

CHAPTER THREE

Xenophon's *Hellenica*



Xenophon's *Hellenica* is notorious for omissions of fact and inequalities of treatment.¹ These flaws could be explained by the theory that Xenophon wrote different sections at different times, without fully unifying it as a whole. Nevertheless, the *Hellenica* is coherent as it stands, and Xenophon is certainly consistent in his views on moral virtue throughout; I therefore treat it as a unified whole.² In the past, the facile explana-

1. Unless otherwise specified, all references to Xenophon in this chapter are from the *Hellenica*.

2. It is a longstanding debate whether or not Xenophon wrote his *Hellenica* as a continuous whole, in view of the distinctive differences between 1–2.3.10 in particular and the rest of the work. The definitive expression of the “analysts’” viewpoint, that Xenophon composed the different sections of the *Hellenica* at different times, is that of Malcolm MacLaren (“On the Composition of Xenophon’s *Hellenica*,” *AJP* 55 [1934]: 121–39, 249–62). The strongest arguments for the opposite camp, the “unitarians,” who believe that Xenophon composed the *Hellenica* as a unified whole, are made by W. P. Henry (*Greek Historical Writing: A Historiographical Essay Based on Xenophon’s Hellenica* [Chicago: Argonaut, 1967]). Because Xenophon must have written much of the *Hellenica* long before the time of the Battle of Mantinea (the last event contained in this work), there are necessarily slight variations in language and expression. These need not, however, obscure the essential unity of the work in purpose and methods; see also W. E. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 99–127 and Vivienne Gray (*The Character of Xenophon’s Hellenica* (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1989), esp. 178–82).

tion of a pro-Spartan, anti-Theban bias was often invoked;³ more recent examinations, however, have led scholars to question so simple an explanation of Xenophon's purpose and method.⁴ The moral and didactic purpose of the *Hellenica* has been recognized by other scholars⁵ but not explicitly connected to its alleged shortcomings. I argue that many of the omissions of fact and inequalities of treatment contained in the *Hellenica* stem not so much from a pro-Spartan, anti-Theban bias as from Xenophon's desire to use lessons from the past for the moral instruction of his fellow aristocrats.

I begin by examining three of the best-known omissions to see whether they can in fact be attributed to moralizing rather than to bias alone. I then proceed to a review of the passages in which Xenophon specifically lists some of his criteria for selection of material, with the aim of ascertaining the extent to which the desire to provide moral instruction governs his choices. Following this preliminary examination, it is necessary to determine what are the moral virtues with which Xenophon is chiefly concerned in the *Hellenica*, and then to proceed to a survey of his methods of instructing the reader in these moral virtues. Finally, I attempt to ascertain to what extent Xenophon can be found to have shaped the past to his own ends for moralizing purposes and what message he was trying to convey by doing so.

Our three omissions, the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy, the foundation of Megalopolis, and the refoundation of Messene, are usually attributed to Xenophon's alleged pro-Spartan, anti-Theban bias; the latter two in particular have been considered attempts to deny Epaminondas his rightful due.⁶ Yet, if one examines the narrative in which scholars believe that Xenophon ought to have included these events, it

3. See, e.g., J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, (London: Macmillan, 1908; reprint, New York: Dover, 1958), 152.

4. Most recently, see Christopher Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11–7.5.27*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 76 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1993) with a useful summary of earlier views on Xenophon's purpose, 14–18, and John Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times* (London: Routledge, 1995).

5. C. H. Grayson, "Did Xenophon Intend to Write History?" in *The Ancient Historian and His Materials: Essays in Honour of C. E. Stevens on His Seventieth Birthday*, ed. Barbara Levick (Westmead, Farnborough, Hants: Gregg International, 1975), 31–43; George Cawkwell, introduction and notes to *Xenophon: A History of My Times (Hellenica)*, trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979), 42–46; and Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*.

6. E.g., by Cawkwell, *Xenophon*, 36.

becomes apparent that his motive for excluding them is different in each case and cannot simply be attributed to the general category of a pro-Spartan, anti-Theban bias.

In the case of the Second Athenian Confederacy, modern scholars tend to criticize Xenophon for not placing an account of its foundation either before or after the raid of Sphodrias.⁷ Yet, both the epigraphical evidence and Diodorus (15.25.1–29.8) indicate that the foundation of the confederacy involved a gradual series of diplomatic negotiations rather than a single abrupt maneuver.⁸ Consequently, the question of whether the confederacy was founded as a result of the raid of Sphodrias or vice versa is a red herring, in that it implies that Athens made a decision at one particular time to create a Second Athenian Confederacy. Our evidence points to the conclusion that the passing of the so-called Charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy was merely the formalization of a process that had already been going on for some five years.⁹ Therefore, it is not strictly fair to criticize Xenophon for his failure to indicate in one specific place the result of an ongoing process.

Nevertheless, it is odd that he does not mention the chief achievement of Athenian foreign policy in the years following the conclusion of the Corinthian War. Also, he does more than leave out an account of the formal structure of the foundation of the confederacy when he implies that the Athenians were isolated immediately before the liberation of the Cadmea (5.3.27), in apparent contradiction to the epigraphical evidence. Furthermore, in the only passage in which he specifically mentions Athenian allies, he is at pains to contrast the fact that Athens and her allies swear an oath individually, with the insistence of the Spartans that they do so on behalf of their allies (6.3.19). There is certainly nothing in the *Hellenica* to suggest that the Athenians, as heads of a confederacy, were entitled to take collective action on behalf of their allies.

7. For arguments supporting a date before the raid, see, e.g., Charles D. Hamilton, "Isocrates, IG ii² 43, Greek Propaganda and Imperialism," *Traditio* 36 (1980): 100; for after, see, e.g., Jack Cargill, *The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 58–59.

8. Hermann Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, vol. 2 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1962–69), nos. 248 (Athenian alliance with Chios), 256 (Byzantium), 257 (the "Aristoteles Decree" or so-called Charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy), 258 (Methymna), 259 (Chalcis), and perhaps 255 (if one can accept this highly fragmentary inscription as an alliance between Athens and Thebes).

9. I follow in the main the interpretation of R. M. Kallet-Marx ("Athens, Thebes, and the Foundation of the Second Athenian League," *CLAnt* 4 (1985): 127–51).

The traditional explanation for Xenophon's failure to mention the confederacy is that he considered it an affront to Sparta.¹⁰ Since his narrative of this period contains some very pointed criticism directed at Sparta (as we shall see), however, this view does not appear sufficient. An examination of the section of Xenophon's narrative in which modern scholars believe that he ought to have mentioned the foundation of the confederacy may shed some light on the reason for its omission.

After the military successes of Sparta against Phlius and Olynthus (5.3.1–26), Xenophon comments (5.3.27) that the hegemony of the Spartans seemed in every way to have been fully and securely established (παντάπασιν ἤδη καλῶς καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἢ ἄρωῃ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς κατεσκευάσθαι). It is tempting to consider this comment as a warning signal that nemesis is soon to fall upon the Spartans for the complacency and conceit engendered by their great good fortune, in the same way that Herodotus, for example, signals the impending doom of Croesus (1.29.1).¹¹ Xenophon's next sentence confirms this interpretation, for he states that divine retribution for the Spartan seizure of the Cadmea and installation of a puppet regime of pro-Spartan tyrants was both imminent and deserved (5.4.1). His condemnation of the Spartans in breaking the oath which they swore in the King's Peace that they would leave the other cities independent, is expressed in strong language for a man who is alleged to have a pro-Spartan (and anti-Theban) bias, and is one of only two examples of explicit denunciation of impiety in the *Hellenica*.¹²

Xenophon then proceeds to an account of how a band of seven Theban exiles liberated their city by dressing up as women and slaughtering at a banquet those responsible for the Spartan occupation (5.4.2–12), which he tells in much more detail than is necessary for general historical purposes. For example, when the Theban exiles arrive at the house of the pro-Spartan Leontiades, they find him sitting with his wife who is doing some work with wool (5.4.7). The detail of the wool is irrelevant to the plot, but emphasizes the respectability of the wife, whose life is spared although Leontiades is killed. Implicitly, Xenophon indicates a moral contrast between the brutality of the action of the assassins and the respectable domesticity of Leontiades' wife. There is also the use of the number seven,

10. E.g., Cawkwell, *Xenophon*, 285.

11. Donald Lateiner, "A Note on the Perils of Prosperity in Herodotus," *RhM* 125 (1982): 97–101.

12. The other is 4.4.2–3; for a fuller discussion of these episodes, see my "Condemnation of the Impious in Xenophon's *Hellenica*," *HTR* 91 (1998): 251–77.

traditional in folktales,¹³ although another version existed in which there were twelve conspirators (Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 8). The pattern of this story is reminiscent of that of Herodotus' description of the murder of the Persian envoys by Alexander of Macedon (5.18–21),¹⁴ which also indicates the possibility that Xenophon is embroidering his account. Xenophon's comment on the existence of an alternative version, in which the killers were dressed as revellers (5.4.7), indicates that he did indeed narrate what he considered to be the more useful as a moral paradigm of the versions of the incident available to him.

One of the arguments used by those who believe that Xenophon has an anti-Theban bias is his failure to mention Pelopidas in his account of the liberation of the Cadmea.¹⁵ The main evidence we have, however, for Pelopidas's leadership comes from Plutarch's *Life* (*Pelopidas* 7–13),¹⁶ which is subject to a certain tendency to treat the hero more favorably in his own *Life* than in other *Lives* in which he may appear.¹⁷ Yet, in his *De genio Socratis*, Pelopidas seems to play no larger role than the other conspirators.¹⁸ Furthermore, Diodorus does not mention Pelopidas in his account of the liberation of the Cadmea (15.25) and only attributes to him the role of leader in this undertaking in his eulogy (15.81.1). Perhaps Pelopidas's role in the liberation of the Cadmea was somewhat exaggerated in the wake of his later success. Since Xenophon's detailed narrative of this episode appears to indicate an interest in it, it is not reasonable that he would have denied Pelopidas his rightful due if he had in fact been the leader. By narrating this incident with close attention to detail, Xenophon gives it emotional content in order to provide a better moral example of how the treachery of the polemarchs in handing over the city to the Spartans was punished and hints at divine retribution. Thus, his narrative appeals to the imagination over the intellect, so that the moral lesson might be more memorable.

13. On the traditional nature of the number seven, see Gray (*Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 203 n. 1), with examples from Herodotus.

14. Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 65–70, and Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times*, 229–30.

15. E.g., Cawkwell (*Xenophon*, 279): "Xenophon does not even name him and his account is therefore 'Hamlet without the Prince.'"

16. Cornelius Nepos (*Pelopidas* 2.5) follows suit.

17. On "biographical distortion" in Plutarch's account of Pelopidas's subsequent career, see J. Buckler, "Plutarch on the Trials of Pelopidas and Epameinondas (369 B.C.)," *CP* 73 (1981): 36–42.

18. Plutarch mentions Pelopidas by name only at 576a, 577a, 594e, 595c, 595d, 596d, 597e, and 597f.

Xenophon now records the invasion of Boeotia by the Spartan army under Cleombrotus (5.4.13–18) and the raid of Sphodrias (5.4.19–24). At this point, he turns aside briefly from strictly military affairs in order to recount the anecdote of how Agesilaus's son, Archidamus, through love of Sphodrias's son Cleonymus, puts pressure on his father to intervene (5.4.25–33). After Sphodrias is acquitted, Cleonymus more than compensates for his father's shortcomings, for he proceeds to act in all things in a way befitting a Spartan (ζῶν ἅπαντ' ἐποίει ὅσα καλὰ ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ) and even dies protecting his king on the battlefield at Leuctra (5.4.33). This story reveals how Archidamus's faith in his friend is eventually rewarded by the way Cleonymus exemplifies Spartan virtue and places loyalty to the king ahead of his own life. Strictly speaking, of course, this incident has nothing to do with divine vengeance for the Spartans' impiety. It seems, however, that Xenophon seizes the opportunity to point out moral virtue. Following this anecdote, Xenophon returns to his narrative to tell how the Athenians join with the Thebans against the Spartans (5.4.34). Again, it is odd that he does not mention the confederacy at this point,¹⁹ for the Athenians now help the Thebans in the first official joint action since the Thebans were admitted to the confederacy.²⁰

At the points at which it would be reasonable to include an account of the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy, Xenophon's motive for omission appears to be not so much a pro-Spartan bias as a desire to moralize. As part of his aim of showing how the Spartans met with divine retribution, he includes two moral exempla: the Theban exiles' revenge on the pro-Spartans and the acquittal of Sphodrias through Archidamus's love for Cleonymus. The two anecdotes culminate in the humiliation of Sparta at Leuctra, to which Xenophon makes explicit reference at the end of the Cleonymus story (5.4.33). In this way, the reader's attention is brought back to the main point in this section, divine retribution for Sparta's impious action. It is presumably as a result of his desire to make this moral point that Xenophon neglects to mention the fact that by this time the Athenians had established themselves at the head of a newly

19. See, e.g., Cawkwell, *Xenophon*, 285.

20. Both Plutarch (*Pelopidas* 15.1) and Diodorus record the admission of the Thebans to the confederacy after the raid of Sphodrias (15.29.7), slightly later than that of Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, and Mytilene (15.28.3). Thebes is listed in the first group of names at the bottom of the so-called Charter of the Confederacy (Bengtson, *Staatsverträge*, no. 257), and a fragmentary inscription (Bengtson, *Staatsverträge*, no. 255), may contain the text of an official Athenian-Theban alliance.

formed naval confederacy. It should be noted, however, that the Athenian democracy does not come off well in this episode, for the Athenian troops, the nature of whose support of the Theban exiles Xenophon leaves unclear (cf. Diodorus 15.26.1), fail to prevent the Thebans from breaking an oath and slaughtering their enemies, even butchering the children of their opponents (5.4.11–12). Also, the Athenian demos is made to look foolish in its misinterpretation of Spartan intentions (5.4.22–23) and divided into factions (esp. 5.4.34). Finally, Xenophon's pointed omission of the culmination of Athens's renascent imperialism and his reference to Leuctra, which dealt the death blow to the Spartan attempt at empire, make it a logical inference that he does not approve of imperialism.

