Notes

The epigraph is taken from Burton 1931, 65.

1. To some degree this change was, to use a very handy piece of jargon, a *discursive* shift, one to be observed in written texts. I will, however, modify this claim later in this introduction.

2. The discovery of the “inner self” has been claimed for a variety of eras. Compare, for example, Phillip Cary’s evocatively titled *Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self* (2000). Foucault, as is well known, terms the inner self “man” in the final section of *The Order of Things* and, positing its invention in the Enlightenment, looks to its imminent demise.

3. The model for societal change that I am using is drawn, to some extent, from childhood developmental psychology. It would not be wide of the mark to state that I analogize the manic reaction to psychological trauma (the dominant mode, I suggest, in nonmedical literature before the Senecan era) with childhood (driven, I suggest, by the “centered,” “egocentric illusion”). Nor would it be wide of the mark to state that I analogize the depressive reaction to psychological trauma (the dominant mode, I suggest, in the nonmedical literature of the post-Senecan era) with adulthood. But that is as far as things should go. The movement from a manic to a depressive mode of consciousness could hardly be said to represent development or progress. It represents, merely, change. Proponents (in varying ways) of the childhood analogy (Lévy-Bruhl [1923], Piaget [1929, 1954], Dodds [1968], Snell [1953], or even Heidegger) usually highlight progress or decline. As should be apparent, I can see no progress or decline here, only change. Either mentality can easily court madness. I will have further explanatory and justificatory comments to make on this matter.

4. Kennell (1997) objects that he finds exceptions to my claims that vitiate their validity. Swain (1996) suggests that I have not surveyed all of the evidence (as if this were humanly possible). Both imply that I have not established historical truths or laws. This is not my intention. My aim is to establish discursive and heuristic patterns and tendencies. I must insist upon this: if several texts in discrete intellectual domains are using the same analytic method, then we have a discursive “truth” or, if one prefers, at least a heuristic tool.

5. Furthermore, the exceptions to my model of discursive change are evidence for the failure of any new paradigm to wholly erase its competitors by the achievement of discursive hegemony.


7. The social self can even be a “national” self; see Syed 1997 on the Roman self.


9. We moderns tend to correlate the thickening of the sense of self with the generic
dissolution of bonds entangling the individual within a wider network of social relations and duties.

10. We might conclude that various illnesses and physical interferences can erase the self. Other conditions (e.g., alcoholism) reduce the complexity and range of our identity to a slimmer, less flexible entity.

11. The Australian prime minister (1969–71) John Grey Gorton was once asked by an interviewer what sort of man he considered himself to be. In response to that query concerning his self, Gorton replied, “I am six feet high and weigh about 12 stone” (Mungo MacCallum, The Age, March 19, 2002). That response, I think, provides a useful commentary on some of the confusion and, dare I say it, the humbug associated with definitions of the self.

12. Donaldson (1978, 27) uses the terms self and self-awareness in much the same manner as I do here. Of the self of the child, she observes, “You cannot think of a universe of stable enduring things, moving around in space and time, unless you have made the crucial distinction between self and not-self by which you award things their independence—and at the same time achieve your own.”

13. The most powerful revision (with which I am familiar) of Piaget’s idea is Donaldson 1978. That I believe Donaldson’s admirable common sense is exaggerated should be apparent. I should detail here my objections to her formulation, if only because the societal model that I have adopted in this book owes some of its lineament to the Piagetian formulation. It appears to me that Donaldson creates a psychological model for the child that comes very close to representing it as a “little adult,” one who seems to be possessed of a conceptual and moral ability that is in many ways comparable to that of an adult. Donaldson seems to believe that if a conceptual or moral conundrum is put to a child in the right language (it must be “decentered,” or couched in a language that is not adult-centered), the child is capable of formulating a proper response. This argument seems to me to be somewhat strange. If a child’s command of language is so primitive that he or she cannot understand an adult’s formulation, must not the child’s conceptual and moral sense be comparably inchoate? (The development of a self-awareness that includes, nonegotistically, other individuals is surely to be linked with one’s increased linguistic ability and to the abilities of one’s linguistic system—not all languages were born equal; early Greek, e.g., is abstract poor.) Donaldson seems to me almost to make a straw man of Piaget. The belief that the “egocentric illusion” (as Piaget terms the child’s apparent inability of “making any distinction between himself and what is not himself”) consistently dominates a child’s psychology up until the age of approximately seven, then vanishes (which view is imputed to Piaget) seems to me to be odd. The movement away from any “egocentric illusion” ought to be gradual: such an illusion, thus, would be very powerful in the neonate but nearly or completely nonexistent in the seven-year-old. I have a little more to say on the development of the child’s psychology in the next note.

14. An interesting report in Toronto’s Globe and Mail (Abraham 2001) suggested that very young children more frequently use the deep, older structures of the brain, those associated with instinct. Older children appear to display more activity in the prefrontal cortex, the brain’s “chair for controlling impulses.” The child’s immediate sense of identification with the world, we could paraphrase, is disrupted, or becomes subject to an alienation, through this prefrontal cortex.
15. Sanity and madness can be readily understood by contemplating these boundaries of the self. If the boundaries between an individual and the world about are insufficiently firm, the response can resemble something close to a manic exaltation or a mystic afflatus. If the boundaries are too watertight, then an individual runs the risk of an internal dialogue that in its solipsism resembles autism. Madness exists at either extreme. Sanity—Horace’s *aurea mediocritas*—sits somewhere in the middle.

16. Foucault, at least in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), uses the term *discursive* of essentially written networks. Wiles (1997), like many others, apparently has broadened the notion to include speech as it is practiced in a particular culture. James Davidson, in the introduction to his *Courtesans and Fishcakes* (1997), provides a very readable and sensible explanation of the term *discourse.*

17. My colleague Dr. Hanne Sigismund Nielsen has described depression to me as a “drive” (rather like lust or gluttony, I suppose). This seems to me to be a very helpful way of conceptualizing melancholia. The “drive” represented by melancholia directs itself toward the striking of an equilibrium between the two poles of the autistic self-absorption represented by mania and its melancholic opposite. Depression, at least in its milder form, aims to assert the autonomy of the self against these polar dangers. In this controversial mode of understanding, I take heart from a curious report in *Calgary Herald* (Trueman 2002) of a study from a “current” issue of the *American Journal of Geriatric Psychology* by a researcher from Duke University, Dan Blazer. Older women with mild depression “are likely to live longer than their non-depressed neighbours,” the research report argues. Trueman explains: “[Blazer’s] research followed a group of 2,401 women and 1,269 men, all over the age of 65. The group was ranked on a scale from ‘depressed,’ ‘mildly depressed,’ to ‘not depressed’ . . . Over an 11-year period, from 1986 to 1997, the women who were ‘mildly depressed’ were 60 per cent less likely to die during any three year interval.”

CHAPTER 1

1. For a recent discussion of this pot and a related series of pottery representations (with bibliography) see Shapiro 1994, 142–48.

2. Shapiro (1994, 146) describes Orestes’ expression as one of “quiet reverie.”

3. Compare the face of this Fury with that of the mourning woman produced as figure 3 in chapter 3. The mouth, the eyes, and the tilt of the head all seem to match. This, I think, helps us in turn to interpret the mood projected by Orestes.

4. Two of the Furies are awake because Clytemnestra (whose form is partly visible at the top left) is rousing them.

5. Shapiro (1994, 147) states, “the third Fury emerging out of the earth can be read as a learned allusion to their chthonic nature.”

6. The frontal depiction of the Fury in the bottom corner of the picture does not allow the representation of emotions. But note the slight downturn of the mouth and the position of the left arm, which, minus the sword, matches that of Orestes.

7. See *LIMC* s.v. “Orestes” for a discussion of this pot and some of the matters I am raising here.

8. Psychiatric literature describes this form of melancholy as a “mixed state.” See the
now classic discussions of Kraepelin 1921, chapter 6 and pp. 106 (on “manic stupor”) and 107 (on depression with “flight of ideas”). On this aspect of the illness see also Koukopoulos and Koukopoulos 1999; Goodwin and Jamison 1990.

9. Kraepelin (1921, 107) describes the woman as follows: “In the rigid expression of countenance of the patient who always remains standing on the same spot, the constraint can be distinctly recognized, which for many months has dominated her and made her dumb. But at the same time, there appeared in the almost invincible tendency to destructiveness and filthy habits, the fundamental feature of the disorder, which in the adornment of torn-off leaves and twigs is recognized also in the picture.”

10. The painting of Orestes exhibits, however, none of the same hostility. We must make allowances for the fact that in the case of Kraepelin’s patient, one is dealing with clinical insanity, rather than with an artist’s conceptualization of the illness.

11. I can see no indication of a comparable depiction of illness in Aeschylus’s version, to which our poet is most indebted. Aeschylus seems to take Orestes’ madness for granted and allows the Furies to corporealize it without an indication of comparable symptoms in Orestes.

12. Translations are normally my own. Where they are not, they are taken from the relevant (if reliable) Loeb editions.

13. For a description of this type of manic behavior in a context of the manic-depressive illness see Kraepelin 1921, 28–31.

14. The distinction is made very clearly by Kraepelin (1921, 36), who describes the exhaustion that necessarily follows a manic episode. See also Kraepelin 1921, 73: “very often after the disappearance of manic excitement a more or less marked condition of weakness appears, which is generally regarded as exhaustion after the severe illness.”

15. Epilepsy and melancholia can be linked. The connection between the two was “an idea which appears in the Epidemics of Hippocrates (6.8.31) and which was accepted by all ancient doctors” (Ullmann 1978, 75). Ullmann cites in support Temkin 1971, index s.v. “melancholy.” Add Goodwin and Jamison 1990, 116–17. See too the discussion of Cydippe’s symptoms in chapter 2 and the linking of Heracles’ melancholia to this in Problema 30.1. See also Jacques 1998, 224.

16. For a brief discussion of mania and delusion see Kraepelin 1921, 65.

17. I suppose that genre plays its part: tragedy, that is, focuses on the “political.” This is, however, only true in part, for the very existence of Euripidean characters such as Orestes points to a tradition straining against the bounds of the apparently “political” basis of the genre.

18. Perhaps the emotions expressed by the Eumenides Painter’s pot would be best rendered in personal poetry (they eventually are rendered, to some extent, in Catullus’s poem 76 in the sixties B.C.E.).

19. Compare Flashar 1966, 47 for this definition; Flashar cites the Hippocratic treatise Epidemics 6.23 [4.568.11.f.L].

20. This position is improbably maintained in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1977), where it is suggested that “depression and Oedipus are agencies of the state” (xx). The representation of melancholia receives a comparable straitjacket from Schiesari (1992), who attempts to make the term gender-defined. Melancholia (which is far more than an appropriated male version of depression) knows no gender boundaries in antiquity, in experi-
ence or literature. The desire to associate melancholia or depression with capitalism or phallocentrism is both mendacious and ahistorical.

21. For a survey of the shifting perceptions of madness through history, looking at literary texts and the history of medicine, see Thiher 1999.

22. Depression can be bipolar, exhibiting at different times active hilarity (or violent aggressive behavior) or passive (regressive) “depression.” On the Democritean tradition of the laughing melancholic see Rütten 1992.

23. The basis of this physiology seems to represent an earlier version of the Galenic humoral theory (Jackson 1986, 30).

24. Solomon (2001, 196) notes that PET (positron emission tomography) scans produce an image of the depressed and manic brain that curiously echoes this Hippocratic speculation. The depressed brain shows up as literally blue, the manic as yellow and orange and red.

25. Griesinger (1845; note also Marneros and Angst 2000 passim) described “seasonally affective disorders” and, like the Hippocratics, noted that melancholia may begin in autumn and winter, mania in spring.


27. On melancholy and the Hippocratic writers see Müri 1953 and, more generally, Smith 1979; compare Neuberger 1909.


29. There is something to be said for the view of Lewis (1971, 73) on writers such as Aristotle/Theophrastus: “it is proposed to abstain here from those citations out of nonmedical writers and discussions about the madness of famous personages, from Hercules onwards, which are common in articles of this kind, but belong less to the history of psychiatry than to its belles-lettre.”

30. A recent discussion of this passage is contained in Rütten 1992. See also Roussel 1988; Van der Eijk 1990.

31. There was a tradition linking melancholia with inspiration. It is associated with Democritus of Abdera (see Rütten 1992; Padel 1995) but relies on the link between mania and melancholy. Plato, in the Phaedrus, had spoken of the prophetic capacities of mania. These, it appears, were transferred to melancholia, insofar as this is identified with mania. The confusion may have been accidentally strengthened by Problema 30.1, which stresses the link between intellectual acumen and melancholia.

32. This bipolarity is acknowledged elsewhere in ancient thought. The following passage on the bipolarity of emotion comes from Seneca Epistles 92.8.

\[
\text{inrationalis pars animi duas habet partes, alteram animosam, ambitiosam, inpoten-
\text{tem, positam in adfectionibus, alteram humilem, languidam, voluptatibus deditam;
illam effrenatam, miliorem tamen, certe fortiorum ac digniorum viro reliquerunt,
hanc necessariam beate vitae putaverunt, et enervem et abiectam. Huic rationem
servire iussurunt . . .}
\]
[the irrational portion of the soul has two parts, one animated, ambitious, violent, and seated in the emotions, the other lowly, languid, and given to pleasure; the former, though uncontrolled, provides a man with a better, bolder, and more worthy nature; the latter, necessary for the good life, [philosophers] consider to be weak and lowly. They have ordered reason to serve the latter . . .]

33. Jamison (1999, 200) notes that “most people who suffer from depression . . . do not kill themselves.” Kraepelin (1921, 78) is as illuminating as ever. He divides depressives into a number of categories (melancholia simplex, stupor, melancholia gravis, paranoid melancholia, etc.). Only melancholia simplex, if I understand things correctly, exists in a unipolar state. It is what we term, popularly, as depression. Of this condition, Kraepelin writes: “just because of this severe volitional disorder [sc., melancholia simplex] it relatively seldom comes to more serious attempts at suicide, although the wish to die very frequently occurs. It is only when with the disappearance of inhibition energy returns while the depression still continues, that the attempts at suicide become more frequent and dangerous.”

34. Sophocles’ character Philoctetes, in the play of the same name, is sometimes accused of suffering depression or at least a severe form of boredom. He deserves comparison. See Kuhn 1976; compare Worman 2000.

35. Books such as Jamison’s Touched with Fire (1993) tread a thin line between the sensational and the scientific.


37. Rufus’s influence on Arabic medicine, especially as this relates to melancholy, appears to have been considerable (Ullmann 1978, 72–78).

38. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl (1964, 49) quotes a fragment of Rufus in Latin to support this: illi sunt qui subtilis ingenii et multae perspicationis, de facili incidunt in melancholicas, eo quod sunt velocis motus et multae praemeditationis et imaginationis [those who are of subtle ability and of great insight, easily become melancholy, in that [their characters] are swift, full of foresight and imagination].

39. For a discussion of Celsus and a bibliography see Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl 1964, 45 f. The authors point out that Celsus bases his work on that of Asclepiades of Bithynia, who came to Rome in 91 B.C.E. and went on to become a friend of Cicero (cf. Vallance 1990). Jackson (1986, 33) believes that Celsus may have been influenced by humoral theory.

40. Soranus survives in a Latin translation made at the end of the fourth century by Caélius Aurelianus (De morbis acutis et chronicis). For a text see Drabkin 1950.

41. Drabkin (1950, 561) quotes the text: melancholia dicta, quod nigra fella aegrotantibus saepe per vomitum veniant . . . et non, ut plerique existimant, quod passionis causa vel generatio nigra sit [sint] fella; hoc enim est aestimantium magis quam videntium veritatem, vel potius falsum, sicut in aliis ostendimus.

42. There is a useful, though aged, text and translation of Aretæus by Adams (1856).
43. Siegel (1973, 273) asserts that it is mistaken to see bipolarity in Aretaeus’s descriptions. Such a claim seems to fly in the face of Aretaeus’s own words.

44. Marneros and Angst (2000) provide a most illuminating historical overview of interpretations of bipolar illness and, in so doing, demonstrate Aretaeus’s honorable place within this history.

45. For literature on Galen see the next note, plus Siegel 1968 and Temkin 1973. Smith (1979, 66 ff.) discusses the relation of Galen to the Hippocratic writings.


47. Rosen (1968, 92–94) offers useful comments on the colloquial use of the term mania in Greece and Rome. See too Müri 1953, 38.

48. Jacques (1998) makes the fascinating deduction that the verb melancholan is older in usage than the noun melancholia. The former, then, suggests anger and mania (being “mad at someone,” in our sense); the latter—developing under the pressure of medical speculation, perhaps—suggests depression.

49. Padel (1995, 48 n. 3) offers parallels from Aristophanes (Birds 14; Wealth 12, 364–66, 903).

50. Padel (1995, 48 n. 3) offers other parallels from Menander (Samia 218; Epitrepontes 217, 560–61) and from Plautus (Amphitryo 727; Captivi 596).

51. Athamas is characterized as violent at Ovid Metamorphoses 4.416 ff., as is Ajax at Metamorphoses 13.1 ff. Orestes appears in this manner in Horace Satires 2.3.137 ff. (Varro wrote a logistoricus entitled Orestes de insania [Rawson 1985, 287]. The ancient source is Aulus Gellius 13.4.1.) Alcmaeon, like Ajax, murdered his mother and suffered in much the same fashion (Euripides wrote an Alcmaeon). On Ajax, see the discussion later in this chapter.

52. Goodwin and Jamison (1990) add Herod the Great to the list.

53. Useful for this play and for the Heracles tradition generally is Galinsky 1972. More precisely on Heracles melancholicus is Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1959, 92–95. For an interrelation of Hippocratic theories of black bile and of tragedy (and of Aristotle) see Tate 1937. See also Yoshitake 1994.

54. The quote is from Collinge 1962, 48. Bond (1981, 309) seems to share this verdict. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff’s theories of “megalomania” may be equally wide of the mark; see Bond 1981, xix and n. 9. Comparable language is used, for example, of Creon’s daughter—no melancholic—after the application of Medea’s poison (Medea 1173 ff.).

55. Depiction of this manic melancholia is furthermore constrained by the conceptual force of Heracles and his madness within the drama. One plausible type of interpretation for the play is to maintain that its logic is to exhibit the moral change that takes place within its hero. (Typical exemplars of this “humanistic” interpretation of the play are Chalk 1962; Conacher 1967, 78–90; and Simon 1978, 130–39. Conacher includes within this critical tendency the remarks on the play by Kitto in his Greek Tragedy. This position is criticized by Adkins [1966, 193 ff.] and implicitly by Bond [1981, xiii ff.].) Previously valuing an aretê based upon lineage and simple physical ability, Heracles learns, through the madness visited upon him by Juno, an aretê of the spirit. Heracles assimilates a spirit of perseverance and, with this, a type of internal heroism and fortitude.
56. Seneca’s version of the legend is also delimited by the same constraints. Hercules’ condition, if melancholic, is to be interpreted as manic. (Seneca’s Hercules is related to that of Virgil.) The *atrum fel* of this passage is usually taken to mean melancholia. It is firmly within the pseudo-Aristotelian tradition of melancholia as mania. Seneca does not name Hercules’ condition, but when, at *Hercules Furens* 939 ff., madness comes upon the hero, it is described in atrabilious terms (analogized with darkness, confusion, etc.: so we read the words *tenebrae, obscuro nube, diem fugat, nox atrum caput*, etc.). Compare Heracles’ similar comments (vv. 867 ff.) in Euripides’ play. The function of the madness in the play is primarily of a symbolic nature. (Hercules’ madness in Seneca’s play is thus provided with a clear etiology. This is not the case for Euripides’ hero.) In Seneca’s *Hercules furens* Juno blights a hero driven not by divine caprice but by a resentment of the violence with which he pursues his claims (vv. 1–124)—especially that of reaching heaven (vv. 89–91). In one sense Hercules represents the life of overweening ambition—to be contrasted with the life of tranquillity urged by the play’s first choral ode (cf. vv. 192–201; contrast the light imagery of this ode with the darkness associated with his madness). His madness, because of his violence and lack of Stoic calm, is in a sense another example of his moral failing. It is, as Galinsky suggests (1972, 170; cf. Pratt 1983, 24 f.), “the logical consequence of his will.” The Hercules in this play contrasts dramatically with the eponymous hero of *Hercules Oetaeus*. The latter is a powerful portrait of the idealized Stoic hero who, like Seneca in Tacitus’s description of his death, understands *bene mori*. The theme of madness is not, however, apparent in this play. Nor is there any reference to the sores mentioned in the *Problema*. The madness of Heracles is as symbolic in Seneca as it is in Euripides. Melancholy is of the manic variety described in the *Problema*, in spite of the fact that current medical opinion—Celsus, for example—interpreted the condition as essentially depressive. Can it be assumed, then, that the determinants for Seneca’s conception of Hercules are those of Euripides and, above all, the *Problema*?

