## Tables

2.1. Relative Shares of Major Powers in Total World Manufacturing Output 30
2.2. GDP Growth 30
2.3. Total Land Areas of Major Powers (Home Area, Colonies, and Mandates) as Percentage of World Surface 32
2.4. Relative Shares of Major Powers in Total World Trade 34
2.5. Major Powers and Global Contenders, 1895–1985 46
3.1. General Deterrence Failure/No Immediate Deterrence, Major Powers, 1895–1985 62
3.2. The Cases of Extended-Immediate Deterrence among Major Powers, 1895–1985 66
3.3. The Cases of Direct-Immediate Deterrence between Major Powers, 1895–1985 68
4.1. Percentage Distribution of the COW National Capability Index among Major Powers, 1895–1985 89
4.2. Descriptive Statistics for Relative Capabilities 93
4.3. The Impact of Relative Power on Deterrence Outcomes for All Major Powers, Multinomial Logit Models 94
4.4. Marginal Change in the Probability of Deterrence Outcomes for All Major Powers 95
4.5. Marginal Change in the Probability of Deterrence Outcomes for Global Contenders 96
5.1. Geopolitical Regions: Classification and Composition 113
5.2. Descriptive Statistics for Regional Salience in General Deterrence Failures 119
5.3. The Impact of Regional Interests on the Onset of Extended-Immediate Deterrence, Binomial Logit Coefficients 120
5.4. The Impact of Regional Interests on Deterrence Outcomes, Multinomial Logit Coefficients 122
5.5. Predicted Probabilities of Deterrence Outcomes 123
6.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Domestic Regime Variable 134
6.2. Domestic Regime and Deterrence Outcomes, Multinomial Logit Coefficients
6.3. Joint Regime Effects on the Probabilities of Deterrence Outcomes
7.1. The Impact of Regional Interests and Relative Power on the Onset of Extended-Immediate Deterrence
7.2. The Inherent Credibility Model of Deterrence Outcomes, Multinomial Logit Coefficients
7.3. The Impact of Regional Interests, Relative Power, and Domestic Regime on the Onset of Extended-Immediate Deterrence
7.4. The Expanded Inherent Credibility Model of Deterrence Outcomes, Multinomial Logit Coefficients
7.5. Predicted Probabilities from the Expanded Inherent Credibility Model
7.6. Descriptive Statistics for Past Behavior and Costly Signals
7.7. A Comparison of the Defender’s Past and Current Behavior
7.8. The Impact of Past Behavior and Costly Signals on Deterrence Outcomes, Multinomial Logit Coefficients
7.9. The Model of Intraregional Past Behavior, Multinomial Logit Coefficients
7.10. Marginal Impact of Past Behavior on the Probability of Deterrence Outcomes
7.11. The Full Model of Deterrence Outcomes, Multinomial Logit Coefficients
7.12. Marginal Change in the Probability of Deterrence Outcomes: Relative Potential of All Variables in Predicting Major Power Conflicts
B1. The Lists of Major Powers, 1895–current
B2. The Lists of Global Contenders, 1895–current
C1. Regional Distributions of Colonies
C2. Regional Distributions of Foreign Trade