

## A Study of Political Positions

### Hypotheses

In this chapter we test the theory developed in chapter 6 by focusing on three implications of that theory. First, the lower the cost of signaling “goodness,” the more people will adopt “progoodness” political positions. This proposition cannot simply be derived from the downward-sloping demand curve because in our case there is a contrary force. When others know of an increase in the price to an individual if he adopts a given political position out of goodness, that individual signals more goodness by espousing such a position. So both the costs and the returns of signaling goodness increase with an increase in the price.

However, as shown in chapter 3, the amount of goodness signaled is the price of adopting a political position out of goodness times the political position itself (all, of course, measured in appropriate units). Assume the desired amount of goodness signaled is invariant with respect to price. That assumption corresponds to the standard assumption that utility is independent of price, holding real income constant. Then, to keep the goodness signaled constant, an increase in one of its components, price, must lead to a proportional decrease in its other component, political position. The price elasticity of demand for goodness signaling in political positions should be  $-1$ . The political positions associated with goodness should increase with a decrease in the price of goodness.

Another proposition has been developed in the previous chapter. People use more resources to loudly proclaim “good” than “bad” positions. This proposition not only applies to demonstrations and what is generally meant by political activism. It also applies to any occupational choice that is in part determined by the goodness motivations. There are some occupations in which one can preach about political positions. One would expect people who wish to preach goodness to be more likely to choose those occupations.

A third implication of our theory follows easily from this second proposition. Relative to private discussions, some people will get a higher proportion of their information about the political views of others from loud activists and “do-gooder” occupations. The imitative behavior of those thus informed will, hence, make them choose political positions with a larger goodness component. As developed in this, the previous chapter, and the next chapter, the information from loud activists and “do-gooder” occupations includes the media, education, and books.

Besides testing these propositions, this chapter discusses a large number of empirical regularities that have gone unexplained. Though most economists studying voting behavior have long been aware of their existence, economists seem a remarkably uncurious lot. If something cannot be easily explained by our simplest models, we just assume it is part of “taste.” In the case of voting behavior that means we ignore a lot. “Why are the young, college teachers, and residents of large cities more liberal?” These questions and others have been unanswered, that is, attributed to “tastes.” Our goodness theory provides more satisfactory answers, answers that allow us to explore subtler features of these regularities.

Before we can test these propositions and answer these questions, however, we must select a data set that allows these tests and controls for the other relevant variables that also have an impact on political positions.

### **Data and Issues**

Our procedure is to run regressions on answers to public policy questions against characteristics of respondents and their families given by data for the United States from the *General Social Survey, 1972–1996* (NORC 1996). Currently, the preferred procedure in the public choice literature for running such regressions is parsimony, but those working with the simple self-interest model usually cannot resist the inclusion of at least a few variables, such as race, region or city size, that they cannot justify on theoretical grounds. We include a large number of variables. That inclusion is justified by the theory we are testing: that concern with what others are thinking is crucial in the determination of voter behavior. There are two main manifestations of that concern: (1) political positions as imitation; (2) political positions chosen to be “good.” In this chapter we concentrate primarily on the latter, since the former has been more thoroughly examined in chapter 5.

Our approach is to examine seventeen different issues, opinions about which will be potentially affected by goodness. We use the commonly accepted liberal versus conservative characterization of views about these issues. On all these issues one can display one's goodness by being liberal. On a few, being conservative offers morality-displaying opportunities. What is crucial, though, is that, with a few exceptions, those groups that have an incentive to be "good" liberals on one issue will have the same incentive on the other issues.

In the previous chapter we provided a rationale for goodness being one-sided for many of the issues examined here: expenditures on the poor, the environment, health, education, for blacks, and for the aged. (We treat expenditures for roads as "antienvironmental" and expenditures on mass transit and large cities as "proenvironmental," following most professional environmentalists.)

The case is more complicated for *two-sided goodness* issues: abortion, expenditures on the police, and defense. But, as we shall see, on these issues the same variables that determine liberal goodness tend to operate with opposite sign in determining conservative morality.

The regression results we report are for ordinary least squares, though we use other procedures as well, with no substantial difference in results.<sup>1</sup> Most of the problems with regressions cannot be solved by different techniques. Confidence can be generated only by consistent results over different kinds of data. That is why we have looked at so many issues in this study.<sup>2</sup>

## Surveys

We use polling data. As discussed in chapter 5, the same person can have different political positions at the same time: a position for discussions with friends, which could vary with the friend, a position for polls, and a voting position. Variation in those positions is at least somewhat limited by the conscience cost of lying and in some cases the probability that the lie will be discovered. Each of these positions has in its own way an impact on public policy.

Polling data, which are important in their own right, can be biased as an estimator of other political positions. We expect polling data to be affected more by goodness variables and less by group variables than discussions with friends. Relative to the latter, polls are more affected by desires to please strangers, the interviewer. Respondents might believe that there is some chance that the interviewer might leak the respondents answers to his friends, but that chance of discovery by

friends is certainly less than when the respondent directly talks to friends. Since goodness is defined as greater general trustworthiness at the expense of trustworthiness to the group, people have a greater incentive to display goodness relative to imitative behavior to strangers than to friends.

The one case of greater goodness displays to friends than to strangers occurs when one is a member of a particularly high-goodness group. But that greater display is attributable to imitative behavior and is counterbalanced by the paucity of goodness displays to friends when one is a member of a particularly low-goodness group.

But one of the big results of these regressions on survey data is that one adopts political positions to please one's friends rather than other people. All of the results emphasized in chapter 5 are of this character, as are many of the results of this chapter. If respondents were just lying to please the interviewer, we would not get these results. These results hold for all the questions asked no matter how vague, so it does appear that real information is being conveyed in the answers.

Our reputational theory does not apply directly to the other form of political expression, voting, because of its secret nature. However, voting is at least somewhat predictable by that theory if a substantial number of people do not lie about how they vote. This condition holds if the returns from voting and then lying about how one voted are not larger than the costs of lying.

This issue is discussed in detail in chapter 5. To the extent that it pays to lie, narrow self-interest is more important in voting than in public political positions. Because of the free-rider problem, our model of political behavior predicts small returns to voting one's narrow self-interest. However, the self-expression model of Kuran (1995) predicts substantial returns. The evidence examined in chapter 5 is not decisive enough to distinguish between these two theories, but it does show no massive difference between aggregate votes and aggregate polls in the usual voting cases in the United States. It would certainly not be surprising if our model that predicts behavior for public political positions also predicts voting behavior, though the latter might well have a greater self-interest component.

There is some evidence that polling data systematically overweight goodness compared to other ways to express political positions. Many of the survey questions asked are of the form, "Should the government spend more, the same amount, or less" on some good, scaled by 3, 2, or 1 respectively. If democracy simply translated these wishes to reality, one would expect the mean of these answers to be roughly equal to 2.

For issues with one-sided goodness implying greater expenditures, there are nine cases of means greater than 2 and only one case of a mean less than 2. There is also one case of a mean greater than 2 when goodness implies less expenditures. (See table 8.1.) The probability of getting nine out of eleven positive outcomes by chance is .032.<sup>3</sup>

There are two obvious explanations for these results. (1) Indirect democracy prevents the full expression of the goodness desires of the electorate. (2) Surveys exaggerate those goodness desires. We present evidence in chapter 9 that is inconsistent with the first hypothesis. Evidence provided in chapter 5 on interviewer bias supports the second hypothesis.

This polling bias means that our actual regression results will not be fully applicable to other forms of political expression. However, the bias itself is some confirmation of the reputation theory that we are trying to test. If the theory works for polls, the theory itself suggests that it ought to work with lower weights for goodness variables for discussions with friends. As we have indicated in chapter 5 the evidence suggests that the theory also works for voting itself.

The scorn that some economists might have for survey questions about political attitudes arises from a misunderstanding of the determinants of voting behavior. "Answers to surveys are designed to impress interviewers, but voting is to influence policy." If both surveys and other forms of political expression are designed to impress others, then they do not stand in such marked contrast. (Voting can be affected by desires to impress others even though it is not so designed. Lying costs can keep it at least somewhat in line with public political expression.)

Besides, the analysis thus far predicts biased means rather than biased regression coefficients. Everybody's incentive to be "good" increases. Biased regression coefficients require some differential effect by variable. Those who lie to convince the interviewer that they are "good" substitute one cost of being perceived good for another. The cost of lying is substituted for the cost of losses in the friendship of close associates. Many of the variables we employ—the community involvement variables—focus on this latter cost. On that account they would be less important in regressions for liars than for others. In spite of this, these variables play an important role in the survey regressions. Something real is captured by our survey results.<sup>4</sup>

Surveys are far from perfect instruments. The alternative to asking people how they voted is to use aggregate data about actual behavior. But cross-sectional analysis using aggregate data has real problems of

