All that was really required to assure stability among the great powers was ‘the preservation of a realistic understanding of the mutual zones of vital interest.’ This, too, the Russians understood” (1967, 249). In the Truman administration, rarely did anyone subscribe to this view, opting instead for a globalist perspective. For instance, Henry A. Wallace, secretary of commerce, was dismissed for advocating a more cautious approach to Eastern Europe, identifying it as an area vital to Soviet concerns, as were Western Europe and Latin America to the United States in his view.

6. Only recently have a few scholars attempted to map the political geography of superpower zones of influence during the Cold War period (see Van der Wusten 1985; O’Loughlin 1987; Nijman 1992).

7. Even the idea of shatterbelts is not completely comparable to the notion of regional salience, for two reasons. First, political weakness and instability of an area do not qualify for salience as defined here. Second, major power connections with the area, as indicated in the regional salience variable, are not based on the behavioral pattern of its conflict involvement in such an area. Namely, as the probability of conflict constitutes the dependent variable, it cannot also be included as a part of an explanatory variable.

8. Historically, of course, many states had different names in various stages of their development. Iran was traditionally known as Persia until the post–World War II period, Northern Rhodesia was proclaimed as Zambia in 1964 (when it became independent), Namibia emerged from the colonial South West Africa, etc. Also, some states emerged through a secessionist process (e.g., Vietnam split into South and North Vietnam in 1954) or, its reverse, through an integration of previously independent states (e.g., North and South Vietnam reintegrated in 1975) or (semi-)colonial possessions (e.g., Cape Colony, Natal, Orange River Colony, and Transvaal merged into the Union of South Africa in 1908, which became an independent state in 1920).

9. Hensel and Diehl (1994), however, subsume almost all of Africa as a single region, whereas Asia, for instance, is divided into three distinct regional clusters.

10. Brecher’s (1993) notion of geostrategic salience is thus very different from the idea of regional salience as used in this study, because it refers to “the
importance of an international crisis in terms of its proximity to/distance from major power centers and its natural resources” (292).

11. Geographic proximity suggests itself as another apparent indicator, but previous empirical research did not confirm a significant difference between the decisions of major powers regarding long-distance compared to neighborhood wars. Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 166), for instance, found that major powers tended “to initiate a disproportionate share of long-distance wars. This indeed proves to be true, with 89 percent of such wars being initiated by major powers, compared to only 40 percent of neighborhood wars.” Consequently, geographic distance does not seem to be particularly critical for the salience of world regions for major powers.

12. See Huth 1994 for using this method in his cited attempt to examine quantitatively the conditions triggering the onset of extended-immediate deterrence.

13. As was done in the previous chapter, the Hausman specification test was run to inspect whether the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which is intrinsic to multinomial logit models, had any substantial impact on the results. The results strongly indicated, with a high statistical significance, that the data did not violate IIA assumption (see appendix D for further details on methodology and modeling choices).

14. Selection bias is more extensively addressed in chapter 6. This issue, raised only recently in the literature, stems from the assumption that states “self-select themselves” into disputes based on their unobservable resolve. It is argued that the impact of factors relevant for general deterrence success (e.g., balance of forces or interests) is reversed once states enter a dispute and immediate deterrence takes place (Fearon 1994a). Censored probit, based on Heckman’s maximum-likelihood estimation with sample selection, is the standard statistical model to control for potential selection bias. Since it assumes only binary choices, however, it is an inappropriate estimator for this analysis based on multiple choices (i.e., multiple deterrence outcomes).

CHAPTER 6

1. Quantitative studies of deterrence have considered a number of variables, but not the impact of domestic politics on deterrence outcomes. Only an early study by Russett (1963) briefly explored the relationship between “political interdependence” and deterrence outcomes, though the results were largely inconclusive. Huth (1994) also examined the impact of regime similarity on the probability of extended deterrence attempts.

2. For a distinction between general and immediate deterrence, see chapters 1 (note 4) and 3.

3. As an analytic survey of the democratic peace literature will demonstrate, there are a number of alternative explanations for why the regime type
increases or diminishes the probability of conflict escalation. With the exception of domestic audience costs models, none of these explanations was directly linked to the issue of threat credibility in deterrence. For this reason, I stay focused on the audience costs argument when examining the implications of the “domestic interests at stake” in the deterrence context.

4. By one count, there have been over one hundred empirical analyses of the joint democratic peace argument (Thompson and Tucker 1997). See also Chan 1997 for an extensive review of the democratic peace literature.

5. Eyerman and Hart (1996) and Partell and Palmer (1999) produce empirical support for Fearon’s model. While these works are important in examining the validity of the model to predict dispute escalation, they do not strictly examine deterrence situations. However, expanding the scope of the type and outcomes of conflicts should indeed help illuminate the conditions under which different democratic peace propositions hold.