57. Plutarch’s interest in humoral theory can be observed elsewhere. In *Alexander* 4 Plutarch ascribes the pleasant odor of Alexander’s body to the heat of his blood. This would also imply, under the humoral scheme of things, that Alexander was choleric. Plutarch does point this out. Ian Worthington points out to me that elsewhere Alexander was accused of being subject to melancholia. So Ephippus (*FGrH* 126 F 5 = Athenaeus 12.537e–538b) notes: “And Alexander used to have the floor sprinkled with exquisite perfumes and with fragrant wine; and myrrh was burnt before him, and other kinds of incense; and all the bystanders kept silence, or spoke only words of good omen, out of fear. For he was a very violent man, with no regard for human life; for he appeared to be a man of a melancholic constitution.” (Ephippus, something of a scandalmonger with a great interest in Alexander’s drinking habits and divine pretensions, was a contemporary of Alexander’s.) Ephippus’s understanding of melancholia is clearly of the traditional, popular, mania-based sort.

58. References from Plutarch to Lysander’s anger and violence occur at *Lysander* 19 (to his cruelty [*chalepotês*]), 22, and 27 (to his anger). An interesting parallel for Lysander is provided by Diodorus Siculus’s depiction of Dionysius of Syracuse (15.7.2–3). Dionysius, an enthusiast for poetry, had his own work performed at Olympia. This was received with derision. The experience seems to have unhinged him. Diodorus says that in his madness he came to suspect his friends of plotting against him. He slew many of them. (Diodorus describes him as *maniôdês* and as suffering from a *hyperbolê lupês*. The term *melancholê* is not used however.) Madness, therefore, is associated with extreme violence.

60. If Bellerophon had lived in the late nineteenth century, his condition would have been diagnosed as fugue (Hacking 1998). Fugue was an apparently faddish hysterical (or melancholic) condition that caused its victims to wander excessively, without resource, over much of Europe or even further. The psychological malaise appeared suddenly and, according to Hacking, disappeared as suddenly. We are not dealing here with an invented or culturally constructed psychological condition (in much the same way as depression has occasionally been argued to have been invented or culturally constructed). That Bellerophon may well have been a victim of fugue points to the longevity and persistence of the illness. What changes is not so much the existence of the illness as the willingness of the contemporary literary and discursive climate to accommodate it and, most importantly, to encourage its communicability by publicizing it. We will encounter such matters again in my later chapters on acedia and on suicide.

61. Naturally there is more to this madness than a mere clinical portrait. It does have a symbolic import. Winnington-Ingram (1980, 11–56), for example, convincingly links Ajax’s madness with a lack of mental balance, self-knowledge, and sophrosynê. It was the lack of these qualities, he argues, that nullified his preeminent aretê. In the imbalance between aretê and sophrosynê, highlighted by the madness brought on by Athena, consists Ajax’s tragedy. Such symbolic understandings of the madness do nothing, however, to diminish the purpose and force of what may have been to contemporary eyes an accurate clinical portrait.


63. Some other discussions of Ajax’s madness and its contemporary medical basis are Harries 1891; Miller 1944; Mattes 1970; Ferrini 1978; Hartigan 1987. (I owe this reference to Cerri 2000, 251 n. 37.)

64. Let us leave Ajax and return to the Problema and to its anger and melancholy. There is a final trio of characters mentioned in the Problema: Empedocles, Plato, and Socrates. Here is what the text says (trans. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl [1964, 19]):

Among the heroes many others evidently suffered in the same way, and among men of recent times Empedocles, Plato, and Socrates, and numerous other well known men, and also most of the poets. For many such people have bodily diseases as the result of this kind of temperament; some of them only a clear constitutional tendency towards such affictions, but to put it briefly, all of them are, as has been said before, melancholics by constitution.

There is little that can be profitably made of these assertions. The biographical tradition of these philosophers is too unreliable. It might be worth observing, however, that if Aristoxenus were correct in saying that Socrates, if contradicted, could fly into anger and violent language (alluded to by Guthrie [1969, 70]. The ancient source is Wehrli 1945, fr. 54), and if Diogenes Laertius were correct in stating that Empedocles perished by leaping into Mt. Aetna (Vita Empedoclis 8.2.69), there might be some grounds for the speculation of pseudo-Aristotle (another more scientific link is offered by Flashar [1966, 57 n. 14]). But, in a sense, all that is beside the point, for it is quite clear that the common denominator between these characters and those that we have already examined is mania. Depression plays an unimportant role in their conditions. Their illnesses were characterized above all by anger
and violence. Despite the understanding of the bipolarity of melancholia that the Problema displays, its preferred illustrations reflect the popular understanding of melaina cholē as a violent, angry, and mania-driven sickness (for a discussion of the origins of the equation of melancholē with mania see Müri 1953, 34–38).

65. There may be more to this than mere discursive privilege. Kraepelin (1921, 171) voices something most of us suspect, that premodern societies experience more mania than depression. Kraepelin asserts that this was the case among nineteenth-century Javanese. This claim is treated with caution, however, by Goodwin and Jamison (1990, 179, 181). They note that Tan 1977 supports Kraepelin’s conjecture.

66. I take this idea of the “epiphenomenon” from Hacking 1998 (see also Toohey 1999b). It means that in the case of an illness such as manic depression, some societies or groups will privilege one or another manifestation and, in their speech, diagnosis, or description, declare the other a mere epiphenomenon. This downgrades and skews the mode by which we understand, socially, the true state of the illness.

67. For a discussion of self-consciousness focusing primarily on Greek literature, philosophy in particular, see Oehler 1997.

68. Beye (1982, 81) says of Jason that “his leave-taking is marked by a melancholia which distinguishes him from his exuberant fellow crewmen.” Beye (183 n. 8) cites the support of Couat 1931, claiming that melancholia is an “emotional attitude common to the poem.” Couat (1931, 337 n. 2) cites the following passages as indicative of the emotional attitude: 1.1172 ff.; 2.541 ff., 1001 ff.; 3.291 ff., 744 ff.; 4.1062 ff.

69. The deposition of Jason’s lugubrious disposition finds parallels in the marked tendency of Theocritean lovers, especially the male ones, for pining and wasting and suicide under pressure. More discussion on this topic will be provided in the next chapter.

70. Heracles’ anger at the loss of Hylas is expressed by Apollonius in language redolent of the manic phase of melancholia. At 1.1262 Heracles’ kelainon haima is said to have boiled hypo splangchnois. Hercules is the old type of hero. It is fitting that he should suffer an “old” illness.

71. The term katêphioôn is often used in contexts relating to a very “depressed” state of mind. On amêchaniê see Green 1997, 39.

72. At 4.1279 all of the Argonauts (Jason included) are said again to be in a similar state.

73. This translation and those that immediately follow are adapted from Green 1997.

74. For the mournful reaction of Achilles to Patroclus’s death, see, for example, Iliad 18.22 ff.

75. Indecision and depressive behavior on Jason’s part are more pronounced in books 1 and 2. In book 3 and to a lesser extent in book 4, the focus is on Medea. This may have blurred the presentation of Jason’s personality. Anyhow, he now has Medea’s help, especially in the scene of the contests at the end of book 3.

76. Compare Odysseus’s far more positive reaction to disaster in the Aeolus episode of Odyssey 11. For a different evaluation of Jason’s character see Hunter 1993.

77. Not all of Soranus’s qualities of a melancholic are present. There is no animosity toward members of the household. (Notice, however, the peculiar simile used of Jason’s mother at 1.268 ff.) Nor are there conflicting desires to live and to die. Idmon, who often acts as a doublet for Jason, perhaps avers to the latter theme at 1.440–44. He is referring mournfully to the danger of death far away from home, in a strange land.
78. Green (1997, 39) makes some suggestive remarks concerning the melancholic tone of the *Argonautica* as a whole: “judged by these criteria, Jason’s much debated ‘inadequacy’ or ‘resourcelessness’ (*amêchaniê*), far from being a flaw (tragic or not) could be interpreted as a realistic acceptance of man’s limitations—a view supported by the constant subversion of the poem’s initial heroic optimism.” Green goes on to cite Pike (1993, 29) with approval: “heroic promise is constantly cast into shadow by what can only be called a negative, melancholy, almost ’autumnal’ tone.”

79. The relationship between *aegritudo animi* and depression is examined by Michel (1993).

80. The Stoics had much to say of considerable interest on emotions (*de affectibus*). Cicero reflects this tradition. The material relating to this fascinating tradition can be found in *SVF* 3.92 ff. The term to look for above all is *lypê*, the equivalent of Cicero’s *aegritudo* (for a useful list of the types of *lypê* see *SVF* 3.151, 12). What disappoints in these Stoic discussions, as it does in Cicero, is the equation of mental illness with moral infirmity. Cicero and Horace and Seneca regularly preach this line (see *SVF* 3.167ff.). It is related to what Mayer (1994, 93–94) terms the Stoic analogy between physical and moral health. Mayer (94) cites as exemplifying this analogy Horace *Epistles* 1.28–32, 33, 36, 37, 101, 108; 2.33–37; 6.28–29; 16.21, 40, 101. I notice a vigorous criticism of this kind of pernicious moralism (which dogged ancient thought) in Caelius Aurelianus’s discussion of mania (trans. Drabkin [1950, 541]): “Those who imagine that the disease [*mania*] is chiefly an affection of the soul and only secondarily of the body are mistaken. For no philosopher has ever ever set forth a successful treatment for this disease; moreover, before the mind is affected, the body itself shows visible symptoms.”

81. Comparable definitions are provided at *Tusculan Disputations* 3.16–19, 22–23.

82. The link between somatic and psychological conditions fascinates. Grief could be expressed as a physiological illness: so in the Hippocratic *Epidemics* (3.15) there is a woman from Thasos, the wife of Delearces, who develops a high fever from grief.

83. This occurs in Freud’s *Mourning and Melancholy*. Julia Kristeva (1987) and Melanie Klein continue the tradition.

84. In 58, Cicero’s year of exile, he describes his condition in terms of mourning (*dies non modo non levat luctum, hunc sed etiam auget* [the passing of time does not alleviate grief but makes it worse]. His mourning of his daughter Tullia is expressed in comparable manner (*itaque solitudinem sequor*—precisely the course of action followed by the melancholy Bellerophon at *Tusculans* 3.63.)

85. In chapter 3 we will look at Lucretius *On the Universe* 3.1060–67, a passage that contemplates the ennui-ridden life of the Roman aristocrat who tires of being at home, goes out, then returns again dissatisfied. Lucretius does not attribute this restlessness to anything as trivial as ennui. He believes that the aristocrat is attempting to escape his fear of death. Does Lucretius therefore provide evidence of how trivial such actions may have seemed. Is this why Cicero may have ignored them?

86. See Pigeuad 1981 on the opinions of the other Stoics on madness—they, too, favor a simple causation for this illness. See *SVF* 3.92 ff.

87. The manic form of melancholia can appear in Horace. Is the mad poet at the end of the *Ars poetica* a melancholic?

88. Porphyrio, glossing Horace’s *use of* the term, suggests a Greek parallel in *lethargia*. 
Lethargy and sluggishness seem to be the usual implications of the term (Seneca *Epistles* 82.19.7, 88.19.3, 115.7.2). Catullus uses it at 17.24 of an old man (*nunc eum volo de tuo / ponte mittere pronum, si pote stolidum repente excitare veternum . . .* [now I’d like to throw you headfirst from your bridge, if it were possible to wake up suddenly a leaden, *veternus* victim . . .]).

89. The *Oxford Latin Dictionary* glosses *Veternus* it as a “morbid state of torpor or lassitude.”

90. Seneca’s *De tranquillitate animi* and its addressee, Marcus Annaeus Serenus, victim of *fluctuatio animi*, falls within this Horatian tradition. I will defer discussion of this key text until chapter 3 and its survey of boredom. There is no “sorrow without cause” in Serenus’s instance.

91. I use the name *Persius* with full knowledge of the various offenses I have committed, biographical, historical, deconstructive, intertextual, and otherwise. The literature on the use of the persona in Roman satire is large and often dispiriting. It is simplest to call the authorial voice Persius, and for all we know, it might be. We are listening, at any rate, to a poet with an interest in philosophy (cf. Hooley’s intertextual “authorless” reading [1997]). The Persius that I find most stimulating is the old-fashioned one of Antonio La Penna (1995; see also Toohey 1997b).

The best commentary on this poem is still that of Conington (1893). Jenkinson’s translation (1980) is extremely helpful. Harvey’s commentary is useful but is rather on the Olympian side for my tastes: *Satires* 3 is a very hard poem to translate and to construe and requires a more pedestrian explication.

The allocation of lines to speakers, I take it, is as follows (following Jenkinson 1980): Persius, 1–4; Friend, 5–6; Persius, 6–7; Friend, 7–8; Persius, 8–14; Friend, 15–43; Persius, 44–47; Friend, 48–51; Persius, 52–55; Friend, 56–106; Persius, 107–9; Friend, 109–18. For a different set of allocations see, e.g., Reckford 1998. Morford’s no-frills paraphrase (1984) is also very instructive.

92. If we must have intertexts for this poem, then, pace Hooley (1997), perhaps they lie in the remarkable manipulation of authorial persona as it is achieved by Horace in *Epistles* 1 or, particularly, in the characterization of Serenus by Seneca in *De tranquillitate animae* 2.6–15. Horace and Seneca are discussed in chapter 2.

93. On Persius’s apparent penchant for the melancholic see Squillante 1995.

94. That the illness is of a psychological variety is stressed by periodical references to inwardness. See v. 30: “I know you inside and out” [*ego te intus et in cute novi*].


96. Persius is again relying on Horace *Satires* 2.3.137 ff. On medical references in Persius see Lachenbacher 1937.

97. Jenkinson (1980) understands this as referring to some form of blistering in the skin. The text seems to me to be inconclusive on this matter and to aim to link more with the imagery of swelling. Were blisters involved, however, the condition might have a melancholic parallel in the sores attributed to those other two melancholics, Heracles and Lysander, at least as they are depicted in the *Problema*.

98. For a brief and recent discussion of hellebore and an attempt to provide a botanical distinction for white hellebore see Amigues 1999. Amigues also has a useful bibliography on the plant (8 n. 6) and cites the discussion of Pliny 25.47.61 on the plant.
99. The effects of hellebore could be gruesome. Aretaeus speaks of the need to accustom a patient to the drug because of the paroxysms it induces. Here is Aretaeus’s description of these effects (Adams 1856, 465):

In the interval between each remedy, the patient is to be supported, in order that he may be able to endure what is to be given in the intermediate periods. The patient is to be assisted during the paroxysms thus: the legs are to be bound above the ankles and knees; and the wrists, and the arms below the shoulders at the elbows. The head is to be bathed with rose-oil and vinegar; but in the oil we must boil wild-thyme, cow-parsnip, ivy, or something such. Friction of the extremities and face. Smelling to vinegar, penny-royal, and mint, and these things with vinegar. Separation of the jaws, for sometimes the jaws are locked together; and tonsils to be tickled to provoke vomiting; for by the discharge of phlegm they are sometimes roused from their gloom. These things, then, are to be done, in order to alleviate the paroxysms and dispel the gloomy condition.

100. On the medical imagery of the poem see Reckford 1998.

101. Celsus states: “now quartan fevers have simpler characteristics. Nearly always they begin with shivering, then heat breaks out, and the fever having endured, there are two free days; thus on the fourth it recurs.”

102. “Quartan fever has its highest incidence in the autumn and in those between the ages of twenty-five and forty-five. This is the time of life when the body is most subject to black bile, and the autumn is the corresponding time of year. If quartan fever occurs at any other time of the year, or at any other age, you may be sure that it will not be chronic unless some other malady be present” (Lloyd 1978, 271).

103. Depression in real life, as we have seen, no doubt was common. Within different literary traditions the condition may appear at different times. In the Hebrew tradition, for example, Antiochus IV is pictured in 164 B.C.E. (at I Maccabees 5.68.8) suffering from what is clearly something like depression (the Greek term is arrôstia). The passage runs as follows: “and it happened that when the king heard these words, he was astounded and distressed and fell on his bed, and fell into despondency [arrôstia] because of his grief [lupê; Goldstein [1976] translates this anachronistically as “melancholy”], because it did not come about for him as he had intended. And he was there for many days, because the great grief kept on at him, and he thought that he was dying.” As we will see in later chapters, his symptoms are reproduced in later Greek contexts. One might also wish, in this context, to compare Ecclesiastes.

104. If there is a reason for the appearance and disappearance of these conditions, it may well be what is suggested by David Konstan (1997) in his piece on public versus private in monarchical states. The necessity of public toadyng (think of Callimachus’s verse on Berenice or Theocritus’s praise poems for Ptolemy) can cause individuals to privilege the private and all that it stands for. This may in turn register itself, in the literary sphere at any rate, as the preference for the depiction of a variety of passive, affective conditions, among which melancholy could be placed.

105. See Kraepelin 1921, 171; note also Tan 1977. Compare, however, Goodwin and Jamison 1990, 179, 181.

106. Jamison (1993, 46) provides the following quote from Shelley that well illustrates mixed-state melancholia—its outward calm and inner turmoil:
There would I stretch my languid frame
Beneath the wild wood’s gloomiest shade,
And try to quench the ceaseless flame
That on my withered vitals preyed;
Would close mine eyes and dream I were
On some remote and friendless plain,
And long to leave existence there,
If with it I might leave the pain
That with a finger cold and lean
Wrote madness on my withering mein.

107. I am not speaking here of the moralistic, Socratic, “Know thyself” type of “self-awareness.” I am speaking of the sort of self-awareness a child feels when he or she notes the chasm between himself or herself and the world about. This is a sense of interiority that, at its crudest level, distinguishes most humans from animals.

CHAPTER 2

1. Erwin Rohde (1914, 157 n. 2) lists the symptoms of lovesickness. Nussbaum (1994, 143–44) flattens the historical experience of love, but, as always, in a fresh and provocative manner: “obsession, madness, attempted escape, suicide—all the ingredients of romantic/erotic love are there, ingredients that have provided the plot of love stories from Aeneid Book 4 to the Sorrows of Young Werther—and of countless stories both before and after these.”

2. Persuasion is the first route to follow according to Amores 2.3.17: optius at fuerit precibus temptasse [it would be better to try with pleading]. See too Amores 2.1.22 and 23–28, 2.17, and, perhaps, Anio’s pleas at 3.6.53 ff. Compare also Amores 1.3. In general see Gross 1985; Toohey 1997a.

3. This pattern is seen most neatly when divine amours are the subject of poetic attention. The god usually indulges in a small amount of persuasion, then, at the least signs of resistance, rapes the object of his desire. See Amores 3.6 (Anio and Ilia [e.g., vv. 81–82]; compare Metamorphoses 1.490 ff. [Apollo and Daphne] and Ars Amatoria 1.703–4); compare Pindar Olympian 1 and the story of Pelops and Poseidon. The tale of Romulus and the Sabine women at Ars amatoria 1.101–34 offers a human version. (Cf. Fantham 1975.) I presume the violence of Amores 1.7 is to be seen in this light, as may well that of 2.5.45–46. Perhaps the best, albeit most cynical, example is the advocating of the use of force at Ars amatoria 1.673–722. Compare also Plutarch Eroticus 751D, 768B.

4. On age see Ibycus 287; Anacreon 358 Campbell. On death compare Aegialeus, the old fisherman of Xenophon of Ephesus’s Ephesian Tale 5.1, who keeps his dead wife, Thelxinoe, embalmed in his house (note Propertius 4.7; Ovid Amores 3.9.15–16). On distance see Horace Odes 3.7; Propertius 4.3; Ovid Amores 2.16 (cf. 2.11). On conclusive rejection see Ovid Amores 3.11A, 11B, 12, 14; seemingly 1.12. On physical infirmity see Ovid Amores 3.7.

5. See Ovid Ars amatoria 1.283 ff., 2.373 ff. Virgil’s Dido and Apollonius’s Medea,
when rejected, present other instances, as do the persuasive exempla with which Gyges is plied in Horace *Odes* 3.7.


7. The overwhelming impression created by Cyrino (1995) in her survey of lovesickness in early Greek poetry is of the violence associated with the onset and effects of eros. Eros is violent and makes its victims violent. The only exceptions seem to be Anticleia, who is not suffering from lovesickness but is pining for her son, Odysseus (*Odyssey* 9.200–203; see Cyrino 1995, 27), and Penelope (*Odyssey* 1.340–44; see Cyrino 1995, 23), who may be pining for the protection and social position afforded by a husband and companion, rather than for an erotic partner. Anticleia’s and Penelope’s conditions are probably better associated with mourning. We could also compare Odysseus’s grieflike nostalgia at *Odyssey* 5.82–84.