**TABLE 8.1. OLS Regression of Support for Government, Political Parties, and Candidate**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables							
	PROWELF	PROPOOR	PROHEAL	PROED	PROENV	PROSOC	PROARMS	
FY	-1.24E-01 ***	-8.67E-02 ***	-4.33E-02 ***	-4.49E-03	-3.01E-02 ***	-7.34E-02 ***	1.74E-02 **	
FY2	3.35E-03	-1.62E-02 ***	-1.42E-02 ***	-9.98E-03	-1.60E-02 ***	-2.43E-02 ***	5.87E-03 *	
FYSLOPE	-1.26E-01 ***	-7.57E-02 ***	-3.37E-02 ***	-2.25E-03	-1.93E-02 ***	-5.70E-02 ***	1.34E-02 *	
SELF	-3.70E-02 **	-1.04E-01 ***	-5.70E-02 ***	-5.22E-02 ***	-4.75E-02 ***	-7.06E-02 ***	-1.57E-02	
PROF	-2.36E-01 ***	-1.29E-01 ***	-1.13E-01 ***	-7.53E-02 ***	-1.73E-01 ***	-5.87E-02 ***	7.85E-02 ***	
MGM	-4.69E-02 **	-1.96E-02	-1.13E-04	-3.18E-02 ***	-5.71E-03	-7.27E-03	1.95E-03	
CLERK	-4.36E-02 ***	-5.39E-02 ***	-8.45E-03	1.42E-03	-9.09E-03	-2.36E-03	-1.06E-02	
SALES	-5.18E-02 ***	-3.88E-02 *	-1.40E-02	-7.44E-03	-3.68E-03	-2.12E-02	1.76E-02	
SERVE	2.23E-02	-3.81E-04	-1.96E-03	-8.82E-03	4.37E-03	1.93E-02	2.31E-02 *	
AGR	-2.44E-02	-3.49E-02	-8.97E-03	-3.50E-02	-6.59E-02 ***	-4.61E-02	-8.59E-02 ***	
BLACK	4.76E-01 ***	2.89E-01 ***	1.49E-01 ***	1.57E-01 ***	6.54E-02 ***	1.05E-01 ***	-1.85E-01 ***	
UNION	-1.35E-03	-6.60E-03	1.32E-02 *	1.59E-02 **	8.07E-03	2.93E-02 ***	-6.17E-03	
GOVR	8.15E-02 ***	0.00E+00	3.27E-02 **	-4.34E-03	3.33E-02 **	0.00E+00	-1.22E-02	
MAIN	-1.19E-02	2.19E-02	1.55E-02	-5.15E-03	2.22E-02	-1.63E-02	-1.26E-02	
JEW	2.16E-01 ***	8.42E-04	6.41E-02	1.81E-01 ***	8.20E-02	5.45E-02	-1.58E-01 **	
JSLOPE	1.33E-01 *	6.96E-03	9.60E-02 *	1.47E-01 ***	9.71E-02 *	2.21E-02	-7.90E-02	
CATHOLIC	2.02E-02	1.10E-02	2.13E-02	1.84E-03	2.69E-02	2.57E-02	-2.14E-02	
CSLOPE	4.72E-02	-2.28E-02	1.57E-02	1.05E-02	5.32E-02 *	2.53E-02	-7.99E-02 **	
NOREL	1.52E-02	-1.21E-01 ***	-2.13E-02	-5.36E-04	1.56E-02	-7.80E-02 ***	-1.05E-01 ***	
OTHREL	1.19E-02	-5.33E-02	9.29E-03	6.51E-02 *	4.07E-02	-4.19E-02	-1.06E-01 ***	
ATTEND	-1.12E-02	1.88E-02	-1.27E-02	-8.50E-03	-2.72E-02 ***	-5.37E-03	1.67E-02 *	
ATTENDSL	-1.03E-02 ***	-2.11E-04	-1.13E-02 ***	-5.55E-03 ***	-8.02E-03 ***	-9.66E-03 ***	4.85E-03 **	
PATT	5.47E-03	-2.65E-02 **	-4.31E-03	1.08E-04	8.06E-03	-2.50E-03	-1.18E-02	
CATT	6.76E-03	-8.49E-03	-1.42E-03	2.18E-03	6.61E-03	-9.70E-05	-1.47E-02 *	
JATT	-2.08E-02	1.54E-03	8.01E-03	-8.39E-03	3.80E-03	-8.12E-03	1.99E-02	
FUNDAT	-1.99E-03	-1.15E-04	2.25E-03	1.29E-03	6.40E-03 ***	-1.31E-03	-5.88E-04	
FYINCOME	9.59E-02	1.15E-02	-3.77E-02	-8.13E-03	-3.95E-02	-8.73E-02 *	-2.02E-01 ***	

FMARRIED	-1.54E-01	-4.99E-01	***	-1.39E-01	*	-1.02E-01	-1.99E-01	**	-1.02E-01	3.70E-01	***
MARRIED	-3.30E-03	-2.16E-02	***	1.13E-02		5.43E-03	-3.52E-02	***	-1.65E-02	3.12E-03	
CHILD	-2.07E-02	8.39E-02	***	6.05E-03		3.23E-02	4.54E-03	**	4.17E-02	2.39E-02	**
NCHILD	3.14E-02	-2.44E-02	**	-5.90E-03		-8.41E-03	-1.03E-02	**	-1.52E-02	-3.78E-03	**
STATMIG	-2.10E-03	1.99E-02	***	3.85E-03		1.86E-02	9.91E-03		-9.82E-03	-2.27E-02	**
CONTMIG	1.13E-02	3.32E-02	*	1.31E-02		2.21E-02	3.42E-02	***	-3.26E-02	-1.25E-02	*
MIGSL	5.40E-03	2.73E-02	*	9.03E-03		2.06E-02	2.35E-02	***	-2.26E-02	-1.70E-02	*
CLERGYSL	1.24E-01	-4.37E-02	***	3.29E-02		1.93E-02	-1.53E-02		-1.37E-02	3.88E-02	
AGE	-1.79E-02	-3.55E-03	***	1.56E-02	***	5.63E-03	-6.71E-03	***	1.90E-02	6.29E-03	**
AGE2	9.35E-05	-4.76E-05	*	-1.30E-04	***	-7.68E-05	3.87E-05	***	-1.71E-04	-9.47E-05	***
AGESL	-2.41E-03	-3.30E-03	***	-1.10E-03	***	-5.32E-03	-8.21E-03	***	-6.34E-04	4.41E-03	***
MEMNUM	-3.36E-04	1.19E-04		1.02E-02	***	1.27E-02	1.02E-02	***	4.00E-03	-5.30E-04	
LCCIT	1.41E-01	3.28E-02	***	4.49E-02	**	7.24E-02	9.88E-02	***	5.04E-02	-5.25E-02	**
SCCIT	4.98E-02	-1.94E-02	**	-9.57E-03		1.48E-02	2.90E-02	*	1.72E-02	-1.12E-02	
SSURB	5.21E-02	-1.50E-02	**	-2.58E-03		2.86E-02	4.82E-02	***	2.54E-02	3.16E-03	
LSURB	8.85E-02	-1.26E-02	***	5.14E-03		3.60E-02	4.41E-02	***	3.05E-02	4.36E-03	
OURB	3.00E-02	-1.84E-02	*	-1.09E-02		-5.12E-03	9.58E-03		1.79E-02	7.86E-03	
SCITY	2.01E-02	8.01E-03	***	3.76E-02	***	3.89E-02	4.53E-02	***	-4.67E-03	1.19E-02	
MCITY	-4.16E-03	5.30E-02	**	4.49E-02	***	6.52E-02	7.47E-02	***	1.44E-02	3.17E-06	
SURRB	2.33E-02	4.17E-02	***	1.97E-02		4.27E-02	7.08E-02	***	-3.10E-02	-4.11E-02	**
LCITY	6.50E-02	2.94E-02	***	5.78E-02	***	5.89E-02	8.03E-02	***	3.70E-02	-1.19E-02	
LOWTEACH	-4.25E-03	1.67E-02	**	3.66E-02	**	5.95E-02	6.94E-03	***	8.85E-03	-2.39E-02	***
COLTEACH	1.04E-01	8.27E-02	*	9.40E-03		-1.14E-02	9.60E-02	***	-4.57E-02	-1.12E-01	***
WRITER	1.71E-01	1.34E-01	**	7.48E-02		-6.89E-02	1.01E-01	**	-3.91E-02	-2.13E-01	***
LAWYER	2.08E-01	5.19E-02	**	2.07E-02		5.02E-02	5.05E-01		-7.35E-02	-1.46E-01	**
CLERGY	1.22E-01	-4.39E-02		3.09E-02		1.46E-02	-3.08E-02		-2.23E-03	4.24E-02	
CLERGYFU	1.11E-02	1.44E-03		1.67E-02		3.92E-02	1.29E-01	**	-9.53E-02	-3.03E-02	
PRIEST	1.71E-02	5.82E-02		7.49E-02	*	1.06E-02	1.13E-01	**	1.45E-02	-1.21E-01	**
BLACCL	1.27E-01	-5.23E-03	*	4.92E-02		5.10E-02	1.63E-02		4.14E-02	-1.24E-02	
ARMY	-3.68E-02	-1.52E-02		-7.68E-03		-8.69E-03	3.21E-02		9.42E-03	2.11E-01	***
GOV	4.62E-02	6.81E-03		3.38E-02		-1.03E-02	-9.33E-03		-1.82E-02	-1.72E-01	***
NCOLYR	-5.82E-02	-3.02E-02	*	3.33E-02	***	2.28E-02	3.86E-02	***	1.06E-02	-3.75E-02	***

**TABLE 8.1. — Continued**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables						
	PROWELF	PROPOOR	PROHEAL	PROED	PROENV	PROSOC	PROARMS
COLYR	1.04E-02	-2.38E-02 **	-8.94E-03	3.16E-02 ***	4.68E-03	-3.69E-02 ***	-6.61E-02 ***
AGENCOLYR	6.23E-04 ***	3.89E-04	-4.40E-04 ***	-3.07E-04 **	-4.60E-04 ***	-3.95E-04 **	5.10E-04 ***
AGECOLYR	1.97E-04	1.29E-04	-1.78E-04	-5.39E-04 ***	1.18E-04	-4.16E-05	6.52E-04 ***
NCYRSLOPE	-4.52E-02 ***	-1.30E-02 *	1.38E-02 ***	9.11E-03 ***	1.82E-02 ***	-7.00E-03	-2.67E-02 ***
COLYRSLOPE	1.45E-02 ***	-1.81E-02 ***	-1.68E-02 ***	7.68E-03 ***	9.92E-03 ***	-3.87E-02 ***	-5.24E-02 ***
MALE	-1.95E-02 *	-4.59E-02 ***	-5.63E-02 ***	-6.48E-02 ***	-4.00E-02 ***	-9.40E-02 ***	4.20E-02 ***
YEAR	-2.76E-03 ***	-1.57E-02 ***	2.39E-03 ***	1.38E-02 ***	3.53E-03 ***	-5.70E-03 ***	-4.48E-03 ***
NE	8.83E-02 *	1.64E-01 ***	5.45E-02	4.79E-02	1.12E-01 ***	4.30E-02	-8.38E-02 ***
MA	-2.38E-02	3.09E-02	3.66E-02	3.34E-02	1.04E-01 ***	3.05E-02	-3.06E-02
ENC	-9.59E-03	4.57E-02	-1.30E-02	9.63E-03	5.74E-02 ***	3.08E-02	-5.70E-04
WNC	6.53E-02 *	-7.97E-02 *	-1.23E-02	3.95E-02	7.66E-02 ***	-5.31E-02 *	2.72E-03
SA	-5.28E-02 *	-3.61E-02	-1.43E-02	6.11E-02 ***	5.01E-02 **	3.98E-03	7.41E-02 ***
ESC	5.03E-02	-8.92E-03	-1.57E-02	3.71E-02	8.21E-03	5.51E-02	1.29E-01 ***
WSC	2.55E-02	-8.20E-02 *	-4.47E-02 *	1.76E-02	4.43E-02 *	4.11E-03	1.29E-01 ***
MT	2.28E-02	5.48E-02	-5.57E-03	3.39E-02	-1.39E-02	9.35E-03	7.44E-03
16NE	-4.74E-02	-3.32E-02	1.22E-02	-3.67E-02	2.54E-02	-3.67E-02	2.55E-02
16MA	-4.67E-02	5.63E-03	-1.19E-03	-6.89E-02 ***	1.85E-03	-1.26E-02	8.37E-03
16ENC	5.97E-03	-7.63E-02 *	-1.33E-02	-2.71E-02	-1.16E-02	-4.46E-02	-3.53E-02
16WNC	4.16E-04	5.50E-02	-2.71E-02	-3.06E-02	-1.90E-02	-2.33E-02	-8.17E-02 ***
16SA	2.95E-02	4.09E-02	2.30E-02	-8.85E-03	8.55E-03	6.34E-03	4.37E-03
16ESC	1.94E-02	-6.00E-02	1.75E-02	3.26E-02	9.27E-03	-1.96E-02	-1.52E-02
16WSC	-2.89E-02	-4.54E-02	-2.12E-02	-3.32E-03	-2.48E-02	-1.99E-02	-2.32E-03
16MT	-1.85E-02	-7.49E-02	-4.17E-02	-2.04E-02	-6.76E-02 **	-3.39E-02	6.93E-03
SIGETHNIC							
N	18,232	7,993	26,798	26,235	25,584	15,482	26,327
RSQUARE	0.119	0.087	0.038	0.095	0.095	0.090	0.071
MEAN	1.69	2.53	2.57	2.56	2.51	2.46	1.87
STDEV	0.767	0.680	0.612	0.611	0.639	0.615	0.712