6. To resolve this issue, Rousseau et al. (1996) find it essential to distinguish between the initiators and targets of conflicts. If democracies are presumed to be pacific in general, then they can be expected to initiate fewer conflicts against other states. This would in turn explain prima facie the contradictory finding of a high frequency of wars between democracies and non-democracies and the low frequency of wars among democracies. Yet, the distinction between initiators and targets can be sometimes questionable since states might preempt in response to the perceived imminence of the other side’s aggressive intent, which, in turn, blurs the line between initiators and targets (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).

7. As already pointed out in chapter 3, notable exceptions are studies exploring the relationship between regime type and “peaceful settlements” (Dixon 1994), “negotiation” (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), and “compromise” (COW project; see Mousseau 1998). Unfortunately, because each of these studies uses different operational rules for identifying the peaceful outcome, interstudy comparison of their findings would not be completely reliable.

8. The literature on selection bias is growing rapidly especially since the late 1980s (e.g., see Achen and Snidal 1989 or Morrow 1989 for their initial theoretical statements). The domestic audience model (Fearon 1994b; Smith 1998) is one of recent theoretical extensions of the argument about self-selection effects and implications.

9. This argument is similar to an implication of the model developed by Schultz (1998, 840) that “threats made by democracies are less likely to be resisted than those made by states which do not permit competition.”

10. Jaggers and Gurr (1995) report a strong correlation between their democracy scores and the Freedom House index of political and economic liberties. Unlike the sources for continuous scales of democracy, there are several data bases for democracy as a categorical dichotomous variable (e.g., Chan 1984; Doyle 1986; Ray 1995). A high correlation between Polity data and
other categorical data sources was reported as well. Bremer, for instance, found a strong Yule's Q between the Polity and Chan's classifications (see Chan 1984; Bremer 1993).

11. As suggested by Jaggers and Gurr (1995), the standard cutoff point of +7 on the scale from −10 to +10 was used to differentiate between democratic and nondemocratic Challengers and Defenders.

12. There have been a few attempts to design a single index or at least an interactive term in statistical analysis that would include regime features of two or more actors, while having the nation-state for the unit of analysis. Maoz and Russett (1993) attempted to create a single index, while others used interactive terms in statistical equations (Rousseau et al. 1996; Reiter and Stam 1998).

13. Moreover, if the Challenger is superior in capabilities, the probability of war between democracies is mildly higher than that between nondemocracies, although it is still less than 50 percent.

CHAPTER 7

1. The calculations of the disparity or parity between the Challenger's and the Defender's interests in the region of conflict and their relative regional interests are the same as those used for estimating the variables of power disparity and relative capabilities (see the preceding text).

2. See appendix D for the methodological explanation of how predicted probabilities and marginal impacts are calculated in logit models.

3. To be exact, if the latter method were used, the number of extended-immediate deterrence cases would be 42, and 18 (43 percent) of these would represent deterrence encounters between the Soviet Union and the United States from 1945 to 1985.

4. I am grateful to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita for pointing to this possible measure for the distinction between "cheap talk" and "costly signals."

5. Note that this variable refers to the Defender's behavior in general to test the argument about "horizontal" interdependence of commitments across different regions. As previously noted, the Defender's past behavior becomes a more significant predictor of deterrence outcomes only if the current conflict occurs within the same region. See the preceding section on intraregional aspects of past behavior, though it should be pointed out that cross-regional (rather than intraregional) interdependence of commitments is at the heart of commitment theory (see chap. 1).

CHAPTER 8

1. Levy's study (1983) provides an almost singular exception to this trend. It is not surprising then that, in the absence of discussion about the opera-
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tional rules for major powers generalizable across epochs, there is much con-
fusion or, at least, disagreement in the current literature about which states
qualify as major powers in the post–Cold War world.

2. This argument is implying that most wars are preceded by some form of
deterrent actions, which is clearly substantiated in an empirical and historical
survey of the cases of major power deterrence and wars in chapter 3 and
appendix A.

3. For instance, Huth and Russett (1984) find that economic ties and arms
transfers from the Defender to its Protégé tend to have a strong deterrent
impact, but that alliance ties between the Defender and Protégé have surpris-
ingly opposite effects. Since the measure of regional stakes used in this study
incorporates both alliances and foreign trade, in addition to colonial posses-
sions and diplomatic exchanges for the earlier periods, the analysis of the
impact of regional salience does not address the issue of which elements have
greater deterrent effects than others.

4. The term used by Johnson (1994) in his critical study of U.S. involve-
ment in the Third World conflicts since World War II.

5. Scholars seem to diverge in evaluating the foreign policy strategy of the
Clinton administration, ranging from the view that it reflected the paradigm of
“collective security” (Posen and Ross 1997, 128 n. 25) to almost the opposite
strategy of “preponderance” (Layne 1997, 91). Yet others indicate the decision
makers’ confusion about an appropriate grand strategy for the post–Cold War
environment and, in this context, point to the lack of clarity about national
priorities that results in the ad hoc decisions (e.g., Haas 1995, 45; Joffe 1995,
94).