8. Compare also Virgil *Aeneid* 1.712, where Dido is apostrophized as *praecipue infelix, pesti devota futurae* [especially wretched and doomed to a plague to come]. Compare Valerius Flaccus *Argonautica* 7.125. Here lovesick Medea is being compared to a feverish lap-dog—*aegra nova iam peste canis rabieque futura* [a dog sick with a recent illness and with a madness to come].


10. There have been a number of terms used for this condition. Jackson (1986, 352) lists the following: “love-melancholy” (Robert Burton’s term), lovesickness, “love-madness,” *amor heroicus*, heroical love (*heroes, heroicus*, and *heroical* are corruptions of the Greek word for love, *erōs*), the malady of *hereus*, the lover’s malady, erotomania. The condition of erotomania is still with us. In Sydney’s *Sunday Telegraph*, the case of an English stalker was reported (“A Bad Case of Lovin’ You” 1997). The medical team who cared for the man (led by Dr. Frank Farnham of London’s Royal Free Hospital Medical School)—and who subsequently published a report of the stalker in *The Lancet*—diagnosed the man as suffering from erotomania.

11. I take lovesickness (or love melancholy, as it came to be known) as the product of un consummated or abnormally frustrated love. Thus jealousy is not here at issue. Bitinna in Herondas 5, for example, exhibits neither an unconsummated nor an unseasonably frustrated love relationship. The same point could be made of the soulful and short-lived amatory frustrations of Roman elegiac poetry (Propertius 1.5, 1.9, 1.19; Tibullus 2.4, 2.6). For more on elegy see n. 60 in the present chapter.


13. This latter description of Medea’s condition may be compared to the descriptions of the condition of Antiochus discussed later in this chapter.

14. She dreamed that Jason had taken on the contest not to gain the fleece but to win her. Medea even dreamed that she fought Aeetes’ bulls in Jason’s stead (Hunter [1989, 164] notes the sexual symbolism of fighting the bulls). In the dream, Medea must decide, her father dictates, whether to award the stranger the fleece. Aeetes would not, for Jason had not fought. Against Aeetes’ wishes, Medea awards Jason the fleece.
15. I am following the order of lines as given by Hunter (1989), not that of Fränkel's Oxford edition.

16. At the beginning of the book (4.4–5) Medea flees from the palace to join Jason: the poet asks whether her action is the result of atēs pēma dysimeron [ill-desired woe resulting from atē] or a phyzan aiekelēn [unseemly panic].

17. Fear is her motive according to Dyck (1989) and Zanker (1979).

18. Later, at Argonautica 6.469 ff. (not quite the same point in the narrative), Valerius Flaccus again moralizes on the destructiveness of love. Here Valerius is describing the girdle Venus lends to Juno. With this she causes Medea to fall in love with Jason.

19. Venus's intention is powerfully described with the imagery of fire:

\[
\text{donis furentem / incendat reginam atque ossibus implicet ignem} \quad [\text{she sets the queen a fire, raging because of the gifts, and insinuates fire into her bones}] \quad (1.659–60). \text{ Note also 1.712–22.}
\]

20. The comparison is important. Orestes is singled out in the canonical discussion of manic melancholia, the pseudo-Aristotelian Problema 30.1. See Toohey 1990b. In Valerius Flaccus Argonautica 7.144–52, Medea, initially inflamed by the love of Jason, is compared to Orestes fures.

21. Argonautica 4.531–32: rursusque resurgens / saevit amor magnoque irarum fluctuat aestu [renascent love rages again and surges with a huge, boiling anger]; note that her anger is linked with love (resurgens / saevit amor); this is not just a matter of insulted pride or broken covenants.

22. The characters of Eclogues 8, too, are not passive, depressive figures.

23. Scylla, in the Ciris, is not Virgilian (see Lyne 1978). But she is very like Apollonius's Medea in her total surrender to love (himeros) and her swift betrayal of her father, Nisus, to her beloved, King Minos.

24. The lineaments of the pattern may be found in Virgil's allusion to depressive, metamorphic love at Aeneid 10.189–93 (the transformation of Cycnus). The allusion is perhaps too brief for proper discussion.


26. In a few random examples, we read that Sallustius insanit [Sallustius is mad] over freedwomen at 1.2.48–49, and amatory frustration is alluded to in a colorful manner at 1.2.71 [mea cum conferbuit ira [when my rage is at a fever pitch]] and at 1.2.118 (malis tentigine rumpi [do you prefer that I’d be ruptured by sexual tension?]).

27. These include, among others, 4, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 20, 25, 26, 28, and 29.

28. Structurally the story resembles that of Zeus and poor Semele. Elements have been inverted: dependent male for female, a Hera-like mother for the king of the gods, the destructions of others for the destruction of self. The most obvious parallel, however, is Oedipus. For a discussion see Lightfoot 1999.

29. Periander's mother feigned fear of wasting away from unrequited love, were she not to gain the object of her desire. After being unmasked by her son and after his subsequent madness, she committed suicide.

30. Parthenius adds a variant: "the story has, however, been related by others that she threw herself in while fleeing from his pursuit."

31. Ovid's Heroides 4 provides us with an ironic letter from Phaedra to Hippolytus. But
here we have a portrait of a loose-living Roman matrona whose love or lust, though apparent, hardly exhibits the symptoms of real lovesickness. Jacobson 1974 (142–58) is helpful.

32. Her condition is sometimes linked with hysteria (Lefkowitz 1981, 19 ff.). But whether ancient hysteria ought be considered a manic or depressive disease (in the same way as lovesickness or melancholy) I am not sure. By the time of Galen, at any rate, some descriptions are of the depressive order (Veith 1965, 31 ff.).

33. van Hoof (1990, 45–46) argues: “media is the ancient method for attracting attention for grief, open or hidden. Phaedra could not reveal her unbecoming love for her stepson Hippolytus. ‘I abstain from food’ (asiteô); such will be ‘the renouncing of life’ (apostasis tou biou) . . . Frustration in love leading up to voluntary starvation is a theme in the ancient novel: on one occasion Chaereas is convinced that Kallirhoe is in love with Dionysios. He decides to abstain from food.”

34. A good survey of the literature related to the identity of “Oppian” and of the background to many of these stories is provided by Bartley (2000). It is usual to link Oppian with the Halieutica and to attribute the Cynegetica to a later writer. For simplicity I refer to both authors as Oppian.

35. The compositional date for this is set somewhere between the second and fourth centuries c.e. Morgan (in Reardon 1989, 352) favors the fourth century. The conflation of the medical and the popular traditions owes its novelty in my opinion to a much earlier era, that of Aretaeus and Galen. Perhaps Charicleia’s illness is evidence for a compositional date for the Aethiopica of the early third century or even the late second century.


37. It is also worth pointing out that Galen seems to have felt that “excessive vehemence in loving” was a condition related to lovesickness (Jackson 1986, 353, citing Harkins 1963, 48). The significance of this suggestion is something to which I will return.


40. Caelius made a Latin translation (De morbis acutis et chronicis) of a lost text by Soranus of Ephesus, who worked in Alexandria during the Trajanic and Hadrianic periods. For a text see Drabkin 1950. Pigeaud 1987 has an extensive discussion of this author. See too Wack 1990, 11.

41. See Drabkin 1950, 561. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl (1964, 48) quotes the text: melancholica dicta, quod nigra fella aegrotantibus saepe per vomitum veniant . . . et non, ut plerique existimant, quod passionis causa vel generatio nigra sint fella; hoc enim est aestimantium magis quam videntium veritatem, vel potius falsum, sicut in aliis ostendimus.

42. Mercovich 1991 is very useful for isolating the difficulties involved in interpreting this poem and for demonstrating that the symptoms made evident by the speaker of this poem are as likely to be the product of lovesickness as jealousy. The evidence in the present book supports Mercovich’s contention. Mercovich (46) provides a reasonably up-to-date bibliography. Devereux (1970), I should add, is surely right to diagnose Sappho’s speaker as suffering from an “anxiety attack.” What is incorrect is Devereux’s etiology.

43. They closely resemble the symptoms attributed to the common real-life condition
of “panic disorder,” listed by Hawley (1997) as “dizziness, light-headedness, confusion, blurred vision, feelings of unreality, breathlessness, increased heart rate, numbness and tingling in feet and hands, clammy hands, stiffness and shakiness in muscles, jelly-legs.” Hawley continues, “If over-breathing persists, the next stage is severe vertigo, nausea, choking, sharp chest pains, temporary paralysis of some muscles, momentary blackouts and rising terror.” See too Devereux 1970; Marcovich 1991, 40 ff.; Lucretius 3.154–57.

44. See, for example, Theocritus 2.106 ff. But this could also point to the “boning” discussed in chapter 4.

45. On envy and jealousy see Schoeck 1969.

46. We might, in this case, want to distinguish between proximate and ultimate etiologies, between, that is, the how and the why of things. The how is certainly lovesickness. The why, however, is not at all clear.

47. The final stanza of Catullus 51 is of little help, for it may be a very free adaptation. At least Catullus does not speak of mania or depression. Compare Wills 1967.

48. Compare Archilochus 112, 118 Campbell.

49. Professor Vivienne Gray of Auckland, for example, once pointed out to me that Sappho depicts lovesickness in the depressive sense.

50. Neither depression nor violence, it is noteworthy, are gendered. Ovid Amores 1.7 has a male dole violence out, while Propertius 3.8 and 4.8 has a male on the receiving end (for some very violent heroines see Sinonis and Calligone in Stephens and Winkler 1995, 197 and 267, respectively). As I will point out later, for every love-depressive female in the novel, there is a depressive male.

51. The point needs to be stressed that the concern here is with lovesickness, not with love in general. This is true of such discussions or expostulations as those of Plato in the Symposium or Phaedrus, of Sophocles at Antigone 781 ff., and of Plautus at Trinumnum 223–75 and 668 ff. (where the stress is less on the subjective experience than it is on the deleterious effects of love on aristocratic young men and their families—though at v. 669 love is said to make men downcast morosi). The same point may be made concerning Garrison’s useful discussion of love in the Hellenistic epigram (1978). Other passages, while offering witness to lovesickness, lack detail. Such a one is Horace Odes 3.12, a description, according to Quinn (1980), of a lovesick Neobule. Quinn terms this a “cliché” and compares Sappho 102 LP. Into this category should be placed such productions as Propertius 1.5 and Ovid Amores 1.6 (note also Barsby’s comments ad loc.).

52. Clausen (1987) points out that the baldness is a symptom of a “morbidly excited condition” and compares Hesiod Catalogue fr. 133.4–5 M.-W. and Virgil Eclogues 6.51.

53. When Simaetha sees Delphis, her swoonlike symptoms seem to match those of Sappho’s speaker in poem 31: see Theocritus 2.106 ff.

54. Another comparable example may be found in Herondas 1.49–62, where Gryllus unrequitedly loves Threiss. Unfortunately the symptomatology is too sketchy to be of assistance.

55. On the evil eye see the discussion of Heliodorus later in this chapter. See also Thomsen 1992; Dickie 1991; Yatromanalakis 1988; Rohde 1914, 486 n. 2; Faraone 1998. Parallels from anthropological literature are provided by Reid (1983, 36 ff.).

56. The numeration is that of Trypanis 1989.

57. The disease is epilepsy. Its being linked here with lovesickness is intriguing. It is as-
sociated in Hippocratic medicine with a superfluity of the phlegmatic humor (Flashar 1966, 28 ff.) and with melancholy (see Goodwin and Jamison 1990, 116–17). In the discussion of Heracles’ madness in the Problema 30.1 (cited in the previous chapter), epilepsy seems to be linked with his manic melancholia (see also the Epidemics and Ullmann 1978, 75). This may provide further grounds for the association of Cydippe’s lovesickness with black bile and melancholia.

58. His poem is conveniently reproduced in Quinn 1969, 13 (I have reproduced Quinn’s translation).

59. Gallus’s situation is an ironic reversal of Phaedria’s at Terence Eunuch 46–49.

60. There is in poems like this the problem of “sincerity.” The genre of elegy is so deliberately unrealistic, literary, and, hence, ironic that it is very difficult to take Gallus seriously (thus I follow Veyne 1988, e.g., 31 ff., 132 ff.). Compare Propertius 1.1.21 (en agedum dominae mentem convertite nostrae, / at facite illa meo palleat ore magis [come then, change my mistress’s mind, and make her more pallid than me]). Baker (1990), for example, seems to take this as an example of the pallor brought on by wasting and lovesickness (thus another instance of Knox’s topos) and cites Plautus and Aretaeus in support. But verses 33–34 of the same poem seem to identify such pallor as the result of too much lovemaking. It is that very sort of complication that makes elegy such an unreliable and ironic witness.

61. Compare Propertius 1.1.23, 1.5.12 ff., 1.6.27, 1.9.17, 1.13, 1.18.21, 2.4, 2.25.25, 2.34b.1, 3.6.4, 3.12.9, 3.19, 3.21.33–34 (where unrequited love leads to death), 4.3.28; Tibullus 1.8.53–54, 1.9.29, 1.9.79, 2.6.17–20, 3.2.27–30 (where lovesickness leads to death), 3.5, 3.10. Compare too Toohey 1999a and, on Catullus, the instructive piece by Joan Booth (1997).

62. On this theme of lovesickness see La Penna 1957.

63. Ovid, in his love poetry, offers many references to what seems almost to be lovesickness: see Amores 1.6, 2.5.2, 2.7.10, 2.9.14, 3.14.37; Ars amatoria 1.729–836.

64. Ovid does not quite depict lovesickness in his elegiac poetry, though he comes close: note Amores 1.6, 2.7.10, 2.9.13; Amores 3.14.37. In these cases lifestyle rather than affective debility seems to be the cause of the weak condition of the male lover. Compare also Ars amatoria 1.723–39.

65. For discussion see Beecher and Ciavolella 1990, 53–54. It is sometimes suggested of Narcissus’s pining away that “the topos is the familiar one of the lover who wastes away with passion.” Knox (1986, 22), who makes this claim, cites in support Ovid Ars amatoria 1.735; compare Amores 1.6.5, 2.9.14; Propertius 1.5.21–22; Theocritus 2.88 ff.

66. A Roman painting of Narcissus is represented in figure 9 in chapter 8.

67. The novelty of this description may be underscored by comparing it with another case of frustrated love in the Metamorphoses. Byblis fell in love with her brother (9.454–665). Declaration of love to him was followed by rejection. Her reaction was not Antiochean pining but violent and unrestrained madness—she became a bacchante (9.635 ff.). The exertion of her Bacchic travels eventually caused her to die. She metamorphosed into a fountain.

68. In Longus’s Daphnis and Chloe (3.23), Daphnis tells Chloe a variant version of the legend. Here Echo repulsed Pan’s advances. In an excess of frustrated love, he caused the local shepherd and goatherds to go into a frenzy (mania) and rip her limb from limb. Earth buried these limbs in a variety of places, where, henceforth, echoes became possible. Pan’s reaction is one of manic lovesickness, which variety I will discuss in the next section. On the history of the Narcissus legend see Vinge 1967.
69. On the historicity of some of these events see Fisher 1993.

70. Plutarch, in his version, attributes the story to a Greek physician, Erasistratus, who lived in the first half of the first century B.C.E. I see no reason why we ought to believe Plutarch’s attribution. The story has the ring of the literature of the Roman Empire.

71. Beecher and Ciavolella (1990, 48–51) provide a number of these and references. See also Wack 1990, 17 ff.

72. For the text see Baehrens 1914, 112–25. For discussion see Bright 1987, 222–44; Wack 1990, 4–5.

73. A possible contemporary parallel comes from the Vandal poet Reposianus, whose miniature epic “The Intrigue of Mars with Venus” (for text and translation see Duff and Duff [1935] 1982) depicts a lovesickness (here effected by jealousy) that is both depressive and manic. The poem describes the famous affair of Venus with Mars and their punishment by Hephaestus. It is the love of Vulcan for Venus that is frustrated. When he discovers his wife’s infidelity, his reaction is a bizarre mixture of depression (v. 160: “and now half benumbed” [iam quasi torpescens]) and mania (vv. 161–62: “he growls aloud, and groaning mournfully strikes his sides to their very depth and wrathfully heaves sigh on sigh unceasing” [trans. Duff and Duff, adapted; the Latin is: ore fremit maestoque modo gemit ultima pulsans / ilia et indignans suspira pressa fatigat]). But anger quickly wins the day (v. 160: vix sufficit ira dolori [the anger scarcely matched the grief]).

74. The tale is repeated by Aurelius Victor (De Caesaribus 16.2).

75. For the translation (here slightly adapted) and Latin text see Magie 1953.

76. A comparably macabre example may be found in Quintus Smyrnaeus’s Posthomerica when Achilles develops a necrophilic lovesickness for Penthesilea. After he has killed the Amazon warrior (1.654 ff.), he gazes on her corpse and is smitten (1.716–21; cf. 1.666–68) by love (1.719; cf. 1.671–74) and by grief (1.720: “deadly grief [aniai] devoured his heart”). His reaction was not violent but passive, at least until provoked by Thersites (1.722 ff.).

77. Dolphins have the strangest of reputations. Louis de Bernières, in Señor Vivo and the Coca Lord (1991, 148–49), states: “Quite often the dolphins save the lives of those who are drowning, and sometimes the dolphins make a mistake and try to save the lives of those who are not drowning at all, but are really diving for turtles. That is just something that one has to put up with from time to time, and it serves to prove how simpatico the animals are. The cabolcos allow the dolphins to take fish from their nets, and when the dolphins become human and emerge from the river with their different-coloured eyes and their beautiful muscles, they make love with whomever they choose, because it is bad to refuse a lover who loves so tenderly. Dolphins’ children always eventually return to the water, and so there are perhaps entire districts where the dolphins are half human, which makes it doubly a crime to kill them. Another reason is that dolphins love each other so romantically, so playfully, so completely, that it is obvious that they are sent by God to teach us by their example to do the same.”

78. There is an astonishing statue in the Museo Nazionale di Napoli of Cupid entwined, in the most provocative of manners, with a dolphin. A reproduction can be found in Maiuri 1957, 37.

79. Pliny (Letters 9.33) presents a nonerotic version of this tale. Sherwin-White (1985,
514) parallels Pliny the Elder *Natural History* 9.26 and cites a real-life parallel for Pliny's story.

80. Less striking instances may be found in Longus's *Daphnis and Chloe* after Chloe has been abducted by the Methymnaeans (2.20), when Daphnis, in the despair of frustrated love, casts himself onto the ground, languishing and waiting for death (*entauhsa perimenô keimeno . . . thanaton*, 2.22). This is not quite melancholy, yet the passive desire for death resembles the despair of Antiochus or Perdita. Melancholy is more evident in book 3. Here Daphnis and Chloe are kept from the pastures and their meetings by the harsh weather of winter. Longus describes how they were sleepless, sad, pensive, and longed for the return of spring (3.4). Similar reactions take place in book 4: Chloe, thinking Daphnis has forgotten her, weeps, complains, and thinks only of death (4.27); Daphnis, after Chloe has subsequently been spirited away by Lampis, sinks into a similar state of despair (4.28).

81. For more of the symptomatology see Toohey 1999a.

82. One might have hoped that this was quartan fever. On this fever see my index s.v.

83. Theagenes suffers too, though not so badly. At the banquet for Neoptolemus (3.10) he is distracted and gloomy, and later he confesses to Calasiris that he is near to death. Calasiris describes his condition at the beginning of 3.11 in terms redolent of medical depression—he is full of *chasmê adêmonousê* (presumably “troubled depression” or perhaps “troubled ennui”), and he is also suffering from a humoral imbalance (he is *anômalos*).


85. Kraepelin (1921, 37) speaks of one variety of melancholy that he treated as stuporous (see fig. 2 in chapter 2). The notion of stuporous mania might well be applied to Charicleia, as I will suggest later in this chapter.

86. Another example of this type of lovesickness is alluded to by Hägg (1983). It is the story of Paul and Thecla in the apocryphal Acts. Hägg points out (160) that “Thecla's first reaction when she hears Paul preaching in the neighboring house—she does not touch her food or drink, she worries her family by her distracted behaviour—is reminiscent of the purely physical manifestations of awakening love in, for instance, the *Ephesiaca*.”

87. It is precisely such jealousy that causes Chaereas to kick pregnant Callirhoe in the belly in Chariton’s novel *Chaereas and Callirhoe* (1.4.10). This example is discussed at the beginning of chapter 5.

88. A reproduction of the Greek text with translation and comments may be found in Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl 1964, 18–29.