Xenophon's failure to mention the foundation of Megalopolis as capital of the newly formed federation of Arcadia as a tangible symbol of Spartan weakness is also often attributed to his alleged pro-Spartan, anti-Theban bias.²¹ This motivation, however, is somewhat undercut by the fact that he mentions the Megalopolitans explicitly later in his narrative (7.5.5), although he does so only to the extent of including them in a list of cities on which Epaminondas could count for support. It would be helpful to examine the sections in which scholars believe Xenophon ought to have included the foundation of Megalopolis, to see whether his omission is attributable to bias or to some other preoccupation.

There is some uncertainty about the relative date of the foundation of Megalopolis. Some scholars believe it to be the eventual result of the formation of the Arcadian Confederacy, and criticize Xenophon for not mentioning it when he alludes to the organization of the latter with an account of some bloody civil strife at Tegea during the establishment of a "new order" in the Peloponnese, following the Spartan defeat at Leuctra (6.5.6–9).²² Xenophon has, however, assumed the existence of the Arcadian Confederacy earlier (5.2.19). Moreover, he obviously takes considerable interest in this episode of civil strife at Tegea, as the fullness of his narrative of this relatively minor incident indicates (it occupies over a page of the Oxford text), most likely because of the violation of sanctuary and the physical damage to a temple.²³ His preoccupation with these offenses

21. See, e.g., Cawkwell, *Xenophon*, 36–37.

22. E.g., G. E. Underhill, *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1900), 255–56.

23. For a fuller discussion of this episode, see my "Condemnation of the Impious in Xenophon's *Hellenica*," 269–72.

probably prevents him from mentioning the foundation of Megalopolis when he alludes to the formation of the Arcadian Confederacy.

Naturally, the formation of the Arcadian Confederacy and the decision to found Megalopolis may not be one and the same. Therefore, some scholars criticize Xenophon for not placing the foundation of Megalopolis at a later spot in the *Hellenica*.²⁴ He returns to the Arcadians after his narrative of the second Theban invasion of the Peloponnese (7.1.23); at this point, he mentions Lycomedes for the first time, although he was certainly influential in the forming of the Arcadian Confederacy,²⁵ and afterward served it as general.²⁶ After a short character sketch, in which he describes Lycomedes as of aristocratic birth, wealthy, and ambitious besides (γένει τε οὐδενὸς ἐνδεῆς χρήμασι τε προήκων καὶ ἄλλως φιλότιμος), Xenophon quotes (in indirect discourse) an inspirational speech to his fellow citizens (7.1.23–24), in which he fills them with overconfidence (φρόνημα). The terms φιλότιμος and φρόνημα are both ambiguous. The root φιλοτιμ- can have good connotations in the *Hellenica*, as in the description of soldiers who are in the best physical condition as φιλότιμοι (6.4.11), but K. J. Dover has shown how the identification of *philotimia* as patriotic behavior that is associated with virtuous action can “shade into aggression, pride, and boastfulness.”²⁷ Similarly, the meaning of φρόνημα ranges from “pride” to “presumption.”²⁸ Xenophon’s narrative of the rest of the episode indicates that the negative meaning of both terms is intended here.

Puffed up with an inflated sense of their own importance as a result of Lycomedes’ speech, the Arcadians are presumptuous enough to take on not only the Thebans and the Eleans (7.1.25–26) but the Spartan army as well (7.1.28–29), resulting in the Tearless Battle, so named from the fact that while many Arcadians fell, not a single Spartan perished (7.1.29–32).²⁹ Xenophon records the report of some that thunder and lightning

24. E.g., Cawkwell, *Xenophon*, 364.

25. Diodorus 15.59.1 (where he mistakenly states that Lycomedes is from Tegea rather than Mantinea) and Pausanias 8.27.2.

26. Compare Diodorus 15.62.2–3 to Xenophon 6.5.13–19.

27. K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 229–33, quotation at 232; see also David Whitehead, “Competitive Outlay and Community Profit: φιλοτιμία in Democratic Athens,” *ClMed* 34 (1983): 55–74.

28. Cf. the examples given in LSJ.

29. Diodorus (15.72.3) and Plutarch (*Agessilaus* 33.3) give the battle this name; Xenophon, while not calling it the Tearless Battle, does comment (7.1.32) that the Spartans burst into tears when they heard of their victory.

appeared in a clear sky, apparently in response to the hortatory words of Archidamus (7.1.31). The Spartan troops gain such confidence from this apparent divine sign that their initial impetus carries the day, with devastating results for the Arcadians. Xenophon concludes his narrative of the Tearless Battle with the comment (7.1.32) that the Thebans and the Eleans were no less pleased than the Spartans at the misfortune of the Arcadians, for they too were offended by their presumption (οὕτως ἤδη ἤχθοντο ἐπὶ τῷ φρόνηματι αὐτῶν). The mention of the φρόνημα of the Arcadians seems designed to recall the φρόνημα with which Lycomedes inspired them (7.1.23), and so seals off this section of the narrative with a sort of ring composition.

In this section of his narrative, then, Xenophon's overriding concern is to show how Lycomedes' ambition and infusion of his fellow Arcadians with φρόνημα led directly to their downfall at the hands of the Spartans. As we have seen, he even postpones mention of Lycomedes until Arcadia's *peripeteia* in the Tearless Battle, where he can be introduced with the greatest dramatic effect. In this way, Xenophon grips the attention of the reader in order to make his moral point, that overweening pride leads to a fall. Therefore, in the two places in this section of his narrative where he mentions the Arcadians, he is preoccupied first with the acts of impiety committed during the civil strife in Tegea and then with the arrogance and downfall of the Arcadians under Lycomedes, and for this reason he does not include an account of the foundation of Megalopolis in either place.

A third omission often attributed to an alleged pro-Spartan bias is the failure to mention the refoundation of Messene,³⁰ resulting from the first Theban invasion of the Peloponnese.³¹ Again, bias does not appear sufficient to explain this omission, because Xenophon does refer to Messenians, in such a way as to indicate that Messene is distinct from Sparta, at later spots in his narrative (7.1.27, 36; 7.4.9). It would be useful to determine whether moral preoccupations are at play here too.

Following his narrative of the events of the first Theban invasion of the Peloponnese (6.5.22–32), Xenophon turns to Athens's reaction, which

30. Underhill (*Commentary on the Hellenica*) and Cawkwell (*Xenophon*) both criticize Xenophon for his omission in their notes to 6.5.51, while J. Hatzfeld (*Xénophon: Helléniques*, 5th ed. 2 vols. [Paris: Belles Lettres, 1965–66]) does so in his note to 7.1.27.

31. The main sources are Diodorus (15.66) and Pausanias (4.27). Carl Angus Roebuck (*A History of Messenia from 369 to 146 B.C.* [Chicago: University of Chicago Libraries, 1941], 31 n. 21) lists the other sources but notes that they “do little more than record the event.” Both Diodorus (15.66.1) and Pausanias (9.14.5) hail Epaminondas as founder.

culminates in a meeting of the Assembly (6.5.33). The final speech is the long and eloquent oration of Procles the Phliasian (6.5.38–48), which finally convinces the Athenians that they should go out in aid of the Spartans in full force (6.5.49). Procles is clearly a character of interest to Xenophon, since he assigns to him two of the longest speeches in direct discourse in the *Hellenica* (and mentions him at 5.3.13 as a ξένοϛ of Agesilaus). He devotes most of his first speech to an appeal to the common sense of the Athenians by arguing that it is in their interests to help the Spartans in their time of need (6.5.38–46). He concludes this speech, however, with an impassioned plea in the tradition of Athenian patriotic oratory for the Athenians not to abandon their glorious policy in the legendary past of going to the aid of the oppressed, and cites the usual examples of the Seven against Thebes and the Heracleidae (6.5.46–48). Attention has often been drawn to the similarity of this section to Isocrates' *Panegyricus* (4.54–60),³² but because these are frequent *topoi*, we need not posit any direct influence. The Athenians respond enthusiastically to Procles' appeal, but their campaign is so unsuccessful that Xenophon makes one of his rare first-person condemnations of the uncharacteristically incompetent tactics of Iphicrates (6.5.51–52), whose generalship he had had occasion to praise extensively earlier (6.2.27–39). As Plato does in the *Menexenus*, Xenophon uses his subsequent narrative to undermine Athenian patriotic claims.

In Procles' second speech, placed almost immediately after his first, he urges the Athenians to accept a proposal put forward by the Corinthians to divide the responsibility for leadership in the newly formed alliance between Sparta and Athens (7.1.2–11). He concludes his speech by saying (7.1.11) that a division of the leadership by land and sea is not only the most expedient for both Athens and Sparta but also in the best interests of all. It is worth noting also that Procles makes several references to the gods (7.1.2, 5, 6, 9), attributing military success to divine rather than human achievement; we have seen already in chapter 1 that piety is an important virtue for Xenophon. Despite the Athenians' enthusiastic acceptance of his proposal, their minds are easily changed by a short rebuttal by the Athenian Cephisodotus. In a short reply, the peroration of which consists of an extended rhetorical question, he persuades his fellow citizens to act purely

32. Underhill, *Commentary on the Hellenica*, 266; John Buckler, "Xenophon's Speeches and the Theban Hegemony," *Athenaeum* 60 (1982): 180–204, at 194–95; Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 115.

on the basis of self-interest and to share with Sparta supreme command of both land and sea for five-day periods in turn (7.1.12–14). Procles' second speech, like his first, underlines the incompetence of the Athenian demos, this time seduced against their better judgment by the demagogic appeal of Cephisodotus. Procles has personal ties with Agesilaus (5.3.13) and is from Phlius, an oligarchic city-state for which Xenophon expresses great admiration (7.2.1); therefore, he is likely to agree in principle with the political statements the Phliasian espouses.³³ Moreover, the sentiments that he expresses are clearly morally superior to the self-interest espoused by Cephisodotus,³⁴ and his references to the gods also put him on the moral high ground. Therefore, in the places where Xenophon might have mentioned an important result of the Theban invasion of that year, he chooses instead to use Procles' speeches to illustrate the folly and incompetence of the Athenian democrats, led by demagogues, and the illusory nature of the standard Athenian patriotic claims.

Our examination of three of Xenophon's more notorious omissions, the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy, the foundation of Megalopolis, and the refoundation of Messene has revealed that they are not due simply to a pro-Spartan, anti-Theban bias. First of all, Xenophon does not disguise their effect, since his narrative of the 370s and the 360s assumes the reader's knowledge of these events, which could hardly have escaped the notice of his contemporaries.³⁵ Second, at the points at which modern scholars believe he ought to have mentioned these events, he chooses to narrate an episode containing material suitable for moral edification. Nevertheless, it is odd that he does not mention the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy, the foundation of Megalopolis, or the refoundation of Messene at some later point in his narrative, after he has taught his moral lesson. Xenophon, it seems, intended to give the impression that he judged the accurate depiction of some of the political changes of the 370s and 360s (particularly when they involved events detrimental to Spartan interests) to be of less import to the moral instruction of his

33. On the political aspects of Procles' speeches, see Joachim Dalfen, "Xenophon als analytiker und kritiker politischer Rede (Zu Hell. VI 3, 4–17 und VI 5, 33–48)," *GrazBeitr* 5 (1976): 59–84; and Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 110–17.

34. Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 112–21, and Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times*, 247–48.

35. See also Grayson, "Did Xenophon Intend to Write History?" 32, and Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian*, 175 n. 136; thus J. K. Anderson's (*Xenophon* [London: Gerald Duckworth, 1974], 170–71) claim that Xenophon would have received no information about these events in his "comfortable backwater" of Scillus does not hold water.

readers than the highlighting of individual incidents. Nonetheless, the very opportunity for moral edification gave him the excuse not to mention matters that were unpalatable to him, such as the success of the Athenian democracy in its renewed aspiration for an overseas empire and actions highlighting Spartan weakness. Although the moral issue is uppermost in these episodes, they are not altogether free of political import.

These three omissions indicate that Xenophon engages in deliberate selection of material. We must now examine passages in which he specifically lists some of his criteria for selection of material, in order to determine what he considers most worthy of narration. On one occasion, he explicitly states that he includes certain events in his narrative while excluding others. This passage occurs at the point where he has completed his account of events on land from 394/3 to 387/6 and now proceeds to recount the naval operations of these years separately. He says (4.8.1) that he will set down only those events that are worthy of mention, while passing over those which are not (τῶν πράξεων τὰς μὲν ἀξιομνημονεύτους γράψω, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀξίας λόγου παρήσω). The distinction between events that are “worthy of mention” and those which are not must be inferred from an examination of Xenophon’s narrative, since he provides no definition.

Xenophon begins his narrative of the naval operations of the period by describing briefly the activities of Conon and Pharnabazus after the Battle of Cnidus (4.8.1–3). He does not give an account of the battle itself, the most significant naval victory of the 390s, perhaps because he has already mentioned it, although out of context, in his narrative of land events of the period, where he is more concerned with Agesilaus’s reaction to this devastating news than with the actual events of the battle (4.3.10–14), and perhaps because a naval battle won by an Athenian in command of a Persian fleet held little value for the purposes of the moral education of the elite. He emphasizes the fact that the cities on the islands and on the coast of Asia Minor welcomed Conon and Pharnabazus because their policy was to drive out the Spartan *harmosts* and leave the cities autonomous, and then contrasts the resentment of much of Asia Minor against high-handed Spartan behavior with the fact that the Spartan Dercylidas had managed to keep the city of Abydus loyal, in spite of the Spartan defeat at Cnidus. Xenophon gives Dercylidas a speech, in *oratio recta*, the main point of which is that those who show themselves loyal friends at the worst of times gain more honor than fair-weather friends (4.8.4). Dercylidas convinces the people of Abydus that they should continue to support Sparta and, by using similar arguments, is equally successful in keeping Sestus loyal

(4.8.5). When Pharnabazus arrives in the area, he is unable to sway the people of Sestus and Abydus away from Sparta by force (4.8.6). Although it seems that this portion of Xenophon's narrative points to the moral that effective military leadership can be achieved through the use of reasoned arguments rather than force,³⁶ the events of the following section show that the sentiments expressed by the Spartans are illusory and deceptive.