FY	1.60E-02	**	6.81E-03	2.96E-03	-3.38E-02	***	-1.25E-02	-2.58E-02	-2.86E-02	***
FY2	-2.26E-03		-2.27E-03	3.65E-03	-9.06E-03	***	-2.64E-03	-8.92E-03	-6.65E-04	
FYSLOPE	1.76E-02	***	8.34E-03	4.91E-04	-2.77E-02	***	-1.07E-02	-1.97E-02	-2.82E-02	***
SELF	-3.29E-02	***	-5.48E-02	***	-2.77E-02	**	-4.46E-02	-2.80E-02	-3.12E-02	**
PROF	-3.26E-02		3.14E-03	-1.16E-02	-2.00E-02		-9.57E-03	-1.25E-02	-5.92E-02	***
MGM	-2.60E-02	**	4.27E-03	-4.45E-03	-2.10E-02	***	-5.74E-02	-1.34E-02	-4.89E-02	***
CLERK	1.88E-02	**	4.15E-03	9.51E-03	-9.75E-03		-7.60E-03	-3.97E-03	-1.66E-02	
SALES	1.34E-02		3.19E-02	2.87E-03	2.99E-03		-1.92E-02	-1.37E-02	-9.86E-03	
SERVE	3.36E-03		3.12E-02	6.64E-03	4.17E-03		1.95E-02	1.26E-02	3.49E-02	***
AGR	-5.34E-02	**	8.77E-03	-3.05E-02	-5.92E-02	**	-9.68E-02	-1.26E-01	2.00E-02	
BLACK	4.22E-02	***	-4.71E-02	6.41E-02	1.32E-01	***	2.58E-01	2.06E-01	0.00E+00	***
UNION	3.08E-02	***	3.61E-02	1.32E-02	2.15E-02	**	4.26E-03	-2.18E-03	-2.71E-02	***
GOVR	-3.73E-02	***	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	0.00E+00		2.96E-02	2.35E-02	-3.78E-02	***
MAIN	7.72E-03		-3.48E-03	3.48E-03	1.97E-03		1.96E-02	2.99E-02	8.42E-03	
JEW	4.53E-02		-1.10E-01	6.32E-03	6.76E-02		1.96E-01	1.98E-01	2.10E-01	***
JSLOPE	-2.26E-02		-6.73E-02	-4.46E-02	4.89E-02		2.53E-01	2.08E-01	1.91E-01	***
CATHOLIC	2.01E-02		-5.25E-03	-3.38E-02	-1.65E-02		2.99E-02	3.77E-02	-3.65E-03	
CSLOPE	-1.00E-02	***	-1.13E-03	-2.45E-02	5.23E-03		2.23E-02	1.26E-02	4.06E-02	
NOREL	-9.23E-02	***	-1.76E-03	2.68E-02	5.10E-02	*	1.65E-02	6.14E-02	9.54E-02	***
OTHREL	-8.21E-02	**	-5.25E-03	3.31E-03	6.53E-02		8.80E-02	6.24E-02	4.34E-02	
ATTEND	6.32E-03		-2.27E-03	7.35E-04	-4.06E-03		-1.02E-04	1.10E-02	-1.20E-02	
ATTENDSL	-1.59E-03		-3.27E-03	9.33E-05	-5.94E-03	***	2.46E-03	-2.24E-05	7.37E-03	***
PATT	-7.37E-03		2.77E-03	-4.86E-03	-2.48E-05		-4.22E-04	-1.00E-02	8.00E-03	
CATT	-7.56E-03		1.04E-03	2.32E-03	5.46E-03		-1.90E-03	-6.32E-03	1.11E-02	
JATT	-1.71E-02		1.07E-02	-1.28E-02	-4.69E-03		1.42E-02	2.60E-03	-4.71E-03	
FUNDAT	-5.39E-04		-1.66E-03	1.09E-03	-1.61E-03		1.56E-03	1.61E-03	6.00E-03	***
FYINCOME	-6.06E-02		4.36E-02	1.13E-01	-1.54E-02	**	-9.14E-04	-4.68E-02	4.07E-02	
FMARRIED	6.59E-02		1.02E-01	-3.10E-02	-2.00E-02		-9.77E-02	-7.17E-02	8.37E-02	
MARRIED	1.65E-02	**	9.80E-03	-1.36E-02	-2.35E-03		-1.79E-02	-1.05E-02	2.25E-03	

**TABLE 8.1.—Continued**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables									
	ANTICRIME	PROROAD	PROMASS	PROPARK	PROCIITY(O)	PROCIITY(I)	PRORACE(O)			
CHILD	1.16E-02	2.24E-02	-2.29E-02	-4.42E-03	1.48E-02	1.85E-02	-3.07E-02			
NCHILD	-6.52E-03	-2.16E-02	9.61E-04	1.78E-02	-1.18E-02	3.91E-03	1.18E-06			
STATMIG	-9.60E-04	-7.69E-03	3.71E-02	-1.76E-03	2.70E-03	-1.03E-02	-6.83E-03			
CONTMIG	-1.93E-02	-8.87E-03	6.32E-02	1.58E-02	3.65E-02	2.53E-02	1.28E-02			
MIGSL	-1.12E-02	-8.35E-03	5.18E-02	8.07E-03	2.16E-02	9.65E-03	4.17E-03			
CLERGYSL	4.81E-02	-1.36E-03	-1.26E-02	-5.38E-02	-3.24E-02	1.40E-02	7.75E-02			
AGE	1.91E-03	2.59E-03	-1.64E-03	-1.30E-02	-1.23E-02	-3.53E-04	-1.42E-02			
AGE2	-1.21E-05	4.96E-05	-2.09E-05	3.27E-05	6.48E-05	-1.73E-05	1.09E-04			
AGESL	-9.38E-05	2.99E-03	1.05E-03	-4.71E-03	-3.72E-03	-1.55E-03	-4.73E-03			
MEMNUM	1.54E-03	-6.24E-04	7.64E-03	1.24E-02	-1.58E-03	7.82E-03	7.39E-05			
LCCIT	5.84E-02	-4.22E-02	1.01E-01	6.67E-02	0.00E+00	1.17E-01	8.32E-02			
SCCIT	3.33E-02	-8.08E-02	4.38E-02	9.11E-03	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	1.68E-03			
SSURB	1.98E-02	-7.45E-02	3.87E-02	-1.47E-02	7.65E-02	0.00E+00	7.06E-03			
LSURB	2.41E-02	-6.48E-02	6.22E-02	2.62E-03	1.20E-01	0.00E+00	-7.13E-03			
OURB	-1.73E-04	-5.34E-02	1.60E-02	-5.10E-03	4.98E-02	0.00E+00	2.74E-02			
SCITY	3.19E-02	-1.02E-02	3.37E-02	3.73E-02	3.08E-02	-3.03E-02	5.32E-02			
MCITY	4.10E-02	-4.41E-02	3.42E-02	6.35E-02	4.63E-02	-3.87E-02	3.19E-02			
SUBR13	9.68E-03	-4.55E-02	2.61E-02	3.29E-02	8.15E-02	-2.52E-02	4.10E-02			
LCITY	4.76E-02	-2.77E-02	6.29E-02	7.30E-02	1.00E-01	1.14E-02	4.41E-02			
LOWTEACH	5.50E-03	-4.06E-02	-3.43E-02	1.73E-02	5.89E-02	6.22E-02	7.05E-04			
COLTEACH	-7.49E-02	1.36E-02	-6.22E-03	2.51E-02	8.77E-02	4.78E-02	9.88E-02			
WRITER	-2.83E-02	2.73E-02	2.97E-02	-3.90E-02	-3.19E-02	1.06E-01	1.09E-01			
LAWYER	-5.51E-02	3.34E-02	1.15E-01	3.41E-03	4.77E-02	9.34E-02	7.06E-02			
CLERGY	4.62E-02	3.94E-03	1.82E-03	-6.09E-02	-8.48E-03	-5.25E-03	7.38E-02			
CLERGYFU	1.59E-02	-4.42E-02	-1.20E-01	5.97E-02	-1.99E-01	1.60E-01	3.06E-02			
PRIEST	-2.67E-02	6.60E-02	1.30E-01	-1.91E-02	5.04E-02	5.40E-02	5.38E-02			
BLACCL	3.99E-02	-9.01E-02	1.61E-02	4.46E-02	-1.20E-02	-4.66E-03	1.06E-01			