90. The fever was a mirage. But it recalls the quartan fevers alluded to earlier in this chapter. It also picks up the motif of the love fever described by Sri Harsa-Deva in the second of the quotations beginning this chapter.


92. Marneros and Angst (2000) describe this condition as “reactive” depression.

93. A very striking example of passive lovesickness as it is described by the great poet of the Roman dialect Gioacchino Belli (1791–1863) follows. It points to the continuity of this tradition. The translation is by Peter Dale and is reprinted with his permission. (Dale uses the slang and speech idiom of Melbourne, Australia, in the 1950s to approximate that of Belli.)
Un fischio d’aria
È ubbidiente, è aggrazziata, è de bbon core,
Je piasce er lavorà, ppovera fijja,
Ché ttutto er po’ de svario che sse pijja
È de ssceggne la sera in coritore:

Diggìuna a ppan’e acqua oggni viggijja,
Abbada semp’r’a ssé, nun fa l’amore . . .
Ché in quant’a questo poi, sur punto onore,
Ve la do pe l’Ottavia maravijja.

L’unica cosa che mme tiè sturbata
È cche da un mese e mezzo, poverella,
Me la trovo un tantino sscinicata.

Da quela santa notte, sora Stella,
C’annò ggù pe ssentì una serenata,
Fussì l’aria o cche sso, nnun è ppiù cquella.

She ’s abedient, graceful, goodharted, alrite,
The poor girl likes wirk, she ’s always on call,
Cos the only relaxation she allows’aself ad all
Is goen down the stairs f’ra chat ev’ry nite:

She fasts on bred’n water ev’ry vigil eve,
Looks after’aself, n’ never makes luv, poor girl . . .
Cos in this regard, my wurd’ve honour, b’lieve
Me, I’d pass’a’r off as the Eighth wunder a the wirld.

The only thing ut tends ta wurry me sick
Is that f’ra munth’n a harf or so, Heather,
I find she ’s getten thin, as thin as a wick.

Frum that blessèd nite, the wun that the poor
Girl wen’ down’a lissen tw’a serenade; an whether
It was a draft or not, she ain’ the girl she was before.]

95. Compare Elizabeth Marshall Thomas (1993, 58) on romantic love in dogs, which she
believes exists and has its biological uses, in dogs as in humans. This might be contrasted to
Veyne’s notion of the discovery of this emotion. There is no reason why a universalist ap-
proach cannot coexist with an opportunist/historicist one such as that of Veyne. The uni-
versalizing of Thomas might be compared to the anthropologizing of Jared Diamond in his
Why Is Sex Fun? The Evolution of Human Sexuality (1997) or the comparable biologism of
Matt Ridley in his The Red Queen (1993).
96. The remarkable condition of acedia, at least in its fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-century
manifestations, bears a very close resemblance to depression and lovesickness. It is curious
that lovesickness receives one of its best descriptions in the Aegritudo Perdicae in Vandal
North Africa at approximately the same time monks and lay folk were being ravaged by the morbus of acedia. There can be no easy explanation for this coincidence except perhaps to remark that the first and fifth centuries of our era were most dangerous and demoralized periods. In such periods, perhaps that sense of passivity that seems a congener of these conditions is especially prevalent and encourages these pestes.


98. Brown (1988, 16 n. 51) states that although Saller and Shaw correct Veyne “on important points,” Veyne’s is “an exceptionally thought-provoking study.”

99. It may be that the formulations of Jack Goody (1998) have more to offer. He maintains that romantic love is the product of literate societies (writing is needed to celebrate the beloved). Depressive love melancholy’s genesis may well be connected.

100. Descola (1996, 195) briefly discusses lovesickness among the Amazonian Jivaro. The condition thus has a very wide sociological appearance. I believe that the emotion, in the literary sphere, became more prominent in the periods I have designated. It was probably always present but often not taken as seriously as we sometimes do.

101. Love melancholy, if we were to follow Melanie Klein (or Julia Kristeva, for that matter) results from the withdrawal, at a crucial stage of early childhood, of maternal affection. People who are prone to this condition are also, on their understanding, afraid of consummation—this would be to defy maternal affection and to court its loss.

102. I make no claim to be anything other than superficial in the analysis of these poems. I have no competence in (or only minimal competence in one of) the languages and literatures being discussed here.


104. According to Lichtheim (1976, 7), “in the New Kingdom the education and training of scribes was expanded, and the genre known as School Texts has no counterpart in earlier periods.”

105. Lichtheim (1976, 7–8) states: “lyric poetry was developed in the Middle Kingdom; but Love Lyrics seem to have been a creation of the New Kingdom. At least, no love poems older than the New Kingdom have come to light. The love poems are misunderstood if they are thought to be naïve and artless. For they are rich in elaborate wordplays, metaphors, and rare words and thereby indicate that they are crafted with deliberation and literate skill. The actual situations of life from which the poems may have arisen are concealed from our view. We do not know enough about the position of women, especially of young unmarried girls, to know how to interpret the free relations of the lovers that are depicted in so many of these poems.”

106. The following translations of the Egyptian poems are those of Lichtheim (1976). There is also an attractive version by Fowler (1994).

107. Another symptom is aging (cf. “my body is young”). This depressed form of wasting that is linked with aging recalls Horace’s melancholy-like condition of veternus (the word is linked with the adjective vetus, meaning “old”).

108. Compare Basedow 1929, 175–79.

109. Wiles (1997, 14), as I have indicated in the introduction to this book, believes that the self is fragmentary and unstable and, most importantly, that “the self seems to be compounded of a series of discursive networks.” His Lacanian view represents postmodern
orthodoxy. The self, I am suggesting, seems to react and to become prominent in a pretty predictable manner. It is, as I have suggested, the product of pain and alienation and a product of total otherness from family, community, and even the self itself. It is defined by the chasm between subject and object enforced on a child at a very young age. The sense is formulated from a basic set of constraints and manifests itself in a standard set of modalities.

110. It is worth noting that these victims of love are young people, a self-perceived marginal group. See too Goody 1998.

111. See n. 6 in chapter 8. See too Goody 1998.

112. Ingalls 1965.

113. Separation is the more probable cause. This is the theme of the following poem taken from Brough’s collection (1968, poem 10):

Although my mind
Is sick with love, I find
I have acquired the gift of magic sight.
Though she is far away, and it is night,
I see her in a foreign land
From where I stand.

(Bhartrhari)

The affective state that is highlighted in this poem is designated. The speaker claims that he is “sick with love.” The condition, he tells us, has been brought on by the absence of his beloved (she is “in a foreign land”). No symptoms for the sickness are provided, but we can guess readily at those that would present themselves.

114. Dropsy was a condition that some have argued was suffered by the addressee of Persius’s Satires 3. I am unaware of a tradition linking it with either melancholia or lovesickness.

115. This is a sickness that may require medical attention, according to the following poem from Brough’s collection (1968, poem 157):

When the fever is caused by her looks and her voice,
The treatment of choice
Is thrice-daily sip
Of her honey-sweet lip.
To avoid further harm,
And to keep the heart warm,
The follow-up treatment is known to be best:
The soothing and gentle warm touch of her breast.

(Professional secret, though—
Careful to keep it so!)

(Jayadeva)

There is lovesickness here, but it is designated only as a fever. There are no other symptoms. Cure, typically, is congress with the beloved.
116. Here is another very pretty example of this theme of wasting (reproduced in Ingalls 1965 as poem 719):

   Upon her body
   golden as the opening tuber of turmeric,
   appears a paleness
   born of the separation from her lover.
   As this increases
   it is as though the fawn-eyed maiden’s limbs
   were made of silver
   melted down with gold.

   (Rajasekhara)

117. Ingalls (1965, 242) points out: “The effects of separation on the man are not very different from its effects on the woman: the same sighs (752, 804), tears (753, 792), and fevers (755, 771, 784). Indeed, he too occasionally takes to the lotus couch and is fanned, all to no avail (801–803). He may even die of love (760).”

118. A couple of other Indian examples of this theme follow. The poems are taken from Brough’s 1968 collection (poems 24 and 135, respectively).

   You are pale, friend moon, and do not sleep at night,
   And by day you waste away.
   Can it be that you also
   Think only of her, as I do?

   (Bhartrhari)

   The references here to lovesickness (a condition that is based upon absence and upon frustration) are succinct, unmistakable, and delivered with such a knowingness as to indicate a strong tradition behind their utterance. The moon (and the speaker of the poem, it is implied) is pale and wasting away. It is obsessively fixated on its beloved.

   “Well but you surely do not mean to spend
   Your whole life pining? Show some proper spirit.
   Are there no other men? What is the merit
   Of faithfulness to one? But when her friend
   Gave this advice, she answered, pale with fear,
   Speak soft. My love lives in my heart, and he will hear.”

   (Amaru)

   This poem puts a spin on the notion of a cure through sexual congress with the beloved. The speaker of the poem is “pining”—wasting away, that is—from a lovesickness brought on by separation from the beloved. This speaker may also exhibit the paleness of love (part of the force of “pale with fear”). The unexpected solution for the suffering lover (for whom union with the beloved seems to be impossible) is to find another partner.

119. Two other representative poems follow. They are poems 92 and 25, respectively, in Brough’s 1968 collection. While they are imprecise on the matter of sickness and on its
treatment, the overall picture is one of a lovesickness fueled and generated by absence. The wracked lovers exhibit tears, sighing, insomnia, an obsessive fixation on the longed-for individual, and a generalized sorrow.

At night the rain came, and thunder deep
Rolled in the distance; and he could not sleep,
But tossed and turned, with long and frequent sighs,
And as he listened, tears came to his eyes;
And thinking of his young wife left alone,
He sobbed and wept aloud until the dawn.
And from that time on
The villagers made it a strict rule that no traveler
should be allowed to take a room for the night
in the village.

(Amaru)

Has God no pity, while he counts away
The endless hours of every weary day,
The endless nights, when still my sad head lies
Unpillowed by the breast of Lotus-eyes?

(Bhartrhari)

120. On looking, seeing, and watching see my final chapter in this book and also Frontisi-Ducroux 1998.

121. There are several current definitions of the self—and these are usually not made as clear as they might be. For example, the “self,” in the anthropological sense, seems in practice to refer to the sets of shared psychological traits that define how individual psychologies exhibit traits of a larger social or historical psychology. So one may speak of Western or Australian or Aboriginal or even Homeric self. But sometimes the “self” is used in a complimentary way to designate a human who is capable of reasoned moral behavior. There is a “self” involved, to follow this definition, whenever we question and weigh up the ethical validity of impulse. Implicit in such an argument is the idea that some individuals (children, the mentally ill, the very old, the primitive, the illiterate, animals) must have a less developed sense of self. Paradoxically those with an interest in this type of self are usually keen to flatten difference. The selves of the primitive, the illiterate, the aged, or the Homeric hero (or even the Australian male) differ only in superficial ways. See also Westra 2001; Stock 1994. For some psychoanalytic discussions and conceptualizations of the self see Alford 1991; Kohut 1971, 1977, 1985. See too Baumeister 1986.

122. For a survey of how, apparently, the definition of self can vary between cultures see Hollan 1992.

123. Goody (1998) believes that this type of love relationship is only possible in urbanized societies with high literacy levels.

124. I offer one last observation: the periodical privileging of romantic love seems closely related to, even dependent on, the privileging of love melancholy. Romantic love’s appearance is dependent, therefore, on the social pressures that I have highlighted in the previous paragraphs in text.
1. The pot can be described as follows: white-ground lekythos, assigned or attributed by Beazley (1963) to “Group R” (ARV 1384, no. 15), under the heading of “Late-Fifth Century Painters of White Lekythoi.” The vessel (height: 50.8 cm; shoulder diameter: 13 cm) is dated to the last quarter of the fifth century B.C.E. and is in the British Museum in London. The iconography shows a fairly standard funerary scene of a woman seated at tomb, with a man and a woman seated on either side. A black-and-white image can be found in Kurtz 1975, 222, no. 49.4.

2. For other examples of this remarkable genre of painting see Robertson 1992, 252 ff.; Arias 1962, plates 200–201.

3. Beazley 1963; Kurtz 1975. John Papadopoulos and Carrie Tove suggest to me that the clothing is that of a female. I could point out, however, that the bulk of the shoulders and the apparent youth of the face present us, as far as gender is concerned, with a profoundly ambiguous picture.

4. The link is apparent visually as well. A more sanguine examination of the Eumenides Painter’s Orestes, with which chapter 1 began, could diagnose severe boredom as Orestes’ problem. The pictorial representation of these emotions once again points to the curious phenomenon that the representation of emotional states in the pictorial tradition seems to antedate that of the literary (discursive) tradition by some centuries.

5. The confusion between the two is nicely captured by the related titles of two books: Kuhn (1976) wrote his classic on boredom and called it The Demon of Noontide; Andrew Solomon (2001) wrote his more sensational, but nonetheless moving, book on a personal account of depression and called it The Noonday Demon. Judd’s novel The Noonday Devil (1986) makes the affective confusion, not to say the repetition of the title, all the more perplexing.

6. What is it exactly that is meant by boredom? The word boredom is used of so many disparate affective states that one is tempted to include it with such outmoded medical terms as “consumption” or “the gripe.” Terms such as these engross such a constellation of disorders (John Dearin’s description) that they become almost too general to be useful and, according to some skeptics, are often best passed over in silence. My former colleague Australian logician Dr. David Londey suggested to me once that there might in fact be no such thing as boredom at all.

7. Liddell, Scott, and Jones’s Greek lexicon offers two early uses of the word where the meaning seems to be “boredom” or “ennui.” The first comes from the Epicurean philosopher Metrodorus. Metrodorus links the verb aluô with the words epi tôn symposiôn (Papyrus Herculaneensis 831.13 A. Körte). The context is fragmentary, but Metrodorus seems to be referring to the tedium that can be induced by a bad drinking party. Lacking a context, it is difficult to state anything with confidence. Yet here it seems not unreasonable to interpret the reference to boredom as being of the simple type. Zeno, as reported by Clement of Alexandria (SVF 1.58), uses the word in a manner that may be appropriate to simple boredom, or so suggests Liddell, Scott, and Jones’s Greek lexicon. To judge from the following lines, it may be easier to gloss the word alus as “satiety”: “but let there be no satiety (alus) of perfume, gold, or wool sellers, [for] here the women, decked out like prostitutes in a brothel, pass the day.”
8. Following are some terms for boredom. In Greek there is alus and its verbal forms aluo, alusthaino, alusso, alustazo, and so on; nouns such as apatheia, akêdia (cf. Cicero Ad Atticum 12.45 and the comment of Shackleton-Bailey [1966, 337–38]), aplêstia, asê, koros, plesmonê (and their verbal forms); and, in some contexts, verbal forms such as aniao, enochleo, or truphao. In Latin there are words such as taedium and related forms, fastidium and related terms, otium, satietas and related forms, vacare, fatigo, defatigo, defetiscor and so on, torpor and related forms, languidus and related terms, desidia, inertia, ineptia, piget and related forms, hebes and related forms, obtundo, molestus, odiosus, odium, vexo, and so on. The list could be extended, had we the time, into suggestive physiological terms that can be associated with boredom: so in various contexts yawning might denote boredom. One could add to the list the various terms for “yawning”: in Greek chasko and in Latin oscito, oscitatio, and hio. Boredom is not depression, but it does use some of the same terminology. For a list of terms applicable to mental distress see SVF 3.100.15 ff.

9. It would be very tempting to invoke Heidegger here and to suggest that boredom is the product of alienation from Dasein. The early Greeks, according to Heidegger, had not experienced this alienation. See Steiner 1989. (Such an understanding seems to inspire as various works as the Snell’s Heideggerian Discovery of the Mind [1953] and Dupont’s The Invention of Literature: From Greek Intoxication to the Latin Book [1999]). This sort of alienation is the sort of thing that animals cannot therefore suffer. I doubt that such an earthly paradise as one free of boredom ever existed. Twentieth-century Romantics may be right, however, to consider that the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution have made widespread boredom more prevalent, at least on paper.

10. The topos has a long history. Compare, from among the many possible examples, Isocrates Panegyricus 7; Ovid Epistulae ex Ponto 3.7.3; Seneca Epistulae morales 100.11; Quintilian Institutio oratoria 8.6.14, 10.1.31; Rutilius Namatianus De reditu suo 2.3. This rhetorical topos never clearly distinguishes between boredom, weariness, and offense.

11. The application of “being burdened” to mental conditions comes early, however. Homer (Iliad 11.274) speaks of “being burdened in regard of the heart.” That, as Liddell, Scott, and Jones’s Greek lexicon suggests, means “grieved.”

12. It needs to be observed, however, that the manuscript readings are crucial. Jocelyn’s text reproducing the codices (1667, 112, 333 f.) tends to remove the sense of “boredom” by reproducing the less comprehensible reading otioso initio rather than Lipsius’s widely accepted otioso in oto. On this fragment and otium see André 1962 and, more generally, 1966. See too Jocelyn 1967; Skutsch 1968, “1157–65” (a reprint of his article in Rheinisches Museum 96 [1953]: 193 ff.)

13. The reading otioso initio is defended by Baker (1989). Baker interprets the phrase as an ablative of attendant circumstances and cites Cicero De legibus 3.37 (hoc populo etc.) as a comparable construction. The reading does produce a scannable half line (the first two metra of this trochaic septenarius are comprised of two trochees followed by two anapests), provided one allows hiatus between initio and animus.

14. It follows from this that the ancients, at least during the periods to which I have been referring, had no clearly conceptualized notion of the emotion (note that the matter of conceptualization differs from that of experience). Why this may have been the case is part of the task of this book to answer. It is my contention that they were in the process of discovering this emotion.
15. For other attempts at definitions see the surveys of Kuhn 1976, 3–13; Healy 1984; Bernstein 1975; Spacks 1995; Jonard 1998.

16. A very nice illustration of this form of situational boredom as it is described by the great Gioacchino Belli (1791–1863) follows. The translation is by Peter Dale.

1482 LA MOJJE MARCONTENTA
Nun me la sento, nò, nun me la sento:
Queste cqui nun zò llègge da cristiani,
D’avé da stà li mesi e ll’anni sani
A mmorisse de pizzichi cqua ddrente.

Mai un po’ d’aria! Ma’ un divertimento!
Sempre ammuffita cqui ccome li cani!
Che mmariti! Che ccori indisumani!
E sse laggneno poi si mmuta vento.

Co cquella ssnimia tua de Lusciola
Er tempo d’annà in zònzoła sce l’hai:
Tutti li gran da-fà ssò ppe mmé ssola.

Oh, inzomma, io drento casa incaroggnita
Nun ce vòjjo stà ppiù. Ssi ccaso-mai,
Nun ho ggruggno né età de fà sta vita.
12/2/1835

[1482 THE DISCONTENTED WIFE
I jus don’ see the point, nah, I don’ see the point:
The rules round here ain’ a witeman’s laws,
Haven ta stay here fa munths n’ hole years, forced
Ta die a boredom bit by bit in this dump uva joint.

Never a breth a fresh air! Never an ounce a fun, an I’m
Stuck here moulden away like a mungrel in its hutch!
Sum ruddy husben’s! Their harts lack the human touch!
An a slite wind change’s anuf ta make’em all whine.

There’s always spare time ta go out f’ra bidda fun
An do the Block with that munkey-faced Lucy a yors
While I’m singled out when there’s hard yakka ta be dun.

Ah, now look here, this place’s depressen f’ra wife
An I’m fed up be’en kept inside. If ya wanna know the corze,
It’s cos neither me mug or age’s cud out fa this sorda life.]

17. Elizabeth Marshall Thomas (1993, 121), commended by Spacks (1995), implies that dogs do not feel boredom (she is thinking of these animals in a natural, nonhuman environment). This claim should be juxtaposed with those made by Françoise Wemelsfelder
(1985) and with that later implied by Thomas (1993, 143). Repeated personal observation suggests that dogs, at any rate, can become profoundly bored.

18. According to Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl (1964, 356), Lucretius is said, in a tract on melancholy by Agrippa of Nettesheim, to be a melancholic (as are Hesiod, Ion, Tynnichus of Chalcis, and Homer). The assertion is not demonstrable. However, it makes more sense than the assertion of Kuhn (1976, 25 ff.) that Lucretius was subject to ennui.

19. Their probable wealth is stressed by Kenney (1971, 239).


22. As a rhetorical demonstration of this fact, we could point, for example, to Cicero’s letters of 59—for example, Ad Atticum 6.9 and 11—that do not mention or describe boredom. One might have expected them to. Similarly one might have expected Ovid in Tomis to be consumed by the emotion. Yet his Epistulae ex Ponto contains no such references (cf. Epistulae ex Ponto 1.5.8, 43–44: 3.4.57).