The next section is devoted to a description of Spartan negotiations for peace with Persia (4.8.12–17), although a peace conference at Sparta that took place around this time is omitted.³⁷ Antalcidas, the Spartan spokesman, makes it clear that the Spartans are more than willing to hand over the Greeks of Asia Minor to the Persians (4.8.14). Although Dercylidas himself is a character of whom Xenophon approves (as we shall see later), his promises to the Greeks of Asia Minor are betrayed by the Spartan initiative for peace with Persia.³⁸

Xenophon's interest is next piqued by the character of the Spartan Thibron, sent to counter the hostile actions of the Persian satrap Struthas. Thibron has appeared earlier as a less than incisive leader (3.1.4–7) and as unable to prevent his army from plundering the territory of his allies (3.1.8, 10, 3.2.1). Xenophon contrasts unfavorably Thibron's treatment of his allies with that of Dercylidas (3.1.10 and 3.2.1), although there are some indications that the latter was not as effective a leader as Xenophon indicates.³⁹ His criticism of Thibron continues in this episode. Struthas notices that Thibron is inclined to make his raids in a disorderly and overconfident manner (ἀτάκτως καὶ καταφρονητικῶς) and resolves to storm his camp. Xenophon then shows Thibron to be so unconcerned with the safety of the men under his command that he has retired to his tent with Thersander the flute player,⁴⁰ apparently without having taken precautions for adequate sentry duty (4.8.18). The camp is taken by surprise, and Thibron and

36. But cf. Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 9.

37. See my "Presbeis Autokratores: Andocides' *De pace*," *Phoenix* 49 (1995): 140–49.

38. Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 76–77.

39. See Peter Krentz, *Xenophon: Hellenika II.3.11–IV.2.8* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1995), 161, 167, 169, and 171. Krentz ("Thibron and the Thirty," *AncW* 15 [1987]: 75–79) suggests that Xenophon treats Thibron less favorably than other sources in order to disassociate himself from his former commander's actions.

40. Marchant's text retains the διασηνῶν of the manuscripts, although Hatzfeld and Karl Hude, ed. *Xenophon: Hellenika* (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1934, reprint 1969) accept Rieckher's emendation of διοσεύων, as does Rex Warner in his translation. Given the fact, however, that Xenophon explicitly commends Diphridas in contrast with Thibron for his self-control over pleasures of the flesh, διασηνῶν seems the more likely reading. See now Clifford Hindley, "Eros and Military Command in Xenophon," *CQ* n.s., 44 (1994): 347–66.

Thersander are the first to fall, while a large number of the Spartans perish in the rout that follows (4.8.19). Xenophon's inclusion of circumstantial details—such as the fact that Thibron took his fateful nap following the noon meal, as well as a short character sketch of Thersander—indicates his particular interest in this episode. Because Thibron was occupied with Thersander, he was dilatory in coming to the aid of his forces, which were under attack by Struthas. Thibron's fate seems intended to point a moral lesson to the reader of the dire consequences that can befall a leader who pursues his own pleasure in neglect of his duties, a sure sign of lack of self-control.

Xenophon now contrasts Thibron with his successor, Diphridas. He explicitly says (4.8.21) Diphridas was successful and implies that the reason was because he was a more organized and enterprising general and, unlike Thibron, bodily pleasures did not rule him (4.8.22). With his awareness of the importance of order and his self-control, Diphridas possesses the very qualities that Thibron lacks, and therefore prospers. Xenophon thus counteracts his negative example of Thibron with the positive example of Diphridas.

After a quick background sketch of events in Rhodes (4.8.20–24), Xenophon now turns to Thrasybulus of Steiria, who is sent out to look after Athenian interests in Rhodes (4.8.25). On his way to Rhodes, on his own initiative, he ravages the south coast of Asia Minor and collects contributions from various cities, including Aspendus. Here, however he meets his doom, for the inhabitants of Aspendus cut him down by night in retaliation for the unjust plundering of their lands by his soldiers (4.8.30).⁴¹ Xenophon seems to have been interested in Thrasybulus, whom he characterizes (4.8.31) as a good man by reputation (*μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι*). Virtue by reputation alone, however, is not sufficient and Thrasybulus's death occurs as a direct result of his failure to follow orders and his inability to ensure good order, and therefore moral behavior, among his soldiers.⁴² Moreover, one wonders if his imperialistic activities immediately preceding his death may, in Xenophon's mind, have contributed to his downfall.

Xenophon now turns to some skirmishing between Iphicrates and

41. The cause of indignation of the Aspendians is more explicit in Diodorus 14.99.4. Cf. similar episodes (with similar results) in the *Anabasis* (5.4.16–18 and 5.4.14–16) with Dillery's commentary (*Xenophon and the History of His Times*, 82–83).

42. Pace Robert J. Buck (*Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy: The Life of an Athenian Statesman*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 120 [Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998], 118), who argues that this statement is one of praise.

Anaxibius, Dercylidas's replacement (4.8.32–39). It should be noted that Xenophon states that Dercylidas was replaced not through any fault of his own, but because Anaxibius had friends in high places (4.8.32), which hints that his abilities are less than those of his predecessor. Our expectations are not disappointed, for Xenophon describes how Iphicrates cunningly sets up an ambush and catches Anaxibius by surprise. He also implies that Anaxibius could have averted disaster, citing a report that the Spartan commander deliberately ignored the result of an unfavorable sacrifice that day and proceeded on his headstrong (*καταφρονήσας*) way (4.8.36). In return for his disregard of the omen, Anaxibius is caught in Iphicrates' ambush and is killed, along with a good many of his men (4.8.38–39). He does redeem himself somewhat by a brave and honorable death, for Xenophon describes him as urging those around him to leave him to die and save themselves. They, proving their loyalty, refuse and die with him. Thus, in addition to the negative example afforded by Anaxibius's impiety in ignoring the results of the sacrifice, Xenophon is able to illustrate his courage and his ability to inspire loyalty among his followers even in dire misfortune.

Just as this section opens with an example of the loyalty inspired by a good moral commander, so does it end. Xenophon turns to the heart-warming farewell given to Teleutias by his soldiers when Hierax arrives to replace him (5.1.3–4). It is not made immediately evident to the reader what specifically these qualities of Teleutias were that instilled such admiration both in his troops and in Xenophon himself. Instead Xenophon describes in relative detail the naval operations in Piraeus of that year and the next (5.1.5–13) and then returns to Teleutias, sent out again as commander of the Spartan fleet, when he addresses his troops in a speech, given in *oratio recta* (5.1.14–17). At last Xenophon reveals what these qualities are that so endear Teleutias to those under his command, for he piously invokes the help of the gods both for himself and his soldiers and is unselfishly willing to share in the same or even greater hardships as his troops. After sacrificing, on the following day he carries out a successful surprise attack on the Piraeus (5.1.18–21), and Xenophon then concludes this section of his narrative with a brief account of some further successes (5.1.23–24). The implication is clear—a moral commander is also a successful one.

At this point (5.1.25), Xenophon turns to the antecedents of the King's Peace, joining together once more events by sea and by land. It is clear from his preceding narrative that what Xenophon considers “worthy

of mention” are the attributes of a good moral commander. Good moral leaders are pious, just, and self-controlled. They are careful to follow their own orders and to keep good order among their troops, in whom they inspire loyalty even in times of misfortune. Dercylidas, Diphridas, and Teleutias provide concrete illustrations of some of the qualities that make up good moral commanders, while the fates of Thrasybulus, Anaxibius, and Thibron are all clearly deserved. A good (that is, moral as well as competent) commander will meet with success in the field, and conversely, a bad (immoral as well as incompetent) leader will meet with a reverse, or worse. Thus, the enlightening passage at the beginning of this section (4.8.1) shows that Xenophon is aware of deliberate selection of material and uses it to point out a moral lesson.⁴³

Xenophon draws criticism not only for his omissions in the *Hellenica*, but also for alleged inequalities of treatment.⁴⁴ This is to say that he is thought to have treated subjects of historical significance more cursorily than they deserved, while giving fuller treatment to matters of less historical significance. What is interesting is that Xenophon himself indicates specifically in three (or possibly four) places that the treatment accorded by him to certain subjects might be controversial in its fullness.

The first of these passages occurs early in the *Hellenica*, during Xenophon’s narrative of Theramenes’ death. As Theramenes is dragged away from his refuge at the altar, he is alleged to have made two witticisms, which Xenophon repeats, albeit disclaiming responsibility for both (2.3.56).⁴⁵ When Satyrus, whom Xenophon characterizes as most arrogant and shameless (2.3.54), tells Theramenes to be quiet or he will be sorry, he retorts (2.3.56): “And if I am quiet, won’t I still be sorry?” Later, when Theramenes has drunk the hemlock, he throws out the dregs, exclaiming (2.3.56): “This to the noble Critias” (Κριτία τοῦτ’ ἔστω τῷ καλῷ).⁴⁶ Xenophon then adds that he is aware that these sayings are not “worthy of mention” (ἀξιόλογα) but that he considers it worthy of admiration when neither intelligence nor a sense of humor deserts someone’s soul in the face of death (2.3.56). Xenophon clearly feels it necessary to explain

43. Grayson, “Did Xenophon Intend to Write History?” 36; Cawkwell, *Xenophon*, 45; and Gray, *Character of Xenophon’s Hellenica*, 8–9); *pace* Stephen Usher (*The Historians of Greece and Rome* [London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969], 97), who argues that this passage offers no criteria of selection.

44. E.g., Underhill (*Commentary on the Hellenica*, xi).

45. “It is said” (λέγεται) and “they say” (ἔφασαν).

46. On the implications of this phrase, see S. Usher, “This to the Fair Critias,” *Eranois* 77 (1979): 39–42.

the inclusion in his narrative of material not normally considered “worthy of mention.” The implication of this statement is that there are conventional subjects worthy of admission into a historical work and that the last words of Theramenes do not fit this category.⁴⁷ As we have seen, however, Xenophon’s own criterion for that which is worthy of mention appears to be moral instructiveness, especially in the sphere of military and political affairs. Therefore, he justifies the inclusion of these *bons mots* by using Theramenes’ courage in the face of death as an example to his readers of moral achievement.⁴⁸

The second passage in which Xenophon feels compelled to explain the inclusion of certain material reveals more explicitly that his primary criterion for worthiness of mention is moral instructiveness. It occurs at the end of the farewell scene between Teleutias and his men (5.1.4). Xenophon, after drawing the reader’s attention to his point by swearing “by Zeus” (ναὶ μὰ Δία), states that he is aware of the fact that in reporting the devotion of Teleutias’s men he is not describing an expenditure, a danger, or a stratagem worthy of mention (ἀξιόλογον) but excuses himself on the grounds that this is the most noteworthy (ἀξιολογώτατον) action of a man. The scene that Xenophon has just painted shows us the soldiers are devoted to Teleutias, and, as we have seen, he goes on to indicate that this happy state of affairs came about as a result of the latter’s moral leadership. Thus, Xenophon informs his reader that the effects which Teleutias achieved and the moral manner in which he did so are what he considers “worthy of mention.” This passage reveals more explicitly than the very similar Theramenes passage, that Xenophon considers it more important to illustrate moral virtue than to narrate strictly conventional subjects.

The third passage in which Xenophon explains the reasons for his inclusion of material, which could be considered extraneous comes during his introduction to a section on the military exploits of the small state of Phlius (7.2.1),⁴⁹ where he remarks that if a small city has accomplished

47. Peter J. Rahn, “Xenophon’s Developing Historiography,” *TAPA* 102 (1971): 497–508, esp. 498–99.

48. Courage in the face of death, of course, is a *topos* that did not originate with Xenophon. It is recurrent, for example, in the work of Herodotus, as demonstrated by Stewart Flory (“Arion’s Leap: Brave Gestures in Herodotus,” *AJP* 99 [1978]: 411–21), who defines (411) the “brave gesture” motif as a case in which “a person faced with death performs some spirited but essentially unnecessary action which demonstrates contempt for danger.” Examples of similar witticisms in extremis in Xenophon include a certain Pasi-machus, a Spartan cavalry commander (4.4.10), and Socrates (*Apology* 28).

49. Pace Tuplin (*Failings of Empire*, 36–40), who contends that these passages add up to no clear indication of Xenophon’s program.

many noble deeds, these are even more worthy of comment than those of great cities. The point of this section of Xenophon's narrative is to show how the Phliasians remain loyal (oligarchic) allies of the Spartans in their darkest hour after Leuctra, although they themselves are hard pressed by their democratic exiles and the Argives and other anti-Spartan forces (7.2.1 and 7.3.1). It is likely, however, that Xenophon is somewhat misrepresenting the facts of the matter, for the author of a study of Phliasian politics suggests that they remained loyal to Sparta in the early 360s largely through fear of their most immediate enemy, Argos.⁵⁰

It is possible that another passage, 2.4.27, belongs to the group.⁵¹ Here, Xenophon prefaces a stratagem of the engineer from the city to repel an attack by the troops from the Piraeus, who were so overconfident (μέγα ἐφρόνουν) as to attack the very walls of the city, with the comment, "if it is necessary to tell this too." As this anecdote does serve to emphasize the presumption of the Piraeus faction, one wonders if this is another snide comment by Xenophon against the Athenian democrats.

These passages reveal quite clearly that Xenophon is reacting against a historical tradition in which the expenditures, dangers, and stratagems of great cities are subjects "worthy of mention" in a historical work.⁵² He, on the other hand, is convinced that at least one of the purposes of his *Hellenica* is a moral one: to provide his readers with examples of moral achievement. Even noble deeds by relatively insignificant people can provide moral instruction. Therefore, he sometimes gives full treatment to matters that he believes to be of great moral significance, while passing over or treating less fully other subjects to subordinate them to a moral point. Thus, his preoccupation with moral matters does leave him open to charges of unevenness of treatment. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Xenophon underlines with these apologies his praise of a (professed) moderate oligarch, a Spartan commander, and an oligarchic ally of Sparta, while those who suffer by comparison are the democrats in Athens and, possibly, the democratic enemies of Phlius. The moral lessons in which Xenophon desires to instruct his readers are clearly not free of political import.

It would be useful at this point to establish the moral virtues with

50. Ronald P. Legon, "Phliasian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth Century B.C.," *Historia* 16 (1967): 324–37.