6. U.S. Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, cited in Gellman and Gra-
ham 1998, A01.

7. As an illustration, in an interview to the New York Times Magazine,
Secretary of State Madeline Albright famously delineated her foreign policy
outlook as being driven by the Munich analogy: “My mind-set is Munich; most of
my generation’s is Vietnam” (Sciolino 1996, 67). Since “the lesson of
Munich is to get in” and “that of Vietnam is to stay out,” the distinction
between “Munich group” and “Vietnam group” is sometimes used to demar-
cate two groups of advocates in the Clinton administration (e.g., see Sciolino
1996; Dobbs 1999). The Vietnam group was represented by General Colin
Powell (later succeeded by General Henry H. Shelton), and the crux of policy
disagreement with the Munich group concerned the validity of the idea of
interdependent commitments in the post–Cold War world. As reported by
observers, “led by Gen. Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the commanders challenged in particular the ‘domino theory’ being
pressed in interagency discussions by Secretary of State Madeline K.
Albright” (Graham 1999, A01).

8. The following list gives examples of some of the representative literature
for each approach. Leading proponents of the global primacy or preponder-
ance approach include Nye (1990), Krauthammer (1990/91), Huntington

9. I distinguish between “hard” and “soft” versions of the strategy of selective engagements according to the concept of national interests upon which they are based. In its “hard” variant (e.g., Art 1990/91; Joffe 1995), this strategy considers national interests to be vital if tangible factors such as military and economic capacity, including the homeland territory, are affected. In the “soft” version of this strategy, national interests that warrant military involvements may also include nontangible issues such as humanitarian disasters or fostering the spread of democracy (Van Evera 1990/91; Art 1998/99).

10. There is a virtual consensus among the proponents of the strategy of selective engagement regarding which regions are of vital interest for the United States in the contemporary age. These are Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East (e.g., Art 1990/91; Joffe 1995; also Layne 1997, 94, but Layne, as an advocate of an “offshore balancing” strategy that oscillates between neoisolationism and selective engagement, identifies even this regional selectivity with the preponderance strategy). Surprisingly, the Western Hemisphere is omitted from their taxonomies of the regions vital to the United States, probably presuming that its relevance has always been implied since the Monroe Doctrine proclamation of 1823.

11. On Germany as a peer competitor to the U.S. role in Europe, see Art 1996. For Japan’s influence in East Asia, see Betts 1993/94. Unlike Betts, who limits the discussion to East Asia, Huntington (1996) considers Japan even as a global contender, because he also sees the primacy of international economy in current affairs.

12. Some analysts suggest that the major interest in these situations is to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon. As this study is only concerned with the relations between major powers, it does not analyze this type of policy recommendation.

13. Huntington (1993), for instance, foresees major competition occurring in the economic realm and, consequently, finds Japan to be a major potential challenger to U.S. interests.

APPENDIX B

1. Leopold von Ranke’s equally well-known German successor, Heinrich von Treitschke, provides a similar definition: “A state may be defined as a great power if its total destruction would require a coalition of other states to accomplish” (1916, 607).
APPENDIX C

1. As this project of trade data collection was close to completion, another trade data set appeared—International Trade Data 1870–1992 (Version 1.1) collected by Katherine Barbieri (http://pss.la.psu.edu/trd_data.htm). While this alternative data set is highly commendable for its attempt to collect information on trade exchanges between all states in the world, the data for most major powers, especially for the interwar period, are largely missing. Therefore, there is hardly any duplication between my data set and that collected by Barbieri for the interwar years. In addition, my more focused task of collecting data only for major powers’ trade exchanges with other states resulted in a much smaller amount of missing data than the other data sets for the postwar period. If one wished to analyze international trade flows for all states in the world, Barbieri’s data set is certainly a valuable source of information. On the other hand, if one wanted to focus on major powers and their trade with all other states in the world, then the trade data set in this book provides much fuller information than alternative sources.

APPENDIX D

1. Amemiya (1981), Maddala (1983), Greene (1997), and Long (1997) provide extensive surveys of modeling options for discrete choice variables. LIMDEP 7.0 and Stata 6.0 are the standard software of choice for estimating such models. Both software packages were used in this analysis as well.

2. It is not surprising, then, that the results of ordered probit tests were inconsistent for different ordinal scales of the deterrence outcomes.


4. None of the Hausman tests showed that the IIA assumption was problematic. See Zhang and Hoffman 1993 for computational details of specification tests for the IIA property.

5. In the LIMDEP manual, Greene (1997) suggests additional two alternatives: heteroscedastic extreme value and random parameters (mixed) logit models. At this stage, however, the routines are not completely developed for a substantive interpretation of the parameters in either model. As a result, empirical applications of these two modeling options are quite rare, difficult to find even in econometric studies. Some further modeling options might be explored in the future when they become more accessible through standard statistical software for discrete choice models (LIMDEP, Stata, SAS) with fully developed procedures for substantive interpretations of the parameters. For example, to incorporate strategic aspects of decision making, several studies used statistical methods such as the strategically censored discrete choice model developed by Smith (1999) or a model based on logit quantal response
equilibrium (Signorino 1999). Since these modeling proposals appeared only recently in the political science literature, it would be interesting to fully explore their potential for this or other data analysis in future research.