23. On horror loci in Lucretius see also Nussbaum 1994, 198.

24. The notion is also picked up in Odes 2.16.18–20: quid terras alio calentis / sole mutamus? patriae quis excusat / se quoque fugit [Why do we leave for lands that are being burned by another sun? What exile doesn’t also flee himself?].

25. This is contra Kilpatrick (1986, 38–39), but compare my discussion in chapter 1.

26. This metaphorical use of veternum might be compared to those of quartan fever—see my index for references.

27. Recall the yawning of Dicaeopolis or of Persius’s addressee in Satires 3.

28. Barton (1993, 51 ff.) also notes the importance of boredom for Roman experience in this period. She seems to think that boredom drove Romans to the gladiatorial games.

29. If we are to understand it satisfactorily, we must engage with it under three headings. First is the physiological: it can literally induce nausea and, moreover, can be life-threatening. Second is the psychological: it is characterized by an acute disjunction between volition and perception. Third is the philosophical: to characterize one’s response to life as a kind of nausea is to make a judgment on the value of life itself. “Biliousness” can be associated with manic depression, however. See Jamison 1993, 181, on Byron, who states “I am so bilious—that I nearly lose my head—and so nervous that I cry for nothing—at least today I burst into tears all alone by myself . . . I have been excited—and agitated and exhausted mentally and bodily all this summer . . .”

30. The Oxford Latin Dictionary (s.v. taedium) allows the meaning “ennui” for taedium only when it stands without the genitive. This seems to me to be unnecessarily prescriptive. For taedium meaning “disgust” or “boredom” see, for example, Epistulae morales 56.9.5, 59.15.8, 100.11.5; De ira 3.1.5.6; De beneficis 2.5.2.7, 2.11.6.2, 6.16.6.2, 7.2.4.2.

31. See Naturales quaestiones 4A, praefatio 2; Epistulae morales 40.3.6, 70.3.7.

32. Compare Epistulae morales 100.6; Martial 3.48.

33. This is not quite the same idea as is contained in Lucretius 3.79–82:

And often so deeply because of fear of death
Does a hatred of life and of seeing the light seize humans
That with sorrowing heart they commit suicide
Forgetting that this fear of death is the origin of their woes.
(Cf. Nussbaum 1994, 197 ff. See also Bailey 1947, 21002.) Suicide here is caused by fear of death, not by satiety (satietas). Bailey compares Democritus B.203 Diels and Cicero De finibus 1.15.49.

34. The term taedium is used earlier in the letter (24.22): Obiurgat Epicurus non minus eos, qui mortem concupiscent, quam eos, qui timent, et ait: “Ridiculum est currere ad mortem taedio vitae, cum genere vitae, ut currendum ad mortem esset, effeceris” [Epicurus also upbraids those who long for death as much as those who fear it and says “it is ridiculous to hasten your own death because you’re bored with life, when you’re doing the same thing by the way you live”]. The sense is the same. The quotation is reproduced by Usener (1966) as fragment 496 of Epicurus’s remains. It would be useful to know what Epicurus said and to have a context. This might alter the conclusions concerning the earlier Greek conceptions of the emotion. As it stands, Seneca may be guilty of distortion.

35. Epistulae morales 16.2 has the remarkable phrase ut dematur otio nausia [that nausia may be taken away from our leisure]. The context in which this clause occurs runs as follows: “Philosophy is no trick to catch the public; it is not devised for show. It is a matter not of words but of facts. It is not pursued in order that the day may yield some amusement before it is spent or that nausia may be taken away from our leisure.”

36. Kuhn (1976, 31) insists incorrectly that the concern of this dialogue is ennui. See too Griffin 1976, 322; Jonard 1998.

37. The following deceptively simple poem is by Gioacchino Belli and is translated by Peter Dale. The speaker of this poem chooses, ironically, a life of boredom to replace the boredom of life. The irony cannot have been lost on Belli. The very neurotic loafer of this poem, I suggest, is more like Seneca’s Serenus than any other figures I have noted so far.

1357 LO STUFARELLO
Sto a spasso, grazziaddio, sto a spasso, Checco.
E inzin’a tantro c’averò er tigame
De bbobba dar convento de le Dame
De Tor-de-Specchi, ho vvinto un terno a ssecco.

Che sserve? A la fatica io nun ciazecco:
Quasi è ppiù mmejjo de mori de fame.
E cquer fà tutt’l anno er falegghname
Nun è vvita pe mmé: ppropio me secco.

Sò stato mozzo, sempriscista, coco . . .
Ar fin de conti {} me sò ddiscisco
De capi cche un ber gioco dura poco.

Uhm, quer zempre reggina è un brutto ingergo:
E nnemmanco annerebbe in paradiso
Pe nnun cantà in eterno er Tantummergo
29/11/1834

1357 EASILY BORED
I’m loafen, thank God, I’m twiddlen me thums, yeah Frank.
N’ as long as them Ladies a the Convent a Mirror Towers
Serve me up a plate a their mush, I'll lounge away me hours.  
It’s like winnen a triple at the lott’ry, mate: money in the bank.

Wot’s the point a wirk. I ain’ cud out fa sweten on a job.  
Id’ud almost be better starven ta deth fa lack uva feed.  
An wod a carpenter duz all year round’s guaranteed  
Ta bore me shitless. That ain’ the life fa me, nah, cob.

I’ve wirked as a stable boy, a herbalist, a cook, . . .  
Then, after all, I finally began ta realise  
All good lurks start ta bore ya if ya wirk by the book.

Uh, it’s ugly that frase ut good tail never stales, an I’ll never,  
If it’s the last thing I do, go off ta paradise,  
Anythen tw’avoid singen ‘Tandem yergo’ f’r ever an ever.

38. For discussions of this dialogue see Griffin 1976, 321–27; Walz 1950, 63–66.
40. Serenus was no melancholic in the medical or any other sense. Seneca’s generalized symptomatology, while at no point presenting a condition that matches, for example, Soranus’s precisely detailed morbus, does exhibit elements in common with the more generally described conditions of Celsus (who links melancholia with prolonged despondency) or Rufus of Ephesus (whose melancholics were gloomy, sad, fearful, and doubting). But this is beside the point, for Serenus’s condition in the De tranquillitate animi is best characterized as a secularized form of the illness. Serenus was indeed a depressive, but in the circumscribed world of literature. His melancholy, we might adjudicate, was existential.
41. Other instances, but scattered ones, exist. See, for example, Martial 12.82.14, which refers to the boring importunities of a man seeking a dinner invitation.
42. Among others, one could cite Eumenes 11; Antonius 51; Pyrrhus 16; Timoleon 14; Romulus 5.
43. Descola (1996, 202) notes that the Jivaro seem to use vendettas in much the same way, as a means of alleviating the tedium of their lives. The Jivaro sound rather like academics.
44. Farquharson 1944, 46–77.
45. The hypochondria, in the modern sense, of Marcus Aurelius and his correspondent here, Fronto, could be linked with this expression of “sick in life.” On their hypochondria as something symptomatic of their era, see Bowersock 1995; on hypochondria more generally as a cultural phenomenon see Baur 1988.
46. Barry Jones, a prominent Australian Labour politician until recently, claimed, in a report to the Australian Parliament entitled Expectations of Life: Increasing the Options for the Twenty-First Century, that for Australian workers, “boredom was one of the country’s ‘greatest economic problems.’” He apparently believes it has “created a ‘ perverse attraction’ to drive long distances from home to work” (Stanaway 1992, 3). Such boredom would be described by Lepenies (1992) or by Deleuze and Guattari (1977) as depression. Perhaps it does not deserve description at all.
47. Lucan has an equally vivid term, mens conscient (7.784: et quantum poenae misero mens
conscia donat [what portion of punishment did self-awareness provide for the wretch]).
(Mens conscia = guilt; cf. Euripides’ suisis in Orestes 396. Donat is usually understood as “makes a present of,” “remits,” or “excuses.”)

48. The depressive melancholia of chapter 1 and the depressive lovesickness of chapter 2, it hardly needs to be pointed out, are built upon a similar divide.

49. See Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986, 118.

50. Various cultures may make the experience harder to cope with than do others. Agrarian societies, where there is a greater correlation between aims and outcomes, and, to an even greater extent, premodern societies, where little industrial estrangement is possible, may suffer this to a lesser degree. It has often been suggested that the difficulties experienced by premodern societies in adapting to the expectations of modern, industrialized societies result in part from their inability to cope with the privileged nature of the subject-object rupture in Western society.

51. The topic of leisure and play is recapitulated in chapter 7.

52. Alice in Wonderland (what can I say but that it is handily translated as Alicia in Terra Mirabili by Clive Harcourt Carruthers) is perhaps one of the few examples of an evocation of the state of mind engendered by the childhood rupture between subject and object. Alice is clearly caught between identity and discriminate consciousness at the outset (note that she dislikes books without pictures, preferring the visual to the discursive, and that, not surprised to hear the White Rabbit talking to himself, she only reflects on the oddness of his taking a timepiece out of his waistcoat). Falling down the rabbit hole or well takes her into the topsy-turvydom of adult logic as it is experienced by a child. La Barre 1972, 92–120, is interesting on this matter. La Barre notes (118 n. 13): “The ‘fuzziness’ between the self and object can best be described in terms of the voluminous empirical researches of Jean Piaget”—see Piaget 1929, 1954. See also Douglas 1966, 108: on “… the fumbling efforts of children to master their environment.” She goes on to say: “Whether we follow Klein or Piaget, the theme is the same; confusion of internal and external, of thing and person, self and environment, sign and instrument, speech and action. Such confusions may be necessary and universal stages in the passage of the individual from the chaotic, undifferentiated experience of infancy to intellectual and moral maturity.” This position is attacked by Donaldson (1978). My only comment here is this: the change that we witness in the various emotional registers surveyed in this book, whether it is real-life or discursive, is a genuine one that is more or less quantifiable. The change involves a movement away from a type of a Piagetian “egocentric illusion” to something that, while hardly “decentered” (to use the term of Donaldson 1978), at least acknowledges the separateness of the self from the world about. Societal change as I have described it thus mirrors the change posited for the movement away from or out of childhood argued for by Piaget and others. To my mind this suggests that Piaget’s arguments, though perhaps extreme (like those of Lévy-Bruhl [1923] or Bruno Snell [1953]), nonetheless have a basis in real experience. In my opinion the “egocentric illusion” is real, but not as extreme as Piaget and his followers suggest. In the introduction to the present book, I have stated my views on what I see as the weakness of Donaldson’s argument.

53. See La Barre 1972, 95. The themes of nostalgia and homesickness relate to this complex of ideas. See Virgil Eclogues 1, 3. On nostalgia see Davis 1979; Brunnert 1984; Heuser 1994 (I have not seen the last two). Boym (2001) links the “invention” of nostalgia with the

54. I thank Peter Dale for assistance in formulating these paragraphs.

55. On the notion of trauma, though not necessarily of the type to which I am referring here, see Leys 2000.

CHAPTER 4

2. The phrase comes from Reid 1983, 100.
3. See also Reid 1983, 36 (on Aboriginal sorcerers and their killing), 37 f. (on their modes of killing), 42 (on boning specifically).
4. On the practice of Australian Aboriginal magic and medicine see also Elkin 1944. Reid (1983, xiv) provides a useful bibliography on magic and Aboriginal healing. (I have not yet seen Kozak and Lopez 2000.) Reid (1983, 126 f.) quotes a very useful firsthand description of the effects of boning:

   Someone pointed the bone at me last year and I nearly died. I was very sick. I was febrile and could see mokuy and people in front of my eyes. They took me to hospital and operated and found I had appendicitis. It was due to *manggimanggi*. I wasn’t afraid, though, because I was praying. The next day [the adult male *marnggitj*] came to the hospital, found the *manggimanggi* and took it out. The operation was very successful. They told me I was swearing at the nurses when I woke up! Dad knows who did it. The man lives at Yirrkala. But dad won’t do anything in the legal way [implication: he will arrange punishment by sorcery].

5. See also Maddock 1974, 166.
6. For an ethnographic parallel see Reid 1983, 46.
7. Devereux (1970) would also link these with an “anxiety attack.” Lucretius (3.152–58) lists these symptoms as the product of fear (was he imitating Sappho?):

   Nevertheless, when mind is stirred by a greater fear,
   We observe the whole body feel it throughout its members,
   So there are sweats and pallor over the whole
   Body, and the tongue is crippled and the voice is broken,
   The eyes cloud, the ears ring, the limbs give way.
   Then we observe, from mental terror, men often
   Falling down.

   There are parallels to be found in Homer—see Marcovich 1991, 38; Page 1955, 29 n. 1. That comes as no surprise, for fear is no culturally specific phenomenon.

8. A remarkable instance of this is to be found in Aurelius Victor’s *De Caesaribus* (33.5). During the era of the Roman emperor Gallienus (253–68 C.E.), such was the psychic despair (*desperatio animi*) of the Roman people, according to Aurelius Victor, that it made them prone to war and pestilence. States Aurelius Victor: “such things usually happen when one
has become bowed under great concerns, and when despair reigns in people’s spirits.” I draw this reference from den Boer 1968 (266) and Bickerman 1972 (24).

9. Compare Reid 1983, 54 (cf. 69 ff.: to combat sorcery there is a class of healers called *marnggiti*) and my chapter 2 generally (and the references there to the evil eye).

10. The most useful study (with which I am familiar) on long-distance sorcery is Reid 1983.

11. Peter Dale suggests to me an intriguing link between boredom and exalted religious states. He speculates that boredom, at least in Western usage, frequently refers to the tedium of talk and of language bereft of evocative power. Because object deprivation and the loss of joy in the attachment to ourselves and the world around us leads to melancholy (a passive state in which the state relates to an internalized, mourned object that cannot be located) or annoyance (active boredom that has found an external cause to blame for its sense of the void), boredom, in one sense, acts as a prelude to mystical afflatus, insofar as it points to the void that a disenchanted world appears to be in certain states of mind. Many are bored and alleviate the feeling by distraction in ephemera. The mystic insists on cultivating and staring in the face of aggravations, of sensory deprivation in order to elicit its opposite, the blinding yet ineffable experience that suddenly makes existence, even at its most banal, infused with a glow of transcendental meaning.

12. This is true in the most unexpected of places. See, for example, Aldous Huxley 1923, 18–25; Waugh 1983; Judd 1986 (reviewed in the *Times Literary Supplement*, June 26, 1987, 697).

13. The issue, for better or worse, has narrowed in on definitions: does the condition represent a form of depression, or (without canvassing the grades in between) does it represent, simply, a type of boredom? Starobinski (1962, 31–44) and Kristeva (1987, 17) see it as a type of depression. For Kuhn (1976, 39–64) and Bouchez (1973, 31–34) acedia is an enervating form of boredom, albeit one with psychological ramifications. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl (1964, 75–78), after seeming to describe acedia as a severe form of depression, refuse to name the state. Following their lead, Jackson (1986, 67), who delivers one recent treatment of the problem, steers the middle course. Siegfried Wenzel (1967), concentrating on the word *acedia* itself, maintains that there is no single definition. (See also Jonard 1998, 23 ff.)

14. The business of affective somatization will reappear in chapter 6, in particular with Trimalchio. It is of considerable importance and deserves some stress here. We have, in the previous three chapters, noticed how emotions such as melancholia, lovesickness, and boredom move in time from an acted-out or externalized mode (manic almost) to, eventually, an internalized or corporealized mode (near depressive). This corporealization seems to gain prevalence in the first century of our era. So, for example, melancholy becomes associated popularly with the quartan fever, lovesickness with wasting, and boredom with nausea. In chapter 6 we will observe that Trimalchio corporealizes time itself (not an emotion, but an emotional register) as indigestion and constipation. This type of corporealization soon leads to a medicalization of these emotions and affective registers. (This notion of affective corporealization gained some popularity in the 1980s—see Joshel 1992.)

15. Showalter (1997, 17) is very helpful on this matter. She suggests that the preconditions for “hysterical epidemics [are] . . . physician-enthusiasts; unhappy, vulnerable patients; and supportive cultural environments.” She characterizes hysteria as an affective condition
“that produces the appearance of disease although the patient is unconscious of the motives for feeling sick” (14).

16. By analogy, these are the conditions under which many other such psychic illnesses transmit. These are surveyed trenchantly in Showalter 1997; Hacking 1995, 1998 (cf. Toohey 1999b).

17. The use of the term *infection* may seem unnecessarily anachronistic. It is sometimes claimed that ancient medicine had no understanding of infection in the modern sense. This seems to me to be less than certain. I offer here one instance of a recognition of the communicability of illness. This is taken from Aretaeus’s discussion of *elephas* (8.13.1; trans. Adams [1856, 494]): “and, moreover, there is danger in living or associating with it no less than with the plague, for the infection *baphê* is thereby communicated by the respiration *anapnoês gar es metadosin réidiê baphê*.”

18. Elizabeth Marshall Thomas (1993) speaks interestingly of the pining and sorrow that can be observed in animals, especially dogs.

19. Nietzsche’s *On the Genealogy of Morals* is helpful on ascetics’ will to power. The will to power is best seen as an assertion of self—perhaps if it is pushed too far we end up with the situation of acedia. Compare France 1995.

20. It cannot be stressed enough how often this emotion is “colonized” by those without a historical sense. For example, Deleuze and Guattari (1977, xx and passim), linking the state and depression, imagine that a removal of Oedipal, colonial, capitalistic, patriarchal values will free us all from this condition.

21. I have heard Australian Aboriginal leaders from the outback argue that young Aboriginal men’s suicide rates increase dramatically when their football team is not operating. I have read in Canada’s national newspaper *Globe and Mail*—the report was hearsay—that petrol sniffing among the Inuit young declined when as simple a thing as a ice-hockey rink was present in the community. A comparable report appeared in the *Sydney Morning Herald* (Bradley 2001).

22. *Peri tôn oktô logismôn pros Anatolion* (*Patrologia Graeca* 40.1271 ff.). The best discussion is by Wenzel (1967). (See also Arbesmann 1958.)


24. *Logos parainetikos pros Stageirion askestôn daimonônta* (*Patrologia Graeca* 47.423 ff.), written in 380 or 381 C.E.

25. Compare Reid 1983, 52. Perhaps Stagirius was a schizophrenic.

26. Cassian wrote *De institutis cenobiorum* (*Patrologia Latina* 49.53 ff.)—published 425—a description of monastic life as he knew it from Palestine and Egypt; books 5–12 treat the eight vices; book 10 (*Patrologia Latina* 49.359 ff.) is written *de spiritu acediae*. (Translations are Ramsey 2000 and Jean-Claude Guy 2001.) Cassian also wrote the *Collationes patrum* (*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* 13), pretended reports of “conferences” with the most famous desert fathers. This was published about 426–28. Generally on Cassian see Chadwick 1968.


28. Cassian seems to have adapted Chrysostomos (*Patrologia Graeca* 47.489). On the relation of Chrysostomos and Cassian see Chadwick 1968, 9.

29. I have discussed this matter at more length in chapter 1. The crucial reference is
Galen *Introductio seu medicus* 14.740.16, in which passage Bellerophon’s status as a melancholic is affirmed.

30. Elsewhere (*Epistles* 130.17, *ad Demetriadem*) St. Jerome discusses the mental derangement that arises from poor surroundings: “I know that sanity can be damaged in both sexes through excessive abstinence . . . with a result that they don’t know what to do, where to turn, what to say, or when to be quiet.”

31. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl 1964, 75 f. For discussion of medical knowledge in the early church see D’Irsay 1927. Wenzel (1967, 191–94) provides a useful compilation of links between acedia and the Galenic humoral theories of the origin of illness; he writes (193), “That acedia is sometimes related to melancholy (1), sometimes to a phlegmatic disposition (2), illustrates the fact brought out repeatedly in our survey of its history: that by 1200 acedia comprised two essentially different vices, grief and indolence.”

32. The solution, as we have seen, is that advocated by Cicero and Seneca as a solution for melancholia—the exercise of the will. Such over-easy and dreary conclusions have be-deviled the diagnosis and treatment of this illness.

33. Bloomfield 1952, 73. The text is *Patrologia Latina* 80.10 ff. See also Bloomfield 1952, 358 n. 50, where, quoting Chadwick on Cassian, Bloomfield notes that Eutropius may depend for his listing on Cassian *Collationes* 5.2.10–16.

34. According to Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl (1964, 76 n. 23), a discussion of his views on acedia may be found in Paget 1903, 8 ff.

35. Bloomfield 1952, 77. The text is *Patrologia Latina* 83.95–98.


37. See Müri 1953 on Hippocratic notions of melancholy and black bile; on the Hippocrates generally see Smith 1979. For the larger view see Neuburger 1909.