51. As suggested by Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 36–37.

52. Rahn ("Xenophon's Developing Historiography," 501–2) connects the tradition from which Xenophon disassociates himself with Thucydides.

which Xenophon appears chiefly concerned in the *Hellenica*. These do not differ in the main from those for which he praises Agesilaus in his encomium of the Spartan king, where, as we have seen, moral virtue is closely entwined with military prowess. An instructive passage in terms of summing up the qualities with which Xenophon is chiefly concerned in the *Hellenica* (an almost identical passage appears at *Agesilaus* 1.27) occurs in the course of his description of Agesilaus's training of his army at Ephesus (3.4.18):

Wherever men revere the gods, train in matters of war, and practice obedience, how is it not likely that everything there be full of good hopes?⁵³

The first moral virtue Xenophon mentions here is piety, and it is significant that he places it at the top of the list, as he does in the *Agesilaus*, while the second is application to matters of war, and the third is obedience to authority, virtues necessary for success in military affairs. All of these, significantly, are virtues characteristic of the Spartans, and ones manifested by the Spartan commanders of whom Xenophon approved, as we have seen above.

If we examine the background to this passage, we see it is Agesilaus's fair and just treatment of those under his authority that leads to their willingness to obey and his proper reverence for the gods, especially in contrast to the faithless Tissaphernes, that ensures his success in the campaign. Agesilaus makes all the proper sacrifices before proceeding on this expedition to Asia (3.4.3), keeps his oath to Tissaphernes to maintain the peace, in spite of the latter's failure to do likewise (3.4.6), treats Lysander's presumptuous behavior reasonably⁵⁴ and forces him to desist by, among other measures, calling his attention to their friendship (3.4.7–10); heeds an unfavorable sacrifice (3.4.15); inspires his troops to excel in their training by offering them prizes (3.4.16–17); and is himself at their head as they dedicate their garlands to Artemis (3.4.18). The immediate result of Agesilaus' piety and his ability to inculcate loyalty and willing obedience in his troops is a major Spartan victory in the Battle of Sardis (3.4.20–24), for which the Persian king blames Tissaphernes and cuts off his head (3.4.25).

53. ὅπου γὰρ ἄνδρες θεοῦς μὲν σέβονται, τὰ δὲ πολεμικὰ ἀσχοίεν, πειθαρχεῖν δὲ μελετῶεν, πῶς οὐκ εἰκόσ ἐνταῦθα πάντα μεστὰ ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι;

54. Even Lysander is forced to admit (3.4.9): "But perhaps you are behaving in an even more reasonable way than I was" (ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ μᾶλλον εἰκότα σὺ ποιεῖς ἢ ἐγὼ ἐπραττον).

It has recently been suggested that Xenophon intends the results of this campaign not to match up to its elaborate preparations, which explains why it appears much less successful here than in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (11.2–12.1) or Diodorus (14.80.1–5).⁵⁵ But the preparations are the point of the passage, for Agesilaus's own moral behavior and ability to instill the same in his troops are the reasons for his eventual success.⁵⁶ Moreover, his narrative of this campaign in the *Agesilaus* is very similar (1.13–15). This passage illustrates well the emphasis throughout the *Hellenica* of the necessity of proper behavior toward both the gods and human beings to achieve political and military success. Interestingly, this is the only place in the *Hellenica* where Xenophon makes this clear in his own voice.⁵⁷ It is also significant that in the apparent palinodes contained at the end of the *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum* (14.7) and the *Cyropaedia* (8.8.7), he attributes the degeneracy and ensuing decline of both the Spartans and the Persians to the fact that they no longer obey either divine or human precepts.

Now, however, it remains for us to see how Xenophon proceeds to instill these moral precepts in the reader. The most obvious method is a system of praise and blame. Xenophon does occasionally intrude into the *Hellenica* in his own *persona*, on certain occasions expressing praise or blame in order to teach a moral lesson. Instances of explicit praise on moral grounds, although not many, outnumber the cases of blame. In addition to the examples of Xenophon's approval that we have seen above, he explicitly praises Agesilaus's courage (although he does hint that his rashness on this occasion may have led to his being wounded) and piety (Agesilaus does not allow the enemy who had taken sanctuary in a temple to be harmed, and he takes pains to honor the deity despite his wounds), which result in Spartan victory in the Battle of Coronea (4.3.16–21). Agesipolis, having promised his father Pausanias that he would be merciful to the Mantineans after the city's capture, arouses such loyalty in the soldiers under his command that they refrain from touching their defeated opponents (unlike the Athenians, who are unable to restrain the Thebans from

55. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times*, 109–14.

56. On Xenophon's insistence on a moral basis for leadership and, conversely, that the leader's own superiority in military prowess justifies his rule, see now Peter Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 146–53.

57. See 1.7.19 and 25 (Euryptolemus), 2.3.53 (Theramenes), 2.4.22 (Cleocritus), and 6.4.2 (Prothous); cf. Rudolf Dietzfelbinger, "Religiöse Kategorien in Xenophons Geschichtsverständnis," *WJA* 18 (1992): 133–45, esp. 136, 137–38, and 143.

committing atrocities upon their defeated opponents at 5.4.11–12). Xenophon goes out of his way to record this incident as an example of obedience (πειθαρχία) (5.2.6). He praises the Phliasian democrats twice during his account of the Spartan siege of their city, first for control of their appetite (5.3.21), and then for the courage of a certain Delphion (5.3.22), who is able to keep his fellow citizens loyal. Finally, Epaminondas draws praise from Xenophon for the inspiration of great loyalty in his troops (7.5.19–20). These last two examples illustrate again how Xenophon is not motivated solely by a pro-Spartan, anti-Theban bias, for he is willing to point out virtue wherever he finds it.

He does on occasion bestow blame on moral grounds. He denounces in strong language (4.4.2) the massacre of those in favor of peace at Corinth, calling it “the most sacrilegious plan of all” (τὸ πάντων ἀνοσιώτατον) because it takes place during a religious festival. When the conspirators continue their slaughter even of those who had taken refuge at the statues of the gods in the marketplace and at the altars of the gods, Xenophon characterizes them (4.4.3) as utterly sacrilegious (ἀνοσιώτατοι) and their action as impiety (ἀσέβεια). Denunciations of this vehemence are rare in the *Hellenica*. The only other example where Xenophon uses comparable language is his placing of the Spartans in the category of the impious (τῶν ἀσεβούντων) and of those who commit unholy acts (τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων), for their unlawful seizure of the Cadmea (5.4.1).⁵⁸

Unfortunately for our purposes, it is not his usual practice to comment explicitly upon moral or immoral actions. Xenophon prefers to teach virtue by example, and indeed is the first historian to make the moral paradigm the central focus of his work.⁵⁹ This is why he shows how the pious actions and concern for those under their command of such commanders as Agesilaus and Teleutias arouse devotion in their troops, and makes it clear that these moral virtues explain their military success as well. Some scholars have deduced from Xenophon's use in particular of various commanders to illustrate virtue that he is chiefly concerned in the *Hellenica* with the portrayal of good military leadership.⁶⁰ This theory does not sufficiently take

58. Grayson (“Did Xenophon Intend to Write History?” 36–37) gives a partial list of Xenophon's intrusions in his own *persona*. The list provided here is a complete list of the places in the *Hellenica* in which Xenophon explicitly expresses praise or blame on moral grounds.

59. See now Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times*, esp. 123–76.

60. H. R. Breitenbach (*Die historiographische Anschauungsformen Xenophons* [Freiburg: Paulusdruckerei, 1950]) is the originator of this theory, although he concedes in his *RE* article (“Xenophon,” *RE* 9A [1967], 1700) that this is not the key to the whole *Hellenica*.

into account, however, the overall moral and political aim of the *Hellenica*. Despite his own absence from political affairs in Athens after the turn of the century as a result of military service and then exile,⁶¹ Xenophon insists it is the duty of a capable aristocrat to take part in public life (*Memorabilia* 3.7). He therefore selects military commanders in particular as his paradigms, in order to show the young aristocrat, whose duty it is to serve his city, the concrete results of good moral behavior.

Xenophon also uses negative exempla to illustrate moral failures, probably because, for a writer of paradigmatic history, such exempla offered the most effective method of expressing disapproval. Some critics claim silence is Xenophon's chief means of censure,⁶² but it is not his usual practice to impose his own views directly; instead, he allows the reader to make the necessary inferences.⁶³ He makes it clear throughout that individuals who commit moral wrongdoings do not meet with success, for almost every moral offense that he mentions in his narrative is almost immediately followed by the destruction of the guilty. Many examples of negative exempla occur in the *Hellenica*, but we shall consider in detail two, which are illustrative of his technique in general.

A good example of the failure to exercise moral leadership is the case of Mnasippus, a Spartan admiral. Upon being sent on campaign to Corcyra, Mnasippus reveals his inability to keep good order among his troops, for he is unable to prevent their desire for luxury (τρυφή) when they disdain drinking some plundered wine, unless it has a good bouquet (6.2.6). Xenophon does not mention τρυφή often, but the other two examples (*Memorabilia* 1.6.10 and 3.11.1) are clearly pejorative.⁶⁴ The Mnasippus begins to mistreat the mercenaries under his command. First of all, he discharges some of them and owes the rest two months' pay, although Xenophon says explicitly that despite his protests to the contrary, he did have the means to pay them (6.2.15–16). Upon attack by the besieged Corcyraeans, Mnasippus orders his officers to lead forth the mercenaries.

61. We know little of Xenophon except that which we can extract from his own writings; the ancient biography of Diogenes Laertius is unreliable in many of its details. For a detailed reconstruction of his life, see Edouard Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1957) (now somewhat dated).

62. E.g., Cawkwell, *Xenophon*, 43.

63. See, e.g., Bodil Due, "The Trial of the Generals in Xenophon's *Hellenica*," *ClMed* 34 (1983): 33–44; Gerald Proietti, *Xenophon's Sparta: An Introduction*, Mnemosyne Supplement 99 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), 108; and J. J. Moles, "Xenophon and Callicratidas," *JHS* 114 (1994): 70–84, at 83–84.

64. Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 131–32.

When some of them retort it is difficult to keep the troops obedient when they are given no provisions, he strikes them, one with a staff and one with the spike of a spear (6.2.17–19). Xenophon then makes the general observation that this is a situation not beneficial for battle, because the soldiers are dispirited and hostile to Mnasippus (6.2.19). Not surprisingly, the unenthusiastic troops are not able to sustain the attack and begin to flee, leaving Mnasippus with only a few men around him. Soon he falls at the hands of the Corcyraeans, a death that is directly attributable to his mistreatment of the men under his command (6.2.20–23). The fact that Xenophon depicts so dramatically the deadly results of a high-ranking Spartan's blatant disregard for the fair treatment of his troops should give some pause to proponents of the theory that he was motivated solely by a philo-laconian bias.⁶⁵ Similarly, the argument that he is simply interested in presenting the paradigm of a bad commander ignores the moral dimension of the episode.⁶⁶

Xenophon likewise uses negative exempla to illustrate in a concrete fashion the results of human disregard for the divine. A striking case where he reveals his disapproval indirectly by describing the fate of the wrongdoers concerns, once again, the small (at this time, oligarchic) city of Phlius. The Arcadians, Eleans, and some exiles storm Phlius without provocation and even kill one of the guards as he seeks sanctuary in the temple of Hera. The Phliasians, although caught unawares, fight extremely bravely and rout the enemy, killing eighty of them (7.2.5–9). Xenophon concludes by describing the scene of the Phliasians' relief at their safety, with the men clasping hands with one another, while the women, weeping all the while, bring them drink (7.2.9).⁶⁷ This detail is gratuitous to the narrative, but it serves to create an emotional tie with the Phliasians, whose unexpected victory Xenophon implies to be the direct consequence of their stronger opponents' act of impiety in failing to respect the sanctuary.⁶⁸

65. Noted as long ago as 1896 by I. Bruns, *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen im fünften und vierten Jahrhundert vor Christi Geburt* (Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1896), 44. Dillery (*Xenophon and the History of His Times*, 164–171) suggests that Mnasippus serves as a concrete example of the moral and military decline of the Spartans.

66. As argued by Peter Krafft, "Vier Beispiele des Xenophontischen in Xenophons *Hellenika*," *RhM* 110 (1967): 103–50, at 142–44.

67. For the same mixture of joy and tears, see also 7.1.32 and *Anabasis* 4.7.21. This scene also evokes Homer, *Iliad* 6.484; see Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times*, 132–33.

68. For a discussion of all the cases where an impious act is followed by a disastrous result in the *Hellenica*, see my "Condemnation of the Impious," 251–77.

Sometimes, Xenophon goes beyond indicating that the destruction of the guilty is attributable to an immoral action, but even makes divine retribution for moral wrongdoing explicit. Like Herodotus,⁶⁹ Xenophon appears not to be concerned with one particular deity (or deities), but his terminology for “the divine” is both abstract and interchangeable, including the terms *deity* (δαμμόνιον), *fate* (μοῖρα), *divine* (θεῖον), *god* (θεός), and *gods* (θεοί).⁷⁰ The first explicit instance of divine intervention occurs in the battle between the Thirty and the men from Phyle under Thrasybulus.⁷¹ The seer of Thrasybulus’ troops warns them not to attack until someone from their side has been killed, and he prophesies victory for them but death for himself (2.4.18). Then, as Xenophon says, “as though led on by some fate” (ὥσπερ ὑπὸ μοίρας τινὸς ἀγόμενος), he runs into the line of battle and is slain by the enemy (2.4.19).⁷² Thrasybulus and his troops, with the gods on their side, are victorious, as prophesied, against the Thirty, who lose over seventy of their supporters in battle on that day, including their leader.

The massacre at Corinth, an event that, as we have seen, had so profound an effect upon Xenophon that he denounces it in uncharacteristically vehement language (4.4.2–3), is also followed by divine vengeance upon the guilty, signaled in the introduction to the episode with the observation that the gods (οἱ θεοί) are not unmindful of those who are impious or who commit unholy acts (5.4.1). The survivors piously obey a portent and, eventually, succeed in summoning the Spartans to liberate the city, assisted by fortune (τύχη) (4.4.5–8).⁷³ Xenophon describes in detail the deaths of the perpetrators of the massacre: trapped beside Corinth’s Long Walls, some climb up onto the walls and are killed after leaping down on the other side, others are slain in skirmishing by the foot of the walls, and still others are trampled by one another and suffocated (4.4.11). He now comments

69. See the (still important) discussion of Ivan M. Linforth, “Named and Unnamed Gods in Herodotus,” *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 9 (1928): 201–43.

70. Jean-Claude Riedinger, *Étude sur les Helléniques: Xénophon et l’histoire* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1991), esp. 250 n. 4.