ARMY	4.84E-02 *	-3.93E-02	2.93E-03	-3.43E-02	-1.68E-02	-8.85E-02	-1.50E-01 ***
GOV	-4.49E-02	4.48E-02	2.10E-02	6.62E-02 *	-8.94E-03	1.00E-01	1.42E-01 ***
NCOLYR	1.75E-02 **	-1.33E-02	-1.93E-02	-2.41E-02 **	-7.18E-03	2.89E-03	1.80E-02 ***
COLYR	-1.51E-02 **	-1.17E-02	3.36E-02 ***	-1.90E-02 ***	-6.84E-03	4.57E-02 ***	3.34E-02 ***
AGENCOLYR	-8.91E-05	4.01E-04 *	4.29E-04 **	4.40E-04 **	2.21E-04	1.12E-04	-6.35E-06
AGECOLYR	4.33E-05	2.66E-04	-1.58E-04	3.69E-04 **	3.10E-04 *	-6.75E-04 **	-1.16E-04
NCYRSLOPE	1.35E-02 ***	4.53E-03	-2.24E-04	-4.55E-03	2.63E-03	7.88E-03	1.52E-03
COLYRSLOPE	-1.32E-02 ***	1.01E-04	2.66E-02 ***	-2.61E-03	6.95E-03 **	1.57E-02 ***	2.83E-02 ***
MALE	-5.44E-02 ***	9.68E-02 ***	8.63E-03	3.47E-02 ***	7.16E-02 ***	-3.15E-02 ***	-6.03E-02 ***
YEAR	-1.44E-04	-3.91E-03 ***	4.20E-03 ***	6.32E-05	-8.04E-03 ***	-9.50E-03 ***	-1.25E-02 *
NE	2.24E-02	4.58E-02	-8.12E-02 **	-3.42E-02	1.99E-01 ***	-3.66E-03	9.14E-02 **
MA	2.10E-02	1.17E-01 ***	-9.07E-02 ***	-1.25E-02	4.37E-02	1.95E-01 ***	-2.73E-02
ENC	3.24E-02	5.74E-02 **	-9.10E-02 ***	-4.31E-02 *	8.45E-02 ***	4.52E-02	-2.87E-02
WNC	1.96E-02	1.54E-02	-1.04E-01 ***	-1.18E-01 ***	8.11E-02 **	1.90E-01 ***	1.16E-03
SA	4.63E-02 **	-3.42E-02	-1.16E-01 ***	-4.09E-02	-2.78E-02	1.72E-03	-1.16E-01 ***
ESC	4.99E-02 *	2.60E-02	-1.47E-01 ***	-4.94E-02	-8.84E-03	-4.90E-02	-1.65E-01 ***
WSC	2.47E-02	-3.04E-02	-1.25E-01 ***	-7.26E-02 **	-1.16E-02	-1.63E-03	-1.37E-01 ***
MT	-5.78E-03	2.26E-02	-2.32E-02	-8.81E-02 ***	-4.81E-02	-1.49E-02	1.51E-02
16NE	-1.42E-02	3.19E-02	3.55E-02	9.23E-02 **	-7.92E-02 *	3.15E-02	-5.37E-03
16MA	-1.83E-02	1.07E-02	-2.39E-03	5.56E-02 *	-1.10E-02	-3.33E-02	-1.87E-02
16ENC	-3.03E-02	-7.87E-03	-2.60E-02	1.11E-02	-6.04E-02 *	4.47E-02	-1.32E-02
16WNC	-3.94E-02	-2.23E-02	1.60E-03	2.57E-02	-4.95E-02	-4.25E-02	-1.42E-03
16SA	-1.46E-02	8.26E-03	-2.63E-02	4.64E-02 *	-2.00E-02	-1.83E-02	-4.25E-02
16ESC	1.92E-03	8.59E-03	-1.69E-02	3.35E-02	-5.14E-02	-3.92E-03	-3.18E-02
16WSC	-1.25E-03	2.83E-02	-3.47E-02	1.78E-02	-7.40E-02 **	-3.45E-02	-4.31E-02
16MT	-5.24E-02 *	-3.62E-03	4.88E-04	-3.67E-02	-1.69E-02	9.49E-03	-3.95E-02
SIGETHNIC							
N	26,839	16,280	16,175	15,508	6,240	20,669	23,501
RSQUARE	0.018	0.030	0.045	0.053	0.051	0.070	0.058
MEAN	2.55	2.31	2.22	2.25	2.16	2.36	1.99
STDEV	0.596	0.609	0.611	0.535	0.738	0.724	0.684

**TABLE 8.1.—Continued**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables						
	PRORACE(0)	ANTIABORT	PROREPUBL	PROCONSERV	PRESR		
FY	-3.02E-02 *	-3.85E-01 ***	2.11E-01 ***	1.57E-02 ***	5.62E-02 ***		
FY2	-7.72E-03	-3.53E-02	7.73E-02 ***	5.94E-03 ***	1.66E-02 ***		
FYSLOPE	-2.50E-02 *	-3.62E-01 ***	1.59E-01 ***	5.95E-02 ***	4.50E-02 ***		
SELF	-8.06E-02 **	-1.24E-01	1.92E-01 ***	4.12E-02 *	3.04E-02 ***		
PROF	-6.63E-02	-5.13E-01 ***	-1.57E-02	2.99E-02	-8.27E-02 ***		
MGM	-3.30E-02	-4.67E-02	2.22E-01 ***	3.50E-02	4.52E-02 ***		
CLERK	1.05E-02	-2.33E-01 ***	1.46E-01 ***	4.52E-02 **	4.14E-02 ***		
SALES	1.41E-02	-1.77E-01 *	2.38E-01 ***	8.26E-02 ***	3.92E-02 ***		
SERVE	-1.55E-02	1.69E-01 *	6.34E-03	-4.68E-02 **	1.24E-02		
AGR	3.08E-02	-2.05E-01	2.07E-01 ***	-1.41E-02	6.45E-03		
BLACK	0.00E+00	-7.07E-02	-1.29E+00 ***	-3.10E-01 ***	-4.12E-01 ***		
UNION	4.97E-02 ***	-1.61E-01 **	-2.33E-01 ***	-7.16E-02 ***	-4.43E-02 ***		
GOVR	-1.80E-02	9.02E-03	-1.59E-01 ***	-1.59E-01 ***	-3.96E-02 ***		
MAIN	-7.26E-02	-3.17E-01 ***	-8.05E-02 **	-1.13E-03	-2.67E-02 **		
JEW	-4.84E-01 *	-3.06E-01	-1.27E+00 ***	-5.38E-01 ***	-2.93E-01 ***		
JSLOPE	-1.68E-01	-1.06E+00 **	-1.37E+00 ***	-4.82E-01 ***	-3.17E-01 ***		
CATHOLIC	1.23E-02	-2.72E-01	-3.15E-01 ***	-1.21E-02	-6.29E-02 ***		
CSLOPE	2.38E-02	3.50E-01	-3.84E-01 ***	-8.15E-02	-1.17E-01 ***		
NOREL	-2.71E-02	-5.79E-01 ***	-8.51E-02	-3.14E-01 ***	-1.36E-01 ***		
OTHREL	5.08E-02	-2.91E-01	-1.47E-01	-9.46E-02	-1.57E-01 ***		
ATTEND	-8.97E-03	3.20E-01 ***	4.51E-04	8.34E-02 ***	1.73E-02 ***		
ATTENDSL	-4.13E-03	5.16E-01 ***	4.14E-02 ***	4.67E-02 ***	1.12E-02 ***		
PATT	8.37E-03	-1.29E-01 **	5.91E-02 ***	2.60E-03	-3.90E-03		
CATT	2.88E-03	1.56E-01 ***	-1.74E-02	-1.74E-02	-1.36E-02 **		
JATT	7.93E-02 *	-1.90E-01 ***	-2.54E-02	1.40E-02	-6.01E-03		
FUNDAT	-1.41E-03	-1.33E-01 ***	4.36E-03	-1.77E-02 ***	-5.90E-05		
FYINCOME	5.79E-02	-1.42E+00 ***	2.98E-01 **	-1.21E-01	3.03E-02		

FMARRIED	1.10E-01	3.74E-01	1.23E+00	***	2.41E-01	8.58E-02
MARRIED	4.02E-02	5.29E-01	1.37E-02	***	9.59E-02	1.09E-03
CHILD	-1.38E-02	-2.36E-01	-9.90E-03	**	-2.27E-02	-4.22E-03
NCHILD	-1.22E-03	3.05E-01	1.56E-02	***	3.30E-02	2.65E-03
STATMIG	-4.69E-02	2.28E-02	7.16E-02	**	2.90E-02	8.32E-03
CONTMIG	-1.76E-02	-7.38E-03	1.02E-01	***	-1.04E-03	8.04E-03
MIGSL	-3.05E-02	5.90E-03	8.86E-02	***	1.21E-02	8.16E-03
CLERGYSL	-1.67E-01	1.92E+00	2.02E-03	***	2.33E-02	4.73E-03
AGE	3.12E-03	-3.63E-02	-8.29E-02	***	5.96E-03	-7.16E-03
AGE2	-2.93E-05	1.07E-04	5.60E-04	***	9.67E-05	5.93E-05
AGESL	-3.79E-04	8.31E-06	-1.02E-02	***	7.74E-03	-1.40E-03
MEMNUM	9.42E-03	-8.80E-02	-2.01E-02	**	-7.98E-03	-1.97E-03
LCCIT	2.50E-02	6.87E-01	-3.00E-01	***	-1.95E-01	-7.26E-02
SCCIT	7.42E-03	-4.75E-01	-1.68E-01	***	-8.08E-02	-5.74E-02
SSURB	5.27E-02	-3.60E-01	-1.88E-02	***	-8.55E-03	-9.42E-03
LSURB	7.97E-02	4.28E-01	4.57E-02	***	-3.12E-02	-1.72E-04
OURB	-2.19E-02	-1.01E-01	-9.45E-02	***	-3.51E-02	-3.03E-02
SCITY	5.79E-02	-1.37E-01	-4.87E-02	***	-6.35E-03	-1.19E-03
MCITY	5.00E-02	4.54E-01	-3.81E-02	***	-6.33E-02	2.73E-03
SURBR	-6.82E-03	-4.95E-01	5.69E-02	***	-7.51E-02	3.65E-03
L CITY	4.38E-02	-5.71E-01	6.39E-03	***	-1.97E-02	5.27E-03
LOWTEACH	4.20E-02	2.36E-01	-4.02E-02	***	-5.84E-03	-4.75E-04
COLTEACH	3.59E-02	-1.87E-01	-3.00E-01	***	-1.17E-01	-6.39E-02
WRITER	-4.00E-01	-6.28E-01	-5.59E-02	***	-1.52E-01	-2.61E-02
LAWYER	-2.24E-02	-6.56E-01	-2.17E-01	***	-1.34E-01	-1.06E-01
CLERGY	-1.40E-01	1.85E+00	-1.50E-02	***	3.78E-03	6.08E-03
CLERGYFU	-2.23E-01	5.47E-01	1.42E-01	***	1.63E-01	-1.13E-02
PRIEST	-1.10E-01	3.68E-01	-1.08E-01	***	-1.17E-01	-1.16E-03
BLACCL	5.70E-02	-1.21E+00	-4.70E-01	***	-1.73E-01	-3.63E-02
ARMY	-7.22E-02	-3.60E-01	9.76E-02	***	1.26E-01	4.62E-02
GOV	5.13E-02	2.37E-02	-2.14E-01	**	-1.65E-01	-7.63E-02
NCOLYR	1.37E-02	-3.36E-01	-8.94E-02	***	-4.72E-02	7.01E-03