39. See Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl 1964, 45 f., for a discussion of Celsus and a bibliography. The authors point out that Celsus bases his work on that of Asclepiades of Bithynia, who came to Rome in 91 B.C.E. and went on to become a friend of Cicero (see Vallance 1990). Jackson (1986, 33) believes that Celsus may have been influenced by humoral theory.

40. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl (1964, 49) make this statement as part of their general discussion (48–55) of Rufus of Ephesus. Rufus’s work on melancholy is reconstructed from fragments and citations: see Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl 1964, 49. The text for the remains of Rufus of Ephesus is now Gärtner 1970. Jackson (1986, 407) refers to the translation of Darenberg and Ruelle (1879).


Soranus survives in a Latin translation made at the end of the fourth century by Caelius Aurelianus (De morbis acutis et chronicis). For a text see Drabkin 1950.

The translation is drawn from Jackson 1986, 40 citing Adams 1856, 298.

This parallel is pointed out by Rosen (1968, 98). The New Testament references are Luke 8:26, 29; Mark 5:3; Matthew 8:28. Demonic possession, in some of its aspects, may be compared generally—see Lewis 1971; La Barre 1972; Cohn 1957.

For discussion of medical knowledge in the early church see D’Irsay 1927.

John Chrysostomos’s alarming linking of the condition with the loose—perhaps homosexual—lifestyle is such a one.

I would include even the mode by which we react to our capacity to read. I have a few remarks (and references) on this matter in Toohey 1996.

The earliest uses of the word to mean “boredom” may be Hellenistic. But these could just as easily be taken to mean “annoyance.” See the previous chapter.

There remains a third aspect of acedia for which I have not offered parallels. This is frustration. It has been argued by Wemelsfelder (1989) that frustration precedes boredom. As far as the literary condition is concerned, this is a less easy concept to pin down. To avoid the attendant imprecision, I have omitted its consideration. It could be observed that horror loci may be as good an example of frustration as one is liable to find.

Chrysostomos, however, did not see it this way. He lists melancholici along with a variety of other sinners (Patrologia Graeca 47.451).

So, too, suggests St. Jerome (Letters 95, 97), who alludes to the melancholy that arises from poor surroundings.

Patrologia Graeca 47.426.

The notion of contagion has become a very popular one in cultural studies. Dan Sperber uses it of what he calls “mental representations”—beliefs and so on. (I am using it of psychosis.) Sperber’s book has been published in English as Explaining Culture (1996; reviewed in the Times Literary Supplement, June 20, 1997). Sperber’s approach was attacked in the Times Literary Supplement (July 4, 1997, 14–15) by Regis Debray, who mentions a number of other books concerned with “contagion” in the cultural sphere (e.g., Siegfried 1960). See also Cullen 1993. The popularity has spread to the natural sciences. I presume that this is the result of the relatively recent appearance of AIDS, the Ebola virus, and so forth. Paul W. Ewald (2000), rejecting both environment and genes, apparently wants to link mental illness, such as schizophrenia or manic depression, to viral infection. He links schizophrenia, for example, to the protozoan Toxoplasma gondii, which is, again apparently, carried by domestic cats. Ewald speculates that cats may pass it on to humans when they live in close proximity to us. Regions and periods where cats live in close proximity to humans, such as in the northern-hemisphere winter, should register higher rates of schizophrenia. I have not been able to ascertain whether Ewald has noted a very high incidence of schizophrenia among Canadians, many of whom keep their cats indoors all year round because of the severity of the climate. Nor have I been able to ascertain whether Australian schizophrenia rates are correspondingly lower. In Australia, cats are habitually kept outdoors. (Cf. the review of Ewald’s book by Julius Schachter in the New England Journal of Medicine 344, no. 15 [April 12, 2001].)

The best discussion of the viral analogy and the transmission of hysterical conditions such as acedia is to be found in Showalter 1997, 60.
56. Viral attacks have become rather popular in current literature: see, for example, Preston 1994; Garrett 1994.

57. McNeill 1976 is very helpful on the notions of pestilential infection and spread. For the viral analogy applied to psychological conditions see Showalter 1985, 1997.

58. For modern parallels see Showalter 1997. With less sweep, Tom Lutz’s American Nervousness (1991) examines the “outbreak” of neurasthenia among American artists, writers, and intellectuals at the turn of the twentieth century.

59. Golden (1977) reports of a case in Littlerock, Arkansas, of an Afro-American man who had been having seizures and hallucinations and was becoming increasingly irritable and withdrawn from his family when he was admitted to a medical center for psychiatric treatment. All medical examinations, including a brain scan, found absolutely nothing wrong with him. But his condition continued to deteriorate, and within two weeks he had a massive heart attack and died. The autopsy found no cause for his death at only thirty-three. Golden believes that the man was killed by voodoo. After the man died, his wife revealed he had been seeing a witch doctor. The widow said she believed her husband had angered the “two headed,” as the female witch doctor was known, and that as a result the witch doctor had caused his death. See also Cannon 1957; Mathis 1964; Milton 1973.

60. An Australian Aboriginal was brought to the Darwin hospital in April 1956, apparently dying of this type of sorcery. He was placed in an oxygen tank and fed intravenously. He gradually recovered, convinced that the white man’s magic was stronger. See Arthur Morley’s article in the London Sunday Times, April 22, 1956, 11.

61. Fugue does have implications for contemporary mental health. The big question posed by Hacking in Mad Travellers (1998) is this: are fugue and comparable disorders the products of our own societies and whims, or are they universals, true through time? Have people always had ME, RSI, bulimia; or are these syndromes products of the neurotic end of the twentieth century? Hacking, despite his agnosticism, leans toward social construction. (Your ME, RSI, post-traumatic stress disorder, MPD, or DID may hurt, but it is not quite real. It has been invented by your society.)

62. The “Paraquat suicides” in contemporary Western Samoa offer another disheartening parallel: “Families throughout Western Samoa are struggling to come to terms with a tragic epidemic of youth suicide . . . Demographers say the official rate of 40 deaths per 100,000, out of a total Samoan population of 160,000, is probably underestimated. The isolation of the island of Savaii and the stigma of suicide among its many Christians are reasons why some suicides are not recorded. About four-fifths of the young men who kill themselves drink the toxic weed-killer Paraquat, which means a high proportion of suicide attempts succeed. A United Nations Children’s Fund report warned South Pacific countries about their suicide rates, some of which are 20 times higher than comparable figures in the United States or Australia . . . The young men sometimes commit suicide in public—drinking Paraquat as a kind of display . . . Earlier this month, Laufau, a mother with a one-year-old son, threatened to leave her husband if he did not give up alcohol. He reacted by drinking a bottle of Paraquat and died in hospital in Apia two weeks later. Her brother committed suicide in a similar fashion last year . . . Ms Moelagi Jackson, a village chief or Matai, runs the Safua hotel and saw her cousin commit suicide after he joined a religious cult and quarrelled with his family. She believes most suicides are due to the clash between the old and the new ways . . . The Reverend Nuu’Osamea, a leading Protestant churchman
in Apia, despairs of the death toll. ‘At times we feel things are getting out of hand,’ he said. ‘We really don’t know how to deal with the situation because we only hear when someone has done a successful job. You’re left with a feeling of helplessness.’ He believes the main cause of youth suicide is the scolding of youngsters by authoritarian parents. “The young people go through a lot of stress, and the most available option for them is to be finished off from this life” (Zinn 1995).

CHAPTER 5

The quote from Tatz is drawn from a report on indigenous youth suicide (an apparent epidemic) in New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory, and New Zealand. The context of this quotation is as follows: “On being taken into cells the youth invariably says, ‘I’ll neck myself, and you’ll lose your job.’ My life he proposes, for your discomfort. Is he drunk? Does he mean it? . . . He says it, and in so doing, he infers that he’ll be around to witness his fleeting moment of sovereignty.”

1. The greatest success rate is in fiction. Nice representatives are Cleite in Apollonius’ Argonautica or Ovid’s Byblis (Metamorphoses 9.457 ff.). On both I note (but have not yet seen) Jackson 1997.

2. I suspect that many alcohol related suicides fit this category. The life affirmation involved in the assertion of the young Aboriginal man (under the influence of alcohol) that is quoted by Colin Tatz is typical.

3. Chaereas’s departure reflects a topos to be seen in Apollonius of Rhodes Argonautica 1.250–59 and Valerius Flaccus Argonautica 1.693–852. In Valerius’s version the parents actually commit suicide.

4. For a different reading of this scene see MacAlister 1996, 28; Konstan 1994, 17. Perkins (1995, 96–103) links the underlying ideas behind Chaereas’s leap to Epictetus’s brand of Stoicism.

5. Some discussions of suicide in the ancient world are Van Hoof 1990; Plass 1995; MacAlister 1996; Hirzel 1908; Grisé 1983; Griffin 1976, 367–88; Garrison 1991, 1995; Bowersock 1995, 59–74. Compare Dillon 1994. Van Hooff (1990, 6—following Durkheim 1952; cf. Taylor 1822) defines suicide as “any case of death which results, directly or indirectly, from an act, positive or negative, accomplished by the victim himself and in the knowledge that it would necessarily produce this result.” See also MacAlister 1996, 14–15.


7. This is the direct opposite of what, for example, MacAlister (1996, 56 ff.) argues in her fascinating and helpful book. She sees despair in these suicides. I see self-advertisement. See also Perkins 1995, 96–103.

8. Suicide attempts may be found in the following places within Chariton’s novel: 1.5.2, 1.6.1, 2.11.3–4, 3.3.1, 3.3.6, 3.5.6, 3.7.6, 4.2.1, 4.3.6, 4.3.9, 5.10.6, 6.3.8, 6.6.2, 7.1.6, 7.5.14.

9. The only person not to suffer repeatedly from lovesickness is Callirhoe. It is notable that the more robust Callirhoe, in love but seldom lovesick, is rarely tempted by suicide. I wonder if this is evidence that Chariton may have been a woman (cf. 2.11.3–4, 6.6.2, 7.6.8)?
10. For falling see 1.1.6, 1.1.14, 2.7.14, 4.1.9; for the black swoon (designated as achlus, nux, nephele, or skotos), 1.1.14, 2.7.4, 2.8.1.
11. See 1.1.8, 2.4.1, 4.2.4, 6.3.2–3.
12. For depression see 2.6.1, 4.2.8; for a deathlike trance, 6.1.6–12; for blushing, 4.2.13, 6.3.1; for silence, 2.4.2, 4.2.13, 6.3.2–3; for insomnia, 2.4.2, 6.7.2; for weeping, 1.1.14, 4.2.13, 6.3.2–3; for the sweats, 4.2.13. We are close to the “anxiety attacks” discussed in chapter 2.
13. For wasting see 1.1.8–9, 2.7.4, 4.2.4; for suicide by starvation, 3.1.1, 6.3.8; for hanging, 5.10.6; for cutting the throat, 7.1.6. It is worth noting at this point that this symptomatology bears a fairly close resemblance to that attributed to boning by Basedow in his description cited at the beginning of the previous chapter.
14. Jealousy may cause speechlessness (1.4.7, 1.4.10), depression (1.3.4), the swoons (1.4.6), a state resembling mourning (1.4.6), weeping (1.4.7), suicidal urges (1.4.7), and anger (cited shortly).
15. Compare Dionysius at 3.1.3, 3.7.4, 3.9.10, 4.5.9–10; Chaereas at 3.6.3–4.
16. A challenging parallel for Artaxerxes’ state of mind is to be found in a remarkable painting (fig. 6) in the Museo Nazionale di Napoli, reproduced in Maiuri 1957 (84) as “Zeus malinconico” (I thank Dr. Sonia Hewitt for providing me with access to this painting). In this wall painting (which no doubt stems from the era of Chariton—I am assuming a Neronian date) is pictured a bored, even melancholic Jupiter. Why is he bored? Idleness is no doubt the cause, though this is not hinted at in the painting (Jupiter might have remarked, along with Seneca, fit aliquando huius rei nausia). The clue to the melancholy is probably provided by the representation of Cupid leaning over his right shoulder. Is that god present to encourage Jupiter toward further diverting love exploits among the humans who inhabit the worldly vistas to his rear? Jupiter will have none of it, the painting seems to be saying. Satiety (and idleness?) has bred a melancholy that further affairs can only prolong. If we could draw a parallel between Jupiter and Artaxerxes, then we might want to compare their mental states and even suggest that Zeus is ripe for a Callirhoe.
17. See chapter 2 for a discussion of this word.
19. See, for example, Theocritus 2.106 ff. But we could also point to Basedow’s boning.
22. For this concept of theatricality see Leigh 1997.
23. What the sword will actually do to Ajax is illustrated on a black-figure vase, dated to ca. 580 B.C.E., that is reproduced as an illustration in Shapiro 1994, 151 (cf. 1153).
25. Suicide, it is worth noting, was condemned by Plato (Laws 871a–3d) and Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 1138a5 ff.) particularly when it involved cowardice. A despairing reaction may have come under the same rubric. On Plato and Aristotle see MacAlister 1996, 6, citing Garrison 1991, 18–19. (There is an interesting discussion of suicide in Plotinus by Dillon [1994].)
26. Giton’s words to Encolpius “You’re wrong . . . if you think by any possible chance you can die before me” match the sentiment, if not the actual words, that we will see
expressed to Argus by his father (who intends to kill himself before his son dies): “you can still outlive me.”

27. On Petronius’s death see Plass 1995, 111. See also Plass 1995, 90, on Tiberius’s chagrin when someone kills himself before Tiberius can strike him (“Why, he escaped me!” Suetonius Tiberius 61.5). Plass (123) also provides an interesting schematic analysis of the place of suicide within the mechanics, as he sees them, of the imperial Roman power game.


29. We must be honest at this point. Petronius may have been a real-life person, but as described by Tacitus he is as subject to Tacitus’s historiographical bias as any characters in fiction.

30. On political suicide at Rome see Plass 1995. My discussion by and large avoids political suicide and its implications (except in the cases of Lucan and Seneca, whose death’s seem to echo their prose works). I have avoided political suicide because it is forced from without. My interest has been in the suicide driven from within, such as those passive and apparently private suicides of Chariton and others. Plass (95) suggests that political suicide may be little more than imperial execution.

31. It is very hard not to think at this point of Arthur Koestler’s act of personal euthanasia, accompanied also by his apparently guileless wife, Cynthia.

32. Bowersock (1995, 59–74) discusses the modes by which the early Christian enthusiasm for martyrdom, another form of suicide, matches and indeed is dependent on the Stoic ideal of the mors voluntaria. (Lucretius 3.72 ff. might profitably, if cynically, be compared: Lucretius believes that suicide happens because people fear death.) See also the panoptic study of MacAlister (1996, especially 84–114) for a discussion of Christian martyrdom and suicide.

33. I apologize for the brevity of these comments. I have repeated them elsewhere in this book. My apology should be applied there too. The topic is too vast—too slippery as well—for proper treatment here. I would like to be able to say that I will leave it to others for demonstration.

34. I have a discussion of other aspects of this matter in the next chapter (concerning time). Seneca’s fascination with the course of time, with ecpyrosis, and with mass annihilation generally seems to reflect a troubled infatuation with death.

35. It is almost as if we witness here a suicidal epidemic (there was an “epidemic” of political suicide in this period). This should be compared to the epidemic of acedia discussed in the previous chapter and to the implications of the practice of boning.


37. The psychic danger faced by Argus’s father perhaps may be associated with psychological disintegration. When Argus’s father spotted his son dying, “night came over him and huge shadows covered his eyes” (3.735). This type of swoon was a typical precursor of a suicide attempt. A comparable line in Homer (Iliad 5.659) is used to characterize the affect of death on a Trojan warrior.

38. On the futility of suicidal resistance see Plass 1995, 83; Tacitus Agricola 42.3.

39. So we can see from Cornelia’s utterances at 8.654–55. Hanging is associated sometimes with women—see Loraux 1987.

40. The phrase is like the libido moriendi used by Seneca at Epistles 24.25.
42. Once again, it is worth noting that we seem to witness an epidemic of suicides in this period that, as Chariton shows, owed its origin to more than just current conditions at Rome. (Showalter [1997] would term this a hysterical epidemic.)
43. I am not speaking here at all of trauma, such as sexual abuse when young. This can present a comparable set of reactions.
44. The reaction can be psychic. A psychic reaction may be, in general, more typical of premodern societies and of children.
45. They are the symptoms of the victim of boning, as Basedow describes him (cited at the beginning of chapter 4).
46. MacAlister (1996, 16), for example, links a rise in suicide to the uncertainties of the late Hellenistic age (and links this with Durkheim’s notion of the “egotistic” suicide). This is, approximately, also the position of Konstan (1994). Swain (1996) sees no such uncertainties in the urban life of, at any rate, the Greeks of this period. I believe that any convincing explanation (indeed any convincing description) must include Greek and Roman evidence side by side.
47. Seneca, at Epistles 77.6, makes even more plain the link between suicide and fastidium vitae when he states that mori velle etiam fastidious potest. The term velle mori is also used by Lucan at Civil War 4.280.
48. A curious variant on this emotion is provided at Epictetus 1.9.12: Epictetus warns against the enthusiasm of young men for doing away with themselves after learning of the advantages of the Stoic afterlife. This type of an erōs thanatōu, it seems to me, is parasitic on a widespread acceptance of self-killing as an alternative to a less than salubrious present life (cf. Griffin 1976, 387).
49. An exception is the Persian king Artaxerxes.
50. The argument goes like this: Roman emperors such as Nero were generating suicides among the elite at a distressing rate. The actions of the principate, therefore, will go some distance to explain the heightened interest in the matter (not to say its practice) by authors such as Seneca, Petronius, and Lucan. (But this will not explain Chariton’s striking fascination for the matter: he wrote in Greek and did not live in Rome.) I doubt that this is a matter of cause and effect, however. We should think of it this way: the power exercised by the principate, for better or worse, highlights or, to use the expression I have favored, problematizes the issue of control. (I doubt that it matters whether you live in Rome or in Asia Minor, if power is at issue.) Most of the acts of suicide described in this chapter respond precisely to this problematization. They cannot be seen as acts of existential despair. Rather, they represent very public acts of self-assertion in contexts where personal control has been severely challenged or, worse, curtailed. That such a representation of suicide coincides with a historical period in which the principate used enforced suicide as a means of punishment and control makes the frequency of suicide and suicide attempts in literature all the more predictable. (Plass [1995, 90] looks at suicide and Roman social etiquette. Something larger still than Roman mores is operating here, as the instance of Chariton demonstrates.)
51. Epidemics of suicide did occur in antiquity, at least according to the literary sources. Plutarch (De muliebris virtutibus 11) speaks of a mysterious epidemic afflicting the women of Milletus. They were inexplicably hanging themselves. (Speculation had it that poisoned air deranged their minds.) The epidemic, according to Plutarch, was stopped by a law insisting
that women who had perished thus should have their bodies carried naked through the agora on the way to their funerals. See also Stadter 1965, 76–77; Bowersock 1995, 65.

52. The epidemic of acedia, surveyed in the last chapter, offers a neat parallel for the modes by which affective contagion may take place.

53. Why did this literary epidemic break out in the nineteenth century? I suspect that the answer may be found in part in the social forces identified of fugue by Hacking (1998) and Showalter (1997) and in part in the sociological changes, underscored by Bourdieu (1996), that took place in this period in the marketplace of art and artistic self-representation.

CHAPTER 6

1. Modern scientific notions of time are relevant, insofar as they point to the relativity of the concept of time. Paul Davies’s popular book About Time (1995) is helpful here. Davies, however, has been chastised for not attempting to analyze (1) the conflict between “philosophical” time (thus the theorizing of Husserl, Heidegger, or Bergson) and scientific time and (2) the conflict between human concepts of time and scientific ones (exemplified in the “celebrated confrontation between Bergson and Einstein on this very point”: see Brian Rotman’s review [1996, 29] of Davies’s book). More generally on time see Macey 1989; Aveni 1989; Borst 1993; Davison 1993.

2. This paragraph restates Toohey 1997c, 50.

3. This cannot be the case for animals and small children, who live in a relatively time-less zone. Randall Jarrell’s poem “The Woman at the Washington Zoo” (1959) makes this point of animals and time. The relevant lines of his moving poem run as follows (the narrator is speaking of himself):

   this serviceable
   Body that no sunlight dyes, no hand suffuses
   But, dome-shadowed, withering among the columns,
   Wavy beneath fountains—small, far-off, shining
   In the eyes of animals, these being trapped
   As I am trapped but not, themselves, the trap,
   Ageing, but without knowledge of their age,
   Kept safe here [the zoo], knowing not of death, for death
   —Oh, bars of my own body, open, open!

4. Arrowsmith (1966, 307) notes of Trimalchio’s circumstances, “wealth brings thoughts of defecation (for wealth is symbolically a satiety that cannot evacuate itself).”