71. Tuplin (*Failings of Empire*, 215) appends a list, with cross-references to Xenophon’s other works, of the incidents of divine intervention in the *Hellenica*. Tuplin’s list is superior to that of Marta Sordi (“I Caratteri dell’opera storiografica di Senofonte nelle Elleniche,” *Athenaeum* 29 [1951]: 273–348, at 337 n. 1), who makes no distinction between statements that Xenophon himself makes and those that he attributes to historical characters.

72. Krentz (*Xenophon: Hellenika II.3.11–IV.2.28*, 144) suggests that Xenophon leaves the seer unnamed in order to emphasize the role of the divine in this episode.

73. 4.8.1: “Partly by fortune and partly by vigilance” (καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ’ἐπιμέλειαν); cf. Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 69 and n. 17.

that the divine (ὁ θεός) is providing the Spartans with an opportunity beyond their prayers, for they are presented with a group of panic-stricken enemies, actively helping in their own destruction (4.4.12). As Xenophon rhetorically asks, “how could anyone not believe that it was divine retribution?” (πῶς οὐκ ἄν τις θεῖον ἠγήσαιο;). Now the perpetrators of the massacre at Corinth are themselves massacred by the Spartans and, as Xenophon informs us (4.4.12), “so many fell in such a short time that men who were accustomed to seeing piles of grain, of planks, and of rocks, at that time looked upon piles of bodies.”⁷⁴ Thus, Xenophon indicates that the perpetrators suffer immediate and terrible divine retribution as a consequence of their impious acts.⁷⁵

Although Xenophon usually reveals the divine retribution striking the guilty soon after he narrates the offense, presumably so the reader will easily make the connection, sometimes divine justice is slow in coming. For example, the Spartan seizure of the Cadmea, denounced so vigorously at 5.4.1, is the most egregious example of a series of similar offenses by the Spartans, for which the gods eventually punish them at Leuctra,⁷⁶ just over a decade later. In Xenophon's account, the Spartans do not heed their fellow citizen Prothous's advice to disband the army, as they swore to do in the peace of 371 (6.3.18–19), and instead begin to make financial and diplomatic preparations for war against the Thebans. By citing the grounds for Prothous's proposal (6.4.2), namely, “the gods will be most favorable and the cities least aggrieved,” Xenophon underlines its soundness. But the Spartan assembly, apparently not at all concerned with the prospect of breaking their oath, dismisses Prothous's proposal as “nonsense.”⁷⁷ At this point, Xenophon comments (6.4.2–3): “For the deity, it seems, was already leading them on” (ἦδη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαμόνιον ἤγεν). Thus, the Spartans are led on to destruction by divine intervention, just as the seer of Thrasylbulus's troops was led on into battle to defeat the Thirty (note that

74. Gray (*Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 154–57) discusses the literary qualities that Xenophon employs in this episode to highlight the link between crime and divine punishment.

75. Pace Riedinger (*Étude sur les Helléniques*, 252 and n. 3), who states that although there are other cases of equally serious impiety in the *Hellenica*, including this episode, the Spartans are the only ones to suffer divine punishment. Dietzfelbinger (“Religiöse Kategorien,” 138–39) also minimizes the role of the divine in this episode, arguing that Xenophon attributes the unexpected Spartan victory to divine intervention only because it can be explained in no more plausible way.

76. See, most recently, Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times*, esp. 221–27 (cf., however, the cautionary remarks of Dietzfelbinger, “Religiöse Kategorien,” 145).

77. Dillery (*Xenophon and the History of His Times*, 246 and n. 20) notes that Prothous serves as the Herodotean “tragic warner.”

ἀγῶ is the verb used in both cases). So Xenophon implies that the Spartans' destruction at Leuctra occurs as a result of their breaking of another oath, which reminds the reader of the unusual vehemence of his condemnation of them for the same offense at 5.4.1.

In his narrative of the battle itself, Xenophon includes a particular concentration of supernatural occurrences: the doors of all the temples in the region open of their own accord, and the weapons disappear from the temple of Heracles (6.4.7). Perhaps the number of supernatural occurrences is intended to underline the magnitude of the disaster for the Spartans. In any case, Xenophon does report (6.4.7–8) the opinion of some that these supernatural occurrences were devices of the leaders, but he immediately undercuts this skepticism by remarking that in the battle, everything turned out badly for the Spartans, while everything turned out well for the other side. The logical conclusion is that Xenophon reports these supernatural occurrences to reinforce his contention that the gods punish the Spartans at Leuctra for their impiety.

In his account of the battle, Xenophon does mention one of the Theban modifications of the hoplite army that contributed to their victory, the deepening of the hoplite phalanx (6.4.12), but he does not give the real cause of the Spartan defeat, their inability to respond adequately to these innovations.⁷⁸ The Spartans lost two detachments four years previously at Tegyra to the Thebans with their new Sacred Band, and so indeed had time to prepare themselves against their innovative opponents. Plutarch (*Pelopidas* 16–17) and Diodorus (15.37.1–2) recount this battle as a foreshadowing of Leuctra, but it does not appear in Xenophon's narrative, perhaps to give prominence to Leuctra as the more crushing defeat and therefore the better moral lesson. Likewise, Xenophon does not mention the Spartan failure to react effectively to the military innovations of the Thebans but prefers to emphasize the divine vengeance against the Spartans for their seizure of the Cadmea.⁷⁹

Lycomedes too is a victim of divine intervention in human affairs. After carrying out some negotiations with the Athenians, Lycomedes

78. G. L. Cawkwell ("Epaminondas and Thebes," *CQ* n.s., 22 [1972]: 254–78) comments (263): "it was not Cleombrotus that failed at Leuctra, but Spartanism." On Xenophon's presentation of the battle, see now Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 134–38 (with recent bibliography).

79. It is also worth noting that Cleombrotus and the Spartans indulged in some wine before the battle (6.4.8); while Xenophon does not explicitly associate this tippling with a lack of self-control, he does cite a statement that the wine stimulated them somewhat, indicating that it may also have been partially responsible for their defeat.

selects a certain ship out of the many available ones in which to sail home. He then tells the sailors to put him ashore wherever he should request. Unfortunately for Lycomedes, he chooses to land at the very spot where there happened to be some Arcadian exiles, who immediately put him to death (7.4.1–3). Xenophon goes out of his way to comment (7.4.3) that Lycomedes perished in a most divinely inspired manner (δαμονιώτατα ἀποθνήσκει). The reader seems meant to infer from the previous mention of Lycomedes that he is being punished for his excessive ambition and his responsibility for the arrogance and downfall of the Arcadians (7.1.23–32).

Another episode involving the gods is the attempt of the Eleans on the occasion of the 104th Olympiad in 364 B.C. to regain control of the sanctuary at Olympia from the Arcadians. Xenophon remarks (7.4.30) that on this occasion the Eleans, although they had been looked down upon previously as unskilled in battle, lead forth their allies as if they were the bravest of all. They meet with immediate and surprising success against the Arcadians and force them to retreat against the temple buildings, from which they pelt the Eleans with missiles (roof tiles?). This destruction of temple property is something that Xenophon would not have approved. Not only are there numerous examples in Greek literature of divine anger striking down those guilty of harming temple buildings,⁸⁰ but the first item for which Xenophon praises Agesilaus in the summary of his virtues at the end of the *Agesilaus* is his reverent treatment of enemies' sanctuaries (11.1). It is not surprising then that Xenophon concludes his narrative of the incident as follows (7.4.32):

They (the Eleans) went back to the city, having become such in valor as a god, after giving inspiration, would be able to produce even in a day, but humans could not create in a large amount of time in those who were not already brave.⁸¹

Because Xenophon has indicated above (7.4.30) that the Eleans are *not* normally brave, there seems to be only one possibility offered in this passage: that the gods provided them with extraordinary valor specifically

80. See Robert Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 168 and n. 33.

81. ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὸ ἄστυ, τοιοῦτοι γινόμενοι οἷους τὴν ἀρετὴν θεὸς μὲν ἂν ἐμπνεύσας δύναιτο καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἀποδείξει, ἄνθρωποι δὲ οὐδ' ἂν ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τοὺς μὴ ὄντας ἀλκίμους ποιήσειαν.

for this occasion (cf. 7.2.21).⁸² In this way, he leads the reader to draw the conclusion that the Eleans' uncharacteristic bravery is divinely inspired because their enemies caused physical damage to temple buildings.

Another reason for divine favoring of the Eleans follows. We learn next that the Arcadians exacerbate the offense of damaging temple buildings by engaging in temple robbery, for they begin to use the sacred funds to support their standing army. Eventually some members of the Arcadian Confederacy begin to object to this use of the sacred treasures, arguing before the federal assembly, as Xenophon reports, that their use of the sacred funds would leave their descendants liable to the wrath of the gods (7.4.33–34).⁸³ The issue of the sacred funds proves divisive for the Arcadian Confederacy, while the Thebans, who give military support to the temple robbers, are unsuccessful in the following campaign, the Mantinea campaign (7.5.1–27), which is the last of the *Hellenica*.

In fact, the Mantinea campaign is the episode that contains the greatest number of references to the divine.⁸⁴ The first reference to forces beyond human control is a comment, in the first person, that he would not consider this campaign εὐτυχής for Epaminondas (7.5.8).⁸⁵ Here, as the rest of Xenophon's narrative of the campaign confirms, εὐτυχής means "favored by fortune" rather than "successful (through human effort)."⁸⁶ Epaminondas's first move in the campaign is an attack on Sparta, which would have been successful had it not been for a certain divine fate (θεία τινὶ μοίρῃ), in the form of a Cretan who informs the Spartans of the approach of the Theban army (7.5.9–10).⁸⁷ As a result of this mischance, Epaminondas and his troops find the city defended but still are superior in numbers. Nevertheless, Archidamus and the Spartans defeat them, an unexpected result that could be attributable to the divine (τὸ θεῖον), although

82. Pace Riedinger, *Étude sur les Helleniques*, 251 n. 3, and Dietzfelbinger, "Religiöse Kategorien," 139–40.

83. Note that this is the only example of the "sins of the fathers" doctrine, which is so pervasive in early Greek thought. I have argued elsewhere ("Condemnation of the Impious," 272–74) that Xenophon distances himself from this doctrine because it removes personal responsibility from the individual.

84. See H. R. Breitenbach, "Xenophon," 1698.

85. εὐτυχῆ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγε φήσομαι τὴν στρατηγίαν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι.

86. See H. D. Westlake, "Xenophon and Epaminondas," *GRBS* 16 (1975): 23–40, at 30 and n. 20.

87. Westlake ("Xenophon and Epaminondas," 31–32) believes that Xenophon misrepresents Epaminondas's desperation in this move, for he had nothing to lose by making this attack and a great deal to gain if it succeeded.

Xenophon also suggests human motivation is possible (7.5.12).⁸⁸ When the Spartans, exulting in their victory, pursue the enemy farther than was opportune (πορρωτέρω τοῦ καιροῦ), they in turn are killed because, as Xenophon says (7.5.13), the divine (τὸ θεῖον) apparently grants them victory only up to a point.⁸⁹ As H. D. Westlake notes, the attribution of these Spartan losses to divine intervention is remarkable because it is natural that when this group of Spartan soldiers caught up with the main body of the enemy, it would have lost the initial impetus of its advance and been at the mercy of a much larger force.⁹⁰ Therefore, Xenophon employs divine intervention when a purely military explanation would have sufficed.

A further defeat for Epaminondas follows in another battle where, despite all his careful planning and forethought, the only honorable option left is to give battle in less than favorable circumstances (7.5.18). Xenophon then comments that this sense of honor is not surprising in an ambitious (φιλότιμος) man such as Epaminondas, who wishes to bequeath to his fatherland the hegemony (ἄρχή) of the Peloponnese. Although the root φιλοτιμ- is ambiguous in the *Hellenica*, as seen in the discussion of Lycomedes, the sequel makes it clear that it is the negative connotation which is intended here also. In spite of all of Epaminondas's ability as a commander, which Xenophon underlines at 7.5.8 and 7.5.19,⁹¹ misfortune strikes again, in the form of his unexpected death, just when the Thebans appear poised on the brink of decisive victory (7.4.24–25). Immediately upon his death, neither side is able to gain the upper hand. Instead, the god (ὁ θεός) so arranges it that both sides claim victory, while leaving Greece in more confusion and disorder than before (7.5.26–27). Xenophon's insistence on divine intervention in his account of the Mantinea campaign may result from his conviction that those who act out of

88. "As for what happened subsequently, it is possible to impute it to the divine, but it is also possible to say that no one could resist desperate men" (τό[τε] γε μὴν ἐντεῦθεν γενομένου ἔξεστι μὲν τὸ θεῖον αἰτιᾶσθαι, ἔξεστι δὲ λέγειν ὡς τοῖς ἀπονενομημένοις οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑποσταίη).

89. "For, it seems, a limit had been drawn by the divine up to which victory had been granted to them" (περιεγέγραπτο γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ μέχρι ὅσου νίκη ἐδέδοτο αὐτοῖς).

90. Westlake, "Xenophon and Epaminondas," 33 n. 29.

91. Cf. the remarks of L. Breitenbach in his 1874 commentary on the *Hellenica* (I was unable to obtain a copy of it) cited by John Wickersham, *Hegemony and Greek Historians* (Lanham, Md: Rowan & Littlefield, 1994), 117 n. 26: "This passage shows that Xenophon saw misfortune for Greece in the efforts and influence of Epaminondas; but he also understood how to enter into the spirit of the great man and esteem his lofty Theban patriotism." I thank one of the referees for bringing this passage to my attention.

the selfish desire to obtain honor and glory for themselves will eventually be stopped by the gods.⁹² Just as in the case of Sparta, Epaminondas's ambition has led him too far, and the gods intervene.⁹³ Imperialism engenders moral corruption and is never successful in the *Hellenica* for long.