**TABLE 8.1. — Continued**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables						
	PRORACE(i)	ANTIABORT	PROREPUBL	PROCONSERV	PRESR		
COLYR	-1.67E-03	-3.27E-01 ***	-4.26E-02 **	-9.50E-02 ***	-2.79E-02 ***		
AGENCOLYR	-9.12E-05	1.98E-03 *	1.83E-03 ***	-5.29E-04 *	-1.58E-05		
AGECOLYR	8.89E-05	3.62E-03 ***	1.97E-03 ***	1.28E-03 ***	4.94E-04 ***		
NCYRSLOPE	9.62E-03 *	-2.48E-01 ***	-8.14E-03 ***	2.37E-02 ***	6.31E-03 **		
COLYRSLOPE	2.28E-03	-1.66E-01 ***	4.48E-02 ***	-3.80E-02 ***	-6.02E-03 ***		
MALE	-3.06E-02 *	3.35E-01 ***	1.59E-01 ***	1.39E-01 ***	4.56E-02 ***		
YEAR	-3.89E-03 ***	2.52E-02 ***	2.29E-02 ***	1.20E-02 ***	-6.85E-04		
NE	2.06E-01 ***	3.64E-01 ***	1.09E-01	-3.46E-02	2.02E-02		
MA	1.05E-01 **	5.54E-01 ***	4.96E-02	-3.75E-02	8.40E-03		
ENC	6.94E-02	1.08E+00 ***	-3.12E-02	4.89E-02	1.67E-02		
WNC	1.12E-01 *	1.23E+00 ***	-8.40E-02	2.62E-02	-1.75E-02		
SA	3.85E-02	4.66E-01 ***	4.61E-02	3.65E-02	4.16E-02 **		
ESC	3.50E-02	7.78E-01 ***	-4.63E-03	1.30E-01 **	3.16E-02		
WSC	7.02E-03	6.62E-01 ***	1.91E-02	9.41E-02 *	7.89E-02 ***		
MT	-2.91E-01 ***	5.56E-01 ***	-6.61E-02	8.08E-05	2.37E-02		
16NE	-3.32E-02	-4.09E-01	2.41E-02	-6.40E-02	-1.19E-02		
16MA	4.28E-02	-3.48E-01 *	2.60E-01 ***	-3.10E-02	2.51E-02		
16ENC	9.40E-02	-1.43E-01	1.51E-01 **	-7.19E-02	6.88E-03		
16WNC	2.65E-02	-2.36E-01	5.65E-02	-1.04E-01 *	-1.85E-02		
16SA	3.81E-02	5.58E-02	-1.57E-01 **	-4.08E-02	-2.39E-02		
16ESC	9.80E-02	4.41E-01 *	-1.99E-01 **	-6.92E-02	-2.15E-02		
16WSC	1.14E-01 *	7.94E-02	-2.49E-01 ***	2.77E-03	-1.98E-02		
16MT	2.71E-01 **	5.22E-01 **	2.04E-01 **	6.19E-02	4.60E-02 **		
SIGETHNIC	7	3	11	4	11		
N	3,393	17,210	27,407	24,290	24,327		
RSQUARE	0.084	0.242	0.160	0.087	0.155		
MEAN	2.77	12.43	2.6	4.08	0.55		
STDEV	0.465	4.640	1.998	1.310	0.496		

## Key to Table 8.1

### I. Dependent Variables

PROWELF: Are we spending too little (1), about the right amount (2), or too much (3) on welfare?  
PROPOOR: Are we spending too little (1), about the right amount (2), or too much (3) on assistance to the poor?  
PROHEAL: on improving and protecting the nation's health?  
PROED: on improving the nation's educational system?  
PROENV: on the environment?  
PROSOC: on Social Security?  
PROARMS: on the military, armaments, and defense?  
ANTICRIME: on halting crime?  
PROROAD: on highways and bridges?  
PROMASS: on mass transportation?  
PROPARK: on parks and recreation?  
PROCITY(0): on solving the problems of big cities? (for those living in cities)  
PROCITY(1): on solving the problem of big cities? (for those not)  
PRORACE(0): on improving the conditions of blacks? (for nonblacks)  
PRORACE(1): on improving the conditions of blacks? (for blacks)  
ANTIABORT: Should it be possible for a pregnant women to obtain a legal abortion under 7 different conditions? Dependent variable runs from 7 (all no) to 14 (all yes).  
PROREPUBL: identifications with Republican Party from strong Democrat (1) to strong Republican (7)  
PROCONSERV: political views from extremely liberal (1) through extremely conservative (8)  
PRESR: vote for or would have voted for Republican presidential candidate

### II. Independent Variables

FY = ln of family income relative to mean family income estimated by a Pareto distribution  
FY2 = the square of the FY  
FYSLOPE = the coefficient of FY evaluated at the mean levels of variables it interacts with  
SELF = self-employed  
PROF = professional or technical workers  
MGM = managers and administrators  
CLERK = clerical workers  
SALES = sales workers  
SERVE = service workers  
AGR = farmers and farm laborers, etc.  
BLACK = blacks  
UNION = union membership by self  
GOVR = recipient of government assistance  
MAIN = Protestant and not Baptist, Holiness Pentecostal, or other  
JEW = Jewish  
JSLOPE = the coefficient of JEW evaluated at the mean levels of the variables it interacts with  
CATHOLIC = Catholic  
CSLOPE = coefficient of CATHOLIC evaluated at mean level of variables it interacts with  
NOREL = no religious preference  
OTHREL = religious preference other than Jewish, Protestant, or Catholic  
ATTEND = from 0 (never) through 8 (several times a week) for attendance at religious services  
ATTENDSL = attend slope  
PATT = interaction of ATTEND and MAIN  
CATT = interaction of ATTEND and CATHOLIC  
JATT = interaction of ATTEND and JEWISH  
FUNDAT = interaction of ATTEND and (1 - MAIN)  
FYINCOME = the average income of the religious denomination to which one belongs  
FMARRIED = the percentage of one's religious denomination either married or widowed and never divorced

**Key to Table 8.1—continued**

MARRIED = married

CHILD = parent of a child at some point in life

NCHILD = number of children parented

STATMIG = located elsewhere in the state at age 16

CONTMIG = located in a different state at age 16

MIGSL = the coefficient of migratory status evaluated at mean

CLERGYSL = CLERGY slope.

AGE = age

AGE2 = the square of age

AGESL = age slope

MEMNUM = number of memberships in 16 voluntary organization types

LCCIT = resides in a central city of 1 of 12 largest standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA)

SCCIT = resides in a small city of next largest central SMSA

SSURB = resides in a suburb of 1 of 12 largest SMSAs

LSURB = resides in a suburb of one of next 88 largest SMSAs

OURB = residence in counties having towns of 10,000 or more

SCITY = resides in suburbs of smaller central city

MCITY = resides in central city of any but the top 100 SMSAs

SURB = resides in suburbs of central city of any but the top 100 SMSAs

LCITY = resides in central city of a smaller central city

LOWTEACH = employed as a teacher other than in college or university

COLTEACH = employed as a college or university teacher

WRITER = editors or reporters

LAWYER = lawyers and judges

CLERGY = clergypersons

CLERGYFU = clergy interacted with (1 – MAIN)

PRIEST = clergy interacted with CATHOLIC

BLACCL = clergy interacted with BLACK

ARMY = membership in the armed forces and police

GOV = employed by government but not in the police, army or education

NCOLYR = number of years of formal schooling at grade 12 or below

COLYR = number of years of college

AGENCOLYR = interaction of age and number of years of non-college education

AGECOLYR = interaction of age and number of years of college education

NCYRSLOPE = the coefficient of noncollege years of education evaluated at the means of the variables it is interacted with

COLYRSLOPE = the coefficient of college years of education at the means of the variables it is interacted with

MALE = male

YEAR = 1972 = 1

The region abbreviations = resides in one of 8 regions of the United States NE (Northeast), MA (Mid-Atlantic), ENC (East North Central), WNC (West North Central), SA (South Atlantic), ESC (East South Central), WSC (West South Central), MT (Mountain).

The region abbreviations preceded by 16 = resided in one of 8 regions at age 16.

SIGETHNIC = There are dummy variables for each of 38 ethnic groups specified in Nelson 1994, and this refers to the number of such that were significant at the 5% level or better.

*N* = sample size

RSQUARE = multiple correlation coefficient squared

MEAN = mean voter participation

STDEV = standard deviation

\*Significant at 10% level. \*\*Significant at 5% level. \*\*\*Significant at 1% level

*Note:* This table is reprinted with permission from Table 1 (pp. 436–42) of Kenneth Greene and Phillip Nelson, “Morality and the Political Process,” in *Method and Morals in the Constitutional Economics*, ed. Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt, and Robert Tollison (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2000), 413–43. © Springer-Verlag 2002.



its own, particularly for voting. Most of these problems are generated by nonlinearities. Population density plays an important role in political decisions, as we shall see, but we do not know how to provide an adequate summary measure of that density by area. Voting regressions by area frequently lead to serious anomalies. For example, high-income areas tend to vote Democratic rather than Republican.

### Self-Interest Variables

In studying political behavior most economists focus exclusively on narrow self-interest: how one would vote if solely concerned with the consequences of the policies voted for. As discussed in chapter 6 this approach is unsatisfactory theoretically because of the free-rider problem. Still, narrow self-interest variables do have an impact empirically. The narrow self-interest of the associates whom one is trying to please magnifies the effect of one's own self-interest because there is a positive correlation between the two, as seen in chapter 5.

The most important narrow self-interest variables we use are income and its square. With the exception of abortion, all of the issues have a redistributive component. For most of the programs examined the rich pay more than they receive. But that is probably not true for defense or police or roads. In the latter half of the twentieth century the Communist Soviet Union was the main external enemy of the United States. Presumably, the relative costs to the rich of its success would have been large. An important function of the police is the protection of property, and the rich own more than do the poor, though the poor are crime victims more frequently. The rich are also less likely to be criminals or charged with crimes, so the interests of this latter group will weigh less in their decisions. There is also a positive income elasticity of demand for automobile travel and for the goods transported by trucks. It is not clear whether this more or less counterbalances the share of taxes paid by higher-income groups to finance roads.

In the regression results reported in table 8.1, in eleven out of the nineteen cases the slope of log income at its mean is significant in the conservative direction: only in one case is it in the liberal direction. In this case—the rich are more proabortion—the liberal cause does not involve greater government expenditures.

Another self-interest variable is whether a person is self-employed (SELF = 1) or not. While business and regulatory costs may ultimately shift to either consumers or owners of capital, there will be some short-run costs borne by current owners of businesses. Furthermore, one

expects the self-employed to be more knowledgeable about this tax burden and many self-employed to be imperfectly aware of tax shifting. There are eleven cases in which the self-employed are significantly conservative. There are only two cases where they adopt significantly more liberal positions, in each case being opposed to greater government expenditures, first on roads, our iffy issue, and on the police.