6. Compare Arrowsmith 1966, 309: “food consumed to the point of satiety is an instance, a symbol, of luxuria; the end of satiety is constipation; and flatulent vapours ‘go straight to your brain and derange your whole system,’ and especially the reason which should, at least in the Epicurean ethics, control the appetites. ‘I know someone who died . . . from holding it in.’ That is, luxuria is death, extinction of the rational will.”

7. Elizabeth Marshall Thomas (1993, 137) describes how knowledge through the body
is natural to dogs but not to us primates. She is speaking in this instance of death. I am suggesting in this chapter, however, that Trimalchio corporealizes time (within the body) as an illness. Understanding through the body is not quite the same thing as this process of visceral internalization that I have been discussing (following many others).

8. It is, that is to say, akin to the hysterical illnesses that I focused on particularly in chapter 4 (on acedia). There, following Showalter (1997, 14), it was suggested that hysteria implies “behaviour that produces the appearance of disease although the patient is unconscious of the motives of feeling sick.” The parallels with lovesickness (discussed in chapter 2) should also be apparent.

9. Petronius’s novel may be sui generis, but his concept of time is not. Seneca periodically alludes to the serial nature of time’s movement. The best place to see this is in his essay De brevitate vitae. It may be worth noting that the essay finishes with a mock funeral, that of Sextus Turannius. Bettini 1991 has some interesting observations on Seneca and time. For Stoic time see Goldschmidt 1979.

10. Perhaps Livy should also be included here. For a discussion of cyclical time in Livy see Beard 1987. Polybius (6.5 ff.) has some very interesting observations about the cyclical nature (the anacyclosis) of the appearance of constitutions in human society—see Walbank 1917, 643 ff.

11. It has been suggested, however, that the Trojan material of these first three books was not an insert but, rather, was freestanding (Büchner 1967, 9–25).

12. This summary is drawn from Toohey 1992c, 96.

13. In Silius Italicus’s epic poem Punica, Scipio is likened to Aeneas (and ecomiastically to the emperor Domitian, under whom this poem was written). History thus repeats itself when we liken Scipio’s pilgrimage to Hades (13.400–895; here he learns of Rome’s future and the fate of Hannibal) to that of Aeneas; compare also Scipio’s celebration of funeral games in honor of his father (16.275–591; cf. Aeneid 5).

14. Marcellus had married Augustus’s daughter Julia and was earmarked as Augustus’s successor. He died at age nineteen in 23 B.C.E.

15. The same notion approximately animates Horace’s Carmen saeculare (alluded to earlier), which was written for Augustus’s centennial games of 17 B.C.E. The games were a festival to be held every eleventh decade and were designed to celebrate the preservation of the state. In this poem, at v. 49 ff., Augustus is addressed in precisely the same manner by which one would address Aeneas: “he of Anchises’ and Venus’ pure blood.” This principle of historical recurrence is also behind Virgil’s Eclologies 4.

16. Although temporal decline is a persistent topos (see, e.g., Virgil Georgics 1.463 ff., 1.121 ff.; Horace Epodes 7, 16 [cf. Lovejoy 1965; Dodds 1985]), much public literature affirmed a cyclical (or agrarian) concept of time. In the Aeneid Augustus completes a cycle in that he embodies the mythical Roman founder, Aeneas (6.752–853, 8.608–731). So he does in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, as we learn through Pythagoras’s teachings on metempsychosis (15.418–52). In Horace’s Carmen saeculare Augustan Rome renovates time, as it were, by its continuation of ancient festival. For this theme in architecture see Zanker 1988. Is the same pattern to be found in Livy? Walsh (1961, 16 ff.) has some helpful comments on this matter.

17. A recent discussion of modern concepts of time is Davies 1996.

18. This template is drawn explicitly from Toohey 1996.
19. Young children, however, are devoid of a clear sense of mortality. Where does that leave their sense of time? I suspect (or should I say that I recall) that their time is “longer” and inevitably repetitive, not unlike that of a dog or a cat. Time has no affective dimension for children.

20. The following is quoted from Rycroft 1997, 37:

To the primordial intelligence humanity held a central position in the cosmic order, lived in a state of intimate participation with nature (what Lévy-Bruhl called participation mystique), held a rhythmic, circular conception of time, inhabited a reality located in the world of the spirit, accepted moral values as absolute, regarded life as eternal, and believed myth and ritual to be indispensable to the health and vitality of the spirit. By contrast, to the modern intellect, humanity holds a peripheral position in the cosmic order, lives in a state of objective separation from nature, holds a progressive linear conception of time, inhabits a reality primarily located in the world of matter, accepts moral values as relative, regards life as strictly finite, and believes myth and ritual to be irrelevant to the requirements of modern life.

If this idea seems very old-fashioned now, I would remind the skeptical of the centrality of ritual in the premodern life and of the fact that it suffused most aspects and actions of an adult’s life. Every deed in a ritualized world recapitulates key primonial events. What is this but circularity?

21. Premodern societies that are not agriculturally based (and hence lack a strong sense of seasonal circularity) may see time differently again. Descola (1996) believes that the Achuar exist in a kind of a temporal amnesia.

22. The chapter “Primitive Worlds” in Douglas 1966 is helpful in locating, if not time specifically, at least the types of society in which such a view of time may flourish. I notice a useful contrast between time in illiterate and literate societies in Ignazio Silone’s Fontamara (1948, 10). Of the peasant village we read: “It was always the same. There was never any change. Years passed, years piled up, the young grew old, the old died. Sowing, weeding, pruning, spraying, mowing, and harvesting went on. What followed? No change of any kind. Every year was like the last year, every season like the last season, every generation like the one before.” The comparison with the literate town in the plain below the village reads: “Many things changed meanwhile down below in the plain, but at Fontamara nothing changed. The soil was meagre, dry and rocky. The meagre soil was divided and subdivided, racked with mortgages.”

23. See Pindar Olympian 2; Pythian 10.

24. On the circularity of the appearance of constitutions see Polybius 6.5 ff.; Walbank 1957, 643 ff.


26. Compare the following quote from Margo 1996, 9: “Professor John Kellow, a gastroenterologist at Sydney’s Royal North Shore Hospital, says constipation is known to be associated with depression. With depression the metabolic rate can become sluggish and the bowels can too.”

27. Flatulence was linked with melancholia by Diocles of Carystus—see Flashar 1966,
On flatulence generally see also Seneca *Natural Questions* 5.4.2. Aristotle (2.8.366b15–20) likens flatulence to earthquakes, a very telling comparison.

28. For the Greek text see Hude 1958.

29. Compare also Siegel 1973, 192.

30. For a link between diet and melancholia see Flashar 1966, 54.

31. Solomon 2001 is helpful on how time is registered as slowing down for the victim of affective disorder.

32. Kraepelin (1921, 55) stresses as characteristic of hypomania “the lack of inner unity of the course of ideas, the incapacity to carry out consistently a definite series of thoughts, to work out steadily and logically and to set in order given ideas”—all characteristics of a haste-driven temperament. Jamison (1993, 130) alludes to the sense of timelessness (or at least the circularity or repetitiveness of time) that can accompany depression. Time for the depressive is sometimes said to slow down. See Borgna 1991.

33. For a definition of cyclothymia see Goodwin and Jamison 1990, 49–54.

34. The following discussion is based on a paper entitled “The Course of Time in the Writings of Lucan and Some of His Contemporaries” delivered in Italian as “Il corso del tempo in Lucan” at a conference entitled “Il Bellum Civile di Lucan, Convegno Internazionale di Studi” and organized by Emanuele Narducci at the Università di Firenze in Florence in March 1999. It was also delivered in English a week earlier at the Department of Greek, Latin, and Ancient History, University of Calgary. Emanuele Narducci (2002, 42 ff.) touches on this same subject usefully in his recent book on Lucan, in a chapter entitled “Lo sfondo cosmico.” In this chapter he has two sections, “La fine di Roma e la dissoluzione dell’universo” and “Una catastrofe senza rinascita.” Narducci covers some of the same passages as I do, but of course from a different perspective.


36. See Barton 1993, 55.

37. This prejudice is not just a feature of the popular imagination. It can be seen in contemporary scientific circles: see, for example, Bull’s vividly titled 1995 book *Apocalypse Theory and the Ends of the World*. In respectable popular literature there are works such as Robert Kaplan’s bleak *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century* (1996) (reviewed by Kennedy [1996] as “doomsterism”). A less pertinent, but discursively typical, example (which, while pandering to the mood of catastrophism that became so prominent as we approached the end of the last millennium, offers a hostile perspective) is Arthur Herman’s *The Idea of Decline in Western Literature* (1997).

38. On *ecpyrosis* see Fantham 1982 (on Troades, 386–92); Tarrant 1985, 209–10; Rist 1969, 93, 175–76; Sandbach 1975, 78–79.

39. Seneca also refers to a mock funeral, that of Sextus Turannius, at the conclusion of the *De brevitate vitae*.

40. Not everyone was this selfish. Lucan tells us that Pompey, after the battle of Pharsalia, felt no such emotions. Of Pompey Lucan says (7.654–55): “nor, as is the habit of the wretched, did he wish to pull down everything / with him and to mingle the human race with his downfall . . .” Sometimes Claudian *In Rufinum* 2.17 ff. is compared: “what remains unless to confound all things in fresh grief / and to mix the innocent with
my destruction? / I’d like to perish in a destroyed world; universal destruction will provide me with solace for my death.” So, too, is Silius Italicus 8.335–37: “he drags everything down with him and fears, fool, that Rome may fall under some other consul.”

41. Compare Seneca Hercules Furens 178–80: *properat cursu / vita citato volucrique die rota praecipitis vertitur anni* [life hastens on its swift course and the wheel of the racing seasons spins with the swift day].

42. Seneca, in a small poem represented in the *Latin Anthology* (232; a handy translation by Marcus Wilson may be found in Boyle and Sullivan 1991, 391–92), neatly links the one-way course of time (“voracious time consumes it”) with “ecpyrotic,” catastrophe imagery (“the sky’s fair dome will blaze, the flames bursting in a flash”) (cf. *Dialogues* 10.10.6.2). I am not attempting to claim, however, that Seneca’s era invented this concept of time. What I am saying is that such a view of time became much more common in this period and that its representation seems to be bound discursively with a number of other related emotions (those surveyed in this book). Can we only speak usefully of “tendencies” and “discourse,” or, following the lead give us by the evidence of my chapter on acedia, should we speak of real-life attitudes? I favor the latter.

43. The pseudo-Senecan *Octavia* (831 ff.) may be relevant here. It depicts Nero as responsible for this Roman *conflagratio*.

44. See Barton 1993, 55, on this passage. Barton usefully links *Natural Questions* 6.2.9 (*si cadendum est, cadam orbe concusso* [if perish I must, let the whole world perish with me]). See, too, Leeman 1971 (*Toderlebnis* in Seneca).

45. Hardie (1986, 381; cf. Feeney 1991, 276) notes, “whereas the *Aeneid* is a poem about the creation of a universe, the *Bellum Civile* is about the destruction of a universe”; Feeney (1991, 278) suggests that the destruction of the Republic is a catastrophe of cosmic proportions.

46. In a much earlier version of portions of this chapter, I finished things with the following curious piece of evidence for this periodical continuity. Think back to Trimalchio’s trumpeting timepiece and the life span allotted to him by an astrologer, which the trumpet and the doomsday clock announced. Some years ago, in the *Sydney Morning Herald* (September 1, 1994, 21), I found the following report (I will let it speak for itself):

A clock which forecasts how long someone has to live is being sold in the United States. Based on the average life span—74 years for men and 79 for women—it is programmed with the owner’s age and gender and calculates his or her remaining hours and minutes.

CHAPTER 7

1. For discussions and analyses of this pot see, among others, Hurwitt 1985, 260–61; Kurke 1999, 261 ff. (with bibliography).

2. Kurke (1999, 261) notes: “most archaeologists have speculated that the image may have a literary source in an episode from one of the cyclic epics . . . Instead, I would suggest that the scene is invented in the sixth century as part of the civic appropriation of the
Trojan War story—an attempt to translate the heroes of epic into the context of the polis.” That would go some distance toward explaining the fact that Achilles and Ajax wear hoplite armor. Kurke goes on to observe (263), “In content and in style, the image affirms that the heroes are played in the game of civic warfare, even as they play on the board between them.”

3. Achilles dominates Ajax in height (the helmet places him above Ajax) and in the game itself. Inscribed on the pot are the current scores—four to Achilles and three to Ajax.

4. Mingazzini (1966) suggests that the heroes are so absorbed in their game that they have forgotten to return to battle.

5. The description by Hurwitt (1985, 260–61) is enormously helpful and should be used to supplement what I have to say.

6. Whether or not the same theme is preserved on the reverse side of the amphora deserves consideration. This preserves for us a family scene of the Dioscuroi—Pollux patting a horse, Castor patting a dog—in company with their parents, Tyndareus and Leda. A slave boy is present between Pollux and Tyndareus. Does the pacific nature of this family scene contrast (as does Achilles’ and Ajax’s game with the Trojan War) with the more normally violent and martial activities in which the Tyndaridae were usually involved?

7. The poignancy of the juxtaposition of Achilles and Ajax is achieved in yet another way. Ajax’s death results from that of Achilles. When he was, soon after Achilles’ death, denied the arms of Achilles in favor of Odysseus, the disappointment and shame of that decision led him to suicide. Hurwitt (1985, 260–61) also stresses the element of fate played out in this picture.

8. Part of the pleasure of this game results, initially, from its purposelessness but also because, requiring considerable concentration, it distracts and because it requires social interaction with another individual.


10. Argyle (1996), like many psychologists and sociologists, allows leisure to be what people want it to be—or, at any rate, what they say it is. Such catholicity opens a Pandora’s box of definitional woes. Hence, for example, religion is assessed as a very significant leisure activity. While religious observance may be therapeutic for some, it is normally performed with an end in mind, that of personal salvation. On such grounds we might as well consider bricklaying as a leisure activity because Winston Churchill found it such a restorative weekend activity. For weekday laborers it certainly represents personal salvation.

11. I admit, in this instance, to be attempting to be prescriptive, rather than descriptive, of leisure. Argyle (1996, 159) attempts to describe what is satisfying in leisure as follows: “The most satisfying forms of leisure have some of the features of work: they involve varied and meaningful activities, use of skills, serious commitment to goals, and membership of cohesive working groups.” Argyle’s results, by and large, are based on questionnaires that ask subjects to rate the degree of pleasure they obtained from various leisure activities.

12. There are sociological determinants for a person’s choice. A sedentary form of leisure is more appealing, no doubt, to a person whose work is more physically demanding. The converse may be true for sedentary academics.
13. Argyle (1996) stresses the therapeutic benefits associated with interactive or community leisure activities.

14. Mark Golden suggests here a comparison with A. Guttman’s suggestively titled *A Whole New Ball Game*.

15. My intention is not to adjudicate upon the universal validity of such a definition of leisure as I have just outlined but, rather, to suggest that it is helpful for looking at the various representatives of didactic epic. The concept I have suggested is, admittedly, elitist and is ultimately founded upon a culture where the division between work and leisure is pronounced, where work is something done for you, usually by a servant or, worse, by a slave, and where a tolerably high level of intellectual attainment is the norm.

16. Gardening is a particular example. I have some very brief comments on this matter in Toohey 1996.

17. Ovid, in *Tristia* 2, refers to considerable amounts of ancient literature devoted to other subjects related to this topic. He refers, at *Tristia* 2.471 ff., to the work of other poets in this genre—in didactic poems on dice games, ball games, swimming, playing with the hoop, cosmetics, feasting, and potting.

18. In my *Epic Lessons* (Toohey 1996) I argued that didactic epic underwent six phases of development. Each of these display a notable “attitude” toward how time ought to be occupied. They may provide, therefore, a schematic basis for an understanding of its change.

1. The oral phase was associated with Hesiod (his *Works and Days*, an instructional poem written some time in the eighth century B.C.E.) and with the pre-Socratic philosophers Xenophanes (active probably toward the middle of the sixth century B.C.E.), Parmenides (ca. 515–?450 B.C.E.), and Empedocles (a Sicilian who lived in the first half of the fifth century B.C.E., ca. 495–35). This didactic poetry is rigorously instructional.

2. The Hellenistic phase is exemplified by the writing on astronomy of Aratus (active in the first half of the third century B.C.E.; his verse *Phaenomena* tells us about the significance of star signs and weather signs and survives in 1,154 lines) and by the writing of Nicander (born in Colophon, perhaps a century after Aratus) on poisons and poisonous creatures.

3. The third phase of the extant literature is represented by an early Roman “reinvention” of the genre. So Cicero (107/6–43 B.C.E.) produced a verse translation of Aratus and Lucretius composed his monolithic poem *On the Universe* (Lucretius lived ca. 98–55 B.C.E.).

4. The fourth phase is typified by Virgil’s *Georgics* (composed between 36 and 29 B.C.E.) and by Ovid’s *Fasti* (composed, probably, between 2 B.C.E. and 14 C.E.; this six-book poem looks at the Roman calendar). This phase is the most complex. The representative poets produce “polyphonic” texts of marked density (playing private, public, and “ludic” voices against one another).

5. In the fifth phase the texture of didactic epic seems to thin. The instructional medium is both a leisure pursuit in itself and instructs on matters associated with leisure time. Representative poets are Horace in his *Ars poetica* and Ovid in his various instructive poems on love. We read this poetry not as mere instructional text but also as a clever, playful, and entertaining artifact in its own right.
6. Most of the literature of the sixth phase aims at a reconciliation with a supreme being. (There are many representatives of the poetry of this phase: for example, Germanicus's version of Aratus; Manilius's poem on astrology; Columella on farming; the Aetna and its volcanic lore; and, on hunting, Grattius, Oppian, and Nemesianus). In this phase didactic poetry aims to curb instinct and to provide privilege for a learned behavior or reason (ratio) in which may be detected the manifestation of divine will.

19. There were prose tracts on hunting, such as Xenophon's and Arrian's Cyneggetica or passages within Pollux's Onomasticon. (These, along with a very engaging and practical evaluation of their advice on technique, are provided in Hull 1964.) Instructional prose tracts have their own agendas and generic laws. Didactic poetry, something with which I am familiar, has a more discrete and graspable agenda.

20. The translation is taken from Anderson 1985, 150.

21. The interest spills over into other areas. Ovid's didactic poems on love not unexpectedly analogize the pursuit of the opposite sex with hunting. Nicander's strange pharmacological poems on dangerous creatures also touch on this theme. See also Schnapp 1997.

22. Fishing is as much hunting as was hunting with dogs (see Longo 1989, 12), though Plato did view it as banausic, and (as Longo shows) it had none of the prestige of hunting with dogs. Fowling may be compared with fishing.

23. Animal lore was popular in this era: see Beagon 1992, 124 ff.

24. Oppian (Cyneggetica 2.7, 2.31 ff.) describes them thus; compare Athenaeus Deipnosophists 1.13.

25. Barringer's The Hunt in Ancient Greece (2001) appeared too late for me to be able to use it within the formulation of this chapter.


27. This was the case in Rome (Anderson 1985, 88) despite Augustus's predilection for angling (Anderson 1985, 85).

28. So popular did this become, in fact, that it developed into a spectator sport. At Caesar's triumph of 46 B.C.E., for example, four hundred lions, Thessalian bulls, and a giraffe were hunted publicly in the arena.

29. The ideology of hunting can be turned on its head—in, for example, the famous Nile scenes of pygmies hunting. Their study in this context and in the context of Roman conceptions of leisure would be extremely fruitful.

30. Anderson (1985) is right on this point, pace Shackleton-Bailey (1993, 1: 77 n.b.)

31. That Ovid wrote this poem is denied by Wilkinson (1955, 363), for example.

32. Some of this can be deduced from examining the topical structure of the poem (following de Saint-Denis 1975; cf. Richmond 1962): (I) every animal has its means of self-protection (vv. 1–9); (II) fish protect themselves by ars (vv. 10–48); (III) land animals protect themselves through timor or non sana ferocia; racing horses may be compared, but dogs seem to exhibit a measure of sagax virtus (vv. 49–81); (IV) where to hunt for fish (vv. 82–93); (V) a list of fish that may be hunted (vv. 94–134: deep-sea fish, vv. 94–117; coastal fish, vv. 118–34). To judge from this summary, Ovid is less interested in instruction (of which the poem possesses little) than in play and in dramatizing a contrast between learned and instinctual behavior.
33. I should stress again here the usefulness of the monograph by Longo (1989).

34. The principle of self-understanding (albeit of a limited form) is stated at vv. 8–9: “assistance is given to understand the force and limit of their own weapon.” This knowledge is vouchsafed by adversity: “all gain assistance in understanding their enemy.”