Xenophon's belief in divine retribution seems linked to his conviction that the supernatural brings about punishment for immoral actions. Often natural phenomena, which are not brought about by human agency but are attributable to some supernatural force, prevent those with moral faults from obtaining victory, or worse. At the beginning of the *Hellenica*, we find a thunderstorm preventing Callicratidas from attacking the Athenians at Arginusae unexpectedly by night (1.6.28). Now, Xenophon has previously portrayed Callicratidas as a morally unsympathetic character.⁹⁴ His excessive pride in taking over command from Lysander shows little concern for the well-being of the men under his command, a moral vice for Xenophon, and results in an undermining of his authority by Lysander's friends (1.6.1–4). His address to his troops is self-centered and refers explicitly to his own *philotimia* (1.6.5). He refuses Persian money altogether when Cyrus asks him to wait two days (1.6.6–7). He proudly proclaims after his capture of Methymna that no Greek will be enslaved if he can help it, but on the very next day he sells the Athenian garrison there into slavery (1.6.14–15).⁹⁵ He then attempts, as he somewhat vulgarly puts it, to put an end to Conon's committing adultery with the sea (Κόνωνι δὲ εἶπεν ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλατταν), by blockading him at Mytilene (1.6.15–18). Callicratidas's selfish concern with his

92. Higgins (*Xenophon the Athenian*, 118) notes the destructive consequences of Epaminondas's *philotimia*.

93. Westlake ("Xenophon and Epaminondas," 23–40) reaches a similar conclusion, but he attributes the insistence upon divine retribution in this passage to Xenophon's prejudice against the Theban leader.

94. Higgins (*Xenophon the Athenian*, 10–12) illuminates the contrast between Callicratidas's words and actions, which disproves the position of many scholars (such as Westlake, "Individuals in Xenophon, 'Hellenica,'" *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 49 [1966]: 246–69; reprinted in *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969], 203–25, at 217) that Xenophon admired Callicratidas. Recently, Moles ("Xenophon and Callicratidas," 70–84, with full references to the positions held by various scholars) and Bruce LaForse ("Xenophon, Callicratidas and Panhellenism," *AHB* 12 [1998]: 55–67) have argued that Xenophon's portrayal of Callicratidas is mixed.

95. He does, however, refuse to sell the free Methymnaeans into slavery, although his allies urge this course of action upon him (1.6.14–15). It may be, as Joseph Roisman ("Kallikratidas—A Greek Patriot?" *CJ* 83 [1987]: 21–33, esp. 30–31) suggests, that Callicratidas excludes the Athenians, as enemies, from his proclamation against the enslavement of Greeks.

own pride seems, however, not to have gone unnoticed by the powers that be. A storm prevents him from attacking the Athenians at night, when he would have had a better chance of catching them off-guard (1.6.26–28). Instead, Callicratidas attacks by day, against the advice of his helmsman to retire from the attack, and explicitly puts his own reputation ahead of the lives of his men and the interests of his state (1.6.32). The result is that not only is Callicratidas defeated in the battle of Arginusae (1.6.33–34), with a tremendous loss of life on the Peloponnesian side, but he also meets a rather ignominious end by falling overboard (1.6.33).⁹⁶ In this case, Xenophon shows how a natural phenomenon actively contributes to Callicratidas's deserved destruction.

In fact, Xenophon's chief use of natural phenomena seems to be as a kind of reinforcement of the recurrent theme throughout the *Hellenica* that moral offenses eventually result in the destruction of the guilty. In addition to the thunderstorm that brings about the death of Callicratidas, an example of this kind is the unexpected snowstorm that protects Thrasybulus and his followers from an attack of the Thirty. This phenomenon is given particular prominence by being mentioned twice: once in Xenophon's regular narrative (2.4.3) and again in Thrasybulus's speech to his men, when he encourages them by saying that the gods are obviously on their side, for they send a storm in fair weather to help them (2.4.14). It is an obvious inference that the storm has appeared providentially to aid the virtuous against the wicked.

An example of a natural phenomenon guiding human right conduct is Xenophon's account of Agis's campaign against Elis. He presents the Eleans as being morally in the wrong, at least according to the Spartans, because, in addition to previous inflammatory actions, they refused to allow Agis to sacrifice to Zeus at Olympia, although he was specifically instructed to do so by an oracle (3.2.21–22). As a result of these offenses, the Spartans decide to make war on Elis and send Agis off with an army. Just after Agis crosses the border into Elis, an earthquake takes place. Thinking it is a divine sign (θεῖον ἠγγισάμενος), he immediately disbands his army and goes home (3.2.24). The next year, after Agis makes his sacrifices at Olympia, his campaign against Elis is so successful that Xenophon comments that it was like a foraging expedition for the Peloponnesians

96. Krentz (*Xenophon: Hellenika I–II.3.10* [Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1989], 156) comments: "Xenophon lets Kallikratidas' disappearance suffice as a comment; he does not give the Spartan an honorable death."

(3.2.26). In this episode, Agis is rewarded for his reverence for the gods, while the Eleans' presumed irreverence in seeking to foil the wishes of the gods, as indicated in the oracle given to Agis, is punished.

A more explicit study of the proper conduct of a commander toward the interpretation of natural phenomena is Xenophon's account of the behavior of Agesipolis while on expedition against Argos. The antecedents to this expedition are interesting. Agesipolis, doubting the sincerity of the Argives' plea of the sacred month every time he was about to invade, consults the oracle of Zeus at Olympia, putting to the god the question of whether it would be impious to ignore this holy truce that was pleaded unjustly. When Zeus gives his permission to ignore this fabricated holy truce, Agesipolis, just to be sure, consults the oracle of Apollo at Delphi as well, and obtains the same answer (4.7.2–3).⁹⁷ Agesipolis, now certain that he is obeying the gods' wishes, proceeds with the expedition.⁹⁸ On the first evening the god (ὁ θεός) sends an earthquake.⁹⁹ This statement is unusual because Xenophon says explicitly in his own *persona* that the earthquake is divinely inspired. Although the soldiers expect they will retreat promptly, as Agis had a decade earlier, Agesipolis argues that there is divine encouragement for the campaign in this case, since they have already crossed the border (4.7.5). After sacrificing, he continues the campaign,¹⁰⁰ reaching the gates of the city (4.7.5–7). Here, he wishes to build a siege wall, but after a thunderbolt strikes his camp and kills some of his troops, he makes a sacrifice to determine the wishes of the gods in this matter (4.7.7). When the omens are unfavorable, Agesipolis piously withdraws, having done much damage to the Argives. It seems clear that Xenophon attributes Agesipolis's success to his diligence in ascertaining the gods' wishes and his prompt obedience to the message indicated by these natural phenomena.

We should perhaps add to this group three incidents in which Xenophon does not endorse the supernatural implications of natural phenomena. The first is the change from heavy rain to a clear and sunny sky that

97. Robert Parker ("Greek States and Greek Oracles," in *Cruce: Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th Birthday*, ed. P. A. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey [Exeter: Imprint Academic, 1985], 298–326, at 300) suggests that Agesipolis was motivated to consult two oracles primarily by the desire to prevent opposition from his troops.

98. There are double consultations of oracles that are apparently acceptable in Herodotus (9.93.4) and in Euripides' *Ion* (esp. 300–302 and 407–9). Nevertheless, Xenophon's Croesus in the *Cyropaedia* claims (7.2.17) that the gods do not love those who do not trust them (οὐ φιλοῦσι τοὺς ἀπιστοῦντας).

99. Literally, "the god shook" (ἔσεισεν ὁ θεός).

100. Accepting Tillmanns's emendation of ἤγε ἴτο αὐ̂ πόρρω for MSS ἤγε ἴτο οὐ πόρρω.

takes place during Alcibiades' attack on the Spartan fleet at Cyzicus (1.1.16). Certainly this incident, which occurs near the beginning of the *Hellenica*, is designed to reveal the leadership abilities of Alcibiades, whose troops are so willing to obey that they agree to be drenched on the way to a battle, which was not certain even to materialize. The implication is that the gods favor him and change the rain to sunshine for him, especially when Xenophon states that the clearing of the skies resulted in Alcibiades' catching sight of the Spartan commander Mindarus's sixty ships training far from the harbor and offering an easy target. It is certainly no coincidence that Alcibiades inflicts a terrible defeat on the Spartan navy on this occasion, including the death of Mindarus himself. The second incident is the occurrence of a sudden windstorm that strikes Cleombrotus's army on his return home from the first Spartan campaign against Thebes after the liberation of the Cadmea (5.4.17). Xenophon tells us that some people considered it to be a sign foreshadowing the future (presumably the decisive Spartan defeat at the battle of Leuctra). If, however, we take into account Xenophon's condemnation of the Spartan seizure of the Cadmea (5.4.1) and his undercutting of the skepticism expressed by some people on the genuineness of the portents before Leuctra, it seems very likely that he did consider the sudden windstorm that beset Cleombrotus to have been an indication of divine displeasure against the Spartans. Similarly, he mentions that some people reported the appearance of thunder and lightning in a clear sky immediately preceding the so-called Tearless Battle (7.1.31). As we have seen above, he lays the responsibility for the outcome of the battle at the door of the Arcadian leader, Lycomedes. Given that Xenophon attributes Lycomedes' death to divine intervention (7.4.3), it is probable that he would like to believe the report that the hands of the gods were at work on this occasion also, although he cannot vouch for its accuracy.¹⁰¹ Although he does not explicitly endorse a divine origin of these natural phenomena, the fact remains that they do aid the virtuous and punish the wicked.

Another method by which Xenophon instills his moral lessons in the reader is his use of speeches.¹⁰² Here, instead of guiding the reader with

101. Other phenomena that appear merely to foreshadow the future are two solar eclipses, one occurring before a major victory of Lycophron (2.3.4) and the other preceding Agesilaus's hearing of the news of the Spartan loss at Cnidus (4.3.10).

102. For a comprehensive treatment of speeches in the *Hellenica*, see Gray (*Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 79–140), who argues that Xenophon's main purpose in including them is the exploration of moral issues through the characterization of the speaker.

explicit comments, he allows the moral qualities of the speaker to reveal themselves; for this reason, he uses direct speech more often than indirect speech. Sometimes, even when a speech begins in *oratio obliqua*, it then switches into *oratio recta*,¹⁰³ which allows the speaker's personality to shine through more clearly. In this way, the virtue of a Teleutias or the vice of a Callicratidas is revealed to the reader through his own words, as it were.

Xenophon uses speeches not only to illustrate the morality of the good, but also as another indirect method of denouncing the bad. In this way, he does not have to make an explicit condemnation in his own *persona*, but can distance himself by putting such comments into the mouth of a third person. Furthermore, the speaker's denunciation of a wrongdoer reveals, by contrast, his own morality. Euryptolemus's speech (1.7.16–33), the first formal speech in direct discourse of any real length,¹⁰⁴ is a good example of the double function that speeches can serve in the *Hellenica*.

In this speech, which occurs in the sad aftermath of the Battle of Arginusae,¹⁰⁵ Euryptolemus cautions against disrespect both of the gods and of the laws. He thus reveals himself as a man of moral character,¹⁰⁶ in contrast to the lawless violence of the Athenian mob, who have been stirred up to commit an act that is morally reprehensible by the evil words of men such as Callixenus, who brought forward the motion (which Xenophon presents as illegal) to condemn the generals en bloc. The truth of Euryptolemus's words comes out a few chapters later when the Athenians regret their hasty decision and decide to bring to trial those who had persuaded them. Callixenus and the others managed to escape beforehand, but Xenophon adds a postscript, saying that upon Callexenus's return to Athens a few years later, hated by all, he died of starvation (1.7.35). Thus, Xenophon expressly records Callixenus's nasty death out of proper chronological sequence to reinforce his condemnation by Euryp-

103. Westlake, "Individuals in Xenophon, 'Hellenica,'" 204. Buckler ("Xenophon's Speeches and the Theban Hegemony," 189) provides a useful chart that tabulates the twenty-nine speeches included in Xenophon's narrative of the Theban hegemony (6.3.1–7.5.27), showing which are in *oratio recta* (eighteen), which are in *oratio obliqua* (five), and which change from the latter to the former (six).

104. So far, in *oratio recta*, there are only the two speeches of Callicratidas (1.6.5 and 1.6.8–11). There are three instances, however, in which a speech begins in *oratio obliqua* but switches to *oratio recta*: Alcibiades to the Athenian fleet (1.1.14), the Syracusan generals to their troops (1.1.28), and Cyrus to Lysander (1.5.6).

105. On Xenophon's presentation of this episode, see my "Shifting Viewpoints in Xenophon's *Hellenica*: The Arginusae Episode," *Athenaeum* 88 (2000): 499–513.

106. Pace Due ("Trial of the Generals," 33–44), who believes that this speech reveals Euryptolemus to be a manipulative demagogue.

tolemus.¹⁰⁷ This example shows how Xenophon uses speeches to provide both positive and negative models of moral qualities.

Euryptolemus's speech also shows how Xenophon's concern to illustrate moral qualities can lead him away from the accurate interpretation of history. More damning than what might appear to be overly excessive attention to the trial (it occupies over six pages in the Oxford text) is the fact that Theramenes' motives are not made clear in Xenophon's narrative. Xenophon ignores the origins of the conflict between the generals and the trierarchs, which may have originated from a misunderstanding, in order to depict a starker contrast on moral grounds. In his concern to give a vivid moral lesson, he does not provide for the reader a complete historical explanation of the situation at hand.¹⁰⁸ Also, he often does not give voice to the leading figures in the historical period that he covers but rather concentrates on relative nonentities, such as Euryptolemus,¹⁰⁹ because they provide better examples of moral achievement. This is not to say that he puts words in their mouths¹¹⁰ but that he may exaggerate their ultimate importance as a result of the sentiments they express. Thus, while probably not indulging in outright invention, Xenophon likely turns the speeches to his own moral use.

Digressions are another method by which Xenophon instructs his readers in moral virtue. He is very careful in his use of digressions and usually indicates clearly to the reader when he is beginning and ending a digression, signaling these points of departure and return with comments in the first person. His most famous digressions concern the rise and fall of two tyrants,¹¹¹ namely, Jason of Pherae and Euphron of Sicyon.

Xenophon first introduces the reader to Jason during his narrative of events leading to the peace of 375 B.C. In fact, he interrupts his account of the growing hostility between the Thebans and the Spartans, which eventually culminates in the battle of Leuctra, by inserting an appeal,

107. Gray (*Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 83–91) sees this speech as a “commemoration of the quality of philanthropy” (91) but does not mention its negative function, the condemnation of Callixenus and the Athenian mob by Euryptolemus.

108. See A. Andrewes, “The Arginousai Trial,” *Phoenix* 28 (1974): 112–22; Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 90–91; and Mabel Lang, “Theramenes and Arginousai,” *Hermes* 120 (1992): 267–79.

109. See Westlake, “Individuals in Xenophon, ‘Hellenica,’” 206–7.

110. Buckler (“Xenophon's Speeches and the Theban Hegemony,” 187–204) shows that Xenophon's speeches during this period convey the essence of what the speaker is likely to have said.