Consider broad occupations as given by the 1968 Standard International Codes as specified in table 8.1. One expects higher-income occupations and those associating with high-income families to behave similarly to high-income families, even controlling for family income.

Using “Production and Related Workers” as the control group, we looked at the behavior of dummy variables for professionals, managers, clerical workers, sales workers, service workers, and agricultural workers, including their spouses. The first four occupations are white-collar occupations. The positive and significant coefficient for each indicates that each behaves more conservatively than the control group.

Race is another self-interest variable in the United States. Blacks are likely to be in favor of greater expenditures for blacks. There are often indirect costs associated with government-generated beneficence, and that beneficence is not uniformly distributed to all members of the group. However, these indirect costs are generally less well known to the group involved than the direct benefits themselves. Also party and conservative-liberal identification and votes for president have a direct self-interest component for blacks because of party differences over affirmative action. There are other issues that are not explicitly about race, but because of imitation blacks should vote the same way low-income groups vote, even though family income is one of the control variables. Blacks are significantly more liberal on ten issues and are significantly more conservative on one issue: crime.<sup>5</sup>

### **Community Involvement: Theory**

At the beginning of this chapter we stated one of the hypotheses that we wanted to test, and the way in which we could test it. The lower the cost of “signaling” goodness, the more people will adopt “progoodness” political positions. As discussed in chapter 4, this proposition holds both for public and private political positions, though it will be more important for public positions. The major cost of signaling goodness is signaling friendship less effectively. The more friends one has, the greater the cost of goodness. Similarly, the greater the cost of

acquiring new friends, the more one values old friends relative to any return to goodness. We call both of these *community involvement* effects.

This process works in spite of an obvious objection. Suppose the signaling of friendship just involved imitating others' political positions. Then, increasing the incentives for such signaling, just yields a greater tendency for people in the aggregate to adopt the average political position in the previous period. If political positions in general were in stable equilibrium, that average past position would be equal to the average current position. In consequence, greater friendship signaling would apparently have no impact on the role of goodness in determining political positions.

There are two objections to this objection. First, we are not in stable equilibrium. As seen in the next chapter, the role of goodness in determining political positions is increasing. Those who help slow down that change will display relatively less goodness.

Second, as we saw in chapter 5, there is likely to be at least a small narrow self-interest component in a person's signal that he wishes to be the friend of another. That is, the friend will expect the other person to adjust his imitation a bit by including a little narrow self-interest in determining his political position. Given that expectation, that is roughly what he will do. As a result, the greater use of friendship signaling moves political positions somewhat away from average political positions toward average narrow self-interest positions. Hence, those who use more of that signaling will display relatively less goodness.

There is another process that produces a positive relationship between community involvement and asymmetric goodness—the third hypothesis developed at the beginning of this chapter. People can get information about the political position of others through political expression designed for a wide audience, or they can obtain their information through contacts with others. The former source has a much larger goodness component than the latter. The greater one's number of contacts with others, the greater the expected ratio of information from contacts with others to wide-audience information.

These processes hold for both liberal goodness and conservative morality, and, therefore provide only limited predictions for those issues where goodness is two-sided, but do provide simple predictions for asymmetric goodness.

But even in those cases of two-sided goodness we expect community involvement to make a person more conservative because we expect community involvement to have other effects increasing the probab-

ity of conservative morality signaling. One expects there to be a positive relationship between community involvement and sexual probity. One pays a bigger price in social ostracism if others disapprove of one's sexual practices. The more one's sexual behavior is in line with group morality, the lower the costs of advocating such morality. We predict a positive effect on antiabortion positions.

The negative association of community involvement with goodness contrasts dramatically with a major implication about standard charity. In chapter 3 we saw that the greater the community involvement, the more a person contributes to the latter. This difference in behavior is produced because community involvement increases the cost of goodness, but it does not increase the cost of standard charity.

In the case of defense spending community involvement works through imitation rather than goodness. Those who are more involved in the community and their friends have a self-interested motivation for increased expenditures for defense. Because they are community leaders, they have more to lose from a change of government by force.

Except in a criminal society, community involvement also reduces the probability that a person and his friends will be criminals. This decreases the cost of favoring greater expenditures to fight crime. But for some community involvement variables, like living in a rural area, the probability of being a victim of crime also decreases. So for those variables the effect is ambiguous.

### **Community Involvement: Tests**

We study several variables that are related to community involvement. Probably the purest such variable is migration, as Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2000) show. Migration reduces community membership, and the further one moves the less the network of friends and relatives one is likely to have at one's destination. We use two migration variables: whether one is an intrastate migrant (STATMIG) in the sense that one lives in a different town but the same state that one lived in when sixteen, and CONTMIG, whether one was an interstate migrant in the same sense. There are three cases where intrastate migrants are significantly more liberal than nonmigrants, and there are no cases where intrastate migrants are more conservative than nonmigrants. Interstate migrants are significantly more liberal in five cases and are not significantly more conservative in any cases.

As discussed in chapter 3, we posit that the costs of developing new friends increases with age. We also believe that signaling goodness is

particularly cheap to the very young who choose both friends and political positions *de novo*.

We would also expect age over most of the range of adulthood to increase the ratio of information about the political position of others that comes from contact with those others compared to the information that comes from public expression associated with wider audiences. The young build up a stockpile of such information coming through education. After the period of formal education is over, the stream of the two sources of information might very well come in at a constant rate. But such a timing pattern implies that the ratio of contact information relative to wider audience information increases with time.<sup>6</sup>

The slope of the age variable at its mean and the mean of other relevant variables is almost always significant. There are thirteen cases where older people are more conservative; three where they are more liberal: they are more Democratic, vote for Democratic candidates for president, and are in favor of greater expenditures on mass transportation.<sup>7</sup>

Another community-involvement-related variable is city size. The denser a community's population, the harder it is to be an active member. The anonymity of the city has long been recognized. Currently, city residence in the United States also makes a person more liberal because her neighbors will be more liberal and may consist of more blacks, migrants, singles, and the nonreligious.

Suburbs also create unfavorable conditions for community involvement, since a substantial portion of their population commutes long distances to work with a resulting separation of the social life of work and residence. Holding density constant, suburbs should have less community involvement than other city types. Suburbanites are also affected by the attitudes of central city residents, since the latter are often the work associates of the former. This too should make suburbanites more liberal.

City-size categories make a significant difference in the predicted direction for most of the issues investigated. In three of the cases, mass transit, roads, and the environment, there are clear differences in self-interest by city-size categories. But the city-size effect is significant for most of the other issues as well. There are thirteen issues where those in the largest central cities (LRCIT) and seven where those in the next largest (SCCIT) are significantly more liberal than those in rural areas, the control group. There are three issues for which no city-size category is significant—Social Security, aid to the poor, and expenditures for blacks (among blacks). For roads, all city-size categories are

significant except large central cities (a surprising exception). For police expenditures, results are reversed, and significantly so. The larger the city the more its residents adopt the conservative position—more expenditures to fight crime. The explanation is obvious.

For six issues the suburbs of the largest cities (LSURB) are significantly more liberal than the comparable density group, other urban: the environment, welfare, abortion, education, city expenditures, roads, and mass transit. This is also true for the suburbs of the next largest cities (SSURB). Three of these positions can be explained by self-interested connections to the city: the environment, city expenditures, and mass transit. One is just the reverse of what one would anticipate in terms of self-interest: opposition to spending on roads. Commuters are heavy users of roads as well as mass transit. For party identification suburbanites are more conservative than residents in the category “other urban.”

There is an alternative explanation for the city-size effect. The association between large cities and reduced family ties has a direct impact. Families are less capable of providing a variety of services: child care, education, health care, and insurance. So there is an increased incentive to substitute public services for family services (Holsey and Borcharding 1996).

Along the same lines, one expects less reciprocal relations the greater the population density. People know less about each other as population density increases. In consequence, there is less reputational loss from being a moocher in big cities compared to rural areas. Indeed, Glaeser et al. (1999) find significantly less social capital for big cities. Public services could be substitutes for help from others.

While this alternative hypothesis might explain part of the city-size-liberal relationship, it cannot explain all of it. Not only does the current city size in which the respondent lives make a significant difference in political positions, but so too does city size of the respondent when sixteen. For three of the issues—aid to the poor, health, and parks—there are more significant coefficients for the latter than the former. For four others the lagged city coefficients are roughly equal those for current cities: the environment, crime, education, city expenditures (for those not in central cities). There are, however, five issues on which the current coefficients are bigger: welfare, abortion, party identification, presidential votes, and mass transit.

In chapter 5, we showed that imitation produces lags in voter response to underlying conditions. In the United States married people typically migrate together. When a person is single or moves with his

immediate family from a city size, that city size no longer affects the reality he confronts, though it might still affect his extended family. It is hard to believe that the weight he gives to his extended family will be more important than the weight he gives his immediate family. His attitudes move with him, however, and it is possible that early attitude formation could be more important than what happens later.

There is one community involvement variable that is positively related to goodness: the number of organizations to which one belongs (MEMNUM). It has a significant liberal coefficient in seven cases and there are no significant conservative coefficients.

The difference between MEMNUM and the other community involvement variables is that MEMNUM can be a function of a person's activism rather than simply influencing the activism. One may join the ACLU or the Sierra Club in one's desire to be good. One may also join the John Birch Society, but there is a greater return to being a good liberal compared to being a good conservative. The relationship of activism to goodness was discussed in detail in chapter 7.

## **Religion**

Religion has assorted effects on political positions of its practitioners. (1) Preachers can directly preach political activism. This runs the gamut of sermons against abortion to exhortations for government action to fight poverty. Knowledge of the nature of those sermons will help predict systematic differences in the political positions of the listeners. These consumers of sermons can be affected by persuasion. Alternatively, they can be selected on the basis of their willingness to be subjected to such sermonizing. It is known, for example, that mainline Protestants preach more liberal activism than do Fundamentalists. (2) Preachers can preach private morality. Fundamentalists on the whole emphasize sexual probity and family commitments more than do mainline Protestants. We would expect Fundamentalists to be more likely to practice such behavior, and in turn we would expect such practitioners to be more involved in the community, because the more one is involved in the community the greater the return from following the approved mores. As we have seen, community involvement leads to more conservative political positions. (3) Those who attend church are more involved in the community than others, as shown in chapter 3. There is the obvious direct effect—church attendance and its accompanying activities are socializing experiences. The indirect effects are also important, since church-based friendships often open up other

friendship opportunities. The details of the regression results we employ using religious variables help show these processes at work.

Probably the most questionable of these listed effects is the second. We try to get at that effect by creating a special measure of the pro-family orientation of the narrowly defined religious denomination of a respondent: the sample percentage of those in the denomination who are either married or widowed and have never been divorced.<sup>8</sup> We call this measure FMARRIED. We also use a dummy variable for main-line Protestants called MAIN, classifying the NORC narrow denominations using the guidelines developed by Kellstedt, Lyman, and Green (1993). Similarly, we would expect those who have no religion, NOREL, to engage in more goodness than others, especially when Fundamentalists are the religion of comparison.