35. The wording for “conscious of” is conscius . . . sibi, which is very close to conscius sui, a synonym for notitia sui, our tag for “self-consciousness” or “self.”

36. Ovid’s Narcissus might be both compared and contrasted.

37. I am not suggesting for a moment that Ovid took his cue concerning leisure from Exekias. There are a limited number of manners by which leisure is conceptualized and practiced. I am suggesting merely that Ovid’s concept matches that of Exekias.

38. Ovid produced three poems of this sort: first the handbook on makeup for women (the incomplete Medicamina faciei femineae [Cosmetics for the female complexion], 2–1 B.C.E.), then three books of versified instruction on methods of seduction (the Ars amatoria [The art of loving], 2 B.C.E.–1 C.E.—on the dating see Murgia 1986; Sharrock 1994, 18), followed by a single book on how to cure oneself of love (Remedia amoris [Remedies for love], 1 or 2 C.E.).


40. The difference between Ovid’s presentation of love and the other presentations seen so far could be explained as follows: When love, as we have seen it in chapter 2, is unconsummated, one has recourse first to persuasion. If persuasion is unsuccessful, one turns to violence. Only in some situations are neither persuasion nor violence applicable. Frustrated love may also lead to a melancholic lovesickness—anorexia and eventual death—of the sort that we take for granted in modern literature and in felt experience. In Ovid’s love didactic, amatory frustration is seldom seen to extend to such a level. Ovid stops short with persuasion. So the Ars amatoria and the Remedia amoris aim to instruct lovers in the art of amatory persuasion. On all of this see Toohey 1997a.

41. See Toohey 1997a for a more full discussion of this matter.

42. That didactic poetry had taken on this ludic function for Ovid, as I have stated often elsewhere, is made most evident at Tristia 2.491 ff., where he writes off his amatory didactic work as mere entertainment. In this passage Ovid states that his didactic verse represents parlor games for winter. That they bear scant relationship to life and that they were understood that way is indicated when Ovid asserts (2.492), “nobody was ruined by composing them.”

43. The Ars thus gains much of its force from its therapeutic value. “Subversive,” anti-Augustan readings, it is worth observing, flatten and attempt to render Ovid’s poetry purposeful. This is exactly what Augustus might have wanted—but from the right wing, as it were.

44. Ovid may have parodied this dull poem in his didactic Ars amatoria (so suggests Hollis 1973, 91). He may also have parodied it in the Halieutica.

45. The following schema of Grattius’s Cynegetica will give some idea of its topics: (I) the huntsman’s equipment (vv. 1–149): (i) nets and ropes (vv. 24–60), (ii) eulogy of the chase (vv. 1–74), (iii) the ingenious hunter Dercylus (vv. 95–110), (iv) weapons (vv. 111–26), especially spears (vv. 127–49); (II) dogs (vv. 150–496): (i) various breeds (vv. 150–212), (ii) the hunter Hagnon (vv. 213–62), (iii) mating (vv. 263–84), (iv) pups (vv. 285–300) and their feeding (vv. 301–9), (v) deleterious luxuria (vv. 310–25) contrasted with discipline (vv.
326–35), (vi) how to dress for the hunt (vv. 336–43), (vii) wounds, disease, and plague (vv. 344–496); (III) horses: (i) the various breeds (vv. 497–541).

46. This paragraph and the one to follow are drawn from Toohey 1996, 198–99.

47. There can be no doubt that Grattius was writing about leisure, as he saw it. His conception of hunting is not as a sustenance-producing or farming activity. It is pursued for pleasure and during free time. Yet his underlying understanding of the social significance of hunting was inherently practical. Grattius’s hunting seems to have an end outside or beyond itself, that of the affirmation of the values to be associated with empire and, with this, Roman civilization and societal order, as least as Grattius understood these.

48. Referring to one “Oppian” may be misleading, for it is often claimed that there were two (Hollis 1994; Hopkinson 1994). There was the Oppian of Cilicia, the author of five books of a Halieutica (On fishing matters) in Greek, likely dedicated to the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius (ruled 161–80 C.E.). There may also have been an Oppian of Syria, who has left us four books in Greek of a Cynegetica dedicated to the Roman emperor Caracalla (ruled 211–17 C.E.; Caracalla is reported to have paid a piece of gold for each verse of this poem).

49. This is not very far at all from Grattius’s imperialistic vision of hunting.

50. Nemesianus has also left us four pastoral poems (traditionally attributed to Calpurnius Siculus) as well as twenty-eight lines from a didactic poem on fowling (looking at two birds, the tetrax and the snipe).

51. It may help to have some idea of the structure and contents of his poem. They run as follows: (I) proem (vv. 1–102): (i) introduction (vv. 1–14), (ii) rejection of mythological themes (vv. 15–47), (iii) Nemesianus prefers to deal with hunting (vv. 48–62), (iv) soon he will eulogize Carinus and Numerianus (vv. 63–85), (v) invocation of Diana (vv. 86–102); (II) dogs (vv. 103–239): (i) selecting dogs for breeding (vv. 102–22), (ii) selecting suitable puppies from the litter (vv. 123–50), (iii) feeding the puppies (vv. 151–76), (iv) training the pups (vv. 177–92), (v) treating growing dogs’ illnesses (vv. 193–223), (vi) other breeds (vv. 224–39); (III) horses (vv. 240–98): (i) horses for hunting (vv. 240–78), (ii) raising such horses in their first year (vv. 279–98); (IV) hunting equipment: (i) nets and snares (vv. 299–320); (V) hunting (vv. 321–35), (i) hunting season (vv. 321–25; the text breaks off at v. 325).

52. This topic of watching will be addressed again in chapter 8. See also Leigh 1997.

CHAPTER 8


2. The murder of a master by his slaves was unusual and not often recorded. Pliny (Epistles 3.4) records the death of Larius Macedo in such a manner, and Tacitus (Annals 14.42–45) records that of Pedanius Secundus (cf. CIL 13.7070). I owe these references to Professor Kelly Olson.

3. Sandra Citroni Marchetti (1991, 156) reminds us that Hostius Quadra’s long gaze upon himself is not unlike that of Narcissus. The parallel is of striking significance, as Narcissus’s death evoked one of the first examples, I have argued in chapter 2, of depressive love melancholy. Hostius Quadra’s antics almost seem to parody those of Ovid’s Narcissus. I
have reproduced within this chapter a Roman version of Narcissus’s gazing longingly into the reflective waters of the spring (fig. 9). This version does not downplay the sexuality (and the sexual ambivalence) of the myth. There is Narcissus’s nudity, his strangely feminine groin, the phallic staff that he carries. Are we to sense that his corporeal and sexual fulfillment resides only outside himself, in that mirror? (Barton [1993, 105], citing Disalvo [1980], speaks of Narcissus, through his gaze into the mirror surface of the spring, as being lost to himself. My point is directly the reverse.)

4. On ancient mirrors and their cultural context see Frontisi-Ducroux and Vernant (1998); for a different and modern view see Gregory 1997.

5. What Tom McCarthy (1998) states of Klossowski’s Sade mon prochain (1947) is helpful in this context, though in an obverse manner: “This interpretation holds that rationalism, although atheistic, represents no more than a secular version of monotheism because of its affirmation of the sovereignty of man. Sade ‘liquidating the norms of reason,’ detonates a semiotic—not to mention moral—bomb within this rationalism, both derationalizing atheism and at the same time rationalizing a monstrosity whose central sign is sodomy. Sade’s goal, Klossowski tells us, is the ‘disintegration of man’ and Klossowski’s aim, as that book’s translator, Alfred Lingis points out (1991), is the extrapolation from Sade’s pedagogic demonstrations of a ‘programmatic Sadean logic.’ Klossowski, apart from his metaphorical interest in sodomy as a symbol for the destruction of a socially sanctioned form of selfhood, is also very keen on mirrors—‘as means by which selves are split, stolen, and multiplied.’” It needs to be pointed out, especially as I shall cite, in the next section of this chapter, Lacan (who was influenced by Klossowski), that I take mirrors and sodomy to create an effect that is the complete reverse. Klossowski speaks of an illusory or fragmented self; I speak of one reinforced. The continuity of the imagery, however, is startling.

6. The topic of reading deserves a chapter of its own. I have discussed aspects of this in Toohey 1994 and Toohey 1996. As has been argued by writers as diverse as Steiner (1994) and Lévi-Strauss (1961, 292: “the primary function of the invention of writing, as a means of communication, is to facilitate the enslavement of other human beings”), writing can be used to establish control and the exercise of power (see too Petrucci 1993). Svenbro (1993) makes much of the identity that can exist between speaker and text and between text and referent (cf. Steiner 1994, 100). Reading (and, with this, literacy) can represent an alienating experience (Carothers 1959; Toohey 1994; Steiner 1994, 100) perhaps because of the fissure that it so emphasizes between words and their referents, the self and the world. This fissure became particularly important in the Hellenistic period, with its stress on the ocular, rather than the auditory, aspects of reading, communication, and the interpretation of signs (se mata) (see Bing 1988). I have argued that the alienating aspects of this form of communication are notably captured in the poetry of Nicander (Toohey 1996, 64–77). In Toohey 1994 I attempt to link this with Jason’s persuasory habits. What does this have to do with Hostius Quadra? The emphasis on him in Seneca’s fabella stresses the sense of alienation implicit in this fissure between words and their referents.

7. It will be obvious that my formulation of the discovery of self in Hostius Quadra’s actions is indebted to Lacan’s famous, though bizarre, idea of the emergence of the ego through an infantile “mirror stage.” This useful summary of Lacan’s concept (far simpler than the explanations of the great man himself) may be found in Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986, 54–55. The original article is Lacan 1977.
8. As is often asked, what if an infant never encounters a mirror? Will the infant then develop no ego? This simple objection ruins—or seems to ruin—Lacan's speculative drift. But his description of the encounter with the mirror may make a valid metaphorical point. I recently watched a repeat of one of the issues of Dr. Jonathan Miller's medical series The Body in Question. He interviewed a woman whose spinal nerve, the one connecting leg motion to the brain, had been severed. The woman explained to Dr. Miller that the only way she could arrange her legs was in a mirror (she had no sensation in them at all). Viewing them directly, with her own eyes, provided a distorted picture. To sense them as real and as manageable, she and Miller agreed, they had to be perceived and even acted upon as if they were other. (Is this how Hostius Quadra saw himself?) I would suggest that Miller's subject neatly challenges the romantic Lacanian notion of the illusory nature of the self. It hints, rather, that we understand ourselves through distance.

9. The conclusions that I draw, however, are un-Lacanian. The personality formed through the mirror stage in his system is ultimately fragmented, decentered, and unstable. I have suggested that it is alienated merely in the senses of being painfully conscious of itself and its separateness from the world and from others and of being painfully conscious of the fissure between perception and reality. The body becomes wholly other to the mental registering of the world.

10. The excellent book on Lucan by Leigh (1997) has much that is instructive on this topic of “viewing.” (See also Barton 1993.) Leigh's reviewer Katherine Eldred (1998) suggests that his comments might be supplemented by the following references: “See, for example, J. Rose (1986) Sexuality in the Field of Vision (London) or S. Zizek, and R. Salecl (eds.) (1996) Gaze and Voice and Love Objects (Durham, London); here too Freud on perverse forms of viewing and Lacan on the gaze are crucial.”

11. The following references may be of some assistance in the interpretation of the term notitia sui in this context: Diogenes Laertius 2.33; Plutarch Advice to Bride and Groom. 25, p. 141 d; Stobaeus Florilegium 2.31.98 and 3.1.72, concerning Demetrios of Phaleros; Galen Protrepticus 8, p. 10. 15 Kaibel; J. P. Postgate, "Phaedrus 3.8.14 ff. and Seneca," Classical Review 33 (1919): 19; Apuleius Apologia 14–15. I thank Emanuele Narducci for providing me with these references.

12. Think of Miller's interviewee (see n. 8). Her legs—part of her, that is—became controllable through mirror recognition.

13. A very good reproduction of this Narcissus (and one other) can be found in Guillaud and Guillaud 1990, plate 302.

14. The background is nondescript (as indeed is the technique of this whole painting). There is a forest to the right behind Narcissus. To his left rear, in the distance, is a pair of rocky crags. To his more immediate left is a large, flat-topped rock.

15. For the vagina represented, alarmingly, as a mere slash see Jacobelli 1995, plate 5.

16. Another source of confusion is this: does the javelin suggest that Narcissus is resting after hunting? Or does the garland suggest that he has just come from a party? Does this indeterminacy reflect a town-and-country opposition?

17. The ambivalence, or duality, is also mirrored by the twinned crags in the background.

18. Guillaud and Guillaud (1990, plates 278–79, [Pompeii IX 1, 7]) reproduce the remarkable painting of Thetis visiting Hephaestus and examining the arms that are being
made for her son, Achilles. Thetis is staring intently at her own image mirrored in the shield that is to become Achilles’. It is, as the Guillaud’s remark, a very melancholy picture, as these arms prefigure Achilles’ death. Thetis stares hard at herself in the shield mirror, puzzling at her identity, at her self. The knowledge denied to her is apparent to us. She is conniving at the death of her son. Her “mirror stage” is made known only to the viewer.

19. Ovid (Metamorphoses 3.348) gives some stress to the idea of self-awareness in Narcissus’s case. When Narcissus was born, his parents consulted a soothsayer and inquired as to whether the boy would have a long life. The reply was yes “unless he knows himself” [si se non noverit]. Ovid’s phrase inverts the Delphian advice “Know thyself.”

20. I have not yet seen Gély-Gherida 2000.

21. Two articles that I have not yet been able to obtain but that may offer some pertinent comments on the relationship between Narcissus and Lacanian thought are Levine 1996 and Bosworth 1997.

22. Milowicki (1996) argues of Ovid’s version that two influential views of the self are presented in the persons of Teiresias (who provides Narcissus’s introduction, as it were) and Narcissus. The tale of Narcissus captures the desire to replicate the self (a depressive version?), while the tale of Teiresias suggests the possibilities of extending or expanding the self (a manic version?).

23. Once again I must repeat that I am describing the literary conceptualizing of these conditions. That tradition did not understand genes.

24. Nussbaum (1994, 90, 91, 101, 69) provides a very interesting understanding of anger (and hence violence). Following Aristotle, she sees in humans a gap between the emotion of anger and its acting out. She believes (101) that emotions are shaped through beliefs, not through some mindless affective drive. (It is hard to identify with her position after Rwanda, Bosnia, Albania, and the Congo—not to mention more recent events.) Nussbaum (69), following Aristotle Eudemian Ethics 1.3 (1214b28ff.), seems to except children and the insane from this position. (Cf. Melanie Klein’s belief that what is normal in a child may be psychotic in an adult.) Nussbaum suggests (79) that grief and anger are not animal emotions; she cites to this end Lutz 1988 and Kenny 1963. (Animals do, however, feel grief—see Jamal 1998. We choose to deny them this experience, just as we might deny early Greeks or pre-imperial Romans boredom and melancholy. Linguistic absence points only to a discursive void, not to an inability to register the emotion.)

25. For Dido see Aeneid 4.300–303; for Medea, Valerius Flaccus Argonautica 7.300–322.

26. Solomon (2001, 257) suggests that such frustration can lead, at least in the case of the octopus, to suicide.

27. Sandbach (1975, 60) points out that a dog smells something and reacts, whereas a human being must assess. Nussbaum (1994, 247) provides an interesting discussion on the extent to which humans do not react in the animal manner. For what it is worth, I think that Nussbaum overestimates the capacity of most people for even minimal self-reflection or self-analysis. For many people, there is little between them and their emotions (however slight these may be) and their being acted out, other than the ingrained societal sanction of the superego. Many of the people I know are like this. (I include myself in this group. I have read that Montaigne claimed that he had little control over himself and his moods, adding, for good measure, that he had a poor memory; that is a comfort.)

28. Once again I would like to stress that my distinction represents a heuristic and ana-
lytic device rather than a stone-graven historical truth. History is far too open-ended and rebarbative to allow the absolute applicability of such a simple distinction.

29. See Basedow 1929, 175–79.
30. See Heliodorus Aethiopica 3.7–9 and Callimachus’s description of Cydippe in Aetia fr. 75.12–20.
32. Narcissus obviously could not negotiate this fissure. This led to his death.
33. See Richlin 1997 for a pungent analysis of these attitudes. There is also now Hallet and Skinner 1997.
34. On hysteria see Showalter 1997; Micale 1994; Gilman et al. 1993. For a more anthropological perspective on some of these hysterical conditions see Lewis 1971; La Barre 1972. Compare also Cohn 1957. (Sargant 1957, though very dated, is still instructive on some of these matters—the illustrations are marvelous. On classical matters there is Nock’s 1933 classic Conversion).
35. For some other works on self-awareness see Lautner 1994; Syed 1997.
36. Autism and schizophrenia, in Laingian terms, read as a social protest. This is even more clear in the case of multiple personality disorder or repressed memory syndrome (cf. Ross 1994).
37. In the cases of Hostius Quadra and Narcissus it resulted in death.
38. See Barton 1993, 98 ff. on the “gaze”; 91 ff. on the “eye.” On the “gaze” writ large see Barton 1993, 104 ff.
39. Even the postmodern “fragmented” personality is, after all, but alienation writ large or run rampant. (Ross 1994 is interesting on applied fragmentation, as it were. I am in no position to comment on this matter other than to commend Hacking’s 1995 book.) The concept of self that we see emerging in the post-Senecan world—the perception of the self as another—held sway until recently. We have since seen it argued (at least in the 1990s) that personality, rather than being reified or alienated, has become fragmented. So we see a disintegration of self. The conceptual step from the watched, alienated self to the “fragmented” personality is a simple step. (On the fragmented personality see Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986, 122. Cf. Greene 1995 for an interesting classical perspective on fragmentation; Greene uses the term fragmentation, however, more in the sense of conflict.)

APPENDIX

1. De Chirico often complains about his digestion (see Baldacci 1997, 53, 106). In Paris in 1911 he took a cure in an attempt to settle his severe intestinal disorder (Soby 1955, 36) while at the same time complaining of a nervous disorder that he explained as an “extreme crisis of melancholy” (Soby 1955, 34).
2. The wraith bears a striking resemblance to the figure of Death in Arnold Böcklin’s Die Toteninsel of 1880. A reproduction of this picture can be found as plate 45 in Burger 1977.
3. Baldacci (1997, 26) suggests that this is its first appearance as a motif in de Chirico’s painting.
4. Baldacci (1997, 126) links the painting to this experience.
5. The train appears again in *The Lassitude of the Infinite* (1912), reproduced later in this appendix. There the train rushes toward infinity and death. Time and death are symbolized by the motif of the tower.

6. That is provided for us in a very strange and hauntingly erotic painting by Mario Sironi, the Fascist apologist. His painting (reproduced in Braun 2000, plate V; Parks 2000, 32) was painted seven or eight years later than those of de Chirico. It is entitled *Melancholy* and depicts a nude woman, the figure of melancholy, seated in a devastated landscape. Time seems drawn into this picture, not merely through the depiction of catastrophe, but also through the egglike object (the beginning of time?) at which this sad but menacing woman stares so intently. Hers, too, is a hard, repellent, yet provocative, nudity. Eros, thus, is blended with Sironi’s evocation of melancholy, time, and catastrophe. It is a terrible vision of eros. There can be little wonder that Sironi became an apologist for Mussolini. Braun (2000, 68 ff.) has written an interesting chapter entitled “Melancholy and the Modern Allegory” that aims to place Sironi’s conception within the intellectual entre-guerre milieu.

7. Böcklin has at least three paintings entitled *Melancholia*. Reproductions of these may be found in Andree 1977 as plates 253 (1871), 338 (1879), and, most notably, 474 (1900). There is no reason to assume that de Chirico would not have known these paintings.

8. The term literally implies a journey of some form or another. This “theme of the journey” is as important in de Chirico’s painting (the trains and the chips are constantly coming and going) as it is in his life (see Baldacci 1997, 128): de Chirico’s illicit journey from Turin to escape the military authorities, for example, caused him much anguish (and has been linked to the vertiginous perspectives of the paintings of this era). For further references on the theme of nostalgia see the next note.


10. The sea vista over which the Odysseus figure gazes from the heights of the oracle’s room no doubt owes something to the deep valley below Apollo’s temple at Delphi.

11. Note how close the figure in figures 14–15 is to those which we could describe as Calypso-like.

12. So she is also in the naturalistic version of her that de Chirico painted in *Ariadne Abandoned* in 1931–32 (reproduced as plate 9 in de Sanna 1998).

13. Braun 2000, 68 ff., on de Chirico’s friend Sironi, is very helpful on the thematics of this period.