111. As noted by Leo Strauss, “Greek Historians,” *Review of Metaphysics* 21 (1968): 656–66, at 662.

loosely connected to the rest of his narrative, by Polydamas of Pharsalus to the Spartans for help against the rising power of Jason. After giving a short character sketch (6.1.2–3) that shows that Polydamas is a man to be trusted, and so gives credibility to what he is about to say about Jason,¹¹² Xenophon quotes a speech of Polydamas, in which he purports to repeat to the Spartans a speech Jason had previously made to him (6.1.5, 7–13), stating that although he could bring Pharsalus over to his side by force, he would prefer to do so if possible by persuasion. In the middle of this reported speech, in which Jason comes across as extremely confident in his own abilities, Polydamas inserts an aside that illustrates the truth of Jason's boasts, by commenting in detail upon his qualities of leadership (6.1.6, 15–16). Jason works his soldiers hard, expecting them to be able to endure what he does (the opposite of that which Teleutias claims in his speech to his men [5.1.14]), but they obey him willingly because he rewards their toil, looks after them when they are sick, and ensures that they have a proper burial. Further, Jason shows self-control over the pleasures of the body, an important virtue for Xenophon. Jason's humanity extends to Polydamas himself, for when he replies that he is unwilling to desert Sparta for no good reason, Jason suggests that he seek help from the Spartans (6.1.13), who rather uncharitably decide they cannot spare the men necessary to aid Polydamas and accordingly send him home empty-handed (6.1.17); Jason's domination of Thessaly follows (6.1.18).

Polydamas thus shows Jason to be a moral leader by the criteria Xenophon expresses elsewhere in the *Hellenica*,¹¹³ in his self-control, the discipline and training needed to achieve it, and his concern for those under his command. These virtues are manifested not only in Xenophon's Socrates¹¹⁴ but are prominent also in his other works, particularly the *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum* (particularly the account of the Spartan *paideia* at 2.3–5 and 4.7), the *Agésilais* (esp. 5.1–7), and the *Cyropaedia*.¹¹⁵ As others have noted, self-control (ἐγκράτεια) and effort (πόνος), while part of the neces-

112. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times*, 171.

113. As noted by, e.g., Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian*, 110, and Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 185–86.

114. Esp. *Memorabilia* 1.2.1–2; see Peter Krafft, “Vier Beispiele des Xenophontischen,” 108 and n. 11, and Bodil Due, *The Cyropaedia: Xenophon's Aims and Methods* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1989), 199–202. Olof Gigon (*Kommentar zum ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien* [Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt, 1953], 27) has demonstrated how the influence of Antisthenes can be seen in Xenophon's emphasis upon the virtues of self-control (ἐγκράτεια), endurance (καρτερία), and self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια).

115. Due, *Cyropaedia*, 170–81.

sary training for war, lead also to excellence (ἀρετή) and thus confer legitimacy on the winner.¹¹⁶ These virtues, therefore, contain simultaneous moral, military, and political implications. While Xenophon's conception of the good moral leader is rooted in his connections with Socrates and Sparta, he considers the best route to achieve the virtues that lead to excellence (ἀρετή) to be a practical one, that is, training and practice. Nevertheless, as was the case with the Spartans and, as we shall see, Jason, any backsliding from these moral virtues will end in disaster.

Xenophon continues the story of Jason in his account of the aftermath of the Battle of Leuctra, when the Thebans appeal to him, as their ally, to help despatch the Spartans (6.4.19–20). Jason advises them not to risk a second battle with the Spartans (6.4.22–23) and ironically (in view of his own impending doom) adds (6.4.23), “for the god, as it seems, often rejoices in making the humble great, and the great humble.”¹¹⁷ He also gives the Spartans “friendly advice” as the Spartan *proxenus* (6.4.24), for which, as Xenophon suggests (6.4.25), the real motive is to play off one side against the other to his own advantage. Xenophon then takes the opportunity to portray Jason at the height of his strength (6.4.28),¹¹⁸ in a portrait that is very similar in tone to his description of Sparta at its height (5.3.27). As was the case with Sparta, however, Jason's arrogant behavior engendered by his great good fortune leads directly to his destruction.

Xenophon now jumps ahead a year in his narrative to Jason's preparations for the festival of Apollo at Delphi. Jason intends, or so people said (ὡς ἔφασσαν), to preside over the festival, but his intentions regarding the treasures are unclear (6.4.29–30). When the Delphians ask Apollo what they should do if Jason attempts to seize any of the treasures, Xenophon reports that the god is said (λέγεται) to have answered that he would see to it himself (6.4.30).¹¹⁹ He then gives a recapitulation of Jason's greatness, before describing dramatically Jason's assassination by seven young men (6.4.31–32). Notably, he makes no explicit moral judgment of Jason except to say that the assassins who managed to escape were honored in

116. Due, *Cyropaedia*, esp. 179–81, and Steven Johnstone, “Virtuous Toil, Vicious Work: Xenophon on Aristocratic Style,” *CP* 89 (1994): 219–40, at 221–22.

117. καὶ ὁ θεὸς δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, πολλάκις χαίρει τοὺς μὲν μικροὺς μεγάλους ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ μεγάλους μικροὺς. Gray (*Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 163) comments on the Herodotean resonance of this statement.

118. On the triadic structure of this passage, see Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times*, 173–74.

119. A similar reply by Apollo occurs in Herodotus (8.36.1).

the cities to which they came, which shows how strongly the Greeks feared that Jason would become their tyrant (6.4.32).

After describing in detail the tragic cycle of murder and revenge that plagues the ruling house of Pherae after Jason's death (6.4.33–37), Xenophon returns to his narrative to tell of the peace that is negotiated in the wake of Leuctra (6.5.1). Other scholars have drawn attention to the moral aspect of Xenophon's portrayal of Jason's meteoric rise and sudden fall¹²⁰ but do not take sufficient account of the fact that his rise and fall is contained mainly in the second digression, which renders the first digression unnecessary if this is the only explanation for Xenophon's interest in him. John Dillery has recently suggested that Xenophon's interruption of his narrative around the Leuctra campaign with the Jason story is due to his desire to inform his narrative of Sparta's fall paratactically.¹²¹ Yet it seems that Xenophon has a wider moral interest in Jason's rise and fall than simply as a decline parallel to that of Sparta. It is necessary, therefore, to examine both digressions in order to determine his reasons for dwelling on Jason at such (relative) length.

In the first digression, Xenophon portrays Jason through the eyes of Polydamas as not only a formidable opponent but also a good moral leader. Furthermore, Jason's basic decency is revealed by his humane treatment of Polydamas (in contrast, one might point out, to the Spartans' refusal to help). By the second digression, however, Jason has lost much of this basic humanity, and instead of providing good advice to potential opponents, as he does with Polydamas, he tries to play off the Thebans and the Spartans against one another for his own gain, although he is the ally of the former and the *proxenus* of the latter. The implication is that Jason has become corrupt with power in the interval between the two digressions. Moreover, Xenophon hints that Jason's alleged intended sacrilege regarding the sacred treasures at Delphi may have had some role in his death, since the vivid depiction of his assassination immediately follows speculation upon his impiety. Thus, the first digression is necessary to indicate the moral high ground to which Jason keeps early in his career, and to provide a contrast with his later, less moral behavior, while the second digression serves to bring Jason to his height in order to contrast more sharply his untimely death at the hands of his assassins.

120. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian*, 110–11, and Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 163–65.

121. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times*, esp. 175–76.

Yet Jason, in contrast to his successors, at least rose to power as a result of his proven ability. Xenophon, therefore, depicts him with some sympathy and gives his death relative dignity. On the other hand, he portrays Jason's successors as a thoroughly unsavory lot, meeting ever more ignominious deaths at the hands of their own relatives. Thus, Xenophon narrates the rise and fall of Jason as a series of contrasts. The upright yet ineffective Polydamas is contrasted with the powerful but increasingly unscrupulous Jason. Jason's rigorous control over himself and the loyalty he inspires in his troops are contrasted with the tyranny and violence of his successors. Xenophon also records Polydamas's own violent death in this section (6.3.34), in order to underline still further the baseness of the dynasty of Pherae, that it would stoop so low as to murder so honorable a man. The moral lessons to be learned from the fates of Jason and his successors, in Xenophon's eyes, evidently justify departing from the strict chronological order of narrative, keeping the story as a coherent whole to give it more impact.

Likewise recorded in two separate digressions is Xenophon's portrait of the rise and fall of Euphron of Sicyon, the only other historical figure in the *Hellenica* whom he singles out in this way. Xenophon begins his account of Euphron's career with his coup, which he places in his narrative immediately following the Theban invasion of Achaea in 367, although it is likely that Euphron became tyrant the previous year.¹²² Thus, in order to keep his moral lesson a coherent whole, Xenophon appears willing to misrepresent the timing of Euphron's coup. Immediately following his coup, Euphron creates a private mercenary army, appropriating both public and sacred money to do so, and begins to eliminate opponents and rivals (7.1.44–46). His banishment of laconizers in order to gain access to their property is particularly revealing of his purely personal motives for seizing power, as he has until only recently been the most influential of his fellow citizens with the Spartans (7.1.44). Xenophon concludes his portrait of Euphron by saying (7.1.46) that he was clearly a tyrant (σαφῶς τύραννος ἦν).

Xenophon now turns to a section devoted to the exploits of the Phliasians (7.2.1–7.3.1), the point of which is to highlight their continued loyalty to Sparta after Leuctra. We should note, however, that Diodorus (15.68.1) says that Epaminondas brought Phlius over to the Theban side

122. Audrey Griffin (*Sikyon* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1982], 71) prefers Diodorus's date of 368 (15.70.3) for Euphron's coup, because the campaign against Phlius of 367 in which he participated (7.2.11–15) took place after he became tyrant.

during his second invasion of the Peloponnese; it is possible Xenophon exaggerates Phlius's loyalty to Sparta in the aftermath of Leuctra.¹²³ In his narrative, Xenophon includes a disgraceful episode in which Euphron and his private army of mercenaries stand by and watch many brave citizen soldiers from Sicyon and Pellene die at the hands of the Phliasians (7.2.11–15). Henceforth, Euphron and his mercenaries keep a low profile, whereas the Phliasians continue their string of military successes, despite being in want of material resources. The Phliasians are not only loyal but treat prisoners humanely (7.2.16) and exhibit piety (7.2.20, 21, and 23), for which they are apparently rewarded by the gods.¹²⁴ It is a natural inference that the Phliasians prevail as a result of their moral superiority, while Euphron's lack of loyalty to his allies hinders his efforts, because he is soon overthrown (7.3.1–3).

At this point, Xenophon once more deviates from strict chronological order to complete the story of Euphron, who again seizes power by means of a coup but is unable to gain complete control of the city with the Theban *harmost* still in possession of the acropolis (7.3.4). Some of the former Sicyonian exiles, fearing lest they might be sent into exile again, follow Euphron to Thebes, where they assassinate him on the acropolis in the presence of the archons and the Council (7.3.5). The Theban archons bring the matter before the Council and demand the supreme penalty (7.3.5–6). All the killers except one deny they committed the deed. The one killer defends his act on the grounds that Euphron deserved his fate, for he pillaged the temples in Sicyon; broke agreements he had made with his allies; and exiled, put to death, and appropriated the property of his own fellow citizens. Consequently, the Thebans ought not to blame those who had disposed of a traitor such as Euphron (7.3.7–11). Xenophon thus uses this speech as a moral exemplum, to illustrate how Euphron's lack of moral scruples led directly to his fate, which he richly deserved.¹²⁵ The nameless killer's moral reasoning prevails, and the Thebans let the accused go free. Xenophon, however, concludes the story of Euphron with the cynical comment that his fellow citizens honored him as founder of the city, for most people define their benefactors as good men (7.3.12).

Xenophon obviously finds the story of the rise and fall of Euphron

123. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times*, 131.

124. Note the reference to a certain divinely inspired enthusiasm (θεία τινη προθυμία) at 7.2.21.

125. Tuplin (*Failings of Empire*, 124) notes that every statement of fact made in the speech is consistent with Xenophon's narrative.

important enough to depart from the chronological framework of his narrative in two places. His placement of these digressions in his narrative is significant, for they are situated so as to form a framework for the exploits of the Phliasians. In this way, Xenophon contrasts more dramatically the loyalty of the Phliasians with the turncoat actions of Euphron. The moral lesson to be gleaned from the contrast is clear—the Phliasians prevail in their endeavors, whereas Euphron is cut down in cold blood and his killers go free.

In both the Jason and the Euphron digressions, Xenophon makes it clear that military prowess alone is not sufficient for a ruler to be successful, since concern for one's subjects and allies and reverence for the gods are the key elements to real success. For this reason, he portrays the Phliasians as successful and Jason and Euphron as meeting the fate deserved by those who lack proper moral scruples. Moreover, he is careful to show how both Jason and Euphron are corrupted by absolute power and how their own imperialistic actions lead directly to their downfalls. Thus, Xenophon uses digressions as an opportunity to narrate events outside their proper chronology to show more explicitly the moral lesson to be gained from them.

In addition to Xenophon's formal use of digressions, in which he explicitly deviates from the strict chronological order of his narrative, on numerous occasions he steps outside the strict factual outline of events in order to recount an anecdote, which I define as an incident not necessary for the development of the narrative but which can stand alone by virtue of its dramatic qualities.¹²⁶ Many of the anecdotes included in Xenophon's *Hellenica* are told with an eye to detail in order to emphasize their moral significance. Of course, they are far too numerous to discuss individually, but I shall discuss one in detail to show how Xenophon uses them to further his moral aims.

One of the most dramatic anecdotes is the story of Mania and Meidias. Xenophon tells the story of Mania in his account of Dercylidas's actions in

126. Stewart Flory *The Archaic Smile of Herodotus* [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987] differentiates between anecdotes and general narrative in Herodotus as follows (151–52): “Short, focused upon a single, brief event, the anecdote reaches a definite conclusion and may centre entirely upon a climactic point. A general narrative concentrates on a sequence of events, often complexly related, and has a conclusion that is the result of prior events and not itself the purpose of the narrative, as often is the case with the characteristically pointed anecdote. Not only are anecdotes self-contained entities, they may have little or no link to any immediate context.” See also K. J. Dover, “Anecdotes, Gossip and Scandal,” in *The Greeks and Their Legacy: Collected Papers*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 45–52.