In addition, we include a measure of a person's own profamily behavior: whether the respondent is married or widowed and has never been divorced. That variable is called MARRIED. MARRIED also has a direct community involvement effect in the same direction. As shown in chapter 3, married people jointly have more friends, since they pool their friends by marrying. We also include a variable called ATTEND, the frequency of church attendance.<sup>9</sup>

Table 8.1 shows that FMARRIED has a significant (at the 5 percent level) impact in the predicted direction on policy preferences in six of the nineteen cases examined, and does not have any significant impacts in the opposite direction. Being a mainline Protestant relative to being a Fundamentalist Protestant, MAIN, leads to a significant effect in the predicted direction in only three cases, but there are no significant cases in the opposite direction. Greater values of NOREL lead to significant effects in the predicted direction in six cases and only one in the opposite direction—against greater Social Security expenditures.

Greater values of MARRIED lead a person to be significantly more conservative, significantly antiabortion, and against more expenditures on the environment. There is one opposite case, but, as we shall see later, it is not very important as an indicator of goodness. For blacks, MARRIED leads to greater support for government expenditures on blacks.

There is a significant slope for ATTEND at the means of other relevant variables for twelve issues. In only one of these cases does greater church attendance lead to the more liberal position: for greater expenditures to help blacks among whites.

ATTEND also has a community involvement feature that is required to explain a seeming paradox. Returning to chapter 3, we see



that church attendance is the single most important variable explaining standard charity for non-church-based contributions as well as contributions through the church, and yet it produces less goodness. The usual altruism explanation for both charity and goodness makes no sense in terms of this result.

Belonging to a minority religion could also generate less community involvement. Jews, other non-Christians, and Catholics, to a lesser extent, have been victims of past social discrimination, placing some restrictions on their community involvement. Jews are significantly more liberal on nine issues and are significantly more conservative on none. Catholics are significantly more liberal on defense, party identification, and votes for president, and significantly more conservative about abortion. OTHREL—membership in other religions—leads to significantly more liberalism on two issues: defense and crime—and is not significantly more conservative on any issue.

### **Religion: The Literature**

The question of the impact of religious views on political positions has been investigated before, but most of the past studies confine their attention to environmental issues (for example Guth et al. 1995). The main conclusion from past studies is that Fundamentalists are more opposed to environmental expenditures than are members of more mainstream, liberal churches (with a doctrinal rather than political definition of the latter). These results are consistent with our finding that the cross-product of church attendance with a measure of the liberalism of the church is quite significant.

The literature has explained this role of Fundamentalism doctrinally. The argument is that those who take the Creation story seriously are more likely to believe in a man-centered universe, and, hence are less likely to cherish the environment in its own right (Lowry 1998) or those who believe in the Apocalypse give less weight to the future.

Clearly, one does not need such interpretations. Without reference to doctrine, our theory predicts that the sexual probity associated with Fundamentalism would be associated with more community involvement in its believers. In the one case where there is clearly a doctrinal message—opposition to abortion—the  $\beta$  coefficient for the cross-product of church liberalism with attendance is almost three times as great as the  $\beta$  coefficient for this cross-product for the environmental question.<sup>10</sup> In addition, the environmental  $\beta$  coefficient is about the same

value as the  $\beta$  coefficients for the other independent variables that are significantly related to this cross-product (expenditures on blacks for whites and conservatism). Furthermore, whether one was a mainline Protestant (with being a Fundamentalist Protestant the control group) was not significant for the environment, while it was significant for the abortion issue, party identification, and how one voted for president. Among the variables significantly related to Fundamentalism, environmentalism does not stand out. Also, there are many other religious variables that play a role in our regressions, including the environmental regression. It is more difficult to explain their role in terms of simple doctrine. For example, opposition to welfare and aid to the poor significantly increases with church attendance, in spite of the "compassion" message of much sermonizing. One suspects, then, that doctrine does not fully explain the role of Fundamentalism in the environmental regression.

### **Occupational Choice**

We hypothesize that one of the determinants of occupational choice is the desire to display goodness. Those occupations that provide a platform for espousing "good" views or an opportunity to fight "injustice" will tend to be chosen by those with such views and those who are convinced about these injustices. For those issues where goodness is asymmetrical we expect these occupations to adopt the goodness side. (However, college teaching could also provide a platform for espousing conservative morality.) For issues in which goodness is two-sided, the occupational position will be governed by the demographic characteristics of the occupational group. College teachers should be more proabortion, for example, because they are less religious. They should be antidefense because they are less involved in the community than others as well as having a higher proportion of Jews.<sup>11</sup>

We concentrate our attention on college and other teachers, journalists, clergymen, and lawyers. Our technique is to look at the regression coefficients of the dummy variables associated with whether one or one's spouse is a member or not of the respective occupations, controlling for all the other determinants of political preferences.<sup>12</sup> We define college teachers by industry rather than occupation because there is a serious problem with the occupational definition in this case. Many college teachers would not so classify themselves. They would call themselves economists, physicists and so forth. However, use of the occupational definition does not change the essence of our results.

It comes as no surprise that college teachers are liberal. In no other occupation are there so few outside constraints placed on advocacy. (Any internal constraints placed by other college teachers, such as political correctness, would just exaggerate the effect of any variables influencing their political position. In other words, the effect of goodness in occupational choice is strengthened by imitating others who also so choose the occupation for goodness sake. The professors with opposite views have those views dampened by the academic norms antithetical to those views.) Academic freedom virtually removes employer monitoring of college teaching. College teachers are significantly liberal on nine issues, and there are no issues on which college teachers are significantly more conservative. Others have found college teachers even more liberal (Trow 1975).

Our regressions show what is at least in part an important consequence of the liberal proclivities of academics. The political position of those who have been to college is affected by what was taught long after they leave college. There are eleven issues on which people adopt significantly more liberal positions the greater the number of years they attended college.<sup>13</sup>

However, there are four cases in which those who have been to college are significantly more conservative, and that is enough to make it unlikely that these latter results are just attributable to chance. This is hardly surprising. The greater one's education, the more likely one associates with others of higher income. Through imitation this should make those who have been to college more conservative even controlling for their own income. We have seen that prediction work by broad occupations. In chapter 5 we showed it works by ethnic groups. We are not able to predict whether the income associates or the college experience effect will dominate. However, two of the liberal positions produced by college do not meet resistance from high-income groups, who are also proabortion and neutral as far as increased expenditures on education are concerned.

Though our theory does not predict the sign of the year of college slope, it does yield more subtle predictions. Holding constant the general age effect, one expects years of college to have a greater liberal effect the younger the person. A college student starts out being indoctrinated by his teachers and his peers. He then starts associating with people with higher incomes, and he gradually moves toward the political position of that group. To test this hypothesis we create a cross-product variable: age times years of college: AGECOLYR. There are six cases where AGECOLYR is significant in the predicted direction

and only one case where it is significant in the wrong direction: parks, hardly a burning campus issue.<sup>14</sup>

There is one more testable implication about the effect of college indoctrination on the political position of those with college experience. If indoctrination works, one would expect those with college to be most liberal on those issues on which college teachers are most liberal and least liberal about those issues on which those with higher income are least liberal. Indeed, this is the case. Since one expects the slope by issues to be sensitive to the variance by issue, we compare standardized regression coefficients—betas—by issue. We then regress the beta for years of college ( $COL\beta$ ) against the log income beta ( $IN\beta$ ) and the college teaching beta ( $COTE\beta$ ). The results:<sup>15</sup>

$$COL\beta = .0087 + .367 IN\beta + .241 COTE\beta \quad (1)$$

(3.58)      (3.18)

With nineteen observations, these  $t$  values (in parenthesis) are significant at the 5 percent level.<sup>16</sup>

Possibly, all of the results on college teaching and college education could be explained by an alternative hypothesis: knowledge makes one liberal. Where does knowledge end and indoctrination begin? Are classes devoted to information about the benefits of government activity without a concern for costs indoctrinating or transmitting knowledge? Economists—the one group that focuses on cost-benefit analysis—are the most conservative group of social scientists (Lipset and Ladd 1971). While self-selection could explain some of this difference, the self-selection requires a preexisting difference in political views between economists and other social scientists. This strongly suggests that at least some of the college effect is attributable to indoctrination. In addition, the aged are more conservative. To the extent that this is attributable to the greater knowledge of the aged, this result is inconsistent with the knowledge explanation for the liberalism of college teachers. This evidence will hardly convince those who believe the contrary. Let the unconvinced present evidence in support of their position.

While teaching at lower than the college level also offers a platform for the espousal of political positions, it is much lower because of the constraints placed on these other teachers by lesson plans and more careful monitoring. They are significantly more liberal on three issues, but are significantly more conservative on two. So this provides little indication that noncollege teachers are more liberal.

Nevertheless, increases in years of below-college education make

people significantly more liberal on five issues, and it makes them significantly more conservative on five issues. In the absence of an indoctrination effect, increases in years of below-college education would be positively associated with conservative positions because increases in education lead to greater associations with people with higher incomes.

Educational indoctrination together with income imitation should make older, less than college educated people more conservative, even controlling for the general effect of aging on political positions. This prediction is significantly confirmed in five cases, while there are two cases in which the sign of the age-years of noncollege education coefficient is significantly in the opposite direction. This evidence seems to us somewhat supportive of the below-college indoctrination hypothesis.

It is possible to get a liberal indoctrinating effect even when there is no net selection of liberals among noncollege teachers. There can be some tendency for those who teach social studies to be more liberal than other teachers, a tendency noted for college teachers. Furthermore, as implied by the material in chapter 7, there will be some tendency for liberal social studies teachers to do more preaching than conservative social studies teachers.

Stigler (1982) proposed a far different explanation for the liberal proclivities of educators—self-interest. Most of education is publicly financed. Hence, educators have a self-interest in a larger public sector.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, this argument has some merit when it comes to expenditures on education, and it is no surprise that educators advocate greater educational expenditures. However, educators do not have a self-interest in most of greater government expenditures elsewhere, and yet college teachers are in the forefront of liberal advocacy on these issues as well. The only way to rationalize this latter result in terms of self-interest is to argue that an expansion of government activity in other areas helps generate an expansion of government in education as well. But college teachers are opposed to greater expenditures on defense, as are nonteaching, nonarmy, nonpolice government employees. Furthermore, those educators with the greatest self-interest in more government expenditures, those below the college level, are not the most liberal educators. The percentage of public financing of education is far greater for noncollege education than for college education. Along the same lines, college teachers are far more liberal than nonteaching, nonarmy, nonpolice government employees, who are significantly liberal on only five issues, in con-

trast to the nine for college teachers. Furthermore, government employees who are in the army or the police are significantly conservative on four issues and liberal on none. Among college teachers, those in the sciences get far more government grants than nonscientists, and yet they are the least liberal college teachers (Lipset and Ladd 1971). The obvious explanation for this latter phenomenon is a goodness explanation. Science provides less of a platform for preaching goodness.<sup>18</sup>

Writing—and journalism in particular—is another occupation that could provide a platform for “do-gooders.” Because of the relatively small sample size of journalists in the NORC study, our study can yield only limited information on this subject. Writers, including journalists, are significantly more liberal than others on four issues. They are not significantly more conservative on any issues.

Some lawyers might choose that occupation to help right the world’s injustices. There are four cases where lawyers are significantly more liberal and no cases where they are more conservative.

These results could explain in part the consistently liberal stance of the American Bar Association in the 1990s. Consider the evidence given by Lexis under the rubric “American Bar Association: partisan,” and by looking at the newsletter *ABAnetwork*. While the issues so documented are not a random sample of issues on which the American Bar Association has taken a stand, evidence so gathered should be unbiased with respect to the question of whether the ABA takes liberal or conservative positions. In the sample the relevant issues are identified by people with liberal, conservative, and moderate views. In our sample we find that the ABA advocates sixteen liberal positions and one conservative position that are not in the obvious self-interest of lawyers.<sup>19</sup> Eight of those positions are about criminal rights. But even excluding those positions, eight liberal positions out of nine is significant at the 5 percent level.

The liberal bias of the ABA on issues is so strong that it has been recognized by liberals and conservatives alike. (This unanimity of views is in marked contrast to views about ABA bias in rating judicial nominees.) Said the former president of the ABA, John Curtin, “If you say that support for a greater voice for women and minorities, support for legal services to the poor or support for the Civil Rights Act is liberal, then I guess we have to plead guilty” (Podgers 1992).

It would appear, in fact, that this bias is so large that it is hard to explain simply by the mild liberalism of lawyers revealed by our regres-

sion results. We believe that views expressed to the public in general as in ABA conventions will have a larger goodness component than will the usual voting behavior of participants. The latter will correspond more closely with the views of close associates whose friendship one values. As we have seen, a signal of goodness is a signal that one is more trustworthy to most people at the expense of being less trustworthy to one's close associates. In consequence, signaling that is directed more to people in general will tend to have a bigger goodness component. This is an example of what Kuran (1995) calls preference falsification.

Clergy is another occupation where sermonizing goodness is a determinant of occupational choice. But in this case the possible range of sermons is large. A clergyman can focus on piety and family values as well as social issues. In consequence, it is not clear, a priori, whether clergymen, in general, will be liberal or conservative. Our study yields only one significant coefficient out of nineteen.

### Gender

A variable that is consistently significant issue after issue is gender. There are thirteen issues where males are significantly more conservative than females; two where they are significantly more liberal: crime and parks. It is easy to understand one of the latter results. Women are more likely to be victims rather than perpetrators of crime.

Why are women generally more liberal than men?<sup>20</sup> Conceivably, the underlying cause is women's lower wages. But, one would expect the imitation effect to be much less with a sex variable than with most others employed. In general, imitation magnifies any underlying regression if one associates dominantly with people like oneself. Compared to low- and high-income groups, women and men do a lot of associating with one another. Yet, the sex variable has more significant liberal coefficients than does income itself (thirteen compared to eleven).

The only explanation for this sex difference that we can see is not really part of our theory. Wilson (1993) claims that women are more compassionate than men. The compassion that is a useful tool of child rearing is transferred to other settings. *Compassion* is a word often used in defense of liberal positions, and it would seem to have particular relevance to the liberal position on crime and defense, as well as all the propoor positions.

## Two Experiments

For two of the issues investigated we separate our observations into two categories: beneficiaries of government largesse and net losers from these government programs. For the question, “Should there be an increase in expenditures to improve large cities?” we divide the sample into residents of central cities in metropolitan areas versus everybody else. For the question, “Should there be an increase in expenditures to improve the condition of blacks?” We divide the sample into blacks versus everybody else. We expect advocates of increased expenditures to display more goodness if they are not the beneficiaries of those expenditures. Therefore, the goodness variables should play a bigger role for the sample of losers than for the sample of beneficiaries.

For both the residential and racial divisions we look at the variables that have been established empirically to have a goodness component—those discussed in the previous sections of this chapter under the categories of community involvement, religion, gender, and specific occupational choice. In both cases we confine our attention just to the subset of those variables that are significant at least at the 10 percent level in either subsample for the specific issue being investigated.<sup>21</sup> We then compare the coefficients of these variables by subsample to see whether the loser subsample has larger coefficients in the predicted direction than the winner subsample.

Table 8.2 records the results. For expenditures on cities there are six cases of greater goodness coefficients for losers compared to winners and two in the opposite direction. For expenditures on blacks there are twelve cases of greater coefficients for losers and three cases of greater coefficients for winners. Combining these experiments, the probability of getting these results by chance is .005. Goodness variables do, indeed, behave as we would predict.

## Results by Issue

A healthy distrust of our data requires us to answer the question, “Do our results make sense?” One simple requirement is that we get more significant results with respect to the issues that people regarded as more important over the time period 1972–96. Table 8.3 shows that that requirement is, indeed, fulfilled. The fewest significant coefficients occur for the aid to large cities for large city residents and for blacks among blacks respectively. We saw in the last section why goodness plays only a minimal role in these cases. The next fewest significant



coefficients occurred for the minor issue equations—expenditures for roads, parks, and mass transit. The smaller number of significant coefficients for these groups can be attributed in part to the smaller sample sizes associated with those issues. But even when we compare major and minor issues with comparable sample sizes, the minor issues yield fewer significant coefficients.

**TABLE 8.2. Relevant Coefficients for Donor versus Beneficiary Groups for Pro-city and Pro-black Issues<sup>a</sup>**

Variable	Pro-city Donor	Pro-city Beneficiary	Pro-black Donor	Pro-black Beneficiary
<i>Community</i>				
AGESL	-3.72(E-3)	-1.55(E-3)	-1.42(E-2)	-3.79(E-4)
STATMIG			-6.83(E-3) <sup>b</sup>	-4.69(E-2) <sup>b</sup>
CONTMIG	3.65(E-2)	2.53(E-2)		
MIGSL	2.16(E-2)	9.65(E-3)		
MARRIED			-2.25(E-3)	4.02(E-2)
<i>City Size</i>				
LCCIT			8.32(E-2)	2.50(E-2)
RB			2.74(E-2) <sup>b</sup>	2.19(E-2) <sup>c</sup>
LSURB			-7.13(E-3)	7.97(E-2)
SCITY16			5.32(E-2)	5.79(E-2)
LCITY16			4.41(E-2)	4.38(E-2)
MCITY16			3.19(E-2)	5.00(E-2) <sup>c</sup>
SURB16			4.10(E-2)	-6.82(E-2) <sup>b</sup>
<i>Faith</i>				
JSLOPE	2.53(E-1)	2.08(E-1)	1.91(E-1)	-1.68(E-1)
CLERGYFU	-1.99(E-1)	1.66(E-1) <sup>b</sup>		
NOREL			9.54(E-2)	-2.71(E-2) <sup>b</sup>
ATTENDSL			7.37(E-3) <sup>b</sup>	-4.13(E-3) <sup>c</sup>
FUNDAT			6.00(E-3)	-1.41(E-3) <sup>b</sup>
<i>“Goodness”</i>				
LOWTEACH	5.98(E-2)	6.22(E-2) <sup>c</sup>		
COLTEACH	8.77(E-2)	4.78(E-2)	9.88(E-2)	3.59(E-2)
COLYRSLOPE	6.59(E-3)	1.57(E-2) <sup>c</sup>	2.83(E-2)	-1.67(E-3) <sup>b</sup>
WRITER			1.09(E-1)	-4.00(E-1) <sup>b</sup>
MALE	-7.16(E-2)	-3.15(E-2)	-6.03(E-2)	-3.06(E-3)

Note: The 16 with city abbreviations signifies residence at age 16. For definitions of other variables, see key to table 8.1.

<sup>a</sup>Regression coefficients for “goodness” related variables that are significant at the 10% level for at least one of the pairs that are being compared.

<sup>b</sup>The particular coefficient has the wrong sign from that predicted by the “goodness” effect itself. Sometimes that wrong sign is generated by the “self-interest” effect.

<sup>c</sup>Test fails because beneficiary coefficient is the larger.

**Table 8.3. Number of Significant Coefficients with the Predicted Signs, by Issue and Category<sup>a</sup>**

Issue	Self	Faith	Community	City	City Lag	Good	Ethnic	Reg	Reg Lag
PROENV	6	5(1)	3	4	4	7	9	6	1
PROWELF	10	1	1	5	1	7	5	3	0
PROPOOR	7	0	3	0	1	0	4	2	1
ANTIABORT	9	9	1	4	3	5(1)	2	7	3
ANTICRIME	7	1	0	2	3	3(1)	6	2	1
PROARMS	4	5	3	2	3	9	9	4	1
PROREPUBL	9	7	4	3	1	5	16	0	6
PROCONSERV	11	4	3	2	3	5	5	1	0
PRESR	8	8	1	3	0	5	7	1	0
PROHEAL	5	1	1	1	3	5	7	1	0
PROED	4	2	3	3	4	8	7	1	1
PROCITY(0)	4	3	2	3	4	4(1)	8	3	3
PROCITY(1)	1	0	1	1	0	2	4	2	0
PRORACE(0)	5	3(1)	1	2	4	4(1)	16	4	0
PRORACE(1)	1	0	0(1)	1	2	0	6	4	2
PROROAD	3(2)	1	1	4	2	2	7	2	0
PROPARK	4	1	1	1	4	2(3)	6	4	2
PROMASS	1	1	2(1)	5	3	2	6	6	0
PROSOC	7	2	2	1	1	2(1)	9	1	0

*Note:* For definitions of variables see key to table 8.1. Self-interest variables: BLACK, GOVR, ARMY, SELF, PROF, MGM, CLERK, SALES, SERVE, AGR, UNION, GOV, FYSLOPE, NCYRSLOPE, COLYRSLOPE. Faith variables: MAIN, PATT, CATT, JATT, FUNDAT, CLERGYFU, PRIEST, BLACCL, FYNCOME, ATTENDSL, JSLOPE, CSLOPE.

<sup>a</sup>Significant at the 5% level. Number of wrong signed significant coefficients in parentheses. We did not distinguish the self-interest variables by right or wrong sign when one could not clearly predict the sign either *a priori* or by the sign of the income variable.