Asia when he took over command of the troops from the ineffectual Thibron. Rather than carrying on a campaign against both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, Dercylidas sensibly decides to make peace with the former and war with the latter, against whom he had a personal grudge (3.1.9). Accordingly, he proceeds with his troops to Aeolis, in Pharnabazus's territory (3.1.10). Xenophon now departs from his narrative to relate the anecdote of how Mania becomes satrap of the province of Aeolis. She had been the wife of Zenis, the previous satrap, and upon his death pays a visit to Pharnabazus, bearing gifts for him and his court, to request that he appoint her satrap. Her character is well portrayed in the short speech she makes in *oratio recta* to Pharnabazus (3.1.11). Xenophon presents her as loyal and unassuming. She makes no demands upon Pharnabazus but requests him politely to allow her a trial period as satrap to prove her worth. When he agrees to appoint her satrap, she proves more than worthy of the office, turning out to be more loyal and energetic than her husband had been (3.12–13).¹²⁷ Mania thus embodies one of the chief Xenophontean virtues, that of loyalty—as does Pharnabazus, for that matter, since he treats her with humanity.

Xenophon deliberately juxtaposes the loyalty of Mania with the perfidy of her son-in-law, Meidias, who takes advantage of his family tie with Mania to gain access to her presence (for she guarded herself against others, as is fitting in a tyranny) and strangle her, or so people said (*λέγεται*), and her adolescent son as well (3.1.14). He then demands from Pharnabazus the same privileges that Mania had been granted. Pharnabazus, however, promises instead to avenge Mania's murder (3.1.15).

Before he has the opportunity, Dercylidas begins to move against Meidias, who, fearing both his own citizens and Pharnabazus's imminent approach, requests an alliance. Dercylidas accepts, on the condition that Meidias allow his citizens to be free and autonomous (3.1.20). Powerless with the will of his citizens against him, Meidias is forced to allow Dercylidas to enter the city and to hand it over to its citizens, to their delight (3.1.21). Notably, the first action of Dercylidas is to sacrifice to Athena (3.1.21). Meidias then demands that Dercylidas hand over the city of Gergis to him but receives only the enigmatic reply that he will not fail to obtain anything he deserves. Dercylidas then orders Meidias to open the gates, and Meidias, too frightened to do otherwise, obeys (3.1.22). Once

127. See Gray's (*Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 30–31) discussion of this anecdote; she remarks upon the general superficial resemblance between Mania and the Herodotean Artemisia.

again, Dercylidas's first action upon entering the city is to sacrifice to Athena (3.1.23). He then dismisses Meidias's personal bodyguard with the comment that Meidias no longer has anything to fear. Meidias, quite rightly, is terrified by the implications of this comment and attempts to remove himself from the scene, on the grounds that he wishes to arrange for Dercylidas the entertainment due a guest. Dercylidas refuses Meidias's invitation and in its place offers one of his own (3.1.24). Over dinner, a conversation takes place between the two men (3.1.25–28), in which Dercylidas determines the exact extent of Meidias's paternal inheritance. When the citizens of Scepsis object that Meidias is exaggerating his property, Dercylidas tells them not to be overly worried about details. He then asks to whom Mania belonged. When the answer "To Pharnabazus," is given, Dercylidas replies that since he is victorious over Pharnabazus, all these possessions now belong to him. He then seizes Mania's property to pay his men, threatening to cut the throats of the stewards if they conceal any, and sends Meidias to his father's house.

One of the points of this anecdote is the contrast between the moral behavior of both Mania and Dercylidas and the immoral behavior of Meidias. First of all, Xenophon compares Mania's loyalty and devotion to her family to the utter perfidy of Meidias, who abuses his familial tie in order to facilitate the brutal murder of both her and her son. Second, the ability of both Mania and Dercylidas as moral commanders is contrasted with that of Meidias to his detriment. Mania kept the cities of the satrapy loyal and also gained control of others. Meidias, however, is unable even to keep loyal to himself the cities that are already part of the province, who welcomed Dercylidas with open arms. Third, the approach of Mania to Pharnabazus is contrasted with that of Meidias. Mania came in person, bearing gifts, to request that she be given a trial period as ruler. Meidias, on the other hand, sends gifts and demands that he be appointed ruler. Instead of granting the special privileges to him that he had granted Mania, Pharnabazus rejects Meidias's demands out of hand. Fourth, Meidias's perfidy in murdering members of his immediate family is contrasted with Dercylidas's piety, which is manifested in the immediate sacrifices he makes upon entering the cities. Fifth, Xenophon skillfully contrasts Pharnabazus's firm intention of revenge with the magnanimity of Dercylidas, who certainly had the power to carry out on Meidias the threat that he makes to the stewards of Mania's house. His liberality extends much further than the simple act of sparing Meidias's life, however. When the citizens of Scepsis attempt to prevent Meidias from exaggerating the number of his possessions,

Dercylidas tells them not to be small-minded. Furthermore, Dercylidas intends to use Mania's treasure to pay his army, instead of for personal enrichment, in contrast with the implied use of the treasure by Meidias. This use of contrasts is an effective means for Xenophon to create the impression in the reader that Meidias is a wicked and immoral man, without saying so explicitly.

Dialogue also plays an important role in this anecdote, for it certainly aids in the characterizations of Mania, Meidias, Pharnabazus, and Dercylidas. The conversation between Meidias and Dercylidas is a masterpiece. Despite its deceptively light and witty tone, it shows how exactly Meidias does, in fact, get what he deserves.¹²⁸ The similarity of this conversation to Socrates' conversations with others in Xenophon's Socratic works has often been noticed.¹²⁹ In addition, as Vivienne Gray has shown,¹³⁰ Xenophon uses dialogue as a more effective means than narrative of illuminating the intellectual qualities of the main characters; this is a use of dialogue similar to that of Plato. Also, like the use of contrast, the addition of dialogue adds to the dramatic qualities of the story of Mania and Meidias, which in turn drives home its moral lessons more effectively.

Finally, the passing reference to tyranny is worthy of notice. Like Jason, Mania is the possessor of many virtues. But in spite of any good qualities possessed by an individual tyrant, tyranny as a general rule causes envy and violence in others,¹³¹ and is therefore something to be avoided. Moreover, one wonders if Xenophon's favoring of the Spartan form of government may account for his desire to show that tyrants meet a bad end (shown particularly in the Jason and Euphron digressions), for the Spartans were famous for their avowed constant opposition to tyranny. Although the wickedness of Meidias is certainly the focal point of the episode, we are left with the nagging feeling that Mania's own ambition, a negative quality for Xenophon when present in excess, may have been a factor in her unfortunate demise (as it certainly was in Meidias's downfall).

The story of Mania and Meidias illustrates Xenophon's use of the anecdote as a vehicle that he is able to use for moral instruction in a dramatic and memorable way. In his anecdotes, effective methods of getting the moral point across are the uses of dialogue and, above all, of contrast. In this way,

128. Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 32–35.

129. See, e.g., Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 34–35 (who observes Herodotean influence also), and Krentz, *Xenophon: Hellenika II.3.11–IV.2.8*, 166.

130. V. J. Gray, "Dialogue in Xenophon's *Hellenica*," *CQ* n.s., 31 (1981): 321–34.

131. Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 49.

he is able to show concretely how one in possession of a certain virtue behaves in comparison to one who is not. Another form of contrast is the use of *peripeteiai*, in which Xenophon sets up the reader to expect a certain conclusion and then immediately provides the opposite. For example, when Lysander sails victoriously into the Piraeus at the end of the Peloponnesian War and the walls are pulled down to the music of flute girls, Xenophon remarks that people thought this day was the beginning of freedom for Greece (2.2.23). Instead of narrating the pleasant circumstances that his previous comments lead the reader to expect, immediately afterward (2.3.2),¹³² he proceeds to describe the election of the Thirty, the most tyrannical set of rulers in the history of Athens. Similarly, Xenophon shows the Spartans (5.3.27), Lycomedes (7.1.23), Jason (6.4.28), and Euphron (7.1.44–46) at their heights, only to dash them down immediately to the depths.¹³³ To enable these *peripeteiai* to make the biggest dramatic impact upon the reader, however, Xenophon sometimes is forced to tamper with chronology (as he does with the date of Euphron's coup and the missing year of Jason's reign) or to suppress mention of the historical character earlier in his narrative in places where one might expect it (as in the case with Lycomedes).

I suggest Xenophon exploits this same dramatic technique with Epaminondas. It is not so much through bias against Thebes that Epaminondas appears very little in the *Hellenica* prior to the Mantinea campaign (though we should note that at 7.1.41–42, the only place where he does appear, he is characterized as a loyal friend), but rather because Xenophon wants to set up a *peripeteia*.¹³⁴ By portraying Epaminondas only at the height of his powers, Xenophon shows dramatically how far he falls as a result of his excessive *philotimia*. With his use of *peripeteiai*, he recreates for the moment a time when the inevitable sad conclusion, of which his readers doubtless were aware, seemed as though it might turn out happily after all. This technique allows him not only to make the contrast between the real and the expected outcome more dramatic, but also to show the moral flaw of the

132. That is, if one omits the two interpolated passages in between.

133. Sudden reversals of fortune (although of a less extreme degree) also beset the Spartans at Haliartus (3.5.5–24) and Agesilaus with the news of Cnidus (4.3.1–10) and the reversal at Lechaem (4.4.17–4.5.18); see Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian*, 111–12; Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 157–63; and Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 69–72.

134. Both Henry (*Greek Historical Writing*, 200–204) and Higgins (*Xenophon the Athenian*, 119) suggest that Xenophon reserves Epaminondas's role in Greek affairs until Mantinea for dramatic reasons, but neither takes the moral aspect of the dramatic *peripeteia* into full consideration.

individual or state in question prevents the expectation generated by the narrative from coming to fruition.

The techniques Xenophon uses to teach his moral lessons in the *Hellenica* tend not to be explicit. The use of paradigms, speeches, digressions, anecdotes, and *peripeteiai* allows Xenophon to avoid direct condemnation, all the while underlining the moral lesson intended with a certain amount of flair. The more literary qualities of these techniques appear inspired, at least in part, by Herodotus, but Xenophon is more overtly moral in judgment. In fact, the moral framework for these techniques seems to owe more to Socrates, who has a similar reluctance to express direct condemnation, preferring to educate his interlocutors, at least indirectly, by the use of examples and models. With Xenophon, for the first time, history becomes primarily moral and paradigmatic.

Nevertheless, Xenophon is more interested in the moral lessons to be gained from historical events than in preserving an accurate record of the past, and throughout the *Hellenica* he omits, postpones, or underemphasizes important political and military developments in order to provide a better or more dramatic moral lesson. Likewise, he often gives relatively minor people and events, for their intrinsic moral value, as much space or more than important ones. In general, larger truths about the past are more important than the accurate recording of the details of individual historical events. The result is a somewhat uneven presentation of the past, from our more detached perspective, but it is important to note that Xenophon left a powerful legacy, for the later fourth century and the Hellenistic and Roman historians largely follow his lead in making the moral lessons offered by the past the most prominent element of their works.¹³⁵

Despite the influence Xenophon had on later historians, in the *Hellenica* he is speaking more extensively to his contemporaries. We have noted how he favors military virtues and the political system of moderate oligarchy, both of which can be found in the old Spartan constitution, before it became corrupt with both wealth and power in Xenophon's own day, which is precisely the reason why some see a pro-Spartan bias in the *Hellenica*. In both an oligarchy and a properly functioning army, a top-down chain of command, self-discipline and a willingness to work hard, the ability to instill loyalty and obedience in one's subordinates, the keep-

135. On the historiographical legacy of Xenophon, see my "Condemnation of the Impious," 274–76.

ing of good order, and piety in order to keep the favor of the gods are necessary to achieve success. The military commander or the politician who is deficient in any of these areas is destined to fail in his objectives. Moreover, Xenophon does not approve of imperialism, and he demonstrates how it corrupts and then leads to the downfall of both states, as in the cases of Athens and Sparta, and individuals.

Xenophon certainly encourages his readers to adhere to these basic moral guidelines, but he also has a more specific prescriptive purpose in mind. Later in the century, Aristotle (*Politics* 1305a 10–15) says the rise of rhetoric has led to those talented at speaking becoming prominent in politics, whereas, through inexperience, they do not become involved in military affairs. Xenophon, with his insistence upon military virtue and disapproval of rhetoric when used by demagogues to lead people away from excellence (ἀρετή), did not approve of the shortcut to a political career offered by the sophists, with their emphasis on rhetoric. Because rhetoric panders to the lowest common denominator, it cannot be effective. As he states in the conclusion to the *Cynegeticus*, the sophists do not lead the young to virtue (13.1), and those politicians who are taught by the sophists are even less useful to the city than private citizens, for they are physically unfit for war through their incapacity for toil (13.11). Xenophon, it seems, advocates a return to the system, before the advent of the sophists and the rise of rhetoric, in which military experience was a prerequisite for a political career.¹³⁶ Through this reinvigoration of a military career as the path to political success,¹³⁷ he hopes to direct his fellow aristocrats, many of whom had become *apragmones*, fed up with the success of demagogues in the Athenian democracy, back into politics.¹³⁸ The return of the aristocrats to political power would spell the end of the despised democracy and the rule of the crowd, the destructive forces of which Xenophon so vividly articulates in his narrative of the aftermath of Arginusae. The disastrous rule of the Thirty, however, made it abundantly

136. Peter Hunt (*Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology*, 153–58) has reached a similar conclusion, that the aim of Xenophon's militarism was the reassertion of elite rule.

137. My interpretation of Xenophon's emphasis upon military virtue differs slightly from Steven Johnstone's argument ("Virtuous Toil, Vicious Work," 219–40) that Xenophon was concerned to mitigate intra-elite competition by shifting its focus to those activities through which the aristocrats maintained their status, such as hunting, athletics, and the practice of war.

138. On the *apragmones*, see W. Robert Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971; reprint, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 175–98; and L. B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986).

clear that the aristocrats could not simply be left to their own devices; they had to be taught political virtue. In the *Hellenica*, Xenophon offers his fellow aristocrats a practical way to put politics back onto what he perceives to be a moral path, with the added inducement that moral behavior would lead to military and political success. He, therefore, like Plato, forms part of the literary resistance to Athenian democratic ideology so well articulated by Josiah Ober, although Xenophon and the other fourth-century historians do not form part of Ober's study.¹³⁹

139. Josiah Ober, *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).